Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Lord Beecham Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dear]

I understand that we are debating an issue of uniformity, which has to be a good thing. I do not think that anyone will be surprised if I remind the Committee that nearly all the organisations mentioned are either controlled by or commercially responsible to either Her Majesty’s Government or to commercial concerns.

I wish to draw attention to the Central Motorway Policing Group, which is in the list. I set up that group in the late 1980s. It was then, and remains, a collaborative agreement between four police forces: the West Midlands, which is at the heart of the ring around the West Midlands conurbation, with substantial stretches in Staffordshire, West Mercia and a small section in Warwickshire. It covers the M5, M6, M40, M42 and the M6 toll road. It is a collaborative agreement in which the constituent chief constables take an interest but it does not fit usefully into that list. Those proposing the amendment, assuming things are not changed, might consider withdrawing it from the list.

[Lord Beecham]

I rise to speak briefly to Amendment 83A. The clause requires the elected police commissioner to co-operate with a variety of partners in the criminal justice system. One might think that it might be overegging the pudding to require that he should co-operate with,

“the chief officer of police for that police area”,

but that is what Clause 10(4)(a) says. The clause then identifies a range of other partners, such as the Crown Prosecution Service, the Lord Chancellor in respect of courts, a Minister of the Crown in respect of functions relating to prisons and a youth offending team —effectively NOMS and probation.

It is arguable that a body might be under a duty to co-operate with such agencies of the criminal justice system but it strikes me as somewhat invidious for a single individual to have that relationship with bodies administering the courts and these other functions. Those powers are sensitive—extremely sensitive, it might be thought—and likely to promote some concern on the part of the public as to whether single individuals should be engaged at that level in such a co-operative enterprise. I should be grateful if the Minister could elucidate the thinking behind that provision. It seems somewhat dangerous to me. One might be more ready to accept the duty if it were that of a police authority, constituting more than one individual. If we do revert to that position, there are some concerns that need to be discussed.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I have a number of amendments in this group. Like other noble Lords, I found the draft of the memorandum of understanding that we have seen useful as a narrative but disappointing in that it seems hardly to tackle the difficult issues. It would be inappropriate for the memorandum of understanding simply to say in other words what the Bill, or Act as it will become, says. It must go further and deeper. There is a lot that could be cut out, but noble Lords are identifying a lot that needs to be covered.

Amendment 69AA, on the supplementary Marshalled List, provides for any protocol or memorandum of understanding to be one of the items that must be considered when the police and crime plan is reviewed. Clause 5 lists other items, but we should recognise that a document such as this will be in existence and should be acknowledged in statute. I appreciate that the Minister will want to talk about whether the protocol should have statutory force when she discusses that with other noble Lords.

Amendments 82 and 83 deal with Clause 10: “Co-operative working”. My simple proposal is that victims of crime and their representatives—I am thinking of various voluntary organisations—should be included among those who work co-operatively and should be brought in to the arena. Similarly, arrangements for obtaining the views of the community, covered by Clause 14, should include those who have been the victims of crime and those who support them, because their views should be obtained and made good use of.

Finally, the Local Government Association asked me to table Amendment 231 on community safety partnerships. The Bill transfers the Secretary of State's authority to commissioners. The amendment would delete the transfer so that authority would remain with the Home Secretary. Noble Lords might be surprised to hear me advocating the retention of a Home Secretary's power: it is not what I normally do. However, the LGA is concerned—and I share its concern—that the introduction of police and crime commissioners could undermine the partnership working that is in place, introduce ambiguity for community safety partnerships over the role of the commissioner and undermine the ability of the partnerships effectively to deliver results. The LGA warns of tension between the differing political mandates of commissioners and local authorities. I remind the House that it speaks on a cross-party basis. It says that to keep the authority over CSPs with the Home Secretary at national level and encourage close collaborative working at local level would be for the best.

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[Baroness Browning]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for raising the potential implications of the protocol or memorandum of understanding for the non-geographic police forces within England and Wales. Of course, the Bill does not change the governance structures of these bodies. With the exception of the Serious Organised Crime Agency, they are not answerable to the Home Secretary, who is to issue the protocol. The protocol will not vary the interaction between the Home Office and non-geographical forces. That is why in the Bill we have safeguarded the direction and control of chief officers. Through that, their operational interaction with, for example, the British Transport Police and others remains unaffected.

