(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful for that. Forgive me, again, if I have called anybody names. That has not been my intention. This is difficult terrain. The path of human rights does not run smooth and there are all sorts of difficult issues to be dealt with. There are some people beyond this Committee and your Lordships’ House who seek to set people against each other. The focus of this legislation, and your Lordships’ focus in this Committee, should be to ensure the safety of vulnerable people in prison, whatever sex they were born and whatever sex they now identify as. I was trying to suggest that that is not just about biology. It is also to do with criminality, profile, attitude and so on. I believe we have too many people in prison and that we therefore have too many women in prison.
I would defend academic freedom and debate, by the way. Forgive me if I have not been seen to do so. I believe that my record on free speech matters is decent enough. I urge noble Lords to send a signal to the wider world that, in this place at least, we can disagree well and focus on protecting all vulnerable people in prison.
My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission. As most noble Lords will know, we are the body charged with protecting the protected characteristic of sex as well as that of gender reassignment and the fundamentally important human right of freedom of expression. All those things have been discussed today relatively calmly, on the whole. On debating well, I start from first principles and say that we should never try to close down debate—and yes, we should debate well.
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra, Lord Morrow and Lord Farmer, and the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, for proposing this amendment, which basically seeks to ensure that female prisoners are protected from harm. This is a complex area, where the rights of trans women prisoners to have their legal sex recognised has to be balanced with those of female prisoners, who may be fearful of attack, if they know that a dangerous sex offender with male anatomy is housed with them, for example. The important point is that, when you are incarcerated and do not have the liberty to leave a place of danger, the state’s duty to look after you is profound. You do not have the choices that other people have.
The noble Lords and noble Baroness have proposed that prisoners with a gender recognition certificate who are suspected or convicted of a “violent or sexual offence” are treated
“by reference to the sex registered at their birth.”
I understand the intent behind this amendment, which is essentially to secure the safety of natal women. However, it raises some issues that require further thought—for example, the risk of violence towards trans women prisoners housed in a male prison as well as to trans men in a female prison. I urge noble Lords not to frame this serious and complex issue either in a numbers game—are there very few or not so few?—or in what may or may not be our personal outlook, if we find ourselves in that position. The law is frequently a straitjacket, and it is not sufficiently malleable to accommodate the complexity of identities around us.
At the heart of this issue is the need to protect female prisoners and ensure that they have access to single-sex spaces, including bathrooms, sleeping accommodation and other areas that they need. Violent and sexual offenders are a threat to their fellow inmates, regardless of their sex or gender identity. Cases of assault sadly already happen in single-sex prisons. However, in the case of trans prisoners who may be violent or who may have committed crimes involving sexual assault, it is right that we now need to give additional thought to how they are housed. As it stands, the law stands calls for these decisions to be made on a case-by-case basis. While this will be right in many situations, it may also raise the question of how female prisoners can have confidence in their ability to safely access spaces such as toilets within the prison, precisely because they cannot know the outcome of a case-by-case assessment, as opposed to the generality of a law that exists for them. Further thought needs to be given to the facilities provided to trans people and whether provision can be expanded for trans people that ensures that all sides of that debate can be safe and secure within the prison estate.
A further problem with the amendment is that, oddly, it is too narrow and does not capture the issue of trans men or trans women who do not have a gender recognition certificate but, nevertheless, self-identify in the gender and can therefore apply and be granted a place in the relevant prison estate. I do not think the noble Lords who put down the amendment intended for it to be quite so narrow—certainly their speeches do not reflect the narrowness of the written words. These are not straightforward issues, and it is right that we properly consider the balance of rights of different prisoners. I do not believe that the amendment gets that balance right, but it does ask serious and important questions that need to be addressed in law.
If the Minister is minded to pursue these arguments through Report, I ask that he give extremely serious consideration to the importance of getting the balance of rights correct and ensuring that all prisoners have the duty of the state to safeguard them upheld as we go forward.
My Lords, I had not intended to speak, but I would like to support what the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, has just said. There are two groups of people who need support. I agree with her that the well-intentioned amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, does not actually meet the problem. These two groups are the women who are women at birth and remain women, and those who were men at birth and become women. Both groups, even in prison, need respect for who they are and what has happened to them. I do not think that the prison system is well adapted at the moment to deal with trans women, and the Minister needs to think with some care whether rather more should be done to help that group of women.
However, the help for that group of women should not be at the expense—I venture into dangerous ground —of those who remain women. This is an extremely tricky area, and we know from areas outside the prison system just how tricky is it. I do not envy the Minister or the Ministry of Justice the situation in which they find themselves because this did not exist—as far as we knew—even 10 or 20 years ago but, my goodness me, it exists now. There are two groups, both of whom need not only respect, but understanding and care, even within a prison.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I am chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, but I make it clear that I speak in a personal capacity.
I and the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, set up something called the Coexistence Trust some dozen years ago to combat anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment at universities, and I deeply regret that the curse of this is still ongoing. However, I am afraid that I do not support the call for an IHRA definition: it is extremely poorly worded and probably unactionable in law. The noble Lord, Lord Pickles, has just said that it is not meant to be legally enforceable. It directly conflicts with the duty on universities to protect free speech. But there is a further danger in this: when universities adopt this definition, the pressure on them increases also to adopt the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Islamophobia’s extremely badly worded definition of Islamophobia. The end route, if we go down this road, is that there is no space left where students may learn to disagree with each other respectfully, something that I am sure no noble Lord would want.
