Baroness Northover
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, on behalf of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay. The age of 85 is indeed the new 65, as he clearly manifests. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, for his amendment.
Clause 20 enables the costs of collecting or pursuing unpaid fines to be recovered directly from the defaulting offender and ensures that there are strong incentives for offenders to pay fines promptly. Ultimately, collection costs, as the noble Lord has outlined, will be added directly to an offender’s fine if the offender fails to pay the fine to the agreed timetable and costs are occurred in pursuing payment.
Once a person has failed to pay their fine, much of the work that goes into pursuing that fine clearly involves labour intensive processes; for example, sending reminder letters, tracing offenders, validating offender information or arranging deductions from benefits or earnings. It cannot be right that a proportion of offenders do not pay their criminal fines in full or in a timely manner. This undermines the effectiveness of fines as a criminal punishment and costs millions of pounds per year to pursue. It cannot be right that the taxpayer should have to pick up the costs of pursuing unpaid fines from some.
We recognise that we must, of course, make allowances for the fact that some offenders lead chaotic lives and are vulnerable. Therefore, these costs will not apply to those who pay as ordered or who remain in contact with the court and comply with their payments plans which fines officers are more than willing to set up for those offenders struggling to pay their fine. This clause is aimed at those who deliberately evade payment.
We understand the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, in this matter. Clearly we must make allowances for the fact that some people find themselves in hardship and find it difficult to pay their debts. That does not mean that the courts ought to permit those convicted simply to ignore the sentence imposed on them. Fines are a criminal sentence and taxpayers should not be subsidising those who avoid payment for whatever reason. If a person is vulnerable or is having difficulty paying their financial penalty, this needs to be discussed with the fines officer.
Under the fines collection scheme, much of the work of managing the payment of fines is the responsibility of the fines officer. Fines officers can arrange more manageable payment terms with offenders who have not defaulted and provide a key link between the offender and the court to ensure that the fine is paid as ordered by the court. Fines officers can also provide advice to offenders to help them understand what has been ordered by the court and can explain the implications of default. This includes advice on where offenders can get help with managing their finances where that is needed.
Indeed, as my noble friend Lord McNally said at Second Reading,
“if the offender provides accurate means information at the outset of their engagement with the justice system and keeps to the payment plan set out by the court, enforcement action will not take place”.—[Official Report, 28/5/12; col. 1067.]
Hence, no additional cost will be incurred. We really cannot emphasise strongly enough the need for offenders, especially those considered to be vulnerable, to keep in continuous engagement with the fines officers. In addition, if on experiencing financial hardship a person wishes to appeal or to be referred back to the court, the court will have the discretion to remit part or all of the administration costs following consideration of all the issues.
In setting the level of fine, it is the judicial responsibility of the court itself to evaluate the circumstances and seriousness of the offence against the financial means of the offenders. Under Clause 20, it is proposed that the administrative costs will be fixed and proportionate to the actual costs of collection, and will be applied where there is default in payment after sentencing. It would not be appropriate to give the fines officer the ability to exercise a judicial discretion when setting the level of costs in the same way as is done for fines.
Following sentencing, where a person’s financial information has not been supplied or verified, fines officers and administrative staff set about trying to engage with the offender, gathering further information, such as whether the person is in receipt of benefits, and verifying the person’s income and other details. Fines officers can then assess the best approach to assist the offender and enable payment. Our aim in the future is significantly to improve the level of information that a court has in order to fix the fine at an appropriate level in the first instance. That is an important step in ensuring that fines are more manageable for those in hardship while remaining an effective punishment for committing a criminal offence.
Lord Touhig
Would I be right in thinking that, without any form of means test for the additional fine, it could be greater than the original fine?
Baroness Northover
In theory, I suppose that that could be the case. The important issue here is that the offender stays closely in touch with the fines officer. If an offender has a very small fine decided because of their circumstances, ways to pay that should be sorted out and the offender assisted in that regard. Only a very small fine would be overtaken by the cost of pursuing it, one would imagine. As I said, it is extremely important for the offender and the fines officer to work through the implications of the decision taken by the court.
