(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank those organisations that have forwarded briefing notes to us. My thanks also go to Senedd Research for its briefing on the legislative consent memorandum to the Bill and, of course, to the Delegated Powers Committee and the Constitution Committee for their excellent reports. These have all helped those of us who do not have a legal background to make sense of this gigantic Christmas tree of a Bill.
As my noble friends have said, there are measures in the Bill that we on these Benches support, such as the police covenant and changes to rules on disclosing criminal records to help with rehabilitation, but there are also measures that so impinge on civil liberties that we cannot support them. Like others who share my concerns, I will refer to Parts 3 and 4.
This is a Bill through which Governments will place new restrictions on the right to protest—a cornerstone of our democracy. Part 3 gives the police new powers and responsibilities to place extra conditions on protests, be they by one person or many. These conditions could make it difficult for people’s voices to be heard and could make them fearful of arrest. These new laws undermine the right to peaceful assembly and smack of government attempts to silence opposition.
Clauses in this part of the Bill increase penalties for those who breach a direction applying to a procession or assembly. I welcome the statement by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which recommends that these clauses be removed from the Bill. It is significant that these powers are also unwelcome for many past and present police officers. They fear that policing could be instrumentalised for political purposes and that the responsibility for deciding on what is and is not allowed will fall on their shoulders.
The noise element of these measures is also of concern to the Welsh Government. Although public order is a reserved matter, controls over noise relate to devolved environmental health matters, and the Senedd’s Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act sets out the principle of involving people in decisions such as these that affect them. This is one of the issues on which the Welsh Government are seeking clarity, and will recommend that Senedd does not give its consent until the legislation is more clearly defined and the responsibilities of the devolved Administration and local authorities are recognised and understood.
I am pleased that the Welsh Government are also withholding consent to the unauthorised encampment measures in Part 4. Of course, these measures introduce a new criminal offence of residing on land without consent in or with a vehicle. As the Constitution Committee points out in its report on the Bill:
“The provisions are clearly intended to apply in the main to the activities of Gypsies, Roma and Travellers … communities.”
There is a fundamental difference in approach between the two Governments. The Welsh Government’s approach has focused on engagement with communities and investment for adequate provision of authorised sites. This is opposed to the UK Government’s approach, which appears to focus on enforcement and criminalisation. As the Constitution Committee concludes, this situation is
“unacceptable in a democratic society … the existing powers to deal with unauthorised encampments are sufficient, and … this is fundamentally a planning—rather than a criminal—issue.”
It appears that, in their rush to solve a perceived problem, the Government are taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut. I understand that work to resolve these concerns, along with other outstanding issues, will continue between the two Governments during the passage of the Bill, but I would be interested to hear the Minister’s initial response to discussion around the legislative consent memorandum.
(9 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Listening to her speech a few minutes ago I was reminded of the first occasion on which I sat on a committee of this House with her. I was struck immediately not just by how she mastered facts and figures but by her compassionate heart, and tonight we have seen these two features in her presentation. For that, I thank her.
I come from a part of the United Kingdom which has reached out to asylum seekers to an extent out of all proportion to its size. Its record deserves scrutiny left, right and centre. Despite all our difficulties over the years—I need not reiterate them to this House—the compassion that our people have shown to asylum seekers is first class. Unfortunately, what we are debating tonight—particularly in relation to the Motion tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—is the adequacy or otherwise of what we are left with to put that compassion into reality.
One of the problems that we have seen locally in Northern Ireland is that what we are allowed to spend on support for families in this terrible condition is inadequate for children, particularly younger children. If noble Lords will forgive me for being specific, I will long remember a priest telling me that he was still haunted by the words of a mother of a disabled child who had become an asylum seeker, and was accepted into our local society. She looked at what she had to spend for the upkeep of the rudiments—not luxuries—for a week and asked: “Is this really the promised land?”. Where is our conscience? Where is our reality?
We have heard technical points in this debate and objections to the way in which Her Majesty’s Government have effected this current situation, and we could argue all night over the rights and wrongs. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has reminded us that there is a doubt in his mind about the legality, so to speak, of the words of the Motion tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I am not concerned about that but about the common denominator of both these Motions which is that behind facts and figures are human beings: men, women and children, and the children are absolutely vulnerable. A recent medical report spoke of the value of providing reasonable nutrition for children, but what is offered to them by society and local authorities is totally inadequate to meet that basic level of nutrition.
