Prison Sentences

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 29th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Rehabilitation is of course an important aim, but it is not the sole aim in the context of criminal justice. At present there are no plans to end short-term prison sentences. Of course, short sentences do not help some offenders turn their backs on crime, but protecting the public has to be our priority.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, is the Minister satisfied that the rehabilitation provided during a short sentence can be sufficient to enable an offender to learn to live a better life, rather than learn to do crime better?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is very difficult to estimate the extent to which rehabilitation can be effective during a short prison sentence. Indeed, where someone is sentenced to a period of less than six months in prison, the median period actually spent in custody is about six weeks.

Prisons: Women

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not in a position to give specific figures in response to the question from the noble Baroness, but I will undertake to write if they are available and I will place a copy of the letter in the Library.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord has mentioned mother and baby units. Am I right in thinking that those are units for newborn and very young babies? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, referred to older children and the importance of maintaining family connections beyond the age of six months or so.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I fully acknowledge that, which is why I added the addendum with regard to the number of mother and baby units because contact at that stage is also very important. Clearly we understand the need for contact between female offenders and their families in general.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, if I appear faint in my defence of the Bill it is due to a lack of food rather than a lack of enthusiasm. I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to this important debate and set out the Government’s position. I will start by making it clear that we are listening carefully to the debates on this issue, and will continue to do so.

The Government agree that protecting our rights and liberties as we leave the EU is of critical importance and it is only right that every detail of our approach is scrutinised. This has been a wide-ranging debate about human rights after exit, but it is worth remembering that the amendments before us relate specifically to the charter and the question of what role, if any, it should have in domestic law when we are no longer a member of the EU.

I maintain that the approach in the Bill to the charter as a document is absolutely right, and that the Bill in this respect is in no need of improvement. However, as many noble Lords have pointed out, that approach cannot be separated from the Bill’s approach to the general principles of EU law, including fundamental rights. In response to the strength of feeling conveyed not just in this House but in the other place, the Government are looking again at these issues. These are highly technical issues in some respects but they are undoubtedly important, so we will look further at whether this part of the Bill can be improved in keeping with some of the concerns that have been expressed. Indeed, my noble friend Lord Lamont referred to an observation made by the Secretary of State himself that, if there were specific examples of rights which were not otherwise covered, we would examine them to ensure that the rights were not lost. However, that is not the case. On the specific question of whether the charter should be kept, our view remains that not incorporating the charter into UK law should not in itself affect the substantive rights from which individuals already benefit in the United Kingdom. This is because the charter was never the source of those rights.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, anticipated that he might be reminded of his previous remarks on the matter, and I see no reason to disappoint him. In 2008, when this House debated the then European Union (Amendment) Bill, he was absolutely clear that,

“the charter was never intended to be applied directly to member states in dealing with those matters that member states have the competence to deal with. It was always intended to constrain the European Union institutions … the United Kingdom’s position, like my position, has always been that the charter affirms existing rights, it does not create any new justiciable rights in any member state and does not extend the power of the courts. Moreover, in many cases the charter rights are based on national laws and practices and so they must mirror the extent and content of those national”,—[Official Report, 9/6/08; cols. 426-27.]

laws.

The noble and learned Lord observed that he had nevertheless then encountered the incorporation of the charter into the Lisbon treaty in 2009. Perhaps that was a game changer. I remind him of his evidence to the European Scrutiny Committee in 2014. At that time he referred back to his previous statements and publications with regard to the charter and went on to say that, as he had there explained, the fundamental point was to provide a clear and accessible statement of existing rights and therefore constraints on the power of the EU to legislate.

As the noble and learned Lord’s previous remarks help to make clear, the charter is only one of the elements of the UK’s existing human rights architecture. It reaffirms rights and principles that exist elsewhere in the EU acquis, irrespective of the charter, and the Bill sets out how those rights and principles will continue to be protected in UK law after exit.

The noble and learned Lord referred to a number of issues, such as the case of Benkharbouche in 2017 in the Supreme Court. In that case the court found that there was a breach of Article 6 of the convention but it also referred to Article 47 of the charter in the context not of rights but of remedies. One has to bear in mind the distinction between rights and remedies.

The noble and learned Lord posed three questions in the context of previous observations about the charter. First, he talked about there being no loss of substantial protection. It is inevitable that leaving the EU will result in changes to the current arrangements, but certainly we do not accept that this in itself will result in a loss of substantive rights.

Secondly, he referred to the procedural protections that will be excluded. When we leave the EU, a person can still rely on sources that are reaffirmed in the charter. I emphasise “reaffirmed in the charter”, as he himself observed in 2008 and 2014. Procedurally there may be differences but we do not consider that that can be a basis for incorporating the charter into domestic law. Indeed, we absolutely stand by what has been said by the Prime Minister: it is not necessary to retain the charter to ensure that rights are protected.

The noble and learned Lord also referred to the body of the charter, beginning with Article 1, and suggested that these rights were contained only in the charter. I simply observe that on 5 December last year the Government published a very detailed paper setting out, as it were, a comparison of the rights in the charter and where they can be found elsewhere—in the convention, in the principles of EU law and in our own common law. The noble and learned Lord referred to Article 1, which concerns the right to human dignity. I remind him that there is a long series of case law both from the ECJ, as it then was, and from the European Court of Human Rights going back to 1995 in which, for example, the convention court emphasised that the very essence of the convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom. That has been repeated in a whole series of cases since then. These are well-established rights and they were well established when they were brought together into the charter.

I want to reassure noble Lords that substantive rights protected in the charter are, and will continue to be, protected elsewhere in UK law after we leave the EU, most notably in convention rights, in retained EU law, in the common law and via specific statutory protections such as those in our own equalities legislation. I have already mentioned that the Government published a detailed analysis providing guidance about how substantive rights found in the charter would be reflected in domestic law after exit.

Reference has been made to various legal opinions and that of Jason Coppel QC, who has had a number of name checks this evening. I can only implore noble Lords to look at the very detailed analysis the Government have produced. I also note that some of the references to Mr Coppel’s opinion involve references to his concern that Ministers might change rights, for example, or that the procedures will be affected. However, that is not to say that the fundamental rights underlying the charter are not found elsewhere.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord quite rightly draws our attention to the distinction between rights and remedies, but he will agree that rights are not helpful unless there are remedies. If we were scrutinising the charter and the source of its rights to establish whether we were satisfied that the rights and remedies could still apply, we might, for instance, have noted that the sources of Article 1 mentioned in the analysis would not confer an enforceable right on individuals after exit day. That is the JCHR’s analysis of the analysis.

I hope that the Minister can answer the question asked, in particular, by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Kerslake, about why we have combined the two debates—one about the charter, its rights and wrongs and whether it is good or bad, and the other about the mechanisms. We have heard so often from the Government Front Bench that this Bill is about mechanisms. Why are the Government not using the mechanism they have themselves designed to give them the opportunity, and to give the Committee the opportunity, to consider the substance calmly after the chimes of midnight?

Digital Economy Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 20th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Amendment 25YX and the related Amendments 28CB, 28CG, 28DV and 28FD seek to impose an express requirement that the public service delivery power may be used to share information only to the extent that it is necessary and proportionate to do so. That covers the changes to debt fraud research and similar civil registration provisions in the Bill. With respect, the amendments are unnecessary as the powers will need to be exercised in line with the Data Protection Act and the codes of practice, which already require that only the minimum data necessary to fulfil the particular objective may be shared. It is therefore unnecessary to amend in accordance with this proposal.

The effect of Amendment 25YYD would be that the list of specified persons permitted to use the public service delivery power could be amended only to add or remove bodies. The removal of the word “modify” would affect the way that minor amendments could be made. I do not believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, expressly referred to this amendment, but as it is listed in this group as her amendment I just mention the point because clearly it is necessary that there should be a degree of flexibility in how that provision operates.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I apologise; I thought that was in another group, though I received a note later. I would like to understand how extensive a modification might be.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness. I am happy to explain within this group, where I understand the amendment remains. The removal of the word “modify” would affect the way in which minor amendments could be made. For example, where a body changes its name or the description of the category of a body needs to be adjusted, you would then want to modify rather than delete and start again.

Amendment 26A seeks to remove reference to,

“the contribution made by individuals or households to society”,

from the public service delivery chapter. Again, I venture that the amendment is unnecessary because subsection (10) gives examples of “well-being” but does not provide an exhaustive list. Therefore we have three categories by way of example—but only by way of example. In response to the specific observation made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I respectfully suggest that there is nothing paternalistic or judgmental about any of the examples given in the Bill. Indeed, where a party makes a contribution to society, that benefits the contributor as well as society, which is why it is appropriate that it should be given as an example in this context.

Amendment 28AU would provide a new definition of “personal information” for the purposes of the public service delivery power. This point was raised in Committee as well. The amendment expressly incorporates the definition of “personal data” under the Data Protection Act 1998 into the definition of personal information for the purposes of these powers, as well as making clear that the Bill’s extended definition also includes deceased individuals and companies. We consider that the existing provisions set out the same position, albeit in slightly different words. I note that reference was made to the issue in Committee, and to the provision of codes of practice in that context.

The intention of Amendment 28AY seems to be to provide greater transparency by ensuring that individuals would know when information about them has been shared. Existing provisions in the Bill already require those using the powers to comply with Data Protection Act requirements as to the information that people are given about the usage of their personal data. This, supplemented by the requirements imposed by applicable codes of practice, ensures that the use of these powers will be as transparent as it can be.

Amendments 28AR and related amendments seek to narrow the exceptions to the general rule in Clause 36(1) that personal information received under the public service delivery powers may be used only for the purpose for which it was shared, to the effect that such information may not be shared for the purpose of preventing anti-social behaviour, and to restrict the exception permitting disclosure for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime to “serious” crime, as indicated by the noble Baroness. These amendments would also bring in an offence of disclosing personal information for the purposes of anti-social behaviour. The prevention of anti-social behaviour and the prevention or detection of crime are matters of significant public interest. If information sharing indicates potential criminal activity, public authorities should be able to take action. Similarly, if information received under the powers indicates that anti-social behaviour is occurring or is likely, we consider that this information should be disclosable to maintain public order. Anti-social behaviour may itself be seriously harmful to those who become its victims.

Amendment 28BM seeks to remove the power given by Clause 40(4), which allows regulations to make disclosures by newly specified persons subject to the same conditions that apply to disclosures of information provided by HMRC. That power would be used to require the consent of the original provider to any subsequent disclosures of particularly sensitive information, as is the case for information provided by HMRC under Clause 38. The amendment is undesirable, as it would remove flexibility to give enhanced protection to information from certain sources. I do not believe the noble Baroness read the provision in that form, but it is there so that enhanced protection may be given in a particular circumstance.

Amendment 28CF would impose a duty on the Secretary of State to review the civil registration power after three years, akin to the powers already provided in the debt and fraud powers. This duty was included in the debt and fraud powers to assess whether the powers deliver demonstrable benefit via an initial piloting process. The information gathered in the course of the pilot process will provide evidence for the review. It is our view that a similar duty to review the civil registration power would not be appropriate. First, civil registration information is already a matter of public record. Secondly, the powers are simply looking to update outmoded legislation to simplify and provide the flexibility to share civil registration data within the public sector to avoid the need to enact specific powers whenever a new need arises. The power has been developed to support a range of public authorities at national and local government level to transform the services that they can provide to citizens.

Finally, Amendment 39 is intended to ensure that Part 5 could not be brought into force until after the GDPR comes into effect, which would be in May 2018. This would prevent the use of the powers until that date, which would be unhelpful given that a number of bodies are keen to use the powers to achieve particular objectives, such as extending the warm home discount scheme. As we have said before, we consider that the present provisions are compatible with the GDPR—compliant, therefore, in that context—and we are committed to revisiting the codes of practice before May 2018 to ensure that they reflect the latest best practice of compliance with the GDPR.

In those circumstances, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I thank the Minister, but all that will bear some reading. We felt it important to extend some of the comments that we made in Committee to get a more extended response. Noble Lords will be pleased to know that I shall not respond to all those points. On the Minister’s first point about “necessary or proportionate”, I do not know whether he means that I misread the ICO’s comments, that the Government disagree with the ICO, or whether some of the changes to the Bill since its initial form have dealt with them. Perhaps I should just leave that hanging.

The fact that the “contribution to society” is an example does not answer our concerns. I remain anxious about it, as I do about “anti-social behaviour”, which the Minister described as being a matter of significant public interest. I do not dispute that, but data sharing is a matter of significant public interest—I suggest, possibly greater. We are told that anti-social behaviour may be seriously harmful, but it is not criminal in this context, because we have other provisions to deal with crime.

I was indeed confused about the application of the HMRC powers to other bodies, and I remain confused about whether that extension is appropriate.

Finally, of course civil registration information is a matter of public record, but the updating takes us into a very different regime. The ability to share information in bulk is very different from that to look up individual pieces of information. Can the Minister tell the House today whether the consultation to which he referred extended beyond the sharing organisations to the sort of bodies concerned with privacy? He may not know, and I may be quite out of order in asking this on Report. I do not think he is going to leap to his feet—pause—no, he is not. I do not hold that against him. It is probably not in his brief. If there was not such consultation, that answers my point.

However, clearly, I should beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, we have two amendments in this group. The Minister was just a little previous in answering Amendment 25YYD on modification, so we do not need to go back to that. Amendment 33ZYD would remove several organisations from the list of specified persons for the purposes of fraud provisions, and the amendment is here to enable us to ask whether all these require the data-sharing gateway or, conversely, whether there are many other government-related organisations; I am not quite sure what the correct term might be for organisations such as the National Lottery or the British Council, but I shall use the term government-related organisations tonight. Are there not others that might use the power? What were the criteria used to select the ones that are in the schedule?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to my noble friend Lord Hunt and note what he said with regard to the amendment. On the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, Amendment 33ZYD, which seeks to remove a number of non-departmental public bodies listed in the schedule for the fraud power, I accept that the list in the schedule is long but the fact is that many public authorities are at serious risk of fraud. Each of the bodies was considered individually before being added to the schedule, and the NDPBs have been included because they each administer many millions of pounds in grant expenditure each year, which exposes them to a significant risk of fraud.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Were any organisations considered and discarded for that purpose?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not in a position to say what number of bodies were considered and discarded, but I will undertake to write to the noble Baroness on that point. All the public bodies included in the schedule must, of course, comply with the data-sharing safeguards in the Bill. Clearly, public authorities may not enter into data sharing lightly. They will have to follow the codes of practice, comply with the Information Commissioner’s requirements on data sharing and privacy and have in place all necessary protections to prevent unlawful disclosure.

The list of public bodies in the government amendments is shorter than the lists we have previously published in draft regulations although, as I indicated to the noble Baroness a moment ago, I do not know how many bodies were considered and removed before the process of listing them in the draft regulations took place. Care has been given to ensuring that we share only where there is a clear benefit, as required by the legislation. I hope that, with that explanation, the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I thank noble Lords for their observations on these matters. There are of course government amendments in this group as well and perhaps I may begin with those.