Lord Touhig
My Lords, I must say that I am somewhat disappointed by the Minister’s response. I entirely agree—I said it at Second Reading and I have said it today—that people should be responsible for paying the debts that are due. If they are fined for an offence, they should be responsible for paying those debts. However, as the Minister said, people often live chaotic lifestyles. We think that it is right that the guidelines of a magistrates’ court make it clear that, although the fine should provide a degree of hardship, it should not leave people with an income on which they cannot survive. Surely we should protect children and the person’s ability to pay for food and housing. Those are three basic things: children, food and housing.
Baroness Northover
I remind the noble Lord that I said that, if offenders find themselves in the circumstances that he describes, they can go back to the court and the administration cost, too, can be varied or set aside. It is not as cast-iron or concrete as the noble Lord suggests.
Lord Touhig
I apologise. I accept the point that the noble Baroness made in her earlier response. The point I seek to make is that if we think that the guidelines to the magistrates should take account of those elements, surely it is right that any additional fine should take account of those elements. At the end of the day, because of the lifestyles of some people, some fines will never be paid. That is wrong, but they will not. The taxpayer will end up paying more if children are not properly cared for. Social services will be involved. Someone will lose a house and have to go into emergency accommodation. The Government are storing up a problem here which could be avoided by simply saying, yes, if a form of means testing is used to determine the initial fine, any additional fine should have the same application.
I regret that the Government do not see it that way. There is clearly much work that we must do as missionaries to persuade the Government, before the Bill passes, of the error of their ways. With those few remarks, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but give notice that I shall come back to it at a later stage.
Lord Beecham
This is a probing amendment dealing with the question of charging orders. Creditors may seek to obtain a charging order against the assets of a judgment debtor, including his or her home, and that can lead to an order for sale. In 2009-10, 566 such orders were obtained.
The Government have been consulting on a proposal to impose a financial threshold below which such action could not be taken in respect of unsecured debts, particularly in relation to consumer credit cases, where the debtor is in fact already paying a premium for the loan through higher interest rates affecting the risk to the creditor.
The whole process began with a report from Citizens Advice in 2009 called Out Of Order, which recommended just such a threshold and which led to the previous Government publishing a consultation paper in February 2010. That was followed in March 2010 by an OFT publication entitled Irresponsible Lending Guidance—in itself an admission of the seriousness of the problem. The key guidance called on creditors to make it clear that charging orders might be obtained which could lead to the sale of the property charged and therefore to the loss of the home at the time of the entry into the consumer credit agreement. It also, significantly, warned creditors not to harass or threaten debtors with the loss of the home if they did not in fact intend to enforce such an order. This, of course, underlines the fact that the problem is not just a financial one, but also encompasses the anxiety and stress caused to debtors and their families. As the evidence base for the recent consultation points out:
“In considering whether to make an order for sale, the court will balance, against the rights of the creditor to recover the debt, the rights of the debtor and his/her family in respect of the family home under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Right … in all cases judicial discretion will be exercised”.
While the latter point is true, it is unlikely to assuage debtors’ fears of losing the family home pending a hearing and a judicial determination.
At present, the information about the number of relevant cases is limited. It would be reasonable to infer that in the past two years numbers will have risen in light of the recession—the “Breadline Britain” so poignantly portrayed in the recent Guardian series. However, the figures rely on monthly returns from individual county courts, so again in the words of the evidence base, there is “scope for collection error” in the statistics, both as to the total numbers and whether they are ultimately enforced. There is still less information about the cost to the public purse of the consequences of people losing their homes—for example, through re-housing, temporary accommodation and children being taken into care.
Given the move to a single county court, will the Government consider establishing a more robust system for tracking the data and costing the outcomes, so that policymakers, and indeed the public, are given a clearer view of the dimension of the problems? The coalition agreement pledged action to deal with this problem and at page 12 of the Government’s programme for government promised, among other things, that they would,
“ban orders for sale on unsecured debts of less than £25,000”.
Unsurprisingly, the credit industry opposed the principle of a threshold, both when the idea was first floated in 2009-10 and during the recent consultation. In the event, it appears that the Government have substantially backtracked and have announced an intention to apply a threshold of only £1,000, so that charging orders and the threat of losing one’s home will remain for debts of that very modest amount or above. This is surely a major breach of the pledge in the coalition agreement. By definition, it threatens homeowners, not people in social housing or in receipt of housing benefit whom the Prime Minister and other Ministers, regretfully, are too often at pains to vilify. It is another example of a policy that will hit the working poor hard, just as some of the other changes will hit this group as hard or harder than the very small minority who abuse the system.