(8 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I should declare that I am a co-owner of a property in the eurozone area and that I am married to a citizen from another EU member country whose right to remain in the UK could theoretically be affected by Britain leaving the European Union.
It has been a pleasure to work under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, and the committee has been extremely well served by its chairman and its secretariat through the inquiries and its scrutiny work. For my part, as chairman of the sub-committee responsible for economic and financial affairs, I will confine my remarks to those areas where additional safeguards have been obtained in economic governance.
I turn to the new settlement for the UK. It is an extraordinary settlement when viewed from other EU capitals. One has only to talk to the delegations from the 27 other countries to see how special this new status the UK has secured is in their eyes. We are not in the eurozone or in Schengen. We have chosen our opt-outs in justice and home affairs and we now have safeguards on the impact of eurozone integration, on welfare, on sovereignty and on further integration. The other EU countries are rather envious that we can dine à la carte while they are stuck with the set menu.
This renegotiation has also been dismissed for lacking legal force, as our chairman pointed out. In the committee’s view, the terms of the new settlement have the same legal force as any other intergovernmental treaty under international law, so those who rubbish the legal status of the renegotiation need to explain to the public why any other treaty has legal force if they believe that this one does not. Why should the public believe that our international obligations under the UN charter hold, or indeed under the WTO, in which the Brexiteers have such faith as the basis of a new trading relationship—oblivious, of course, to the fact that the WTO does not cover services or financial services trade? That is such an important and vital aspect of the UK’s relationship with the EU and the rest of the world. So the question they need to answer is why their new trade deal would have any legal basis if this renegotiation does not. Moreover, the renegotiation specifically states at Article 7 of the section on economic governance that the provisions under Section A will be incorporated into EU law the next time treaty change takes place.
On the details of economic governance, the UK and my committee had concerns that eurozone integration would disadvantage sterling. In Section A of the new settlement the UK has ensured that there can be no discrimination against those who do not use the euro and that our interests are protected. There was concern that eurozone caucusing might leave us outside the room, so to speak, when decisions are taken by the eurogroup. That, too, has been addressed and we have secured safeguards not only for ourselves but for the other eight countries currently outside the eurozone. We also have the additional safeguard mechanism whereby, if we feel that Section A has not being upheld, we can escalate our concern to the European Council, which, if our argument has merit, is required to,
“do all in its power to reach … a satisfactory solution”,
within a “reasonable time”.
I have been bemused by Vote Leave’s obsession with the Five Presidents’ Report. This, for the uninitiated in the Chamber, is a paper published last year by the leaders of the five EU institutions. The sub-committee I chair has conducted an inquiry into this and we published our report only last month. We say, in terms, that the ambitions of the five presidents apply mainly to the eurozone. Where they do not, such as recommending national competitiveness boards, they are voluntary. The Five Presidents’ Report is actually notable for saying so little. We commented on that in our report. We criticised it on the institutional direction and political structures needed for the eurozone to proceed to be successful. It is a very thin statement of good intentions. The conspiracy theorists in Vote Leave need to be pressed as to where they find all that they claim indicates the direction of European monetary integration—it is pure fiction.
I turn to the process of withdrawal, as the framework proposed by Vote Leave today sets out, and on which the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, has commented. We are led to believe from what one is tempted to call the presumptive Government—pace the Republican nominee; both have rather similar traits—that they will not need to use Article 50. Presumably they will take their time until 2020 to finalise the exit, including their new trade deal.
As noble Lords have heard, the legal experts consulted by the committee told us that Article 50 provided the only means of withdrawing that was consistent with the UK’s obligations under international law. If the UK unilaterally decided to start putting Bills through Parliament to disentangle ourselves—and, of course, this assumes that Parliament would be prepared to break its own treaty obligations in a very significant way, demonstrating to the world that it does not live by its word—the same UK, assuming Parliament were prepared to do this, would then seek to sign a whole lot of other treaties with the rest of the world, including the 27 other EU states, having spectacularly broken its word. What a non-display of bona fides this would represent.
So those who seek to disregard law while they sit in a law-making body need to bear one thought in mind. Trust is at such a low ebb in British political life, but the British public still expect their country to uphold the rule of law. That is the foundation of our democracy. This is a nation that values integrity, and if it finds that it has sleepwalked into a self-made disaster it will be a very long time indeed before it will permit itself to be led in that way again by that group of individuals.
(9 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 27. I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, that this group of amendments and the consequences of leaving or staying in are among the most important that we shall debate in this House. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, has moved an amendment asking the Government to report on the possible consequences to the UK if we vote to leave. I believe it is equally important that we have an assessment of the likely consequences if we vote to stay in. Some might ask how one can report on that when one has no idea what the EU might agree to in a future treaty. That is true, but only to a certain extent. There is a track record here; the EU has a bit of form on this. It is not as if we have not been here before on numerous occasions.
