Economic Update

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Wednesday 19th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

I do not know that I do agree. I fear that I am not the most assiduous reader of the Financial Times—certainly not its editorial copy. The Government’s aspiration is to serve the people, not the bond markets.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I just point out to the Minister that, even with the list of flimsy growth measures he just described, Goldman Sachs forecast a 1% drop in output in the UK next year—so a recession. That is on the back of these policy announcements. I push him on this: today at Prime Minister’s Questions, if I understood the Prime Minister correctly, she said that there would not be cuts to public spending. She even implied that there would be growth in public spending. Could the Minister clarify if, once again, she was talking in nominal terms—or cash terms, as it is sometimes called? If it is not in real terms, swingeing cuts are on the way.

[Lord True (Con)]

If it is £1 less in real terms, that is an interesting definition of a swingeing cut. A medium-term fiscal plan is going to be published shortly. The noble Baroness and I go back a long way and I have great respect for her, but I suggest she waits for that. I believe the noble Baroness still has interests in the lovely California, so she should understand, from her knowledge of the United States, that there are international issues at play.

Replacement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Tuesday 18th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, on the question of mortgages, everyone will be sensible to the position of those seeking to buy—I have a son seeking a mortgage at the moment—in conditions where interest rates are rising, which they are internationally. On the more general question, the Chancellor is clear that the Government will need to take some very difficult decisions on spending and tax to place the public finances on a sustainable footing. Sound public finances are the bedrock on which future economic growth will be built. There is no trade-off here; the mini-Budget moved further and faster than the market expected, but this Government remain committed to growth and supporting families and the most vulnerable in society. We will continue to seek to perform that duty.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, the change of Chancellor may have mollified the financial markets slightly and temporarily but ordinary people, frankly, are on the verge of being utterly distraught. In addition to soaring food prices, mortgages and rents, they have no idea at all what their energy costs will be after April next year. When will people know what the cost of energy will be after next spring, because they have to plan and think it through? It is also crucial for businesses to know as they sign contracts. Also, how much will the typical individual be paying in bills and additional public service cuts to cover the costs of the permanent scarring and damage that the Government’s appalling handling of the last few weeks has caused to the UK economy?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, apart from the rhetoric, the main part of the noble Baroness’s question was on energy prices. I hope that your Lordships have heard with delight that a Bill, for which I expect the support of both parties opposite, has been presented to the House on which we will debate these matters in some detail.

On the specifics, I say that continuing with the planned level of support between now and 2023 will remain a landmark policy. It will support millions of people through a difficult winter and means that they will not have to face bills as high as they would have been. A Treasury-led review has been announced into how we support energy bills beyond April next year; its objective is to design a new approach that will cost the taxpayer significantly less than planned while ensuring enough support for those in need, which I think all noble Lords would like to see. Equally, any support for businesses will be targeted to those most affected. This new approach will better incentivise energy efficiency. However, it is important to underline that the support with energy bills that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister so swiftly announced is going ahead, and what is being provided between now and next April will not change.

Financial Services Bill

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 28th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, this Financial Services Bill will enhance the UK’s world-leading prudential standards, promote financial stability, promote openness between the UK and international markets, and maintain an effective financial services regulatory framework and sound capital markets. I acknowledge the work of your Lordships in scrutinising this important Bill. The issue of parliamentary scrutiny has been prominent in our debates and noble Lords have more than demonstrated the positive role that they can play in this regard.

During the passage of the Bill, Members of both Houses debated how best to address issues of consumer harm in the financial sector. Amendment 1, which this House approved on Report, proposes that this should be addressed through a requirement for the FCA to bring forward rules on a duty of care. Let me underline that the Government are committed to ensuring that financial services consumers are protected and that steps are taken quickly to address issues, when they are identified. However, as the Economic Secretary set out in the other place, the Government believe that the FCA already has the necessary powers and is acting to ensure that sufficient protections are in place for consumers, so I cannot accept this amendment.

It is important to remember that financial services firms’ treatment of their customers is already governed by the FCA’s Principles for Businesses and specific requirements in its handbook. These fundamental principles set out specific requirements for firms, including that

“A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly.”


The FCA’s enforcement powers allow it to ensure that these standards are met, but it recognises that the level of harm in markets is still too high. It is committed to taking further actions.

The Government accept, as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, has rightly suggested, that this harm may stem from asymmetry of information between financial services firms and their customers. The risk is that some firms may seek to exploit this asymmetry. The FCA is well aware of how informational asymmetries and behavioural biases can influence consumer behaviour, and it works every day to address these issues where it considers that they may result in harm. The Government therefore support the FCA’s ongoing programme of work in this area and believe that it will deliver meaningful change for the benefit of consumers.

The FCA has considered its existing framework of principles and whether the way in which firms has responded to them is sufficient to ensure that consumers have the right protections and get the right outcomes. Building on this, in May, the FCA will consult on clear proposals to raise and clarify its expectations of firms’ actions and behaviours and on any necessary changes to its principles to deliver them. These proposals will consider how to raise the level of care that firms must provide to consumers, through a duty of care or other provisions. Ultimately, the proposals in this consultation seek to ensure that consumers benefit from a better level of care from financial services firms.

Amendment 1A puts this work on a statutory footing. It requires the FCA to consult on whether it should make rules providing that authorised persons owe a duty of care to consumers. It ensures that the FCA will publish its analysis of the responses to this consultation by the end of the year. It also ensures that the FCA will make final rules, following that consultation, before 1 August 2022. I hope that this provides reassurance of both the FCA’s and the Government’s commitment to this important agenda. I urge the House to accept this proportionate and, I believe, well-judged amendment.

The FCA will bring its consultation to the attention of the relevant parliamentary committees. This will give them an opportunity to consider the proposals and, if they choose, to express a view or raise any issues. The FCA will respond to any issues raised by parliamentary committees, in line with commitments made during the passage of this Bill.

Let me end there. I hope that noble Lords will accept Motion A and this amendment in lieu.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, we will not challenge this Motion. I cannot say that it goes as far as reassurance, but I think we are in a much better place to have the consultation and its characteristics in statute on the face of the Bill. I particularly thank the Minister and his team. I suspect they have been instrumental in making sure that the concerns, from all sides of the House, were communicated back to the Treasury and the Treasury team.

The Minister today repeated a number of the statements that the Economic Secretary made in the other place when he addressed this issue. I will highlight a few that were of particular importance to me. The FCA recognises that,

“the level of harm in markets is still too high and is committed to—”—[Official Report, 24/4/21; col. 867]

taking further actions. That is an important statement to have on the record. I am slightly concerned, however, that the focus of the FCA should not exclusively be on asymmetry of information. Asymmetry of information is fundamental and important, but it is far from everything. The Economic Secretary said that

“the FCA will consult in May on clear proposals to raise and clarify its expectations of firms’ actions and behaviours, and on any necessary changes to its principles to deliver this.”—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/21; col. 84]

I hope that will not be confined simply to asymmetry of information, but as the Economic Secretary said, and the Minister today said, Parliament wants to be assured that the FCA’s ongoing work will lead to meaningful change. I think that reflects some of the frustrations expressed in this House of having had eight consultations to date and relatively little action. I hope this will lead to a great change.

In the amendment in lieu—this is perhaps something the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell will address more extensively than I—the fact that all consumers are part of the consideration is an important one. I want to use this opportunity to underscore to the Minister how urgent and significant this issue is.

When the Government’s amendment in lieu was passed, I got an email from one of the leading financial services lawyers in the country, and two things are pertinent. It said that it looks like this one is headed for the long grass again. I think that is partly because we are looking at action in 2022 and not immediately. The reason for that level of concern was, apparently, that audit firms are now saying that any credit risk between the client and the authorised firm should be counted as client money within the meaning of CASS—the protection of client assets and money. This is storing up some big problems when one of these babies—we are talking about firms that collectively have well over £10 trillion in assets under management—goes down and a judge finds that the trust is bust because they comingled client money with money that is not. Lehman Brothers, here we go again. I went immediately to the FCA site, and it is an excellent but sad example of the very limited powers that the FCA has to deal with such situations, because of the regulatory perimeter that limits a great deal of their potential for action to their definition of consumers. The issue has always been that that is a very narrow definition of consumer.

Every day we wait for a duty of care to become embedded in the system, we run significant risk. It is a risk that none of us wants—it has the potential to be limited to a small pool of clients, but also to knock the economy off its paces once again. It is important that there is an element of urgency built into all of this, that the issue is taken seriously and that there is not an attempt to narrow examination by and the focus of the FCA to simply something like asymmetry of information, but to consider the much wider picture before we end up with another crisis none of us wants.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, while we on this side of the House were hoping for action rather than further consultation, and we remain somewhat puzzled as to exactly what further the FCA has to learn that was not learned in the consultation of 2018 when it published a discussion paper entitled with some prescience, A Duty of Care and Potential Alternative Approaches. None the less, despite our desire for action and puzzlement in that respect, we welcome the tenor of the Government’s amendment.

In particular, I congratulate the Government on the clear acknowledgement that real harm is done today to millions of users of financial services by this famous asymmetrical relationship in financial transactions and that harm is done to those excluded from access to financial services. As evidence of this acknowledgement, I refer to the remarks just made by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and also the remarks by the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. For example, Mr Glen said:

“The Government agree with the concerns that … this harm may in part stem from an asymmetry of information between financial services firms and their customers. The risk is that many firms may seek to exploit this asymmetry. The FCA is well aware of how informational asymmetries and behavioural biases can influence consumer behaviour, and is committed to ensuring that these issues are addressed where it considers that they may result in harm”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/21; cols. 83-84.]


All I can say to that is: “Quite right too”.

I am particularly pleased that in new subsection 2(b) in their amendment, the Government refer to the need to extend the duty of care to “all consumers”. I urge the FCA to ignore the suggestion that a duty of care might be limited to “particular classes of consumer”. That way lies unnecessary complexity and the potential for error and injustice. Any inclusive list of “particular classes” is also a list that excludes. Confining the duty of care to particular classes would also eliminate the peculiar advantages of principles-based regulation, namely the flexibility of the principle in an industry of which persistent innovation is a defining characteristic. This is an advantage not to be sacrificed lightly.

In the debates on this issue—including those in the other place—not only Mr Glen, but the noble Earl, Lord Howe, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and several noble Lords have referred to the prevalence of asymmetric information in retail financial services. As we know, this renders markets inefficient. In retail financial markets, asymmetric information results in excessive risk being loaded on to consumers. A duty of care will rebalance risk by shifting the balance of risk from the consumer back towards the provider, which in an efficient market is where it should be.

However, the FCA must be alert to a potential consequence. This may well result in some financial services providers deciding to withdraw from the provision of services where previously they happily dumped the risk on consumers. This increase in exclusion would be contrary to the intent and spirit of the Government amendment. We should therefore emphasise that having the status of an authorised person in financial services is a privilege, and with that privilege comes responsibility. Indeed, as Mr Glen remarked in the other place,

“authorised persons owe a duty of care to consumers.”—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/21; col. 84.]

He is quite right. It is the responsibility of financial institutions providing financial services not to withdraw but, on the contrary, to play their full part in tackling financial exclusion. I am sure that the FCA will address this issue as it draws up its new general rules on the level of care.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will be brief. My noble friend Lord Sharkey comprehensively answered the points raised by the Economic Secretary on Monday and by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, today in rejecting this amendment. I should point out that if the Government thought that the amendment was not quite correctly finessed, they could easily have brought in an amendment in lieu that would have achieved relief for mortgage prisoners, and they have chosen not to do so.

The nub of the problem is straightforward. Would the financial experience of a mortgage holder be the same if his or her mortgage had been sold by the Government to an active, rather than an inactive, lender? Even the Government do not deny that the answer to that is no. The difference in experience between those whose mortgages were held by active lenders, compared with those whose mortgages were sold to inactive lenders, has been markedly different. Those whose mortgages were held by active lenders that did not collapse in the 2008-09 crash have been able to take advantage of the fact that rates have fallen very sharply and have been offered a whole variety of new and different deals, as part of the normal practice of banks in dealing with their mortgage opportunities and portfolios. Those who ended up in the hands of inactive lenders have faced between limited options and none, and have been unable to take advantage of interest rates falling exceedingly sharply.

That is the only issue at play here. To compare those mortgage prisoners to people today seeking a mortgage is to look at an entirely false set of circumstances. I am concerned that the Government are choosing not to rectify the situation. It was the Government who chose to sell those mortgage assets to inactive lenders. They did so in good faith and without any expectation that the mortgage holders would end up in a different position from their peers who had taken out mortgages with institutions that did not fail. I understand that that was not an intentional process, but, regardless, the Government remain responsible for their decisions when they sold off those assets.

People are genuinely suffering and I ask the Government that the very small measure that my noble friend Lord Sharkey begged for at the end of his speech—that those individuals could at the very least be protected from foreclosures as we exit from Covid and the rules change on repossessions—could be put in place. The Government would then have an opportunity to justify the arguments made in both Houses that they are genuinely trying to find a solution to the problems and devastation that so many individuals face.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, we have not made as much progress on this issue as many people, including thousands across the country, would have hoped. That is not through any lack of effort. The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and my noble friend Lord Stevenson have been tenacious in their pursuit of change. However, for that to be possible, both sides must want to work towards a favourable outcome.

I said on Report that we were not convinced that this amendment provided the answer to the long-running problems experienced by mortgage prisoners. It certainly provides an answer, but I accept the argument that there would be consequences for the mortgage market as a whole. With this in mind, colleagues offered an alternative option in what was then Amendment 37B. Your Lordships’ House has a reputation for being constructive and, in that spirit, the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and my noble friend made further offers to look at any text that the Treasury would be prepared to bring forward. Unfortunately, Ministers chose not to put an amendment on the table.

The Economic Secretary has, to his credit, demonstrated knowledge of the challenges in this area. Every time he has spoken, I have believed his wish to identify workable solutions. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Lord, Lord True, have said similar things in our meetings; again, I have viewed their comments as earnest. The problem is that warm words do not pay bills—nor do they generally lead to lenders taking the kind of steps that are required. The initiatives launched to date have helped only a tiny fraction of mortgage prisoners, so one would have thought that the case for further action was overwhelming.

We wanted—and continue to need—the Government to take proper ownership of this issue. We welcome the fact that the FCA will conduct a further review of the options available to mortgage prisoners and that the Treasury will revisit its data on the different cohorts of affected customers. As well as following these processes closely, we will of course continue to press the Economic Secretary to do what is needed.

It is regrettable that we have not been able to achieve a satisfactory outcome on this legislation, which should have been more than another false dawn. However, Conservative MPs have rejected the case for action, and it is hard to imagine meaningful progress being made unless Ministers revise their red lines. Accordingly, we do not believe we should press this matter any further today and look to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, to withdraw his amendment. However, I can assure the Minister that we will return to this issue at the next legislative opportunity.

Financial Services Bill

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

3rd reading & Report stage
Monday 19th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group all deal in one way or another with the digital world and its implications for financial services. We all understand that we are in the midst of a revolution which will gather pace, rapidly expand, and reshape how we lead our lives. It is important that the UK is at the front of the curve in delivering those changes, to underpin its financial services industry. I was very pleased to see that the Bank of England and the Treasury have just announced the creation of a joint task force on central bank digital currency, a potential linchpin to those changes.

These amendments are all extremely useful. On digital identity, the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, hit the nail on the head, when he talked about the importance of engagement with the public. There are a lot of issues around identity, including issues of privacy. It is not an easy issue but a complex one. I hope that this engagement is dealt with more broadly. It may well be that the kind of targeted examples that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, is concerned to see delivered much more quickly are easier to deal with, but of course, they will always lead to further questions, and this is something that we must confront head on.

We will be discussing access to cash in another group, as the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, has a specific amendment related to that, but it also points out how when we go through revolutionary change, there are always people who will be part of the “left behind”, either by choice or by capacity. Those people have every right to be able to pay a full part in our society and in our communities. Finding those mechanisms may be expensive, since it is much more efficient to go with a single strategy, but we must recognise the full complexity of the societies in which we live, the different pace at which people accept change and the degree to which they need support through that change.

I very much hope that we see something strategic coming from the Government, because we are dealing with each issue in a rather piecemeal way. We have reached the point where we need that fundamental underpinning, and I hope that we can begin to develop that strategic view, and quickly.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, we welcome the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, on digital ID and other, broader, fintech issues. They provide the Government with an opportunity to elaborate on the responses given in Committee. I hope that those who tabled the amendments will forgive me for not speaking to each in turn, but to do so would be to repeat many of the points already made.

While we would not necessarily endorse some of the timescales envisaged in the amendments, the questions asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, are sensible. In commissioning a review of fintech, the Government have demonstrated a level of interest in it, but the key question is how that is developed into concrete initiatives that grow the financial services sector while also improving the customer experience. The use of distributed digital identification could bring about a fundamental shift in how individuals and financial service businesses operate and interact on a day-to-day basis.

Properly considered implementation of digital ID could empower consumers by giving them greater choice in the services that they can access and better control over their personal data. The latter point is crucial. Any steps to further digitise the sector must come with security and privacy safeguards built in. It may not be possible or desirable to roll out digital ID overnight, but it would be interesting to hear more on the steps being taken by the Treasury and others to assess the opportunities and risks that exist. I hope that the Minister can also speak to potential timescales, even if they are not as ambitious as those spelled out in the amendments.

Amendment 37E in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, appears to be a probing amendment, but I hope the Government will take seriously his suggestion of studying the links between digital and financial exclusion. In an earlier debate I referred to the need to tackle some of the bigger, more complex issues that contribute to financial exclusion. Without concerted effort now, one can envisage a scenario in which certain sections of the population already susceptible to financial exclusion will be unable to avail themselves of the products and services facilitated by new technologies.

We are at an interesting point in the fintech debate following publication of the Kalifa review. Items such as digital ID are mentioned in that document, albeit in the context of the need to establish international codes and standards. The UK has long been a leader in this sector. If we are to continue being so, both government and business must seek to participate fully in relevant cross-border discussions and initiatives.

I note from my latest perusal of the House of Lords business that the ever-tenacious noble Lord, Lord Holmes, has secured an Oral Question on 27 April regarding the Government’s response to the Kalifa review’s recommendations. I hope the Minister can provide sufficient reassurance that the Treasury recognises and wishes to harness the potential of fintech, but I am sure that any gaps in the response today will be revisited in just under two weeks.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Lord Bishop of St Albans [V]]

My Lords, I will be brief in my support for this amendment. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for speaking at great length. I therefore do not need to add a huge amount more, not least as I intend to go into a bit more detail on my concerns about transparency when speaking in support of Amendment 34, which touches on similar issues of accountability.

I am a little puzzled why the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, thinks that this is a case of bad cases making bad laws. It seems to me that there have been very considerable concerns in the past. Surely those ought to be investigated.

We are facing a real crisis of trust in public bodies at the moment, and I believe that this amendment will be a beneficial addition to this Financial Services Bill. In making provisions for an additional layer of transparency, it will act as an incentive against any possible interference; whether done formally or informally, it will still have that effect. The truth is that we do not know whether ministerial interference in FCA investigations has occurred, and positively stating either way is speculative.

Although I was not privy to the written response from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, which he promised to send to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, confirming whether there were provisions within the Ministerial Code to allow for interventions in FCA investigations, the assumption in Committee was that any attempt to steer an FCA investigation would constitute a breach of the Ministerial Code. That would require breaches of the Ministerial Code or other offences to be taken seriously, and not treated lightly or even dismissed. Last year, an inquiry found evidence that the Home Secretary had breached the Ministerial Code, yet the consequences extended little further than an apology. In February, it was revealed that the Health Secretary had acted unlawfully when his department failed to reveal details of contracts signed during the Covid-19 period. Just before Easter, we all started reading about allegations surrounding conflicts of interest in a former Prime Minister’s dealings with the financial services firm Greensill, and there have been concerns about the current Prime Minister’s dealings during his time at City Hall. It is vital that, if we are to rely on breaches of the Ministerial Code, they are given some teeth and have some effect.

I have no evidence, but it may be that no Minister has ever interfered in any FCA investigation, in any way. I sincerely hope that that is the case, but we cannot rule it out. If interferences have occurred, it would be doubtful to assume that investigations are always steered in the interests of consumers. Although provisions are in place to prevent misconduct, they should not discount the contribution that this important amendment can make in strengthening those rules and further disincentivising any possible ministerial interferences in FCA investigations. If Her Majesty’s Government have concerns about small parts of the wording here, I hope they come back with some improvements to ensure that the levels of transparency are clear to everybody, in every part of the system.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, unfortunately, I did not bring with me a copy of the letter that the noble Earl, Lord Howe, kindly sent me in response to my question about the Ministerial Code. I expect that a copy is in the Library and available to everyone, but I am sure that the Minister will follow through. While reading the content was reassuring, I do not want it to be a distraction—it is one of the reasons that I have not signed this amendment—from the underlying issue of whether there is adequate transparency to act as the cleansing light that we need in an industry sector that will always be subject to misbehaviour. There is just too much money and opportunity, and an awful lot of power, washing through this industry. Insight, clarity and visibility are probably more important than in almost any other sector of our economy.

The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, talked as if all the misbehaviour was in the past, but we are talking about Greensill today and I have questions. I know that there are many task forces and investigations going on, but I still have no understanding of how a company with as many red flags against it as Greensill got through the accreditation process to enable it to participate in the CBILS. Other than writing to the British Business Bank—and I doubt that I will get an adequate answer—I am not sure what mechanism I can possibly use to get to the bottom of that. We do not have transparency in the areas where we need it.

I remember many conversations, in the midst of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequently, with regulators that were anxious not to rock the boat. The economy and industry were fragile enough, and they were disinclined to investigate. It is to that which I have always attributed the FCA’s inaction with regard to HBOS. I support the description of the HBOS crisis given by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. It was purely by chance that the fraud—it was literally fraud that sent people to jail for 10 years—at HBOS was exposed. Thames Valley Police decided to investigate when all the regulators, the Serious Fraud Office and the most relevant and obvious police forces had refused. Part of that was due to a lack of resources, from the police forces’ perspective.

I do not think I have ever forgiven the Treasury for its actions in this regard. It cost £7 million for Thames Valley Police to investigate that fraud and it was never reimbursed that money. The fine, of about £45 million, went to the Treasury and was deliberately not shared with the police force. Had it been, it would have encouraged and enabled police forces around the country to be more acutely aware and engaged when there was evidence of fraudulent behaviour. Even today, the various companies that were defrauded have not yet been fully compensated. Nearly 14 years on, it has not been resolved. We have two more bodies now involved in trying to clean up that mess.

The other area that leaves me with great concern is that the response I always get when I raise issues around transparency and enforcement in financial services is: “We now have the senior managers regime.” I was on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which drove a lot of the thinking that led to that regime, but, as we have often discussed in this House, it has been holed below the waterline by decisions of the FCA not to pursue senior executives. We know mostly about Barclays and Jes Staley—who had hired private investigators to track down a whistleblower—being fined but not declared unfit to hold his position. The fine was of a size that was more than made up by the bonuses he received in the following years, so it was pointless.

We have an underlying problem. It is not that the senior managers regime does not do some good—it establishes some procedures and processes—but it focuses on more junior people and does not hold people accountable at the senior level. With Greensill coming into the picture now and triggering a much wider discussion, I very much hope that the Government will take back the message that they have to sit the regulators and the various enforcement bodies down, and work out a way to make this system more effective. They are up against powerful forces and there is inequality of arms, but this industry has to be kept under oversight and control because, when it goes wrong, it takes a large part of our economy with it, as well as creating many individual victims.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Sikka facilitated perhaps one of the most interesting debates in Grand Committee. The amendments raised several important questions about the independence of the FCA, as well as the nature and success, or otherwise, of its past investigations. My noble friend was not happy with the response provided by the Minister last time; nevertheless, I felt that we had a helpful initial response in Committee, with references to legislation that requires FCA action in certain circumstances and allows a Minister to initiate an investigation in others. The response was perhaps a little light on the limits of ministerial power; recent times have shown that the Ministerial Code is not always considered binding. I hope that we will hear more on this later.

Some of the concerns that my noble friends cited related to events preceding the financial crisis, and I wonder whether this is an area where Ministers can go further today. For example, the noble Earl mentioned Section 73 of the Financial Services Act 2012, which imposes a duty on the FCA to investigate in the event of certain regulatory failures. As the measure was introduced after the global crash, it is clearly of no use in shedding light on events that took place before it. However, is he confident that, if some of the instances cited by my noble friend were to happen today, the current legal provisions would be sufficient to trigger an independent investigation?