There are also questions about how the protocol, as it is currently conceived, would apply to these bodies, which differ from the geographical police forces significantly in terms of their functions. The Committee has touched on some of these this evening. The governance arrangements and relationship with the public, although overlapping, are often quite different. However, I appreciate that at least some of those forces may benefit from such a protocol being in place. I genuinely welcome further discussion on the merits of widening the protocol's scope.

However, this has not been the immediate focus of the protocol as drafted and we would be keen to discuss that further, including of course detailed discussions with the bodies concerned. I reiterate that Members of the Committee who have expressed an interest in the protocol as currently drafted will receive an invitation to discuss it in more detail with me. Those letters should go out in the next 24 hours. I hope that after the recess we can have a more detailed discussion about that protocol.

The Government expect police and crime commissioners, community safety partnerships and other criminal justice bodies to co-operate in order to deliver the best service to local communities across the force area. Their priority should be tackling crime and disorder for the benefit of the local people. Therefore, they should work together to overcome any particular issues. Clause 10 sets out in legislation a reciprocal duty to co-operate for police and crime commissioners and authorities comprising community safety partnerships. It also requires police and crime commissioners and other criminal justice agencies within their force area such as the probation, prison and court services to make local arrangements to work effectively together.

We want to establish a framework that enables commissioners to develop strong relationships with these key local partners. Those relationships will be critical to commissioners in order to make the most sustainable impact on crime and community safety. The clause sets the foundations for that framework and we expect commissioners and local partners to build on that through strategic engagement and dialogue. They will work together to provide the most effective and efficient response to the needs of their local communities. It is important to see Clause 10 in the context of other measures to advance joint working in the Bill, such as grant-making powers, provisions to elevate crime and disorder strategies to a force-wide level and to commission reports to examine any element of those strategies.

The noble Baroness, Lady Henig, asked specifically about payment by results. I hope that she will find it agreeable for me to write to her on that issue. I know that she focused on Clause 10.

I do not think it necessary to further labour the duty with a memorandum of understanding which has the potential to become burdensome on the professional and experienced services that certain amendments within this group are seeking to bind in law. We have agreed a way forward with the protocol and I hope that noble Lords will avail themselves of making their views on specific issues known to me. However, I want to keep that light touch because there is a danger if too much detail is set into the protocol it will become a burden. That is not what we want it to do.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, was concerned that an individual would carry the power and responsibility. But I gently remind the noble Lord that if they are elected by the public, that person, whatever badge they had when they stood for election, would have had to present themselves to the public and convince them that they were able to do the job. They would have to carry out those important functions not just in an honourable way but in a competent way. Therefore, they would have to gain the trust of the public.

This is often the cause of debate. We say that we trust the public, but do we really? I do and I believe that our democratic process is such that if we give the public an opportunity to elect somebody to an important and responsible role such as this—as we do in other areas of our democratic process—we should trust them. The police and crime commissioners will of course have the scrutiny of the panel behind them which will hold them to account and who will be an important check and balance on the way in which they carry out their duties.

[Lord Beecham]

Does the Minister not see that, in all the partnerships that arise, there will be only one person—the elected police commissioner—who stands alone? In no other case will he be engaged with a single individual. He will be dealing with a properly constituted body, whether that is the Lord Chancellor's Department—he will not have a direct relationship with the Lord Chancellor—the Prison Service, the National Offender Management Service or the youth offending teams.

We will have a situation where an individual, elected as the noble Baroness said, deals effectively with a number of corporate bodies. Does that relationship not look odd constitutionally? My noble friend Lord Harris pointed that out. Is there not a danger that, with their having been invested with that elected authority, there may be a temptation, which may be difficult to resist, for an unprecedented—in our system—degree of pressure on other parts of the criminal justice system?

[Baroness Browning]

The Mayor of London might well be described as having similar power as constituted already and already elected. I was not aware at the time that that was an argument brought forward to oppose the powers of the Mayor of London. I do not know whether I am reading the noble Lord correctly. I understand why he is concerned but he has not yet persuaded me. I am sorry to tell him that.