In 1989 we had the Delors report, calling for full European integration. It was pooh-poohed by the UK Government and press as something that was never going to happen, but that ignored the inexorable drive to ever-closer union—though that was not the terminology then—that led to the Maastricht treaty. We got qualified majority voting and the start of interference in justice and home affairs measures, as well as a host of other unexpected consequences. Of course, the British people were given no say in a referendum. So we got the Delors report, warts and all.
About 10 years later, we had the Valéry Giscard d’Estaing grand report, the draft treaty establishing a constitution for Europe. This, again, was pooh-poohed by EU supporters as not being a radical change, and nothing to worry about. If I recall, the UK Government and press condemned it and said that it should not and would not happen. It was vetoed by France and then the EU did what it always does; it reintroduced it in slightly different clothes as the Lisbon treaty. Some 95% of the EU superstate constitution proposed by d’Estaing was incorporated into the Lisbon treaty and the name was changed from “constitution” in order to deceive the electors of Europe. Once again, the British electorate were given no say.
The point I am trying to make with these two examples is that that there is a track record of the EU taking ever more power from national Governments and vesting it in the Commission. Now we come to the core of my amendments, based on the five presidents’ report, published in June or July this year. If we say to the British people, “Look at this report; this is what you can expect if we stay in”, the response of the BSE campaign will be that it is just some vague suggestions; it may not happen and if it does, it will be years away and will apply only to the eurozone members in any case. In other words, these are the same lines we were spun about the Delors report and the d’Estaing report, but a few years later they became binding treaties.
The noble Lord might not know that this House’s EU financial affairs sub-committee is looking into the five presidents’ report. He might like to see the conclusions of that before he draws these conclusions here.
I thank the noble Baroness. I would be delighted to see the conclusions of any of our august Select Committees. I was privileged to serve under the notable chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, for a while, but I am afraid that the conclusions that this House may draw as to what will happen to the five presidents’ report may not accord with the opinion of the five presidents—Jean-Claude Juncker, Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi and Martin Schulz. I am sure that the noble Baroness will show her conclusions to them; I only hope that they will pay some attention to some of them. My amendment does ask the Government to look at the five presidents’ report. My worry is that it is not a question of if some day it will happen but of when it will happen, because that is the track record of previous reports.
A key objective is EU representation on the IMF in place of nation states. Theoretically, the UK, not being part of the eurozone, would keep its seat and independent voice, but that is not the case. We might still have our seat but we would have to sing the EU tune. Under Article 34(2) of the Treaty of European Union, member states are required to,
“concert and keep the other Member States and the High Representative fully informed ... defend the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter. When the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council shall”—
I thought it might continue with “obey”, but it is not quite that—
“request that the High Representative be invited to present the Union’s position”.
That is the position on the United Nations Security Council, where our independent voice now has to be somewhat muted to comply with the EU position. Exactly the same would apply to the IMF.
I thank the noble Lord for his support. We need a factual analysis of a whole range of things. However, I merely suggest to the Committee that if the Government are tempted to accept the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, or a similar one, on producing a report on the consequences of leaving the EU—some of that would be speculative, as I have attempted to suggest—we also need a report on the consequences of staying in. In many ways that would be equally speculative, although no more so than the outcome of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay. Therefore, we must have the Government’s analysis of the consequences for the UK if that decline in the European economy continues.
The five presidents’ report envisages competitiveness authorities taking over wage and work conditions. I will not quote from the Commission press release of 21 October, but it talks about deepening the EMU, getting social fairness and paying greater attention to new macroeconomic adjustment programmes, as it did in Greece. We all know that worked very well. Therefore, we need the Government’s view on that aspect of the report.
The report goes on to say that we need adequate access to,
“adequate education and … an effective social protection system … in place to protect the most vulnerable in society, including a ‘social protection floor’”.
I therefore suggest that we need a UK government analysis of the consequences of those proposals when they are incorporated into a treaty. It is no good for the BSE campaigners to say that they will apply to eurozone countries only. The Commission will use the excuse, justification and treaty base of the single market, as it usually does, to make them apply to us, and we will not be able to stop it since the eurozone countries will have an in-built majority.
I declare that I am currently chairing the inquiry into the five presidents’ report, which I mentioned. The noble Lord is misrepresenting the black ink on white paper in that report. They are national competitiveness authorities for the eurozone; they do not apply to the eurozone-outs. However, I will give the noble Lord a broader point: he is asking the Government to produce their assessment of this. The Government will respond to the Select Committee’s report—it is just a matter of time. His amendment is more or less redundant, given the information I have just laid before the Committee.
The Government will respond to the Select Committee’s report, but that is different from an analysis of what the situation would be in this country if it were to take place. There may be similarities in the report we would make, but we still need that analysis of staying in the European Union.
I am almost concluded, noble Lords will be pleased to hear; at least I have provoked a bit of controversy in this debate. The five presidents’ report also talks about harmonising insolvency law, company law and property rights. We need an analysis of the dangers of that point.
In his speech two weeks ago, the Governor of the Bank of England noted that being in the EU had benefited us in the past. However, in the referendum we will be voting not on the EU’s past record but on what it will do for us in the future. What was most interesting in Mr Carney’s speech was the clear warning over further eurozone integration and its impact on the UK economy. He noted that the five presidents’ report states that there is “unfinished business” over further fiscal and financial integration in the euro area. The Bank’s report cautioned that the “necessary deepening” of integration, coupled with the,
“weight of … the members of the single currency”,
would impair the ability of the Bank to,
“meet its financial stability objective”.