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Trenchard (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I declare my interests in financial services businesses, as stated in the register. I would also like to record my sadness and offer my sincere condolences at the passing of both the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams. Both made an enormous contribution to your Lordships’ House over very many years and will be much missed on all sides of the House.

It is a great pleasure to follow the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans. We agree on so much, but on this question and this amendment I have to take a slightly different view from his. The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has brought back Amendment 34, substantially in the same form as his Amendment 120 in Committee.

The drafting of the amendment suggests that it is intended that there should be a single supervisory board of both regulators, the FCA and PRA. The Member’s explanatory statement on the other hand states:

“The new Clause will create a Supervisory Body for each of the FCA and the PRA.”


This implies one supervisory board for each of two regulators. That at least makes more sense than a single supervisory board for the two separate regulators, which is an impossible concept, as I pointed out on 10 March.

As the FCA and PRA are not the same organisation—although I sometimes wish they were—each has its own executive board. In the case of the FCA, this is the FCA board. However, the PRA board was replaced four years ago on 1 March 2017 by the Prudential Regulation Committee and the PRA was absorbed into the single legal entity of the Bank of England. I pointed this out to the noble Lord on 10 March, but he has not altered his approach. My noble friend Lady Noakes has also explained these fundamental errors clearly. A supervisory board such as he proposes, charged with exercising oversight over the board of the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Committee of the Bank of England, could not be a single entity. It would have to have two distinct personae, one within the FCA and one within the Bank of England.

My noble friend Lord Howe explained to the noble Lord that both the FCA and PRA must already

“attend … hearings before parliamentary committees, and those committees may also hear evidence from stakeholders about the performance of the regulators.”

He said:

“Parliamentary committees of both Houses are also able to summon the regulators to give evidence whenever they may choose.”


He added,

“the Treasury already has the capacity to order independent reviews into the regulators’ economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore, all told, the amendment would result in a duplication of existing opportunities for scrutiny and oversight of the regulators’ resourcing.”

As I said on 10 March:

“I do not think that such a supervisory board would replace the need for parliamentary scrutiny of the regulators, which will in itself provide appropriate transparency and accountability, rather than the completely crushing, destructive oversight that I believe the noble Lord’s new board would cause.”


The noble Lord said that his new board would

“not duplicate in any way whatever what any parliamentary committee or review board might do. The supervisory board would simply be engaged in day-to-day strategic oversight. Those people would be in the organisation on a permanent basis, observing, requiring reports, making recommendations”.—[Official Report, 10/3/21; cols. GC 723-26.]

Such an advisory board would seriously and negatively impact the operation of the regulators.

The noble Lord has said that he will not press his amendment, which I think is a wise decision because I believe your Lordships would have rejected it as unworkable, impractical and likely to have a negative impact on the attractiveness of our financial markets which provide so many jobs and a large slice of the country’s tax revenues.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I suspect that the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, was referring to the loss of the noble Lord, Lord Judd, which was just announced, rather than the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. I join with him; I am still feeling slightly in shock, frankly, at the news. We have all lost too many people of significance to this House over this last year. I think we all want to pay tribute to all of them, but we are all struggling a little with some of the very significant people who will not be here for future debates.

On this amendment, I will speak briefly. I understand where some of the thinking of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, is coming from, but I cannot say that I see a supervisory board as the answer to the issue he raises. I am much more taken with the proposal made by my noble friend Lady Bowles in Committee, for an expert body—it takes experts to really understand how the regulator functions—regularly to follow the Australian model and review the regulators. This could be every three years; the number of years is not exactly the key issue. It would not second-guess the decisions the regulators have made but look at operations, resources and effectiveness. With the regulator now so detached in many ways, that is essential.

I would want the Treasury to be a good distance from anything like this because, like it or not, the Treasury will always be seen as an influencer of decision-making. An expert view is needed to help us ensure that our regulators are functioning in the way that they need to, given the enormous challenges and responsibilities that they have. With that, I have to say that I cannot support this amendment.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Sikka for bringing back this amendment. In Grand Committee, it was discussed in the context of our wider debates on parliamentary scrutiny and the financial services regulators. My noble friend was not content with this, and while I believe that there is a degree of overlap, I accept the point that his amendment focuses on detailed day-to-day oversights rather than taking what some might call a “helicopter view”.

In his previous response, the Minister indicated that supervisory bodies are not necessary because of the various panels that must be consulted by the PRA and the FCA as they fulfil their duties. However, while these panels undertake valuable work, the extent to which the regulators take their views on board is unclear; for example, I sense that the FCA’s consumer panel would take a very different view on the duty-of-care amendment passed on day 1 from the positions taken by both the Treasury and the FCA.

The Minister also pointed to the future regulatory framework review as the correct vehicle for taking this issue forward. I have some sympathy with that view: I will be very surprised if the review endorses the status quo. If it does, we have had assurances that there will be further primary legislation and that means further opportunities for my noble friend to pursue this initiative.

--- Later in debate ---

This amendment is one of a number of proposals that seek to promote a responsible finance industry. That task cannot be undertaken by the finance industry itself and necessarily involves stakeholders hitherto ignored. I support this amendment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I think we may end up coming to something like a UK Finance Watch, but I hope not, because I hope Parliament will step up to the plate. The kind of issues described here ought to be part of parliamentary accountability, but that will take support from significant expertise that I do not think currently exists for many of the committees we operate. This is such an important industry; it is so huge, complex and powerful. That specialist knowledge will be necessary.

I was on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, and it is fair to say that the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, then in the Commons and chair of that commission, had to beg and borrow to find the staff we needed to support that commission. It was scratched together probably with the minimum number of staff with which it could have operated. We were so lucky; we had brilliant people totally dedicated and working the most ridiculous hours. That commission was a good demonstration of how we often underresource around critical issues. That is going to have to be remedied.

I hope Parliament, as it works out how it is going to manage this process of accountability, will take all that on board, so we will come back and look at this amendment for UK Finance Watch and see that a lot of what it proposes has been ticked off as “satisfactory,” because it has been embedded in the support and expertise that will be provided to Parliament. But anyone who thinks that two meetings a year with the Treasury Select Committee, and ad-hoc meetings on whatever happens to be the issue of the day, is anything close to satisfactory, and anyone who thinks that the annual report—never one of the most informative documents from any organisation—is accountability, completely misunderstands the animal with which we are now dealing.

I hope we will not have to go back and resort to an equivalent to the EU Finance Watch body. We may have to, but I would almost regard that as a mark of failure by this House and the other place. Our committees that look at these issues are going to need to be resourced and provided with the real expertise that they need to deal with both the quantity and the quality of the investigation and challenge that they will have to undertake.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, gave us fair warning that she was likely to bring an amendment back on Report for further debate, which is reasonable given the time constraint we faced in Grand Committee. As with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, we agree that implementing the right forms of oversight is of utmost importance. In Committee, several speakers mentioned the potentially valuable contributions to policy debates that could come from academics, think tanks and others, if they only had access to the data they needed. We agree that more must be done to facilitate such research, and I hope the Minister will say something on this.

The noble Baroness’s redrafting of her amendment addresses some of the points raised in the previous debate. However, her original pitch was for

“a network, not reinventing the wheel, not creating a whole new institution.”—[Official Report, 10/3/21; col. GC 735.]

Yet Amendment 124 from Committee and today’s Amendment 36 would create a whole new institution. I believe that the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, bear consideration. Surely the first thing we should do is to make sure that this role is fully taken up by Parliament. We have already established, informally at least, that much more scrutiny of how the FCA and the PRA work will be necessary, and I look forward to how well Parliament reacts to this challenge. It is also important to recognise that resources may be needed to give parliamentary scrutiny the expertise necessary in this complex area.

One area that interests me is the impact of the financial services sector on the real economy. We are all familiar with the arguments advanced by the Minister last time on jobs, tax take and so on, and colleagues will remember that I reflected on the successes of the sector at Second Reading. However, as the UK comes out of the pandemic and as government support schemes begin to disappear, we will need to monitor the extent to which lenders continue to support business expansion and other aspects of the economy. This brings us back to the point about ensuring the availability of data.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I again draw attention to my interests as set out in the register, particularly as an independent non-executive director of LINK.

In speaking to an earlier amendment, I touched on the challenges of financial exclusion. The problem is complex and the answer, in so far as there is one, is never going to be simple. However, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond, particularly on his vision in seeing a way to at least meet the problem that he so clearly set out. I welcome word that the Government propose to act along the lines set out in this amendment and the subsequent one to help create greater flexibility in access to cash. Of course we all accept that financial services require regulation, but that regulation should always be proportionate, not stifling.

In some respects we have been fortunate in the past year. Not only have food supplies been maintained, but our digital infrastructure held up remarkably well, despite the increased demands on it. Imagine if it had not—if the internet had crashed for a few days or our banking system had cracked and digital payments had failed. I believe there would then have been rather less talk of cash being a thing of the past.

The principal theme of recent months has been resilience, which demands diversity and innovation. The amendment, and my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond’s vision and thinking behind it, perfectly captures that.

For the foreseeable future, cash will continue to be a vital medium of exchange for millions of people. The viability of our system for providing access to cash is therefore a necessity, not a luxury. I pay tribute also to the foresight and leadership shown by my noble friend Lord True. These decisions demand innovation and flexibility, and the kind of thinking captured by my noble friend’s amendment will be vital. I know that everyone involved in the payment system will be very supportive.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, on reading Amendment 37D I think I recognised some of the distinct phraseology to denote an expert hand in its drafting, so I am exceedingly hopeful that the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, has been effective in persuading the Government that this is language they can accept and live with.

Of course, I join in all the calls to make sure that access to cash remains. Despite Covid and all the pressures that have encouraged people to change to digital and electronic payments, 5 million people have stuck to cash, and those people deserve to be served as much as anyone else. Indeed, the point made by noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that digital systems can always go down and that you had better have a back-up, did not occur to me but strikes me as fundamentally important.

My concern is this: I hope the Government do not think this is all they need to do and that this is part of a broader programme of ensuring access to cash. I spoke to quite a number of the storekeepers in my local area. It is a mixed area, with a lot of wealthy and middle-class people but also many people living on a former council estate, now housing association. Among that range, quite a number of people, for a whole variety of reasons, still want to use cash—but I could not find a single shop that would be willing to do cashback without a purchase. In fact, they did not want to do cashback with a purchase in most instances, simply because they did not want to have the cash on the premises, especially at night. Frankly, because of all the various bank branch closures, it would be at least a 35 to 40-minute drive to get to a place where you could deposit the cash overnight. Then you would have to collect it in the morning, which of course would make no sense because most of the shops would be open before the bank was available to hand it over.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Kramer]

37F: After Clause 40, insert the following new Clause—
“Response from the regulators to Parliamentary scrutiny
(1) The PRA and the FCA must have regard to the findings of any Parliamentary scrutiny of their work and operational performance, including but not limited to consultations, rules, supervision and enforcement.(2) The consultations and rules under subsection (1) include but are not limited to—(a) prospective or actual rule changes, and(b) rules and rule changes that have already taken place.(3) The PRA and the FCA must provide a written response to any committee of either House of Parliament in relation to any concerns it has expressed following such scrutiny.(4) The written response in subsection (3) must be received by the committee—(a) in the case of a prospective rule change, before that rule change takes place, or(b) in any other case, within 12 weeks following publication of an expression of concern.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, it seems very fitting that the last amendment for debate on Report should return to the issue of parliamentary scrutiny. Of all the issues that we have discussed over the past many days, and of all the sections of this Bill, it seems to me that that is the one that stands out as being extraordinarily important. It refers to the constitution, in a sense, and the constitutional roles in this country. It deals with the largest economic sector, the way in which it is regulated, and Parliament’s role in scrutinising the regulation of that sector.

The amendment itself is quite brief; it is almost a summation of some of the previous amendments that we have looked at. But let me reassure the House that we have made the decision not to press it today. We will be relying on the Government’s many assertions that the future regulatory framework will offer far more than it appeared to offer in the first days when we looked at the initial consultation.

I want to thank the Minister for persuading—the word is probably not “persuade” but let us use it—both the FCA and the PRA to write to him with their views on this issue. He knows that I consider the FCA letter to be one that simply confirms the status quo, which is inadequate. The PRA letter, however, recognised that, with our departure from the European Union, a whole layer of scrutiny over financial regulation had been stripped away. Although the PRA would obviously not dictate to Parliament how it should replace that accountability, it recognised that it was very likely that Parliament would feel the need to enhance the way in which it scrutinised financial regulation. In the end, we also had a letter from John Glen, using some language to say that it was his view that there must be some toughening of parliamentary oversight—I do not think I paraphrase him incorrectly.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that my assurances, and those of the regulators, have demonstrated the Government’s appreciation of Parliament’s unique role in relation to scrutiny. I therefore hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, feels even more comfortable than she did earlier in withdrawing her amendment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am going to do something quite dangerous and put myself for a moment in the shoes of my noble friend Lady Bowles, picking up a couple of points from the Minister, because they are necessary.

First, one of the underlying points of my noble friend Lady Bowles is that, certainly in the European Union but in other places too, there are mechanisms for confidential information to be shared with Parliament, and shared in such a way that the individual firm is not afraid that this will get out into the wider world and therefore compromise it in any competitive way. Sometimes that is a necessary part of appropriate oversight and scrutiny of the decisions the regulator is making. On behalf of my noble friend, I think I can say that she would be delighted to meet with the Economic Secretary to discuss how this could be addressed.

Secondly, it is always slightly disingenuous to treat Basel as though it were some distant body that, essentially, comes out with a set of regulations and tells us what we have to do. The UK regulators are incredibly influential—or they traditionally have been—on the Basel process; they fundamentally shape it. Therefore, engagement with those regulators before they trot off to a Basel meeting and use their various resources to affect the outcome and decisions at the Basel level is particularly significant and important. I want to make sure that it is understood that this is not just a question of our regulators following instructions from a world body; our regulators have a very big impact on what that world body chooses to say. It is a very important way for us as a Parliament to make sure that our concerns that regulation is appropriate are communicated through that route and help shape—or, at least, are in the minds of regulators when they engage in shaping—that world environment.

Having said that, I think we all recognise that we are at the early stages of a process that will not be completed in this Bill. That process now takes off to a series of consultations and eventually to legislation. I have said to the Minister before that I hope there will not be any more measures that end-run that final regulatory framework, but that may happen, and if it does, we will have to deal with it as it occurs. We are doing this backwards—a lot of legislation is going through, shaping the relationship between Parliament and the regulator, before we have even done the consultation on what that should look like, but I appreciate the time that the Minister has taken to respond to my noble friend’s points. With that, I will sit down and be quiet until the next opportunity to take on this issue. I beg to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 37F withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, this is a very significant Bill. At the point of discontinuity between the days of EU involvement and control to the new world after leaving the EU, the depth of involvement that we have had with both other parties and the Government has been significant. We have had conversations on the Floor of the House and in other meetings, and we have all at least understood one another. We have gone some way to address the central point of the Bill, which is how to scrutinise the regulators while, at the same time, leaving them independent and effective. We will see whether the compromises that have been agreed work, over the next several months, in both the day-to-day examination of the regulators’ output and the development of subsequent law.

I thank the noble Earl, Lord Howe, the noble Lord, Lord True, the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, and their teams, for all their efforts. The leader of the Labour side in this debate was of course my noble friend Lord Eatwell who, unfortunately, was not able to be with us today, but he asked me to read the following statement. These are his words, not mine.

“Standing at the Dispatch Box for the Opposition, I have always believed that my job is to oppose; to expose the flaws in the Government’s erroneous and sloppy thinking. It has, however, been a very new experience working on this Bill with the noble Earl, Lord Howe. It was evident from the start that his objective was to achieve something useful—a constructive experience that I value and for which I am grateful.”

I was less surprised than my noble friend Lord Eatwell, because I have been on the opposite side of this Chamber from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for many years, and have always found him very committed to finding a consensus way forward, where possible.

I thank my researcher, assistant and speechwriter, Dan Stevens, for all his work, because I would not have survived without it. Finally, I thank the House for its tributes to Frank Judd. He was a wonderful person and he carried on being a wonderful person right to the end. He was voting last week—the right way, of course. I was also his whip, but it really felt the other way round, because he was always so supportive. I have lost not only a member of my team but a very good friend, who has always supported me and been helpful. I thank the House once again for its tributes.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, once again I thank Lord Judd, because he contributed to this Bill, so it is entirely appropriate to reference him, as we close and the Bill passes. This was originally presented as a “limited, technical Bill”. Whoever thought up that phrase is probably now assigned to writing detailed amendments on obscure financial practice, because it has been anything but.

From my perspective, we had three major areas to tackle in this Bill. We have talked about the constitutional issues of regulator accountability to Parliament, which are overwhelmingly important to this House and the other place. We have also dealt with extensive legislation that impacts ordinary consumers. One can never overstate the importance of dealing with issues such as debt, mortgage prisoners, sharia finance, access to cash or financial exclusion. They are crucial to the people of this country and to everyday lives, so I am very glad that they formed a major part of this Bill. Thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, we have had some particular success—and perhaps will have more success with the amendments that we passed.

We also dealt with the environment and made some real progress in that area. I regret that by one vote only—because it was a tie—we did not get our capital adequacy amendment through but I think the House will, at some point in time, be back discussing that issue. I also suspect that, at some point, the PRA will announce the changes to capital adequacy ratios that reflect the underlying stranded assets associated with fossil fuels in various forms. That, too, I see as a work in progress but it was an important discussion and put down some very significant markers.

I want to thank the Public Bill Office. I cannot remember a piece of legislation where so many amendments appeared in each round, both in Grand Committee and on Report. Its work in turning around those amendments to ensure they were in an appropriate form was very much appreciated.

I join in thanking the noble Earl, Lord Howe, the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, and the noble Lord, Lord True. I say to all three of them that we appreciate that they listened to what we had to say and, whether they agreed or disagreed, always responded to us with respect and looked for common ground. Frankly, I regard the noble Earl, Lord Howe, as the Conservative Government’s secret weapon because he certainly brings us to a common point that finds a way through when relatively few other people could.

I really want to thank others for the co-operative working across the House. We have worked closely with all those on the Labour Benches, but it has been with the Conservative Benches as well. It really shows this House at its best when it deals with issues of fundamental importance.

On my own team, Sarah Pughe in the Whips’ Office kept us co-ordinated; she also kept us informed, which was quite some challenge. My noble friends Lord Bruce, Lady Sheehan and Lady Tyler stepped in to contribute some special knowledge. I thank in particular my noble friends Lady Bowles, Lord Sharkey and Lord Oates, each of whom took on one of those three areas that I categorised as crucial in this Bill and brought to them absolutely exceptional levels of expertise, real dedication and hard work. They supported their positions with extraordinary diligence. Sometimes when people come with not only expertise but passion and concern, they can make an effective difference in the way they communicate with the House. I have to say to those three how much I appreciated them.

My noble friends Lady Bowles and Lord Sharkey are off at the Industry and Regulators Select Committee. I understand that the noble Lords, Lord Eatwell and Lord Blackwell, are there. I am sure they are missing the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, today but I hope she will make that up at the next meeting and ensure that her imprint is on the work of that committee.

This has been a real pleasure. I believe we have achieved something. It is not all I would have wanted but, as I say, this is only the beginning of a long process.

[Baroness Coussins (CB)]

From these Benches, I too am grateful for the opportunity to express my thanks to all noble Lords who participated at all stages of the Bill. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, and, from the point of view of my own particular interest in the Bill, especially the noble Lord, Lord True, have steered the Bill skilfully through your Lordships’ House. Although he is not in the Chamber at the moment, I place on record my grateful thanks to the noble Lord, Lord True, for his constructive engagement and for meeting me and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, on two occasions to discuss amendments concerning the statutory debt repayment plans.

Together with the Bill team and the wider group of Treasury officials, the noble Lord, Lord True, has given me and the network of debt advice charities a great deal of confidence that these plans will be brought into effect in 2024. We are all grateful for this positive attitude. I thank all other noble Lords who spoke on this issue and on a variety of other matters of concern to consumers. As well as SDRPs, I welcome the fact that the Bill paves the way towards regulating buy now, pay later products, for example. Indeed, it has been very pleasing to see the level of consensus across the House on the need to improve support for people in financial difficulty and to tackle financial exclusion.

Finally, the passage of the Bill has been an important opportunity to look at what more needs doing on the financial services regulatory framework to ensure that it is as effective as possible at protecting consumers; for example, one area that was raised but ultimately found to be beyond the ambit of the Bill was oversight of bailiffs, but the commitment from the Government to work with stakeholders to develop this is very welcome.

I thank all concerned, including the excellent Lord Judd, whom we will all miss very much indeed.

Financial Services Bill

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 24th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in this debate on the first group of amendments on the first day of Report on the Financial Services Bill. I declare my interests as set out in the register.

I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, on tabling this amendment and on the way in which he introduced it. These arguments have been put since at least 2017, when we debated the Financial Guidance and Claims Bill. What has happened in the interim has merely strengthened those arguments on the need for a duty of care. During the last year, as in so many other areas of life, we have seen exactly why something in this space would assist. Now that we have the excellent vaccine rollout and inoculation programme, such a duty would put a capital “B” into the “build back better” approach. It would be a real example of “better”.

I will not rehearse the arguments that I made at Second Reading and in Committee. I want to take this opportunity again to thank Macmillan Cancer Support and congratulate it for everything that it continues to do in this area. According to the testimony of a cancer patient,

“I felt I was battling my bank as well as cancer.”


Will the Minister consider what can be done between Report and Third Reading? With the Easter break in between, there is time, so this is more than timely. Can she reassure noble Lords of the potential for movement on this specific point of a duty of care?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I shall be very brief. I spoke on this issue at length in Committee. The Government may take note that every single speaker today from across the House has supported the concept of a duty of care and non-exploitation and has urged the Government to act.

In all the speeches, both before today and referenced again today, we have heard about this chain of malfeasance, whether it has been described as scandal or fraud or an abuse of customers. Clearly, the existing legislation does not work, or we would not have this kind of history with new scandals cropping up, sadly, on a regular basis. Like it or not, treating customers fairly is interpreted by both the industry and the regulator as exceedingly light touch, to be offset by the “caveat emptor” principle—the taking of personal responsibility—to which the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, referred. This is unacceptable. This Government often say that they focus on outcomes. The outcomes have been unacceptable. Look at the outcomes and the chain of scandals. Here is the opportunity to act.

In response, the Minister might say that there are effective tools, such as the senior managers and certification regime. Anyone who has followed the progress of this Bill and the amendments through Committee will have heard how that has broken down. It has, in effect, become something of a busted flush. The Minister might say that scandals have been picked up very early because we have working whistleblowing channels. Again, from listening to the discussion throughout Committee stage, it is clear that this scheme is not working. The analysis in the Gloster report reinforces that.

We do not need a ninth consultation. Every time there is another major scandal, the FCA’s response is to have another consultation. In the end, there is something like a freckle of movement. This issue needs to be seized by the scruff of the neck and resolved before more people suffer injury. The regulator needs to be put on the front foot. By supporting this concept and this amendment or something equivalent to it, the regulator will finally be put on the front foot and the industry will recognise that it has been duly warned and must reconsider the way in which it behaves.

I hope that we shall hear from the Minister that we shall see an equivalent proposal at Third Reading because, if not, I will not hesitate to ask all my colleagues and every Member of your Lordships’ House to support any decision by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, to move this to a Division.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, during our debates on this Bill, we have referred several times to the success of principles-based regulation in this country. We have contrasted it with the more prescriptive regulatory structures introduced within the European Union. The idea of a duty of care is a prime example of principles-based regulation because it presents a principle from which particular actions can be derived. It is now very important, given the financial stresses created by the pandemic to which several noble Lords have referred in their contributions to this debate. This is but one example of the unexpected pressures in the financial system that arise on a regular basis, not least because of the fintech innovations referred to earlier which require a flexible, principles-based approach. The strength of this approach is that is encompasses financial innovation—the changes to which many noble Lords have referred.

I understand that later in the consideration of this Bill the Government will bring forward measures to regulate the “buy now, pay later” market. This would already have been encompassed in a duty of care. It would not have slipped through the gap. If there had been a general duty of care in place, consumers would have received some degree of protection already.

One of the striking things about the issue of a duty of care and the FCA rulebook is that a number of measures that amount to a duty of care exist in the rulebook already. There are “know your customer”, “treating customers fairly” and the consumer credit rules, which require assessment of creditworthiness. What is striking is that this specific list has gaps in it.