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Moved by

[Lord Beecham]

31B: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Deputy police and crime commissioners
(1) There is to be a deputy police and crime commissioner (“the deputy commissioner”) for each police area listed in Schedule 1 to the Police Act 1996 (police areas outside London).
(2) The name of the deputy commissioner for a police area is “the Deputy Police and Crime Commissioner for” with the addition of the name of the police area.
(3) The deputy commissioner shall be appointed by the police and crime commissioner for the area from among those members of the police and crime panel for the police area who are properly appointed as members of the panel.
(4) The deputy commissioner shall have—
(a) such functions that are performed by the police and crime commissioner for that police area, where the police and crime commissioner is unable or unavailable to perform them in accordance with this Act;(b) such other functions that are conferred by this Act or any other enactment.(5) A person must not hold the office of deputy commissioner and chair the police and crime panel at the same time.
(6) If the police and crime commissioner appoints as deputy commissioner the person who chairs the police and crime panel, the person shall resign as chair of the police and crime panel.
(7) Subsections (5) and (6) apply in relation to the deputy chair of the police and crime panel (if there is one) as they apply in relation to the chair of the police and crime panel.
(8) A person shall cease to be the deputy commissioner if—
(a) that person ceases to be a police and crime panel member;(b) that person, at any time, gives notice of resignation as the deputy commissioner to the police and crime commissioner’s chief executive; or(c) the police and crime commissioner at any time gives notice terminating his or her appointment as deputy commissioner.(9) A person who ceases to be deputy commissioner shall be eligible for reappointment.”

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, the amendments in my name in this group relate to the situation in which a vacancy arises in the position of police and crime commissioner, which, for the purposes of this debate only, we will assume might eventually emerge as enshrined in the legislation.

Such a vacancy could arise in a number of ways. It could arise because of incapacity or because of the resignation or death of a police and crime commissioner; it could also arise if the police and crime panel suspended the commissioner under Clause 30 of the Bill. Incidentally, the police and crime panel does not have to suspend the commissioner if he is charged with an offence carrying a maximum prison sentence of more than two years—that is an issue to which your Lordships might wish to revert later, as it seems rather odd that there is such discretion—but, be that as it may, the situation could arise under which a commissioner is suspended, and the period of the vacancy could be quite considerable. In the event of death or resignation, there would have to be an election of a successor within 35 days, which is a tolerably short period of time, unless the vacancy arises within six months before the due date for an election, in which case the vacancy would last for six months. However, I assume that, if there is a suspension, the vacancy could last for a considerably longer period, because the suspension would lapse if the charge was withdrawn or if the commissioner was acquitted, but that process could take many months.

The extraordinary position arises under this Bill that the vacancy would be filled by a member of staff appointed by the police and crime panel. That is the procedure under Clause 62. It is quite remarkable that, presumably, any member of staff would be eligible to be appointed by the police and crime panel for that purpose. That is the opposite of the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government’s desire to combine the position of elected mayors with that of the chief executive; this is the other way round, as an officer would in effect become the police and crime commissioner. It is as if Caligula, in appointing a horse as his consul, had to appoint a police horse. It is quite a remarkable concept and is, really, entirely unsatisfactory.

My amendments, therefore, seek to create the position of a deputy commissioner, who would be chosen from the police and crime panel—it could not be the chairman but it could be another member. Under these amendments, the deputy commissioner would in effect have the powers of the police and crime commissioner whose position had been vacated permanently or temporarily. Otherwise, under the Bill as it stands, the position would be exercised by a paid officer. Curiously, the Bill provides that in the event of incapacity, the incapacitated police commissioner’s views should be sought about which member of his staff, appointed by him in the first instance, would be appointed. That is again a rather curious concept—that somebody incapacitated for one reason or another should designate a successor in that way. Given the nature of the duties that would fall on an acting commissioner, which is the Bill’s phrase, it seems inappropriate for that position to be held by someone appointed in the manner currently prescribed by the Bill. It would be much better if it were a member of the police authority; the amendment provides for it to be a councillor member of the police authority—that is to say, somebody with a democratic mandate. That seems appropriate, particularly given that the period during which the deputy served could be many months. Obviously, he could have a whole range of duties including quite possibly determining the precept, bringing forward the crime plan, and so on.

This is not in any way a destructive amendment, but one which I hope the Government will consider carefully, because the proposal before the House is in my recollection quite unprecedented to be made in the way that the Bill prescribes. It certainly does not engender confidence that accountability would be served. So I hope that the Minister will look sympathetically at a way of improving the provision in order to cover those occasions when a vacancy might arise.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

Yes, we accept that and it is something which we will have to consider further and discuss with noble Lords who wish to pursue the issue. Nevertheless, we are concerned about blurring the relationship between the panel and the commissioner. We have conceded that the panel should make the temporary appointment, as the most suitable single body for an event that might arise from a multitude of different causes, but the principle of the Bill is that there should be a definite dynamic which depends on direct election and a high public profile. I am reminded that the Bill states that six months is the maximum for an assistant commissioner and that there would then be a by-election.