This group of amendments concerns the codes of practice issued under Part 5 and those issued by the Information Commissioner’s Office. It includes the government amendments that implement the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, observed, the recommendations of the Information Commissioner’s Office. In addition, there are some opposition amendments on similar points.

We have already published draft codes of practice on data sharing. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended that the first codes of practice and the UK Statistics Authority’s statement of principles should be laid before Parliament in draft and should not be brought into force until they had been approved under the affirmative procedure. Revisions were to follow the draft negative procedure. We agree and have tabled amendments to achieve this, and it is intended that Parliament should have a suitable opportunity to consider these drafts and any amendments thereto in due course.

A further series of government amendments will require persons disclosing personal information under relevant chapters of Part 5 to have regard to the Information Commissioner’s codes of practice on privacy impact assessments and privacy notices, transparency and control in so far as they apply to information which is being shared. As the noble Lord, Lord Collins, observed, the Information Commissioner called for explicit reference to these two codes to be made on the face of the Bill. We have worked with her office to develop these amendments, which supplement the existing requirement that the codes of practice prepared under the Bill must be consistent with the commissioner’s own code on data sharing, and I understand that she is satisfied with the steps we have taken in that regard. I hope that this will provide further assurance to noble Lords that we are committed to ensuring that best practice concerning compliance with data protection and transparency will be applied to the exercise of powers under Part 5 of the Bill.

I now turn to the opposition amendments in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I hope I can persuade them that their amendments are no longer necessary, as the government amendments fully address the concerns of both the Information Commissioner’s Office and the DPRRC.

As the noble Baroness has explained, the amendments in their names seek to ensure further consistency with the ICO’s codes and to strengthen the role of those codes in the regime set up by Part 5, as well as providing for greater parliamentary oversight of the Government’s codes, and I believe that we are now there. The Bill already requires that codes of practice issued under Part 5 of the Bill must be consistent with the ICO’s data-sharing code of practice. The government amendments further require persons to have regard to the ICO’s codes on privacy impact assessments and privacy notices, transparency and control when exercising relevant powers under Part 5. So we are now referencing all the codes which the ICO felt were critical for the operation of Part 5.

Of course, this is not the first time we have discussed amendments that seek to strengthen enforcement of the codes of practice by requiring authorities that use the powers of determined specified bodies to “comply with” rather than “have regard to” these codes. The Government’s position remains that “have regard to” is the right weight to give to codes of this type. That is itself a legal obligation, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, noted. Moreover, the public law will expect those who are subject to the codes to follow their stipulations unless there are cogent reasons why they should not. We note that the Information Commissioner’s own codes are themselves advisory. A requirement to “comply with” the codes could lead to their being applied in a tick-box fashion, without due regard to whether the recommendations are actually applicable to and desirable in the context of the specific data share.

On the issue of adding additional persons to the consultation obligations for the codes, since Ministers have committed before Parliament to consult publicly on the Part 5 codes of practice, we suggest that such a requirement is unnecessary. The present provisions reflect what the noble Baroness noted to be the normal position.

Finally, on parliamentary oversight, the Government’s amendments fully implement the DPRRC’s recommendations, including, exceptionally, the use of the affirmative procedure for the first codes and the draft negative procedure thereafter. They go further than the noble Baroness’s amendment, and I hope that that will be welcomed by all noble Lords. I therefore invite the noble Baroness not to press her amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that response. I had forgotten to say that I was glad to see the government amendments about the affirmative procedure—it was because of looking at those that we got those two stray amendments that were tabled in error.

The noble Lord, Lord Collins, is absolutely right about the codes of practice. I simply say, before begging leave to withdraw, that it will not be possible for amendments to be made once the codes are put formally to Parliament. That is why wide consultation and—I do not like the term—an iterative process is very important on what will be significant documents. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Digital Economy Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 6th February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, perhaps I may ask a couple of questions which arise from the fact sheet on this issue. On civil registration, it says:

“The Bill establishes a framework, with appropriate safeguards, to share bulk registration information where there is a clear and compelling need”.


I wonder whether the Minister can help the Committee in understanding where that is translated into the Bill. The fact sheet also says:

“There are no intentions to share data with the private sector or for data to be used for any commercial purposes”.


It then goes on to say that,

“the powers would not permit this”.

However, I am sure that the Minister will understand my querying the words “no intentions”, because they suggest that there could be a change, and possibly one with which Parliament is not hugely involved. I am going to assume that the points made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee are in the rather large pile of items that it raised and which the Government will reply to before Report, so I am referring to that only in passing, but it would be very helpful to understand how the points in the fact sheet, which is where many people would start, move over into the legislation.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the proposals in Chapter 2 of Part 5, which are being addressed here, will ensure that citizens are able to access future—can I have a moment to sort out my own speaking notes?

Digital Economy Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 3rd sitting Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 6th February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, support the various amendments in this group. “Having regard to” a matter always seems to leave some wriggle room. If there should be exceptions to compliance—because I think we are talking about compliance here, not about consistency—then those should be spelled out. I accept that having codes of practice outside primary legislation allows for flexibility, which might be useful, for a response to experience of the operation of the code and, perhaps, for changing circumstances. However, there is so much reliance on codes of practice here that an inclusive process for constructing and finalising them is very important, as well as transparency in operation.

The noble and learned Lord will probably have a better recollection than I have of the discussion during the passage of the Investigatory Powers Bill about providing transparency by way of ensuring that people who were affected by the transmission of information knew about it. This was rejected for security reasons, but that would not be the case here. The overall objective has to be transparency and inclusiveness.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 81 and the other amendments in this group are intended, of course—and I understand this—to strengthen enforcement of the codes of practice in relation to the public service delivery, debt and fraud, and research powers by requiring authorities who use the powers to “comply with” rather than “have regard to” these codes. The noble Lord, Lord Collins, has sight of a loophole, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has encountered wriggle room, but I would take issue with those descriptions.

There is common ground here. We, too, believe that the codes are an important part of the data-sharing powers. However, the Government believe that “have regard to” is the right level of obligation for a code of practice. This is a legal obligation. Such persons when disclosing or using information will be expected as a matter of law to take the codes seriously and follow their requirements in all cases unless there are cogent reasons why they should not do so. It is, of course, common practice for legislation to set out the critical limitations on a power while codes of practice—which are more adaptable, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, acknowledged—are advisory tools that supplement with regard to best practice, principles and guidance.

The noble Lord, Lord Collins, alluded to a situation in which an authority exceeds its powers for the public good. In such a situation—without going into the detail of it—the authority would be exceeding its powers and it would have to answer for that, whatever the public good might justify in other circumstances.

Key conditions for the disclosure and use of information are set out in the Bill, including what can be shared, by whom and for what purpose. We have followed a common approach taken by government and others, including the Information Commissioner, to provide more detail on how data are to be shared in a code of practice. That does not mean that the code is to be treated lightly. Legal consequences may follow if the code is disregarded, as the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee pointed out in its report on the Bill. The relevant Minister can make regulations to remove a body’s ability to share information under the power if it fails to adhere to the code. The noble Lord, Lord Collins, raised the question as to whether that is considered sufficient in the circumstances. We do consider that that is a sufficient safeguard in the circumstances. I also remind noble Lords—in particular, the noble Baroness, Lady Janke—that the first requirement of the Data Protection Act is that processing of data should be fair and reasonable. That underpins in existing legislation the whole approach that should be taken to this Bill.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, sought to draw a distinction between the provisions here and those in the Investigatory Powers Act about knowledge of data transfers. Of course, although we are not necessarily dealing here with national security, we are dealing with issues such as fraud, where it would be wholly inappropriate to give people advance notice of data sharing, particularly if one were going to address issues of criminal conduct.

Amendment 107B would require breaches of the code of practice on the public service delivery power to be reported to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. It also places a duty on the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to investigate serious breaches and, where necessary, to inform the relevant individual of the breach. In doing so, the commissioner would have to ask the person in breach to make submissions before making a decision. With respect, the amendment would impose a considerable additional function on the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, where he or she would be bound to deal with breaches of a code of practice on information sharing which in no way relates to the commissioner’s remit of investigatory powers.

Indeed, placing such duties on the Information Commissioner would effectively be broadening the Information Commissioner’s remit without appropriate consultation. It would, as with Amendment 81B, cut right across the functions of the Information Commissioner, as distinct from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner; the Information Commissioner being responsible for upholding the Data Protection Act 1998, and also the safeguards and procedures for dealing with breaches of the code, which are already set out in various provisions. Such an amendment would blur the lines between the responsibilities of the Information Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and potentially lead to confusion and unnecessary duplication. If, in making those observations, I referred to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner when I meant the Information Commissioner and referred to the Information Commissioner when I meant the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, that simply underlines how easy it is to cause confusion in this area.

Amendments 108, 115, 134 and 151 call for the codes to be subject to approval by Parliament. A similar requirement was also raised by the Delegated Powers Committee in its recent report. We are carefully considering that proposal and I assure noble Lords that we will be responding to it shortly. Amendments 109 and 135 would introduce a requirement for the Minister to consult publicly on the code for a minimum of 12 weeks before issuing or reissuing it. Amendments 110, 152 and 190 would require that the Minister demonstrate that responses to the public consultation,

“have been given conscientious consideration”.

The policy in respect of these powers, and much of the content of the codes of practice, have been developed over two years of open policy development with a range of public authority and civil society organisations. The code sets out procedures and best practice drawn from guidance produced by the ICO and Her Majesty’s Government. We amended Clauses 36, 45, 53 and 61 in the other place to ensure our code will be consistent with the Information Commissioner’s data-sharing code of practice. The clauses contain a requirement that the Minister consults the devolved Administrations, the Information Commissioner and any other person the Minister considers appropriate prior to the issue or reissue of the code. I assure noble Lords that these other persons will include civil society groups and experts from the data and technology areas. It is, indeed, our intention to run a public consultation before laying the code before Parliament. I need hardly add that all consultations are taken seriously by the Government and all responses considered with appropriate conscientiousness.

I understand the interest in the codes and the desire to make sure they are effective. The codes will provide a strong safeguard for the use of the power, backed up by real consequences if they are not adhered to. With that, and while we consider the recommendations of the Delegated Powers Committee further—as I have indicated, we intend to do that in the very near future—I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

The noble and learned Lord warned us against giving advance notice to potential fraudsters, but I think we are talking in these amendments about notice which may be in retrospect. I am looking at the noble Lord who has tabled the amendments. There are different issues, I think, about giving notice in advance and telling people that you have transferred information. Maybe we need to come back to the distinction between the two at the next stage. On the requirement to have regard but not necessarily to comply, does that not point up the real weakness of a code that is not approved by Parliament? These two bits of fragility seem to me to go hand in hand and undermine the security, as it were, of the regime.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am content that we return to the noble Baroness’s first point if she feels that there is a point of distinction to be made. On her second point, I do not accept that there is fragility in this context. We are well aware, by virtue of past practice, that this formulation is appropriate to the application of codes of practice. Indeed, the noble Baroness herself observed that when applying one’s mind to a code of practice, a degree of flexibility is necessary. One cannot freeze them. That is why we consider that the wording here is appropriate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Although the definition of personal information differs from the definition of personal data in the DPA, all personal data shared and used under the public service delivery provisions must be handled in accordance with the framework of rules set out in the DPA, and in particular with the data protection principles, because the DPA is not overridden by this chapter. To the extent that the class of personal information is wider than personal data, although the DPA does not directly govern such information, we still expect that information will be handled in accordance with that framework because of the requirements of the codes of practice under Part 5. I hope that answers the noble Baroness’s question.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I see an amendment at Report coming up.

Digital Economy Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 6th February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I come rather late to the table with the Bill, but fresh, if that is the term, from the Investigatory Powers Act, as does the noble and learned Lord. Like me, he may have reflected on the fact that one of our basic documents in debating the Investigatory Powers Act was called by David Anderson A Question of Trust; the issue of trust is equally relevant to the provisions in the Bill. Like other noble Lords, I see the value of sharing information but—and for me it is a big “but”—with constraints, limits, conditions, checks. I would say balances but I do not think they always do the job. It would be too easy in this area to let convenience obscure other considerations. I have concerns about fundamental issues and I have difficulty, as I suspect do other noble Lords, knowing quite what to raise where, but my most fundamental concern is about respect for privacy. The use of bulk data, which we will come to, is bound to raise this.

I share concerns which have been raised about providers—not the public authorities and public services themselves, but the providers. Maybe we have to be realistic, as our public services are now provided so much through commissioning and procurement but, as I read the Bill, the regulations will not be required to list specific providers. I may be wrong about that. If providers have to be included, it would be appropriate for the public to be reassured, for instance, that the public authority in question maintains a register of its providers and publishes it. Maybe, also, all records of information held under these provisions should be destroyed at the termination of the provider’s contract.

The purposes set out here include well-being, which includes the contribution to society. I am not going to let this pass without saying that that risks being read, and I read it, as very paternalistic. I cannot see how it properly covers anything that is not covered by the other well-being provisions. Others have suggested that Clause 30 might lead to profiling. There is certainly a concern over health information, which we will come to separately. I also find it quite hard to think: if you are not contributing to society, are you not deserving of or entitled to public services? I think it is a very unfortunate term to use in legislation.

I share the concerns about Clause 33. At the very least, to share personal information to prevent anti-social behaviour which is not a crime—we know it is not a crime; you do not even need to go to the legislation about anti-social behaviour to know that, because it is referred to separately from crime—is going several steps too far. I start—I am not suggesting that others do not—from the premise that personal information should be kept confidential unless there is good reason not to do so, and if it is not confidential it needs to be treated with the greatest care and sensitivity. Respect for private life is one of our basic values. The Minister would be able to quote Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights—as I will do—without reading it. It says that there are “necessary”—I stress that word—exceptions in the interests of national security, public safety, the economic well-being of the country, the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. I support the amendments—I think they are in this group—that would import the term “necessary”.

Article 8 refers to disorder and crime, but—I will not be surprised if the Minister quotes some case law at me on the definition of “disorder”—I would have thought that in this context it must refer to something a good deal more serious than what may fall within “anti-social behaviour”.

The Investigatory Powers Act includes the much-welcomed and much-discussed “privacy” clause; during the debate on that we considered the requirements of both necessity and proportionality. The Act also refers specifically to the Human Rights Act and to crime as a consideration when it is a serious crime, and it refers to using “less intrusive means”. These points are all relevant to this debate.

For my part, this amounts to support for all the amendments in the group and a concern to persuade the Government to look at the issues through the lens of rights to privacy as well as efficiency. Most citizens accept—indeed, expect—that in a digital age government departments will share information, but with narrower purposes and stricter checks than the Bill offers.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to noble Lords for their observations on this group.

The powers in Chapter 1 of Part 5 will support the delivery of better services to achieve specified objectives, such as providing assistance to those suffering, for example, from fuel poverty. Your Lordships would all appear to be agreed on the need for effective data-sharing, but when we talk about that we must mean data-sharing that is secure and commands the trust of the general public—that is sufficiently ring-fenced to give confidence in the whole process. No one would take issue with that.

