(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will not be the only person in the Chamber this evening who remembers when mortgage interest rates were 15%, and very painful they were too. I have one question for the Minister, relating to the term “available” in proposed new paragraph 3A(1)(a). When does the figure become “available” within the meaning of the provision? Does it mean published or “available” to the public? The figure must be available to others privately before it is published. I do not know whether it means published in the sense that the consumer prices index uses the word “published”, but we need to be clear about how one identifies when a figure becomes available.
My Lords, in Committee, I raised a number of issues and said that I would consider the position further before Report. I took advantage of seeking advice from leading counsel, Mr Nugee, who gave evidence to the Committee. I have to say that he received the same fee for his services as the Minister receives for his in his present capacity, and I am obliged to Mr Nugee for his advice. Having considered it, I am not proposing any further amendments today. He would perhaps be inclined to support such amendments but, taking things in the round, thought that the position that had been reached in Committee was reasonable.
We are discussing an amendment stemming effectively—I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd—from the contribution of my noble friend Lord Hanworth. As I said to him just before we entered the Chamber, he has the law in his genes because his grandfather, the first Viscount Hanworth, was Attorney-General in the coalition and subsequent Conservative Governments in the early 1920s. Clearly, he has inherited that gene and deployed it to some effect. I have no difficulty with the amendment that the Minister has moved, but I have one query.
In Committee, I moved an amendment to Clause 1 which did not succeed because it referred to simple interest. Are the amendments now being proposed compatible with Clause 1 as it now stands, which appears to provide for the interest rate referred to in paragraph (B) of case (2) of the table to be the Bank of England rate? I may have misunderstood the original effect of Clause 1 and the amendment. I assume, but perhaps wrongly, that Clause 1 deals with the situation that the amendments now seek to modify. I just hope that the provisions are compatible but that, if they are not, perhaps by Third Reading we might have the necessary change. On the face of it—again, I may have misunderstood the position—the two are to some degree in conflict.
My Lords, before the Minister finishes, I will test the patience of the House and say that I understand his common-sense answer, which was what I expected. However, I am not completely convinced that the Bill, incorporating this amendment, actually says that. I will leave that with him, as it is not very sensible for the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, to go to and from the Box to answer a rather technical question. However, we are all such pedants in this Chamber that I know we all want it to be correct.
I follow the noble Baroness to take a little further our discussion on the impact of Clause 1 and the amendments. If I understand the noble Lord correctly, there are two situations. One will be governed by one rate of interest, as specified in Clause 1, and the other will be covered by these amendments. This raises a further question of why there should not be consistency, in terms of the interest to be calculated, in respect of what appear to be two separate situations. If they are not separate situations, there is a degree of confusion; if they are separate, there needs to be a rationale for having two different rates of interests. I invite the noble Lord to consider that before Third Reading. It may or may not need tidying up. On the face of it, there seems to be something slightly awry with the position we will be in when the amendment is passed.
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as the noble Lord has made very clear, this amendment addresses issues both of form and substance. I entirely concur with his devastating and magisterial critique of the way the Government are seeking not merely to impose massive changes on a highly successful—indeed, award winning—public service but to do so without an evidence base, proper costings or any parliamentary scrutiny. The farce of the impact assessments has been compounded by the revelations of advice given to Ministers by Ministry of Justice officials on the risks attendant on the implementation of their policies and by the recently leaked document showing that the residual probation service dealing with high-risk offenders that is envisaged by the proposals will face further cuts in funding of 19% by 2017-18.
When the Government drove through their controversial, some of us would say disastrous, reorganisation of the National Health Service, they at least observed the proprieties and made the changes the subject of a Bill that was itself subject to scrutiny. In this case, as I have previously observed, the future of this service, so vital a part of our system of criminal justice and so important in maintaining the safety of the public, would not be being debated at all were it not for amendments emanating from the Opposition and Cross Benches in your Lordships’ House. It is astonishing, indeed disgraceful, that we read today that in their risk analysis Ministry of Justice officials have apparently stated that this Bill has been deliberately kept slim to “minimise the dependence of the reforms” on the passing of the legislation. I do not blame officials for this, nor do I blame the Minister in this House. The blame lies with the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State Mr Grayling, whose only reaction so far, I understand, is to have ordered a leaks inquiry.
Lord Randolph Churchill famously described Gladstone as an old man in a hurry. The Lord Chancellor is a relatively young man in a hurry, but he, as I am sure the noble Lord, Lord McNally, would agree, is no Gladstone. If anything, he more closely resembles Randolph Churchill and if he continues on his present path, rushing on with eye-catching gimmicks and policies which have attracted the deep concern of the senior judiciary, such as those on criminal legal aid, judicial review and court privatisation, his political career is likely to end in the same way as Churchill’s.
It is characteristic of this Lord Chancellor that he proposes to begin to implement the changes he seeks as early as the end of August this year. What answers does he give to the questions raised by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Probation in her response to the consultation? Many of these relate to the payment by results scheme to which we will turn when we debate the next amendment, but what is the Government’s reply to Liz Calderbank’s concern that the process of advising the court and Parole Board on sentencing and licensing conditions will require increased investment because more full pre-sentence reports will be required where cases will be referred to the private sector for supervision?
She suggests that a more mediated approach to supervising short-sentence offenders, which all of us welcome as a proposal in the Bill, would facilitate the better use of scarce resources. She is concerned that the proposed move to national commissioning instead of by 35 probation trusts,
“could be at the expense of the local perspective”,
cutting across promising developments in partnership work and disrupting successful partnerships with probation trusts. She refers to an issue raised in Committee about the position of small voluntary organisations in a commissioning framework dominated by large private sector providers, the fragmentation of responsibilities and a duplication of work. As she points out, the changes will effectively be irreversible once implemented. Do the words and warnings of this highly experienced public servant count for nothing?
The Lord Chancellor is promoting this agenda in the spirit of the promoters of the South Sea bubble, one of whom, it will be recalled, advertised a project,
“for carrying out an undertaking of great advantage but nobody to know what it is”.
Well, we know what it is, but we do not know what it will cost or whether it will work, and neither do the Government.
Under the Government’s appalling proposals for criminal legal aid a defence advocate will be paid the same fee for a guilty plea as a not guilty plea. The salary of the noble Lord, Lord McNally, I am happy to say, will be the same whatever the outcome of this debate. Nevertheless, I advise him to plead guilty, accept the amendment which would allow a proper consideration of the Government’s proposals, their benefits certainly alongside the risks and costs, and get it over with.
My Lords, I share the frustration that has been expressed about this Bill not being about what we want to talk about and, indeed, diverting us from the important aspects of rehabilitation. I know we all share the objectives that have found this legislative form even if we do not all agree on the form they have taken in the Bill.
Being rather boring, I want to address the amendment as it is tabled and ask a couple of questions of the noble Lord when he comes to respond, if not of my noble friend. First, although this sounds quite counterintuitive, is there such a thing in legislation as the probation service? The Offender Management Act 2007, which is what I understand the changes which are being described are based on, talks about probation provision, probation purposes, probation service, but not the probation service. Secondly, again looking at the 2007 Act, have the proposers of this amendment taken into account the provisions within the Act for affirmative orders? Section 5(3)(c)—I know this is not the sort of speech that holds the House, certainly without me handing out programmes—provides for the purposes of a probation trust to include a purpose specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State. Those must be made, we find later in the Act, by affirmative resolution. Section 38(2)(a) is about amending, repealing or revoking an enactment and this again requires an affirmative resolution. As I said, being rather tedious, I am struggling a little with the form of the amendment and in understanding quite how it would apply in taking forward the points that have been made by the two noble Lords, given that I think we have to base what we are doing on the existing legislation.
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am obliged for the noble and learned Lord’s intervention but perhaps I should decode what is happening for the benefit of those who do not understand—it took me some time—the effect of the amendment as originally drafted.
As originally drawn, the amendment would have removed from Clause 13(7) reference to,
“activities whose purpose is reparative”,
and substituted “restorative justice activities”.
The two things are not the same. Reparative justice will involve doing work, for example, of the kind that I came across when involved in a justice reinvestment project in the north-east. In fact, there were two significant projects: one led to the effective reconstruction of Albert Park in Middlesbrough and the other at Saltwell Park in Gateshead, both Victorian parks which had become very run down. Offenders were brought in to work on these and benefited from being taught skills, which it is to be hoped will be useful later. They made a visible contribution to the communities which they had damaged by their offences. It was a very good scheme.
Taking that out would exclude work of that kind. As the noble and learned Lord said, Amendment 27A reinstates that in addition to restorative justice so that the complete range of options would remain available. I hope that the Minister will accept the noble and learned Lord’s amendment, as amended by my restoration of the paragraph in the original Bill. It would be extremely disappointing, given that the Government are supportive of the principle of restorative justice, if statutory recognition was not incorporated in the Bill at this time and the opportunity not taken in its passage to lend weight to the growing support up and down the country for the concept in our system.