I trust that the noble Baroness will question the Governor of the Bank of England on that statement in the Bank’s report. I look forward to reading the analysis.
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too wish to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I see this part of the Bill as being one of those ideas which starts with good intent but has risks attached to it: it is the law of unintended consequences. I can understand that those who have looked at the appointment of senior judiciary and have seen the absence of women, for example, have thought that perhaps if somebody—the Lord Chancellor—were sitting on that panel, he would be able to represent more vociferously public concerns about the way in which appointments are recreating the same people. I can see that that was the intention of giving a role to the Lord Chancellor in the current appointment procedures.
However, we must be very conscious of the risks. We should be concerned about the way in which this could be detrimental to our constitutional arrangements and could be the beginning of a much more politicised role for the Secretary of State as Lord Chancellor sitting on such committees. I say this because, regarding the slide to such things, we always say, “Oh, it could not happen here”. I have just heard the decision made in Europe today that the new judge to be appointed to the European Court of Human Rights will not be the preferred candidate coming forward from Britain. The person appointed was pushed by the Conservatives in Europe and supported by Russia and Serbia. The best candidate, Ben Emmerson, one of our most distinguished human rights lawyers, did not get that role because of politicking of the ugliest kind. He was considered to be too protective of human rights.
We should be ashamed of what has happened in that appointment process and we should be aware of what happens when politics enters the fray in judicial appointments and how it can often lead to unsatisfactory outcomes. I raise this as a warning because it happens all too easily. The best candidate has been lost to the European Court of Human Rights and it has happened because of an ugly form of politicking.
My Lords, I fear that I will be in a minority of one, which is always a rather brave position, but it is important to put another perspective. That is what the House of Lords is very good at, so I rise to put that other perspective.
The Government’s position is essentially about whether the so-called nuclear option is the way forward or, as I would put it, whether the power to reject after the process, or influence, is the right way forward. I should have declared at the outset that I, too, am a member of the Constitution Committee, but I was not a member when its most excellent report on judicial appointments came out earlier this year.
I note the Constitution Committee’s recommendations in this regard. It states that the Lord Chancellor’s inclusion on a selection commission risks politicising the process, an argument which we have heard today. I draw noble Lords’ attention to the text of that report, which shows that the committee’s witnesses were in two camps; it was not a straightforward matter even at the time. There were those who thought that the current system was the only way to preserve the independence of the judiciary and there were those who believed that the political angle was invariably part of the greater balance of considerations. Among those who felt that the Lord Chancellor should have an increased role were Lord Justice Goldring, Jack Straw MP, a former Lord Chancellor, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale.
Even when resisting greater involvement, the Constitution Committee states at paragraph 25 of its report that it is important to maintain the connection between Parliament, the Executive and the judiciary partly so that,
“the government cannot entirely wash their hands of what is happening”—
I believe that those were the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf—
“and partly to enable the Lord Chancellor better to defend the judges from attack by taking responsibility for the system which appointed them”,
which I believe were the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. The issue then is the extent to which the independence of the senior judiciary will be compromised if the Lord Chancellor sits as a non-chairing, non-voting member of the selection commission. We are talking of two instances only. We are talking of the positions of the President of the Supreme Court and the Lord Chief Justice.
Six years to evaluate the current system is a very short time—I am talking about the six years since the Constitutional Reform Act—but, in the longer term, a given Lord Chancellor may wish to exercise the right to reject or ask for reconsideration of a nomination. We also need to remember, in that context, that this Lord Chancellor, whoever he or she may be, will get only one name coming forward. He will not have a choice of three candidates, hierarchically or non-hierarchically ordered, and make a judgment as to which of those two or three might be the best candidate. He will have the very stark choice indeed of exercising the nuclear option—rejection—and I suggest that, as things stand under the Constitutional Reform Act, it would be virtually impossible to exercise that nuclear option. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, himself explained to the House that you have to give your reasons in writing for doing so.
To describe the question of rejection or reconsideration as “the nuclear option” is not really appropriate because it is part of the process. I would use the word influence. In fact, the Lord Chancellor has the opportunity to discuss the process, is consulted at appropriate times during the process and is able to give a view of the kind of person he or she would like. So it is not right to call it a nuclear option. He has the opportunity to be involved and have a say in the process.
I am afraid that, unusually, I have to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar. It is widely referred to as a nuclear option—we could call it the veto, perhaps, but it is very well known that it is a veto and a very final kind of veto, in that not only does one exercise the veto—if one chooses to do so—but one has to give reasons in writing for arriving at that decision. It is a very tough position to take. The pool from which the candidate would be drawn is so small and so intimately known to one another—the judges of the Supreme Court, for example—that a rejection would be known and would, indeed, indicate a significant level of political interference. It would inevitably get out that a veto had been exercised and people would draw their own inferences as to what had happened. I suggest that that would indicate a huge level of political interference. It would probably leak to the media; there would be wide speculation in and around the legal profession. It would truly be seen, I am afraid, as a nuclear option.
The reality of this provision is that it gives power to several other entities, but not to the individual who is, in the words of the Constitution Committee report, at paragraph 26, responsible and,
“accountable to Parliament for the overall appointments process”.