In that context I make this observation at the outset. It applies not only to this group of amendments but to further groups that we will come to this afternoon and perhaps much later this evening. We have to look at the provisions in this Bill in the context, first, of the Data Protection Act 1998, because the provisions of that Act apply in the context of this Bill. Therefore, as we look at the Bill, we must remember the protections that already exist in law with regard to data in this context. First, processing of personal data must always be fair and lawful. Secondly, data cannot be processed in a way that is incompatible with the purpose for which they were gathered. Thirdly, personal data must be,

“adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed”.

The personal data should be “accurate”, so a subject may be in a position to demand that they should be corrected.

Furthermore, on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, personal data can be kept no longer than is necessary for a particular objective. Where, therefore, they have been employed for a particular objective—or a party has received them for a particular purpose—and a need to keep the data for that purpose can no longer be displayed, they cannot be retained.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, will the noble and learned Lord address—in a later group, if not this one—why the terminology in the Bill is “personal information” rather than “personal data”, which might have made the marrying-up of the legislation a bit easier?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Indeed I can. The reason is that in the present context, personal information extends to bodies corporate and other personalities that are not otherwise covered by the first definition. I will elaborate upon that later but that is why there is a distinction between the two terms. We can see that the two terms substantially overlap but it is only because of that technical distinction that they are employed in this way. I hope that that satisfies the inquiry from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

The Data Protection Act not only circumscribes the use of data in very particular ways—for example, personal data must be processed in accordance with the data subject’s rights under the Act and be held securely to guard against unlawful or unauthorised processing, which addresses a point that many of your Lordships referred—but provides remedies in the event that those obligations are not adhered to. Generally speaking, that involves a complaint to the Information Commissioner.

Of course there have been lapses in data control. We are well aware of many of them. The noble Lord, Lord Collins, alluded to Concentrix, where there clearly appeared to have been lapses such that the Revenue terminated its contract without further notice in November of last year. We recognise that there are risks associated with data and data-sharing. That is why we emphasise the need to look at the provisions in the Bill not only alone but in the context of the Data Protection Act.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 19th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, this amendment is unnecessary. The Government have already made it clear that the new Investigatory Powers Commissioner will bring together the existing responsibilities of the Intelligence Services Commissioner, the Interception of Communications Commissioner and the Chief Surveillance Commissioner. That includes oversight of the consolidated guidance on the detention and interviewing of detainees. In addition, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will have a bigger budget and a dedicated staff of commissioners and inspectors, as well as independent legal advisers, to ensure that the highest levels of independent scrutiny are maintained. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I chose the last words of my remarks quite carefully because it is the statutory basis of the current arrangements that is so important, which is why we raised it at this—I acknowledge—late stage. Obviously, I am glad to have these assurances. They do not answer my question but that position is now on the record. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - part two): House of Lords
Monday 17th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, this group contains a variety of government amendments relating to oversight arrangements.

Amendments 133 and 149 clarify the delegation of functions by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner or judicial commissioners. They make clear that certain judicial functions of the IPC or judicial commissioners cannot of course be delegated to staff. The amendments also make clear that, where the Bill requires a judicial commissioner to undertake a task, any of the judicial commissioners can perform that duty. However, the IPC can still delegate a function or functions to an individual judicial commissioner in order to create a de facto deputy, should he wish to do so. Delegation of certain functions is sensible and allows for a flexible and efficient working environment. Of course, it would be inappropriate if the IPC could delegate to a judicial commissioner the ability to recommend individuals to be appointed as judicial commissioners and so this function is reserved to the IPC.

Amendment 149 puts beyond any doubt that the inspectors and expert advisers who work for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner or a judicial commissioner will be working with their full delegated authority. This responds to concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in Committee. We have been clear that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will lead a powerful new oversight body which will rely on the work of inspectors and technical experts alongside the commissioners themselves. Those working under the authority of the commissioner will have the same right to access and interrogate information that the commissioners themselves would have. This amendment puts that beyond doubt. It makes it clear that commissioners can, formally and in accordance with statute, delegate some of their functions to the staff working for them.

However, it is right that not all functions should be capable of delegation. There are some activities and decisions, such as decisions to approve the use of powers, that should rightly be undertaken by judges. Therefore, this amendment also prevents those types of activities and decisions from being delegated to members of staff. These amendments strike the right balance between allowing members of staff to claim the full authority of the commissioner while reserving key judicial functions to those who are appropriately qualified to undertake them. I hope that that brings some satisfaction to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who was concerned to anticipate whether these amendments would go as far as he hoped; I believe that they do.

Amendment 135 is intended to provide further clarity about when a commissioner does not need to consider the duties set out in Clause 207(6) and (7). I hope that the House will agree that while the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the judicial commissioners who will be working for him or her will be performing vital functions, it is important that the actual performance of those functions does not damage the public interest. Subsections (6) and (7) set out a number of duties on the commissioner: for example, that they should not act in a way that in their own opinion is prejudicial to national security, nor should they act in a way that they consider would compromise the safety of those involved in a security operation.

When the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill considered the first incarnation of this clause, it expressed concern that the duty placed on the commissioners as set out in these subsections was too broad. The Government then carefully considered this clause and agreed that there should be occasions on which a commissioner was not caught by these additional duties. For example, we put it beyond doubt that a commissioner could refuse to approve the decision to issue a warrant without worrying that they were breaching their duties in relation to national security. This amendment goes further still along that same path. It increases the list of circumstances in which a judicial commissioner will not be subject to the duty contained in subsections (6) and (7). The amendment expands the list to include all circumstances in which a judicial commissioner could be said to be exercising a “judicial function” or taking a judicial decision. I hope that this provides the House with further reassurance that we do not intend subsections (6) and (7) to be unduly limiting upon the important work of the commissioners.

Clause 223 provides for membership of the Technical Advisory Board, a non-departmental public body that advises the Secretary of State on cost and technical grounds if a notice given under Parts 4 or 9 of the Bill is referred by a telecommunications operator for review. Membership of the board must include a balanced representation of those on whom obligations may be imposed by virtue of notices and of those persons entitled to apply for warrants or authorisations under the Bill. At present, subsection (2)(a) of this clause requires that the membership of the board must include persons on whom obligations could be imposed by virtue of a data retention notice or technical capability notice—namely, telecommunications operators. Government Amendment 177 makes a minor change to this provision to add persons on whom obligations could be imposed by a national security notice. The amendment will not change the scope of the persons who must be represented on the board; indeed, a national security notice may only be given to a telecommunications operator. However, this minor change will make the meaning of the provision more clear.

Amendment 136 is a minor amendment to Clause 207, clarifying the policy intention that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner should be able to review the decisions of other judicial commissioners should this be necessary.

Amendments 137, 263 and 274 move the definition of a “statutory function” to Clause 239 alongside other definitions.

I turn now to Amendment 146. In Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, sought further clarity as to precisely who is covered by the definition of a “member” of a public authority. Having reflected on the matter, I can see that perhaps this definition is not as clear as it could be. Therefore, the Government have introduced this amendment to be clear that everyone who works for a public authority or who has worked for a public authority in the past will have to provide the IPC with all necessary assistance. I hope that that gives the House reassurance that the IPC will be able to hold those public authorities properly and clearly to account.

Amendment 147 is intended to put beyond doubt the fact that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will have access to advisers, be they legal, technical or of any other nature, that the commissioner feels is necessary to undertake their statutory functions. This amendment provides that the Secretary of State, after discussion with the IPC, must provide the commissioner with services as well as with staff, accommodation, equipment and facilities. I would like to be clear, though, that the commissioner will be entirely free to choose their own advisers and that the Secretary of State will merely supply the resources to pay for those advisers. This will allow the commissioner flexibility to “buy in” whatever advice they need at whatever time.

Amendments 154 to 156 are technical amendments providing additional certainty around the definition of the chief and other surveillance commissioners who are being abolished by the Bill and replaced by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

Clause 221 already makes a number of amendments to Sections 65, 67 and 68 of RIPA in relation to the functions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Amendments 163 to 175 are further technical amendments simply updating the relevant provisions of RIPA to ensure that it is clear that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal has the jurisdiction to investigate any claims or complaints relating to the provisions of the Investigatory Powers Bill. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, we welcome the amendments in this group. The provisions on delegation are indeed extremely helpful, as we were concerned about the chain of command and chain of responsibilities. I am glad to see the little amendment about being a “member” of a local authority—or HMRC, which I think was the other example I used. I had thought I was maybe going a bit too far in raising that point, but I am glad that I did. I am also glad to see the insertion of the reference to services for the IPC, which we were also concerned about. Having said that, we are happy with these amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

I appreciate that I may be speaking prematurely since the Government have not moved their amendment on the Technology Advisory Panel. On the basis that they are not about to stand up and withdraw it, I thank the Government for the amendment establishing a Technology Advisory Panel, which reflects the recommendation by David Anderson QC in his report on the bulk powers provisions in the Bill, a report that we had secured during the passage of the Bill in the Commons and a recommendation on which we had an amendment in Committee in this House.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and will resist the temptation that he laid in my path. As he observed, the government amendments have been tabled to give effect to the recommendation of David Anderson’s bulk powers review.

The review demonstrated that the bulk powers are crucial. Mr Anderson’s report concludes that the powers,

“have a clear operational purpose”,

and,

“play an important part in identifying, understanding and averting threats in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and further afield”,

and that, where alternatives exist to their use,

“they were likely to produce less comprehensive intelligence and were often more dangerous (for example to agents and their handlers), more resource-intensive, more intrusive or – crucially – slower”.

The review also concludes that bulk powers are vital across the full range of security and intelligence agency activity, including counterterrorism, cyberdefence, combating child sexual exploitation and organised crime, and supporting military operations; and that they have been used to disrupt terrorist activity, prevent bomb attacks, facilitate the rescue of hostages, thwart cyberattacks and save lives.

Mr Anderson’s report included a single recommendation, which was:

“The Bill should be amended to provide for a Technology Advisory Panel, appointed by and reporting to the IPC”—

that is, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner—

“to advise the IPC and the Secretary of State on the impact of changing technology on the exercise of investigatory powers and on the availability and development of techniques to use those powers while minimising interference with privacy”.

Following careful consideration of this recommendation, we agree with Mr Anderson’s assessment that those authorising, approving and overseeing the exercise of bulk powers must be alert to the impact of technological change on those powers’ utility and impact. These amendments therefore give effect to Mr Anderson’s recommendation in full.

The amendments provide that a Technology Advisory Panel must be established by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and, in line with Mr Anderson’s recommendation, members of the panel would be appointed by, and clearly accountable to, the commissioner. They also provide that the role of the panel is to advise the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers on precisely those matters set out in David Anderson’s recommendation —namely, the impact of changing technology on the exercise of investigatory powers, and the availability and development of techniques to use such powers while minimising interference with privacy. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner would have the power to direct the panel to provide advice on any issue relevant to these matters.

While David Anderson’s review was in relation specifically to the bulk powers in the Bill, we agree with his view that there is no reason to restrict the scope of the Technology Advisory Panel just to those powers. Indeed, the panel giving advice in relation to the targeted powers could be just as valuable. As such, the amendments make clear that the panel’s role would extend to providing advice on all investigatory powers whose exercise is subject to review by the commissioner, which of course includes all the investigatory powers under the Bill.

To ensure that the panel would be able to undertake its role effectively, the amendments also make clear that its members would have the same right to access information as judicial commissioners. This means that any relevant person, such as any member of a public authority, must disclose or provide to a member of the panel all such documents and information as that member may require in order to carry out their functions.

We also agree with David Anderson that it should be mandatory for the Technology Advisory Panel to produce an annual report on the exercise of its functions. The amendments would therefore require that the panel make such a report to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as reasonably practicable at the end of each calendar year. At the same time as providing the report to the commissioner, a copy would also need to be sent to the Secretary of State and to Scottish Ministers where the report related to matters for which Scottish Ministers are responsible. To ensure sufficient transparency about the panel’s work, the amendments would require the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to include information about the work of the panel in their annual report.

I turn to the opposition amendments that have been tabled to the new clause establishing the Technology Advisory Panel. The first of these amendments would expand the role of the panel explicitly to provide advice to the commissioner on safeguards. While I appreciate what is intended by the amendment, I do not think it is necessary. The panel’s role is to advise on the impact of changing technology on the exercise of investigatory powers. Therefore, if technology changes in a way which means that existing safeguards are no longer appropriate or if new safeguards are needed to protect privacy, the panel can provide such advice to the commissioner and the Secretary of State. The panel must provide advice when asked to do so, but may also provide advice as it considers appropriate. While I appreciate the intent behind the amendment, I believe that the clause as drafted already provides for such advice to be given by the panel. Therefore, I do not believe that the noble Baroness’s amendment is necessary.

The second amendment to which she referred would expand the role of the panel to provide advice on an additional matter, namely,

“the impact of changing technology on the interpretation of the law and any amendments to legislation required to ensure the application of the provisions of this Act to changed technology”.

This amendment is neither necessary nor desirable. The role of the panel would, rightly, be squarely to provide advice on the impact of technology on the exercise of investigatory powers. This clearly defined role will ensure that members of the panel will be exactly what we need them to be: technical experts. David Anderson’s recommendation was designed to fill a gap. He was conscious that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and judicial commissioners will be senior judicial figures. So, while they will be experts in the law and the interpretation of the law, they will not necessarily be experts in technology. What he felt was needed, and what the Government agree is needed, is technical experts to provide technical advice. In seeking to expand the panel’s remit to provide legal advice as well, I strongly fear we would end up with lawyers rather than technical experts. Indeed, David Anderson specifically warned that,

“the technological expertise of the TAP should not be unduly diluted”.

I pause to wonder whether one could ever dilute something with a lawyer, but I continue. That is exactly what this amendment would do, and that is why we firmly believe that it should be resisted.

This brings me to the amendment, which would permit the commissioner to make a report on his or her views about the legal operation of the Bill but would not place a duty on the commissioner to do so. I appreciate the sentiment behind the amendment, but I believe it is unnecessary. Clause 212 already gives the Investigatory Powers Commissioner a very wide remit to report on any matter relating to the functions of the judicial commissioners. That will, of course, permit the IPC, as he or she thinks fit, to report on the legal interpretation of the Bill. However, I hope that the IPC will not feel it necessary to do so, or at least to do so often. That is because the Bill serves to put beyond doubt the powers available to the state and the safeguards that apply to them. In the words of David Anderson, the Bill,

“restores the rule of law and sets an international benchmark for candour”,

but if the commissioner felt the need to report on the legal operation of the Bill, he could already do so.