Many noble Lords referred to the examples of malfeasance; it is this structure that creates the environment for and encourages malfeasance. It encourages testing of boundaries and of gaps. If there were instead a broad principle it would significantly discourage that persistent, competitive drive to test the gaps that exist in the current list of consumer protection measures in the FCA rulebook.

It is not simply that the lack of a duty of care creates the inability to deal with malfeasance; it actually creates it by the structure it presents for a very competitive market. We all know that this particular structure—having a specific list of something in a legal document—always raises the question of what has been left out. That is exactly the case in the FCA rulebook. It lacks the firm foundation of principle.

In Grand Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, was quite right to argue in summing up that

“the FCA is already taking steps to ensure that financial services firms exercise due care and regard when offering products, services and advice to consumers.”

She was right that there is a list, but she was quite wrong to then argue that a statutory duty of care

“does not add to the FCA’s existing powers in this area.”—[Official Report, 22/2/21; col. GC 116.]

Of course it does. It must do, in one of the most dynamic industries in the United Kingdom, associated with innovation, change and competition. It is the very nature of successful principles-based regulation that actions should derive from general principles.

The FCA lacks this statutory declaration of general principle. This is why Macmillan Cancer Support’s campaign Banking on Change was necessary, and why it is so important to place a general principle of duty of care on the statute book. My noble friend Lord Stevenson has made a very specific offer to the Minister with respect to Third Reading. I strongly urge her to accept it.

--- Later in debate ---

Almost every week there is another financial scandal; I have just mentioned two or three in passing. They are man-made and the outcome of failed institutional structures and the absence of effective democratic oversight. Scandals can be checked and require a new approach to regulation, as was ably argued by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. This amendment seeks to guide the FCA, the PRA and other regulators through external reviews. The focus is on their conduct and whether they are fit for the purpose of meeting their statutory duties, or whether those duties are adequate for protecting the people. The review would focus upon all kinds of resources which the regulators need. It would be laid before Parliament and become a key mechanism for building trust in regulatory bodies to ensure that they carry out their main mission, which, above all, should be to protect people from malpractice.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Bowles has already indicated that she does not intend to call a Division on this amendment, which I think is right. However, this is probably one of the most important amendments that we have discussed under the umbrella of the Bill. It opens up a new area to consider: how we make our regulators accountable and whether the committee system and traditional structures of Parliament can do the whole job or whether support is needed from some additional bodies. What the noble Lord, Lord Davies, called an outside pair of eyes on this issue could be extremely useful to Parliament by bringing a particular expertise. There could be periodic reviews, looking, for example, not at the decisions made by the regulator but at its capacity and mode of operation—those core issues which determine whether a regulator is effective. The noble Lord compared it to a visit from Ofsted, which is probably a little light-touch and simple but it takes the conversation in the right direction.

I have a strong suspicion that three or four years from now, we will be back to this discussion and looking much at an independent arrangement to look at our various regulators in order to provide information when appropriate to Parliament, so that it can get on with the areas of scrutiny in which it has most capacity, which is to ensure that the rules fit with the mandate that Parliament has given it in primary legislation. This is an extremely important area with some very interesting thinking.

I hope that the Treasury takes note. It would be lovely if it was picked up in the financial framework review, but that might be hoping for too much. That review has gone on a very limited and very traditional route. It would be good to challenge it with some new thinking, and to open its process to break through and work out how effective accountability can be put in place. This affects our fundamental economy and the capacity of a Government to deliver on public services, so the consequences are significant. Real attention paid to this area would be exceedingly welcome.

I will not pick up the other scrutiny issues because we will deal with those on the second day on Report. I will discuss some of the letters we have had from the regulators then. However, I want to put down a marker that this is an area and a thought process that must be taken seriously. I hope that the Government see that as an opportunity.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I was tempted to start my speech with the famous quotation from Juvenal, “Who guards the guardians?”. But, given the strictures by the Leader of another place against speaking in foreign languages—although he was referring to Welsh—I will instead begin with a different quotation, from the late Lord Keynes. In the introduction to The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, he says:

“It is astonishing what foolish things one can temporarily believe if one thinks too long alone, particularly in economics.”


Well, we have certainly had many examples of regulators believing foolish things. The sorry history of the regulatory response to the role of credit derivatives in the expansion of credit in the run-up to the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 is a clear example of the folly of thinking alone. Hence, a periodic review of the thinking of regulators—whether the prudential regulator or the conduct of business regulator—would certainly be worthwhile; it would be a useful challenge to groupthink.

However, this particular aspect is not best achieved by three independent persons, because there would be a grave temptation to appoint three expert regulators—just the sort of people who would think in the same way. However, they would, no doubt, come up with recommendations that deal with the operational objectives in this amendment, so I see the review activity as falling into two parts: the operational assessment; and the core policy issues, about which I would have less confidence in the approach of the three independent persons. Peer reviews are all very well, but I assure you that any academic economist will tell you that they not only tend to embody the status quo but often stifle innovation and can perpetuate error.

That is why I and others in the House have argued that the intention of the amendment with respect to policy would be best met by a parliamentary scrutiny committee. It is the nature of parliamentarians to be sceptical, to pose without embarrassment the naive question, to entertain the views of mavericks and free-thinkers, and to relate the performance of any organisation to its statutory objectives—after all, they are responsible for the statutes. So we have two tasks before us: a review, as proposed in the amendment, which would be a valuable check and assessment of operational matters; and the review of policy and thinking, which could be the regular component of the work programme of a scrutiny committee.

But first, of course, we need the acknowledgement from Her Majesty’s Government that they would support the foundation of such a scrutiny committee, giving it appropriate powers to work with the regulators in an effective and constructive manner and to commission regular reviews of policy issues of the sort sought by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. We will discuss this matter later; so much hangs on the issue of the general scrutiny of the activities of regulators, voiced by Members on all sides of the House, that we will certainly return to this matter later in consideration of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, we have not as yet been able to restore contact with the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond. Should he reappear before the Minister speaks, I will try to call him, but for the time being he is not with us, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will follow my practice of trying to be brief and selective on Report. We have had absolutely brilliant speeches and I do not intend to repeat them.

Perhaps I can start by being helpful to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and I speak as a fairly weather-worn commercial banker who dealt extensively with loans and risk. She will understand, therefore, that the PRA, as the regulator, in dealing with capital adequacy issues, looks at the loans that sit as assets on the bank’s books, but of course it does not stop there. It looks through that to the operational activities—to the activities and investment of the company to which the loan is made. That is why the terminology “investment” pins exactly what this amendment is intended to do, which is to make sure that the PRA does that look-through to investment. I do not think that any member of the PRA would have the slightest difficulty in understanding what this amendment is guiding them to carry out. They would see that it has genuine precision in it. I do not have a problem with the wording; the wording says what it should, it says what it means and it says what the PRA would understand and follow through.

Very briefly, I thank the Minister for the two “have regard” amendments that he has embedded in this group. To “have regard” to the climate change target of 2050 is a step forward, but we have to recognise that it is very light-touch and will not scare the horses. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, captured that rather well when she said that the two “have regard” amendments will do no harm. I do not think they change the landscape, but they give a little hint of a change in direction and I welcome that change in direction.

Like others, I am very frustrated that we have a PRA that is going to do stress tests to test the sufficiency of banks’ capital buffers to deal with the financial instability caused by climate change, but then seems to have taken almost the equivalent of a vow of passivity and will not then follow through and implement the consequential adjustments to capital adequacy ratios that would come from that exploration and examination of the buffers. I really do not understand going through the process and then saying, “But we will not learn from or implement the consequences of that work”.

I sometimes think, as I listen to the speeches, that there is a sense that this requirement to look at capital adequacy ratios is somehow novel or revolutionary. I sit on the Economic Affairs Committee and last week, we were privileged to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Turner of Ecchinswell. I hope I have pronounced that correctly. We were looking at quantitative easing issues and therefore it was a discussion of central banks, but the issue of climate change came up. I thought what he said was quite helpful in understanding how normalised the approach of challenging this issue through capital adequacy ratios is now becoming. He said that any role of central banks in relation to climate change is very much secondary to the fiscal and regulatory authorities—the same issue that I think was raised with reference to quotes from the noble Lord, Lord King—but that is an important statement. It is secondary to the fiscal and regulatory authorities because, of course, the relevant regulatory authority is the PRA. He went on to give an illustration by referring to coal:

“If banks go on lending to coal companies, they may end up with stranded assets on which they will make a loss. That will be bad for their capital ratio. I think that it is reasonable for the PRA to set higher capital ratios for anybody who is still lending to coal.”


I do not want to suggest that he was willing to go further than coal, but he was using it as an illustration. I think most of this House would very happily accept that that language needs to be extended across the full range of fossil fuels, certainly in requiring the PRA to do a review. So, I wanted to underscore that this is a normalised approach; this is where we will go, and where we will end up. Given that we have described climate change, absolutely correctly, as an emergency, a delay in getting to that appropriate application of capital adequacy is really serious.

I wanted to pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes—that most loans are short or medium term. They are, but they are supporting longer-term projects. Of course, the duration of financing the project itself—the project they enable, the project they empower, the project they drive—has a much longer-term application. So, the fact that the loan itself is short term does not mean that it can be set aside as though it had no longer-term implications. It is merely the first step in an ongoing process, and once the process is started it is almost impossible to stop. Loans might be short term because people think they might get better terms and conditions or pricing in the future. The short-term issue is not applicable here; the urgency issue is.

We know that we face an emergency and that how we act in the future will have to be more draconian and dramatic, and have far greater collateral damage, than if we act early. It is crucial that the issues raised in Amendment 3—getting in place the plan, pattern and process for using capital adequacy ratios to tackle the financial instability that will come from allowing climate change-related activities to continue and grow—be dealt with now, and rapidly. If the Government do not recognise what we have been describing here and commit to this review of the whole issue of capital adequacy and climate change, I very much hope that my noble friend Lord Oates will press his amendment. The message is absolutely critical.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Oates, for leading this debate this afternoon, and to all noble Lords who have spoken. We had a detailed debate in Committee on the need for the regulators to take a more systematic and urgent approach to their climate change obligations. I do not intend to repeat the general arguments, not least because the Minister accepted the need to embed our climate change goals in the financial services sector. The point of difference remained, how deep and how fast. Since that time, we have had a useful meeting with the Minister and we were pleased to hear that he had accepted our arguments concerning the need for the regulators to have regard to the Climate Change Act. The Government’s amendments, tabled today, reflect that concession and we consider this to be a considerable step forward. I thank him for his work in making that happen.

Since then, the Minister has also facilitated the sending of two letters from the PRA and FCA setting out their work on sustainable finance, to which a number of noble Lords have referred. It is useful to have their current commitments restated in this way and we are pleased that they have engaged with us on the subject. It is also helpful that they have set their work in an international context, as we know that we cannot solve this issue alone. However, I would say to the regulators, and indeed to the Treasury, that what is lacking in these letters is the urgency and reprioritisation that the climate change emergency demands. As we discussed in Committee, many individual financial institutions are already ahead of the game and are implementing dynamic green initiatives. We have heard great speeches from the Chancellor and others on the importance of the issue, but why are the regulators not being more ambitious, to ensure that everybody meets the standard of the best? As a result, today we have tabled further amendments to spell out in more detail how systemic finance-related climate risks should be embedded in the policy agenda going forward.

I have added my name to Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Oates. It addresses the need for the PRA to review the risk weighting applied to investments in existing and new fossil fuel exploitation and production. The noble Lord has explained the case for that amendment extremely well today. We agree that the current regime does not adequately reflect the high-risk exposure of such investments. Clearly, institutions with over-exposure to carbon-intensive investments are not acting prudentially and their capital requirements should reflect this. As we discussed before, as the policy agenda moves rapidly away from fossil fuels and towards renewables, there is a considerable risk of the assets being stranded. The capital adequacy requirements need to reflect this risk more accurately.

The Minister will know that the Basel Committee conducted a survey of regulators in April of last year to stocktake their supervisory initiatives on climate change financial risk. This seems to run counter to the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, was making—I listened carefully to what she was saying about the comparative responsibilities of regulators and banks—because the Bank of England and the PRA were both respondents to the survey. In fact, only six out of the 27 replies factored the mitigation of climate-related risk in to their prudential capital requirements so far, but there was some criticism in the conclusions of the survey as a result of that. So, were the UK regulators in the good minority or the bad majority in the outcome of that survey, and are their responses to it in the public domain? Does he also accept that, without the necessary adjustments made in Amendment 3, investments will continue to focus disproportionately on outdated oil and gas activities that run counter not only to investments but to the interests of the UK economy as a whole? This point was well illustrated by the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan. This is why we would particularly welcome the involvement of the Climate Change Committee, in order to provide the wider perspective of the longer-term UK interests, rather than the narrow short-term interests on which investment decisions are too often made. I therefore hope that the Minister will be able to give us the assurances we seek in this regard.

I have also added my name to Amendment 22, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, for which she made a very powerful case. We believe it essential that the Government set out how they will actively ensure that climate change considerations are reflected in the regulators’ statutory objectives. This amendment would provide a framework for systematically assessing and reporting on climate change financial risk. It would ensure that all government guidance is linked in order to provide a coherent and entire picture on managing climate change—an improvement on the current piecemeal reporting structure. I therefore hope that the Minister will be able to give us the assurances we seek on this issue. It would also be helpful if he could spell out what future formal reporting mechanisms would be put in place to achieve this.

Moving on to Amendment 23, at Committee and again today, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, has made a compelling case that the FCA needs a senior executive to oversee and deliver the climate change agenda. Like her, we were pleased to see in the FCA’s letter that a dedicated director of environmental and social governance standards is being recruited to lead on this work. We welcome this appointment and believe it represents a real step forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blackwell (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I declare my interests as set out in the register. I support these amendments, which have been so well explained by my noble friend Lady Noakes. In Grand Committee, the Minister accepted that there were concerns that a residual risk of disruption and potential litigation would remain even once the FCA had exercised its powers under the Bill. This is really important, given the amount of money and the number of contracts at stake, and the timescale of the changes in the benchmark at the end of 2021.

My noble friend the Minister said that the Government would prefer to wait for the results of the consultation, but these are not new issues. The Treasury and regulators have been aware of them for many months. The argument was made that the reason for waiting for the consultation is that there might be areas where there was legitimate reason for civil litigation and that those legitimate legal claims might be blocked. I am not persuaded that there are legitimate legal claims where the benchmark is being replaced with a synthetic benchmark at the direction of the regulator. There has to be a change and I cannot think of situations where those claims might be appropriate and fair. I would welcome it if the Minister can explain where those concerns come from and what situations might be blocked unfairly by these amendments.

Other than that, we should move to deal with these concerns now, as noble Lords have said. If the Minister does not like the specificity of Amendments 4 and 5, I would certainly be prepared to accept Amendment 6. I hope my noble friend the Minister will come back at Third Reading with government amendments to address these issues. If she does not feel able to do that and my noble friend Lady Noakes were to bring back her amendments at Third Reading, I would be compelled to support her.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for bringing forward these amendments. I have to confess that I am not keen on Amendment 5 because it seems that it would create an opportunity for various institutions to use the change in the benchmark in a way that would be abusive to a customer, who would then have no redress.

Amendment 5 goes too far, but Amendment 6 makes perfect sense to me. Frankly, I find it extraordinary to think that the Government have not seized it and put “government” in front of it. We will face tough legacy contracts and there needs to be a sensible and appropriate way to deal with them. Amendment 6 captures that exactly as it should. I hope very much that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, will get a positive reply on Amendment 6 from the Government, otherwise there will be litigation and a mess, and I am not sure that that helps anybody.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, we should all be grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for her persistence in this vital area. She is quite right that the clock is ticking: with nine months to go, we really need to do something about this issue; to do otherwise would be irresponsible.

Amendment 4 is valuable in defining continuity of contract, but there remains a problem that it does not and cannot solve: if the foundation of a contract is changed, its value can change. That leads on to Amendment 5. Here, I regret to say that I differ with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and with the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. It is surely the responsibility of Parliament in this case primarily to protect the retail investor, as it is the retail investor who is not the professional, who typically does not have the same information as the professional and who is likely to be more financially vulnerable, not least because retail investment is dominated by pension savings. I therefore conclude that the provision of a safe harbour is inappropriate in this case and would be looking instead for some mechanism of reconciliation rather than prevention of claim.

However, I am delighted to express my support for Amendment 6—which is not surprising as my name is on it. Here the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has actually saved the Government from considerable embarrassment by presenting an amendment which succinctly encapsulates, without being prescriptive, the issues the FCA must address in facing the difficulties created by the replacement of Libor: continuity of contract and reconciling the damages. Unlike Amendments 4 and 5, Amendment 6 incorporates those. I express strong support for Amendment 6 and recommend it wholeheartedly to the Government. In terms of the buffet approach, it is the healthy option.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, who has presented the amendment so clearly and effectively, while I also regret the absence of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, who has been doing such sterling work in focusing on the practical real-world impacts of the Bill on people’s lives and welfare, to which, as we have discussed in other groups, a lack of effective regulation in the financial sector has done such damage.

In Committee, during a debate on a similar amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, referred to brass-plate economies and the damage that they do to societies if they become dominant. Indeed, much of our debate in Committee focused on the well-being of the people of Gibraltar. I have no objection to that; indeed, I welcome it. I wish them well in their difficult post-Brexit position, which they were put into despite 96% of them voting in 2016 to remain in the EU. However, we have to ask why 20% of the UK insurance sector and a large amount of our out-of-control, seriously damaging gambling sector is going through Gibraltar’s servers, with very little benefit to the people of the UK. I doubt whether ending it will make any great difference to the people of Gibraltar either; as the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has just outlined—and he is one of your Lordships’ House’s experts in this area—very little of that money is likely to be seen in Gibraltar in any meaningful sense.

I note that the Minister said in Committee:

“This proposal cannot be supported by the Government because it does not reflect Gibraltar’s autonomy”,


but I am not sure that I understand that. If we are talking about regulating activities in the UK, which is what the amendment is explicitly about, surely that is a matter of sovereignty—the issue to which the Government are so attached. Perhaps the Minister can explain that further in his answer.

In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord True, said:

“The Government were satisfied that the Gibraltar authorisation regime is rigorous”,—[Official Report, 1/3/21; col. GC 308.]


but we have to ask why so much business is whizzing through Gibraltar, at least in electronic form, for no obvious reason.

The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, pointed out in Committee that Gibraltar has a population of around 33,000 but more than 60,000 registered companies, nearly two for every person living on the Rock. We know that Gibraltar as a society must need people to fulfil many roles, from childcare to garbage collection, food preparation and, probably now much more than before, customs officials. The regulators of those 60,000 companies must be kept very busy keeping a tight and careful eye on their activities. Perhaps the reason is simply the comparative corporation tax rates. As the right reverend Prelate intended to say, our corporation tax rate is 19% whereas Gibraltar’s is 10%. Of course, the Government promise that our corporation tax rates will rise to become somewhat closer to international norms—if not just yet—so the disparity and the potential attraction are likely only to increase.

I referred in Committee to the Tax Justice Network estimate that the Gibraltarian arrangements inflict costs of $4 billion on other nations, predominantly the UK. That figure could grow significantly with tax rises, so I would argue that the case for this amendment has become even stronger, and I remain, with many others, doubtful about the level of transparency and scrutiny.

Ultimately, this amendment is about activities in the UK. It is not about Gibraltar at all. It is about transparency, honesty and ensuring that profits made in the UK are properly taxed in the UK.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am cautious about any further disruption for Gibraltar post Brexit. The challenge that Gibraltarians face is going to be an exceedingly difficult one and, since the UK put Gibraltar into that situation, we ought to be sympathetic and supportive.

I understand the motives of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans and others to increase transparency, but we are talking about what is best described as legal tax avoidance, not tax evasion. I hear nothing but widespread respect for the Gibraltarian tax authorities and the way they manage the business that falls under their supervision.

This is a dangerous time to deny another party equivalence when we ourselves are seeking equivalence from the European Union. I would point out, as others have done, that we have rather a low corporate tax rate at the moment. It is due to rise in the future, but we will still be at the low end of the G7. At the moment, we are exceedingly low compared to most of our EU competitors. We have also granted equivalence to the EU, and that includes locations such as Luxembourg and Ireland, which have low corporate taxes much more akin to those of Gibraltar.

So I do not think we have a major problem here. I am always glad to see an opportunity for transparency but, in this case, we are not looking at shutting down criminal activities, which is the area where I would like to see us work very hard on transparency. I think we need to be responsible to the people of Gibraltar, who sit in a position that is not of their choosing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, the minute I saw this group of amendments, I knew they were above my pay grade. I am in awe of the understanding of the noble Lords, Lord True and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. I forwarded all the amendments to those of my colleagues who deal specifically with Northern Ireland, and I think they travelled over to Northern Ireland, as well, for review there. The message I got back was that the timing—I will not repeat the word that followed—problem, let us say, was not a problem.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Coussins (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I support Amendment 11 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, and I remind the House of my interest as an ambassador and former president of the Money Advice Trust.

Although Clause 34 may be seen as a relatively small part of the Bill, we have had a great deal of discussion on it during the passage of the Bill—a sign of how important SDRPs are. Throughout the process, I and other noble Lords have been keen to secure clarity over the timetable for introducing SDRPs.

I thank the Minister for his positive and constructive engagement on this issue and for meeting me and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, to discuss the timings for the introduction of SDRPs. Like the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, I am also grateful to the Minister for his letter yesterday, which provided further clarity on this timetable.

In Committee, the Government did not accept my amendment to include a specific date by which SDRPs should be implemented. I was pleased nevertheless to hear the Minister confirm that the complex and detailed process to prepare for implementation seemed to be entirely compatible with the end date I was proposing—albeit pretty tightly.

So I hope the Minister will be able to confirm that on the record this evening, by specifying the various stages of the Treasury’s intended timetable for laying the regulations and reassuring the House that SDRPs are genuinely intended to have a commencement date before May 2024. I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I join in congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, on his amendments in Committee and again here on Report. He has clearly found a mechanism for engaging very fruitfully with the Government, and therefore we all have the benefit of a letter that lays out some of the important and significant elements of statutory debt repayment plans; for that, I am grateful.

I join with the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, in being rather perturbed—I think the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, was as well—that the implementation date is 2024. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, said that it was towards the end of 2024. I advise the Government not then to use terms such as “at pace”, which they use extensively in the Financial Services Bill—usually to argue that there is no time for a statutory instrument to be approved by Parliament, which takes a matter of weeks.

I am rather troubled and it suggests that the Government might want to think of some kind of stopgap to deal with the very significant number of people who will find themselves with debt problems as we come to the end of furlough. People will find that they have been moved into permanent redundancy and that other jobs are hard to obtain, and a lot of young people coming out of university courses will not find the usual opportunities.

We are going to go through a very rough period where quite a number of people will find themselves loaded down with private debt, not because they have behaved inappropriately in any way but because the way events have hit them. They will need some additional support and rescue, rather than just the schemes that are in place. The SDRPs would almost certainly have been ideal for many of them. So I hope the Government will look at the events that are going to force a lot of people into a very difficult position.

Amendment 12, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, would do what I think Amendment 55 in Committee was intended to do. This time I think it would do it. It is designed to enhance opportunities for people who have signed up to SDRPs to pay off their debts early at a discount. It will need some structure and engagement from social enterprise groups and perhaps even the Government providing some measure of support, because seed funding will be needed to get a scheme such as this off the ground. I hope that the Government will think some of that through. It seems the kind of scheme that would enable people to get back into the financial mainstream more quickly, which is surely something we want to achieve. Again, the need for that will be more acute because of the extraordinary number of people who will find themselves in debt as a consequence of Covid. I do not think it actually requires legislation, so I am glad that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, will choose not to move it.

These two amendments highlight the need for some serious thinking on how the Government can best support people who will come out of Covid and find themselves in fairly difficult circumstances. When we work with people who have debt problems, a fundamental issue usually has to be dealt with that has led them into that corner. Sometimes it is to do with lifestyle choices, but very often it might be mental health issues or family breakdown. The group who will find themselves in problems because of the impact of Covid do not fall into that category. Therefore, with a proper helping hand at the right time, they could quickly and easily be returned to a position where they are no longer financially excluded or in financial difficulties. That is absolutely necessary if we are to see the recovery that we all hope for. I hope the Government will look at these amendments and continue to build on them, rather than consider them concluded because Report has passed.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, we welcome the re-tabling of Amendment 11 by my noble friend Lord Stevenson, which provides the Minister with an opportunity to give more detail on the intention behind the Government’s introduction of the statutory debt management scheme. We are grateful to the Minister and his officials for the various meetings that have taken place in recent weeks. We hope that, even once the Bill has passed, there will be opportunities for further cross-party dialogue on issues relating to personal debt, financial resilience and so on.