Taking up what the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, said, as I understand it this is not just a question of a name going to a Lord Chancellor who has no idea what has gone on before. If there was to be the slightest doubt that this candidate was not suitable, there would have been enormous discussions at a much earlier stage. It is almost inconceivable that somebody would go forward who was known to have reasons for not being acceptable and unless those reasons are such that the Lord Chancellor felt that he could say that, they ought to have been known already.
This does not work in isolation; the judges and the Lord Chancellor discuss a large number of matters extremely carefully over quite a long time. There is no isolation of the Lord Chancellor and his team from the senior judiciary and the appointments commission which is discussing this. I think that the noble Baroness is assuming that the Lord Chancellor is in an ivory tower, not knowing anything until the name comes to him. That is not the position.
I say to the noble and learned Baroness that if that non-transparent process that she describes, which sounds like the old game of clubbing together to fix it all up, is indeed accurate, there should be no reason for the amendment. In that case, if it is all so chummy, why not have the Lord Chancellor sit on the panel?
The power to veto seems to contradict Section 3(6)(a) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which places a statutory duty on the Lord Chancellor to defend the independence of the judiciary. Not for the first time, one part of an Act—the duty to defend the independence of the judiciary—sits uneasily with the process as defined. Moreover, the process requires the Lord Chancellor to put his reasons in writing. I have already commented on that. It would be far better in increasing transparency and enhancing accountability for the Lord Chancellor to be a member of the selection commission —listening, participating and evaluating the candidate being questioned, without a veto over the appointment—than, after the fact, disagreeing with the selection commission.
In conclusion, I touch on the point made that either a very powerful Lord Chancellor would sit on the commission panel and influence it to go in the direction that he wanted; or, if the Government got their way, that the Lord Chancellor, having sat on the selection panel, could not persuade the panel of his views on an individual candidate and would be deeply dissatisfied because he did not carry the selection panel with him.
I argue that his potential for dissatisfaction would be greater if he had not exercised the veto and was therefore stuck with someone he found it difficult to work with. In fact, it could be said that he would take greater responsibility for working with a candidate with whom he did not entirely agree if he were on the selection panel and had been overruled. He would have been part of the decision-making, he would have been there and heard the argument why the majority of the commission wanted to go in a certain direction and would therefore have to suck it and see. On that basis, I have a lot of sympathy with the Government on the amendment.
My Lords, going back some 25 years, I remember being warned in 1987: “You realise, don’t you, that Mrs Thatcher has never appointed anybody as a High Court judge who has been overtly political?”. I was about to stand for the 1987 election. I stood; I lost for the eighth time; but that did not dissuade me. My point is that then, how the system worked was completely opaque. You did not know what recommendations were being made. You did not know when you had scored a black mark. I recall a close colleague once seeing his file in the Lord Chancellor’s Department, which said in terms that he had fought and lost eight elections as a Liberal candidate—he was so close a colleague that he had been mixed up with me. I am sure that that held him back for a long time from obtaining the appointment that he ultimately did.
I was slightly shocked to hear that we still have a non-transparent system whereby the Lord Chancellor is consulted and becomes involved in the appointment of judges, although there is nothing formal about it. I did not know that. It is opaque. The Bill makes it absolutely transparent that the Lord Chancellor will play a part, and I think it is very good that he should. He should listen to other people who are high in the profession and to what a lay person thinks of a particular appointment. His view may change. I do not think that the Lord Chancellor would necessarily dominate such a selection committee, certainly not if he has a political angle. There may be a toing and froing of views within that committee but we will know that it is happening because he is on it. Consequently it will be a far more satisfactory system than what we have heard is happening now: the Lord Chancellor, without it being in any statute, is involved in some way. That is wrong and I think that the Bill is preferable.
That is absolutely not what I said; that is a mischaracterisation entirely. I said that if a Lord Chancellor exercised a veto and rejected a candidate and, as he would have to, gave his reasons for doing so in writing, given that it is such a small and intimate community, not only would everyone else know that this had happened but inevitably it would leak into the legal papers. That is what I was saying. I was not saying that the transparency would come from the leak but that huge damage would be done by that happening.
As I understand it, the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, is saying that gossip would be the way that transparency would come. No? Explain again.
Forgive me. I am describing what could potentially happen; I am not saying that that would be transparent. All I am trying to say is that very few vetoes are exercised. There are vetoes in other positions as well—the Prime Minister has the power of veto over several other appointments, for example—but apparently they are seldom used; I could find the figures for the noble and learned Lord. I think that one of the reasons why they are so infrequently used is the damage that it might do if it got out that they had been used.
I think that there is a misunderstanding here. As I understand it, the noble Baroness is saying that when the veto is used it is kept secret. It is not, so there is no question of gossip. The Lord Chancellor is willing to use that veto where appropriate. I have no problem with that and it does not cause difficulty. In the proposed system, there would be no transparency about the role that the political Minister had played; indeed, it would be assumed that he or she was the person who had dominated the process. It would profoundly undermine the settlement. At the moment, I can see no benefit from it. I have not had the pleasure and privilege of reading the letter that was sent to the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar. I have heard the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, which was very persuasive in many respects. However, I am unable at the moment to see the basis for departing from a constitutional settlement that is intended to ensure the sanctity of the process. It is an independent process in which one is judged on one’s merits, and it keeps politics out of it except for the exercise of a transparent veto.