Not having come with a long speech, I want to register my support and that of my noble friends on these Benches for these amendments and, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham said, the growing support for the concept of restorative justice. The more I hear about that, the more it seems a very important part of rehabilitation. It has many aspects and one of those fits neatly within the thrust of this Bill and in the new Section 200A. Among the things it can achieve is redirecting offenders who can be described, as many noble Lords have done at previous stages, as having chaotic lives. Being able to put the chaos of one’s life into the perspective that this kind of activity can help achieve is an important objective of rehabilitation.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, over the years I have been very much persuaded on this issue by those who have put forward the arguments that we have heard this afternoon. However, my noble friend made a point on Report which I confess I had not thought of before. That was that we should ensure that the banks and other lenders are taken along with new arrangements, because it is so important to keep the flow of credit—something that your Lordships have discussed on many occasions.
When he comes to reply, will the Minister tell your Lordships any more about discussions with the banks or other lending institutions? After all, many discussions have taken place with the lending institutions about the availability of credit. His point was important; when he spoke last week I realised that there is another side to this. I absolutely take the points that were made about the behaviour of some bailiffs, but that very cohort, or constituency, of those who are affected would be affected if credit were not available.
My Lords, I raised the issue of bailiffs at Second Reading. I followed it up with a Written Question which asked when the Government would respond to consultation. I was told, as I have reminded the House before, that it would be some time in the autumn. Autumn is now safely past us and we do not yet have a response. I spoke in Committee and subscribed to the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, on Report. I would have been very happy to subscribe to today’s amendment had it not been for the fact that there were already four signatures on it, which would have left me as a fifth wheel on the coach of the noble Baroness.
I strongly support her amendment because it is important to get some movement here. As my noble friend Lady Smith has pointed out, the Government have introduced three substantial new proposals to the Bill at a late stage. Two of them were at least subject to the recommitment procedure, and followed consultations—consultations, incidentally, which began after the consultation closed on the whole issue of bailiffs, on which the Government consulted last winter and spring. The third amendment, which deals with self-defence, was of course tabled two days before Report, with no apparent consultation with anybody at all beforehand.
I entirely subscribe to and share the views of noble Lords who believe that the Minister is absolutely genuine in his concern about this matter, but why has it taken his department so long to consult all relevant bodies? There was an extensive consultation period; seven months have now passed. What further consultations, if any, have taken place—that is a legitimate question to ask—and with what result? The Minister indicated, in answer to previous questions, that he hoped that there would be a response by the end of November. We are now past that date, and there is still nothing to be seen. As the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, has pointed out, time is not running out completely, but it is running out fast against a particular deadline.
Incidentally, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, will consider another aspect of the coalition agreement, to which I have made previous reference during the passage of this Bill, namely the part of that agreement which indicated that the Government would introduce a threshold of £25,000, below which it would not be possible to obtain charging orders. On the first day back in January we will have in Grand Committee regulations prescribing a £1,000, instead of a £25,000, threshold. No doubt we will have an opportunity to debate that on a subsequent occasion.
In respect of this matter, the noble Baroness’s amendment is, as she put it, almost the least that could be done to get some progress quickly on this matter. If the Government do not accede to this request and if we are looking to another Bill to come forward—I do not know how many Ministry of Justice Bills we can expect to see in the next Session of Parliament—it clearly will take a long time. In the mean time, as other noble Lords have pointed out, there will be the potential for substantial suffering on the part of far too many people—not merely adults because children would be affected as well, including children in the most vulnerable and difficult of circumstances. It is simply unforgiveable that the department has let down the Minister, which is the fair way to put it, in progressing this matter. I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to accept the noble Baroness’s amendment. If not, I certainly shall advise my colleagues on these Benches to join her in the Lobby.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is very rare indeed that I do not wholly agree with the noble Baroness. As for my noble friend, Lord Lester, I do not even stop to assess whether I agree with him because I know that I should. However, as the noble and learned Lord has just mentioned, we in Parliament are used to our proceedings being recorded—we barely notice the cameras now—and edited. I am constantly taken aback by the number of people who watch the Parliament channel and our proceedings at great length—they must be terrible insomniacs, but they do. It may be that they prefer to watch and listen to a large chunk of a particular matter rather than have the proceedings edited by that very respectable and useful programme, “Today in Parliament”, or the print media. I support giving that opportunity with regard to the courts.
I recently attended a sentencing. I was there accompanying somebody who was concerned with the case. Waiting for my friend afterwards, I listened to the quite considerable number of print journalists there, writing up their stories. They had been handed a copy of the judge’s sentencing remarks but barely referred to the copy. They checked one or two comments with each other instead of bothering to go back to what they had been given, and I could hear how they were editing the remarks to make a sensational story.
I am very happy to rely on the Lord Chief Justice and the judges in particular cases where, as I understand it, the ability to make particular restrictions will still continue. Of course, editing—being a camera—is subjective. I have agonised about this quite a lot and I spoke rather in the other direction at the previous stage, but I have come down to believing that this quite cautious move is the right one. Judges are less tempted than politicians to make off-the-cuff remarks about major moves forward. I am therefore very happy that the Lord Chief Justice is so much involved.
My Lords, I understand the points made by my noble friend and by the noble Lord, Lord Lester. This is an innovation in English court procedures and we should approach it with a degree of caution. The case for opening up the judicial system to more public information and understanding is well made, and to that extent I concur with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I was less happy with the second part of his speech, which addressed the amendments in my name. I endorse what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has just said about discretion on the part of the trial judge to decide whether or not to permit broadcasting. That ought to be a significant safeguard, but it is not quite good enough to rely just on the Lord Chief Justice. I say “just”; although one has every confidence in the holders of that office, this is, as I say, a new departure and there is a wider interest to be considered. The amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Rosser try to establish the principles both in relation to any decision to extend court broadcasting and regarding the matters to be considered when a court gives a direction, precisely to meet some of the objections and difficulties envisaged by my noble friend Lady Kennedy and the noble Lord, Lord Lester.
Amendment 120B requires any statutory instrument to be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. I am in slight difficulty here because, when these matters were raised in Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, said that the government amendments would make the provisions under what was then Clause 22 and is now Clause 23 subject to the affirmative procedure, as recommended by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. She also referred to what was then Clause 29, which again required amendments to primary legislation to be subject to the affirmative procedure. I may have missed them but I cannot actually see those references in the Bill. They may be disguised under some form of words that does not immediately disclose their presence, but I would be grateful if the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, could confirm that the affirmative procedure would apply so that it would not simply be a matter of a decision by the Lord Chief Justice but, if there were to be significant changes, particularly to extend the range of matters that could be broadcast, then the affirmative procedure would apply. If that were the case, we would certainly be content to support the Bill in its present form. Perhaps, with the assistance of the Box, he may be able to help me and, more importantly, your Lordships, to come to a conclusion about whether the Government’s intentions are currently reflected in the Bill.
My Lords, I have a good deal of sympathy with the noble Lord’s first amendment, but am not perhaps quite as persuaded by the subsequent amendments. However, in any event I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, for his consistent concern with the problems of a particularly vulnerable group in our society and his very powerful advocacy on their behalf. He has obviously seized the opportunity to bring that concern into this Bill. I object less to that spatchcocking than I did to the previous amendment moved by the Minister in relation to burglary, but perhaps it is not the best forum in which to take these matters forward. I hope that the Minister can go a little further than he appears to have done in correspondence with the noble Lord and at least indicate that this whole area should be reviewed. It is some time since we have had a proper debate around the particularly delicate issues to which the noble Lord referred. While it is probably the case that this is not a matter to be voted on today, it should not be neglected indefinitely and ought to be considered.
Perhaps the Minister could indicate that discussions, not in respect of Third Reading but more generally, could take place around these and allied issues in connection with asylum and immigration matters where they impinge on the presence or otherwise in our country of people who have fled persecution and danger elsewhere, in a context that is outside the legislative framework for the time being. That might be a way forward in which a broad consensus could be reached across the House rather than dealing with it in terms of the amendments that are before us today. Again, I pay tribute to the noble Lord for raising these matters. I hope that can be seen as a first step and not the last step in a process of looking at the issue.
My Lords, I support my noble friend and add one further thought. In terms of public awareness, I have heard it said that these issues are now at about the same stage that domestic violence was about 20 years ago. I think that there would be a good deal more public understanding and sympathy for the sorts of changes that my noble friend has advocated even than there might have been four or five years ago. I think that the public mood is moving somewhat on this. It would be nice for the Government to be ahead of the public mood.
