(2 days, 19 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, last week the Government published the AI Opportunities Action Plan and confirmed that they have accepted or partially accepted all 50 of the recommendations from the report’s author, Matt Clifford. Reading the report, there can be no doubting Government’s commitment to making the UK a welcoming environment for AI companies. What is less clear is how creating the infrastructure and skills pool needed for AI companies to thrive will lead to economic and social benefits for UK citizens.
I am aware that the Government have already said that they will provide further details to flesh out the top-level commitments, including policy and legislative changes over the coming months. I reiterate the point made by many noble Lords in Committee that, if data is the ultimate fuel and infrastructure on which AI is built, why, given that we have a new Government, is the data Bill going through the House without all the strategic pieces in place? This is a Bill flying blind.
Amendment 1 is very modest and would ensure that information that traders were required to provide to customers on goods, services and digital content included information that had been created using AI to build a profile about them. This is necessary because the data that companies hold about us is already a combination of information proffered by us and information inferred, increasingly, by AI. This amendment would simply ensure that all customer data—our likes and dislikes, buying habits, product uses and so on—was disclosable, whether provided by us or a guesstimate by AI.
The Government’s recent statements have promised to “mainline AI into the veins” of the nation. If AI were a drug, its design and deployment would be subject to governance and oversight to ensure its safety and efficacy. Equally, they have said that they will “unleash” AI into our public services, communities and business. If the rhetoric also included commitments to understand and manage the well-established risks of AI, the public might feel more inclined to trust both AI and the Government.
The issue of how the data Bill fails to address AI— and how the AI Opportunities Action Plan, and the government response to it, fail to protect UK citizens, children, the creative industries and so on—will be a theme throughout Report. For now, I hope that the Government can find their way to agreeing that AI-generated content that forms part of a customer’s profile should be considered personal data for the purposes of defining business and customer data. I beg to move.
My Lords, this is clearly box-office material, as ever.
I support Amendment 1 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on inferred data. Like her, I regret that we do not have this Bill flying in tandem with an AI Bill. As she said, data and AI go together, and we need to see the two together in context. However, inferred data has its own dangers: inaccuracy and what are called junk inferences; discrimination and unfair treatment; invasions of privacy; a lack of transparency; security risks; predatory targeting; and a loss of anonymity. These dangers highlight the need for strong data privacy protection for consumers in smart data schemes and more transparent data collection practices.
Noble Lords will remember that Cambridge Analytica dealt extensively with inferred data. That company used various data sources to create detailed psychological profiles of individuals going far beyond the information that users explicitly provided. I will not go into the complete history, but, frankly, we do not want to repeat that. Without safeguards, the development of AI technologies could lead to a lack of public trust, as the noble Baroness said, and indeed to a backlash against the use of AI, which could hinder the Government’s ambitions to make the UK an AI superpower. I do not like that kind of boosterish language—some of the Government’s statements perhaps could have been written by Boris Johnson—nevertheless the ambition to put the UK on the AI map, and to keep it there, is a worthy one. This kind of safeguard is therefore extremely important in that context.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, for their proposed amendments and continued interest in Part 1 of this Bill. I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness that the definition of customer data is purposefully broad. It encompasses information relating to a customer or a trader and the Government consider that this would indeed include inferred data. The specific data to be disclosed under a smart data scheme will be determined in the context of that scheme and I reassure the noble Baroness that there will be appropriate consultation before a smart data scheme is introduced.
I turn to Amendment 5. Clause 13 provides statutory authority for the Secretary of State or the Treasury to give financial assistance to decision-makers, enforcers and others for the purpose of meeting any expense in the exercise of their functions in the smart data schemes. Existing and trusted bodies such as sector regulators will likely be in the lead of the delivery of new schemes. These bodies will act as decision-makers and enforcers. It is intended that smart data schemes will be self-financing through the fees and levies produced by Clauses 11 and 12. However, because of the nature of the bodies that are involved, it is deemed appropriate for there to be a statutory spending authority as a backstop provision if that is necessary. Any spending commitment of resources will, of course, be subject to the usual estimates process and to existing public sector spending controls and transparency requirements.
I hope that with this brief explanation of the types of bodies involved, and the other explanations, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw Amendment 1 and that noble Lords will not press Amendment 5.
I thank the Minister for his reassurance, particularly that we will have an opportunity for a consultation on exactly how the smart data scheme works. I look forward to such agreement throughout the afternoon. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 2 I will speak to Amendments 3, 4, 25, 42 and 43, all of which are in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. The very detailed arguments for Amendments 25, 42 and 43 were made during the DPDI Bill and can be found at col. GC 89 of vol. 837 of Hansard, and the subsequent arguments for their inclusion in this Bill were made in Committee at col. GC 454. For that reason, I do not propose to make them in full again. I simply say that these amendments for data communities represent a more ambitious and optimistic view of the Bill that would empower citizens to use data law to benefit those with common interests. The example I gave last time was of gig workers assigning their data rights to an expert third party to see whether they were being fairly compensated. That is not something that any individual data subject can easily do alone.
The new Amendments 2, 3 and 4 demonstrate how the concept of data communities might work in relation to the Government’s smart data scheme. Amendment 2 would add enacting data rights to the list of actions that the Secretary of State or the Treasury can enable an authorised person to take on behalf of customers. Amendment 3 requires the Secretary of State or the Treasury to include data communities in the list of those who would be able to activate rights, including data rights on a customer’s behalf. Amendment 4 provides a definition of “data communities”.
Data communities are a process by which one data holder can assign their rights for a given purpose to a community of people who agree with that purpose. I share the Government’s desire to empower consumers and to promote innovation, and these amendments would do just that. Allowing the sharing of data rights of individuals, as opposed to specific categories of data, would strengthen the existing proposal and provide economic and social benefit to the UK and its citizens, rather than imagining that the third party is always a commercial entity.