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am very cognisant of the difficulties that might be involved in those scenarios, but has it never happened in the Supreme Court, or in its predecessor court, that a judge in the middle of a trial got ill for an extended period of time? I suggest that both the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf and Lord Carswell, are framing this debate in terms of part-time far too narrowly. There is far greater flexibility in the reality of part-time working than the noble Lord suggests.
Perhaps I might develop the point as I come to it. I have no experience myself of a judge taking ill and being unable to carry on, but I do not think that that really assists the argument.
It also applies—and I say this from my own observation—at trial court level, where it is most obvious. It is a significant factor in appellate courts. No doubt in the Supreme Court many cases are quite short—two days, sometimes even less—but there are many cases, and the most important and significant cases tend to be somewhat longer. If a part-time judge is unable to sit on these for practical reasons, and cannot pull his or her weight, then that judge is downgraded in the eyes of other people to being a second-string member of the court. That is no good for anybody.
Secondly, on the practical level a part-time judge would normally need some fixity of schedule, so that the rest of the judge’s life can be arranged. That is why a person is likely to want to be a part-time judge on, let us say, Monday and Tuesday of each week. The timetable would have to be juggled to ensure that the judge is able to sit on those regular days. Obviously difficulties would arise if for various reasons an appeal needs to be listed on the other days of the week, and of course that happens, in fitting in the appeals for which that judge’s particular skills are required.
It is not as easy as turning up on fixed days and taking cases on those days. I fear that it is bound to lead to a feeling that part-time judges are not pulling their weight. This is highly detrimental to collegiality, which is of prime importance on an appellate bench. It may be viewed—however unfairly—by others that that judge is not a proper member of the court. The judge may also feel, subjectively, concern that she is not fully accepted as a full member. That, although it may not be exactly the feeling held by the others, would undermine the judicial confidence which is so necessary for high-class judicial work.
It is important that we try to find ways of accommodating this problem and of using the talents of able women, of which I am very strongly in favour myself. It is important that we can work out a way of not confining them to the junior ranks where it is easier in practice for them to carry out their functions part-time.
A suggestion has been mooted by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that one could do that by stages, for a woman. If she has family responsibilities at an earlier part of the time when she is ready for judicial life, then she could be appointed to a lower-tier court, with a clear assurance that when family circumstances change and she would be available for full-time work, she would receive proper and serious consideration for early promotion to the higher levels, and that that assurance should be fully honoured by those who are making the appointments. Paragraph 2 was a well intentioned attempt to facilitate women or other people by extending part-time appointments, but I fear that it did so in the wrong way.
My Lords, I apologise for not having spoken at Second Reading. I am sorry that the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, is not in her place. She would have appreciated that I was probably not able to speak at that stage of the Bill because I am a 50-something mother of an adolescent child who, in her words, was probably too busy supervising the child’s exam-taking. For the purpose of declaring an interest, I should also say that I am a member of the Constitution Committee, but I was not involved in the report on judicial appointments. However, I was involved in the Constitution Committee’s report on this Bill.
I want to pick up a few points that have been made. As I have already said, the framing of the debate is rather narrow. The past hour or so has involved a discussion of women serving as judges of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal. I want to inject a little pluralism into the debate about diversity by suggesting that there are other groups that are also affected by this: all the protected groups, people with disabilities, people from lesbian, gay and transgender backgrounds, but, particularly, people from ethnic minorities.
I think it was implied at some point in the debate that the clauses for flexible working would probably not be taken up by black and minority-ethnic community people, particularly men from that community, because at the age at which these jobs would be open to them, they would have no use for them. As a woman from that community, I have made it my life’s mission to ensure that men from black and minority-ethnic communities take caring responsibilities for their children and their parents—in other words, be new men—and I do not intend to give up now. I do not see why that category of men or women would not be better served by provisions for flexible working. I would not distinguish them, and I would certainly not set them apart from women who might, or might not, have children.
I think it was also implied that the Supreme Court has a heavy responsibility for maintaining the high reputation that the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords built up over decades—probably centuries—and whose decisions were treated with the greatest respect. I completely agree with noble and learned Lords and noble Lords who have spoken in this debate that that is the case. I did quite a lot of work on the Latimer House principles for the Commonwealth which involved agreeing a balance on the principles of accountability and the separation of powers between the judiciary, the Executive and the legislature. It is absolutely true that the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is held in extraordinary esteem certainly by 54 Commonwealth countries and beyond those shores, but I do not accept the implication of the debate that, because it is held in such high esteem and such great respect, if it were to move to a more flexible pattern of working, let us say, with the inclusion of perhaps more women or more ethnic minorities, that would inevitably diminish the quality and standard of the judgments it handed down.
It was also implied that this was gesture politics and that there would be no realistic possibility of any candidate capable of being so appointed to be able to do it or even want to do it. My answer to the critics of these proposals is that that may well be true. I have no evidence to show that it might work either way. But we know that the past has not delivered the diversity that we want, so perhaps changing this may well do so. Let us try it and see.