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this amendment deals with the proposal in the Bill to delegate some decisions in the family court to legal advisers. The amendment seeks to define those duties in a way that would avoid legal advisers assuming the role of the court itself in making effectively legal decisions. It is quite a different matter if they were to make effectively administrative or case management decisions on matters of that kind. There is a concern, among the magistracy as well as more generally, that powers to adjudicate should be conferred on legal advisers.
The Minister wrote to me in some detail about this, and I am grateful for that letter, but I understand that discussions are going ahead and have not yet reached a conclusion about the precise form of regulations that are to come to both Houses. It is unfortunate that once again we are in a position of enacting legislation without a clear view of how it is to be implemented. Your Lordships may think that that is happening rather too regularly. Clearly, however, the Government are taking this matter seriously, and I look forward to seeing the draft regulations and ultimately the statutory instruments, which I understand will be subject to affirmative procedure. That being the case, I do not know whether the noble Lord is in a position to give an indication of the scope of the proposed delegation, without going into too much detail, because the regulations have not yet been drafted and consultations are still taking place. It might be helpful if he were able to give an indication that there will be some kind of limitation perhaps not precisely along the lines of the amendment but avoiding too much of a judicial role being assumed by legal assistants as opposed to judges—and, for the purposes of the family court, magistrates become judges.
It would be helpful to have that information, although if it is not available we will simply have to wait. But while waiting to hear what the Minister says, I make it clear that I do not propose to press the amendment. We will have a parliamentary opportunity at some point, although not one that would allow us to amend anything. Even so, in those circumstances I will not be pressing the amendment, but it would be interesting to hear whether the noble Lord can update us to any degree.
My Lords, could I ask my noble friend a question? He may not be able to answer at this point, but I am afraid that it has only just occurred to me—it is with regard to assistant legal advisers. I can well understand that a person should be able to act as a legal adviser only if that person is a justices’ clerk, but why should a justices’ clerk, as distinct from an assistant to a justice’s clerk, not be able to act as an assistant legal adviser? It may be that the requirements on any given day, or because of the complexity of the matter or whatever, would make it more convenient for a justices’ clerk to act as an assistant legal adviser. It may be that I do not understand enough about how the magistracy works with its clerks at the moment. However, the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, caused me to look back to see who these individuals might be, because I share his concern about what they would be expected to do. It is an odd little restriction.
My Lords, I very much agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger. I, too, feel a great sense of trepidation, also being a “mere” solicitor, non-practising.
It is very rare that I agree with those who have spoken on the other side of this argument but I want to respond to the point that has been made about the perception of women who wish to work flexibly. My own experience has been that those who work to a slightly different pattern almost invariably turn themselves inside-out to work harder than is humanly possible in order to make it quite clear that they are not taking advantage of the arrangements that have been made for them.
In this walk of life, as in any, if we deny that cohort of people the opportunity, we are not only denying them, we are denying the whole of society the opportunity to use their life experience as well as their professional experience.
My Lords, I join my two fellow members of the junior branch of the profession with equal trepidation. We have heard from four most distinguished noble and learned Lords, all of whom support the amendment.
Last night I was lobbied, perfectly properly, by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, who drew my attention to the constant use of the word “flexibility” in the debate which took place some five months ago. It is true that the word was used but I am not sure that it was used in the sense that the noble and learned Lord perhaps implies, contrasting with the word “part-time”. When we discussed the matter I said that I was not quite sure what the difference meant in practice. I am still not sure what difference the noble and learned Lord would construct between the two.
The noble and learned Lord quoted two or three Members of your Lordships’ House as using the term “flexibility”. He mentioned, for example, my noble friend Lady Kennedy. She did use that word. At one point in the debate, at col. 92, he asked my noble friend a question. He said:
“Much of what she said dealt with flexibility. I think that everybody in the House is in favour of maximum flexibility … The real question is whether flexibility demands part-time judges. The view of some of us is that it does not”.
We have heard this today most eloquently from the noble and learned Lord and from other noble and learned Lords. My noble friend replied:
“If I may respond to the noble and learned Lord, it seems to me that it has to be one of the possibilities in the whole panoply open to those making appointments”.
That “it”, of course, is the question of part-time service. She continued:
“I do not imagine that it would happen very often but it might be that someone exceptional could be appointed who would say, ‘I will sit during these parts of the year and will be available to you then’”.
This was precisely the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger. My noble friend went on:
“I do not believe that that would bring about resentment from other colleagues once they saw the quality of the work done by people of real ability”.—[Official Report, 25/6/12; col. 92.]
That is perhaps an answer to my noble friend Lord Clinton-Davis.
The noble and learned Lord also referred to my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer—who made but a fleeting appearance, unfortunately, in the Chamber this afternoon. I would have been delighted to give way to him for the purposes of this debate and, indeed, possibly to some others. My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer spoke in some detail and also rather deprecated the use of the term “part-time”. In the conclusion to his remarks, he said:
“So if we were to agree to a provision that allowed part-time or flexible working members of the Supreme Court … there would be two benefits. First, it would increase the pool of people who would be able to apply. Secondly, it would lead to a sense that we thought that flexible working was available from the top to the bottom of our judicial system”.
My noble and learned friend treated “part-time” and “flexible” working as much the same thing. In the real world, surely that must be right. He concluded:
“I cannot think of a better message for us to send—and it would be one that was not just a gesture but would have an effect on increasing merit”.—[Official Report, 25/6/12; col. 101.]
My noble and learned friend said that the Opposition endorsed the proposals in the Bill, and we do again tonight.
Having never appeared before a tribunal higher than the county court I speak with some trepidation. However, I take some comfort from the experience of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, my noble friend Lady Kennedy and, in particular, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who has again eloquently made the case.
We are looking at flexible working that would necessarily involve—to avoid the use of the dreaded phrase “part-time”—less than full-time working. It seems to me that that is consistent with the objectives that have been outlined by noble and learned Lords who have supported the Government’s position. If it is of any comfort to the Minister, that will be the position should a Division be called: we would support the Government. We think that this is an imaginative forward step in the judicial system. We have every confidence that the people who are appointed to that very senior position will discharge it to the best of their obviously very considerable ability and with the utmost conscientiousness. I have no fears about that or about the capacity of the system to cope with what would inevitably be a relatively modest number of people occupying senior positions of that kind in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.
On this occasion, the Minister and I are at one —which is perhaps, subsequently, a matter for some modest celebration.
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will follow that by asking whether the Government are satisfied that the objections that they have told us there are to the use of intercept evidence in other cases do not apply in the case of employment tribunals. I have been listening to the introduction of this amendment, wondering whether I am in favour of it because I am in favour of the use of intercept evidence or against it because, presumably, the intercept evidence could be treated as closed material. I am rather torn on this, but the question that the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, raises is a very important one.
My Lords, I endorse my noble friend’s remarks. I touched on a similar point during Second Reading and I think other Members of your Lordships’ House have also expressed an interest in this matter. We obviously do not expect the Minister to confirm that the principle will be adopted forthwith, but it would be helpful if an indication could be given as to when the Government might respond to the interest in this that has been evident in various of our debates as this Bill has made progress through the House.
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, a number of requirements may be made under paragraph 5, including imposing a fine or asking for compensation, a donation of money to a charity and reasonable costs. I was particularly concerned that the donation to a charity should not be treated by P as a deductable expense for tax purposes. In normal circumstances it probably would be, but that seemed to me to be offensive.
The HMRC has confirmed on its website that a fine is not,
“incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the trade”,
but I do not think that it would do any harm to confirm this in the legislation. I have not included disgorging profits because, presumably, tax was paid on them in the first instance, so I can see an argument that they should be deductable. But I am interested in particular in hearing what the Minister has to say about payments to charity. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee for drawing the Committee’s attention to this issue. The Government firmly believe that wrongdoers should not be able to profit or otherwise benefit from their offending behaviour; that is why DPAs will require organisations to comply with tough terms and conditions. These terms may include financial elements such as requirements to pay compensation to victims, a financial penalty, and the reasonable costs of the prosecutor, as well as a requirement on the organisation to disgorge the proceeds of criminal wrongdoing. However, it should also be remembered—as it was in discussions on a previous amendment, as pointed out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith—that DPAs can include other non-financial requirements, such as updating anti-corruption or fraud policies and retraining staff. Those are important attributes.
Deferred prosecution agreements are intended to ensure that organisations recognise and are held to account for their wrongdoing and take steps to mend their ways. Fulfilling the terms of an agreement should not be seen as simple entries in an organisation’s financial book-keeping records. The harm inflicted on the victims of economic crime and innocent third parties should not be seen simply as a cost of doing business.