In response to these amendments in Committee, the then Minister said two things. The first was that the UK GDPR does not prevent data subjects authorising third parties to exercise certain rights on their behalf. She also warmly said that something of this kind was being planned by government and invited me and other noble Lords to discuss this area further. I made it clear that I would like such a meeting, but it has only just been scheduled and is planned for next week, which clearly does not meet the needs of the House, since we are discussing this today. I would be grateful if the current Minister could undertake to bring something on this subject back at Third Reading if we are not reassured by what we hear at the meeting.
While the UK GDPR does not prevent data subjects authorising third parties to exercise certain rights on their behalf, in the example I gave the Minister in Committee it took many years and a bespoke agreement between the ICO and Uber for the 300-plus drivers to combine their data. Under equivalent GDPR provisions in European law, it required a Court of Appeal judgment in Norway before Uber conceded that it was entitled to the data on the drivers’ behalf. A right that cannot be activated without legal action and years of effort is not a right fully given; the UK GDPR is not sufficient in these circumstances.
I want to stress that these amendments are not simply about contesting wrongs. Introducing the concept of data communities would facilitate innovation and promote fairness, which is surely an aim of the legislation.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 2, 3, 4, 25, 42 and 43. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for these amendments on data communities, which were previously tabled in Committee, and for the new clauses linking these with the Bill’s clauses on smart data.
As my noble friend Lady Jones noted in Committee, the Government support giving individuals greater agency over their data. The Government are strongly supportive of a robust regime of data subject rights and believe strongly in the opportunity presented by data for innovation and economic growth. UK GDPR does not prevent data subjects authorising third parties to exercise certain rights on their behalf. Stakeholders have, however, said that there may be barriers to this in practice.
I reassure noble Lords that the Government are actively exploring how we can support data intermediaries while maintaining the highest data protection standards. It is our intention to publish a call for evidence in the coming weeks on the activities of data intermediaries and the exercise of data subject rights by third parties. This will enable us to ensure that the policy settings on this topic are right.
In the context of smart data specifically, Part 1 of the Bill does not limit who the regulations may allow customers to authorise. Bearing in mind the IT and security-related requirements inherent in smart data schemes, provisions on who a customer may authorise are best determined in the context of a specific scheme, when the regulations are made following appropriate consultation. I hope to provide some additional reassurance that exercise of the smart data powers is subject to data protection legislation and does not displace data rights under that legislation.
There will be appropriate consultation, including with the Information Commissioner’s Office, before smart data schemes are introduced. This year, the Department for Business and Trade will be publishing a strategy on future uses of these powers.
While the smart data schemes and digital verification services are initial examples of government action to facilitate data portability and innovative uses of data, my noble friend Lady Jones previously offered a meeting with officials and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, to discuss these proposals, which I know my officials have arranged for next week—as the noble Baroness indicated earlier. I hope she is therefore content to withdraw her amendment.
Before the Minister sits down, may I ask whether there is a definition of “customer” and whether that includes a user in the broader sense, or means worker or any citizen? Is it a customer relationship?
My understanding is that “customer” reflects an individual, but I am sure that the Minister will give a better explanation at the meeting with officials next week.
I thank the noble Lord for that request, and I am sure my officials would be willing to do that.
My Lords, I do not intend to detain the House on this for very long, but I want to say that holding meetings after the discussion on Report is not adequate. “Certain rights” and “customer” are exactly the sort of terms that I am trying to address here. To the noble Viscount—and my noble friend—Lord Camrose, I say that it is not adequate, and we have an academic history going back a long way. I hope that the meeting next week is fruitful and that the Government’s enthusiasm for this benefits workers, citizens and customers. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Kidron and the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, for adding their signatures to my Amendment 14. I withdrew this amendment in Committee, but I am now asking the Minister to consider once again the definition of “scientific research” in the Bill. If he cannot satisfy me in his speech this evening, I will seek the opinion of the House.
I have been worried about the safeguards for defining scientific research since the Bill was published. This amendment will require that the research should be in “the public interest”, which I am sure most noble Lords will agree is a laudable aim and an important safeguard. This amendment has been looked at in the context of the Government’s recent announcements on turning this country into an AI superpower. I am very much a supporter of this endeavour, but across the country there are many people who are worried about the need to set up safeguards for their data. They fear data safety is threatened by this explosion of AI and its inexorable development by the big tech companies. This amendment will go some way to building public trust in the AI revolution.
The vision of Donald Trump surrounded at his inauguration yesterday by tech billionaires, most of whom have until recently been Democrats, puts the fear of God into me. I fear their companies are coming for our data. We have some of the best data in the world, and it needs to be safeguarded. The AI companies are spending billions of dollars developing their foundation models, and they are beholden to their shareholders to minimise the cost of developing these models.
Clause 67 gives a huge fillip to the scientific research community. It exempts research which falls within the definition of scientific research as laid out in the Bill from having to gain new consent from data subjects to reuse millions of points of data.
It costs time and money for the tech companies to get renewed consent from data holders before reusing their data. This is an issue we will discuss further when we debate amendments on scraping data from creatives without copyright licensing. It is clear from our debates in Committee that many noble Lords fear that AI companies will do what they can to avoid either getting consent or licensing data for use in scraping data. Defining their research as scientific will allow them to escape these constraints. I could not be a greater supporter of the wonderful scientific research that is carried out in this country, but I want the Bill to ensure that it really is scientific research and not AI development camouflaged as scientific research.
The line between product development and scientific research is often blurred. Many developers posit efforts to increase model capabilities, efficiency, or indeed the study of their risks, as scientific research. The balance has to be struck between allowing this country to become an AI superpower and exploiting its data subjects. I contend that this amendment will go far to allay public fears of the abuse and use of their data to further the profits and goals of huge AI companies, most of which are based in the United States.