There was a lively debate on this issue in Grand Committee, and various amendments were tabled by colleagues from across the Committee. Despite the number of amendments, almost all noble Lords were united in saying that the Government must get on with introducing the scheme. Amendment 12 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, co-signed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, deals with some slightly broader issues relating to problem debt. We hope that the Minister can provide a full response to those points, either now or in writing.

Looking at these amendments and the next group on BNPL and financial exclusion, I am struck by just how important it is to adopt a more holistic approach to personal finance, as proposed by my noble friend Lord Stevenson in his previous amendment on the concept of financial well-being. Helping people with debt has to be important. I have trouble understanding how people cope with that situation. It is the role of the state to provide structures to allow people to take on their debt problems in a managed way. I look forward to the Minister’s response to my noble friend’s amendment.

Financial Services Bill

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 10th March 2021 Grand Committee

This seems eminently resolvable if the Government truly stand by, which I believe they do, a levelling-up agenda—an agenda of opportunity, possibility and enablement. A simple amendment to resolve the issue of mortgage prisoners would fit well within that. If my Amendment 127, Amendment 99 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, or the other amendments in this group do not do the trick, will the Government consider bringing forward an amendment of their own on Report to enable everybody who finds themselves in this situation to have the freedoms and the flexibilities enjoyed by so many others who simply have the financial product of a mortgage? If not, why not?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I have taken a vow to try to be brief in all my responses today, recognising the time pressures of the day. I also listened carefully to my noble friend Lord Sharkey and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and I am not sure that the case could be better made.

However, I must follow the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, in picking up an issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who described mortgage prisoners essentially as problem debtors. These are people the overwhelming majority of whom would not have any problem with their debt if they had been allowed to take advantage of the changes in interest rates and mortgage terms that have been available much more widely. The case to act for their protection is simply overwhelming. If we had not had the financial crash and they had remained with regulated lenders, the vast majority of them would not be facing any issue. They would have had their mortgages restructured to lower rates and they would not be facing stresses and strains today.

I have been sent information from a significant number of people who find themselves to be mortgage prisoners and, frankly, the stories are often heart-breaking. I heard this morning from someone who is desperately ill in hospital, but the stress of the financial challenges that he faces makes every day far worse and far more difficult to deal with. To me, it is inhuman that action is not taken. The Government recognise that action must be taken, given the circumstances and the stress that so many people face and the corners that they have been pinned into. Surely such action should be taken now and not be kicked down the road yet again.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the case for reform in this area has been overwhelmingly made by my noble friends Lord Stevenson and Lord Griffiths, the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. I wish not to delay the Committee any longer, but simply to advise that the Labour Front Bench supports my noble friend Lord Stevenson’s amendment and the generality of those proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, as many Members of the Committee have already noted, my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe is well known in your Lordships’ House for her pursuit of impact assessments and is a stern critic of government departments that hide behind the exact wording of Cabinet Office guidance. Recently, many of us have joined her in being appalled by the complete lack of impact statements published to support the Government’s coronavirus policies, involving—I remind the Committee—the greatest ever peacetime infringement of civil liberties. The Department of Health and Social Care used the flimsy excuse that the Cabinet Office does not require impact assessments for policies intended to have a temporary effect.

I am particularly interested in my noble friend’s Amendment 104, which requires an annual report to Parliament. I am not wholly in favour of annual reports, because they can degenerate into boiler plate and have a very short-term horizon; I prefer the concept of periodic reports that can look at impacts over a longer time span. However, whether such reviews are annual or less frequent, I suggest to my noble friend that the report could also usefully concentrate on the quality of consultation carried out by the regulators, and that would include the quality of impact statements.

Consultations by the PRA and the FCA often feel like not much more than going through the motions. They are not alone in the public sector in seeming to exaggerate the benefits and underestimate the costs. HMRC, for example, is a particular case in point, having been criticised more than once by the Economic Affairs Committee of your Lordships’ House for the use of cost assumptions that seem to bear little relationship to reality. Similarly, the PRA’s consultation on ring-fencing rules was widely regarded as a massive underestimate of the cost of compliance, as was borne out by subsequent cost experience. A superficial impact assessment, or one that overstates the benefits or systematically underestimates the costs, is worse than useless and can lead to poor policy-making. It would be wise to ensure that the regulator’s performance in this regard is kept under review.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, in many of the groups of amendments to the Bill we have discussed the issue of accountability, and it has been a very important discussion. However, we have also discussed the necessity to have proper evidence and information to make that accountability worthwhile, valid and effective. These amendments follow exactly that direction.

One of the pleas that I will put in is that an impact assessment should be studied and then reviewed. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, is not speaking in this group of amendments but I can think of numerous occasions when he has spoken on a financial services Bill and pointed out that the information in the assessment did not seem to answer any of the obvious questions that a sensible person would ask in order to understand the regulations involved. I would join him in that. We seem to have narrow definitions of what an impact assessment is, and it seems to me that it should do what it says on the tin. It ought actually to assess the impact in a way that is meaningful to the regulation or piece of legislation in front of us.

This push for evidence and information, and quality in both, is an important thrust of the conversations and debates that we have had around the Bill. I very much hope that Ministers take that on board, because this is starting a pressure that will not go away. In fact, for the Government, if they want to produce the highest-quality legislation possible, the discussion created by developing a high-quality impact assessment will lead in the end to far better legislation.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, my initial reaction to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, was to puzzle over exactly what sort of impact assessment she had in mind. Was she perhaps thinking of the famous remark by the noble Lord, Lord Turner, that the banking sector in the UK does much that is not socially useful? After all, the ultimate rationale for regulatory activity is the enhancement of the common good—the goal of good government.

However, this debate has clarified the issue before us, which is that an effective impact assessment requires not just thorough analysis but a definition of an objective or, perhaps, objectives. The lack of clear objectives is the key weakness of Amendment 103. Amendment 104, therefore, is much stronger in that it lays out a number of objectives against which an impact assessment might be calibrated. The key to resolving the dilemma—I apologise for sounding a bit like a broken record—is to take the parliamentary role referred to in Amendment 103 and combine it with the sense of Amendment 104. An effective parliamentary process and, dare I say, a parliamentary committee, could define the objectives to be addressed in any impact assessment of the type referred to in Amendment 103—“We want to know the impact of this regulation on problem x, y or z”—and then seek annual reviews focusing on matters that are deemed to be important at any given time, thereby avoiding the template issue referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.

That is what is missing from the amendment—a means of making the impact assessment an effective means of acquiring information and an insight into the thinking of regulators, which can then be scrutinised in a coherent and consistent manner.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Lord Bishop of St Albans [V]]

My Lords, I apologise; I am so sorry.

I am glad to speak in support of Amendment 107 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. Throughout the course of this debate, there have been a number of comments on the current functioning of the FCA, the scope of its remit and whether it is properly undertaking its duties.

As the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, pointed out, there have been occasions when financial misconduct has not been fully disclosed, and it is worrying that this may have been due to interventions from those within government. As we establish our new position in the world following Brexit and seek to build on our financial services sector, it is vital that we are known for our honesty and transparency throughout the world. Our future will depend on this. So surely the amendment is entirely uncontroversial. The FCA is meant to be an independent regulator, not a direct arm of the Government. Hence, if Ministers have sought to intervene in any sort of FCA work or investigation, it should be a matter of transparency and disclosed.

Recently, the FCA dropped its investigation into Lookers, arguing it had instead made its concerns clear relating to the

“historic culture, systems and controls”

of the group. Why the investigation was not carried out to the full remains unclear—certainly to me, despite trying to find out. I imagine that many, including me, find the FCA’s answer unsatisfactory. It does not give us the assurances that we would hope an independent regulator would give.

Some commentators have noted that the dropping of this investigation seemed to coincide rather conveniently with the FCA’s new rules relating to car finance, brought in at the end of January 2021. Yet even these changes fell short of a mis-sell, which would undoubtedly have cost the providers of finance billions—strongly hinted at by the FCA’s 2019 report into car finance.

How the FCA came to its decision was in-house, even if it was sometimes perplexing to those of us outside. Nevertheless, in this instance, for example—and in many others—what we do not know is whether there has been any direct ministerial intervention to steer the FCA into any specific course of action. Many people would like reassurances that any intervention should be made in the interests of all and for the common good, particularly in customers’ best interests.

The amendment, in shining a light on what happens behind the FCA’s closed doors, would be a valuable addition to the Financial Services Bill. It would help in a mission that I know many in this House share to create a more transparent, robust and, dare I even say, moral financial system that in the long run will benefit all of us. I hope that the Government will look closely at either the amendment or something similar as we return to the matter later during the passage of the Bill through your Lordships’ House.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I need to spend more time, frankly, trying to understand the amendment. I would be genuinely shocked if Ministers interfered with an investigation of any of the regulators—certainly the FCA, the body at the centre of the amendment. I am not sufficiently familiar, I confess, with the Ministerial Code, but if the code does not make that clear, it would seem absolutely necessary that it does.

I perfectly understand concerns about the effectiveness of the FCA as a regulator in dealing with wrongful behaviour. It needs to be much more aggressive and transparent. We have talked earlier in Grand Committee about the HBOS Reading fraud scandal. The FCA was finally pressured into commissioning a report from Promontory, then did not publish it—only a summary that did not reflect in any significant way the actual conclusions of the report. That was extremely disturbing. We have also talked about the FCA’s actions under the senior managers and certification regime against Jes Staley, chief executive of Barclays—

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)]

My Lords, there is a Division, so we shall adjourn for five minutes and reconvene thereafter.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I was in the middle of saying that we need the FCA to be much more aggressive and transparent in its pursuit of wrongdoing within the financial services industry. I gave the example of what I considered to be real weakness in the way that it handled the HBOS Reading fraud and in its treatment of Jes Staley, chief executive of Barclays. As we discussed earlier, he was fined by the PRA and FCA, under the senior managers and certification regime, something in excess of £600,000 for, among other things, hiring private detectives to try to hunt down the identity of an internal whistleblower.

I note that it was the US authorities—one of the New York regulators, I think—that fined Barclays $15 million for the same behaviour, not the UK authorities. Some Members of your Lordships’ House may be aware that the US regulators visit the UK—I have certainly met with the CFTC when they have been doing this—in order to get the message over to bankers here that, if they come across any wrongdoing that potentially has an impact on the United States, as well as informing the UK regulators they should also make immediate contact with US regulators, who start from a position that they will be far more aggressive in hunting down wrongdoing.

I am afraid that the reputation of the UK for hunting down wrongdoers is not good. I wish we did not see ourselves in that position. That is one of the reasons why I am hopeful for an office of the whistle- blower. If there is any suspicion that a Minister had intervened inappropriately, it is through a whistleblower that that information would be exposed. We need an absolute safe haven for such a whistleblower to make contact, in order for that exposure to happen. Again, I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Ministerial Code impacts on a situation such as this. If it does not, or is ineffective, the answer seems to me to be: strengthen the Ministerial Code.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Sikka has made a powerful case for greater transparency in regulatory matters. I think it is clear to everybody that nothing undermines confidence in the regulatory system so much as the sort of cases to which my noble friend referred. What is often evident is that these matters eventually come out, and so the traditional rule that the cover-up is worse than the original transgression exerts itself once again.

The Government have made a virtue of transparency and openness in several aspects of the regulatory system. Not least, for example, we have discussed in this Committee the case of beneficial ownership, and we heard the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, make the argument for transparency of the beneficial ownership record of Companies House as a great virtue at an earlier stage of our considerations. Surely that commitment to transparency should be quite general, covering all regulatory matters, and not limited just to selected parts of the regulatory system.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak to this group of amendments. In doing so, I declare my interests as set out in the register. I shall speak particularly to Amendment 122. It is evident that employee share ownership is a positive force within our economy, and speaks so much to the current Covid environment and what kind of economic sector, work and business basis we can have to our economy as we built out of Covid.

It is no surprise that Sir Nicholas Goodisson, after taking the London Stock Exchange through the big bang and seeing some of the early privatisations, then moved on to a role heading up the Wider Share Ownership Council. He saw the benefits and the positive impact that it had for people to have a stake in something, and there could be no better example of that than employees having a stake—a share—in the company for which they work on a daily basis.

I believe we will see more innovative models of employee ownership coming through. The EOT, for example, is still very much in its embryonic phase but it is a very positive concept and construct. There will be further developments in this area and I believe Amendment 122 sets out the case very well that when employees have a share, a stake and a say in the business for which they work, it benefits all concerned.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, first, I have to correct an error I made in the last group of amendments. I referred to the HBOS Reading scandal when I was talking about the Promontory report, and of course I should have been talking about the RBS GRG scandal; I am afraid I got my scandals wrong. My apologies for that—there really are too many to choose from. I hope that one day I find there are no choices; that would be a very good situation to be in.

I find this group of amendments wonderfully refreshing and a very important change of direction. Amendments 108, 109 and 110 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, build on the concepts that we already have in the UK Stewardship Code but take that further. In many ways, one can see a relationship with the duty of care amendments that we talked about earlier in this debate. That duty of care was focused on customers but in many ways that is now extending that perspective to employees. I find that exciting and worthwhile.

I and my colleagues in the Liberal Democrats have long talked about the need for a very different social contract between employers and the workforce. Very often that workforce may not be an official workforce in the formal sense; it may be people who are self-employed and working freelance but who in effect are working very closely with an organisation. The whole of that workforce needs a very different social contract as we go forward into a different era.

I think we both have different standards about how we treat each other and different expectations. However, we are also about to go into a period of transition to the digital age. That will be disruptive. It creates real issues for a large swathe of people and we cannot passively step back and look at a group of people just as collateral damage as we make that transition. The obligations to the workforce have become far more significant than they might have been in a fairly steady and static era when everything was expected and was not changing very significantly.

I have long been a fan of what is loosely called triple bottom line accounting—and have probably talked about it too often in this House—whereby issues such as the environment and the social impact along with the financial impact are measured when we look at both individual accounts and when we look globally at a nation’s accounts. We had earlier amendments around the issue of well-being, which are well related to all that.

I was excited to hear the example of New Zealand that the noble Lord, Lord Knight, detailed to a fairly significant degree. Nearly 20 years ago I spoke to a conference in Auckland around these issues as New Zealand was making its decision to revisit the way in which it managed its national accounts and looked at corporate accounts. I notice that very often, when we look at an English-speaking country with close ties to the UK, we find it much easier to absorb the examples and to treat them in a sense as a pilot from which we can learn. I therefore hope very much that the principles in these amendments will be enhanced.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and my noble friend Lady Bowles, I am a great believer in employee share schemes. There is always a downside to be aware of. If something goes wrong in a company, you want to make sure that employees have also built other pension resources, have diversification and all those kinds of opportunities. A principle that is held as very important for senior management ought to be extended down throughout the employee base. Where you have ownership, you have a voice, and having a voice is important both in empowering people in their everyday life as a workforce and in making sure that they drive the direction of the company they are working for. We all know that the old-fashioned view that all that matters is the shareholder is essentially part of the past, and I very much welcome all these amendments as part of the future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lord Holmes of Richmond and Lady McIntosh of Pickering for tabling these amendments and I very much agree with my noble friend Lord Holmes on the scale of the transformation that will be driven by fintech. It is more important to the sector, in my view, than Brexit, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh’s question is therefore a good one.

I rise to speak on Amendment 115 on digital identification. I have taken a substantial interest in facilitating the provision of digital ID for several years. It is the sort of thing where the UK, with its early digital adoption and its skill in matters of security, should be ahead of the curve. Some good systems exist and have been rolled out in other European countries, but not here. This is probably because we have been waiting for the banking sector to make a decisive move.

I tabled amendments on digital identification during the passage of the Covid legislation, with support from some noble Lords here today. I did not press the matter because I was promised progress, and I had good meetings with my noble friend Lady Williams and the Digital Minister, Matt Warman MP, who published proposals for the UK digital identity and attributes trust framework on 11 February, with comments on it due from us all by tomorrow.

I thought that I would get another chance to press my case when our Covid laws were renewed but there is no sign of any such opportunity. I noted, however, that on 4 March my noble friend Lord Bethell, the Health Minister, told us that digital certificates, not physical ones, are being used for vaccines to avoid fraud, underlining the need to make progress in the financial area. The fraudulent attempt to trick my noble friend Lord Holmes in relation to his driving licence underlines exactly the scale of fraud in everyday life, an issue that is calling for digital ID.

I am disappointed about the pace of change on digital ID and although I support Amendment 115, it needs to be stronger. Waiting yet another six months for a plan is too slow. Why can we not get a grip of this important area, as we have done in the much greater challenge of vaccines? Give the job to Matt Warman with a remit to bring in digital ID for those who need it by 1 September. That would be novel provision but we need to accelerate this change.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, after all those excellent speeches, I shall try to be brief but I need to declare my interests in the register because they apply to this group of amendments.

Fintech is an extraordinary success story in the UK. In 2011, shortly after having the privilege of being appointed to this House, I sought out and invited the chief executive of every fintech in the UK that I could find to come to a meeting. We needed only a small conference room over in Millbank House. Today, the QEII Centre would not be adequate. That alone speaks to the extraordinary success of the industry, much helped by an enlightened view from the Financial Conduct Authority, which had to be dragged kicking and screaming into looking benevolently upon the industry and understanding that it required appropriate regulation to grow. However, once it got there, the FCA has been incredibly positive and powerful.

I want to plead against complacency, which is a rather British weakness. In the days before Brexit, many of our fintechs chose to expand into continental Europe, using passporting and the e-commerce directive. They also attempted to go into the United States but few have been successful, partly because of the competition there and the difference in structure. The European market is incredibly important for expansion. We also know that it has been important for recruitment, which raises many issues around visas. A single person is perhaps not so hard to attract but someone whose wife or husband is unable to work may not be so cheered in taking up a visa to come to the UK. That is an underlying problem that we face for entrepreneurs and skills.

Many issues have been raised in this debate, including AI and fintech: the two merge over some significant territory. The issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, are important and will, I hope, be a prod to make sure that we continue to deal with them at pace and to understand that there is no easy time. Berlin has, frankly, become a centre for tech within Europe and it would not be so very difficult to swivel that around and begin to absorb fintech. We do not want to put ourselves into that situation.

I wanted quickly to make two other points, picking up on points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. Digital fiat currency is now the issue of the moment. We have a relatively small window in which to decide whether we want to play in that area in such a way as to make us a significant player. One could say that sterling is not a natural global currency and we therefore need to be first mover. Picking up on the noble Lord’s point, I hope that we will look more at that area.

AI obviously brings with it extraordinary complexities and question marks but they are issues that can all be worked through if we focus on them. They will not become easier over time; they are just as difficult now as in the future, so one might as well deal with them as is. The issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, deserve a proper debate on the Floor of the House and I am sure will draw in many more people than those who focus on financial services issues alone. I very much look forward to that opportunity as well as listening to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, for tabling this group of amendments, which deal with various aspects of fintech. His contributions on this Bill have been thoughtful, and nobody should be surprised by him pushing this agenda today, given his role as co-chair of the relevant APPG. As other noble Lords have mentioned, this debate is a topical one, following the publication of the Kalifa review on fintech last month. We welcome that review and hope that the Government will support our world-leading fintech sector to continue innovating and do so in a way that spreads opportunity to all parts of the country.

When we refer to things being life changing, we often do so in a hyperbolic manner. However, it is no exaggeration to say that technological innovation in the financial services sector has fundamentally altered our understanding of and everyday experiences with money. The pace and scope of change has been incredible; the journey from cheques to mobile phone payments, for example, has been a swift one. Many young people conduct virtually all their banking activity online through the apps of high-street banks or using entirely digital services such as Monzo. Elsewhere, terms such as crowdfunding and crypto currency have become common parlance, with the emergence and increasing use of new technologies, including artificial intelligence and blockchain. The possibilities are almost beyond comprehension.

Taken collectively, the noble Lord’s amendments point to the crux of the issue: how can we maximise the opportunities that undoubtedly exist in the sector while guarding against the risk inherent in the use of new technologies and working practices? Artificial intelligence is an interesting case in point. AI tools, which are regularly deployed in a number of sectors, have the potential to assist with a variety of issues which we have covered in previous debates, such as identifying fraudulent or otherwise suspicious transactions. However, Amendments 112 and 118 refer to some of the ethical considerations that arise from automated decision-making.

In a recent piece for the House magazine, and again in his opening remarks, the noble Lord issued a challenge to the Government that they should take steps now to foster the potential for our fintech sector or risk losing talent to our competitors, falling behind in the global tech arms race and, ultimately, having to play catch-up. I am not necessarily convinced of the case for legislative requirements for reports and reviews on these issues. The noble Lord is right to seek more information on the Government’s intentions. If London is to be the world-leading financial centre that the Chancellor and many others would like it to be, how do the Government plan to strike the balance that I spoke of previously? In striking that balance, how do Ministers plan to ensure that consumers and citizens are placed at the heart of a digital finance package? With technology touching all our lives, it is only right that we should all reap the benefits of change. However, as I mentioned previously, we must also take steps to identify and mitigate the risks.

There is probably far more that could be said than time allows. I look forward to seeing how much ground the Minister is able to cover.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for introducing this amendment. I will be brief, because it concerns accountability, which has already been much discussed; and, like the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, I have really only just found out the intentions of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, regarding the amendment—I was a little blindsided about the formal structure. The accountability debate, as we have progressed through this Bill, has shown more appetite to enhance Parliament’s oversight than to create other bodies. My personal view is well known, that ultimately I think more than Parliament will be needed, but if the route of just Parliament is followed, at least to start, then it is true that some of the functions—or challenges—listed in this amendment for the supervisory board could be pursued that way.

However, the other intention of this amendment is to find a way to prevent regulatory capture from within, which I understand. The mechanism to ensure that the supervisory board itself is not captured includes having public meetings and public documents—bringing in the sunshine, as the noble Lord said. This has some merit as a way to reflect the public interest that supervisors seemingly could not define and to democratise in some way—although I am not sure whether it has been correctly formulated yet. I also share the noble Lord’s concern that press releases, annual reports and even appearances before Select Committees do not give penetration beyond the regulators making assertions. That has to be so, because there is a mismatch between reports and assertions and then what we discover further down the track about what was actually going on at the same time as we received those assertions. We have obtained penetration only through reports such as the Gloucester review.

Some stronger powers would be needed to compel better information than is currently provided by regulators and made public. That will apply to all the ideas about oversight that we have been probing. I am not sure that we have found a perfect solution or combination of solutions yet, and I suspect that we will need more than one stage to do that. However, having a mechanism to prevent regulatory capture and groupthink is necessary—never mind the revolving door between the regulators and industry and the representation of industries within the regulators’ structure. The obligation to consult the public about rules is predominantly served through responses from industry. One thing that we know about consultations is that, broadly, they run on the weighing of the responses. At least that is certainly the way when it comes to government. When you have the weight of responses from industry, the relatively few that go in from public interest bodies do not necessarily hold the weight that they should.

The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has brought forward some issues that we have to recognise and address. We need to put them into the pot of the matters that we think about as we move forward on accountability. I maintain my view that we probably will not achieve what we want simply by saying “enhance Parliament”. We will find over time that we need something else as well.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I very much agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, that regulatory capture is a real risk. We certainly saw that prior to the 2008-09 crash, and many people would say that the soft hand of the regulator has ever since reflected an ongoing degree of regulatory capture. I am less focused on the revolving door issue but am much more concerned that the regulator says, “Wait a minute. If we go hard after whichever institution has done wrong, particularly if it is a major one and would involve going after senior people, we will disrupt financial stability. For that greater good, we must go softly and gently”. That approach has not served the industry or the country well.

We have talked extensively about accountability. I see this matter as an extension of that conversation. We have talked about the importance of accountability being extremely well informed in a way in which it is not today, and about the importance of transparency. Numerous ideas have come forward during the process of this Grand Committee. This is another, different approach that essentially tries to get to the same place —a regulator that has to be transparent and which provides genuine, sufficient and high-quality information that can be assessed by people of a relevant skills base, and that is accountable to Parliament. It should not be a regulator that just meets with Parliament and gives it an explanation once or twice a year but one that is actually accountable.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the interesting amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Sikka is another demonstration of the considerable unease felt on all sides of the Grand Committee about the governance of the FCA and the PRA, and their relationship with one another. The amendments moved on Monday by the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, addressed similar concerns. The question still to be answered is: what would be the composition and terms of reference of such a supervisory board? Is the Treasury not deemed to be performing that role? How can we be confident that the supervisory board would have the authority and expertise to perform a task that my noble friend Lord Sikka rightly identified as being necessary?