[Lord Beecham]

Surely that would not be the case, would it, in the event of a suspension? The suspension could clearly last for more than six months in the circumstances to which I referred—for example, a trial on a charge carrying a sentence of more than two years’ imprisonment.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I thank the noble Lord for that intervention. We may agree that appointing or electing the deputy commissioner at the outset may well not be necessary or desirable, but we will look at what happens if there is a long-term suspension. There are precedents with directly elected mayors and others that we will want to look at. We will reflect on this and discuss it off the Floor and, on that basis, I ask if the noble Lord would care to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

I withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 31B withdrawn.

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[Baroness Browning]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, but a thought has just occurred to me. There is always the danger with salaries, particularly with someone who is elected, that a Dutch auction ensues of who will do it for least. We want to get value for money in setting the salaries, but we want the salary to be fair. With elected positions, there is a danger in how the candidate might canvass the electorate in trying to bid themselves down. That will give an advantage to people with a lot of personal wealth or a lot of money behind their campaign. I think that the Home Secretary, with SSRB recommendations, is a much more stand-apart arrangement and would mean that we would not go down that route.

[Lord Beecham]

Does the noble Baroness’s statement that we should trust the electorate to choose not extend to their capacity to distinguish the cases to which she referred?

[Baroness Browning]

The noble Lord is quite right to chide me. In fact, as I was saying it, I remembered my words to him earlier; they were ringing in the back of my mind. This is not about the electorate; this is about the motivations of the candidate who is not as worthy as we would like to apply for these positions. If the salary has been set by a body such as the SSRB, through the Home Secretary, it is complete and divorced from anything that a candidate might say in seeking to put themselves forward or any questions a candidate may be asked during their selection.

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Moved by

[Lord Beecham]

34A: Schedule 1, page 107, line 44, at end insert —
“( ) The police and crime commissioner must exercise these powers in consultation with the police and crime panel.
( ) The police and crime panel may amend or reject the police and crime commissioner’s decisions to use these powers if the panel agrees to do so by a two-thirds majority.”

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, we are now moving into the territory of checks and balances, which, as some noble Lords have indicated, lies very much at the heart of the concerns expressed around the House at Second Reading.

Amendment 34A relates to the incidental powers of the proposed commissioner contained in paragraph 9 of Schedule 1, which declares that the,

“commissioner may do anything which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the exercise of the functions of commissioner”,

including,

“entering into contracts ... acquiring and disposing of property”,

and “borrowing money”. The amendment would require the police and crime commissioner, in exercising those powers, to consult the police and crime panel, which would have the right on a two-thirds majority vote to reject or amend the proposed exercise of those powers.

It was generally the view of your Lordships’ House that the checks and balances claimed for the Bill were more apparent than real. I believe that we must flesh out the functions of the police and crime panel to give it a real say—although not one which would be likely to be exercised because, as I have indicated, the amendment proposes a two-thirds majority as being requisite—in critical decisions of the very broad kind that the schedule gives the police and crime commissioner. In any event, it is surely reasonable for the commissioner to consult the panel on such important matters.

A second amendment in this group, Amendment 85A, concerns information. The Minister and others before her as the Bill has been debated have referred to the huge interest shown by people in consulting the crime statistics for their area and in doing so online. Very many people, including, as we have already heard, Members of your Lordships’ House, have done that. Of course, I do not think—although I stand to be corrected—that information about what they have been looking at is available. I suspect that most people will have looked at the statistics for their immediate locality. Based on my experience as a local councillor, to which I have referred more than once in this House, it is unlikely that people would look very much beyond their immediate locality. They would be very unlikely to look at the statistics for a whole area, and they would be least likely of all to look at the information at force level, although of course some people will do that. Therefore, it seems all the more necessary to consider the provision of information—and, indeed, to require the provision of information—at the appropriate levels.

For most people, the appropriate level will be the very local, or neighbourhood, level. The amendment suggests that such information should be provided at that level and that, in effect, the neighbourhood should be determined in conjunction with the local authority, which is in a very good position to ascertain reasonable measures of area and population. Above that, although I suspect that, again, fewer people will be interested in it, you need to have information at a divisional or basic command unit level—in London it will be the borough level. I think that we have two divisions in my city of Newcastle, although obviously in large county areas there may well be more. However, it seems appropriate to provide the information at that level for people who are interested in it and, finally, at force level.