Noble Lords have only to look at the outrage last year at Meta’s use of Instagram users’ data without their consent to train the datasets for its new Llama AI model to understand the levels of concern. There were complaints to regulators, and the ICO posted that Meta
“responded to our request to pause and review plans to use Facebook and Instagram user data to train generative AI”.
However, so far, there has been no official change to Meta’s privacy policy that would legally bind it to stop processing data without consent for the development of its AI technologies, and the ICO has not issued a binding order to stop Meta’s plans to scrape users’ data to train its AI systems. Meanwhile, Meta has resumed reusing subjects’ data without their consent.
I thank the Minister for meeting me and talking through Amendment 14. I understand his concerns that, at a public interest threshold, the definition of scientific research will create a heavy burden on researchers, but I think it is worth the risk in the name of safety. Some noble Lords are concerned about the difficulty of defining “public interest”. However, the ICO has very clear guidelines about what public interest consists of. It states that
“you should broadly interpret public interest in the research context to include any clear and positive public benefit likely to arise from that research”.
It continues:
“The public interest covers a wide range of values and principles about the public good, or what is in society’s best interests. In making the case that your research is in the public interest, it is not enough to point to your own private interests”.
The guidance even includes further examples of research in the public interest, such as
“the advancement of academic knowledge in a given field … the preservation of art, culture and knowledge for the enrichment of society … or … the provision of more efficient or more effective products and services for the public”.
This guidance is already being applied in the Bill to sensitive data and public health data. I contend that if these carefully thought-through guidelines are good enough for health data, they should be good enough for all scientific data.
This view is supported in the EU, where
“the special data protection regime for scientific research is understood to apply where … the research is carried out with the aim of growing society’s collective knowledge and wellbeing, as opposed to serving primarily one or several private interests.”
The Minister will tell the House that the data exempted to be used for scientific research is well protected—that it has both the lawfulness test, as set out in the UK GDPR, and a reasonableness test. I am concerned that the reasonableness test in this Bill references
“processing for the purposes of any research that can reasonably be described as scientific, whether publicly or privately funded and whether carried out as a commercial or non-commercial activity”.
Normally, a reasonableness test requires an expert in the context of that research to decide whether it is reasonable to consider it scientific. However, in this Bill, “reasonable” just means that an ordinary person in the street can decide whether the research is reasonable to be considered scientific. This must be a broadening of the threshold of the definition.
It seems “reasonable” in the current climate to ask the Government to include a public interest test before giving the AI companies extensive scope to reuse our data, without getting renewed consent, on the pretext that the work is for scientific research. In the light of possible deregulation of the sector by the new regime in America, it is beholden on this country to ensure that our scientific research is dynamic, but safe. If the Government can bring this reassurance then for millions of people in this country they will increase trust in Britain’s AI revolution. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Colville. He has made an excellent argument, and I ask noble Lords on the Government Benches to think about it very carefully. If it is good enough for health data, it is good enough for the rest of science. In the interest of time, I will give an example of one of the issues, rather than repeat the excellent argument made by my noble friend.
In Committee, I asked the Government three times whether the cover of scientific research could be used, for example, to market-test ways to hack human responses to dopamine in order to keep children online. In the Minister’s letter, written during Committee, she could not say that the A/B testing of millions of children to make services more sticky—that is, more addictive—would not be considered scientific, but rather that the regulator, the ICO, could decide on a case-by-case basis. That is not good enough.
There is no greater argument for my noble friend Lord Colville’s amendment than the fact that the Government are unable to say if hacking children’s attention for commercial gain is scientific or not. We will come to children and child protection in the Bill in the next group, but it is alarming that the Government feel able to put in writing that this is an open question. That is not what Labour believed in opposition, and it is beyond disappointing that, now in government, Labour has forgotten what it then believed. I will be following my noble friend through the Lobby.
My Lords, it is almost impossible to better the arguments put forward by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, so I am not even going to try.
The inclusion of a public interest requirement would ensure that the use of data for scientific research would serve a genuine societal benefit, rather than primarily benefiting private interests. This would help safeguard against the misuse of data for purely commercial purposes under the guise of research. The debate in Committee highlighted the need for further clarity and stronger safeguards in the Bill, to ensure that data for scientific research genuinely serves the public interest, particularly concerning the sensitive data of children. The call for a public interest requirement reflects the desire to ensure a balance between promoting research and innovation and upholding the rights and interests of data subjects. I very much hope that the House will support this amendment.
My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 15 and to speak to Amendments 16, 20, 22, 27, 39, 45 and, briefly, government Amendment 40. Together, these amendments offer protections that children were afforded in the Data Protection Act 2018, which passed through this House, and they seek to fix some of the underperformance of the ICO in relation to children’s data.
Before we debate these amendments, it is perhaps worth the Government reflecting on the fact that survey after survey shows that the vast majority—indeed, almost all—of the UK population support stronger digital regulation in respect of children. In refusing to accept these amendments, or, indeed, in replacing them with their own amendments to the same effect, the Government are throwing away one of the successes of the UK Parliament with their newfound enthusiasm for tech with fewer safeguards.
I repeat my belief that lowering data protections for adults is a regressive step for all of us, but for children it is a tragedy that puts them at greater risk of harm—a harm that we in this House have a proud record of seeking to mitigate. The amendments in my name and variously in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord Clement-Jones, my noble friend Lord Russell and the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, are essential to preserving the UK’s commitment to child protection and privacy. As the House is well aware, there is cross-party support for child protection. While I will listen very carefully to the Minister, I too am prepared to test the opinion of the House if he has nothing to offer, and I will ask Labour colleagues to consider their responsibility to the nation’s children before they walk through the Lobby.