I am sorry to sound like a broken record. Are not my noble friend Lord Sikka’s concerns another example of the lack of an effective mechanism of parliamentary scrutiny? Whether an effective parliamentary mechanism can be created is a question that we do not hear or have the ability to address but it must be addressed. I am sure that the Minister will agree.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, not just because she highlighted the role of the Greens in pushing country-by-country reporting at the European level, and the value of having a Green in the room. A great way of bringing people on board and into the debate is to ask them for help. I will briefly quote the chair of European Parliament’s sub-committee on taxation, MEP Paul Tang:

“I think transparency is a powerful tool for change because many of the current tax policies can’t stand the light of day. Just shine the light on it.”


That was from an interview with Forbes, showing how so many of the defenders of the status quo are increasingly isolated and clearly out of touch, not just with the public but with much of the establishment who realise that things cannot go on as they are.

I have been asked at public meetings over many years how we get multinationals, rich individuals and the financial sector to pay their taxes. My first answer is simple: you need a Government who want to make them pay their taxes. My second, more detailed and technical, answer is, simply, country-by-country reporting. This is something that the UK can impose without needing international agreements. I back the noble Baroness’s amendment to the hilt.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am going to be very brief again on this issue, because I cannot pretend that it is my area of expertise. I remember the period when George Osborne was very proud of saying that not only would he make country-by-country a requirement but that it would be published. My understanding is that that was reversed in 2016. Perhaps the Minister will correct me, but that information is no longer published at a national level and the UK has been fairly instrumental in blocking the OECD from publishing the data at an international level. I apologise if I have got that wrong: I am reading from a Tax Justice Network report. Its calculation is that, as a consequence of not publishing, and therefore not having the cleansing impact of transparency, the UK misses out on collecting something in the range of £2.5 billion in corporate taxes a year.

Again, this is not my area of expertise, but I shall wish to hear from the Minister. We as a country have always said the answer is transparency. We have insisted that publication is the mechanism for cleaning up abuse. I would be extremely troubled if the regulators felt they were now in a position to weaken in any way country-by-country reporting requirements.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the provision of country-by-country data by banks and investment firms will be an important step forward both in combating financial crime and in addressing the vexed question of the fair taxation of international entities. These problems will be solved only by international negotiation and agreement. It is important that we are seen as an exemplar, and satisfactory country-by-country reporting is surely part of that.

--- Later in debate ---

We have talked a lot about regulatory and policy capture; it has been well documented. Lawyers talk about the need for equality of arms in court cases. In oversight of the financial sector and its regulation, there is extreme inequality of arms. FSON would not be a magic wand, but it would be a start. I beg to move.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I think I understand where the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, is coming from. I am not sure that I personally would want to let the Treasury get its hands on an assessment of the UK financial services sector, because it seems that so much depends on the lens through which you look. But what I would like to be sure of is that the relevant information and statistics—those kinds of metrics that would enable you to assess impacts on the real economy—would be available, because we have quite a number of institutions, including think tanks and academic institutions, that could do really good work on all these areas which would then inform Parliament. I would very much like that to happen.

Perhaps this all feeds back into the issue that we have looked at over and over again, which is that, absent some significant change, the necessary information is just not available, whether one is trying to look at the macro level or the micro level. That information has to be available, or else accountability in any proper sense just cannot exist.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I think the whole subject of supervision and the presentation of information for decision-making is very important. I do not think that it could be shoehorned into this Bill. I hope that the Government will note the concerns about this and meet it where we can in parts of the Bill, but perhaps there has to be an ongoing debate, which will hopefully come to some consensus about how we improve the supervision and accountability of the financial services sector.

Financial Services Bill

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 8th March 2021 Grand Committee

[Viscount Trenchard (Con) [V]]

My Lords, these amendments, which are technical in nature, require banks that prepare their accounts in accordance with international accounting standards to apply prudential filters discounting capital to the banks’ statutory accounts. Having read the amendment, I am not clear which is the tail and which is the dog. Amendment 74 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, requires a bank to align its accounts with its regulatory capital or prudential capital, and at the same time requires the bank to align its regulatory capital with its accounting capital, for three separate purposes.

I agree with my noble friend Lady Noakes’s forensic criticism of the amendment. I am not a chartered accountant, but I have worked in corporate finance and mergers and acquisitions for many years, and I find the amendment confusing. Does

“then the accounting numbers must have an adjustment to the … profit and loss account”

mean that the bank concerned must alter its accounting principles and adjust its accounts to use the prescriptive and conservative accounting principles used by the PRA for the monitoring of banks? If so, would a bank be required to restate past years’ published accounts for consistency’s sake? Proposed new paragraph (a) suggests that the PRA’s measurement of capital must be carried through to the bank’s accounts, but proposed new paragraphs (b) to (d) suggest that the bank’s regulatory accounts should be adjusted to conform with the PRA’s measurements. I am not clear how that can be done and what the PRA would have to say about it.

The amendment refers to international accounting standards, which were standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Board, based in London. EU legislation has continued to use the term “international accounting standards”, but they were replaced in 2001 by international financial reporting standards—IFRS. The noble Baroness confirmed that she meant IFRS rather than IAS in her amendment, but how does she intend that her amendment should affect banks that apply other accounting standards, such as American banks, which still prepare their accounts according to GAAP? Concepts in the amendment such as accounting numbers and regulatory capital need proper definition.

I have rather more sympathy with Amendment 77. The International Accounting Standards Board develops and issues IFRS for use internationally. In the EU, things are then at the discretion of the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group—EFRAG—which advises the European Commission on whether and how the IFRS should be adopted for businesses in the EU. EFRAG will consult the relevant national bodies as part of that process; for example, if a new or revised IFRS is issued by the IASB that impacts the banking industry, EFRAG will consult the European Central Bank on the impact of that standard before making a decision on its adoption.

Now that the UK is able to establish an independent endorsement process, it seems sensible that that process should similarly involve the Bank of England in matters relating to IFRS that may impact the institutions over which the PRA has regulatory authority. I am not sure whether the amendment as drafted is satisfactory, but I would support the introduction here of an endorsement role for the Bank. I look forward to hearing my noble friend the Minister’s views on that.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, in this area I cannot pretend to have the scope of knowledge or the expertise of my noble friend Lady Bowles or the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, but I have a great deal of sympathy with their amendments which comes from long frustration with trying to deal with banking standards. I probably had some small part to play in the focus that the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards applied to looking at IFRS and other banking frameworks. I would defy almost anybody looking at the published accounts of Northern Rock, HBOS or RBS to have identified how fragile those institutions were and how easily they would crack the moment any pressure was applied to the very fragile arrangements they had in place. It is no wonder that it was missed by the regulators if they were looking at the disclosures that came from those institutions. They were not falsified; it is just that working your way through the disclosures very often discloses very little.

I spent a good part of my banking career trying to extract real and consistent information from accounting statements. That was largely in the States, so we were using GAAP, which I think many people will acknowledge tells one a lot more than IRFS ever does, but a bank has the resource to do that kind of deconstruction for a potential or existing credit client. Investment firms have the resources to do that kind of deconstruction, and so do regulators, but for any normal investor, and certainly for any smaller creditor such as a trade creditor, it is impossible to have those resources, as it is for any normal politician, even if in the end we carry the buck, in a sense, for whether or not we have a system that works. Over many years, the only clients who ever handed me a straightforward deconstructed set of accounts were Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger, who headed up the GEICO insurance subsidiary. They did it simply because they felt that bankers should know what was going on. That is a good enough recommendation for any company or regulator.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I have sympathy with the concerns behind these amendments. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and my noble friend Lord Sikka have spelled out so clearly, there is an intimate link between accounting standards and effective prudential regulation. It is probably true that nothing has a greater impact on policy than the manner in which relevant variables are measured.

That relationship between accounting standards and prudential regulation has been exposed just this last week with the collapse of Greensill Capital, a supply chain financing firm. Its business model was based on flaws in UK accounting—that was how it worked. As the Financial Times reports:

“While a company that uses supply-chain finance owes money to a financial institution, accountants do not class these facilities as debt. Instead a company typically books the money owed in the ‘trade payable’ or ‘accounts payable’ line of its balance sheet, mingled in with all the other bills owed to suppliers. While a footnote to the accounts might explain how much of this line is made up of money actually owed to financial institutions, rather than suppliers, there is no requirement to disclose it.”


Lack of disclosure means that the supply chain has proved popular with struggling companies looking to mask their mounting borrowings. When nervous lenders remove these facilities from heavily indebted companies, it can create an effect similar to a bank run on their working capital position, whereby that quasi bank run then escalates into risk to the financial services sector. Who really suffers? Typically, it is the SMEs at the origins of the supply chain. Greensill is not an isolated example. Parliamentary investigations into the collapse of the Carillion group, already mentioned, found that it made heavy use of the Government’s supply chain finance programme. MPs investigating the outsourcer’s demise said that the scheme allowed it to “prop up” its failing business model.

This is a major concern in the prudential management of the financial services sector in the UK. If accounting standards and methods do not accurately represent the fragility or strength of an institution, especially a financial institution, they severely compromise our efforts at prudential regulation.

A quite different prudential and market conduct risk created by accounting standards arises from the fact—again already mentioned—that while the UK’s accounting standards apply IFRS, the US maintains its own GAAP different standard. Are the UK Government pursuing negotiations with the US Administration to encourage the adoption of a common standard, perhaps one that accurately represents the risks present in financial institutions?

The issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, require urgent consideration, not just by the accounting profession but by Her Majesty’s Treasury and by the prudential regulators.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Trenchard (Con) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 78, in the names of my noble friends Lady McIntosh of Pickering and Lord Holmes of Richmond, seeks to commission a review of legislation relating to short selling. It is a pleasure to follow my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Sharpe of Epsom; I must say, I agree with everything they said.

From time to time in the UK and in other countries, financial regulators have sought to restrict short selling, as the British Government did to stabilise the market after the bursting of the South Sea bubble in 1720. While short selling has been blamed for market crashes and is considered unethical by some as it is a bet against positive growth, many economists and financial practitioners now recognise short selling as a key component of a well-functioning and efficient market, providing liquidity to buyers and promoting a greater degree of price discovery.

I note that, under the statutory instrument transposing the European regulation into UK law, the minimum threshold for the notification of short positions has been set permanently at 0.1% of the issued share capital of a listed company, whereas in the EU, the threshold will revert to the less onerous 0.2% of issued share capital on 19 March. I consider both thresholds unnecessarily restrictive and wonder why the Government have adopted a rule that will be even more cumbersome and bureaucratic than the EU’s, when the Prime Minister and the Governor of the Bank of England have said that we will get rid of red tape. The EU will relax its red tape on short selling reporting on 19 March but we will not. That is disappointing, is it not? What does my noble friend the Minister have to say about that?

In any case, the competitiveness of the market would be best served by removing the current restrictions on short selling. However, I do not think it would be helpful to place in the Bill this kind of requirement, which will add to uncertainty over the freedom to sell short in future and send the wrong message about the kind of regulatory framework the Government intend to adopt.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, once again, I am moving outside of any area where I can claim expertise. Essentially, I have no problem with short selling in the right place and time and under the right regulations, but I am concerned that, in the current environment, any move to look at the regulations again would listen more closely to the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes—in other words, look for opportunities to reduce the restrictions on short selling.

We have had a number of exchanges on short selling in the Chamber. The noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, is particularly vocal, and I do not think that I represent him unfairly by saying that he believes that the restrictions on short selling that were set in place in 2012, which severely limited naked short selling on AIM, are too onerous and that relaxation would be a good thing. He would argue for bringing more liquidity into AIM. I remember that campaign, which was strong and led by companies that were either listed on AIM or wished to be so but that were concerned about becoming the target of speculators who were not interested in supporting sustainable growth but were very interested in bubbles. Of course, this is a risk that goes alongside naked short selling in particular.

I suspect that this issue will be reviewed; I am sure my noble friend Lady Bowles is right that it should be done in a much wider context—I think the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, agreed with that. But I would not work on the assumption that this comes from a concern that rules need to be tightened and safeguards increased; this will very quickly become a process of trying to see whether we can return to the old animal spirits and largely casino-like speculation that once fired London so powerfully and which many of us think largely contributed to the financial crash in 2007-8. While I understand the concerns of the City of London that it needs to make itself more of an exception in order to gather increasing amounts of business, I am rather disturbed if that mode of exception is to allow a great deal more risk to be taken in ways that then impact on the real economy.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, this request for a review of short selling is essentially a request to focus on just one of the aspects of the financial markets today that may contribute to enhanced instability in times of stress. It is not just short selling that involves the sale of borrowed assets—this is what the repo market, for example, is all about. The repo market was central to the dangerously short-term funding of the banking sector in the run-up to the financial crisis of 2007-9.

Of course, short selling is prominent because it is a factor in falling markets, when money is being lost, as opposed to similar practices in rising market bubbles, when money is being made. Of course, the short sellers sometimes get their comeuppance, as has been mentioned by several noble Lords in reference to the case of GameStop. The fundamental question is not whether short selling is a process that can be abused—of course it can. What is important is whether the very existence of the practice contributes to market instability and risk or, as has also been argued, to price discovery and greater liquidity.

Those questions may be asked of many practices in our financial markets today, and, at a time when the UK is rethinking its economic and financial future after leaving the European Union, perhaps the time is right for such a wider review of permitted practices. This could begin with consideration of the impact of trading in borrowed assets—as well as, of course, naked transactions—in forward markets.

Since the liberalising years of the 1970s and 1980s, a wide range of these market practices have developed, with potentially serious destabilising consequences—indeed, we have seen these. As such, does the Minister agree with the many noble Lords who have argued that it is time to stand back and think through whether matters have gone too far, are just right or have not gone far enough? Perhaps such a review is too specific for the regulatory framework review that is going on at the moment because, after all, that is about the framework. However, it is necessary to consider, from time to time, practices that will inevitably have downsides but may also have upsides. That sort of consideration should not be delayed at a time when market regulation is changing significantly, with the exit from the European Union.

--- Later in debate ---

Individuals in this position need legislative protection from the Financial Conduct Authority. It is a matter of regret that so far the Government have not brought forward such an amendment, but there is always the possibility that they might accept this amendment or bring forward amendments on Report. I too commend the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Eatwell, on their compassionate and interventionist amendment which would protect people from a genuine humanitarian point of view. I note that this matter was raised in the other place by the Labour MP Stella Creasy and that at that stage it was rejected by the Government, but the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, said that that was perhaps in view of the fact that they were waiting for the results of the Woolard Review. The Government should put social justice and humanitarian matters along with compassion at the heart of financial policy and therefore should consider accepting this amendment, which would ensure that the Chancellor of the Exchequer conferred responsibility for the regulation of the non-interest-bearing elements of buy now, pay later to the Financial Conduct Authority, with such a duty to come into force no later than the beginning of 2022-23. This amendment, if accepted, would be a much-needed initiative in legislation to prevent those in debt getting further into debt. We must always remember that buy now, pay later schemes encourage all of us to spend when we might not have done so if we were simply using cash.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I read all the amendments in this group, and I found myself in support of every one of them. It is an excellent group. We all realise now that Amendment 136F, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, is in the wrong group, which I suspect is why she is not speaking on this group under the heading that I loosely call offences.

Picking up on that theme, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, that he was the victim of an attempted fraud. It is astonishing that action did not follow. When we discuss that group of offences, one of my underlying concerns is about the lack of resources to pursue offences of any kind within the financial services spectrum, so I suspect that that is probably where the resistance has been coming from. It is an area that we need to resource properly, and we need to make sure that when a red flag is raised by an experience such as his there is follow-up, knowing that that will have been one of many attempts to defraud and that some of them will have succeeded. I hope that the Government will look at resourcing.

When I look at quite a number of the amendments in this group, whether on buy now, pay later, bills of sale or mortgage prisoners—which I think we will deal with in more detail later—it strikes me that all of them could have been headed off at the pass as problems if we had had an underlying duty of care. That takes me back to the first group of amendments that we dealt with, because with that in place we would not have had a regulator hanging back to see what the competitive implications were, whether or not various tests were reached and so on. It would have shaped very early the framework within which these activities sat. It really is a very strong argument for that duty of care.

On the excellent Amendment 79, I understand, following Chris Woolard’s report, that we are to expect action. The Woolard report raises the issues in detail; I will not repeat them here today but I will say this: if the FCA does nothing more than introduce an affordability test, which is how it tried to manage the payday lenders, we can guarantee that this House will intervene. We will expect stronger action than that, to make sure this problem is grasped—and not allowed to encourage people to fall into debt which frankly they cannot handle—and to put a proper framework around what is essentially a form of lending. I note in that context that Klarna is described today as the most valuable new start-up in Europe; its rate of growth and the appetite for buy now, pay later should set alarm bells ringing.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, for supporting my Amendment 92. It is a probing amendment that deals with a crucial aspect of financial inclusion—I find echoes of this in some of the words of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. The inadequacy of basic bank accounts and the reluctance of many of the banks that offer them to engage with the needs of basic bank account customers is an underlying problem. It certainly means that basic bank accounts do not lead to appropriate vehicles for people in the most disadvantaged end to borrow or save, or to engage much more broadly with financial service products. In this day and age, that is a serious issue.

The situation is better today than it was a few years ago; I remember listening to high-street banks who would encourage those coming in to open a basic bank account to go down the street to Nationwide, where they would receive a friendlier reception. Basic bank accounts were regarded just as cost; this was not only inappropriate but meant that those who were welcoming ended up with the greatest share of the burden. I have always taken the view that trying to make an institution provide a service to a customer that they do not want will mean a failed product. We have about 7.5 million people with basic bank accounts and some 1.2 million people completely unbanked. We have to grasp this nettle.

In the United States, intended or not, the approach to people who have been shut out of the financial services system has been different and rather more effective. I would like the Government as well as the regulators to go away and look at it. Under the Community Reinvestment Act 1977, any bank that sought permission to acquire or merge with another bank—something almost every bank was doing at the time—was required to demonstrate that it fully served the disadvantaged communities in its service area. As a civil rights measure, banks were basically red-lining African American, Latin American or Central American communities. They were allowed to serve those communities by supporting local institutions identified as much better fitted to the purpose. This gave a new lease of life to community development financial institutions—CDFIs—of all kinds, including credit unions and community banks. The major banks invested in them to pass that threshold and be able to do acquisitions and mergers, and supported them with expertise in marketing and technology.

I would very much like to see that model here; that is the purpose of my amendment. The DWP’s 2019 report on financial inclusion states:

“Social and community lenders such as credit unions and … CDFIs … provide a lower cost alternative to high-cost lenders, they are small in comparison and lack the visibility and capability to compete at scale. The UK needs a much larger, more vibrant social lending sector”.


CDFIs know the needs of their clients—that is where their work is targeted. They often work with local charities and civil society groups to provide money advice, business advice and a wide range of additional support to make people financially capable.

Some investors in the UK are developing new entities in this space. I am aware of two potential new mutuals, one in the south-west and one in London, targeted at this group of people. The recent report by Ron Kalifa on fintechs identified that new fintechs have the capability to provide a tailored, low-cost offering. But the reality is that very few new players have emerged to serve the excluded sector, which tells me that the system that we have at present is not working. I want all major UK banks to engage with this sector and for the regulator to make it a requirement, not just an act of charity or public relations. That could be done within the banking licence or through regulation, but that would change it from being a passive set of actions to an active way in which to make sure that this gap in the market is filled by people capable of doing it well.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, and others who supported Amendment 93, which deals with the current and accelerating crisis of access to cash. The Government promised legislation at last year’s Budget, but there is no sign of it yet. Covid has driven a sharp drop in cash usage from three in 10 people before the crisis to just one in 10 people. That is a huge drop, but it still leaves about 5 million people who rely on using cash. Of course poverty and age are often a characteristic, but for many people it is a strong cultural preference; they want to use cash, and it is really their right.

As I understand it, the Government are going to follow the direction recommended by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes; they will be able to confirm whether that is correct. That would permit retailers to provide cash without a purchase, which would help, but it is still very hit and miss. The Access to Cash Review done by Natalie Ceeney in 2019 highlighted the fact that retailers’ reluctance to accept cash is driving a lot of the change. Bank branches are closing across the country, especially in rural and disadvantaged communities. LINK, the largest cash machine network, has a contract with the Post Office, but it has about 18 months or so to run. Free-to-use ATMs are disappearing fast; when I talked to the industry, the estimate that I was given was that, if we do not do something quickly, half the ATMs in the country will be pay to use within 18 months.

We will need intervention by the FCA. Lots of commercial companies are involved in the system and any change or rationalisation throws up competition issues. The banks, for example, could be given an obligation to provide free access to cash but then allowed to use a utility model whereby they combine to provide free, shared smart machines capable of a range of services, perhaps with an assistant present to help users to navigate the machines. That changes how we think about this issue quite dramatically—and normally we would have time to do that, but we are now faced with an urgent situation.

I quote one final phrase of Natalie Ceeney’s report, because to me it says it all:

“It is … critical that action is taken now, so that no-one is left behind.”


I recommend that the Government take urgent action to deal with access to cash.

[The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Lord True) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken very genuinely, because we are considering an important group of amendments on consumer access to credit. I am very grateful for the continued and thoughtful interest of noble Lords in this area. I assure all those who have spoken that we are listening carefully and will read this debate.

Amendment 79 would require the Treasury to introduce legislation to bring buy now, pay later products into FCA regulation, to which all speakers referred. The Government are committed to protecting the interests of consumers and, since Second Reading, as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, said in moving his amendment so ably, the Woolard Review has recommended that these products should be brought into the scope of FCA regulation. The Government are acting swiftly, following the outcome to this review, just as the Economic Secretary committed to do during this Bill’s passage through the other place. That is why, on 2 February, we announced our intention to legislate to bring them into regulation. However, it is important to know that these products are interest free and, therefore, inherently lower risk than most other forms of borrowing, so it is essential that regulation protects customers in a way that ensures that they can continue to use these products to manage their finances, rather than more expensive forms of credit on which they might otherwise rely. The Government therefore intend to consult stakeholders to ensure that a proportionate approach to regulation is achieved.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I believe the House owes a great debt of gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for the work he has been doing on this issue over the last nine years. I have been involved in part of the process, which is why I put my name down to speak: like him, I feel rather confused and not a little embarrassed that no action has been taken in recent years.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, I first got involved in this when policy changed in the early part of the coalition Government and new arrangements were introduced for interest-bearing loans and, eventually, maintenance loans. I recall that in about 2014 there was the consultation process described by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. As I was then the Labour spokesperson on higher education in your Lordships’ House, I got a lot of correspondence, exactly as he described, from potential students and some existing students. Potential students wanted to know whether at the time they applied and went to higher education there would be a real chance of there being loans that they could take out that would not be a problem in terms of sharia compliance. More worryingly, students who were already at university in the middle of their course found that they could not continue without a guarantee in some form that finance would be available to allow them to see out their course.

In a sense, we were all trying to do the same thing. Indeed, I sat in on meetings with the Higher Education Minister at the time, Jo Johnson, and other colleagues in the House. We had meetings with representatives of Muslim students and the community at which a lot of these issues were explored. When the Government took powers in the 2018 Act, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, to ensure that they could facilitate the production of loans of this type, we thought the matter was over. Indeed, I wrote to a number of people I had been working with saying that we thought that the process had reached its natural conclusion and that it was just a matter of time before the Government brought forward the necessary proposals.

As we have discovered, that has not happened, and although there have been promises and suggestions that it was coming, it has not. The Government have got themselves into a very bad position here. I cannot believe that it is impossible to go forward—as the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, said, just to do it—and I am looking forward to hearing the Minister’s response. If there is anything we can do to help, he should be sure that there is, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said, no politics in this. We simply want a good job done to make sure that all people who contribute and wish to contribute to higher education in this country can do so and are not in any sense disadvantaged simply because of their religion.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, any one of us can go on to our smartphone and find an app for halal financing for someone who wants to buy a car or a house—they are called “halal mortgages”—or who needs money to support a small business. It is incredible and quite incomprehensible that we do not have a sharia-compliant version of student loans. It is not as though we do not know how to do it or the institutions do not exist in the UK. I suspect that many noble Lords have been, like I have, at general meetings of the financial services industry where, as well as talking about being world leading in terms of green finance, we have talked about London as a very important centre for sharia-compliant finance as we attempt to expand and have a much greater global reach. Six years is an incredible time to wait. It has been four years since enabling legislation was put in place.