Finally, Amendment 178C would require the panel to have regard to the same matters which a public authority must have regard to, as set out in Clause 2, which is referred to as the privacy clause. I appreciate the spirit of this amendment, but I believe it is unnecessary. Clause 2 is already clear that whenever exercising certain powers, such as to authorise warrants, all public authorities must have regard to the issues outlined in the privacy clause, but of course the Technology Advisory Panel will not be exercising such powers, so the amendment does not, in that context, make sense. If the intention is that when the panel gives advice it should bear in mind the various privacy considerations contained in Clause 2, then the amendment is also unnecessary, since the requirement, contained in government Amendment 178, that the panel advise on,

“the impact of changing technology on the exercise of investigatory powers”,

already includes advising on the ability to exercise those powers within the statutory framework and subject to all the safeguards contained in the privacy clause. Of course, the whole point of the Technology Advisory Panel, as specified in the government amendment, is to advise on techniques to “minimise interference with privacy”. So I really think that this amendment is unnecessary.

I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I recognise that this is Report stage. I was aware, of course, that the panel will not be a public authority, and that is why I framed Amendment 178C as I did: the Technology Advisory Panel would need to,

“have regard to the matters”,

in Clause 2, rather than be bound by them. I suggested the amendment because subsection (1)(b) of government Amendment 178 talks about, “minimising interference with privacy”, and that seemed to me not nearly as strong as the privacy clause, Clause 2, which we took to bits but welcomed earlier in the passage of the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 134A.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 138 and the other amendments in this group, which would ensure that the Scottish Government are provided with appropriate means to engage with and support the work of judicial commissioners relating to devolved powers in Scotland.

Clause 210 allows a judicial commissioner to provide advice and information to any person. It requires the judicial commissioner to consult the Secretary of State first where providing advice and information might be contrary to the public interest. It is clearly appropriate that Scottish Ministers are similarly consulted if the provision of advice and information by the judicial commissioner may be prejudicial specifically to activities that fall under those Ministers’ responsibility. Accordingly, Amendments 138 and 139 would require the judicial commissioner to consult additionally the Scottish Ministers when providing information and advice that may be prejudicial to the prevention or detection of serious crime in Scotland, or the continued discharge of any devolved functions of a Scottish public authority.

Clause 216 sets out the funding arrangements for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the judicial commissioners. Amendment 148 would grant the Scottish Ministers the power to make such payments as they consider appropriate to judicial commissioners for work relating to the exercise of devolved functions by public authorities in Scotland. This simply maintains the current position, as the Scottish Government currently have the power to pay surveillance commissioners who carry out their functions wholly or mainly in Scotland such allowances as the Scottish Ministers consider appropriate. The surveillance commissioners will be abolished by the Bill, and their functions taken on by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the judicial commissioners. Accordingly, I beg to move Amendment 138.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord may have answered one of my questions about Amendment 148. It was about whether this sort of arrangement is in place elsewhere because, on reading it, it seemed that there might be scope for some squabbles as to who should be responsible for paying how much. However, I think he said that this is already working satisfactorily under the current arrangements. My other question is about the term “allowances”, which in normal language means less than paying salaries. It does not address payment for facilities, infrastructure and so on. It seemed a curious term to use but that is probably because I do not understand quite how the system will work. Allowances, to most of us, sounds like more like an ex gratia arrangement.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Might I be permitted to respond briefly to the noble Baroness on these points? First, these amendments have been agreed with officials in the Scottish Government and reflect an existing arrangement whereby the allowances of surveillance commissioners are determined by the Scottish Ministers in that context. “Allowances” is used there, as I understand it, because we are not relying upon them for payment of certain standing charges incurred in setting up the commissioners, for example.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - part one): House of Lords
Monday 17th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

The noble Lord made a very persuasive case for this amendment and I do not think that he will be surprised to be supported by these Benches, given our concerns about internet connection records—so any further constraint on them is something that we would welcome. But he went into far more detail than that and we support him.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government have consistently recognised that care must be applied to the acquisition of internet connection records and, importantly, that they should not be acquired for trivial purposes. That is why we brought forward amendments in Committee to put in place a number of restrictions to provide reassurance that the powers to acquire internet connection records would only ever be used proportionately. These amendments included a threshold which would mean internet connection records could only be used to investigate certain crimes which could attract a sentence of at least six months’ imprisonment.

This amendment raises the threshold for offences which are sufficiently serious that an offender can be sentenced to at least 12 months’ imprisonment, rather than six. The amendment rightly leaves unchanged the important exceptions in the Bill to the crime threshold. The House has recognised the need to ensure that internet connection records can be obtained for the investigation of certain specified types of crime—for example, those relating to cyberbullying and harassment, and those relating to a breach of a person’s privacy—which, for whatever reason, carry a lower sentencing limit.

We recognise that this amendment will provide further reassurance and ensure public trust in the use of these vital powers, whose value and importance have been widely recognised and acknowledged. In these circumstances, we are therefore content to accept the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, Amendment 117B is grouped with government Amendments 118 and 130. It aims at the same thing, but I think that the Government’s aim is better than ours in Amendment 117B. The amendments are about the retention of third-party data, so in order to move the business on we are very happy to support the government amendments in this group. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I do not understand why the noble Baroness wishes to insist on Amendment 117B.

Sorry, I am getting a great deal of advice from around the Chamber, and it is all immensely helpful.

Perhaps I may explain the purpose of government Amendments 118 and 130. As I said in Committee, we have been making good progress on drafting a clause that could put into the Bill the Government’s clear commitment that we will not require a telecommunications operator to retain third-party data.

It is important to be clear exactly what we are referring to as third-party data. Where one telecommunications operator is able to see the communications data in relation to applications or services running over its network but where it does not use or retain that data for any purpose, then it is regarded as third-party data. For example, if you use an internet access provider such as a home broadband provider to use the internet to log into a separate email provider in order to send an email, the broadband service might be able to see your access communications data in relation to the email service. If that information was not used or retained for any purpose by the broadband provider, the data would be considered to be third-party data.

I am pleased to say that we have now produced a clause that prohibits the retention of third-party data. We have tested this drafting with operational partners and with those telecommunications operators likely to be affected by the legislation and we are confident that it delivers the desired effect. That being so, the Bill essentially replicates the current position in RIPA, which is that data that already exist and could save a life or convict a criminal and so on can be accessed, but we are not insisting that data should be retained.

In these circumstances and in light of the opening observations by the noble Baroness, I commend government Amendments 118 and 130 in the event that we proceed.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am sorry to have confused the noble and learned Lord. I was simply trying to explain that we are seeking to achieve the same thing, but that the Government have done better than we have. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Report: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 11th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, this might be a mouse after the last amendment but it is not unimportant. It is about transparency—and perhaps more than transparency. It is about positively putting information into the public domain and not simply providing information which can be looked through. It is, if you like, a companion to the very welcome privacy clauses in the Bill. It is intended to help the citizen understand what is going on and to enable operators to put into the public domain the warrants and so on with which they have to deal. It provides that they will not commit an offence by disclosing not details but the number of warrants, the number of accounts and the number of warrants complied with, going back only for a limited period of six months. The second limb of the amendment —that they can do more, or more can be done by whoever, if the Secretary of State agrees it—should go almost without saying.

I am told, and would welcome confirmation if the Minister can give it, that the Government are considering regulations to introduce a clear framework for transparency and that provisions such as this might fall within those. To that extent, my amendment is a probing amendment.

User transparency around engagement with law enforcement and government agencies is a key component of accountability to users. It is a prerequisite too, I would say, of redress. Given that the Government are committed to greater transparency than we have had hitherto through this Bill, and to this being a world-leading piece of legislation, I hope that they will be sympathetic to the provisions proposed. The amendment would permit providers to publish statistical data and would complement the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s annual report, looking at the issues through a different lens and from another perspective. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, it is the Government’s view that a new public reporting clause, as proposed by this amendment, is unnecessary. I will seek to explain why.

Clauses 55 and 125 already provide for the Secretary of State to make regulations that will permit operators to report information in relation to the number of interception and equipment interference warrants they have given effect to. Furthermore, the Government have proposed amendments to these clauses to give more flexibility to permit operators to publish greater statistical information about the warrants they have received. In response to a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I can tell the House that it is the Government’s intention that the regulations will permit companies to publish details relating to the number of warrants they have given effect to and the number of customer accounts to which these warrants refer.

However, as was previously discussed in Committee, we need to be very careful about any exemptions to prohibitions on revealing sensitive information and the extent to which they might reveal the capabilities of the agencies. It is already the case that terrorists and criminals change their behaviour and the means they use to communicate to evade detection, and we must not give them further information that would help them to do so.

The Secretary of State must have the ability to protect the technical capabilities deployed by law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies by setting out the way information relating to warrants may be reported—for example, the time period between being served with a warrant and publication of that information, or the bandings to be used for reporting on the numbers of warrants received. It is our view that the level of detail required is appropriate for such conditions to be provided for in regulations, not in the Bill.

The Government will of course continue to work closely with telecommunications operators on their transparency reporting. We have already discussed the proposed content of the draft regulations with them. Indeed, the government amendments to Clauses 55 and 125 reflect our efforts to address issues raised by operators in response to this consultation. Of course, also, the regulations issued under Clauses 55 and 125 will in due course be subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

It is therefore our view that the Bill and the Government amendments already provide for what these amendments seek, in in a way that allows companies to be transparent and the Government to protect sensitive capabilities. Accordingly, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for that response. What we are really being told is that the fleshing out of transparency provisions that I seek is in train. I of course understand points such as the need to consider exceptions.

I am prompted by this to mention a question that I should perhaps have asked the Government a little while ago, but I think all noble Lords will be interested. I am not expecting the noble and learned Lord to respond to this instantly, but we would all be interested to know the timetable for introducing regulations. We know there is a deadline of the end of this year because of DRIPA coming to the end of its natural life, but I assume the Bill cannot operate without a lot of secondary legislation. I wonder whether there could at some point be an indication of not only how the Government propose to deal with regulations but how the House, which is generally very supportive of the thrust of the legislation, despite one or two bits and pieces, can be helpful without losing its proper role of scrutinising regulations.

I should not perhaps take time on Report to be as pompous as that sounds. It is intended to be both an inquiry and an expression of concern about a matter that is for Parliament, not just the Government. Having said that, and welcoming the information about the work going on on this subject, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 7th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, Clause 199 explains the process of, and sets the time limits for, the initial examination of a dataset. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has explained the purpose of Amendments 231ZD and 231ZC, and I am obliged to her for indicating that these are probing amendments. I make no point about the technicalities of the proposed amendment, and understand the underlying rationale for making these probing amendments.

Although there may be occasions when a security and intelligence agency knows exactly what it has received, that is clearly not always the case. To give a simple example, an agency may receive a USB stick that it believes contains files relating to an organisation engaged in terrorist activity. This might, or might not, be a bulk personal dataset, and needs to be subject to an initial examination to determine whether it is a bulk personal dataset. To be absolutely clear, this initial examination process can only establish what the data are: in particular, whether this is a bulk personal dataset or not, and whether there is a case for retaining it. They cannot be searched or selected for examination without a warrant, so delaying applying for a warrant is not a way for the intelligence agency to work round the system provided for in the Bill.

It is not in anyone’s interest to delay the process. The agency cannot start using the data until a warrant is issued, and the agencies will therefore want to get warrants in place as quickly as possible, particularly as there may be concerns about whether threats and opportunities will be missed by reason of any delay. More generally, the Bill places an obligation on the agency to apply for a warrant,

“as soon as reasonably practicable”,

meaning that if it is possible to apply for a warrant sooner than the deadline set out in Clause 199 the agency would do so. The time limit here is just what I would term the “hard stop” provision within the clause. Amendment 231ZD is therefore unnecessary and indeed, in a sense, unhelpful.

From the point where the intelligence agency believes a dataset created in the United Kingdom includes personal data, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, noted, it has three months to complete the initial examination and apply for a warrant to retain and, if necessary, select data for examination from the dataset. Amendment 231ZE seeks to reduce this period from three months to one month.

The Government do not think this is appropriate. The structure and format of some bulk personal datasets can be highly complex, even if created in the United Kingdom. In some cases, it can take considerable time to be confident that the structure is sufficiently understood. Only then can the intelligence agency accurately describe the information contained in the dataset and know whether it is necessary and proportionate for it to be retained. There may be other factors that require time to resolve, including, for example, technical difficulties such as formatting, compression and encryption. Indeed, there may be language issues: the dataset, even if created in the United Kingdom, may be in a foreign language. In addition to that, the size of the dataset can be a factor. Three months is therefore considered the appropriate time limit for this initial examination. However, I underline the point that this is an outer limit—this is the hard limit for that.

Again, I emphasise to the noble Baroness that this three-month time limit does not provide a way for the agencies somehow to circumvent the safeguards within the Bill. The dataset in question cannot be used for intelligence purposes until a specific BPD warrant is in place or until the provisions set out in chapter 6 of the draft code of practice, which relate to authorising retention and use of a dataset fitting within a class warrant, are met. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am grateful for that explanation. It has helped me to understand the process but it has also made me wonder whether in Clause 199(3) the term “belief” is the correct one. The way that the Minister has described it, it is more of a suspicion—I do not mean that in any negative way—or a concern. A “belief” suggests that there has been a thought process arriving at a conclusion. I do not expect him to respond to that now unless he wants to but I am left wondering, and he might want to look at this again, whether this wording quite describes the completely cogent explanation about the clause that we have just heard. For the moment, though, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 7th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord’s intention in Amendment 204 to ensure that communications data can be acquired in bulk and analysed in real time. Indeed, the Bill already permits this. I draw attention to Clause 146(5) and 146(6), which provide for such a scenario as he suggests in this amendment. These subsections specify the conduct which must be described in the warrant and any conduct that it is necessary to undertake to do what the warrant expressly requires. If it was therefore necessary to obtain bulk communications data in real time, these provisions would allow it.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I think that the noble and learned Lord is speaking to Amendment 204, which has not in fact been spoken to.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I had understood that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also referred to Amendment 204 but if he did not, I apologise.

I turn then to Amendment 203A, which seeks to exclude the ability for a bulk acquisition warrant to require a communication service provider to obtain third-party data where it is not already in its possession. I do believe that the noble Lord referred to that.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 5th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak also to Amendments 191B, 191BA, 191C, 191D, 191E, 191F, 191FA, 191G, 191GA, 191GB, 191H and 191J—on this occasion, I do not think that the importance is in inverse proportion to the number of amendments, as one often finds.

Taken together, these amendments would give the Investigatory Powers Commissioner greater scope to report errors—this is not unrelated to the previous amendment—and create a more level approach by removing many of the strict limitations which would prevent many errors being reported. The objective is to ensure that the protections in place for the agencies do not restrict those for the general public in learning whether an error involving them has been made. I must thank the organisation Big Brother Watch for drawing several points to our attention.

The first two amendments simply seek to bring more objectivity to the exercise.

Amendments 191C and 191D deal with when an error should be reported. According to the Bill, that should happen when it is “a serious error” and,

“it is in the public interest for the person to be informed”.

I suggest that the default should be that a person who has been the subject of an error should be informed unless there is a good reason for him not to be. The clause does not say that the person should be informed unless it is in the public interest for the person not to be informed. In the debate on the previous amendment, the Minister talked about prejudicing an ongoing investigation. Without consulting my noble friend Lord Paddick, I would regard that as being something that would be in the public interest to create a block on information. We have the phrase “serious error”. To me, “serious” risks an ever-higher threshold being set on reporting an error. One of my amendments suggests the term “not trivial” as an alternative that would provide a proportionate response to the issue.