It is said that full-time judges would be left in a position where they would be trying the heavier cases—in other words that they would have a disproportionate burden put upon them by those who had a need occasionally to work flexibly, and that colleagues would resent this. Before I came into this House I worked in senior positions where successive employers granted me flexible working conditions in pretty full-on jobs. Most people who work flexible hours—there is evidence for this and I will get it for Report stage as I did not know the debate would go this way—tend to overcompensate for the fact that they are putting a burden on others and they therefore tend to work longer hours, be it on a Saturday or Sunday at home or elsewhere, in order not to allow an illusion to develop that they are not pulling their weight.
We have been debating in this House and will debate in the future options for increasing the targets of women serving on boards in the corporate world. As the noble Baronesses, Lady Neuberger and Lady Jay of Paddington, said, in the medical profession we have ample evidence of how difficult it was to convince people of this change, how well it works, and so on. In all other senior positions diversity has been found to add to decision-making and, if not positively to add to it, certainly to create a more plural set of inputs into decision-making. So it is extraordinary that for one category of professionals, some of the most esteemed professionals in the land, there is a question about having a change to slightly more flexible working. That does not mean, as many noble Lords have inferred, that the subject individual would say “I will not work on Mondays and Tuesdays, irrespective of what comes my way”. That is not the meaning of flexible working and that is not the meaning of part-time working either, if we are being pedantic about words in the Bill. The meaning of part-time or flexible working is that people recognise or say openly to their employer that they will be occasionally needing flexibility in terms of their personal arrangements and will be taking that flexibility from time to time. The people who make it into those positions are usually dedicated to fulfilling the task that they are appointed to do in the best manner that they are capable of. That is the basis on which this clause should be debated.
My Lords, I will be brief because I do not intend to divide the Committee. I am grateful to the Minister for his reply.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jay, was quite right to refer to the Lord Chief Justice’s evidence to her Constitution Committee. However, the point he was surely making was that there is already a great deal of flexibility in the High Court. That point was also made by the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, during my speech. Indeed, it was made very recently by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. For example, if a judge is unable to go on circuit for family reasons or any other reason, he or she will of course stay in London and other arrangements will be made. That is already happening in the High Court. I say “he or she” because flexibility applies to both sexes; it applies to men as it applies to women. The thought seems to have been that somehow flexibility will help only women. That is not the case; it helps men also.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, also made a strong point on the importance of flexibility—as did the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger. The truth is that we are all in favour of greater flexibility, just as we are all in favour of greater diversity. However, greater flexibility does not require the appointment of part-time judges. That is what this debate is not about. It is about whether part-time judges should be appointed not in order to give greater flexibility but to solve the never-ending problem of diversity—how to get more women into the higher courts. When the Minister said in his reply that flexibility and diversity for men and women were all one thing, he missed the whole point of this part of the Bill, which is intended to increase the number of women in the higher courts. All that I can say is that it will do no such thing.
I greatly appreciate the noble and learned Lord giving way. I again ask him to clarify whether he accepts that diversity encompasses more than just gender. It encompasses several strands, including disability, sexual orientation, ethnic minorities and so on. The Bill nowhere states that it is intended only to increase the number of women. It speaks in terms of diversity.
I could not agree more; of course we are not talking about women but about, above all in this context, black and ethnic minority judges, as I made clear when moving the amendment. As the noble Baroness made clear, we are also talking about other forms of minority, including people with disabilities, for example. However, the whole thrust of this part of the Bill is intended, as one can see from the history, to get more women, as well as ethnic minority judges, into the High Court.
I will not say any more about those who have supported the amendment, except to emphasise the extremely effective point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell, made regarding the collegiality of the Supreme Court. I certainly had a sense of that when I was in the Supreme Court, and I also felt it throughout my time in the Court of Appeal, although one obviously does not have that sense as a High Court judge. We were all members of one court. I do not think anyone can tell what the effect of the appointment of part-time judges will be on that essential concept of collegiality in both those courts.
I should mention the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. He was unable to imagine a woman who would be willing to accept part-time appointment to the House of Lords but not full-time appointment. The question comes back to this: if that is the case, the purpose of this part of the Bill is not to cure the problem of diversity. Instead, the purpose is to send out what the noble and learned Lord called a signal; a gesture. I am opposed to gesture legislation, which is what this amounts to. It will not make any difference in practice. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord made a slight mistake. He did not beg to move; we can just carry on debating the amendments in this group.
My Lords, I will comment briefly on this point. In his closing remarks the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, asked an interesting question that is posed frequently: where there is a tie-break, as I would refer to it, what should be done if there are two candidates of supposedly equal merit, one of whom is a woman and the other, for example, is from an ethic minority? I note that the report of the Constitution Committee gives a lot of assistance in how we should define merit but makes the point that, certainly in large-scale selection processes, there could conceivably be candidates who end up in a tie-break: in other words, who are assessed to be of equal merit.
It would be quite straightforward to apply the test in those circumstances. You would look to see which group is more underrepresented than the other group and, in the case where there are two from underrepresented groups, appoint the one that was not to be found there. That would be fairly straightforward. With more senior appointments, it is entirely conceivable that it would be much clearer. We have heard that there is one female and no ethnic minority member of the current Supreme Court. In that case, it would be fairly straightforward, if the candidates were tied and came out equally in an assessment, you would go for the ethnic minority candidate. Although you would want to increase the gender diversity, on such an occasion, you would need to increase the diversity overall.