It is fair to say that many police authorities now provide information online, in annual reports, at public meetings and at a very local level. Certainly in my experience—and the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, will confirm it from his perspective—Northumbria Police is very good at providing accessible, readable information at very local level, and that is to be commended. The amendment seeks to ensure that that takes place across the whole force.

My final amendment in this group, Amendment 123C, talks about the need for transparency and accountability in relation to the police commissioner—a matter to which many of your Lordships have referred. That goes to the heart of many of the concerns about the Bill. However, it is equally necessary for the police and crime panel to be transparent in its operations and to be accountable, and that is why the amendment proposes that meetings of the police and crime panel should be in public. That would accord with practice and we might hear more about it if and when we receive the Bill on NHS reform—for example, with regard to GP consortia, if they survive the current consultation. I think that there will be moves to ensure that they meet in public as well, which seems appropriate.

In addition, there is provision in Amendment 123C for a call-in procedure, which would effectively give police and crime panels the same rights as non-executive members in local authorities to call in decisions of the executive. I cannot see any reason why the same principle should not apply to both. It would not mean that that procedure would allow a decision to be overturned; it would require the person making the decision—in this case, the police and crime commissioner—to consider it and explain it, and to answer questions about it. It seems highly desirable that the mechanism provided for local government—whether it is a mayoral model or a leader and executive model—should also apply in the context of police authorities.

These three amendments by no means cover the entire ground of checks and balances—there will be many more; there are some on the Marshalled List today and there will no doubt be others as the Bill goes forward—but they represent the beginning of an attempt to strengthen the checks and balances applicable, whatever system we have. However, they will be particularly necessary if we revert to the concept of the elected police commission. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group and I shall give the numbers as I come to them. The noble Lord has, for the first time in our proceedings, raised the subject of the level of veto that should apply, reducing it from three-quarters to two-thirds. Depending on the size of the panel, that would make a difference of only one or two members—none the less, a significant difference. The normal world—perhaps I should not suggest that we are not operating with a degree of normality—would consider a decision taken by 50 per cent plus one to be adequate. I was a member of the London Assembly, which had the power, if two-thirds of us agreed, to block the mayor’s budget. I remember when the previous mayor, sitting in the public gallery, listened to the Assembly debate his budget. It was rejected by the Assembly but not quite by two-thirds and, from the public gallery, he shouted out “Agreed”. I think that at least one other Member of your Lordships’ House was there and there is another Member who may not be surprised at what happened on that occasion. It is very counterintuitive to have a veto applied by such a high proportion of the membership.

My Amendment 84 deals with information to be provided to the public under Clause 11 and suggests that not only should that be specified by the Secretary of State but that it is thought “necessary” by the police and crime panel. I do not know how one challenges the “necessary” or what is more generalised. I am suggesting widening it to,

“or required by the relevant … panel”.

Amendment 85 deals with what is necessary or required to assess the “performance”. I am deliberately dealing with these amendments quite fast. This amendment suggests that the,

“treatment of victims of crime”,

should be one of the factors assessed within “performance”.

Amendment 86 is about the contents of the annual report, and I have based this on the arrangements within the Greater London Authority applying to the mayor. It proposes that the annual report should include information which the relevant police and crime panel has notified the police and crime commissioner that it wishes to see included. This will not necessarily be contentious but it is part of the scrutiny process and part of the check on the commissioner. Amendment 88 would allow the police and crime commissioner to provide the panel with the information that it requests. Amendment 87 would limit the information that would be withheld on grounds of security and confidentiality by suggesting that it could be provided in an alternative form. Only if it could not be provided in an alternative form would it be limited.

I have a number of amendments to Clause 29 about requiring both the attendance of individuals at meetings of the panel and information. For the panel to do its job it is essential that it has the tools, and many of the tools are information. Some of that is best obtained by asking questions but sometimes one needs to have people at meetings to question them and to follow a line of questioning in public. I can anticipate that the Government might say that panel meetings should not be turned into some sort of circus, but occasionally that might happen because of the subject matter. Sometimes you find that a meeting has an item on the agenda that has become extremely topical, and people pour in and the press and media crowd round. I am not suggesting putting officers on trial in proposing that they could be required to attend meetings, but they may have information that is essential to the panel doing the job.

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[Lord Beecham]

I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 34A withdrawn.