I will take the amendments out of numerical order, for the benefit of those who have not been following our proceedings. Amendment 22 creates a direct, unambiguous obligation on data processors and controllers to consider the central principles of the age-appropriate design code when processing children’s data. It acknowledges that children of different ages have different capacities and therefore may require different responses. Subsection (2) of the new clause it would insert addresses the concern expressed during the passage of the Bill and its predecessor that children should be shielded from the reduction in privacy protections that adults would experience under the Act when passed.
In the last few weeks, Meta has removed its moderators, and the once-lauded Twitter has become flooded with disinformation and abuse as a result of Elon Musk’s determined deregulation and support of untruth. We have seen the dial move on elections in Romania’s presidential election via TikTok, a rise in scams and the horror of sexually explicit deepfakes, which we will discuss in a later group.
Public trust in both tech and politics is catastrophically low. While we may disagree on the extent to which adults deserve privacy and protection, there are few in this House or the other place who do not believe it is a duty of government to protect children. Amendment 22 simply makes it a requirement that those who control and process children’s data are directly accountable for considering and prioritising their needs. Amendment 39 does the same job in relation to the ICO, highlighting the need to consider that high bar of privacy to which children are entitled, which should be a focus of the commissioner when exercising its regulatory functions, with a particular emphasis on their age and development stage.
Despite Dame Elizabeth Denham’s early success in drafting the age-appropriate design code, the ICO’s track record on enforcement is poor and the leadership has not championed children by robustly enforcing the ADC, or when faced with proposals that watered down child protections in this Bill and its predecessor. We will get to the question of the ICO next week, but I have been surprised by the amount of incoming mail dissatisfied with the regulator and calling on Parliament to demand more robust action. This amendment does exactly that in relation to children.
Government Amendment 40 would require the ICO, when exercising its functions, to consider the fact that children merit specific protections. I am grateful for and welcome this addition as far as it goes; but in light of the ICO’s disappointing track record, clearer and more robust guidance on its obligations is needed.
Moreover, the Government’s proposal is also insufficient because it creates a duty on the ICO only. It does nothing for the controllers and processors, as I have already set out in Amendment 22. It is essential that those who control and process children’s data are directly accountable for prioritising their needs. The consequences when they do not are visible in the anxiety, body dysmorphia and other developmental issues that children experience as a result of their time online.
The Government have usefully introduced an annual report of ICO activities and action. Amendment 45 simply requires them to report the action it has taken specifically in relation to children, as a separate item. Creating better reporting is one of the advances the Government have made; making it possible to see what the ICO has done in regard to children is little more than housekeeping.
This group also includes clause-specific amendments, which are more targeted than Amendment 22. Amendment 15 excludes children from the impact of the proposal to widen the definition of scientific research in Clause 68. Given that we have just discussed this, I may reconsider that amendment. However, Amendment 16 excludes children from the “recognised legitimate interest” provisions in Clause 70. This means that data controllers would still be required to consider and protect children, as currently required under the legitimate interest basis for processing their data.
Amendment 20 excludes children from the new provisions in Clause 71 on purpose limitation. Purpose limitation is at the heart of GDPR. If you ask for a particular purpose and consent to it, extending that purpose is problematic. Amendment 21 ensures that, for children at least, the status quo of data protection law stays the same: that is to say, their personal data can be used only for the purpose for which it was originally collected. If the controller wants to use it in a different way, it must go back to the child—or, if they are under 13, their parent—to ask for further permission.
Finally, Amendment 27 ensures that significant decisions that impact children cannot be made during automated processes unless they are in a child’s best interest. This is a reasonable check and balance on the proposals in Clause 80.
In full, these amendments uphold our collective responsibility to support, protect and make allowances for children as they journey from infancy to adulthood. I met with the Minister and the Bill team, and I thank them for their time. They rightly made the point that children should be participants in the digital world, and I should not seek to exempt them. I suggest to the House that it is the other way round: I will not seek to exempt children if the Government do not seek to put them at risk.
Our responsibility to children is woven into the fabric of our laws, our culture and our behaviour. It has taken two decades to begin to weave childhood into the digital environment, and I am asking the House to make sure we do not take a single retrograde step. The Government have a decision to make. They can choose to please the CEOs of Silicon Valley in the hope that capitulation on regulatory standards will get us a data centre or two; or they can prioritise the best interests of UK children and agree to these amendments, which put children’s needs first. I beg to move.
My Lords, I rise to support all the amendments in this group. I have added my name to Amendments 15, 22, 27 and 45. The only reason my name is not on the other amendments is that others got there before me. As is always the case in our debates on this topic, I do not need to repeat the arguments of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I would just like to make a very high-level point.
I will speak first to government Amendment 40, tabled in my name, concerning the ICO’s duty relating to children’s personal data. Before that, though, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord Russell, the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, and in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for such considered debates on this incredibly important issue, both in today’s discussion in the House and in the meetings we have had together. Everyone here wants this to be effective and recognises that we must protect children.
The Government are firmly committed to maintaining high standards of protection for children, which is why they decided not to proceed with measures in the previous Data Protection and Digital Information Bill that would have reduced requirements for data protection impact assessments, prior consultation with the ICO and the designation of data protection officers. The ICO guidance is clear that organisations must complete an impact assessment in relation to any processing activity that uses children’s or other vulnerable people’s data for marketing purposes, profiling or other automated decision-making, or for offering online services directly to children.
The Government also expect organisations which provide online services likely to be accessed by children to continue to follow the standards on age-appropriate design set out in the children’s code. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, worked tirelessly to include those provisions in the Data Protection Act 2018 and the code continues to provide essential guidance for relevant online services on how to comply with the data protection principles in respect of children’s data. In addition to these existing provisions, Clause 90 already includes a requirement for the ICO to consider the rights and interests of children when carrying out its functions.
I appreciate the point that the noble Baroness made in Committee about the omission of the first 10 words of recital 38 from these provisions. As such, I am very happy to rectify this through government Amendment 40. The changes we are making to Clause 90 will require the Information Commissioner to consider, where relevant, when carrying out its regulatory functions the fact that children merit special protection with regard to their personal data. I hope noble Lords will support this government amendment.