It will come as no surprise to your Lordships that my noble friend referred to tax. The tax obligations of organisations relating to financial penalties and compensation payments can be, and are, complicated. These obligations have been very carefully developed over many years to ensure the right balance is struck. Although I welcome my noble friend’s efforts to clarify taxation arrangements under a DPA, the question of whether and which financial elements might be tax deductible is, and should continue to be, determined by finance legislation so that all relevant matters and consequences can be taken into consideration. That also avoids a piecemeal and haphazard approach to tax matters which might set an unhelpful precedent or have unintended consequences. Matters in respect of taxation are properly a matter for the Finance Acts and not for legislation such as this.
In light of these points, I would be grateful if my noble friend Lady Hamwee would agree to withdraw her amendment. In conclusion, I say to the Committee, and in particular to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that I think it would be beneficial to arrange a meeting with officials so that we can address some of the issues more specifically in advance of Report stage. But for now, I hope that my noble friend Lady Hamwee will agree to withdraw her amendment.
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 22 is a very low-key and minor introduction to this important new schedule about deferred prosecution agreements. It deals with the provision of certain persons to be designated as prosecutors who can enter into deferred prosecution agreements. Paragraph 3(2) states:
“A designated prosecutor must exercise personally the power to enter into a DPA”.
If I split an infinitive, it was because I was quoting. Paragraph 3(3) states that,
“if the designated prosecutor is unavailable, the power … may be exercised personally by a person authorised … by the designated prosecutor”.
This is a probing amendment. I seek to understand what is meant by “unavailable”. I assume that it would mean something more than “unavailable because he has gone to the dentist that afternoon”, and would mean unavailable because he or she is having long-term treatment for a medical problem that keeps them away from the office and away from work. The amendment specifies that the unavailability should be,
“for a period of or likely to be of more than 21 days”.
I am by no means wedded to that. As I said, this is a probing amendment, because “unavailable” could be read as meaning a very brief period where it would not be appropriate for power to be delegated. I beg to move.
My Lords, the noble Baroness raised a perfectly fair and reasonable point, to which no doubt the Minister will be able to reply. Looking again at paragraph 3, it strikes me that perhaps there are one or two other questions to ask. Paragraph 3(1) states that the prosecutor is designated by an order made by the Secretary of State. That is a very high-level appointment. It is emphasised by paragraph 3(2), which states that the designated prosecutor,
“must exercise personally the power to enter into a DPA”.
Again, it follows that this is a serious responsibility for somebody appointed at the highest level relevant to that appointment.
It would appear that the person then has a delegated power, in the circumstances which no doubt the Minister will elucidate of his or her unavailability, to appoint somebody else. There does not seem to be any procedure for that person necessarily to be one of a group approved in advance by the Secretary of State. It may be that a sort of panel system is envisaged, but that is not clear in the Bill. Presumably anybody could be designated—in theory they could be relatively junior—by the original designated prosecutor to carry out this very responsible work.
This thought had not occurred to me until the noble Baroness opened up the issue. However, it strikes me as a matter that the Minister should take back and look at. I would envisage that a panel system would apply, but surely it would be sensible to specify that that would be the case, rather than leave an untrammelled decision to the designated prosecutor in circumstances where he or she is not available to do the job. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, will take that back and look at it, in order to answer both problems that we have identified this evening.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for moving her amendment. When devising the new process for deferred prosecution agreements for England and Wales, the Government sought to ensure that it aligned with key strengths and aspects of the existing criminal justice system. To that end, we provided for decision-making throughout the process to be properly guided, including by the code of practice for prosecutors, and overseen by the judiciary.
Paragraph 3 of the schedule provides that the decision to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement with an organisation should be exercised personally by designated prosecutors, namely the Director of Public Prosecutions and the director of the Serious Fraud Office. This is to ensure that there is prosecutorial oversight of each DPA at the highest level. It mirrors existing requirements for such oversight, including, for example, decisions to bring proceedings under the Bribery Act 2010. Offences under the Bribery Act 2010 are among the economic and financial offences for which we propose DPAs. This process should be available, as detailed in Part 2 of Schedule 17.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked what would occur when the relevant director, whom we hope in each case will make the decision personally, is not available. In order that due process can continue without delay, we have provided the power for the relevant director, if they are going to be unavailable, to designate another prosecutor to exercise the oversight and decision-making functions. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked whether they could assign this power to anyone. I suggest that someone who is qualified and in such a senior role will assign it to an appropriate prosecutor in their relevant area.
Consistent with similar powers for personal decisions by directors, such as those under the Bribery Act 2010, we have not sought to constrain the ability to delegate the power to enter into a DPA. We are not contemplating large numbers of deferred prosecution agreements each year, and are confident that the directors are fully committed to making decisions personally, as envisaged, and would designate another person to do so only in exceptional circumstances and with good reason—and, I will add, would designate only an appropriate person.
I consider it important in the interests of openness and consistency that DPAs should align as closely as possible with existing and established law, and with the processes of our criminal justice system. That is what we have sought to achieve in paragraph 3, and indeed throughout Schedule 17. I therefore hope that with this explanation my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.
I am grateful for the Minister’s response, but he has not quite addressed the issue. There is nothing in the Bill that would require the substitute prosecutor to be a designated prosecutor; they could be anybody nominated by the original designated prosecutor. I again invite the Minister to take this back and have a look at it. It seems—and I think that the noble Baroness agrees with me—that there is a lacuna here that needs to be filled.
My Lords, of course I will look in any direction that the noble Lord points me to in considering consistency with other legislation. I think that what we are being asked to do is to rely on the good sense, and good sense of responsibility, of those who hold the posts specified in paragraph 3(1)(c). I understand that and take the point seriously but, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said, at least some further thought is required in order that we can be confident that enough constraint is in place. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberWe now come to debate the broadcasting of court proceedings. This has already taken place in respect of certain proceedings of the Supreme Court. There is a suggestion in the Bill that this should be significantly widened. My amendments support the principle, but set out guidelines as to the way in which change might be made and also take into account—implicitly, I have to say, rather than explicitly—the recommendation of the Delegated Powers Committee that any changes should be made by regulation; again to be approved by parliamentary vote.
Amendment 147ZC proposes that in making an order as to which categories of case might be broadcast and when that might happen, the Lord Chancellor should apply principles that should be first reported to Parliament. The basic principle is surely that broadcasting of court proceedings is for the purposes not of entertainment but of promoting understanding of the judicial system and thereby reinforcing public confidence in it. It is not by any means to be a YouTube of incidents, as opposed to proper, sensible coverage of an important area of public life, the justice system.
Amendment 147ZC requires the Lord Chancellor, in making any order extending categories of broadcasting, to confirm that principles have been adhered to, including, most essentially, the protection of witnesses, victims, defendants, parties and jurors, who shall under no circumstances be recorded; the promotion and proper administration of justice; and that filming should not be permitted if it would cause undue prejudice to any person involved in the proceedings. That is a fairly straightforward provision designed to protect the integrity of the system.
The decision in an individual case should, of course, be a matter for the judge. There may well be cases in which the judge decides that it is not appropriate, in all the circumstances, to take advantage of the permission to allow broadcasting that the Bill, if enacted, would confer. Amendment 147B simply says that, in making a direction that broadcasting should be permitted, the court or tribunal should have regard to the principles that I have adumbrated, which would, if the amendment is accepted, apply to the Lord Chancellor in widening the range of potential broadcasts in the first place.
Clearly there are legitimate concerns about the extent to which broadcasting might impinge on people’s positions, particularly parties to the case. I do not think that the Government envisage extending coverage to the whole process of trials, rather to particular aspects. Some of these are mentioned in other amendments, in particular sentencing, remarks on sentencing, and perhaps arguments by a counsel. Such matters should be dealt with properly by regulation, taking into account the factors mentioned in Amendment 147A.
I hope that the Government will respond positively to these suggestions and I look forward very much to hearing the views of other noble Lords who have tabled amendments. This is an area of considerable public interest and concern. There is a way forward, the Government are on the right lines, and with some safeguards we would be prepared to support the principle of extension. The question, of course, is where one draws the line and that is a matter which we will no doubt be debating this evening and further on Report. I beg to move.
Amendment 147A is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford. I do not take issue with the principles set out in Amendment 147ZC, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, except that I question the term, “undue prejudice”. I wonder whether filming should be permitted if it might cause any prejudice, but that is a minor point.
I am pleased to see the government amendment providing for the affirmative procedure; it will give us the opportunity to debate the extension of the subjects that can be broadcast. I have no doubt with my amendments that the Government intend to see how it goes, limiting the items as they have described. The two paragraphs listed in our amendment may look less than the Government had proposed for the initial—experiment is perhaps too loaded a term—experience of filming, recording and broadcast, but my noble friend Lord Thomas corrected my drafting and said that the term “judgments” covered everything that was needed in the first paragraph. However, this development seems to me to be so significant that I am not convinced that it should not be stated in the Bill and that any extension of it should not be the subject of primary legislation.