The Government have pointed out that creditors who are thwarted under a threshold scheme might resort to bankruptcy proceedings. I suppose that risk exists. If they did, however, at least they would not rank above other creditors who had not priced for the risk in the first place by charging a premium for the credit.
I hope that the Government will reconsider the level of the threshold. This amendment does not seek to prescribe a particular level, but rather to establish the principle and a requirement for parliamentary approval of any regulation establishing such a level. That is what the Delegated Powers Committee recommended in its second report; an affirmative resolution procedure for the establishment or alteration of a threshold level. It is clearly necessary for the threshold to be realistic and proportionate, and £1,000 patently does not meet those criteria. It would be interesting to learn from the Minister—perhaps not today because this is not, after all, her departmental concern—the rationale behind the Government’s abandonment of its pledge in the coalition agreement and its reduction of the threshold from £25,000 to the nugatory figure of £1,000. I beg to move.
Baroness Northover
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for bringing to the Committee’s attention the issue of charging orders. The power to prescribe the minimum amount above which a charging order may be imposed already exists, although it has not yet been implemented. That power is enshrined in Section 94 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which gives the Lord Chancellor the power to make regulations to provide that a charging order may not be made to secure a sum of money below a certain amount. While differently expressed from the noble Lord’s amendment, it will achieve the same end.
It should also be borne in mind that a charging order is only a means of securing a sum of money ordered to be paid under judgment and that it requires an order for sale of the charged property for ultimate enforcement. Section 94 of the 2007 Act includes a second power for the Lord Chancellor to provide that an order for sale may not be made to enforce payment of a sum below a certain amount.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I am engaged in a series of probing exercises today. Not being a dentist, it is not a familiar role. This amendment deals with the thorny question of bailiffs. Again, this is an area of law on which the Government have been engaged in consultation with a view to strengthening the system of debt collection and debt enforcement. They have come up with some proposals, but rather than deferring action until the next Session of Parliament, I would urge them to take the opportunity to bring forward those proposals for inclusion in this Bill. We will, after all, still be in Committee when the House returns after the summer Recess. If it were delayed beyond then, there may well not be time in this Session of Parliament to deal with this issue. Admittedly, the consultation has only just ended—I think it ended last month—but I suggest that it is not beyond the Government’s capacity to seek to deal with it by an addition to this Bill after the summer.
There has long been concern about the law covering debt enforcement by bailiffs, whether under county court judgments, under a warrant for execution or under the magistrates’ court, to collect fines, council tax arrears, compensation or maintenance in family cases, when acting on a distress warrant or liability order. In the High Court, High Court enforcement officers are employed to enforce writs of execution. The whole area is, in the Government’s view, “complex, unclear and confusing”, with a history stretching back centuries and sometimes with language to match. It is understandable that, as the Ministry of Justice stated in its consultation paper of February 2012:
“This confusion can result in bailiffs and enforcement officers misrepresenting their … authority”.
I must stress that the concern is not, essentially, over the actions of employees of the courts but over private bailiffs. There are unfortunately many cases in which bailiffs have acted in unacceptable ways and beyond their powers, and there is widespread concern about their charges, which the debtor must meet. I cite one example, which was quoted by the Zacchaeus 2000 Trust—again, chaired by the Reverend Paul Nicolson—in its briefing on what was the LASPO Bill. It cited the case of a firm of bailiffs that, without going through the necessary procedure, seized goods from a single mother with an 11 month-old baby and another young child. She was on benefits and suffered mental health problems. She owed £2,365—a substantial amount. The goods seized included a kettle and a toaster. The firm said that it was permissible to seize the kettle and toaster because the mother had a pot and a cooker.