Turning to Amendment 15 from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, which excludes children’s data from Clause 68, I reassure her that neither the protections for adults nor for children are being lowered. Clause 68 faithfully transposes the existing concept of giving consent to processing for an area of scientific research from the current recital. This must be freely given and be fully revokable at any point. While the research purpose initially identified may become more specific as the research progresses, this clause does not permit researchers to use the data for research that lies outside the original consent. As has been highlighted by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, excluding children from Clause 68 could have a detrimental effect on health research in children and could unfairly disadvantage them. This is already an area of research that is difficult and underrepresented.
I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, cares deeply about this but the fact is that if we start to make research in children more difficult—for example, if research on children with a particular type of cancer found something in those children that was relevant to another cancer, this would preclude the use of that data—that cannot be right for children. It is a risk to move and exempt children from this part of the Bill.
Amendment 16 would prevent data controllers from processing children’s data under the new recognised legitimate interests lawful ground. However, one of the main reasons this ground was introduced was to encourage organisations to process personal data speedily when there is a pressing need to do so for important purposes. This could be where there is a need to report a safeguarding concern or to prevent a crime being committed against a child. Excluding children’s data from the scope of the provision could therefore delay action being taken to protect some children—a point also made in the debate.
Amendment 20 aims to prohibit further processing of children’s personal data when it was collected under the consent lawful basis. The Government believe an individual’s consent should not be undermined, whether they are an adult or a child. This is why the Bill sets out that personal data should be used only for the purpose a person has consented to, apart from situations that are in the public interest and authorised by law or to comply with the UK GDPR principles. Safeguarding children or vulnerable individuals is one of these situations. There may be cases where a child’s data is processed under consent by a social media company and information provided by the child raises serious safeguarding concerns. The social media company must be able to further process the child’s data to make safeguarding referrals when necessary. It is also important to note that these public interest exceptions apply only when the controller cannot reasonably be expected to obtain consent.
I know the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, hoped that the Government might also introduce amendments to require data controllers to apply a higher standard of protection to children’s data than to adults’. The Government have considered Amendment 22 carefully, but requiring all data controllers to identify whether any of the personal data they hold relates to children, and to apply a higher standard to it, would place disproportionate burdens on small businesses and other organisations that currently have no way of differentiating age groups.
Although we cannot pursue this amendment as drafted, my understanding of the very helpful conversations that I have had with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, is that she intended for this amendment to be aimed at online services directed at or likely to be accessed by children, not to every public body, business or third sector organisation that might process children’s data from time to time.
I reassure noble Lords that the Government are open to exploring a more targeted approach that focuses on those services that the noble Baroness is most concerned about. The age-appropriate design code already applies to such services and we are very open to exploring what further measures could be beneficial to strengthen protection for children’s data. This point was eloquently raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Harding and Lady Kidron, and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and is one that we would like to continue. Combined with the steps we are taking in relation to the new ICO duty, which will influence the support and guidance it provides for organisations, we believe this could drive better rates of compliance. I would be very pleased to work with all noble Lords who have spoken on this to try to get this into the right place.
I turn to Amendment 27, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I agree with her on the importance of protecting children’s rights and interests when undertaking solely automated decision-making. However, we think this amendment, as currently drafted, would cause operational confusion as to when solely automated decision-making can be carried out. Compliance with the reformed Article 22 and the wider data protection legislation will ensure high standards of protection for adults and children alike, and that is what we should pursue.
I now turn to Amendment 39, which would replace the ICO’s children’s duty, and for which I again thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell. As a public body, the ICO must adhere to the UK’s commitment to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and we respectfully submit that it is unnecessary to add further wording of this nature to the ICO’s duty. We believe that government Amendment 40, coupled with the ICO’s principal objective to secure an appropriate level of protection, takes account of the fact that the needs of children might not always look the same.
Finally, to address Amendment 45, the Government believe that the Bill already delivers on this aim. While the new annual regulatory action report in Clause 101 will not break down the activity that relates to children, it does cover all the ICO’s regulatory activity, including that taken to uphold the rights of children. This will deliver greater transparency and accountability on the ICO’s actions. Furthermore, Clause 90 requires the ICO to set out in its annual report how it has complied with its statutory duties. This includes the new duty relating to children.
To conclude, I hope that the amendment we tabled today and the responses I have set out reassure noble Lords of our commitment to protect children’s data. I ask noble Lords to support the amendment tabled in my name, and hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, feels content to withdraw her own.
Before the Minister sits down, I have some things to say about his words. I did not hear: “agree to bring forward a government amendment at Third Reading”. Those are the magic words that would help us get out of this situation. I have tried to suggest several times that the Government bring forward their own amendment at Third Reading, drafted in a manner that would satisfy the whole House, with the words of the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, incorporated and the things that are fundamental.
I very much admire the Minister and enjoy seeing him in his place but I say to him that we have been round this a few times now and a lot of those amendments, while rather nerdy in their obsession, are based on lived experience of trying to hold the regulator and the companies to account for the law that we have already passed. I am seeking those magic words before the Minister sits down.
I have likewise enjoyed working with the noble Baroness. As has been said several times, we are all working towards the same thing, which is to protect children. The age-appropriate design code has been a success in that regard. That is why we are open to exploring what further measures can be put in place in relation to the ICO duty, which can help influence and support the guidance to get that into the right place. That is what I would be more than happy to work on with the noble Baroness and others to make sure that we get it right.
I thank the Minister for that very generous offer. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for his incredible support. I note that, coming from the Government Benches, that is a very difficult thing to do, and I really appreciate it. On the basis that we are to have an amendment at Third Reading, whether written by me with government and opposition help or by the Government, that will address these fundamental concerns set out by noble Lords, I will not press this amendment today.