I agree with those who predict pressure from the broadcasters for an extension so that there is livelier material for the 6.30 news and so on. Even “Today in Parliament”, admirable though it is, chooses the livelier and racier exchanges, and that is entirely understandable—it seeks to balance those with the important items that get discussed in both Houses, and it has half an hour to do so. When one is looking for a clip of only a few seconds, one is bound to want something that will grab the audience’s attention. Of course, a wider understanding of the justice system must be a good thing. I do not want to sound too paternalistic, but there must be a danger that an extension that popularises and simplifies would lead to a loss of subtlety and complexity. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws—who has far more experience of the courts than I do—spoke powerfully about this at Second Reading.
At Second Reading I mentioned the issue of counsel playing to the gallery. It occurs to me that others may do so as well. The experience of the riots last summer, and what came out regarding the behaviour of some of those who were charged and what was prompting them, has made me wonder whether people in that situation might themselves seek to use proceedings that were broadcast in order to continue the political statements that they were making. The Government always say that we must beware of the lack of legislative opportunities but, as we generally get a criminal justice Bill each year, that does not necessarily seem to be the best argument.
When we have secondary legislation—I acknowledge that there have been improvements in the reporting by departments of consultation that has taken place before secondary legislation comes before your Lordships—it is likely that there will be a variety of views on the details of the extension and the parts of court proceedings that would be covered. These will be difficult to deal with because of the inability to amend secondary legislation. My general point is that this is so important a step that it should require the closest consideration.
As ever, when one looks at one’s own drafting immediately before standing up to speak to an amendment, one sees the faults in it. I should perhaps have included the word “only” after the phrase,
“an order may be made”,
but this is Committee so I hope that your Lordships will not hold that against me. I do not regard approval of the very limited recording that is currently proposed as amounting to approval in principle for recording and filming in court to such an extent as to avoid the need for the consideration, on the basis of primary legislation, of an extension to this.
(12 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI, too, shall read the Minister’s reply with interest. Is he satisfied that there would not be other types of claim, apart from judicial review, with which a damages claim might be almost inseparably linked as part of the same proceedings? I do not expect him to answer that immediately.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, perhaps I may ask a short supplementary question following the queries made by my noble friend Lord Carlile about Clause 9. I was intending to raise it on a later amendment but will do so now if my noble friend is going to deal with it.
The natural meaning of “exceptional cases” suggests to me something very unusual about either the claim or the claimant. I am troubled that claimants might fall foul by virtue of being part of a cohort. Can the Minister help me with what is meant by “enforceable EU rights”, which, along with convention rights, bring one within the exceptional determination provision?
My Lords, before I address the amendments, I must correct something that I said in Committee. I unfortunately misrepresented the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, as saying that 10 per cent of National Health Service patients suffered clinical negligence. I rather conflated different figures. He referred to the fact that a million of what are described in somewhat Orwellian language as “adverse incidents” take place in the health service, of which only 10,000 give rise to claims, which represents only 1 per cent of those adverse incidents.
The noble Lord, Lord McNally, has in the previous debate, and indeed in virtually every debate, prayed in aid as a rationale for government policy the question of costs. It is not unreasonable that costs and public expenditure should form part of these discussions, but, as we have heard today from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and others, the argument in this case runs the other way. What the Government are proposing would cost the Exchequer, rather than the converse. In any case, we are speaking only of some £10 million, which would have been the saving under the Government’s original policy. I welcome so far as it goes the amendment that the Government are proposing. As they are now going some way—though not far enough—towards meeting the case for extending legal aid, that amount of saving would be reduced in any event.
However, it is not just those of us who support the amendments of the noble and learned Lord and of the noble Baronesses, Lady Grey-Thompson and Lady Eaton, who take the point about the cost and the way in which the system would work. No less an authority than the National Health Service Litigation Authority has expressed its considerable reservations about the Government’s approach, saying:
“We have serious concerns over the proposal to withdraw legal aid from clinical negligence claims. Whilst we have seen an upsurge of claims brought under Conditional Fee Agreements (CFAs) in recent years, we question whether CFAs are likely to be readily available to fund many of the more serious claims currently brought via legal aid”.
That view is at odds with that of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas. Given that the litigation authority is at the receiving end of these claims, I am inclined to give rather more weight to its views.
(13 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I certainly support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, in respect of the proposal that two or more employees could issue a challenge to the authority, which I would much rather were not in the Bill at all. Failing that, my Amendment 197CB, would at least require a majority of the employees affected to support such a move. I really hope that the Government will take that seriously. It does not seem appropriate that two or more employees—it might be a director or deputy director; it could be people lower in the organisation—could simply take a decision which would affect a considerable number of people without their consent and outsource a whole section of the local authority. That seems wholly unreasonable and not at all compatible with the general thrust of the Bill, which looks to secure support for a range of measures on the part of communities. I hope that the Government will acknowledge that there is an issue here and will accept one or other of the amendments. My preference would be that of the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, but, failing that, I would be delighted to accept his support for the fallback position.
However, I am less persuaded by his Amendment 197DA. I quite take the thrust of his intention, but I am not sure the wording is very compelling. The amendment refers to the body concerned being required to be,
“actively engaged … in the area in which the relevant service is being provided”.
Let us take as an example a county area and services for the elderly or domiciliary care. There might be an organisation in one corner of the county carrying out that service. It would hardly meet the description of being,
“actively engaged in the area”;
that is, across the area in which the relevant service is being provided. It is difficult to define in the way that the noble Lord seeks.
I am therefore unenthusiastic about the way in which the noble Lord reaches his objective, although I am bound to say that I am not sure that I can offer a better alternative. However, in respect of the previous two amendments, the Government need to rethink their position to facilitate at the very least a majority decision by those who would be affected by a move of two of their colleagues. I cannot see any logical reason why the Government should resist that.
My Lords, I have later amendments on the same issues. In relation to Amendment 197DA, I would like to say to my noble friend that I think that experience in the particular activity that is at issue is less important than the geographical link. I take his point about wanting a connection, but I am not quite convinced that it is the particular connection that he has mentioned. However, by and large I am entirely with him on this issue.
The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, framed this in terms of urban needs, and I myself am very much an urban and suburban person. He also mentioned the comfort of state provision. Since this debate has morphed into discussion not just about two employees, but about whether two employees might, as it were, sell out to Tesco, it does remind me that there is often a very sharp divide on this issue. People do not like Tesco, but they do like being able to shop in Tesco, which creates quite a dilemma.
My question for my noble friend is whether there is any room for local variation in a local authority’s response to such an expression of interest? I will come to my other questions when we come to my amendments later.
My Lords, the ingenuity of the noble Lord’s colleagues defies description. I certainly welcome this sensible amendment. However, it is timely to say a word in favour of the leader and executive model and, in particular, to draw attention to the one part of the recent publication by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, with which I agree. In relation to elected mayors, the paper makes a strong point. I told him that I agreed with something he had written and he was surprised. The relevant part is the emphasis that he makes about the need for a strong and independent scrutiny function, with which I entirely agree under whatever system is operated—be it mayoral, leader and executive or a straight committee system.
There are those who are still in love with the old-style committee system; the notion that you have a collection of Socratic city elders engaged in philosophical dialogue about the affairs of state in a particular borough or authority. I am bound to say that that does not accord with my own experience, particularly after serving for many years as chairman of committees, leader of the council, and so on.
When I departed to the Siberian power station of the arts and recreation committee, having given up the leadership and any other executive position—by choice I may say; it was self-imposed exile—I discovered that as a back-bench member of the traditional committee system one’s influence was pretty limited. When you are in the chair you can move things on quite briskly: you have an agenda and you get it through. When you are a back-bench member you usually have a political group meeting beforehand. It may last about an hour and there are 12 or 15 of you, which gives an average of four or five minutes each. The point of the formal meeting is to get it over with as quickly as possible. In reality, very little of the purported scrutiny takes place in the traditional committee system nor is there very much influence over policy.
That was summarised for me most effectively one day—I hope your Lordships will forgive this brief anecdote. I had missed a committee meeting of the arts and recreation committee but went to the next one. I read the minutes, which said that a member had raised a question about birds eating the grass seed in the Leazes Park allotments. I thought to myself, “Has it really come to this?”. We had an £800 million budget, with goodness knows how many problems and opportunities to debate, and the most the member could think of to raise at a committee meeting was birds eating grass seed at an allotment. I do not say that that entirely characterises the committee system, but there is some danger of that happening.