Amendment 191E would delete Clause 207(3). Subsection (3) provides that,

“the fact that there has been a breach of a person’s Convention rights (within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998) is not by itself sufficient for an error to be a serious error”.

The requirements of the Human Rights Act are a particular consideration under Clause 2, which is the privacy clause. I would regard any breach of the convention rights as something about which to be very careful. Article 8, the right to private and family life, is not absolute; there may be interference with it in accordance with the law where it is necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security and given other matters set out in the article. I have two questions, and it looks from the way he is writing notes as though they should be addressed to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen. First, how does subsection (3) affect Clause 2, the privacy clause? Can the Committee be assured that that clause is in no way weakened by Clause 207(3)? Secondly, is Clause 207(3) included in order to meet the wording of Article 8, which is that it does not apply if the breach is “in accordance with law”? Is this clause bringing that situation within the scope of being in accordance with law?

Amendment 191F requires the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to consider matters which are the subject of Clause 2, the privacy clause. This part of the Bill is not referred to in Clause 2. The safeguards to protect privacy are referred to in Clause 205(5) but that is in connection with a review under Clause 205. How does the privacy safeguard apply to this clause?

Amendments 191G and 191GA—probably best read the other way round by noble Lords who are managing to follow this, which is not a stream of consciousness but a stream of amendments—would provide that the details which the commissioner considers necessary for the exercise of the right to apply to the tribunal and “other details” should be made public and be proportionate. If an error is made, why should information about it be limited to details necessary for an application to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal? There may be other rights in play, and should the person not be informed? People do not always want to exercise a right, but nevertheless if an error has been made they should have the information about it. The second of this pair of amendments, which refers to proportionality, may not be quite right in its drafting, but I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will understand that I am seeking to find the balance between individual rights and national security and so on.

I turn to Amendment 191GB. Clause 207(9) provides that an error which prompts action under the clause is an error by a “public authority”. For this purpose, do public authorities include telecommunications officers? They should do, which is why the amendment adds them if they are not already there, because those operators carry out a very significant amount of surveillance work on behalf of public authorities.

On Amendment 191H, we are told that errors must be of a description identified in a code of practice. The important term here is “code”. The codes of practice are variable: they are not part of the primary legislation. I know I am going to be told about scrutiny of them, but they limit what will be a relevant error and I am a bit doubtful about the sort of scrutiny one is able to give to this type of instrument or document. You would have to be very diligent and on the ball to pick up the connection with this clause.

Finally, Amendment 191J suggests that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner should include these matters in a report—Clause 210, which we are coming to, provides for periodic reports—and make recommendations. I dare say I might be told that he could, of course, make recommendations arising from his reviews of relevant errors and of the definition of a relevant error, but it would be appropriate to link the reviews to the statutory report. I beg to move.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 207 is clearly of the utmost importance. It provides that if a person has been the subject of a serious error, and it would not be contrary to the public interest, the commissioner must inform them of the error and of their right to apply to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The judicial commissioner must provide such details as the commissioner considers necessary for the person to bring a claim. I understand the intention behind the amendments to this clause and, of course, support the principle that individuals should have the right to seek appropriate redress if they have suffered serious harm or prejudice as a result of use of the powers under the Bill. However, I do not consider that it would be appropriate for an individual to be notified if that went against the wider public interest.

The threshold that has to be reached before an individual should be notified has been considered very carefully. It has been set to ensure that the rights of the individual who may have suffered as a result of a serious error are balanced against the wider national interest of preserving the operational capabilities of the security and intelligence agencies and those of law enforcement. That is a delicate balance and it is right that the commissioner, with his independence and expertise and with all the facts in front of him—or, indeed, her—is best placed to take that decision on a case-by-case basis.

Amendment 191GB seeks to expand the definition of “relevant error” to include errors by telecommunications operators, who are not, in response to the question posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, public authorities. The definition of what constitutes a relevant error is important for the reporting duties placed on public authorities and telecommunications operators and it is right that those persons should be under a duty to report any relevant errors to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The amendment is also unnecessary. Telecommunications operators already report their errors to the Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office. The IPC can comment on any CSP errors in its annual report and can disclose information via Clause 211(2), and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal can investigate errors by telecommunication operators. I hope noble Lords will appreciate that errors by telecommunications operators are very much in the minority.

The Investigatory Powers Commissioner is under a duty to keep under review the definition of a relevant error, so will no doubt raise concerns if they feel that the definition is incorrect. The commissioner’s reports under Clause 210 may include recommendations. They do not, therefore, need to be put under a duty to make recommendations, as Amendment 191J would achieve, if the definition of relevant error is working as intended and there is nothing to recommend.

Clause 207(3) states that a breach of a person’s convention rights is not necessarily a serious error. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, observed that any breach of convention rights is a matter about which we should be very careful. I do not disagree with that. She asked how subsection (3) would affect the privacy provision in Clause 2. It would in no way weaken that clause, I suggest. As for Clause 207(3), which addresses the wording of Article 8, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, observed, Article 8 refers to proceedings that are in accordance with law, and therefore the provision is there in Clause 207(3). Subsection (3) really brings about only a factual clarification. The test for whether an error is serious is whether it has caused significant prejudice or harm to the person concerned. It follows that a breach of a person’s convention rights is not necessarily, or per se, a serious error. It may well be, for the reasons already outlined, but a technical breach that does not cause harm or prejudice may not be sufficiently serious for it to be necessary to inform the person.

One of the amendments seeks to require notification where the error has not caused serious harm or prejudice but may do so in the future. Given the difficult balance that has to be struck here, it is not necessary or appropriate for persons to be informed when the error has not caused them harm or prejudice but may do so in the future. We also consider that this would place the commissioner in the difficult position of speculating. Of course, we would expect the commissioner to keep under review the circumstances related to such an error. If harm was then caused to the person, the commissioner may then decide it is necessary to notify that person.

There will be transparency about this process. Clause 207(8) means that each year the commissioner has to publish the statistics of his or her decision-making. They have to publish the number of errors that they are aware of, which proportion of these they consider to be serious, and then what proportion of those errors were so serious that the public interest was best served by an individual being informed. This provision will ensure that the information will be in the public domain and that the IPC’s approach to errors will be subject to significant scrutiny.

Amendment 191F would require the commissioner, when deciding whether to notify a person, to take into account the matters in the new privacy clause. However, I am afraid that I do not think that the considerations in the privacy clause are directly or strictly relevant to this decision. If a public authority has failed to have regard to the matters in the privacy clause, that in itself may constitute a serious error. However, that will anyway be the case under the Bill as drafted and so this amendment is not necessary on that basis.

Amendment 191FA seeks to remove the need for the IPC to consider whether it is in the public interest for the individual to be informed. If this amendment were accepted, we would end up with a situation in which an individual was informed of an error even if it was completely contrary to the wider public interest for them to be so. I do not consider that that would be appropriate.

The Bill provides that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must provide the individual with the details the commissioner considers necessary to bring a claim in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. That is the manner in which the individual will vindicate their right of relief and is the manner provided for in the Bill. Amendment 191G would additionally require the provision of information “to be proportionate”. We do not think that these requirements are needed and they would tend to erect an additional threshold to be met before information is provided to a potential claimant. Therefore, they might well defeat the amendment’s intent. We think it is sufficient that the person is provided with such information as is necessary.

Similarly, Amendment 191GA seeks to amend Clause 207(6) so that, when informing an affected person, the IPC would have to inform them not only of their rights to apply to the IPT but also of “other details”. Presumably, these details would be over and above what was needed by the individual to bring a claim in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and, of course, further disclosures can be handled by the IPT in the normal way. I am not sure what these extra details would be and they have the potential to damage national security if too much information was given to an individual. I repeat the point made earlier that the Bill provides that the means by which an individual can vindicate their right is by way of an application to the IPT, and they are to be given the necessary information for that purpose. Given all those circumstances, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, on the example my noble friend mentioned, it is hard to think that it would not be in the public interest for somebody who has been the subject of,

“a number of unauthorised searches for related communications data”,

to be notified. Of course I thank the noble and learned Lord for his detailed reply, although I am not sure whether he responded to my amendment on the code of practice.

I do not disagree about the national interest but it does not answer my point about reversing the burden so that the default position would be that there is notification unless it is not in the public interest—or, to put it another way, notification rather than notification only if it is in the public interest that somebody is informed.

On telecommunications operators and the report to the ICO, as the Bill seeks to do throughout, I sought to join up some of the dots in this landscape. Importantly, on the Human Rights Act, the noble and learned Lord says that the considerations in Clause 2 are not relevant; we may have another go at this on Report with a slightly different approach. However, he also said—I know that this was simply a turn of phrase—that Clause 207(3) does not weaken Clause 2, “I suggest”. I hope that he will be able to say that that amounts to an assurance to the Committee. Perhaps I may invite him to do that, otherwise we will certainly come back to this for an assurance.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I was expressing my thoughts upon the matter but I hope that I was entirely positive about the point.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I may have to consider that.

Finally, I turn to the question of whether just details would give rise to a right to make a claim to the tribunal. The way this issue is described, it is almost as though the commissioner is standing in for the tribunal and making an assessment of what has happened. I think that it should be up to the individual to assess that for himself on the basis of information. However, we are in Committee and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness and the noble Lord. I will begin by responding to the two particular questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. First, with regard to the observation made by David Anderson in his report at paragraph 2.26(g), I confirm it is the Government’s position that the authority is inherent in Clauses 205 and 211. On the provisions of Amendment 192, which I will come to, it will be in the first instance for the commissioner to determine the content of his report—but if that is not considered adequate, questions will be raised as to whether further particulars should be given.

I come back to Amendment 191K to Clause 208, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, which relates to the relationship between the commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. I believe that the amendment is unnecessary. The commissioner will be under a duty to provide all documents, information and assistance that the tribunal needs for its investigation, consideration or determination of any matter. If the tribunal judges that it requires assistance, the commissioner is under a duty to provide it. Just as one wishes to rely on the tribunal’s judgment, so one wishes to rely also on the judgment of the commissioner. That is why it is sufficient in these circumstances that the word “require” should be provided for in the clause. In reality, of course, we expect the commissioner and the tribunal to have a strong working relationship, under which the tribunal will be free to call upon the expertise of the commissioner and their staff as necessary.

I appreciate the intention behind Amendments 191L and 192A to Clause 210 on the reporting duties of the commissioner—but, again, I believe that they are unnecessary. Currently, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must make an annual report about the functions of the judicial commissioners and may make recommendations about their functions. Clause 205 is clear that the function of the commissioner is to review the use of the powers in the Bill by those who are authorised to use them. Therefore, the content of the commissioner’s annual report will be about the operation of the Act once it is in force.

Government Amendment 192 brings forward a change to Clause 210 to make it clear that the commissioner must publish a summary of the use of operational purposes in each of his or her annual reports. No doubt we shall talk more about operational purposes in the coming days in Committee, but this amendment will enhance the oversight and transparency of the use of operational purposes, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, observed. I hope that I have given sufficient clarification of how that report should proceed. Clearly, we will be open to further discussion about that as we go forward.

With respect to Amendment 192C, Clause 211(7)(a) places a duty on,

“any member of a public authority”,

to provide assistance to the judicial commissioners. The Government intend for this duty to be a broad one, encompassing everyone working for that public authority. But I note the observations of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and if that intention is not clear from the drafting, we will reconsider the clause. I therefore invite the noble Baroness to not move her amendment.

Amendment 194G seeks to amend Clause 220, which replaces Section 13 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and provides for the continued existence of the Technical Advisory Board. As I mentioned in previous Committee sessions, the board will advise the Secretary of State on cost and technical grounds if a notice given under Parts 4 or 9 of the Bill is referred by a telecommunications or postal operator for review. The board comprises a balanced representation of those on whom obligations may be imposed by virtue of notices—namely, telecommunications operators—and of those persons entitled to apply for warrants or authorisations under the Bill. These individuals will have a detailed technical understanding of the capabilities provided for by the notices.

Amendment 194G would provide for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to monitor and report on the performance of the board. This, I suggest, is unnecessary. The Technical Advisory Board and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner conduct very different functions during the review process. The primary role of the board is to advise the Secretary of State on cost and technical issues during a review. Should the Secretary of State decide to vary or confirm the effect of the notice after considering this advice, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must review and approve the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to the necessity and proportionality of the notice.

Noble Lords will see that the board will provide a different viewpoint from that of the commissioner during a review. Indeed, the robustness of this safeguard lies precisely in the fact that the board and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner play distinct roles in the review process. As such, it simply would not be appropriate for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to oversee the work of the board.

It is of course right that the Government keep under review the performance of their non-departmental public bodies, including the Technical Advisory Board. This is part of the normal process of ensuring that those bodies adhere to best practice: for example, in their management of resources. I assure noble Lords and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that the Home Office, as sponsor of this board, already does so, adhering to Cabinet Office guidance in the process. The board’s annual report is published on the internet for public scrutiny.

Although I consider that oversight of the board by the commissioner would be inappropriate, I wish to make it clear that the Bill already provides for the commissioner to comment on the work of the board in his or her annual report. Clause 210 allows the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to make recommendations about any matters relating to the commissioner’s functions. The commissioner has oversight of the giving of notices and can therefore make such recommendations as he or she considers appropriate on matters relating to notices, including the role of the Technical Advisory Board in respect of such notices.

I hope that this satisfies the noble Baroness that oversight of the board’s performance by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner really is not necessary. It is my view that the scrutiny of the board’s performance and any changes to its membership continue to be overseen by the sponsoring body, the Home Office, and its Secretary of State, and not by another independent body.

It is also worth noting that, to date, the board has never been required to fulfil its statutory role—hence there has been very little work to scrutinise. This reflects the close consultation between the Government and communications service providers before a notice is given.

I appreciate that Amendment 192B intends to highlight the importance of safeguards to protect privacy. I share this sentiment, and there are safeguards to protect privacy running through the Bill. However, it is for those who are actually utilising the investigatory powers to ensure that safeguards to protect privacy are applied. It is then the job of the judicial commissioner to ensure that they are actually being correctly applied. The Government introduced an amendment to Clause 205(5) to make it clear that the commissioner must keep under review, by way of audit, inspection and investigation, the operation of safeguards to protect privacy.

In these circumstances, I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am aware that there are a number of noble Lords in the Chamber for the next business, so I will be very brief and mention just a couple of things. On the question of a “public authority”, will the Minister, in one of the very helpful letters that we receive following Committee days, tell us the Home Office’s further thoughts on this to save a possible further amendment at Report?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I will endeavour to ensure that that is done before Report in order that the position can be clarified.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am grateful for that. My next request is for an explanation of the assurance given with regard to paragraph 2.26(g) of David Anderson’s review. I do not doubt the assurance, but it would be helpful to understand the logic.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Again, I am content to write to the noble Baroness on that point.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am very grateful for both those assurances and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 19th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I do not wish to go through all of the amendments sequentially; rather, perhaps I may pick up on just two points.