These are not small matters. The implementation of the age-appropriate design code depends on some of the things being resolved in the Bill. There is no equality of arms here. A child, whether five or 15, is no match for the billions of dollars spent hijacking their attention, their self-esteem and their body. We have to, in these moments as a House, choose David over Goliath. I thank the Minister and all the supporters in this House —the “Lords tech team”, as we have been called in the press. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(2 days, 19 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support what the noble Baroness, Lady Freeman, said. Her maiden speech was a forewarning of how good her subsequent speeches would be and how dedicated she is to openness, which is absolutely crucial in this area. We are going to have to get used to a lot of automatic processes and come to consider that they are by and large fair. Unless we are able to challenge it, understand it and see that it has been properly looked after, we are not going to develop that degree of trust in it.
Anyone who has used current AI programs will know about the capacity of AI for hallucination. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, uses them a lot. I have been looking, with the noble Lord, Lord Saatchi, at how we could use them in this House to deal with the huge information flows we have and to help us understand the depths of some of the bigger problems and challenges we are asked to get a grip on. But AI can just invent things, leaping at an answer that is easier to find, ignoring two-thirds of the evidence and not understanding the difference between reliable and unreliable witnesses.
There is so much potential, but there is so much that needs to be done to make AI something we can comfortably rely on. The only way to get there is to be absolutely open and allow and encourage challenge. The direction pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and, most particularly by the noble Baroness, Lady Freeman, is one that I very much think we should follow.
My Lords, I will very briefly speak to Amendment 30 in my name. Curiously, it was in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, in Committee, but somehow it has jumped.
On the whole, I have always advocated for age-appropriate solutions. The amendment refers to preventing children consenting to special category data being used in automated decision-making, simply because there are some things that children should not be able to consent to.
I am not sure that this exact amendment is the answer. I hope that the previous conversation that we had before the dinner break will produce some thought about this issue—about how automatic decision-making affects children specifically—and we can deal with it in a slightly different way.
While I am on my feet, I want to say that I was very struck by the words of my noble friend Lady Freeman, particularly about efficacy. I have seen so many things that have purported to work in clinical conditions that have failed to work in the complexity of real life, and I want to associate myself with her words and, indeed, the amendments in her name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.
I start with Amendment 26, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose. As he said in Committee, a principles-based approach ensures that our rules remain fit in the face of fast-evolving technologies by avoiding being overly prescriptive. The data protection framework achieves this by requiring organisations to apply data protection principles when personal data is processed, regardless of the technology used.
I agree with the principles that are present for AI, which are useful in the context in which they were put together, but introducing separate principles for AI could cause confusion around how data protection principles are interpreted when using other technologies. I note the comment that there is a significant overlap between the principles, and the comment from the noble Viscount that there are situations in which one would catch things and another would not. I am unable to see what those particular examples are, and I hope that the noble Viscount will agree with the Government’s rationale for seeking to protect the framework’s technology-neutral set of principles, rather than having two separate sets.
Amendment 28 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would extend the existing safeguards for decisions based on solely automated processing to decisions based on predominantly automated processing. These safeguards protect people when there is no meaningful human involvement in the decision-making. The introduction of predominantly automated decision-making, which already includes meaningful human involvement—and I shall say a bit more about that in a minute—could create uncertainty over when the safeguards are required. This may deter controllers from using automated systems that have significant benefits for individuals and society at large. However, the Government agree with the noble Viscount on strengthening the protections for individuals, which is why we have introduced a definition for solely automated decision-making as one which lacks “meaningful human involvement”.
I thank noble Lords for Amendments 29 and 36 and the important points raised in Committee on the definition of “meaningful human involvement”. This terminology, introduced in the Bill, goes beyond the current UK GDPR wording to prevent cursory human involvement being used to rubber stamp decisions as not being solely automated. The point at which human involvement becomes meaningful is context specific, which is why we have not sought to be prescriptive in the Bill. The ICO sets out in its guidance its interpretation that meaningful human involvement must be active: someone must review the decision and have the discretion to alter it before the decision is applied. The Government’s introduction of “meaningful” into primary legislation does not change this definition, and we are supportive of the ICO’s guidance in this space.
As such, the Government agree on the importance of the ICO continuing to provide its views on the interpretation of terms used in the legislation. Our reforms do not remove the ICO’s ability to do this, or to advise Parliament or the Government if it considers that the law needs clarification. The Government also acknowledge that there may be a need to provide further legal certainty in future. That is why there are a number of regulation-making powers in Article 22D, including the power to describe meaningful human involvement or to add additional safeguards. These could be used, for example, to impose a timeline on controllers to provide human intervention upon the request of the data subject, if evidence suggested that this was not happening in a timely manner following implementation of these reforms. Any regulations must follow consultation with the ICO.
Amendment 30 from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would prevent law enforcement agencies seeking the consent of a young person to the processing of their special category or sensitive personal data when using automated decision-making. I thank her for this amendment and agree about the importance of protecting the sensitive personal data of children and young adults. We believe that automated decision-making will continue to be rarely deployed in the context of law enforcement decision-making as a whole.
Likewise, consent is rarely used as a lawful basis for processing by law enforcement agencies, which are far more likely to process personal data for the performance of a task, such as questioning a suspect or gathering evidence, as part of a law enforcement process. Where consent is needed—for example, when asking a victim for fingerprints or something else—noble Lords will be aware that Clause 69 clearly defines consent under the law enforcement regime as
“freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous”
and
“as easy … to withdraw … as to give”.
So the tight restrictions on its use will be crystal clear to law enforcement agencies. In summary, I believe the taking of an automated decision based on a young person’s sensitive personal data, processed with their consent, to be an extremely rare scenario. Even when it happens, the safeguards that apply to all sensitive processing will still apply.