The main thrust of my, perhaps somewhat tedious, observations is to recommend that, whatever the circumstances, there must be a strong and independently sourced scrutiny role, not only to hold the executive to account, because perhaps too much of scrutiny has been based on a retrospective look at the actions of an executive, but to look forward, and, as it should be, in an unwhipped forum, at policy, development and so on. That is not incompatible with a committee system, but in reality, in my experience, it rarely took place that way. It needs a push for strong scrutiny and I hope that irrespective of the provisions of the Bill, the Government will encourage authorities to maintain and enhance that scrutiny role, whatever type of authority they are and whatever model of governance they adopt. I certainly would not oppose these amendments to give councils the option to choose their own system.
My Lords, my noble friend, who I understand has executive responsibility for grass seed in the London Borough of Sutton, along with allotments and other matters, would have wanted to have come back to say that these amendments are not about the merits of any particular system, but about local decisions about what is appropriate for each local authority.
I think that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, would agree that scrutiny is a developing art rather than a science, and that the experience of different systems over the past 10 years has contributed to an extension of that expertise.
This is not much of an anecdote I am afraid, but my first experience of scrutiny was as a member of what we then called the performance review committee, which was formed largely to respond to what the Audit Commission had to say about what was going on in the authority. My goodness, things have moved a long way since then. I agree with the noble Lord that if scrutiny is to be good, it needs to be much more constructive than simply looking back and commenting on decisions and actions that have been taken.
I do not think that what underlies these amendments needs in any way threaten the development of scrutiny. Further, I should declare an interest as a member of the advisory board at the Centre for Public Scrutiny. It will be interesting to see how the art of scrutiny develops further under another mix of arrangements across authorities.
My Lords, the word that I stumbled over when I first read Clause 14(2) was “just”. Not justice, which of course is important, but “just because”, which is not the sort of language that one normally sees in legislation. However, since the noble Lord has spoken, and having heard what he said, which I found extremely helpful, the word that now concerns me is “might”. Clause 14(2)(a) refers to a view that a decision-maker,
“took, or would or might take”.
How does “might” stand in the context of the distinction between predisposition and predetermination? I am far more confused than I was 10 minutes ago.
My Lords, I support the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord McKenzie—especially the second amendment in the group. We are entering difficult territory, as outlined clearly by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. At the very least, given the potential difficulties that might arise from a change, there ought to be a proper, evidence-based review, and three years should be sufficient for that. There are clear dangers in the way that the clause is drafted, and we cannot overlook the political background to its production. Its provenance lies in political debate, with those on one side claiming that it is improper to prevent councillors campaigning on issues and then voting on them. Of course, that is perfectly legitimate in the context of any council policy such as education, social care or whatever: but not in a situation that is quasi-judicial, which is how planning and licensing decisions should be taken.
I am afraid that the rather loose terminology deployed on political platforms colours one’s view of the potential impact of the proposal in Clause 14. It also raises the possibility of undue pressure being applied to elected members who will no longer have the defence that, “I must not indicate how I am going to vote because I am obliged to look at all sides of the case”. That might be regarded as being swept away. I am not saying that it is the intention of the clause to sweep it away, but that inference might be drawn by those seeking to solicit the support of members. One must not assume that that solicitation will always be on the part of electors. It may be on the part of those on the other side of the proposal: namely, the developers. It is invidious to place members in that position. They need the protection of the kind of approach that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has enunciated.
I hope that the Minister will look again at this, particularly at Amendment 165A, and whether that can be deployed to mitigate the impact of Clause 14. In any event, however, I hope he would accept, or just consider accepting, Amendment 165B, which would allow the situation to be reviewed in this rather delicate area on the basis of evidence rather than surmise. We are looking, at this late hour, for some commitment to think again and talk again about this in order to avoid potential future difficulties for elected members and officers of the council as well. It would also provide clarity for public applicants and objectors alike.
I have three short questions on Clause 83. The noble Baroness may not be able to answer them immediately; if not, perhaps she will write to me. First, for the purposes of subsection (2), could a charge on a property be regarded as a disposal if the property is then vacant? The second question arises under subsection (6) in respect of the qualifying leaseholders’ state, which would have to have at least 25 years to run. It strikes me that someone might grant a lease for less than that, which would take it outside the parameters of the clause, with an option for the tenant to renew it which could effectively carry it beyond 25 years. Had that been a straightforward grant, it would be within the framework. Does that need to be considered? Finally, subsection (7) gives the appropriate authority the right to amend the clause by order. As in previous debates, I would like confirmation that that would be subject to an affirmative order, as it deals with personal property rights, rather than a negative resolution.
(13 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberLet us go on to the Local Government Association. That seems to follow, as Amendment 239A would add police and crime commissioners as statutory partners on community safety partnerships. Under the Bill, commissioners do not replace police authorities as members of CSPs; they simply have a duty to co-operate. The Local Government Association, making the point that this is an all-party view, says that it is concerned about fracturing current local community safety governance arrangements and that placing commissioners as statutory members on CSPs would help to ensure that all bodies involved in local community safety work together through a collaborative approach in the best interest of local communities and that the commissioner does not undertake contradictory efforts to those of the other CSP members.
I apologise to your Lordships for the length of time it has taken me to introduce all those amendments. It is a medium-sized group in the context of the Bill.
My Lords, pursuing my usual course of local government recidivism, I will comment briefly on Amendment 49A, which will include local authorities in the rather wide category of criminal justice bodies set out in Clause 11(4). On Second Reading, I rather questioned the extent of that list and wondered whether it is appropriate to regard the police commissioner in the same category as, for example, the Crown Prosecution Service or youth offending teams. However, be that as it may, if there are to be bodies such as those listed here—including, for example, youth offending teams, which are regarded as criminal justice bodies—surely it is logical that local government should be included as well, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seems to acknowledge at least on this occasion. I hope that the Minister will accept that modest amendment. However, I will endorse the noble Baroness’s amendments that refer to the need for local government to be included, particularly, for example, in relation to the annual reports in Clause 13. It would be strange if the elected local policing body—effectively the commissioner—were not to give a local authority a response to a report or recommendations that such an authority might make to the commissioner. Again I hope—possibly vainly—that the Minister will see the logic of that and accept the amendment to that effect which the noble Baroness has moved.
(13 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I would accept that: democracy is quite untidy. Liberal Democrats have often said that it is not a bad thing to have a patchwork, with different arrangements for the delivery of service in different places and to different communities, which may be geographic or may have other characteristics. For instance, with regard to Wales, we have heard that it is important to have similarity because the provision of the service crosses the border. I think that we need to be reassured that the underlying framework, which may then grow different bits, is robust enough to serve the whole of England and Wales.
I tabled an amendment on pilots at Committee, and I acknowledged that the proposals could be approved. For instance, to have an independent review and report would be a good thing, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, rightly suggested. He also made the point—this is a question to him—that, if the experience from the pilots was to be utilised, there would have to be a mechanism whereby the Secretary of State, probably, could tweak the arrangements within the Bill. I am not sure that I have found that in his amendment, but he may be relying on the arrangements around commencement; I do not know.
At the previous stage, I asked the Minister whether there was any other mechanism that the Government might suggest for—to use the words that I used then—assessing and evaluating the model, but she did not answer the question. I am not sure whether she was unable to answer it, but for me that question still remains. I understand that there is a concern about certainty, but I do not understand that there is a concern to achieve certainty about a model over which there still hang so many anxieties. Speaking for my noble friend Lord Shipley and myself, we support the amendment.
I confess to being in two minds, having heard my noble friend’s argument for the case, supported by the noble Baroness, but also the objections to the proposed course from the noble Lords, Lord Howard, Lord Dear and Lord Stevens. I can see the force of the objection to the prospect of a limited number of pilots stretching over a number of years, but it is not so much a question of democratic principle being at risk from such an exercise. The concern is around precisely the issue of checks and balances. If it goes through and we have an elected police commissioner, that is relatively straightforward; it is what happens in that context over time that will tell whether the checks and balances that some of us feel are inadequate are sufficient to meet the case. Actually, a limited number of pilot examples might not demonstrate that. The noble Lord has a point in that respect.
To develop a theme that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, advanced, I wonder whether the practice of what is a major constitutional change in the way in which the police service in this country is run could be reviewed after a period of three years. I do not mean on the basis of a number of pilots, but we could take a considered view after three years, say, and look at whether the expectations are being fulfilled. I accept that the Government are genuine in their belief that they have got it right or are getting it right on checks and balances. Without a formal sunset clause, perhaps we could have an indication that that situation would be reviewed and adjustments made, if necessary, around the areas of concern that many noble Lords have voiced about the practice of this new structure, with its implications for accountability and effectiveness, both at local level and in connection with the other concerns about national strategies and the like.