There are worse cases than that. Last September, a bailiff called on a pregnant woman, saying that she owed £58 in council tax. She had received no communication about this. When she asked the bailiff to hold on while she got dressed and moved to close the door, the bailiff kicked the door in, injuring her leg and hip. When the police were notified and sought information from the bailiff’s firm, they were denied on the rather spurious grounds of data protection. There was another case in Wales in which a bailiff obtained a walking possession illegally, harassed a woman in the street in front of her friends and contacted her through a social networking website. As a final example, in south-east England a 19 year-old woman failed to pay a £118 fine for improper use of a child’s train ticket and, although she requested a payment plan, was visited by a bailiff who threatened to seize her mother’s goods—not her’s but her mother’s—if the bailiffs were not paid £418. He abused the young woman’s mother, threatened to remove her car and said that he could take anything in the house and break the door down to do it.
These are matters of great concern and, in fairness to the Government, they have acknowledged that there needs to be considerable improvement in the whole system. The previous Government sought to address some of these issues in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which was designed, inter alia, to improve the regulation and practices of bailiffs and change the way that debt collection and enforcement is carried out. Part 3 of that Act, which has yet to be implemented, would introduce a complete code setting out the bailiffs’ power of entry onto premises, what goods can be seized and sold, what fees can be charged and the whole process from the serving of notice to the distribution of sale proceeds.
One aspect of Part 3 of the 2007 Act would create a proper system for the independent regulation of bailiffs, which is at present sadly lacking. There is no nationally recognised qualification or standard of competence for bailiffs, who can merely be certificated by the county court in relation to certain types of debt enforcement, including road traffic debts, council tax and non-domestic rates. In addition, they need to be certificated to distrain for rent—although Part 3 of the 2007 Act, if and when it is implemented, would also limit that to cases of commercial properties and rents, rather than domestic rents.
The previous Government made some initial moves to improve matters by setting up an online register of certificated bailiffs—so that debtors could check whether the bailiffs were in fact recognised to that extent—a Criminal Records Bureau check for would-be bailiffs when applying for certification and some minimum training requirements. The present Government took matters forward in January, and I welcome that, by setting out the National Standards for Enforcement Agents to be adopted by councils and other authorities for use by those working for them. This is a voluntary code and requires, for example, that bailiffs refrain from using threatening behaviour or unlawful force to gain access to premises, or from discussing a debt with anyone except the debtor. They have to withdraw if only a child is present on gaining entry and have a duty of care to elderly, disabled or vulnerable people. So far as they go, those are useful measures and, to their credit, the Government seek to enshrine these principles and other measures in law, and to reply to the consultation that concluded in October.
However, it is critically important that the new regime includes rigorous criteria for the independent accreditation of bailiffs, backed by an effective regulatory regime with regular monitoring and an accessible complaints system. The courts and other statutory bodies must have a special responsibility both for staff they directly employ on enforcement and those with whom they contract. In my view, the Government are moving in the right direction but need to act to carry out the intentions of the 2007 Act and take them further, so that we can avoid the disgraceful behaviour of what are no doubt a minority of bailiffs, who were exemplified in the cases to which I have referred. I again urge the Government to clarify today what they have in mind, if they can, but certainly, if at all possible, to go beyond simply replying to the consultation in October by bringing forward amendments to this Bill so that the matter can be dealt with as part of this legislation and concluded in this Session. I beg to move.
Baroness Northover
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for explaining his thinking behind this amendment. He described what are, indeed, horrendous accounts. There have been debates over many years about this problem. Let me start by saying that we understand the concerns about bailiffs. The Government have given a commitment to providing more protection against aggressive bailiffs and are working to this end. I thank the noble Lord for his welcome for the progress that we have been making.
In January, the Government announced the updating of the National Standards for Enforcement Agents, with a view to defining acceptable behaviour for bailiffs. This was the first step in the Government’s plans to change the way that bailiffs are regulated and to make sure that they operate fairly to all concerned. Then, in February, we launched a public consultation which set out how we plan to provide more protection against aggressive bailiffs while still enabling effective enforcement. The package of proposals seeks to restore balance to the system; to improve clarity so that both debtors and creditors know where they stand; to strengthen protections for the vulnerable; and to ensure that individuals, business and government are able to collect the debts that they are owed.