I am also reminded—this is the point that I would urge the House to remember about both Motions—that one of the practical consequences of the inadequacy of what we are able to give to these families is that they will turn to other sources of support. They will turn to charities, charitable organisations and churches. I speak from more than 40 years of experience of that sector. The problem I foresee, while listening to the emotion of this debate, is that there will be a limit to how far charities can meet the demands that they are faced with. For local authorities, charities, churches and well-meaning individuals there is a limit. Society will then have to turn back and ask, “What has brought us to this point where the line has been drawn in the sand and these sources can no longer meet the demand?”. When that time comes, I respectfully suggest to your Lordships’ House that it will not be parliamentary niceties that will concern us as a nation: it will be the crying need of a generation of refugees and asylum seekers—knowing the distinction between the two, of course. That generation will judge us, and it will judge that we have failed it.
My Lords, I will make a very brief contribution to this debate and concentrate on aspects of the report of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee regarding these regulations. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Alton, have already covered most of the points that I wanted to make, and I hope that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, will forgive me for being slightly emotionless in what I am about to say and concentrating on what the committee thought.
The committee had concerns with the original set of regulations that came before us. When the Government introduced this new set of regulations in July, we were surprised that there was no reference to our original concerns. Even in the new Explanatory Memorandum, to which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has already referred, we were presented with no cost-benefit analysis. I would be grateful if the Minister could give us some information about whether a cost-benefit analysis has been made. There was no indication of the number of households affected by the changes and, again, I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments on those. There was no indication of the sum expected to be saved, and I would like the Minister’s comments on that. There was also no real definition of the term “essential living needs”, although we all know that the sum has been based on them.
I want to press the Minister on the term “essential living needs”. Reference was made to it in the original regulations, which were subject to judicial review in 2014, and the courts adversely commented on the items overlooked by the Government. Some noble Lords have already referred to theme, but I make no apology for repeating them. Our report stated:
“Among other things, the court identified particular categories of essential living costs that had been overlooked by the Government when setting the rates of support: for example, nappies, baby clothes and other baby products, non-prescription medication, washing powder and cleaning products”.
It was not until we received the letter that the Government had written to NASF members that we had some idea of the methodology that was to be used.
The one figure that stands out for me as a grandmother in the methodology that the Government are using is the expenditure budgeted for clothing and footwear, which is £2.51 per week. I would love to be able to tell my children that clothing and footwear for their children could cost just £2.51 per week. That is just one point that I wanted to make.
I would be grateful if the Minister could give the House a definitive definition of essential living needs, on which these regulations are based. How confident is he that this definition will not be subject to another judicial review?
(9 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, these instruments form a very important part of the defence of our borders and of the realm. I think I am right in saying that they provide for the reintroduction of the monitoring of the departure of persons from the United Kingdom. I want to ask my noble friend—in as far as the instruments cover the departure of persons from the United Kingdom—about the method of administering the scrutiny of travel documents of persons proposing to or attempting to depart. Is that scrutiny made by the organisation, company or airline by which the persons intends to travel, or by an immigration officer in the same way as is now being done to people arriving? In other words, who will scrutinise passports? Under these instruments, will it be done by the airline or whatever? If it is not being done by an immigration official scrutinising the travel documents using the latest technology, will any warning that an immigration officer would have who scrutinises and examines a passport or other travel document of somebody seeking to arrive in this country—a system that has advanced a great deal in recent years—be available to anyone who is asked to scrutinise the document or passport of someone seeking to depart from the United Kingdom in the same way? In other words, will a non-government official to whom the task is delegated, such as the airline, the railway people or the boat people, have that same information or be able to have it under these instruments?
My Lords, I merely seek clarification on one aspect of the 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act’s code of practice for officers exercising functions under Schedule 1 of the Act, which accompanies these instruments. This code of practice is referred to in the 28th report of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. The final sentence of the information paragraph reads:
“In its consideration of the Code the Committee was concerned that directions about when officers may search a member of the opposite sex, particularly a child, were not as clear and consistent as they need to be”.
I am most grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his reply to my written query regarding this matter, but I remain concerned that the clarification I sought has not quite been met.
The committee and I still have concerns relating to the powers that the code of practice confers on officers who need to search a child—defined as anybody under 18—in order to seize or retain their travel documents. The code is exemplary in its guidance to police constables and designated border control officers, highlighting the care which must be taken when exercising their powers and the need to be aware of the necessity of safeguarding a child’s safety and welfare, as well as urging officers to be sensitive to the intimidation that children travelling alone can feel and the possibility that they may be vulnerable to exploitation by an adult with whom they are travelling.