On independence, the point really being made by the Constitution Committee is about perceived independence. I certainly would not question that. Happily, our judiciary is splendid in that respect. I think it was my noble friend Lord Carlile who talked about the halo; that seems to apply to all of our judiciary unquestioningly. As I say, the point here is the perception.

I acknowledge that we should have referred to the Scottish and Northern Ireland judiciary in our amendments, but I am interested in the point made about the Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor has a role in making the judicial appointment in the first place, which then puts the individual in the position to be appointed as a commissioner. As I understand it, we have a Judicial Appointments Commission and then the Lord Chancellor has a role after it has done its work in allocating the appointees. We were not seeking to exclude the Lord Chancellor; I had just assumed that the Lord Chancellor was in there in any event. I want to make that point clear.

I shall be interested to read the points that have been made just to check that everything has been covered, but perhaps not until next week. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

There was a point I omitted to mention, which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, raised. He asked whether the Government had given consideration to the recommendations of the Select Committee. Clearly we have done so, albeit we have not slavishly followed all of them. I reassure the noble Lord that we did so.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 13th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I begin with some of the observations made in your Lordships’ House regarding judicial oversight. On the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, I have a double lock on my front door. The two locks work differently but they are equally effective. That really is the point of the double lock in the context of this legislation: the locks do indeed work differently but they are equally effective at the end of the day. I would adopt the observation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, that judicial oversight as it has developed provides us with a flexible standard of oversight, which in many senses is wide-ranging, as has been observed. But, of course, it is judicial oversight, and that is what we have to emphasise.

Turning to a point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on working days a week, we consider that the present provision is appropriate. As to the calculation of the working day, the third working day will be calculated from the day after the warrant is issued. For example, if a warrant is issued on a Monday, it must be authorised by the commissioner by the close of Thursday. So it is the date of issue plus three working days.

Amendments 39 to 42, 165A, 167 and 168A would significantly change the so-called double-lock safeguard, such that the judicial commissioner would be taking their own decision rather than reviewing the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to whether the warrant is necessary and proportionate. The Committee will appreciate that the issue of authorisation has been a central feature in the debate on the Bill. Perhaps I might just give a brief potted history of its development.

The three reviews that shaped the draft Bill—by David Anderson QC, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament and the Royal United Services Institute surveillance panel—made different recommendations in respect of authorisation. One called for full Secretary of State authorisation and the other two called for a hybrid judicial/executive model. It is noteworthy that none of them called for full judicial authorisation for all warrants. The Joint Committee that undertook pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill supported the double-lock approach set out in the Bill, including the use of the well-established principles of judicial review. At Second Reading in the other place, there was very strong cross-party support for a government amendment that preserved the double lock and the role of the judicial commissioner, while linking the judicial commissioner’s scrutiny to the new privacy clause, to put beyond doubt, if it needed to be, that the judicial commissioner would need to apply a sufficient degree of care to ensure that he or she had complied with duties imposed by the new protection of privacy clause in Part 1 of the Bill. So we are on well-trodden ground, and it is clear that there is strong support—including from senior members of the judiciary—for the approach set out in the Bill.

These amendments would confuse the distinct roles of the Executive and the judiciary and undermine democratic accountability—a point touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. It is surely right that a Secretary of State, who is accountable to Parliament and ultimately to the public, should be making the decision as to whether a warrant for the most intrusive powers is necessary and proportionate. Equally, it is entirely appropriate that a judicial commissioner should be carefully reviewing that decision. While the commissioner’s role is to review the original decision, your Lordships should be clear that this is a robust safeguard. Also, the judicial commissioners will have held or will be holding high judicial office and will be familiar with the principles of judicial review.

As amended in the other place, Clause 23 makes it clear that the commissioners’ review must involve careful consideration and ultimately if the Investigatory Powers Commissioner does not approve the decision to issue the warrant, it cannot come into force. The amendments I have referred to would also require the judicial commissioner to consider the reasons given for the decision to issue the warrant. The amendment is based on a misunderstanding of how warrants operate. The Secretary of State will receive a detailed application setting out the necessity and proportionality considerations. If they agree, they will issue the warrant. They do not have to give reasons for the decision beyond confirming that they personally consider that the warrant is necessary and proportionate. The judicial commissioner will review the decision of the Secretary of State based on the evidence provided to the Secretary of State in the application. If the commissioner thinks that the evidence in the application is not a sufficient basis for the decision that has been made, the commissioner will refuse to approve the decision. We would submit that it is in these circumstances that the double-lock mechanism is appropriate in this context, and accordingly I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

On Amendments 16 and 19, I have already touched on the reference to removing the term “working days”. Our position is that that is an appropriate way forward with these provisions, and I again invite the noble Baroness not to press these amendments.

Amendments 97 to 99 would significantly alter the double-lock safeguard for notices, such that the judicial commissioner would be taking their own decision rather than reviewing the conclusions of the Secretary of State as to whether the notice under Part 9 of the Bill is necessary and proportionate. The amendments would accordingly also remove the requirement for the judicial commissioner to apply the same principles as would be applied by a court in an application for judicial review. As discussed during scrutiny by this House of similar clauses in Part 2 of the Bill, these amendments would confuse the distinct roles of the Executive and the judiciary, as I mentioned earlier. It is right that a Secretary of State, who is accountable to Parliament and ultimately the public, should make the decision whether it is necessary and proportionate to impose obligations on operators through the giving of a notice. Equally, it is entirely appropriate that a judicial commissioner should be carefully reviewing that decision. As I stated previously, the commissioner’s role is to review the original decision, and your Lordships should be clear that this is a robust safeguard.

One of the amendments would also require the judicial commissioner to consider the reasons given for the decision to give a notice, and again as I indicated before, this amendment appears to be based on a misunderstanding of the process of giving a notice because the reasons are not provided. In other words, under the Bill there is no need to give written reasons over and above those set out in the application itself. Again, in that context I would invite the noble Baroness not to press the amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have taken part in the debate either to support or oppose me, and of course one is used to one’s friends being behind one sometimes. Perhaps I should make a disclaimer. Many years ago the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, when he was at the Dispatch Box was being a bit disparaging—that might be the term—about lawyers and, when I protested, said to me, “Not you. You’re not a lawyer”. Solicitors are excluded for this purpose.

I turn first to “working day”. The noble and learned Lord has said in effect that he disagrees with me, but I am not sure on what basis. Clause 24, where the term first comes up, deals with urgent cases, so it seems counterintuitive that one might have an extended period for dealing with an urgent case rather than one that is as tightly drawn as possible. Can the noble and learned Lord offer the Committee more as to the Government’s reasoning on this?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Originally, the period was five working days and, after due consideration, it has been reduced to three. That is considered to be an appropriate period in the context of these provisions. But the Government have reviewed the measure and, as I said, that amendment has already been made.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Turning to judicial review, determination, refusal to approve and so on, the debate has made my point that we need greater clarity than is provided in these provisions. I agree with my noble friend Lord Carlile—the Committee may be relieved to hear that there is some agreement—at least to the extent that we should know what we want, and we do not yet have clarity in the Bill. A number of noble Lords are clear about what they want, but the Bill is not clear as to what the job is. Clause 23(4), the same clause that provides for a review, states:

“Where a Judicial Commissioner … refuses to approve”.

That suggests something more than we have been hearing about and does not suggest a double lock. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, said, and we now have references in Clause 23(1) to necessity and proportionality. However, in assessing those matters, the judicial commissioner must apply the principles of judicial review. I may not be a lawyer in the terms of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, but I find that this has a degree of circularity and confusion.

In his evidence to the Public Bill Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said:

“I myself do not think that judicial review is a sufficient indication of those matters”.—[Official Report, Commons Public Bill Committee, 24/3/16; col. 68.]

Although I will not seek to pursue the matter today, we may well wish to return to it.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I should correct a reference I made. I referred in the context of the working days to Amendments 16 and 19, which must have puzzled the noble Baroness. That was my internal numbering and I was, of course, referring to Amendments 43 and 61. I apologise for that.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I was so confused that I did not even bother to check the references. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, before the Minister responds to that, it seems that he would be in a better position to answer the question than the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, because I cannot see how he could give an example without someone having breached client confidentiality along the way.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Let me say this: the matter is not speculative and it is not theoretical, as the noble Lord concedes. I am not aware of any example of this having happened in the past 16 years, but that does not render it speculative. The point is that the example that can be given—the example I gave—is one that could arise in the future. The question then is whether the agencies should have a means to secure that vital intelligence or face a complete brick wall. In this context, we would simply say this. In response to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, over the past 16 years, there is no evidence of damage to the rule of law and no evidence of any intrusion on the ability of lawyers to say that their legal advice is confidential because it is appreciated that this is a wholly exceptional power.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Because it has been established as a matter of evidential law over many years that it can be admitted. Therefore, adequate provision is in place for its admission as evidence.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am not sure that my noble friend will feel that he has had further enlightenment, but I have to say that I agree with pretty much everything the noble and learned Lord said. The one thing he said which I could not really have known is that circumstances have not changed—I think that was his term. The amendment is by no means ideal, but we have taken only nine minutes on it, which in the context of the Bill is but a blink of an eye, and it was right to put on record our concern that the issue should not be lost sight of. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Modern Slavery (Transparency in Supply Chains) Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Friday 8th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to my noble friend. I have already met the noble Baroness, and I am obliged to her for making time for that meeting. I am perfectly prepared to meet again to discuss how we can address some of the issues raised by the Bill because the Government’s position is that, while we welcome some of the proposals, we do not consider that primary legislation is required to achieve these ends. I would welcome an opportunity to discuss those points further in due course.

I turn to the observations by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. She asked a number of questions about the burden of regulation and whether it was any longer an issue because, as she put it, in the consultation process the biggest companies said it was not a problem. We are not concerned with just the biggest companies, though; we acknowledge their role in this and the peer pressure that they can bring to bear, but this concerns every company with a turnover of £36 million or more and we have to take account of the burden upon all those companies, not just the biggest of them.

On the point about government procurement, I hope I have addressed that by pointing out that in a sense a parallel scheme is in place regarding procurement. I acknowledge the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that the regulations do not carry an absolute. There are reasons for that. The code of practice will complement how and why those regulations should be taken into account.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Is the Minister aware, and he may not be, whether the Government have any plans to report publicly on the compliance with—“compliance” may be the wrong term for something that is discretionary, so perhaps I should say “observance” of—those regulations? In other words, will they report on how successful those regulations are? That is a matter of public concern, obviously.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I can understand the observation but, as the regulations are to be complemented by a code of practice that I believe is going to be brought into force in October this year, I do not think I am able to anticipate how compliance may occur. I will address in writing to the noble Baroness the question of whether there will be some form of requirement for compliance auditing in respect of that matter.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Derby raised the question of central repositories, and mentioned an instance of an organisation in Bristol. I am not in a position to go into individual cases at this time. As noble Lords are well aware, the Government have not launched an online repository, although we are aware of a number of proposals from third parties who suggest that they could develop a website to host these statements and to help people to search for them. I would like to complete a quotation that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, made regarding an answer I gave in April this year when I said:

“There never was an intention to establish any central monitoring system with respect to these provisions”.

That was in the context that there was never any government intention, which was perfectly clear. I went on to say:

“The Government have always been clear that it is for others to establish such a mechanism. We are aware of a number of organisations that propose to set up a central repository”.—[Official Report, 13/4/16; cols. 256-58.]

The right reverend Prelate went into some detail regarding a particular development in this regard, and I undertake to write to him on that matter because he raised a point that I am not in a position to address this stage.

The noble Baroness made the point, which was also made by other noble Lords, that these are early days. I remind your Lordships that this legislation came into force in October 2015, requiring companies to respond and to obtemper their Section 54 statement in their financial year from March 2016 onwards. We are at the very beginnings of this process.

That brings me on to a point made by my noble friend Lord Smith, who asked me a number of questions about the number of companies that have complied and the number that have relied upon Section 54(4)(b) of the Act and said they could not make a statement. It is simply too early to say what the position is regarding those matters. Those figures have not been collated and cannot be, because it is only from March this year that companies have had to address the question of compliance. I regret that I cannot provide figures at this stage.

The noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, raised the issue of local authorities and government departments. I hope that to some extent I have addressed the point that she was making by seeking to explain that the original legislation was designed particularly for the private sector, and that there are parallel provisions. They may not be regarded as quite as absolute as those that apply to the private sector, but there are parallel provisions that we have under the procurement regulations and which are being developed by reference to the code of practice.

I turn to the observations from the noble Lord, Lord Alton. Again, he referred to early indications of how the Act is being complied with. I underline that point: these are only early indications. We have to look further and consider how the Act is going to bed in. In my submission, it is too early to suggest that we should be tinkering with the legislation before we know how it is actually going to work in practice. He also alluded to the alleged lack of any monetary penalty for those who simply ignore the provisions of the Act. I remind noble Lords that the provisions are civil. The Secretary of State has the right to bring injunctive proceedings against a company that persistently fails to obtemper its Section 54 obligations, and if it still fails thereafter to obtemper those obligations it will be in contempt of court and liable to an unlimited fine.

Refugees: Unaccompanied Children

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 10th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I can give no such assurance. The position of these children when they reach the age of 18 will be assessed and their right to remain will be determined by reference to the country from which they arrived and also by reference to whether it is fair, reasonable and safe for them to return.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

Are the Government in communication with the Government of Canada, who are working with civil society? For instance, Canada has a private sponsorship of refugees programme, whereby sponsors can provide financial and emotional support for a period—usually a year—and the joint assistance programme, partnering with organisations to resettle refugees with special needs.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 10th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, the noble Lord makes my point for me. It is questionable whether there is any distinction to be drawn between exceptional, properly understood, and very exceptional or most exceptional. That is what lies behind the manner in which this provision has been drafted. Nevertheless, to dispel doubt in the minds of others, it has been said in the guidance that, as a matter of policy, the term “very exceptional” may be applied when approaching the application of this provision to the detention of pregnant women.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I wish to pursue this issue. There must be a difference, otherwise it would not be necessary to use the word or the distinct phrases. Are the Government not in danger of falling foul of their own legislation by applying guidance that is different from the legislation?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I had rather summed up, but I can say to the noble Lord, Lord Winston, that of course there are elements in the journey of such a person that will cause stress. Detention may be a factor in that but, in the round, we have to come to a reasoned conclusion as to how we deal with unlawful entry into the United Kingdom.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Can I make the Minister an offer? He is obviously as uncomfortable as I am with the drafting of this clause. Can we find a way in which to get it to mean what—whether we like it or not—he is telling us that we ought to understand it to mean early in the next Session? Let us tack it on to something that will come to us fairly shortly.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect to the noble Baroness, “It means what I say—it does not say what I mean” may be her line, but that is one that we shall take into consideration.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 12th April 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, Amendments 7, 10 and 11 are all relatively minor and somewhat technical in nature. Clause 63 ensures that a person may be on immigration bail when they are liable to detention, even if they can no longer be detained, and subsections (3) and (4) apply this to people who have been released on bail under the current provisions of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971. Amendment 7 to Clause 63(5) removes the reference to an amendment being made by subsection (3). This is because, in an earlier draft of the clause, subsection (3) contained an amendment to Schedule 2 to the 1971 Act, but subsections (3) and (4) no longer use that construction.