Our aim is to respect the competing rights of both the creditor and the debtor. Unless there is prompt and effective enforcement, the authority of the courts and public confidence in the justice system are undermined. Creditors are entitled to collect what they are owed, while debtors should be protected from the kind of oppressive pursuit of their debt that the noble Lord has just described. This consultation set out a number of specific proposals, which, among other things, seek to: set out to whom and under what circumstances reasonable force to enter premises will be available; set out when and how a bailiff can enter a property; create minimum entry standards and certification processes to ensure bailiffs are fit to operate; prohibit the use of force against a person, with additional safeguards to protect children; make clear which items an enforcement agent may not take from someone’s home; make clear what fees bailiffs can charge for the range of debts that they collect for local government, courts and businesses; and remodel and clarify the complaints process available to the debtor. I hope that all of those proposals would address the noble Lord’s points.
The consultation, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, acknowledges, closed only recently on 14 May and we are now carefully considering the responses, with a view to publishing our response in the autumn. This has therefore been a timely debate and we will certainly take account of the noble Lord’s views. I will make sure that what he has just said is fed into the MoJ.
Like the noble Lord, the Government are clear that aggressive bailiff activity is unacceptable. We are committed to bringing forward effective proposals in due course to protect the public and ensure that bailiff activity is proportionate. I hope that, with those assurances, and having had the opportunity to raise this important issue, which we fully recognise, the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw his amendment and await the Government’s proposals later in the year.
Lord Beecham
I thank the Minister for her very full reply. I am certainly prepared to withdraw the amendment. Can she give me an indication as to whether the Government will at least consider using the Bill as a vehicle for the welcome changes that she suggests will follow? I would have thought it feasible to do that, given that we will not have completed Committee by the time we return. When we return, we will have further work to do on the Bill as it stands and since there is likely to be very broad support across the House for the changes that she proposes, it would not be too difficult to add these matters to the Bill. I do not ask for a firm commitment but for an indication that the Government will at least consider doing that.
Baroness Northover
As an extremely junior member of the Government, that would be going way beyond what I am allowed to do, but the important thing is not to pre-empt consideration of the consultation. The noble Lord may assume as to what may emerge from people’s responses to that consultation, but it is appropriate for Government to give due consideration to what comes in, and we will make proposals in due course.
Lord Borrie
My Lords, after hearing my noble friend Lord Beecham on my own Front Bench and the spokesman from the Liberal Democrat Benches, I was a little anxious that we were going to be extremely restrictive on this opening-up of the courts to television, radio, et cetera. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has redressed the balance by putting an emphasis on what I might call “open justice”. The phrase, “Justice must be seen to be done” is not just one we trot out when dealing with matters of significance, in terms of enabling the public to know the arguments for this or that, it is a meaningful phrase that has its origins in the reality that people used to attend courts, especially the local magistrates’ courts, in great numbers. I remind your Lordships that in the 19th century, and to some extent the 20th century, newspapers, especially local newspapers, used to have journalists on tap who would report at great length—pages and pages—on the evidence, arguments and judgments given in the magistrates’ courts. That was the way in which the public could assess what was going on in their name in the courts of justice in this country.
As a matter of fact, sadly or otherwise, nowadays journalists on local newspapers very rarely go to magistrates’ courts and do that job that used to be done by their predecessors. It follows that people today know less about what goes on in their local courts than was the case, and the Government’s proposal in Clause 22 redresses the matter. I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and found myself nodding as he said that we do not want such television performances as that of the Norwegian defendant in the case to which the noble Lord referred. The defendant was skilfully using the fact of being in court to retail political and other propaganda, for the benefit not of the justice system being better understood but of the kind of extreme views that he held.
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, indicated, it should be possible to broadcast lawyers and judges arguing legal matters or otherwise, or judges sentencing when a trial comes to an end. As the Government are making a relatively new and welcome advance in these matters, we should not be too restrictive. That does not mean I necessarily disagree with my noble friend Lord Beecham on the matter of detail to which he referred, but I had the feeling he might be a little too restrictive—or cautious, it might be sufficient to say—and preferred the open approach of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
Baroness Northover
My Lords, as we have heard, the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, and my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Thomas of Gresford seek to clarify, in their different ways, the circumstances in which court broadcasting is to be permitted. There are also a number of government amendments in this group, which I will explain.