I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, for Amendments 31 and 32. Amendment 31 would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance specifying how law enforcement agencies should go about obtaining the consent of the data subject to process their data. To reiterate a point made by my noble friend Lady Jones in Committee, Clause 69 already provides a definition of “consent” and sets out the conditions for its use; they apply to all processing under the law enforcement regime, not just automated decision-making, so the Government believe this amendment is unnecessary.
Amendment 32 would require the person reviewing an automated decision to have sufficient competence and authority to amend the decision if required. In Committee, the noble Viscount also expressed the view that a person should be “suitably qualified”. Of course, I agree with him on that. However, as my noble friend Lady Jones said in Committee, the Information Commissioner’s Office has already issued guidance which makes it clear that the individual who reconsiders an automated decision must have the “authority and competence” to change it. Consequently, the Government do not feel that it is necessary to add further restrictions in the Bill as to the type of person who can carry out such a review.
The noble Baroness, Lady Freeman, raised extremely important points about the performance of automated decision-making. The Government already provide a range of products, but A Blueprint for Modern Digital Government, laid this morning, makes it clear that part of the new digital centre’s role will be to offer specialist insurance support, including, importantly in relation to this debate,
“a service to rigorously test models and products before release”.
That function will be in place and available to departments.
On Amendments 34 and 35, my noble friend Lady Jones previously advised the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that the Government would publish new algorithmic transparency recording standard records imminently. I am pleased to say that 14 new records were published on 17 December, with more to follow. I accept that these are not yet in the state in which we would wish them to be. Where these amendments seek to ensure that the efficacy of such systems is evaluated, A Blueprint for Modern Digital Government, as I have said, makes it clear that part of the digital centre’s role will be to offer such support, including this service. I hope that this provides reassurance.
My Lords, we have waited with bated breath for the Minister to share his hand, and I very much hope that he will reveal the nature of his bountiful offer of a code of practice on the use of automated decision-making.
I will wear it as a badge of pride to be accused of introducing an analogue concept by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose. I am still keen to see the word “predominantly” inserted into the Bill in reference to automated decision-making.
As the Minister can see, there is considerable unhappiness with the nature of Clause 80. There is a view that it does not sufficiently protect the citizen in the face of automated decision-making, so I hope that he will be able to elaborate further on the nature of those protections.
I will not steal any of the thunder of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. For some unaccountable reason, Amendment 33 is grouped with Amendment 41. The groupings on this Bill have been rather peculiar and at this time of night I do not think any long speeches are in order, but it is important that we at least have some debate about the importance of a code of conduct for the use of AI in education, because it is something that a great many people in the education sector believe is necessary. I beg to move.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 41 in my name and in the names of my noble friend Lord Russell, the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. The House can be forgiven if it is sensing a bit of déjà-vu, since I have proposed this clause once or twice before. However, since Committee, a couple of things have happened that make the argument for the code more urgent. We have now heard that the Prime Minister thinks that regulating AI is “leaning out” when we should be, as the tech industry likes to say, leaning in. We have had Matt Clifford’s review, which does not mention children even once. In the meantime, we have seen rollout of AI in almost all products and services that children use. In one of the companies—a household name that I will not mention—an employee was so concerned that they rang me to say that nothing had been checked except whether the platform would fall over.
Amendment 41 does not seek to solve what is a global issue of an industry arrogantly flying a little too close to the sun and it does not grasp how we could use this extraordinary technology and put it to use for humankind on a more equitable basis than the current extractive and winner-takes-all model; it is far more modest than that. It simply says that products and services that engage with kids should undertake a mandatory process that considers their specific vulnerabilities related to age. I want to stress this point. When we talk about AI, increasingly we imagine the spectre of diagnostic benefits or the multiple uses of generative models, but of course AI is not new nor confined to these uses. It is all around us and, in particular, it is all around children.
In 2021, Amazon’s AI voice assistant, Alexa, instructed a 10 year-old to touch a live electrical plug with a coin. Last year, Snapchat’s My AI gave adult researchers posing as a 13 year-old girl tips on how to lose her virginity with a 31 year-old. Researchers were also able to obtain tips on how to hide the smell of alcohol and weed and how to conceal Snapchat conversations from their parents. Meanwhile, character.ai is being sued by the mother of a 14 year-old boy in Florida who died by suicide after becoming emotionally attached to a companion bot that encouraged him to commit suicide.
In these cases, the companies in question responded by implementing safety measures after the fact, but how many children have to put their fingers in electrical sockets, injure themselves, take their own lives and so on before we say that those measures should be mandatory? That is all that the proposed code does. It asks that companies consider the ways in which their products may impact on children and, having considered them, take steps to mitigate known risk and put procedures in place to deal with emerging risks.
One of the frustrating things about being an advocate for children in the digital world is how much time I spend articulating avoidable harms. The sorts of solutions that come after the event, or suggestions that we ban children from products and services, take away from the fact that the vast majority of products and services could, with a little forethought, be places of education, entertainment and personal growth for children. However, children are by definition not fully mature, which puts them at risk. They chat with smart speakers, disclosing details that grown-ups might consider private. One study found that three to six year-olds believed that smart speakers have thoughts, feelings and social abilities and are more reliable than human beings when it came to answering fact-based questions.
I ask the Minister: should we ban children from the kitchen or living room in which the smart speaker lives, or demand, as we do of every other product and service, minimum standards of product safety based on the broad principle that we have a collective obligation to the safety and well-being of children? An AI code is not a stretch for the Bill. It is a bare minimum.
My Lords, I will speak very briefly, given the hour, just to reinforce three things that I have said as the wingman to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, many times, sadly, in this Chamber in child safety debates. The age-appropriate design code that we worked on together and which she championed a decade ago has driven real change. So we have evidence that setting in place codes of conduct that require technology companies to think in advance about the potential harms of their technologies genuinely drives change. That is point one.