Amendments 10 and 11 to Schedule 10 ensure that any cross-references in other legislation to immigration bail granted, or a condition imposed, under Schedule 10 will include the rare circumstance when bail is granted by the court, just as if it were granted by the tribunal. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation but, on Amendment 7, it seems to me that we have never really had an explanation of why it is necessary for these provisions to be made retrospective. The Constitution Committee raised the matter in its report to the House on the Bill, and referred to the Government’s acknowledgement of retrospectivity in the Explanatory Notes, which said:

“This clause is retrospective in its effect because it is intended to clarify the law following a recent Court of Appeal judgment”.

Having read on in the Constitution Committee’s report, I wonder whether “clarify” is the right term. I do not think one can talk about correcting a Court of Appeal judgment, but that is the flavour of what the Constitution Committee had to say. The Government’s response to the committee was that the clause has been remodelled, which does not seem quite to take the point. Could the noble and learned Lord assist the House by explaining why this does not broaden the scope of the Bill and why it is appropriate?

My first reaction on reading Amendments 10 and 11 was to wonder whether the draftsman could not have made a real effort to make them really opaque and difficult to follow. After that rather flippant comment, the serious point is that, as I understand the issue, the Secretary of State is now to have powers over courts as well as the tribunals. The noble and learned Lord is shaking his head, so I look forward to his refuting that. We are bothered, as we have been concerned before, about not respecting the independence of the judiciary. What if a tribunal judge thinks that it is contrary to a person’s human rights to impose the electronic monitoring condition, and the Secretary of State says that it is not contrary to do so? The judge is very conflicted there. What if he or she wants to impose a condition, and considers that it would be practicable to do so, but the Secretary of State says that it is not practicable, so the judge cannot impose the condition? If that meant that the judge did not grant bail to that person, this would be a considerable—and, I think, unwarrantable—interference with the person’s right to liberty. Would the noble and learned Lord expand a little on his explanations?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

Once again, my Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling this amendment. With her usual lawyer’s quickness, she picked up the point that I raised on Report. As I said then, it is a point that was raised with me by an organisation local to me in the East Midlands, Baca. It was worried because it could not understand why that wording was there. It is perhaps not surprising if groups are worried and perhaps slightly cynical when they come across measures that they do not understand, given that there is so much in legislation that they do not like. So I am delighted that, at the last minute, the letter from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie—not the noble Earl—made it very clear that the definition, as in the amendment, is,

“separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who in law or by custom has responsibility to do so”.

It is helpful to have that in Hansard because of course your average punter cannot read the letters sent between Ministers and Members of your Lordships’ House. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will repeat that for the record. Also, like the noble Baroness, I would appreciate an explanation of why this clause is necessary, given that this is, as the letter says, the,

“established definition in the Immigration Rules”,

and it is accepted by the UN. I am glad that through this organisation raising this matter with me, we have some clarity on what is meant by it.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Lister. As they have observed, there is already an established definition of “unaccompanied” in the present context. It is not in guidance alone; it is in the Immigration Rules, and that is important. The definition states that an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child is someone who—perhaps I may, as suggested, read this into the record—is under 18 years of age when the claim is submitted, is claiming asylum in their own right, is separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who in law or by custom has responsibility to do so.

Following the commitment given by my noble friend Lord Bates on Report to explain how the definition would operate, I wrote to the noble Baronesses—albeit, as they observed, at the last minute—to confirm that there is no intention of altering the definition of “unaccompanied” as set out in the Immigration Rules for the purposes of the transfer provisions in the Immigration Bill. Furthermore, defining particular categories in primary legislation is not always desirable or even necessary. As your Lordships will appreciate, there are times, particularly in the context of the current migration crisis, when the Government need to respond quickly to changing circumstances.

I should make it clear that at present we have no intention of amending the definition of “unaccompanied”. We would do so only in response to a significant change in circumstances, but it is important that in such circumstances we are able to react swiftly and efficiently. Clearly, regulations subject to parliamentary scrutiny are a more appropriate way to achieve that result than placing something on the face of this Bill.

I reassure the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Lister, that safeguarding and promoting the welfare of vulnerable children is at the forefront of the Home Office’s work with the Local Government Association and the Department for Education to develop a transfer scheme for unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. I understand the concerns about the definition of “unaccompanied”—it may have unintended consequences and inadvertently place children in the hands of traffickers—but immigration officials working with these vulnerable children are trained to be alert to any signs that a child is at risk of harm or abuse or may have been trafficked. Where an asylum-seeking child is accompanied by an adult who is not a parent or a relative, Home Office officials work with local authority children’s services to verify the identity of the adult and establish the true relationship with the child. If that relationship cannot be verified or there are ongoing welfare or safeguarding concerns, the child will be treated as unaccompanied.

In the light of those points and our recent correspondence confirming that we have no intention of amending the already established definition of “unaccompanied” for the purposes of the transfer provisions, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, that is reassuring. It is difficult to imagine how urgent the circumstances might be that would require a swift change of the definition. However, I am very glad to have the assurances about the position on the record in Hansard, which, as the noble Baroness said, is most easily accessible by those outside this place. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 15th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I wonder if I may be permitted to correct the noble Lord, Lord Rosser: it is the court’s interpretation of the obligation, as is found in the case of SS (Nigeria) in 2014. It is on the basis of that judicial interpretation of the obligation that the Secretary of State proceeds. I am obliged to the noble Lord for the question.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Before the Minister sits down, he referred to guidance with regard to payment for the return of an appellant following a successful appeal. The guidance that I referred to relates to deportation—inevitably, because that is the current position. Is the Minister saying that equivalent guidance is to be provided in the case of appellants in this situation?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not in a position to immediately answer that question but, if I may, I will write to the noble Baroness on that point.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 15th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I will confine myself to one question and to thanking the noble and learned Lord for that remarkably succinct explanation of several pages of amendments. I am sure it will bear reading and rereading. I think that he has answered my question, but I just want to be sure. What happens if electronic monitoring cannot be imposed, for instance because of mental health concerns or some other human rights issue? I think that he said that bail could—or indeed would—still be granted. That is the central question.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness. The answer is that, in those circumstances, bail could still be granted. It will be dependent on the individual conditions that arise in a particular case. But I make it absolutely clear that it would still be possible for bail to be granted in such circumstances.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 9th February 2016 Grand Committee

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It appears that, although we each purport to be speaking fluent English, we may not be communicating with each other as clearly as might be the case. In circumstances where a person employs British Sign Language and there is a customer-facing individual available to communicate with them in British Sign Language, the person communicating in British Sign Language will either have with them a British Sign Language interpreter or will be able to communicate in British Sign Language and speak fluent English.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I think there are two different debates going on. To pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, the explanation given by the Minister about how this would work is, to me, intelligible, but it does not reflect the words in the Bill because it suggests that the person who is working in a customer-facing role is the interpreter, not the person who is doing the substantive job. If the Government’s concern is that the drafting is not invented here, I hope that they can find a way of explaining that there are two roles in the situation which the noble Baroness set out.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I wonder whether I may respond briefly to that and then make a further observation. In circumstances where somebody is in a customer-facing role and uses only British Sign Language, they will, as a matter of practice and pursuant to the Equality Act 2010, have available to them a British Sign Language interpreter. So they will be communicating in a customer-facing role, together with a British Sign Language interpreter.

I do not accept the interpretation of the clause that has been advanced by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but, having regard to the considerations of time, if nothing else, I will take this matter away and reflect upon the observations that have been made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord. He will appreciate that I, too, am concerned about whether it is necessary for such a provision to appear in the Bill. Our view is that the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, is an important one but that it is already accommodated by the terms of the Bill. However, as I said, I will reflect on that.

I turn to the observations made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in addressing Amendments 242C, 242G and 242J regarding the implementation of the various duties, as well as the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on the question of public sector workers.

Beginning with Amendment 242C and the question of public and private sector workers, I shall seek to allay the concerns of the noble Baroness but will resist the amendment. We have no desire at this time to lay regulations before further consultation. At present, the Government are committed to carrying out an open consultation before calling on the reserve powers to expand the scope of the duty to the private and third sectors. That is why the provision is expressed in its present form.

The government response to the open consultation, which is scheduled to be made available to noble Lords for our Report stage discussion, will provide preliminary views on this matter. At present, the responses are quite balanced. Many welcome the expansion specifically for the safety and comfort of patients in the social care sector, for example. Others are understandably concerned in case any costs of enhanced recruitment practices have to be passed on to public authorities which are contracting. We do not accept that such costs will increase. Public authorities can simply make job descriptions more specific; there is no need to increase costs. So we do not consider it necessary at this stage to contemplate the proposal in Amendment 242C.

Regarding the noble Baroness’s second amendment, Amendment 242G, I seek to provide reassurance that the principal focus of the code of practice underpinning this duty will be to assist public authorities in setting language expectations for different job roles. I hope, therefore, that she will agree that there is no need to provide for this in the Bill, as it will be an element of the code of practice.

I am conscious of the variations that may occur so far as fluency in language is concerned. Indeed, as a Scot, it is a matter of particular concern to me as well. Clearly fluency will be determined by the employer—and, in this context, by the employer alone.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, to be absolutely precise about this, I hear what is intended regarding the code of practice but can the Minister confirm that,

“different provision for different purposes”,

encompasses my point about different roles? That is the wording in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I can indeed confirm that. That is the purpose of the provisions in the code of practice.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am grateful.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I quite understand the spirit of the noble Baroness’s third amendment, Amendment 242J. The Government intend to review the implementation of this policy. We will commit to doing so in the government response to the recent consultation on the draft code of practice.

On further inspection, the details of the report described in the amendment appear to impose a significant reporting burden on public authorities. The Government’s review will certainly look to cover the principles of the recommendation, such as setting proportionate standards for job roles and avoiding cases of discrimination, because these were the main areas of concern voiced by respondents to the recent open consultation. So these points will most certainly be addressed in that context. Regarding the position of Network Rail, if there are public sector workers there, they will be covered by the initial provisions. As they move into the private sector, they will be covered by the further provisions that will be brought forward following consultation. I hope that reassures the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I do not understand that there are any provisions regarding the National Health Service in the Bill. In these circumstances, I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 3rd February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is not immediately apparent to me that it is applicable to this proposal, but in this context one has to bear in mind that a primary consideration is the interests of the child or the children. To that extent, what might be regarded as an aspect of the family test is being applied. That is always a primary consideration. There are circumstances where it may be appropriate for the children to accompany a person out of the United Kingdom, and there may be no difficulty about that. There may be circumstances in which it is appropriate for the children to remain with a parent or carer within the United Kingdom. If there are circumstances where they will have no parent or carer within the United Kingdom and it would not be appropriate for them to leave the United Kingdom, again, there is the safety net of the certification, dealt with in Clause 34, as there is under the existing legislation. To that extent, it appears to me that the matter is dealt with.

The noble Baroness went on to mention again the interests of the child and to ask how many children would be affected by this. It is not possible at this stage to say. On the basis of unofficial and informal figures, I understand that no child has been certified for an out-of-country appeal under existing legislation. Of course, the present amended legislation has been in force for only a short time, since 2015, so it is difficult to discern figures from that.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Norwich referred to particular cases. I hope that I have addressed his concerns. If there was such a serious risk to a child as he alluded to, it appears to me that, with respect, the safety net in Clause 34 would apply.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, referred to difficulties in producing evidence in the context of an out-of-country appeal. I do not accept that it would be materially more difficult to produce evidence in these circumstances. We are talking about an appeal to a specialist tribunal that is well equipped to decide the form of evidence it requires in a particular case. As I mentioned, when dealing with a case that is going to arise largely on the basis of Article 8 of the convention, if there is to be a convention appeal, one is concerned with family links with the United Kingdom, which are going to be spoken to by persons within the United Kingdom. In so far as there is any factual issue to be addressed by an appellant, it can be done in writing, by video link or even by telephone. That may appear less satisfactory than taking oral evidence but, as the noble Baroness may be aware, it is far from exceptional for appellants not to give evidence in such appeals before a tribunal. It is certainly far from exceptional for appellants not to give oral evidence in such proceedings.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful for that. I did acknowledge the Court of Appeal decision, but I said that in our view it did not make the situation right. However, do the Home Office or the Tribunal Service give information or even assistance to appellants who are outside the country—as a minimum, information on how they can set about dealing with an appeal from outside the country?

While I am on my feet, the Minister credited me with a comment about the best interests of the child which I think came from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I have an amendment on that later so it is understandable that he might have thought that I was going to say what I will be saying.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness. Without the benefit of second sight, I cannot say whether I thought she was going to say what she had not said but was planning to say later—but I acknowledge that the original comment came from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I acknowledge the observation made, but I cannot comment on the particulars of such a case. What I can say is perhaps only related and not directly on point. Part of the thrust of the next part of the Bill is to address the time taken for appeals to be processed. That matter will be addressed by my noble friend Lord Bates in due course. In general, it is hoped that appeal processes in simple cases will not exceed six months and even in complex cases will not exceed 12 months, so that there will not be the degree of separation that has been alluded to, even in cases where one child perhaps goes out of the United Kingdom and another remains in the United Kingdom. I rather suspect that that would be an exceptional case—albeit it is amazing when you read the facts of some of these cases just how diverse the family arrangements can be.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Is the noble and learned Lord able to answer the question I asked?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble Baroness asked about communication of out-of-country appeals procedures. I do not have that information immediately to hand. I am aware of the tribunal regulations. Perhaps I could undertake to write to her to outline what the guidance is.

My research has come to a conclusion already. There is published guidance on the GOV.UK website on how to appeal from overseas, so it is there. I knew that it existed but I was not aware that it was actually on the website. Whether further steps are taken with regard to this matter, I cannot say. If in fact there is something over and above the website, I will write to advise the noble Baroness.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 1st February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

There was, among other things, a determination as to the legality of the process. I accept that—but that is why it was suspended and why it remains suspended at the present time.

Those who are detained for any length in the removal centre estate will normally be cases that fall into the second category mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown: those who have had their application to remain in the United Kingdom refused, whose rights have expired and who it is proposed should finally be removed. I ask the Committee to reflect on the fact that if all individuals complied with a notice that they should leave the United Kingdom, there would be little need for immigration detention, and certainly very limited need for detention beyond a very short period. However, some individuals choose not to comply with the law and do not leave the United Kingdom when they should. That is the position we are in.

Amendment 218A would require a bail hearing in every case of detention within 28 days. As I have explained previously, mandatory bail hearings by set deadlines are incredibly resource-intensive for the tribunal and have been rejected previously as being unworkable in practice. Amendment 218B would impose a requirement to release on immigration bail after 28 days of detention, unless an individual had been convicted of an offence under the Modern Slavery Act.