The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is right that this is about promoting understanding of our judicial system, as happens in various other countries, and I welcome what he and the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Borrie, said about the Government being on the right lines. We recognise the risks outlined by my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Thomas of Gresford. We have considered this very carefully and I am sure the implementation of these changes will be carefully monitored by all. We have heard from both sides in this argument—from what the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, described as “open justice” to concerns that coverage should not have negative consequences.
Clause 22 will allow the Lord Chancellor, with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice, to lift the ban on filming in courts in certain circumstances and set out the limitations surrounding those. The provisions build on the successful broadcasting of the proceedings of the Supreme Court. The Government initially plan to use the order-making power in this clause to allow the broadcasting of judgments and advocates’ arguments in cases before the Criminal and Civil Divisions of the Court of Appeal. Cases in the Court of Appeal normally deal with complex issues of law or evidence, and victims and witnesses rarely appear in order to provide new evidence. Given the complexity of legal issues in Court of Appeal cases, we believe that allowing advocates’ arguments to be filmed in addition to judgments would be more likely to improve public understanding than filming judgments alone. Over a longer period, we expect to allow broadcasting from the Crown Court, but to limit it to the judge’s sentencing remarks after the conclusion of the trial. We believe that this will help to increase the public’s understanding of sentencing, with low risk to the proper administration of justice.
Lord Beecham
We are addressing these issues in wonderfully archaic language. The “scandalisation” of judges; the “murmuring” of judges in Scotland, which puts me in mind of the murmuration of starlings—it is, apparently, the collective noun for starlings—and here we are in this High Court of Parliament considering this arcane offence.
Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, I deprecate the tendency of politicians of all political colours and Ministers of different Governments publicly to criticise judges when decisions have gone against them. I also deprecate the tendency of the tabloid press in particular to denounce the judiciary for perceived leniency, or whatever it might be, from time to time. However, as other Members of the Committee have made clear, that does not justify applying a criminal offence and criminal sanctions to those who are critical, rightly or wrongly, of what the judiciary has done.
Scandalising the judiciary has not always been the province of politicians or the media. One of the most frequent scandalisers of the judiciary was that eminent Conservative lawyer and Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, known as FE Smith. He frequently clashed with judges. On one occasion the judge, in an irritated spasm, inquired, “Mr Smith, what do you think I am here for?”, to which he replied, “My Lord, it is not for me to question the inscrutable workings of providence”. That came as near as anything to scandalising that particular judge. I do not think it was Mr Justice Darling, whose reputation has been adequately canvassed tonight.
We certainly support this amendment. It is clearly timely to dispose of the revival of a procedure that is quite antiquated and unnecessary. I hope that the Government will accept the amendment.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
My Lords, every so often this House produces a little nugget of a debate that is extremely important and that will bear further reading and study. I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions, and to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for his murmuring of starlings.
Lord McNally
Murmuration. We learn something new every day in this House. I also thank him for another good FE Smith story.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, introduced the amendment with his usual eloquence and well-structured argument, marred only by a terrible joke about Fifty Shades of Grey, but at least yet another book was plugged in this debate. We have all been rushing to eBay to get the remaining copies of Borrie on defamation, which will be worth getting; and of course Peter Hain’s memoirs, as has been rightly pointed out, have been given far greater coverage than I recall their getting when they were published.
Nevertheless, what has been discussed is extremely important. I very much welcome the contribution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell. As a judge in Northern Ireland, he and his fellow judges were so important in upholding the rule of law in the most difficult of circumstances, and in so doing he not only has our admiration but we are all in his debt for his courage and consistency. For him to say that he thought that the law was not necessary weighs heavily in making any judgment. I also share the views of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, about getting the balance right between politicians and judges.
I understand what the Prime Minister meant when he spoke in the other place about there always being a little bit of rough and tumble between the two in the modern age. I think I have said at the Dispatch Box that a little bit of dynamic tension between politicians and the judiciary in a democracy does not go amiss. The warning from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, is correct, and he will not be surprised to know that the present Lord Chancellor—I cannot speak for the present Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General—has not been slow to remind exasperated Ministers that it does not help to start opining on this. The balance of contributions was right that it will happen occasionally, but if it became too much of a free-for-all it would genuinely undermine public confidence in the judiciary and in the workings of our legal system. The warnings are well made.