It is less of a formal legislative process that I am suggesting might be considered and more one in which it would be possible to revisit these concerns, taking a broad look across however many authorities will be involved in any new structure and with a view to fine tuning, as it may be, or making perhaps more substantial changes in the light of what will by then be a general experience, which might tell us whether the hopes of Ministers in proposing these changes are being fulfilled. Would the Minister care to consider whether such a process might be acceptable to the Government without necessarily changing the terms of the Bill?
(13 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, declare an interest as a councillor in Newcastle upon Tyne and as a vice-president of the Local Government Association. A week ago in your Lordships' House, the government Chief Whip lamented the fact that not enough legislation was being debated in Grand Committee. Of course, it would have been quite wrong for this Bill to be assigned to Grand Committee. However, this debate could hardly be better placed than in Grand Committee in the Moses Room. After all, that Room bears a portrait of a majestic, bearded figure bearing tables of stone on which are incised 10 commandments.
This afternoon, the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, comes to us not with 10 commandments but with 10 criteria by which this Bill is to be judged. Try as I might—and I have tried—I cannot find very much to disagree with. It is something like 120 years since Sir William Harcourt, a distinguished Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer, proclaimed, somewhat optimistically from one point of view, or perhaps pessimistically from another point of view, that, “We are all socialists now”. Nowadays, we are all localist, but that definition of localism is, to put it mildly, somewhat elastic. I think the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, has set out as good a definition as one might reasonably expect. If I had a reservation, it would be that in proposed new subsection (1)(d) in the amendment the reference is to,
“minimum standards for the provision of public services”.
I accept that that would be a partial definition, but I think one needs to look at minimum entitlements in addition to minimum standards. Standards imply provision of a service; entitlements are a somewhat broader concept that would, for example, avoid us reverting to a 19th-century poor law view in which benefits are calculated differentially across the country. Indeed, there is a case for variation, and I have sometimes thought of promoting a society for the preservation of the postcode lottery because it seems to me that localism of any definition implies different choices according to local circumstances. I therefore welcome the thrust of this proposed new clause.
Would the noble Lord agree that a better term might be “postcode democracy”?
I would not say that it is a better definition, but I would accept it as an additional definition. However, the spirit is shared across the Chamber.
The key to the noble Lord’s amendment is surely the emphasis on representative local democracy. That is what local government is and must be all about. That is what, as we go through this Bill, we shall see is in danger of being significantly undermined, both in the Bill’s provisions and in some of the current policies that are being applied. Representative local democracy is different from government by referendum of the kind that we sometimes see in jurisdictions such as Switzerland or California, but we will debate those matters later.
I think the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, was entirely right to borrow my phrase about the atomisation of local government. There is a real danger in this Bill and in other legislation that is currently being debated in Grand Committee and other places that that will be a feature. He is also right to say that all government departments need to adopt an integrated approach. In that context, it is worth reflecting on what appears to be happening to what is now called community budgeting and was called total place. There is little evidence, it seems to me, certainly based on an Answer that I received from the Minister, that anyone in government, apart from the Department for Communities and Local Government, is taking this very seriously, but it is a serious issue and I certainly wish the Minister well in her efforts to persuade her colleagues to sign up effectively to it. In that context, if we are talking about local government promoted and administered on the lines that the noble Lord’s amendment suggests, we need to look closely at what is happening in that regard.
Having said that, I think there are difficulties in the noble Lord’s amendment as an amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, and other noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, have pointed out the—
My Lords, I endorse the amendments and the questions that the noble Lord, Lord Tope, has asked because it is far from clear what the import of these provisions will be, particularly in relation to charging. Do the costs of provision allow for just the basic costs or would they include the cost of replacement, renewal, training and reinvestment? The definition in the Bill seems very narrow. Perhaps the Minister would agree to take it away and look at it. I do not think that there is a lot between us on this. We on this side are not seeking, and nor do I think is the noble Lord, to encourage a position where the provision of a service is translated into a commercial enterprise, but the boundaries are perhaps less obvious than they might first appear. I should have thought it would be possible to reach an accommodation that gives sufficient tolerance to allow a surplus to be reinvested into the service as opposed to something that might be distributed elsewhere.
My Lords, “the costs of provision”, the term used in Clause 3(3), could mean only the direct costs of provision or it might mean the indirect, back office costs and so on. Can the Minister help me on the exact import of the term? My second question concerns how this provision fits with Clause 4, which deals with doing things for a commercial purpose. Is there some sort of provision that falls short of doing things for a commercial purpose but which is outlawed by Clause 3(3)?
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI shall speak also to Amendments 139, 150 and 226, and shall perhaps mention the other amendments in this group. Amendment 93 is very short. It seeks to understand why subsections (6) to (10) of Section 96 of the Police Act 1996 are to be omitted, although I can see that this is partly consequential. However, subsection (6) deals with the Common Council of the City of London and, as we debated the other day and as the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, mentioned this afternoon, the City has escaped being affected by this Bill. Subsection (7) is about the duty to review arrangements and subsection (8) gives the Secretary of State powers. I am always happy to see Secretary of State powers going but I wonder why it is happening in this instance.
Amendment 139 relates to Schedule 6 to the Bill. Paragraph 32 of the schedule deals with regulations made by the Secretary of State to modify or exclude the application of enactments. That seems to be a rather extreme way of putting it without a limitation regarding, for example, the modification being only as necessary for the particular requirements of the panels. I put down this amendment to give the Minister an opportunity to give some assurances on that. I tabled it before seeing the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which deals with this issue at paragraphs 11 and 12 of its report and recommends that regulations under paragraph 36 of the schedule,
“should be subject to the affirmative procedure”.
I overlooked taking the matter to the next stage. If the Minister can give us the assurances that we need, perhaps we will not have to come back to this at the next stage, although we may need to do so.
Amendment 150 would take out paragraph 6 of Schedule 7 to the Bill. The paragraph says that regulations may apply to amend or modify Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002—I am abbreviating the wording—and may apply such other enactments,
“as appear to the Secretary of State to be necessary or expedient in connection with, or in consequence of, regulations”.
What is that intended to achieve? Regarding the words,
“in connection with, or in consequence of, regulations”,
I ask: what regulations? It seems a bit circular to me. Therefore, again, I seek information.
I turn, finally, to my Amendment 226. Clause 80 gives the Secretary of State the general duty to exercise powers in a way,
“best calculated to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of the police”.
I heard what the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, said about that phrase in the previous debate. I have proposed substituting the phrase “safety and security” because I think that it goes wider and deeper than, and encompasses, “efficiency and effectiveness”.
We will hear from other noble Lords about their amendments but I think that Amendment 226AA, which will perhaps be dealt with by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, seeks to retain performance targets for police strategic priorities. I have never been much of a fan of targets but I am a fan of reporting, so I go a little way along the road with him on that. I beg to move.
My Lords, I break the habit of a brief parliamentary lifetime by suggesting that the Secretary of State retains the two powers which she proposes to dispense with under Clause 82. This amendment would restore the power of the Secretary of State to issue codes of practice for and to secure reports from police authorities. It seems to me that there ought to be a standard code of practice, not necessarily covering everything, but at least covering the basics in the operation of the police force to provide a degree of uniformity across the country or countries—Wales is, of course, included in the provisions of the Bill—rather than different forces operating significantly differently in the way in which they conduct the crucial area of public policy in crime and community safety. It is perfectly reasonable for the Secretary of State to issue such guidance, obviously after the appropriate consultation.
Similarly, accountability is repeatedly averred to be the core of the Bill. At some level the Secretary of State needs to be informed about what is going on nationally in terms of policing so that, in Parliament, she can answer issues that are her responsibility, particularly when they relate to strategic concerns. My noble friend Lord Rosser will be moving an amendment precisely relating to those strategic priorities. There are national and local priorities and it seems to me axiomatic that the Secretary of State should have the information available in the form of reports which she can digest and which Parliament can also read and discuss. This is another aspect in which transparency and accountability can be reinforced, somewhat paradoxically in this case, by restoring to the Secretary of State powers which, at the moment, she is happy to lose. I hope that the Minister will consider this modest accretion to the functions of central government in the wider interests of accountability and transparency in respect of these matters.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI rise to speak briefly to Amendment 83A. The clause requires the elected police commissioner to co-operate with a variety of partners in the criminal justice system. One might think that it might be overegging the pudding to require that he should co-operate with,
“the chief officer of police for that police area”,
but that is what Clause 10(4)(a) says. The clause then identifies a range of other partners, such as the Crown Prosecution Service, the Lord Chancellor in respect of courts, a Minister of the Crown in respect of functions relating to prisons and a youth offending team —effectively NOMS and probation.