Point two is that we all know that AI is a foundational technology which is already transforming the services that our children use. So we should be applying that same principle that was so hard fought 10 years ago for non-AI digital to this foundational technology. We know that, however well meaning, technology companies’ development stacks are always contended. They always have more good things that they think they can do to improve their products for their consumers, that will make them money, than they have the resources to do. However much money they have, they just are contended. That is the nature of technology businesses. This means that they never get to the safety-by-design issues unless they are required to. It was no different 150 or 200 years ago as electricity was rolling through the factories of the mill towns in the north of England. It required health and safety legislation. AI requires health and safety legislation. You start with codes of conduct and then you move forward, and I really do not think that we can wait.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for Amendment 33, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for Amendment 41, and for their thoughtful comments on AI and automated decision-making throughout this Bill’s passage.
The Government have carefully considered these issues and agree that there is a need for greater guidance. I am pleased to say that we are committing to use our powers under the Data Protection Act to require the ICO to produce a code of practice on AI and solely automated decision-making through secondary legislation. This code will support controllers in complying with their data protection obligations through practical guidance. I reiterate that the Government are committed to this work as an early priority, following the Bill receiving Royal Assent. The secondary legislation will have to be approved by both Houses of Parliament, which means it will be scrutinised by Peers and parliamentarians.
I can also reassure the noble Baroness that the code of practice will include guidance about protecting data subjects, including children. The new ICO duties set out in the Bill will ensure that where children’s interests are relevant to any activity the ICO is carrying out, it should consider the specific protection of children. This includes when preparing codes of practice, such as the one the Government are committing to in this area.
I understand that noble Lords will be keen to discuss the specific contents of the code. The ICO, as the independent data protection regulator, will have views as to the scope of the code and the topics it should cover. We should allow it time to develop those thoughts. The Government are also committed to engaging with noble Lords and other stakeholders after Royal Assent to make sure that we get this right. I hope noble Lords will agree that working closely together to prepare the secondary legislation to request this code is the right approach instead of pre-empting the exact scope.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, mentioned edtech. I should add—I am getting into a habit now—that it is discussed in a future group.
Before the Minister sits down, I welcome his words, which are absolutely what we want to hear. I understand that the ICO is an independent regulator, but it is often the case that the scope and some of Parliament’s concerns are delivered to it from this House—or, indeed, from the other place. I wonder whether we could find an opportunity to make sure that the ICO hears Parliament’s wish on the scope of the children’s code, at least. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will say similar on his own behalf.
It will be clear to the ICO from the amendments that have been tabled and my comments that there is an expectation that it should take into account the discussion we have had on this Bill.
(6 months ago)
Lords ChamberI welcome the new Ministers and commend the noble Lord, Lord Vallance, on his maiden speech. Indeed, I wish the new Government well in their ambition for growth and their commitment to creativity in education, without which we squander both joy and one of our most valuable industries. I am encouraged by early statements about skills and innovation.
I will use my time to raise vital unfinished business that was abandoned as the snap election was called. In doing so, I declare my interests in the register, particularly as chair of 5Rights Foundation and adviser to the Oxford Institute for Ethics in AI. Top of the list was the measure to give coroners access to company data in cases where a child has died. We have campaigned long and hard for this and I am grateful to the Secretary of State, Peter Kyle, for committing to carry it forward in the data Bill. Can the Minister say when the Bill is anticipated and confirm that it will not undermine any existing protections for children’s data privacy?
Similarly promised and equally urgent is the new criminal offence of training, distributing or sharing digital files that create AI-generated child sexual abuse. The offence was agreed in principle with the Home Office and the irrefutable reasons for it are recorded in Hansard on 24 April at col. 588GC. Can the Minister please also commit to this measure?
Other agreed measures, all supported by the Labour Front Bench when in opposition, include data access for independent academic researchers. Access to data is an essential part of the innovation supply chain, and therefore the growth agenda.
There is a scandal brewing as the edtech sector oversells and underdelivers in our schools. The DfE had agreed to a review to establish criteria for efficacy, safety, security and privacy, so that children are as well protected inside the classroom as on the bus to school. A trusted edtech sector is yet to be developed anywhere in the world. It is a necessity and an opportunity.
The new Secretary of State has committed to strengthening the Online Safety Act. The children’s coalition has set out its concerns with Ofcom’s draft codes, which I will forward to Ministers. The gaps that it has identified are as mission-critical to the published codes as they will be to tackle violence against women and girls. It would mean a lot if the Secretary of State’s commitment made in the media to look again was repeated at the Dispatch Box today.
Finally on unfinished business, current UK law determines that computer information is always reliable, which is nonsense and has contributed to multiple injustices, most notably Horizon. The previous Lord Chancellor looked at how to rectify this. I was delighted to see the new Attorney-General introduced today. This must be a priority for him.
This is not an arbitrary list but part of a broader view that we need to live with and alongside technology to build a future that many cannot yet imagine and access, as the noble Lord, Lord Vallance, said. Technology will play an enormous part in our economy, but it is also fundamental to our security, self-worth, well-being, happiness, confidence in the future, and Britain’s place in the world, all of which are essential for growth.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I am concerned by the absence of a more comprehensive AI Bill, and I pray that the incoming Government have not already blinked in the face of tech lobbying. An AI Bill to establish minimum standards for the design and deployment of AI systems, manage risk, build necessary digital infrastructure and distribute the benefits more equitably is essential. As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said, innovation should not be unconditional and regulation need not be the enemy of innovation.
Our response to digital transformation has been poor, largely due to a gap between the expertise of policymakers and those we seek to regulate. A permanent Joint Committee of both Houses on digital regulation is often asked for and could address this. In the meantime, I invite the Minister to meet the cross-party Peers informally referred to as the Lords tech team—of which the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, was once part—to take forward the issues I have raised and work towards a model of innovation that serves the public as well as the Government’s growth agenda.