I was looking at a Metro article on the web about students who were interviewed in 2019. Some had managed to put together a way to pay their student fees. One said:

“I was constantly broke as a student and never, ever did anything remotely fun. I always felt too guilty if I spent any money on myself.”


Students who started out and found that they just could not keep going left and went to work, but then found that, as this lady said,

“to progress further I need that degree so the plan is to go back.”

However, this young woman has no idea how to finance it. Another youngster talked about the stress of

“having to live scrupulously and scrape up enough to pay each instalment in time.”

We really should not be putting any student into this situation. I do not understand the delay. There does not seem to be an obstacle in terms of designing the appropriate facility or the appropriate legislation. I hope that the Ministers who are here, all of whom are people of understanding and sympathy, will go and put pressure on the Government to take this from the bottom of the in-tray and put it at the top. It could be a minor amendment that we make on Report.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the last Labour Government were supportive of facilitating access to sharia-compliant financial services, and we understand—and welcome—that Her Majesty’s Government have made similarly helpful noises during their time in office. This is an interesting time for financial services as some firms prioritise divesting from fossil fuel projects, and so on. If such moves are possible, surely we can make progress on services that do not have involvement in industries such as gambling or alcohol?

Amendment 88 raises the issue of sharia-compliant student finance, which was subject to a recent e-petition on the Parliament website. In their response, the Government recalled their consultation on the matter back in 2014 and said that they intend to publish an update on progress later this year. While we appreciate that it takes time to engage with communities to understand their needs, evaluate feedback, devise new schemes and ultimately make them operational, there has been a significant wait for new products, and we need evidence from the Minister that we will soon turn a corner.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Trenchard (Con) [V]]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Blackwell’s amendment is an interesting idea and deserves serious consideration. It requires the establishment of a new joint co-ordination committee, comprising delegates of both regulators under the chairmanship of the Governor of the Bank of England. As long as we retain a “twin peaks” regulatory structure, it is clearly right that both regulators carry out their duties in a co-ordinated manner, ensuring that their activities are consistent and proportionate in meeting their respective general duties and objectives.

At the time of the introduction of the “twin peaks” system, we were told that it was necessary because there was a conflict between the interests of the consumer and those of the Government in maintaining financial stability. However, the FCA is responsible for both consumer protection and the prudential regulation of all regulated companies except very large ones that are considered systemically important. Might not the best way to be sure that the regulators’ actions are consistent and proportionate be to merge them into a single regulator—the FSA—but leave the Bank responsible for macroprudential regulation?

As I failed to add my name to the speakers’ list for the group of amendments beginning with Amendment 2, debated on 22 February, I was able to speak only briefly after the Minister. My noble friend’s amendment deals with much the same ground, which gives me an opportunity, with the Committee’s leave, to make some of the points that I had wanted to make on the first day.

My noble friend’s amendment seeks to ensure consistent priorities between the two regulators. This is hard to do if the objectives confer conflicting priorities on the two regulators. Indeed, it can be argued that being dual regulated at all is time-consuming, expensive and unattractive. However, I strongly believe that we must move quickly to maximise the attractiveness of London’s markets in order to be assured that the City, including our wider financial services industry, will remain one of the two truly leading global financial centres, with all that that means for our prosperity as a nation.

In 1999, I was privileged to serve on the Joint Committee on Financial Services and Markets under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Burns, during my first incarnation in your Lordships’ House. At that time, we considered arguments that the FSA should be given a competition objective as a fifth objective. This was supported by the BBA and the ABI, but the Government argued, and the committee ultimately decided, to put competition and competitiveness among the principles rather than the statutory objectives. Two arguments that led us so to decide were that ensuring competition was the primary task of the OFT, not the FSA, and that making competitiveness of UK financial services an objective could damage the FSA’s relations with overseas regulators. Our report at that time noted that some members of the committee would have preferred competition and competitiveness to feature among the FSA’s statutory objectives.

Much water has flowed under the bridge since 1999. Following the financial crisis of 2008, the FSA was split into two regulators, and we adopted the “twin peaks” model that had first been introduced by Australia. On 22 February, my noble friend Lord Howe said that discussions about the balance of the regulator’s objectives

“are not arguments for today. The Government’s future regulatory framework review is considering how the UK’s financial services regulatory framework must adapt to reflect our future outside of the EU. That has to be the right place to consider issues such as the regulators’ objectives”.—[Official Report, 22/2/21; col. GC 142.]

The Minister’s response was disappointing. Does he not agree that our departure from the EU and freedom to adopt an entirely different, principles-based, outcomes-oriented regulatory model suggests that the Government should look seriously at this question as soon as possible?

Some encouraging proposals are included in the phase 2 framework consultation, such as the introduction of “activity-specific regulatory principles”, described in section 2.38. However, it seems that the Government do not plan wholesale changes. They conclude in section 2.46 that these regulatory principles could bring about

“enhanced regulator focus on … competitiveness, without needing to change the regulators’ overarching objectives”.

Such an approach is dangerously complacent. Can the Minister confirm that the Government agree with Andrew Bailey that it would be unrealistic and dangerous to stick to EU banking rules in the future? Surely, in financial services, where we enjoy the advantages of scale and can influence the emergence of global consensus around principles-based regulations that support innovation, we should move quickly to establish the right regulatory framework to do that.

Co-ordination between our two regulators has served us fairly well to date, but it is likely that the regulators will continue to face difficulties inherent in a multi-agency regulatory structure where the performance of one regulator is often dependent on that of the other. There is also a challenge in establishing the borders of financial regulation for allocating functions between the FCA and the PRA. In particular, the increased focus on systemic stability and macroprudential regulations has resulted in overlap between the two regulators. The FCA has responsibility for the prudential regulation of more than 24,000 firms in the UK, whereas the PRA is responsible only for the prudential regulation of some 1,500 systemically important banks and investment firms. Further, the “twin peaks” system is inherently anti-competitive for dual-regulated banks and investment companies, which have to report a large amount of monthly data in two different formats to two different regulators.

The PRA’s secondary competition objective is, by definition, subordinate to its other two objectives. In effect, it is simply a principle to which the PRA should have regard. Many countries have financial regulators that incorporate some kind of competition objective among their statutory objectives, and I do not think that there is any evidence that this has damaged their relationships with either the PRA or the FCA.

Furthermore, in his recent report on competition and markets, John Penrose found that

“our independent competition and consumer regulation regime currently has a good reputation, but not a great one. International rankings put our major competition institutions behind USA, France, Germany, EU and Australia. We have stopped making progress on cutting the costs of red tape and, in recent years, have gone backwards”.

This is largely as a result of a constantly increasing number of sectors, including many in financial services, being caught by the tentacles of the very cumbersome, expensive and complicated system of regulation that has been increasingly pushed by the Commission in the interests of harmonisation.

We have prospered and succeeded as a global financial centre not because of our EU regulatory framework but in spite of it. We may have devised much of the financial regulation ourselves and may even have gold-plated some of it, but we did not choose to work within the codified structures on which European law is based. Besides, our regulators are not that different from anyone else’s: they like to make rules, and gold-plating has been the only way that they could do that in recent years.

As Barnabas Reynolds explains well in his recent paper, published by Politeia and entitled Restoring UK Law: Freeing the UK’s Global Financial Market, common law is

“pivotal to the success of a global financial centre … A key element of London's attractiveness to investors is its legal framework, which underpins a flourishing commercial environment with the rule of law”.

I worry that the Government do not yet recognise that we have to replace the entire directives-based, cumbersome, EU-derived financial services rulebook and go back to something more like how we used to regulate: based on common law principles and outcomes. There is huge resistance to change among trade associations and larger financial services groups because the present system helps the strong incumbent against the innovator and the challenger—and is, in fact, a form of protectionism.

I look forward to hearing what my noble friend the Minister intends to do to move in the direction in which we need to go. I believe that my noble friend’s amendment may provide a first step on that journey.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will respond to the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. I for one would be very reluctant to go back to the pre-2008 principles-based approach to regulation that led us into a long, slow crash that, frankly, seriously undermined the financial stability of the UK and caused years of austerity. I do not think that is a good example to hold up of the world that we want to return to.

When the FCA and PRA were created—at that point the latter had a degree of independence from the Bank of England, although I think the Governor was always going to be its chair—one of the reasons that it was important to keep some distinct separation was to prevent the groupthink that had been fundamental to the failures that led to 2007-08. Those were failures to identify systemic risk, to ask questions, to create challenge and to recognise that conduct and prudential regulation are equally important in keeping a system as complex and difficult to regulate as the financial services industry on some kind of transparent and rational platform.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted to follow my noble friend Lady Noakes. Like her, I was struck by the comments of the Governor of the Bank of England, and I feel she has given us a welcome dose of reality this evening.

I speak as a member of the EU Committee and its Services Sub-Committee. We have wrestled long and hard on the vexed question of the granting of equivalence by the EU, including the important issue of reciprocity, highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I want to make three points and ask one question.

First, once one has decided to leave the EU, it makes little sense to be tied to its rules and regulations—in effect, as the Governor of the Bank of England has said recently, thereby becoming a rule taker without being able to make any input to the new rules. So we will have to plough our own furrow on financial services. But that does not stop us agreeing equivalence arrangements in areas where there is strong mutual interest such as central counterparties, known as CCPs, already temporarily approved, and perhaps insurance. We have granted equivalence to European banks and other bodies, as has been said, and the prospect of maintaining that equivalence gives us some leverage.

Secondly, I do not see why we should necessarily refuse equivalence to third countries which do not have similar legal and supervisory standards. Flexibility is important if we are to welcome investors here, and they may have different yet adequate regimes, bringing in innovation and diversity of offer, which could be valuable in the UK. Trade in services is absolutely vital to the future of this country.

Thirdly, I can see the value of some form of reporting to Parliament, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, in Amendment 100 and my noble friend Lord Hodgson in Amendment 105—although in different ways. Even on the EU Committee, we have had the greatest difficulty extracting information on the progress of negotiations on financial services, partly because this is in the hands of the Treasury and its officials, while the main spokesman has been my noble friend Lord Frost, who has led our negotiations across the board with such tenacity.

My question is this. How does my noble friend the Deputy Leader feel about the balance between UK-owned banks and financial service operators and their EU competitors now that we have granted equivalence and the EU, in the main, has not? Am I right in thinking that a German bank such as Deutsche Bank, a Dutch bank such as Rabobank or a French asset management firm such as Amundi is regulated in its own country and less subject to UK regulator bureaucracy and aggressive enforcement of something like MiFID than its UK counterparts? Is there any sense in which it is privileged, and is this true also of smaller operators? Does this matter to UK plc?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I shall begin by addressing Amendments 100 and 105, which would require reports that would be both useful and interesting. However, I want to pick up the point that was made by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who essentially took the position—I understand its logic—“Why bother to seek equivalence from the EU?” I think she said, “They wish us ill and see a competitive advantage in not offering equivalence.” However, I do not think she listened carefully to my noble friend Lady Bowles, who comes with a great deal of experience from the EU. The point my noble friend made is that in the EU, which is a rules-based organisation —that is its absolutely core fundamental structure—it is quite hard to offer equivalence to a financial centre where those who are regulating it make it very clear that they want great flexibility to be able to make change very easily and with very little process. That is what we are doing with this Bill.

Essentially, we are removing the normal parliamentary processes that would have been engaged in the process of changing regulation and leaving it in the hands of the regulator, with, as we have all discussed, virtually no accountability to Parliament. It seems from what we read that a 12-week consultation would be about all that is required for a regulator to change the rules, compared with the process in the EU, which people may regard as cumbersome but which has with it extensive consultation, engagement and oversight, and which flushes out exactly what is associated with, what is involved with and what the consequences are of that rule change. We will now have light-touch rule change—that would be an accurate way to describe it. In an atmosphere where there is very little trust—the language certainly has not been that which would develop and promote trust—I can certainly see why the EU would be uncomfortable with the idea of offering equivalence in those circumstances. Therefore, it is not a determination to do us ill but, to a significant degree, some shock that change will happen so often that it will have very little idea of the rule base that applies in the UK and certainly will not understand its various ramifications.

However, in a sense it really does not matter. I find it quite shattering that we have a Government—the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, seems to be aligned with them—who say, “We are really not interested in being able to sell our services into the second-largest economy on the globe”—whether measured by population or in terms of GDP. That is a huge and significant market. We have never been successful at selling financial services into the United States, partly because it has its own, very stalwart financial services sector. I suggest that selling financial services into China will be exceedingly difficult over many years. China will wish to develop its own financial centre; it has Hong Kong. We begin then to look at countries across Asia and in South America. However, I think we will find very shortly that they intend to develop their own financial centres. When I have talked to people in India, they would be willing to do some work here with people in the UK but they want to develop Mumbai. We are seeing a regionalisation of economic blocs, which will lead to a rise of significant financial centres in other locations across the globe. There is a real danger in dismissing with a wave of the hand the customers who sit on our doorstep, who have traditionally been our core customers, and saying, in essence, “It really doesn’t matter whether we are able to sell them services. Let’s look elsewhere.” I am not sure that “elsewhere” looks quite so promising.

What I found most interesting in this whole debate was a very different set of questions raised by my noble friend Lady Bowles. To me they were, if you like, the financial services equivalent of the chlorinated chicken question. As we go out and seek to sell our financial services more broadly, presumably, many of those locations will turn to us and say, “You can sell to us provided we can sell to you. We’re developing our financial sector and we would like to have access to your markets.” My noble friend was asking: what standards will we be using to determine that reciprocity? As I say, it is the chlorinated chicken question. We have not heard much—or anything, frankly—from the Government about what standards we will apply under those circumstances.

It seems to me that, when we assert that we can find markets all over the globe that will take the place of the EU—and that this can be done rapidly and very easily—we have to answer that question. Are we going to have to pay the price of providing reciprocity to financial centres whose standards do not meet our own? What are the consequences of that if those entities are then freely able to enter the UK market? We have a long history of concern about money laundering and market abuse. There are very serious questions associated with that; I would like to begin to hear some answers.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I have been very struck by this particular debate and the positions taken by Members of the Grand Committee. I approach this question of our future financial services relationship with the European Union with a sort of historical perspective. In a way, the financial services industry in this country is unique in the history of financial centres in that it is a financial centre without any significant savings or economic hinterland. The great financial centres of history—be it Venice, Amsterdam, 19th-century London or 20th/21st-century New York—have thrived on a powerful flow of domestic and imperial savings, and have tended to fade when that flow has dried up.

The fact that the City of London has continued to thrive even as Britain has lost its Empire and the UK economy has lost its dominant position is no doubt due to a remarkable concentration of talent and entrepreneurship; to the remarkable luck of widespread access to financial markets around the world; and to becoming, as the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, pointed out, the financial centre of the European Union. The international liberalisation of the 1980s and the creation of the European single market gave the City access to that economic hinterland and the opportunity to provide financial services throughout an open market.

As we know, the openness of the European market for financial services to the UK is now in question. As this Bill makes clear, access that was previously open is now potentially closed and hanging on this delicate thread of equivalence. It is interesting to see that the Bill is nervous about equivalence. On page 65, we read that

“the FCA must consider, and consult the Treasury about, the likely effect of the rules on relevant equivalence decisions.”

On page 82, we read that

“the PRA must consider, and consult the Treasury about, the likely effect of the rules on relevant equivalence decisions.”

That nervousness is well founded. I agree with the noble Lords who have been critical of the European Union that the likelihood of equivalence being the foundation of successful financial activities for the City’s continuing growth in Europe is at least in great doubt. Indeed, just imagine the chief executive of a big international bank or an asset manager with a large number of employees in London telling the board of directors that they are planning their long-term investments on the shaky foundations of a political equivalence ruling by Brussels.

At the moment, the only thread that seems to be at least holding and maintaining the potential of access to a market of 500 million people is the memorandum of understanding, which was due in June but is still apparently debated. However, a draft that was leaked to the Politico website

“states categorically that equivalence findings remain unilateral decisions, meaning the U.K. would have no recourse if the EU opted to withdraw it.”

The draft does propose the creation of an EU-UK financial regulatory forum but this resembles the arrangement with the United States that is defined as “strictly informal”. I think that access will be diminished, perhaps significantly. That is the only certain conclusion we can make. Perhaps the Minister will tell us more about the progress of the memorandum of understanding when he sums up.

Financial Services Bill

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 1st March 2021 Grand Committee

In closing, will my noble friend the Minister tell the Committee what plans the Government have to look at the issue of capital risk weighting and at how it can align with the UK’s net-zero commitment? Is this something that will be looked at by, for example, the Network for Greening the Financial System? Will the Government think again and have some sympathy with the idea of increasing the risk weighting associated with these assets, at least in line with what is proposed in Amendment 31?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I begin by welcoming Amendment 136A from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, which is the only amendment in the group that does not have my name attached to it. The amendment is useful. In a sense, it belongs with the group of amendments on climate change that we discussed last week, in that it is focused on disclosure and other such issues, which is helpful. The reason why we have this group of amendments is that we require more powerful levers, we need to recognise urgency and we need the financial system to recognise both the risks that it faces as a sector from the implications of climate change and the positive role that it can play.

Mark Carney and Andrew Bailey have both accepted that climate change is the greatest risk that we face to financial stability. That surely should be reflected in the way that the industry is regulated. I was therefore taken aback when Andrew Bailey, in his speech to the Green Horizon Summit in November, laid out a strategy that seemed to depend, essentially, on better data, disclosure and guidance. At the macro level, Mr Bailey confirmed that a climate stress exercise, postponed because of Covid, would launch in June 2021, but then he said:

“We will not use the results to size firms’ capital buffers.”


I found that quite shocking, but, having listened to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, I realise the kind of pressures that Andrew Bailey must be facing from the industry. Surely capital buffers are a crucial tool of the regulator. If climate change is the most important risk to financial stability, surely the Bank of England must be prepared to reflect that in its capital adequacy requirements.

The noble Lord, Lord Oates, explained the complexity of some of the calculations. I understand that the numbers look really large when they are written down, but of course they are a weighting. The consequence for existing assets is not that a bank will have to hold 150% equivalent to its exposure but rather a percentage of that—around 12% of the exposure, I think. The number is not quite as alarming as it looks. When we look at future exploitation, we see that essentially what is being said is that it is so risky that 100% of capital needs to be held against any loan made—in effect, it is an equity investment because of the nature of its risk and not a risk that can accept the additional risk that is attached to leverage.

When I listened to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, a couple of things particularly struck me. One is that I have far less faith than she does in the ability of the banks to assess credit risk. Sometimes they are pretty good at looking at an individual company—though, my goodness, a lot of that was flawed, if we look at the period before 2008. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, was on the board of RBS and must have looked back at its credit—not at the time of its troubles being created but afterwards—and probably was in shock at some of the credit practices that were in place. That is similarly true at HBOS, Northern Rock and a wide range of banking institutions.

We should not fool ourselves that banks are all-seeing, even when it comes to looking at an individual company’s credit risk. But where they are really poor is in identifying change and looking at systemic and holistic risk. That is why we ran into that incredible crisis in 2008. The industry struggles to look beyond the small and narrow to understand the broader picture and then apply it to its whole range of credit decisions. I say that as someone who spent most of their banking career in the United States as a commercial banker, looking extensively at credit risk; I very much understand the weakness of the system.

Banking is, almost by definition, a short-term activity, so decisions are made over relatively short horizons. Despite the many changes that we have introduced at governance level to try to inculcate a longer-term culture, it will always be true—partly because of the way that remuneration and promotions are structured, and partly because it is just inherent in the culture of most of these institutions—that the way that banks look is inherently short term. They are particularly bad at assessing long-term risk and understanding how the implications of that should be applied on any given day.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, said that if we do not want to see lending to future fossil fuel exploitation, we should deal with it globally at the COP meeting later in the year. I say to him that we take this same attitude to junk mortgages; I do not remember us saying that we must not do anything to increase the risk of those while we wait for a global agreement. We do the same thing with a wide range of high-risk derivatives and I do not remember us saying we should not act on those until we get a global agreement. When the financial regulator sees risk and recognises it, it has a responsibility to act. I remain, as I said, rather shaken at the idea that we have a financial regulator that will be identifying that risk but then not using it in its power to adapt capital buffers. As I have said, this is almost the last point at which we as parliamentarians will collectively be able to have an impact on the banks’ thinking and it strikes me that we need to seize that opportunity now.

Holding capital is a powerful tool to force a banking institution to face up to the risk that it is undertaking. That is why it is particularly true that the capital adequacy requirements are some of the most powerful leverages to change. In that same conversation, we must also make it clear to banks that they are not too big to fail and that if they undertake high-risk transactions there are consequences—in the past there have not been, as we as a country have bailed them out.

Finally, I will talk to Amendment 42, which deals with credit rating agencies. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, pointed out, an organisation such as Shell has a very high credit rating and who would not lend to an organisation with a credit rating on that scale? We always—I would say this to any individual Minister—have to be somewhat cynical when we look at the product of credit rating agencies. I know that they try to behave with integrity, but the companies pay their fees and their wages and that tends to incline them to think in very narrow terms. None of the credit rating agencies got right the crisis that we saw in 2008-09, even though it developed over quite a period of years leading up to 2008-09. This was not an overnight event; it was a crisis that built over a decade and, in that way, it is very similar to the climate change crisis.

We have an opportunity to put down a particularly important marker to the regulator and say, “You have a tool that matters, a tool that you can use to protect the financial system from risk, which you yourself acknowledge and recognise and which you say you find frankly somewhat frightening. So use those tools.” In these amendments, we have the leverage to make the regulator do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Naseby (Con) [V]]

I thank the Lord Chairman. As I was just saying, in both the United States and Canada there has been a change in young people’s attitudes to debt. This is one reason why the credit union movement there is seeing better times and beginning to come strongly back to life. However, two other things have happened here. First, during the pandemic, people have had a chance to look in great depth at their own financial situation; many are responding to approaches by building societies, credit unions and the other mutuals by having interactions, on the basis that they know somebody. They do not know anybody in the banks. I do not have a clue who looks after an account that I have at RBS; all I can do is act on the telephone. Secondly, and in addition, what do we see on the ground? Bank after bank are closing branches. Whereas in the old days I could go to the RBS in Biggleswade, and then to Bedford, now they have all gone. There is an opportunity here that should be encouraged.

Secondly, I will look not at cheap credit—I hasten to say—but what is called “home-collected credit”, which I covered to some extent at Second Reading. That is all about consumer choice and a fair price. Home-collected credit has been around for 150 years. It is highly successful: it is the credit of choice for the working classes, if I may use that phrase in today’s world. People who use home-collected credit take out small, short-term loans perhaps three or four times a year, probably around Christmas, Easter, birthdays and days such as that. They know what the terms are; the terms do not change, and if they run over in terms of repayment, there is not some swingeing increase in the rate charged. They get a single credit charge.

On the other side, there are payday loans. Every one of us in politics knows exactly what those loans are about: they compound interest and offer high-frequency, weekly loans that people get hooked on. When they go a bit wrong, the claims management companies—CMCs—leap in with a huge volume of complaints, most of which are manufactured. The problem is that today the FCA appears to be treating all high-cost credit models in the same way. The regulator is taking a singular sector-wide approach to affordability and repeat lending and pays less or no attention to the crucial differences between these two products. Whereas officials once differentiated between the responsible and the harmful models, now they treat them all the same. There is therefore a real danger of the HCCs being driven out of business.

In 2018 no less a man than Andrew Bailey said that people viewed home-collected credit differently from rent-to-own and payday ones, and that this was the model he thought about because the difference with home-collected credit is that the borrower knows the lender. The agent is the lender; that is, it is a different, almost social relationship that goes on and creates different attitudes. I ask the Minister to have a close look at this, and perhaps a discussion with the FCA and the Financial Ombudsman Service, to ensure that there is a clear differentiation in any investigations that they might want to undertake between these two very different models.

Thirdly, with the permission of the Committee, I would like to go back to the Mutuals’ Deferred Shares Bill, which I took through your Lordships’ House in 2015. I was motivated to do so by my interest in the mutual movement and by the financial crash of 2008. It seemed to me that there was a need for mutual insurers and friendly societies to have a means of raising capital. That is what I set about doing and it became law in 2015. That was, for me, a high day for the mutual movement. Today, there are not hundreds of mutual insurers and friendly societies: in fact, the active ones are the 52 that are members of the Association of Financial Mutuals.