I draw the attention of the House to paragraph 31, which outlines the scope of the power as it relates to the searching of children who have been removed from an adult. In particular, it gives guidance that two officers of the same sex as the child should, where reasonably practicable, be present during the search. It was the insertion of the three words, “where reasonably practicable”, which most concerned the committee and which led to its call for clarity. It seemed to the committee that the words,
“two officers of the same sex … where reasonably practicable”,
could give rise to any number of permissible permutations. I would be grateful if the Minister would clarify which of these would be justifiable and acceptable.
If two officers of the same sex as the child are not available, would two officers, one of the same sex and one of the opposite sex, be acceptable? If they are not available, would two officers of the opposite sex to the child be acceptable? If two officers are not available, would just one officer of the same sex as the child be acceptable? If they are not available, would just one officer of the opposite sex to the child be acceptable? At this stage, I am at a loss to understand why the last alternative is included. Are we to take from this that our ports are so understaffed that there are likely to be times when only one officer of the opposite sex will be available to search a child?
The code has already referred to the intimidation that a child travelling alone can experience. Does the Minister believe that a child, removed from an adult, would experience a similar feeling if searched by one or two officers of the opposite sex because they were the only reasonably practicable alternatives?
I would also be grateful if the Minister would add some detail on the advice given to officers governing the circumstances in which a child may be searched in the absence of the responsible adult with whom they are travelling, and explain how the child is to be removed from the adult and where the search will take place. If the child is travelling with an adult who is deemed to be exerting influence or pressure, how is an officer to defend him or herself against accusations of inappropriate behaviour if the child is influenced to make accusations against the officer and there are no witnesses to the search?
However, these children are unlikely to make a complaint about the manner in which they are searched, by whom they are searched and where they are searched. They are intent on leaving this country and, to all intents and purposes, this renders them powerless to control their situation. I would want firm guidelines to govern the way in which my grandchildren could be removed from my presence and searched at a UK port. Those firm, unambiguous guidelines should be applicable to all children.
The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee called for clarity in this aspect of the code of practice. I hope that the Minister will be able to provide the House with that clarity and describe, definitively, the circumstances under which children will be searched.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for explaining this raft of instruments. I have a few comments and queries.
As my first query is on an order which is not before us but which is relevant, I do not expect an answer, but I want to use this opportunity to explain a point which I raised with the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, of which I am a member. The authority to carry scheme sets out to whom it applies. As one would expect, it applies to those who are subject to a temporary exclusion order. Statutory instrument 438—I apologise to the House that I did not make a note of its name—provides that, for the purposes of the service of the order, it can be served on an individual’s representative. I queried who a representative might be for this purpose. The advisers to the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee took this up with the Home Office. I was concerned that, in the normal run of things, one might think that a representative was, for instance, a solicitor, but a solicitor who was not able to pass on the information to his client that an order had been served would find himself in a very difficult state and would probably disclaim the client.
An answer has come back and I want to get it on the record. It states:
“The Home Office agrees that … For adults … a representative must be a legal representative such as a solicitor or legal executive who acts on behalf of the person. The Home Office agrees that the Secretary of State cannot deem someone to be a representative in the absence of a clear relationship such as a … contractual relationship”.
As I have said, any lawyer thinking ahead a bit in that situation would disclaim that relationship. The Home Office also agreed that,
“for someone under 18 the term would cover the person’s parent or guardian”,
and that they could be a representative for this purpose. As I said, I am not expecting the Minister to comment on that.
Paragraph 22 of the scheme states that a person who,
“is refused authority to carry will be informed of that”,
in a notice by the carrier. It occurred to me to ask whether there is any penalty on the carrier who fails to pass on information—not information that they have been denied boarding, because they will have worked that out, but information of the contact telephone and email address that the individual needs to make further inquiries—and whether there should be any liability for compensation on a carrier who fails to pass on that information.
The Explanatory Memorandum to the authority to carry scheme regulations refers to,
“the need for an effective redress process in the case of mistaken identity. Administrative arrangements are in place to ensure that an individual is not mistakenly identified again”.
The second occasion would be pretty awful, but the first occasion of mistaken identity is pretty bad, too. I do not know whether the Minister has any comment on that.
With regard to the penalties for breach of the scheme, again I quote from the relevant Explanatory Memorandum. The consultees felt that the maximum £50,000 fine,
“was excessive and disproportionate, especially when compared to the possible fines imposed by other countries”.
Does the Minister have any information as to that comparison? There is also a feeling that the maximum penalty is unreasonably high, and I understand that there will be guidance on how the penalties will be applied. As this goes to the amount that will actually be levied in different circumstances, can the Minister tell the House when that guidance will be issued?
More generally, there has been a good deal of comment that the current authority to carry scheme is actually quite effective. What extensions from the current scheme will these various regulations and orders bring in?