I also make the point to the noble and learned Lord that blatantly nobody is seeking to have the senior judiciary reflect the people they serve, because the people they serve on the whole are there, particularly in criminal cases, because they have done wrong. Nobody is suggesting that. However, the Constitution Committee’s report makes clear, as do a lot of other reports, that in senior positions in life it is terribly important for an inclusive society to have people who are representative of different strands of society as a whole. I rest my case there.
My Lords, I will just make one rather straightforward point. I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, said in relation to the previous amendment that he felt that this was simply gesture politics and somehow the phrase that we used in our report, which the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, has now repeated, about sending out “a strong signal” by adopting this part of the Equality Act was simply inappropriate in legislative terms. I only say that the experience that we heard, particularly from abroad, about the way in which change had been brought about in judicial systems in other countries—I would cite particularly Canada—was that it came from very strong leadership from the top. That may be either in practical terms or, quite importantly, in terms of what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, if I may say so, refers to, in a slightly deprecating way, as gestures but which I regard as importantly symbolic of a change of attitude at the top. In these terms, that means both ministerial and judicial and therefore conveys what I hope would be a change that would percolate down through the system.
Will the Minister bear in mind that it is very important that there is someone who can speak on behalf of the judiciary in Parliament? One of the changes that took place in consequence of the Constitutional Reform Act was that the right of the Lord Chief Justice, which had existed hitherto, to speak to Parliament on behalf of the judiciary on matters that affected the administration of justice went and we have this business of putting in a statement. That illustrates that the Lord Chancellor will be the spokesman who has to take parliamentary responsibility for the appointment of all judges. We know that sometimes it is very tempting for a Minister or even a very senior Minister to refer to unelected judges. It causes the judiciary grave offence that that should be said because judges may not be elected but they are appointed in accordance with the process laid down by Parliament and by Members of Parliament who, certainly in the other place, are elected. That responsibility means that Parliament is a place where in regard to these matters somebody has to be answerable. We do not want to see the Lord Chancellor no longer having responsibility for these appointments.
I have agreed with almost every word that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, has said this afternoon but I am now surprised at his explanation for why he wishes to move these amendments with respect to what I think he implied was an abrogation of responsibility by the Lord Chancellor for the judiciary. I wonder whether he is familiar with those parts of the Constitution Committee’s report.
For other noble Lords who might not be, I will take just a minute or two to point those parts out. Looking at this part and pages 14 and 15, the Constitution Committee in taking its evidence found:
“This argument was supported by the previous Lord Chancellor, Jack Straw MP, who described his role in relation to the lower tiers of the judiciary as ‘ridiculous’. The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, also stressed that the Lord Chancellor ‘has no input at all to make other than to be there to look as if he is making an input ... It simply suggests there is political involvement when we have tried to get rid of it’”.
The committee goes on to make the point at paragraph 32 that,
“The Lord Chief Justice has day to day responsibility for the judiciary of England and Wales: he knows what is required of judicial office at all levels. He is therefore better placed than the Lord Chancellor to make an informed assessment of whether a nominee put forward by the JAC should be appointed. Transferring the Lord Chancellor’s power to request reconsideration or reject nominations to the Lord Chief Justice would strengthen the appointments system”.
In conclusion, the committee finds that,
“there is indeed a need for the legal framework for appointments to reflect both the extent to which the Executive should be involved in individual appointments and the reality of that involvement”.
The committee makes one point which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, made, that,
“The Government should consider whether the Lord Chief Justice will need additional support in order to take on this role”.
I think that point is well made.
The noble Baroness asked me whether I was aware of that. I most certainly was. With the greatest respect to the chair of the committee, my noble friend Lady Jay of Paddington, it was wrong. It is such a misunderstanding of the importance of the role of the Executive. I admire the judges more than anyone but I do not want the judges to be completely in control of the process of appointment. It is a siren song to say “let the Lord Chief Justice do it”. He is a splendid person but what a mistake it would be to remove the Executive and say “hold on a minute, I am not sure that is right”. Yes, I was aware and, my goodness me, she was led astray in what she said.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI hear what the noble and learned Lord said. I can only say that 30 years ago when I was in government in the Foreign Office, women advisers were a rarity at any meeting. Returning to government 30 years later, I quite often sit in meetings where the majority of my advisers are able and talented women. I wonder why the legal profession has not made the same progress in the past 30 years as has been made in public appointments. I suspect that, perhaps not intentionally, the idea of quality and suitability is embedded in the thought “people like us”.
Does the noble Lord agree that the previous question implied that women and ethnic minorities possibly do not have the merit or the suitable qualifications, which should not be allowed to stand? Will he tell the House whether the judicial appointments review will set targets? If that other bastion of male privilege, the City of London, can have targets, is it not time that the senior judiciary did as well?
I think that targetry would be the wrong approach but it is worth remembering the figures. Just over 20 per cent of our judges are women. Even in the magistracy under 8 per cent represent black and ethnic minorities. I understand selection on merit but there are still signs of old selection prejudices that produce these appalling figures. They have to be broken into.