What that Bill—which is now an Act—did was important, first, because it gave access to new capital, particularly for the friendly societies and mutual insurers. Secondly, without that new capital, many mutuals would have been driven into inappropriate corporate forms through demutualisation. Thirdly, a lack of capital limits mutuals’ growth and their ability to develop new services, which is what this amendment is all about. Fourthly, like all businesses, mutuals need to be able to benefit from economies of scale. Fifthly, it is important to learn lessons from that financial crisis I mentioned; if financial services businesses are to build up stronger capital bases, they require the legislated regulatory agility with which to do so. Sixthly and lastly, there are direct benefits of being able to issue new shares; debt—the alternative—is of lower quality than equity for firms wishing to build their capital base.

One dimension of the then Bill had two elements to it. I am afraid the Government of the day decided they would not accept the second arm that I put in the Bill originally, which was the proposal to have redeemable share instruments for co-operative and community benefit societies. At the time, the Government said they were

“unpersuaded about the merit of a redeemable share instrument as these societies already have a means of issuing redeemable shares. The Government do not see a clear need and demand for such an instrument”.—[Official Report, 24/10/14; col. 923.]

I think the world has not changed. The Government need to have another long, hard look at the second element of that Bill. Obviously, I withdrew that section, because I was happy to have what I could get.

The mutual world is dynamic. If we have learned nothing else from Covid—I was in isolation for my 10 days because I caught it at the beginning of January—it is that people work very hard on a local level. We need to capitalise on that. Society wants it. The wind is in the right direction. I hope very much that the amendments that both the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and my very good and noble friend Lord Holmes are putting forward find a following wind—not necessarily in the format they have produced them but certainly in some other format—and come to fruition.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak very quickly to Amendments 29 and 126. Like the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, I welcome both. We need to keep putting pressure on the regulator to be far more granular in regulation. There has been significant improvement on predecessor regulators, but there is a lot more work to be done. I will speak in a later group about roles which could encourage the regulator to gap-fill, which is very much related to how it regulates a much more varied set of financial organisations, particularly relatively small ones.

Unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I am a very strong fan of the idea of regional banks, so I appreciate the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. You have only to look at the Landesbanken in Germany and their capacity to focus on local issues and people; they are there for them during times of crisis when, frankly, big banks tend to flee. Being regional does not guarantee that you are good, but it certainly creates a different dynamic, which we ought to explore—particularly in an era when we are talking much more about the importance of devolution and recognising its significance, and dealing with a levelling-up agenda. I hope all those will generate some thought in the Treasury and Government.

My three amendments—I am sorry there are three and that I have to talk to all of them—are probing amendments into problems that the Government need to get down and fix promptly.

Amendment 43 deals with the proportionality issue, which really is urgent. The level of loss-absorbing capital which medium-sized banks must hold in the UK is decided by the Bank of England. The Bank has been clear in declaring that these banks are not systemic, so we are not looking at systemic risk, but it treats them as if they were major banks, systemically risky, for the purposes of setting the requirement for loss-absorbing capital, and sets what is known as MREL—the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities—at 200% of their minimum capital requirements.

This is not an international norm. In the UK, the threshold at which MREL kicks in is a £15 billion balance sheet, or 40,000 transactional accounts—that really is a medium-sized bank. In the eurozone, the threshold is a €100 billion balance sheet, and in the US it is $250 billion before MREL kicks in. I really think that the Bank of England needs to go back and look at this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Naseby (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I would like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for the second time this afternoon for an interesting new clause. I have in the back of my mind the concluding words of the Minister of State, my noble friend Lord Agnew, when he introduced this Bill. Colleagues will remember that he said the Bill

“will support economic prosperity across the country, ensure financial stability, market integrity and consumer protection. It will ensure that the UK remains a world-class financial centre.”—[Official Report, 28/1/21; col. 1814.]

So we all know that the Bill is absolutely key. This particular amendment is about the enhanced role of the FCA and the PRA and, in particular, those who lead them. It means, frankly, that they are ever more powerful and important.

The amendment calls for a review after five years, although the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, made it clear that, according to her contacts in Australia, a shorter period would have been better. I am quite clear in my own mind that five years is far too long. A great many changes are happening all the time, and I am quite sure that the market will remain dynamic and there will be many opportunities; personally, I would suggest a period of three years. You could argue for two, and I understand why you might, but I think that three years is about right, because it is quite a challenge for those who are running these two organisations to be reviewed after two years, which in effect means 18 months.

Should it be just one person? No, it is far too big a challenge for just one person. I believe there should be a team of three, and it should be the responsibility of one of them to be the chairman of the review, with a casting vote if necessary. In my experience of 12 years on the Public Accounts Committee, quite often a small working group would be set up of just three of us to look at the spread and success or otherwise of our work, and it seems to me that that was a good test market. Secondly, I had the privilege of being chairman of a quoted investment trust for some 10 years on a fixed-term basis. We had a limited number of non-executives and we decided that there should be a review every two to three years of the strategy that the operational company was following.

I say to the noble Baroness: well done for putting this forward. In principle, it ought to find favour from Her Majesty’s Government, although I am sure that the review period should be shorter than five years.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, come another Monday, come another financial regulator story—this time in the Times. There are concerns that the FCA is going too slowly in its investigation of the Woodford scandal, to the point that Neil Woodford has felt confident about announcing plans to stage a comeback. It is just one story after another, and it very sadly makes the point. I think it is necessary to say that there are many—plenty—of good people at the FCA and the PRA, but clearly something is not working when we have regulatory scandal after regulatory scandal.

Financial services are notoriously difficult to police. The FCA is knee-deep in reviews that it has carried out after a failure, but the internal remedies that are promised every time perhaps help with the problem but do not seem to really cure it. Any financial services firm with a track record like the FCA would have been required by the regulator to bring in outside expertise to give an objective overview but then also to oversee change.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blackwell (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I too support these amendments and welcome the fact that the Bill addresses these issues. While Libor may have been effective in the past, we all know that it was becoming an unviable way of setting rates and was subject to manipulation, in the way mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Desai. It is therefore important that the regulators have taken a firm line in moving us on from Libor to other benchmarks. But, as my noble friend Lady Noakes set out, in doing that, there are lots of problems with continuity of contracts. The legislation is necessary to help address those issues and ensure that partners in contracts move together to a new common contract based on a synthetic Libor.

We have to recognise that no substitute for Libor will have exactly the same characteristics. There is no perfect substitute. Most contracts will be based on SONIA, the sterling overnight index average rate, but getting SONIA terms that have the same characteristics over time is not perfect, so there will be winners and losers. That is one reason why it is important that, to give certainty, the legislation requires the regulator to ensure that synthetic Libor interest rates are taken in the contracts as substituting for Libor for both parties.

As my noble friend Lady Noakes set out, however, some parties will not accept that. They will take the change in the contract as the basis to believe, argue or litigate that the contract has been abrogated. Some parties will be out of the money in a contract and it will simply serve their convenience to choose this method to abrogate the contract. Safe harbour is therefore an important secondary requirement. If banks are following the requirement of the regulator to stop using Libor, and following its instructions in substituting synthetic Libor, they cannot then be subject to litigation from counterparties claiming that, by following the instructions of the regulator, they have abrogated their contracts. This is an important thing for those contracts, which could, in particularly vulnerable contracts, involve vast sums of money.

The Government have launched a consultation on this, but I do not think that is a reason not to legislate in the timescale of this Bill. The problem has been known about for many months—indeed, years—and has been discussed. I do not believe the Government need a consultation to understand that there is a problem or that it must be dealt with. During the passage of this Bill, if not in these amendments then in the Government’s amendments, it is important for this to be incorporated into the Bill. Otherwise, the uncertainty will go on far too long. Libor will come to an end and these issues will present themselves. This Bill is the opportunity to address them.

In taking this issue seriously, can my noble friend the Minister commit that the Government will bring back amendments, or accept these amendments, during the passage of this Bill through the House?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I know we have to accept the safe harbour provisions in Amendment 45, but it would be slightly less galling if we had not had to drag the FCA kicking and screaming to investigate the Libor scandal. As noble Lords know, it was finally revealed after a series of American journalists published an investigation into Libor; it then took parliamentarians months to actually get the FCA to do anything about investigating. It first did so because, by that point, the Bank of England was involved in manipulating Libor as well, although, as I think I said in my Second Reading speech, it intervened to try to provide some element of financial stability for the more honourable purpose of disguising to the world how badly the banks had been hit by the 2008 crisis. However, all of them had been aware for years that Libor was being manipulated.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Desai, that this was no secret cartel; traders were shouting their required Libor benchmarks—the ones that would assist their bonuses—openly across the trading floors of various banks. There was nothing secret in this. At the time, under the UK approach—which is that anything not forbidden is permitted; since there was nothing to say, you could not lie in contributing to a financial benchmark —it was apparently not a criminal act or fraud. I do not think it ever even invoked the senior managers regime which came in later, but many of the players who were deeply involved in all this were obviously still around. It is a real stain on London.

I accept the safe harbour, but one of the things that saddens me is that some of those who will be hardest hit by the transition are small companies. Loans with spreads over Libor were not restricted to large, sophisticated companies; those companies will manage to work their way through this and make sure, if they are moving to a particular benchmark or negotiating a contract with the financial organisation they are set up with, that they do not come out damaged. However, many small businesses are exceedingly worried and have no idea which way to turn—do they get shifted to a new benchmark or stay with synthetic Libor? I hate to say this, but I think the assumption will turn out to be justified that, whatever happens, the amount they will pay in interest will be ratcheted up compared to the interest they would have paid had Libor remained. I find it very hard to conceive of banks saying, “We will move you to Sonia and you will pay less than you would have”. I am afraid there will be rounding up involved in all this. I am not sure how we provide any kind of fairness and justice, but maybe the Minister can talk about that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sikka (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I draw attention to my interests as set out in the register: I am an unpaid adviser to the Tax Justice Network. I strongly support Amendment 46 and congratulate the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans for providing the moral lead in securing tax justice and transparency.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, just pointed out, Gibraltar is one of the most secretive jurisdictions on this planet; indeed, it is among the top 30 most secretive, and inflicts tax losses on many nations including the UK. We all know that secrecy is an essential ingredient for tax avoidance and illicit financial flows. Over the years, Transparency International has reported that Gibraltar-based companies have been used to purchase properties in the UK, possibly with dirty money. Gibraltar has a population of around 33,000 but it has over 60,000 registered companies: that is, nearly two for every person living on the Rock. Many of these are just shell companies and little is really known about their authentic beneficial owners.

Gibraltar-based companies pop up in smuggling and bribery scandals all over the world. Unsurprisingly, a headline in the Guardian on 9 April 2017 said:

“Defend Gibraltar? Better Condemn it as a Dodgy Tax Haven”.


Little has changed. In February 2020, a report by the Council of Europe’s anti-money laundering body, MONEYVAL, called on Gibraltar to improve its efforts to combat, money-laundering and financing for terrorism.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans has already drawn attention to the tax haven aspects of Gibraltar. Unsurprisingly, many UK insurance and gambling companies are headquartered there because it is considerably more profitable to run UK operations from there by dodging UK taxes and increasing profit-related executive pay.

Research by TaxWatch shows that Gibraltar is indeed a hub for tax-avoidance: some 55% of the remote gambling services provided to UK-based customers are provided by companies based in Gibraltar. Most of the big companies, including William Hill, Ladbrokes and Bet365, have links to the Rock. Unibet’s website states that its servers are based in Malta, Alderney and Gibraltar and that it is registered and licensed in Gibraltar. The company is also listed on the New York Stock Exchange. This organisational maze provides opacity and tax avoidance and obfuscates accountability and the regulators’ ability to investigate.

William Hill has six subsidiaries in Gibraltar and is expected to pay around 12% in corporation tax for 2020, compared with the headline rate of just 19%. One of Ladbrokes Coral’s two licences to operate in the UK is registered in Gibraltar. On 9 August 2019, the Daily Mail reported that 32Red, which is based in Gibraltar,

“paid just £812,000 in corporation tax over ten years—an effective tax rate of just three per cent.”

The company is obviously not in Gibraltar just for the sunshine and the good climate. On 7 August 2020, the Daily Mail reported:

“Over the past two years, Bet 365 paid an effective tax rate of 12.7 percent on profits of £1.4 billion.”


Bet365’s accounts for the period 2015-19 show that the company’s corporation tax bill was £176 million lower because it has various operations in tax havens, including Gibraltar. Adjusting for inflation, Bet365 avoided around £182 million of UK corporation tax for the period 2015-19.

Ministers continue to tell us that companies should be taxed where sales and profits are made, but then we have this Bill, which will enable companies to book their profits in Gibraltar, even though they will have their sales and profits in the UK. The Government’s briefings on the Bill have not stated how much of the profits made in the UK are booked in Gibraltar and what the effect the Financial Services Bill will have on that.

The Government have a legal and moral duty for the good governance of Gibraltar and other jurisdictions to ensure that they do not continue to be what I call the world’s fiddle factories. Through this Bill, the Government are showering more gifts upon Gibraltar but without any quid pro quo; what exactly is it that we are getting in return? Can the Minister explain how these gifts aid tax justice in the UK? I strongly support Amendment 46 because it provides the basis for tax justice and transparency.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will be very brief—this is not my area of expertise. I do not know if this is a required declaration, but my family have a small apartment in Andalusia; we do not rent it out, so there is no income involved—but it means that we have many neighbours who seem to run their financial affairs through Gibraltar, much to their general advantage.

Gibraltar suffers from a perception that it is something of a tax haven, and, indeed, most of the normal taxes that are levied in the UK or Spain are not levied there. However, I think we all feel great sympathy for Gibraltar; it has absolutely been caught in the Brexit conundrum and has seen many of its sources of income from the Navy and the military disappear over a number of years.

Financial Services Bill

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 24th February 2021 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, we have, sadly, become used to skeleton primary legislation, with policy embedded in statutory instruments that cannot be amended and cannot be voted down without threats of a constitutional crisis. But at least statutory instruments can be brought before Parliament, and Ministers must then make the case.

This Bill is a new low—skeleton primary legislation, elimination of secondary legislation and policy set in regulators’ rules with no meaningful accountability to Parliament. The accountability set out in the Bill, which largely mirrors proposals in the future regulatory framework review, provides, in essence, just for a bit more explanation by the regulator, the existing right of a parliamentarian to submit evidence to any consultation, and the existing right for committees such as the Treasury Select Committee and the Economic Affairs Committee to question the regulator from time to time. This will be the policy framework shaping a sector of the economy that will fundamentally impact our national prosperity, jobs and public spending.

The Minister was kind enough to meet us, so I can perhaps anticipate some of the arguments that the Government are likely to make. They will argue that the Bill is just a stopgap while consultation takes place, but the consultation under way has multiple stages and will stretch the whole process out for 18 months or two years. By then the horse will have long bolted and procedures will largely have been set in stone. Perhaps the Minister would spell out the timetable—because the Bill looks to me like a template, not a stopgap.

Secondly, the Minister will say that only part of financial regulation is covered by the Bill. But, since it includes all of Basel III, the Bill actually covers almost everything that matters in prudential regulation. I have also heard from parts of industry that a second financial services Bill is on its way. I do not know that; I have not heard it from the Government—but if so, it will have come and gone before the new framework legislation is finalised. Perhaps the Minister would comment on that. It is absolutely clear that what happens with this Bill genuinely matters.

I value consultation—real consultation—but I am saddened because consultation has become a cynical tool to sideline Parliament. “Just give us a free hand now, because we’re doing a consultation.” Colleagues who cover other areas of policy tell me that this is a pattern, and are now concluding that it is cynically being used with a wide range of legislation, to make sure that Parliament is sidestepped.

I suspect that the Minister will argue that the powers being given to the regulators in this Bill, with minimal accountability, are necessary so that the UK can respond to changing events. After all, we have left the European Union and times are going to change. I regard that as nonsense. We are in changing times, but we have proved in the last year that fast-track procedures exist when they are genuinely needed.

I very much welcome the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, also signed by my noble friend Lady Bowles, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. They are tough: they would prevent Schedules 2 and 3 coming into effect before the accountability deficit is sorted. That, I suggest, is what the circumstance warrants.

This group of amendments was revised from Monday, so it now includes proposals detailing how accountability can be structured. We have heard a whole series of brilliant speeches in this debate, so I want to make only some limited comments.

The noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Eatwell, have tabled a number of amendments laying out process and timetable. I find that extremely constructive. By contrast, the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, has tabled an amendment that covers similar territory, but with such a light touch that—I hope he does not take this wrongly—I think it will be read as cosmetic. The industry needs to recognise the importance of proper scrutiny and understand that scrutiny in name only will, in the end, do the industry itself no long-term good.

In addition to the procedural amendments, my noble friend Lady Bowles has tackled an equally crucial but often overlooked element of oversight—one that goes to the heart of the matter. It is the need for the regulator to provide the detailed information to Parliament to fully understand and evaluate the evidence, reasoning and consequences of changes to rules. For years this has been done for us within the oversight process of the European Parliament, which has expert resources in depth. My noble friend, in her role in that Parliament, was able to use the information to improve proposals for rules and make them more effective. We have now lost that capacity, and nothing in the Bill or the framework consultation replaces it.

My noble friend Lady Bowles has also proposed amendments that would put this oversight on a regular basis, not just an ad hoc one, and would bring in an independent expert panel to do some of the heavy lifting. As the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, referred to, recently the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Financial Markets and Services addressed similar concerns. I quote from its February report, The Role of Parliament in the Future Regulatory Framework for Financial Services:

“Regardless of the format, the level of technical support available to Parliamentarians in this policy area will be key.”


The APPG goes on to propose secondments from the Treasury to the relevant parliamentary committees to bolster institutional capacity. I personally regard that as the wrong approach—that would be letting foxes into the henhouse—but it makes the point that proper parliamentary oversight requires new expert capability to replace that lost with Brexit. We have expertise within the regulator but we must have it for oversight of the regulator.

Before I finish, I want to refer to Amendment 137, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bruce, which would require the Government to consult on rule changes with the devolved Administrations. It is quite shocking to me that the devolved Administrations are overlooked in the Bill. Scotland is a major player in financial services and that needs to be recognised.

I will listen to the Minister’s response. I hope he will not repeat the airy dismissal that the Economic Secretary in the Commons deigned to give as his response. Voices on all Benches in this House are capable of coalescing around a set of viable amendments on Report that would at least remedy the worst in the Bill. The Government ought to be coming forward with the best.

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, in due course I will speak to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe and myself, which, as many noble Lords have commented, would introduce operational proposals that would address the problem of adequate parliamentary scrutiny.

Before I turn to those practicalities, though, I wish to speak to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, which deal with the principles at stake. As we might expect from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, her amendments are precise and direct and go to the heart of the matter: the inadequacy of parliamentary scrutiny.

I regret that I was unable to attend the Second Reading debate on the Bill. On reading the report of that debate, it is evident that an overwhelming sentiment in your Lordships’ House was that the procedures suggested by Her Majesty’s Government for the future development of the regulatory powers display a serious lack of appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. The fears expressed at Second Reading can only have been further reinforced by the note entitled “Meeting between the Economic Secretary, Peers, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulatory Authority: Background Briefing for Peers”, and by the document Financial Services Future Regulatory Framework Review Phase II Consultation, published by Her Majesty’s Treasury in October last year. Both documents advocate a degree of parliamentary scrutiny that may at very best be described as minimalist. Seldom can two documents have made the case so eloquently for the adoption of a policy entirely at odds with that which they propose.

The central thrust of government thinking is spelt out in the phase 2 consultation document to which I have just referred. It may help if I quote the relevant passage:

“The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), and the model of regulation introduced by that Act, continue to sit at the centre of the UK’s regulatory framework. The government believes that this model, which delegates the setting of regulatory standards to expert, independent regulators that work within an overall policy framework set by government and Parliament, continues to be the most effective way of delivering a stable, fair and prosperous financial services sector. The model maximises the use of expertise in the policy-making process by allowing regulators with day-to-day experience of supervising financial services firms to bring that real-world experience into the design of regulatory standards. It also allows regulators to flex and update those standards efficiently in order to respond quickly to changing market conditions and emerging risks. The FSMA model was readily adapted to address the regulatory failings of the 2007-08 financial crisis.”


Commenting further on the manner in which this model was readily adapted to address the regulatory failings of the 2007-08 financial crisis, the authors of this document declare:

“The financial crisis of 2007-08 revealed serious flaws in the UK’s system of regulation, particularly in the allocation and co-ordination of responsibilities across the ‘tripartite’ institutions – HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA … The post-crisis framework reforms were therefore focused primarily on institutional design and allocation of responsibilities.”


So the problem that led to massive regulatory failure and to a regulatory system that failed to protect UK citizens and firms from a near-existential breakdown in the financial system, that heralded a sharp downturn in real income and higher unemployment, and that led inexorably to the disastrous austerity policy was a problem of

“institutional design and allocation of responsibilities”.

There is no mention of the failed analysis, no mention of the pernicious groupthink that infected the analysis of the FCA and the Bank of England, no mention of the fact that warnings from distinguished commentators in academia and in the financial services industry were airily dismissed, and no acknowledgement that our regulators participated in the creation of a procyclical regulatory model that actually made the crisis worse than it otherwise might have been.

If anyone has any doubt that allowing regulators to bring that real-world experience into design of regulatory standards was the foundation of that massive failure, they should consider the words of Alan Greenspan, then head of the US Federal Reserve system—essentially, the western world’s senior regulator—speaking to the banking committee of the US House of Representatives in October 2008. He said:

“This modern risk-management paradigm held sway for decades. The whole intellectual edifice, however, collapsed in the summer of last year.”


Where in this document is the recognition that the intellectual edifice collapsed? Where is the acknowledgement that those with real-world expertise did not understand the systemic risks in the industry that they were supposed to be regulating?

All this was clearly set out in the Turner review, published by the FSA in 2009 and seemingly unread by the authors of this document. The review advocated a shift from microprudential regulation that focuses attention on the risks facing individual firms to macroprudential regulation focusing on the risks inherent in the operation of the system as a whole. It is entirely true that implementing that change has proved more difficult than the noble Lord, Lord Turner, could have anticipated. Basel III, the regulatory system lauded in this Bill, was supposed to do the job, but as Professor Hyun Shin, chief economist of the Bank for International Settlements, the home of Basel III, has commented:

“Under its current … form, Basel III is almost exclusively micro-prudential in its focus, concerned with the solvency of individual banks, rather than being macro-prudential, concerned with the resilience of the financial system as a whole. The language of Basel III is revealing in this regard, with repeated references to greater ‘loss absorbency’ of bank capital.”


When we turn to the impact assessment published by Her Majesty’s Treasury to accompany the Bill, we again find many references to the virtues of bank capital, its loss absorbency and the resilience of individual firms. There is, however, absolutely nothing about the attempt to deal with systemic risk using liquidity rules, resolution regimes and comprehensive supervisions. The authors of this document have been rewriting history. They have also failed to learn from history.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I will not speak on the substance of most of the amendments in this group. In general terms I do not believe that alterations are required to legislation governing the PRA and the FCA, in view of the enthusiastic work that they have already commenced to embed climate-related financial risks in their work and in the work of the institutions that they regulate. Neither the FCA nor the PRA needed any alteration to their statutory powers and duties to start this process, and I do not believe they need anything in statute to carry on their work.

My noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom said that he was worried about the meaning of “climate-related financial risk”. In practical terms, the sectors of the financial services industry have an understanding of what is meant by climate-related financial risk in relation to them, and that will inevitably evolve over time. If you take banks, it is fundamentally a credit risk problem; you can track almost all the issues back to credit risk. If you take an investment company, it is an investment risk problem, as I think the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, said in an earlier contribution. With insurance, we are talking about something like the shifting nature and scale of conventionally insured risks in that sector. I am sure that other parts of the financial services sector will have an understanding of climate-related financial risk. So I am not concerned about the definition of that; I am just not sure that it is necessary to find its way into legislation, because it is already being done.

I would also caution people who want change overnight in this area that a huge amount of work is needed to implement, for example, measuring the carbon intensity of a bank’s balance sheet, or indeed an investment company’s balance sheet. These are not simple things to do but require huge amounts of new data and new ways of manipulating it, and the industries need to work out how efficiently to do that. I know a little about insurance companies and I am sure that there are similar challenges to overcome there too. I make a plea to leave it to the regulators to determine the pace of change that is required and not to impose additional duties on them. They must judge themselves how best to achieve the aims which I believe they share with the people who have tabled and moved this amendment.