I can understand the noble Baroness’s reasoning for the amendment. The offences listed in Schedule 4 are very high-harm offences. But what justification could there be for detaining beyond 28 days anyone other than these high-harm criminals? Matters are not that simple. We seek to remove national security threats under deportation powers—individuals who do not have a conviction but where there is clear intelligence that they pose a risk to the public. This power would prevent detention of these individuals beyond 28 days. It would lead to the release, for example, of Abu Qatada, despite the clear threat that he and others like him pose.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, went on to say:

“Many participants in this debate have urged and will urge, benevolently, for fixed limits—sometimes as little as 28 days—to immigration detention. I say to those noble Lords: do not underestimate the ingenuity and persistence of many of those who seek to defeat immigration controls. Time and again, down the years, the system has been cleverly played, often by those who are least deserving of our sympathies. In the present edition of one of the standard textbooks on immigration law, the chapter on detention and bail extends to 96 dense pages and endless footnotes. A case on this topic in the Supreme Court in 2011 … stretched to 115 pages of judgments. This is a difficult area of the law and I respectfully suggest that we should not rush to impose some limit”.—[Official Report, 22/12/15; col. 2474.]

Again, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, summarised the position well. I ask this House to heed his wise words and not to legislate in haste. It is for these reasons that I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

Before I sit down, I notice that I have not responded fully to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. In particular, he raised the question of consultation on the short-term holding facility rules. It is regrettable that we have not yet consulted on those rules. However it has to be remembered that they operate not in a vacuum but under the statutory framework contained in Part 8 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and its associated schedules. They are also covered by the Home Office’s detention services orders. Now that the Shaw report has been published, we will take forward consultation on the draft rules.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, responds, the picture that has been painted of the situation, including those who are subject to detention, does not seem to accord with the observations which so many of us have heard, including those of Stephen Shaw. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, quoted the last sentence of Mr Shaw’s conclusions, which is in paragraph 11.8. He said:

“Immigration detention has increased, is increasing, and—whether by better screening, more effective reviews, or formal time limit—it ought to be reduced”.

It seems unlikely to me that it has been increasing because the number of people who have been convicted of offences and are due for deportation, but for some reason or another are not being deported, would account for that increase in the way in which I heard the explanation.

I took seriously the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton under Heywood. I ask again whether there is not a way in which those of us who are concerned properly to get to a situation where there is not the lack of hope to which noble Lords have referred cannot together find, with some imagination, a way of dealing with this that will give a structure to detention immigration but allow for the very rare exceptions that it might be proper to make.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

With great respect, one could ask about one out of 64,000. It is not a question of which one but of addressing all of them in due course and in the context not necessarily of primary legislation but of the need for further guidance. The noble Lord has underlined the potential need for further guidance in this area.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I suspect that the noble Lord may be coming towards a halt, if not to the end of the issue. It occurs to me that I do not think that any of us asked about the Home Office’s internal review on this subject, which we heard about in previous debates.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, this is a shorter group. Amendments 224A, 224B, 224C and 224D are in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Paddick.

Paragraph 7 of Schedule 7 gives powers to the Secretary of State to enable a person to meet bail conditions. Paragraph 7(1) provides for when a person is subject to a condition requiring him to reside at a particular address and he would not be able to support himself at that address without assistance. Sub-paragraph (2) allows the Secretary of State to,

“provide, or arrange for … facilities for the accommodation … at that address”.

My first amendment would again change this from permissive to mandatory. If the Secretary of State requires someone to live at a particular address, it seems to us that, in the circumstances spelled out of the person not being able to otherwise support himself, the Secretary of State should provide the facilities. Sub-paragraph (3) limits the power I just described,

“to the extent that the Secretary of State thinks that there are exceptional circumstances which justify the exercise of the power”.

We would take out the thinking element of that to make the limitation more objective.

Sub-paragraph (4) gives the power to make a payment for travelling expenses which the person incurs,

“for the purpose of complying with a bail condition”.

Similarly, it applies,

“to the extent that the Secretary of State thinks that there are exceptional circumstances”,

and we would make the same two amendments.

I rather wish now that we had also sought to delete the reference to “exceptional circumstances”, given that by definition the person who is the subject of this cannot support himself. I failed to do that, but I do not think it invalidates the amendments. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness. As she observed, Amendments 224A and 224B would create a duty to pay, in exceptional circumstances, for accommodation to anyone released on bail if the individual were required to live at a bail address not of their choosing or if the person could not otherwise support themselves. In turn, Amendments 224C and 224D would require the Secretary of State to pay an individual for travel costs incurred while complying with conditions of immigration bail where there were exceptional circumstances, again limiting discretion.

We would submit that these amendments are unnecessary. As was noted by the noble Baroness, paragraph 7 of Schedule 7 provides a power for the Secretary of State to ensure a person can meet bail conditions by paying for the costs of their accommodation and travel expenses in appropriate circumstances. It is important to note that the Secretary of State is given a discretion on the matter of exceptional circumstances. Individuals released on bail will be able to be supported by the Home Office under the Bill if their individual circumstances warrant it, generally because they do not have the funds to obtain adequate accommodation, cannot obtain it from friends or relatives, and are unable to avoid the risk of destitution while they are here except by leaving the United Kingdom.

However, if a person is an asylum seeker, they will be able to apply for support under Section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, and the Bill makes no changes to the support available to asylum seekers who would otherwise be destitute. They will continue to be provided with accommodation and a cash allowance to cover their other essential living needs.

In our submission, it is right that the Secretary of State, who is accountable to Parliament, has the final discretion on whether to provide accommodation to, or to pay the travel expenses of, those released on bail. It is not a matter that she should be obliged to respond to. In those circumstances, I ask that these amendments be withdrawn.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. It seems that whether the amendments are necessary or not depends on whether you are the Secretary of State or the person subject to the bail condition. However, I heard what the Minister said. I do not think it would be appropriate to pursue the matter now. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness. As she observes, Amendment 225 seeks to change the wording of Clause 33 so that leave extended by Section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 may be cancelled only when the failure to comply with a condition of their leave relates to a “material” condition. That would leave us in the situation whereby the original grant is not subject to that condition, but the extension was. The Immigration Rules allow for leave to be curtailed when a person has failed to comply with any condition attached to their grant of leave. However, the Home Office has published guidance on when failure to comply with conditions of leave may lead to curtailment of leave. For example, if a student is granted leave with the condition that they work no more than 10 hours each week, the guidance states that curtailment is appropriate if the student is working full time. However, when the breach of leave is very minor—for example where a student worked for 10.5 hours for one week only and was compliant with their conditions of leave in all other respects, the guidance states that it would normally be disproportionate to curtail their leave. In considering whether to cancel leave extended by Section 3C, caseworkers will apply the same principles as they do when considering whether to curtail leave under the Immigration Rules. So there is here consistency between the original leave and the extension allowed for, which is why the wording is as it is. The same considerations of proportionality will apply as in terms of the guidance that I have just indicated.

The effect of Amendment 226 is to change the power to cancel leave extended by Section 3C so that a person has to “deliberately” use or have used deception in seeking leave to remain. The wording of Clause 33 is the same as that used in the offence of deception in Section 24A of the 1971 Immigration Act and the wording used in the Immigration Rules to curtail immigration leave. The courts have confirmed that “deception” means something that is knowingly done and so the addition of the word deliberate is, with respect, unnecessary.

Both Amendment 225 and Amendment 226 would mean that the power to cancel leave extended by Section 3C would differ in its wording from equivalent powers to curtail leave under the Immigration Rules. This creates the risk of perceived differences between the circumstances in which Section 3C extended leave and leave granted under the Immigration Rules can be cancelled. I fear that if either of these amendments were to pass, much time and cost would be spent in the courts considering whether these differences in wording have the effect of creating different powers in practice.

I understand the concerns about how the power to cancel leave extended by Section 3C is to be exercised. I reassure noble Lords that the power to cancel leave extended by Section 3C is discretionary. For example, it would not be right to cancel leave extended by Section 3C where a person was unaware of the deception. In deciding whether to cancel leave extended by Section 3C, the same principles will apply as when considering the curtailment of immigration leave. For the benefit of the noble Baroness, the relevant decision on deception is the case of AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department in 2010. In these circumstances, I invite her to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I did not disbelieve the noble and learned Lord when he said that there was case law on this. I understand that the term “deliberately” is encompassed within deception. As I said, my concern was to probe how the power would be used and why it would be necessary. From what we have heard, it seems to have been something of a tidying-up exercise, rather than because there has been a bad experience—the Minister is nodding his head.

I suspect that I am not alone in, as always, feeling just a little uneasy when we are told that the answer is “in guidance” so it will all be okay. Having made that observation, though, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I notice what the noble Lord says and I do not take issue with it. I add only that, where an individual does identify particular circumstances pertaining to themselves, whether it be religion or whatever, those circumstances are taken into consideration. However, I appreciate the point that the noble Lord has made.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. Jamaica is indeed an example, and maybe the Democratic Republic of Congo as well. In defence of my rubbish drafting, one of my then quite new colleagues told other colleagues that the most reassuring thing she had encountered in giving her confidence to speak in the Chamber was when I moved the wrong amendment and the sky did not fall. I may use this example in encouraging other new colleagues. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 226C standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire. This amendment deals with the requirement for certain immigrants to register with the police and calls for a review of the arrangements.

The matter was brought to our attention by Universities UK because of the experience of foreign students being required to register with the police within seven days. Failure to register in that time limit may lead to the curtailment of leave or may affect future applications. We heard of students having to queue through the night or round the block to register. The question that was asked of us, and which I now ask of the Minister, is: what is done with the information garnered through that registration process? That is why subsection (2) in the proposed new clause refers to an assessment of the resources that are required, how useful the registration is, the uses to which the information is put, the need for the requirement, and any recommended changes, including efficiencies. I have not used the term “cost-benefit analysis”, but that is essentially what it amounts to, together with a concern for the individuals.

I also wonder about the cost of the administration for this. There is a fee of £34: not only do you have to register but you have to pay £34 for the privilege of queuing through the night. The numbers arising at particular times make the administration really quite difficult to handle. There is also the issue of this country’s reputation internationally as a result of this procedure. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Again, I am obliged to the noble Baroness for highlighting this point. The new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the requirement that non-visitor migrants of specified nationalities register with the police, and then lay before both Houses a report on that review. In our submission, such a review and report is not necessary.

The noble Baroness correctly identified that there is a police registration scheme. The provision is set out in Section 3(1)(c) of the Immigration Act 1971. The requirements to register with the police are specified in the Immigration Rules. The requirement to register with the police is normally placed on a migrant who is aged 16 or over, from a non-EU country and who is given leave for longer than six months. The requirement is to register within seven days of obtaining qualifying leave to enter or remain. There are a number of exceptions where the requirement will not usually apply, including ministers of religion, people exercising access rights to a child resident in the UK, and those granted refugee status.

The requirement to register with the police is not onerous. In the Metropolitan Police area, where there is the highest concentration of migrants required to register, there is a designated office in Borough. For all other police force areas, the individual should register at the nearest police registration office. As the noble Baroness noted, there is a registration fee, currently £34, which reflects the administration costs of the police registration certificate.

The noble Baroness mentioned an occasion when students were reported to have had to queue. In October 2012, some long queues of migrants, mainly students, were seeking to register at the London Overseas Visitors Records Office. OVRO made changes to its process following that incident, including providing pre-booked timeslots for migrants required to register, and I am advised that there has been no recurrence of those queues. Universities are also given the option of collating the relevant paperwork from their students who are required to register and delivering it to the OVRO in bulk. The police continue to work and engage with those involved to manage peak flows in registrations and to minimise any inconvenience from that. I accept that there was an occasion in 2012 when there were delays, but that has not repeated itself.

The information required for registration is all information that will be held by the individual, including personal details, a current photograph, passport details, address in the United Kingdom, their last place of residence outside the UK, and details of their employment and/or place of study. This information is then on record for the police and other law enforcement to access, as necessary, in order to maintain security.

The various requirements for those seeking to stay and live in the UK, as set out in the Immigration Rules, are periodically under review to ensure that they strike the right balance between immigration control and security in the UK. I believe that this current approach is proportionate, particularly in the current state of heightened security concerns, and it is unnecessary for there to be a statutory requirement for a formal review to be conducted and a report laid before both Houses. In light of these points, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 1st February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I think that some Members of your Lordships’ House are still struggling to work out how a search which is complete in bits sequentially is different from a strip search. However, what I want to say at this point is that I am not the only Member of your Lordships’ House, or indeed the only Member present today, to take part in the inquiry by the all-party groups to which the Minister referred. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, was also an energetic member of the group.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble Baroness is of course quite right and I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for omitting her name from the reference. Of course it is acknowledged that the report was the precursor to Stephen Shaw’s helpful and incisive report on this matter. I am obliged for that.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am most obliged to the noble Lord and I undertake to write on that point.

The government amendments that arise here are essentially consequential amendments. Amendments 224E to 224K are consequential amendments to legislation to ensure that the provisions in Schedule 7 work as they should, by bringing existing legislation into line with Schedule 7, removing references to provisions which have been or are being repealed by Schedule 7 and, where necessary, inserting references to the relevant provisions in Schedule 7. Amendments 229ZA and 230ZA are consequential amendments to Schedule 8 to the Bill to reflect the amendments and repeals made in Schedule 7.

I am conscious that your Lordships had in mind not only the question of bail but the question of detention. However, as that is going to be addressed in a further group of amendments, I will come to that when we address that further group. I hope your Lordships will support the amendments standing in the name of my noble friend Lord Bates, but I ask that noble Lords withdraw their amendment—I say noble Lords, but I address that to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I think we are all Lords, whether Lords or Baronesses. I am obviously pleased to hear that the Government are considering the issues around the relationship between the Executive and the judiciary raised in the three amendments, although I am not entirely surprised, as I felt that the arguments—they were not mine—were irresistible. I was also interested to hear the response on the restriction of studies. It will be very helpful to see the detail of that.

I said when I moved my amendment that I would use the term “bail” in the debate because that is the term used in the Bill, although “temporary admission” is in fact used in a government amendment later. When we are bringing six statuses into one, it seems the perfect time to change the terminology. It does not necessarily have to be temporary admission—I heard what the noble and learned Lord said—but any ideas will be gratefully received on this. It is clearly something that other noble Lords feel as strongly about as I do.

I will just pick up two other points. On safeguarding for a very short time, I would be much happier if I saw that short time limit reflected in the legislation. After all, we are talking about detention here, and it is particularly ironic if it is applied to people who are on their way to care and support, which are the categories referred to. As regards public health, I suspect that if one holds a visa and comes in through a recognised route, but is found at Heathrow or wherever to be suffering from a communicable disease, one’s destination is hospital not detention.

We will wait to see the amendments on the central issue of the Executive’s power in this regard—or otherwise—and I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment 215A.