It is arguable that a body might be under a duty to co-operate with such agencies of the criminal justice system but it strikes me as somewhat invidious for a single individual to have that relationship with bodies administering the courts and these other functions. Those powers are sensitive—extremely sensitive, it might be thought—and likely to promote some concern on the part of the public as to whether single individuals should be engaged at that level in such a co-operative enterprise. I should be grateful if the Minister could elucidate the thinking behind that provision. It seems somewhat dangerous to me. One might be more ready to accept the duty if it were that of a police authority, constituting more than one individual. If we do revert to that position, there are some concerns that need to be discussed.
I have a number of amendments in this group. Like other noble Lords, I found the draft of the memorandum of understanding that we have seen useful as a narrative but disappointing in that it seems hardly to tackle the difficult issues. It would be inappropriate for the memorandum of understanding simply to say in other words what the Bill, or Act as it will become, says. It must go further and deeper. There is a lot that could be cut out, but noble Lords are identifying a lot that needs to be covered.
Amendment 69AA, on the supplementary Marshalled List, provides for any protocol or memorandum of understanding to be one of the items that must be considered when the police and crime plan is reviewed. Clause 5 lists other items, but we should recognise that a document such as this will be in existence and should be acknowledged in statute. I appreciate that the Minister will want to talk about whether the protocol should have statutory force when she discusses that with other noble Lords.
Amendments 82 and 83 deal with Clause 10: “Co-operative working”. My simple proposal is that victims of crime and their representatives—I am thinking of various voluntary organisations—should be included among those who work co-operatively and should be brought in to the arena. Similarly, arrangements for obtaining the views of the community, covered by Clause 14, should include those who have been the victims of crime and those who support them, because their views should be obtained and made good use of.
Finally, the Local Government Association asked me to table Amendment 231 on community safety partnerships. The Bill transfers the Secretary of State's authority to commissioners. The amendment would delete the transfer so that authority would remain with the Home Secretary. Noble Lords might be surprised to hear me advocating the retention of a Home Secretary's power: it is not what I normally do. However, the LGA is concerned—and I share its concern—that the introduction of police and crime commissioners could undermine the partnership working that is in place, introduce ambiguity for community safety partnerships over the role of the commissioner and undermine the ability of the partnerships effectively to deliver results. The LGA warns of tension between the differing political mandates of commissioners and local authorities. I remind the House that it speaks on a cross-party basis. It says that to keep the authority over CSPs with the Home Secretary at national level and encourage close collaborative working at local level would be for the best.
My Lords, we are now moving into the territory of checks and balances, which, as some noble Lords have indicated, lies very much at the heart of the concerns expressed around the House at Second Reading.
Amendment 34A relates to the incidental powers of the proposed commissioner contained in paragraph 9 of Schedule 1, which declares that the,
“commissioner may do anything which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the exercise of the functions of commissioner”,
including,
“entering into contracts ... acquiring and disposing of property”,
and “borrowing money”. The amendment would require the police and crime commissioner, in exercising those powers, to consult the police and crime panel, which would have the right on a two-thirds majority vote to reject or amend the proposed exercise of those powers.
It was generally the view of your Lordships’ House that the checks and balances claimed for the Bill were more apparent than real. I believe that we must flesh out the functions of the police and crime panel to give it a real say—although not one which would be likely to be exercised because, as I have indicated, the amendment proposes a two-thirds majority as being requisite—in critical decisions of the very broad kind that the schedule gives the police and crime commissioner. In any event, it is surely reasonable for the commissioner to consult the panel on such important matters.
A second amendment in this group, Amendment 85A, concerns information. The Minister and others before her as the Bill has been debated have referred to the huge interest shown by people in consulting the crime statistics for their area and in doing so online. Very many people, including, as we have already heard, Members of your Lordships’ House, have done that. Of course, I do not think—although I stand to be corrected—that information about what they have been looking at is available. I suspect that most people will have looked at the statistics for their immediate locality. Based on my experience as a local councillor, to which I have referred more than once in this House, it is unlikely that people would look very much beyond their immediate locality. They would be very unlikely to look at the statistics for a whole area, and they would be least likely of all to look at the information at force level, although of course some people will do that. Therefore, it seems all the more necessary to consider the provision of information—and, indeed, to require the provision of information—at the appropriate levels.
For most people, the appropriate level will be the very local, or neighbourhood, level. The amendment suggests that such information should be provided at that level and that, in effect, the neighbourhood should be determined in conjunction with the local authority, which is in a very good position to ascertain reasonable measures of area and population. Above that, although I suspect that, again, fewer people will be interested in it, you need to have information at a divisional or basic command unit level—in London it will be the borough level. I think that we have two divisions in my city of Newcastle, although obviously in large county areas there may well be more. However, it seems appropriate to provide the information at that level for people who are interested in it and, finally, at force level.
It is fair to say that many police authorities now provide information online, in annual reports, at public meetings and at a very local level. Certainly in my experience—and the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, will confirm it from his perspective—Northumbria Police is very good at providing accessible, readable information at very local level, and that is to be commended. The amendment seeks to ensure that that takes place across the whole force.
My final amendment in this group, Amendment 123C, talks about the need for transparency and accountability in relation to the police commissioner—a matter to which many of your Lordships have referred. That goes to the heart of many of the concerns about the Bill. However, it is equally necessary for the police and crime panel to be transparent in its operations and to be accountable, and that is why the amendment proposes that meetings of the police and crime panel should be in public. That would accord with practice and we might hear more about it if and when we receive the Bill on NHS reform—for example, with regard to GP consortia, if they survive the current consultation. I think that there will be moves to ensure that they meet in public as well, which seems appropriate.
In addition, there is provision in Amendment 123C for a call-in procedure, which would effectively give police and crime panels the same rights as non-executive members in local authorities to call in decisions of the executive. I cannot see any reason why the same principle should not apply to both. It would not mean that that procedure would allow a decision to be overturned; it would require the person making the decision—in this case, the police and crime commissioner—to consider it and explain it, and to answer questions about it. It seems highly desirable that the mechanism provided for local government—whether it is a mayoral model or a leader and executive model—should also apply in the context of police authorities.
These three amendments by no means cover the entire ground of checks and balances—there will be many more; there are some on the Marshalled List today and there will no doubt be others as the Bill goes forward—but they represent the beginning of an attempt to strengthen the checks and balances applicable, whatever system we have. However, they will be particularly necessary if we revert to the concept of the elected police commission. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group and I shall give the numbers as I come to them. The noble Lord has, for the first time in our proceedings, raised the subject of the level of veto that should apply, reducing it from three-quarters to two-thirds. Depending on the size of the panel, that would make a difference of only one or two members—none the less, a significant difference. The normal world—perhaps I should not suggest that we are not operating with a degree of normality—would consider a decision taken by 50 per cent plus one to be adequate. I was a member of the London Assembly, which had the power, if two-thirds of us agreed, to block the mayor’s budget. I remember when the previous mayor, sitting in the public gallery, listened to the Assembly debate his budget. It was rejected by the Assembly but not quite by two-thirds and, from the public gallery, he shouted out “Agreed”. I think that at least one other Member of your Lordships’ House was there and there is another Member who may not be surprised at what happened on that occasion. It is very counterintuitive to have a veto applied by such a high proportion of the membership.
My Amendment 84 deals with information to be provided to the public under Clause 11 and suggests that not only should that be specified by the Secretary of State but that it is thought “necessary” by the police and crime panel. I do not know how one challenges the “necessary” or what is more generalised. I am suggesting widening it to,
“or required by the relevant … panel”.
Amendment 85 deals with what is necessary or required to assess the “performance”. I am deliberately dealing with these amendments quite fast. This amendment suggests that the,
“treatment of victims of crime”,
should be one of the factors assessed within “performance”.
Amendment 86 is about the contents of the annual report, and I have based this on the arrangements within the Greater London Authority applying to the mayor. It proposes that the annual report should include information which the relevant police and crime panel has notified the police and crime commissioner that it wishes to see included. This will not necessarily be contentious but it is part of the scrutiny process and part of the check on the commissioner. Amendment 88 would allow the police and crime commissioner to provide the panel with the information that it requests. Amendment 87 would limit the information that would be withheld on grounds of security and confidentiality by suggesting that it could be provided in an alternative form. Only if it could not be provided in an alternative form would it be limited.
I have a number of amendments to Clause 29 about requiring both the attendance of individuals at meetings of the panel and information. For the panel to do its job it is essential that it has the tools, and many of the tools are information. Some of that is best obtained by asking questions but sometimes one needs to have people at meetings to question them and to follow a line of questioning in public. I can anticipate that the Government might say that panel meetings should not be turned into some sort of circus, but occasionally that might happen because of the subject matter. Sometimes you find that a meeting has an item on the agenda that has become extremely topical, and people pour in and the press and media crowd round. I am not suggesting putting officers on trial in proposing that they could be required to attend meetings, but they may have information that is essential to the panel doing the job.