I have a couple of comments on two of the amendments. Amendment 48 would bring forward the timing of the disclosures from the task force on climate-related disclosure to the end of next year, with the draconian penalty of not allowing companies to continue to operate in the UK if they have not made the disclosures. Are the proposers of this amendment seriously saying that they will stop a FTSE 100 company from doing business in the UK if its disclosures are not quite in line with the recommendations? Are they prepared for UK employees to lose their jobs because of technical disclosures? I do not believe that the amendment does anything to advance substantive climate change measures, only disclosures in annual reports which, at the end of the day, very few people actually read. This is not a real-world amendment, in my view, and it seems to be drafted in a disproportionate way.

My main reason for putting my name down to speak on this group is Amendment 75, which provides for the appointment of a member of the FCA board to have responsibility for climate change. This contains a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of boards, whether of public bodies such as the FCA or of private sector companies. Boards are there for governance purposes. They set strategy and hold chief executives to account for delivering against that strategy. They should review performance against what is required of them by statute and what they themselves set. They do not make operational decisions and should not get involved in day-to-day activities. That is why the FCA, like most major organisations, has to have a majority of non-executives on its board.

The amendment is silent as to whether this board member is to be an executive or a non-executive but I believe that either would be wrong. A non-executive should not have responsibility for particular activities within an organisation. This distracts from the core function of a non-executive which is around strategy, oversight and accountability. If the amendment is intended to create an executive board member with responsibility for climate change, that is misconceived as it implies that climate change is not the responsibility of the chief executive. The only way for any policy—whether it is climate change, diversity, social purpose or whatever—to gain traction in an organisation is through its leadership and that is sourced in the chief executive. I believe that the amendment is wrong, likely to be counterproductive or both.

I want to pick up on something that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, said. She said that this would bring it in line with the requirements of the senior managers and certification regime, which requires—I think she said—a board member to be responsible for climate change. That is not what the SMCR requires. It requires only the identification of a senior manager, as defined within the SMCR, who has to have identified responsibility. It is absolutely not required that it is a member at board level, so that is not an appropriate precedent to cite in aid of this amendment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, listening to today’s really outstanding speeches, I think most of us can agree that tackling climate change is not an optional extra. It is necessary to the survival of a liveable and civilised world, and it is urgent. The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, seemed rather the stand-out among the speeches. If I understand him correctly, he shares the general principles but would like them parked in some very long grass for a very long time. That fails to recognise the real urgency that we face. We are past the point where long grass is an appropriate place to put concerns.

This is a substantial group of amendments. It looks to the financial regulators, influencing the financial sector as they do, to become part of the solution. The amendments break roughly into three parts—a cluster of “have regards” and “considerations” that would influence the FCA and the PRA in shaping the rules to support the net-zero target; disclosure and reporting requirements; and the setting of a climate change objective for the FCA, together with appointment to the governing board of an individual responsible for climate change. Here, I disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I think there should be an individual with particular responsibility at the highest level to make sure that things happen in organisations.

I almost wonder that we are having to discuss disclosure, because, in American terminology, it seems to me a slam dunk. Andrew Bailey, in his Mansion House speech last November, called for “data and disclosure”, and repeated that time-honoured but real truism:

“What we cannot measure we cannot manage”.


The other measures proposed are equally straightforward —it is a very straightforward set of amendments. I have my name to many of them, but the range of names on various amendments underscores the cross-party nature of the concern and the determination of this House to use the Bill to leverage change. I join others in saying, that if you cannot tackle the issue of climate change in a financial services Bill, it is going to be hard to tackle it at all.

The hour moves on, so I do not want to repeat the brilliant discussion, except to say that speaker after speaker detailed the urgency of acting on climate change and the necessity that it become a priority for this sector. My message to the Government is carpe diem, because this House will if the Government will not. If the UK is to be a leader—and of all the years in which we wish to show leadership, it must be this one—it must break new ground.

There will be more to say on the next group of climate change amendments, which I consider more powerful and radical. They deal with risk and capital requirements. I very much hope that we receive a strong response from the Minister. I can understand that someone looking at the Bill and a template of previous financial services Bills may not have thought that climate change had a place. By now, Ministers surely must. Included among this group of amendments are so many that are exceedingly reasonable and, frankly, quite uncontroversial. I hope that the Government will begin to shape some amendments of their own, drawing on the content so very firmly placed before them.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am pleased to respond to this substantial group of amendments, several of which are in my name and all of which address the need for better regulation to ensure financial services meet their climate change obligations and the associated financial risk. These amendments correct a fundamental failure of the Bill to address those obligations.

As was pointed out at Second Reading, we find ourselves entangled in an argument from the Minister that these issues are not covered in the Bill, and therefore amendments inserting climate change obligations are inappropriate for it. We reject that argument; it makes nonsense of the scrutiny and revising process that we are here to enact. If we find an omission, it is perfectly proper that we seek to correct it by tabling amendments to the Bill.

That is why we regret that the Government did not bring forward their own amendments, following the excellent arguments put forward by my shadow Minister colleague, Pat McFadden, and others in the Commons. As he pointed out there, and as others have pointed out today, the Chancellor set out green goals for the UK financial services industry back in November. Therefore, the Bill was an ideal vehicle to set out an accountability framework to underpin those goals. Every sector of our economy will have to play its part in delivering the climate change net-zero target—whether it is in energy, transport, housing or agriculture—and all these changes will require large-scale financial investment. Financial institutions will thus have to play a central role in delivering it, and it is right that we use this opportunity to spell out how it should be done in practice.

During the Commons debate, the Minister, John Glen, also argued that this issue would be dealt with elsewhere as part of a separate review—again, reference was made to this today. This cannot wait for another review or consultation. We are already falling dangerously behind, and as the climate change committee has made clear, we are not on track to meet the net-zero 2050 target. We need action now to galvanise both public and private finance to step up to the mark and to be accountable for the promises made. The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, said that we were in danger of complicating regulation, but I do not think our asks do anything like that. Our asks are simple: they set out core principles that we expect the regulators to embrace, but we leave them to sort out the detail of how to follow that through and enact it. That is the right way to go about it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I understand the purpose of Amendments 24 and 25, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, but do they suggest that he would like to stick with the enormously detailed and prescriptive provisions of the CRR as they are in retained EU law? The Government’s intention to transfer most of the provisions of the CRR into more flexible rules is right. The PRA will be able to react more quickly if it needs to change particular rules, and this should reduce the risk of failure of banks in the future.

The Government have been clear that the UK’s regulators are the right people to set the detailed, firm-level rules to implement the remaining Basel standards. Of course, as discussed in previous debates, and supported by noble Lords on all sides of the Committee, we need proper parliamentary oversight of the PRA before it starts to use its new powers. The wording in the noble Lord’s amendments suggests that he wishes to reduce the degree of flexibility that the Treasury will grant the PRA, but I think that that might be counterproductive. Does he not accept that, as we move to a simpler, more flexible, outcomes-based regulatory framework, there should be less detailed prescriptive rules?

The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, wants to retain all the CRR rules in legislation. I cannot agree with her approach, which might damage the attractiveness of the City as a financial centre. She referred to Singapore-on-Thames, which is becoming a fashionable way to describe a light-touch regulatory regime, but is she not aware that Singapore is one of the best and most strictly regulated centres in the world? It is strict, yes, but much simpler and less cumbersome and bureaucratic. Does the Minister agree that we need to return to a simpler, different, more flexible and agile regulatory style?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I do not have a great deal to say but there are a couple of points that I would like to make. First, the two probing amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Eatwell, make a great deal of sense to me, so I hope that the Government will pay attention to them and provide some substantial answers.

However, what struck me more than anything else was that this was an opportunity to comment on Clause 3. That suddenly dawned on me as I looked at the language both in the Bill and in two amendments which appear in later groups. One I have added my name to and the other is in my name only at this point in time. The first, in the name of my noble friend Lord Oates, looks at capital adequacy ratios for investments in fossil fuel relating to exploitation and exploration. The other amendment, which stands in my name and is in what could loosely be called a regulatory group, deals with MREL thresholds for medium-sized banks.

It occurred to me that this is the last time that we will be able to raise issues such as these in government time in this House if the Bill passes with Clause 3 in it. All the rules issues detailed in Clause 3, which are in effect fundamental to policy, will be transferred to the book of the regulator. Were I to look for an opportunity to raise these issues, which I shall follow up on in later debates on the Bill, the Government would say to me either, “You’re out of scope”, or, “Those are dealt with by the regulator, so wait a year or two and the regulator might do a consultation on one of these issues, then you can make your opinions heard.” They might say to me, “Write a letter to the Treasury Select Committee and see whether it considers the issue important enough to take up its very precious time, in dealing with its very heavy workload, by picking up your issue as part of one of its broader consultations.”

If ever we needed a graphic illustration of the loss of authority of Parliament and the loss of accountability to it, this is the time to illustrate and say it. I am really curious to hear from the Minister how he feels that that is justified and why he will explain to me that the amendments we have tabled are such an irritant to him that he is quite determined that never again will they fall into the scope of a debate on government time.

Financial Services Bill

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 22nd February 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I agree with much of what has been said and it is not necessary to repeat it. I support the objective of the amendments—in particular, I support my noble friend’s Amendment 4—and I look forward to the Minister’s reply. It is difficult to see how the principle of these amendments can be refused.

However, it is necessary to make an overarching point, which I base on my experience over 50 years as a close observer of the financial services industry. The truth is that the industry has a systemic tendency to malfeasance. This is not an attack on the great many good people who work within the industry, as the last contribution mentioned, in banks and insurance companies, who only wish to do a good day’s work. However, the unremitting succession of scandals involving finance is not just a series of unfortunate one-offs; it is built into its very nature. This is a big issue, but I emphasise two simple reasons. First, there is an inevitable asymmetry of information. As Amendment 4 highlights, there are

“a consumer’s vulnerability, behavioural biases or constrained choices”.

This situation is bound to create the sort of problem that we have seen. The second, even simpler, reason, using the classic but apocryphal words of Willie Sutton, is because it is “where the money is”. People seek to gain money from where there is lots of it and there is lots of it in the finance industry.

There is much to be done to solve this problem. It is systemic but it still needs to be addressed because people need help. However, what is in these amendments seems to me simply a minimum of what might be done to address the problems that the industry so clearly incorporates.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I simply do not understand the resistance we find from the Government and the FCA to the duty of care amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Sharkey, and supported by my noble friend Lady Bowles and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and to the almost identical Amendment 4 proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and again by my noble friend Lady Bowles. I am not going to repeat the saga of abuse that many noble Lords have described. That has been done incredibly well and is exceedingly powerful. I will say though that this issue keeps happening. I notice the headline in today’s Times:

“City regulator ‘slow to act’ against car leasing firm”.


Every time we think that we are perhaps past a period of abuse, another one comes along. To me, it is utterly unacceptable, as I hope it is to everyone in this House.

What makes me particularly angry is that the regulator has largely known, very early on thanks to whistleblowers, when the financial institutions that it regulates are treating customers badly. However, again and again, the regulator takes years to react, reacts minimally at first, initiates a lengthy review—often several—asks the organisation to review itself and then does too little, too late. I want to pick up one issue in illustration: the treatment of payday lenders.

Many people in this House will remember the experience of trying to pass legislation to get a cap on the interest rates that payday lenders could levy. I bring up this issue because it deals with the difference between treating customers fairly and a duty of care. The FCA took a very strong position that customers were being treated fairly so long as they knew the terms of the contract. There were, perhaps, some constraints such as a limited number of rollovers. The FCA did not look at the far deeper issue of the way that people were being abused by payday lenders and the extraordinary level of interest rates. That is why the duty of care is very much more powerful. As my noble friend Lord Sharkey said, treating customers fairly is undermined in the FiSMA legislation by the caveat emptor parts of the FCA’s rules.

I am not a bit surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, objects to these duty of care amendments. When I sat for nearly two years on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, the industry objected to almost every measure that would have constrained the abuse which created the crisis in 2008, such as the Libor crisis and PPI. The saga was endless. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, that in a later group of amendments I will be referring to the HBOS Reading case, another example of fraud perpetrated between 2003 and 2007. A number of bankers went to prison but today, in 2021, victims of that fraud still have not received fair compensation.

Dame Elizabeth Gloster’s damning report of last November on the FCA’s regulation of London Capital & Finance Plc said:

“The root causes of the FCA’s failure to regulate LCF appropriately were significant gaps and weaknesses in the policies and practices”.


That is simply true across the board. It is piecemeal, as my noble friend Lord Sharkey described.

Misbehaviour keeps happening and delayed redress is the normal pattern. To quote Einstein:

“The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.”


It is time to make a step change to protect consumers, and I hope very much that the Government do so in this Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I draw attention to my interests as set out in the register. I recognise that these are probing amendments, but I exhort my noble friend the Minister not to underestimate either the strength of feeling on the question of international competitiveness or its importance to a sector vital to our economic recovery, as my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe stressed in her impressive speech earlier in this debate. The foundation stone for the regulation of financial services is still FiSMA—the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000—albeit in a form substantially amended by subsequent legislation. As the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, reminded us, the regulatory structure is currently subject to a fundamental review.

The financial services future regulatory framework review and phase 2 consultation closed at the end of last week. The early indications of a general direction of travel are welcome. The original version of FSMA set out those four clear objectives for the new Financial Services Authority, the FSA: market confidence; public awareness; the protection of consumers; and the reduction of financial crime. In addition, the FSA was required to have regard to a number of other considerations, which included such obvious factors as efficiency, proportionality and innovation. They also included, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, reminded us—and I quote verbatim

“the international character of financial services and markets and the desirability of maintaining the competitive position of the United Kingdom”

and

“the need to minimise the adverse effects on competition that may arise from anything done in the discharge of those functions”.

As other speakers have reminded us, after the crash of 2008, the incoming coalition Government inherited a severe recession and an unstable and untenable financial situation. They therefore undertook a deep consideration of regulation. In the debates in another place on what became the Financial Services Act 2012, concerns were repeatedly expressed to the effect that regulation under the FSMA had been not so much light touch as soft touch. Since 2012, the entire financial services sector, broad and diverse as it is, has effectively been punished—put into the naughty corner, as it were —almost entirely because of the alleged failures of the banks. The regulatory brush used was simply too broad and therefore not fit for purpose. The requirement to take account of international competitiveness was jettisoned because, it was argued, it might dilute the robustness of regulation.

I have also taken a close look at the Second Reading debate on the then Financial Services Bill, on 11 June 2012, in which one colleague after another raised this question of competitiveness, including my noble friends Lord Trenchard, Lord Hodgson and Lady Noakes. So this is a “Groundhog Day” debate, but I hope no less persuasive for that. My noble friend Lord Trenchard certainly wins a prize for consistency and constancy, because he eloquently argued that day:

“Some of us believed that competition and the competitiveness of our financial markets should have been made an objective of the FSA rather than merely one of the principles to which it had to have regard. I welcome the fact that the FCA is given a competition objective in the Bill, but it is inadequate in that it falls short of a responsibility to maintain or enhance the competitiveness of the UK’s financial markets”.—[Official Report, 11/6/12; col. 1245.]


As both the Association of British Insurers and the London Market Group have rightly pointed out, promoting the international competitiveness of the UK financial services sector to nurture its contribution to our economic strength must now be restored to the objectives of the regulators. This would bring our regulators into line with other, competitor jurisdictions, such as Hong Kong, the United States, Singapore and Australia. In its phase 2 consultation paper, the Government explicitly acknowledge:

“A gap in the original FSMA model is that, while it set high-level general objectives and principles, it did not provide for government and Parliament to set the policy approach for specific areas of financial services regulation.”


A move towards increasingly activity-specific regulatory principles is helpfully adumbrated, as my noble friend Lord Blackwell pointed out, ahead of the outcome of the FRF consultation, in Schedule 3 to the Bill. This would require the PRA, when considering capital requirements regulation, to have regard to

“the likely effect of the rules on the relative standing of the United Kingdom as a place for internationally active credit institutions and investment firms to be based or to carry on activities.”

This seems a welcome step back towards an old principle and, quite possibly, a Rubicon of significance crossed—or, more accurately, re-crossed. On that basis the Bill, while welcome in its own terms, is merely the beginning of a vital process which will determine the character of the post-Brexit UK financial services sector, potentially for a generation or more.

Once the results of the consultation have been digested, I hope to see far more acknowledgement in regulation of the great differences that exist between different elements of financial services, along with an explicit recognition that our international competitiveness matters. It is entirely spurious to claim that a regulator mindful of international competitiveness is likely to be a weak regulator. It could and should be a very effective one indeed.

As the noble Lord, Lord Mountevans, has just pointed out, our competitiveness relies on our strength. Our greatest strength is surely our reputation for providing the best advice and the best products at the best price, something no regulatory race to the bottom could ever deliver. If we really have the ambition to become the global centre for insurance and financial services—a realistic ambition, I argue, if we work together to deliver upon it—then we simply must get this right. I very much hope that the Bill does not go down as a missed opportunity.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, inevitably with so many amendments to one Bill, this group is something of an omnibus collection. I have some sympathy with some of them—for example, the country-by-country reporting amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. While I disagree very much with the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson and Lord Holmes, on their overall support for an international competitiveness objective in other areas, they are pointing out a need for the regulator to look again at issues such as proportionality and how to adapt to the new digital world. However, that does not seem to need to be put into law. This is really advice to the regulator, and I hope that they will take a great deal of that good advice on board.

I want to reply to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, because he echoed an opinion raised by the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, but very effectively countered by my noble friend Lady Bowles. He talked about activity-specific regulation creating the opportunity for some significant divergence in the regulatory environment. The lesson of 2008 was that the financial services sector is linked systemically. As my noble friend Lady Bowles pointed out, the crash in 2008 started with largely fake and junk mortgages in the United States. It worked its way into various securities instruments that were sold to people in the UK who did not understand them, but should have.

The underpinning consequences of risk were also completely misunderstood. The way that derivatives were traded and structured created a potential risk of losing liquidity overnight. This is exactly what happened with the high street banks in the UK. They became competitive with others in the financial sector to develop the kinds of profits that they saw being made by rival companies, pushed their credit standards to the point where, frankly, they were no longer standards, and chose methods of funding themselves that made them vulnerable to any volatility in the overnight markets. This is not an industry in which we can separate the different pieces into silos. They are all interlinked and that must underpin any form of regulation that we have.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]]

Apologies, my Lords, but I have sorted the problem out now. I speak briefly in support of Amendments 5, 73 and 95, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles, Lady Altmann and Lady Kramer. Although not a generalisation that is 100% true, the gender division of the people on various sides speaking on the Bill is interesting. It made me reflect back to the financial crash of 2007-08 and the role that the extreme gender imbalance in the financial sector was seen to have played within it.

When I thought to look at these issues about exploitation, unconscionable conduct, and legal protection against mis-selling, I went to the website moneysavingexpert.com. In a previous contribution, I referred to the role of such commentators who, using the power of public opinion, often seem to be a stronger check on the behaviour of the financial sector than the Government. But, of course, they are able to work only after the fact. Just looking down the list, we are talking about payment protection insurance, mis-sold ID fraud insurance, the mis-selling of package bank accounts and excessive charges on bank accounts—and that is just talking about individual consumers. A similar list would come up for small business. It is a long tale of woe that has caused a great deal of suffering and harm to individuals and small businesses, the operators of which have often put their whole heart and soul into the business.

What we seem to have now is a strategy of shutting the stable door sometime after the horse has bolted, and after a long delay for debate and inquiry. All three of these amendments are a very strong bolt that we should be sliding home now to protect consumers and small businesses from the overweening, immense power of the financial sector.

[Baroness Kramer (LD) [V]]

My goodness, this has moved fast. My Lords, let me start by addressing Amendment 95, because it is in my name. It would give SMEs the right to sue in respect of all regulated financial services, not just banking. It would—and this is an important example—entitle them to sue for breaches of the rules relating to insurance, otherwise known as COBS, in respect of business interruption insurance policies.

Another big practical implication relates to the cross-selling of regulated products or services as part of the add-ons to a loan. In the swaps mis-selling scandal—I believe my noble friend Lord Sharkey mentioned this in his earlier list, when talking about a duty of care—over 40,000 swaps were sold to SMEs. The banks had broken the regulatory requirements in over 90% of cases. It is almost impossible to imagine that having happened if the banks’ legal departments knew that the banks would be sued by their customers as a result.

None of the SMEs that have taken swaps cases all the way to court have won. Judges have repeatedly said that, had the customer been able to sue for breach of the COBS rules, that would have made all the difference. The evidence is there in Green & Rowley v RBS, Crestsign Ltd v NatWest, London Executive Aviation Ltd v RBS, and Fine Care Homes Ltd v NatWest. Those cases and the other swap cases that failed at trial show that—even where a judge is convinced that the customer did not understand the product they were buying and even where the bank salesperson knew that the customer was relying on them to explain the product—the common law fails to provide the customer with a remedy. I realise that the swaps scandal is, hopefully, in the past but, without the amendment proposed, there is nothing to stop banks from perpetrating similar behaviour in future.

My amendment addresses only part of the issue of the limitations of the regulatory perimeter, which both my noble friend Lady Bowles and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, have discussed, and it is why I support Amendments 5 and 73 in the name of my noble friend. I find it ridiculous that the regulatory perimeter treats small businesses as, in effect, akin to multinationals in their capacity to understand financial products and fight on an equal footing with big institutions.

My noble friend Lady Bowles has cited the case of RBS GRG. For those not familiar with this case, GRG was the turnaround unit of RBS. A number of firms were persuaded to allow themselves to go into the turnaround unit even though they were both viable and paying their loans on time; but RBS believed that under the terms of their loan agreement they were at risk because the value of their assets had declined, which created a covenant default. In a remarkable number of cases, those companies that were viable and paying on time were made bankrupt, their assets were stripped after having been assessed at very low market values and—surprise, surprise—the bank was able some time later to sell those assets for a much higher value, thereby generating profits. It was indeed not just a turnaround unit but a profit centre.

After great pressure from Vince Cable, the FCA initiated an investigation. It asked a group called Promontory to produce a two-stage report: one to look at the case and the other to make recommendations. However, after the first phase of the report was complete, the FCA explained that it could not publish it as it contained commercially sensitive information, and it therefore produced a summary. Miraculously, the original report made its way into the hands of the Treasury Select Committee. This, to me, is almost the worst part of the story: the summary that had been provided by the FCA and the report itself did not match. There was essentially a whitewash of the conclusions of Promontory. The FCA may have disagreed with the report that it received, but that would have been a very different declaration.

We have talked before about the senior management and certification regime; the FCA could have used that regime to try to deal with senior management who had been involved in this entire process, but it chose not to. That, I am afraid, is the history of the use of the senior management and certification regime. However, my noble friend Lady Bowles could equally well have cited the HBOS Reading fraud perpetrated between 2003 and 2007, which I mentioned earlier. Six bankers ended up in jail for that fraud, but we are now in 2021 and fair compensation has not yet been paid to the victims. This is now a Lloyds problem and has been for some time.

We have been through multiple reviews and are now awaiting the work of yet another review of compensation, the Foskett panel, which hopefully will make sure the compensation is appropriate—but, as I said, it is 2021. There have been issues; for example, a whistleblower who examined who knew what and when has been compensated twice by Lloyds for retaliation against her. There is currently a review by Dame Linda Dobbs into who in senior management knew or ought to have known what was going on.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I find the thrust of all three amendments in this group really interesting and worthy of thought. I would particularly have added my name, had I been fast enough, to Amendment 9 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. I think that is a strong and very positive amendment. Parliament, financial institutions, regulators and civic society have been discussing financial inclusion for years, and all of us recognise that there has been some progress. The Government’s financial inclusion report of 2019 identified 1.23 million people without even a basic bank account. That is half of what it was about 15 years earlier, but I think we all know that it is still unacceptably high. I will say more about basic bank accounts in an amendment in my name in a later group, as I think there are some real issues there.

Debt management advice has significantly improved and much of our thanks is owed there to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, as other noble Lords have said. We will discuss amendments that would strengthen that in another group. The FCA has made changes to the high-cost credit market. Many of those changes both in the debt advice arena and the high-cost credit arena were not actually initiated by the regulator. They were driven by this House, and I think that this House deserves to take credit for recognising that need and for driving through what has been real and effective action.