Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Baroness Butler-Sloss Excerpts

Wednesday 27th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jay of Paddington]

My Lords, I am pleased to follow the noble and learned Lord in the constitutional points that he and others have made in supporting this amendment. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, summed it up very well in his Second Reading speech when he said that if this provision in the Government’s Bill went through, the Lord Chancellor would be in a position of giving advice to himself, which in itself is anomalous, if nothing more.

As other noble Lords have made the constitutional points most effectively, I wonder whether I could raise just an administrative question with the Minister. It seems to me surprising that the Government should propose such a potentially flexibly arrangement for the Lord Chancellor in relation to these very senior appointments as it seems to be the Lord Chancellor’s personal choice whether he takes part in a selection panel or not. As far as I can make out from reading the Bill, this may mean that he decides to sit on appointment body “A” but not on appointment body “B”. A question arises about the consistency of the appointing panel’s approach. There is also the rather bizarre question about what happens if the Lord Chancellor decides that he will not be a member of that panel and the panel has been constituted, as we understand it, in the legislation. Who replaces him, how is that replacement chosen, and to whom is he responsible? For all the reasons that noble Lords have given, I suggest that this is both constitutionally and administratively inappropriate. That is why I would be very happy to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, should he ask the Committee to give an opinion on it today.

I make one further point to reinforce the point which the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, was making about the change in the Lord Chancellor’s position. This was confirmed in the hearings that the Constitution Committee held on this matter by the present office-holder himself, the right honourable Kenneth Clarke, when he said:

“I think that we will have a Lord Chancellor who is not a lawyer. The lawyers that we have, including me, will not be as senior and distinguished as they used to be ... A better understanding of my role would be to describe me as Secretary of State for Justice”.

That seems to underline the points about potential politicisation, which other noble Lords have made.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, I agree entirely with what has already been said but I wonder whether I might add another point. I refer to a situation where a Lord Chancellor is not a lawyer or a very senior person but perhaps wants to make his mark in the political world and is much more overtly political than the present Lord Chancellor, who is very distinguished in his own right in the law. I ask the Minister to visualise the meeting of the commission. The Lord Chancellor is a member of the commission. He has a role as the Secretary of State for Justice, but he is only a single member among a number of people. Either he is going to be very powerful and he is going to override what everybody else wants, or he is not going to be very powerful, and he is going to be very dissatisfied with not being able to carry the commission with him. Either way would be extraordinarily unsatisfactory for someone who is head of the administration of justice in running the courts and has some responsibility for the judiciary. It is yet another point that leads me to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords, I too wish to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I see this part of the Bill as being one of those ideas which starts with good intent but has risks attached to it: it is the law of unintended consequences. I can understand that those who have looked at the appointment of senior judiciary and have seen the absence of women, for example, have thought that perhaps if somebody—the Lord Chancellor—were sitting on that panel, he would be able to represent more vociferously public concerns about the way in which appointments are recreating the same people. I can see that that was the intention of giving a role to the Lord Chancellor in the current appointment procedures.

However, we must be very conscious of the risks. We should be concerned about the way in which this could be detrimental to our constitutional arrangements and could be the beginning of a much more politicised role for the Secretary of State as Lord Chancellor sitting on such committees. I say this because, regarding the slide to such things, we always say, “Oh, it could not happen here”. I have just heard the decision made in Europe today that the new judge to be appointed to the European Court of Human Rights will not be the preferred candidate coming forward from Britain. The person appointed was pushed by the Conservatives in Europe and supported by Russia and Serbia. The best candidate, Ben Emmerson, one of our most distinguished human rights lawyers, did not get that role because of politicking of the ugliest kind. He was considered to be too protective of human rights.

We should be ashamed of what has happened in that appointment process and we should be aware of what happens when politics enters the fray in judicial appointments and how it can often lead to unsatisfactory outcomes. I raise this as a warning because it happens all too easily. The best candidate has been lost to the European Court of Human Rights and it has happened because of an ugly form of politicking.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

I am afraid that, unusually, I have to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar. It is widely referred to as a nuclear option—we could call it the veto, perhaps, but it is very well known that it is a veto and a very final kind of veto, in that not only does one exercise the veto—if one chooses to do so—but one has to give reasons in writing for arriving at that decision. It is a very tough position to take. The pool from which the candidate would be drawn is so small and so intimately known to one another—the judges of the Supreme Court, for example—that a rejection would be known and would, indeed, indicate a significant level of political interference. It would inevitably get out that a veto had been exercised and people would draw their own inferences as to what had happened. I suggest that that would indicate a huge level of political interference. It would probably leak to the media; there would be wide speculation in and around the legal profession. It would truly be seen, I am afraid, as a nuclear option.

The reality of this provision is that it gives power to several other entities, but not to the individual who is, in the words of the Constitution Committee report, at paragraph 26, responsible and,

“accountable to Parliament for the overall appointments process”.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

Taking up what the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, said, as I understand it this is not just a question of a name going to a Lord Chancellor who has no idea what has gone on before. If there was to be the slightest doubt that this candidate was not suitable, there would have been enormous discussions at a much earlier stage. It is almost inconceivable that somebody would go forward who was known to have reasons for not being acceptable and unless those reasons are such that the Lord Chancellor felt that he could say that, they ought to have been known already.

This does not work in isolation; the judges and the Lord Chancellor discuss a large number of matters extremely carefully over quite a long time. There is no isolation of the Lord Chancellor and his team from the senior judiciary and the appointments commission which is discussing this. I think that the noble Baroness is assuming that the Lord Chancellor is in an ivory tower, not knowing anything until the name comes to him. That is not the position.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

I say to the noble and learned Baroness that if that non-transparent process that she describes, which sounds like the old game of clubbing together to fix it all up, is indeed accurate, there should be no reason for the amendment. In that case, if it is all so chummy, why not have the Lord Chancellor sit on the panel?

The power to veto seems to contradict Section 3(6)(a) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which places a statutory duty on the Lord Chancellor to defend the independence of the judiciary. Not for the first time, one part of an Act—the duty to defend the independence of the judiciary—sits uneasily with the process as defined. Moreover, the process requires the Lord Chancellor to put his reasons in writing. I have already commented on that. It would be far better in increasing transparency and enhancing accountability for the Lord Chancellor to be a member of the selection commission —listening, participating and evaluating the candidate being questioned, without a veto over the appointment—than, after the fact, disagreeing with the selection commission.

In conclusion, I touch on the point made that either a very powerful Lord Chancellor would sit on the commission panel and influence it to go in the direction that he wanted; or, if the Government got their way, that the Lord Chancellor, having sat on the selection panel, could not persuade the panel of his views on an individual candidate and would be deeply dissatisfied because he did not carry the selection panel with him.

I argue that his potential for dissatisfaction would be greater if he had not exercised the veto and was therefore stuck with someone he found it difficult to work with. In fact, it could be said that he would take greater responsibility for working with a candidate with whom he did not entirely agree if he were on the selection panel and had been overruled. He would have been part of the decision-making, he would have been there and heard the argument why the majority of the commission wanted to go in a certain direction and would therefore have to suck it and see. On that basis, I have a lot of sympathy with the Government on the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McNally]

This is my problem as a simple lad dealing with these Silks. I have never used the word “cosy” about the relationship. I have had a chance look at the relationship in the last two years; the last way I would describe the relationship between the Lord Chancellor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, is “cosy”. It is businesslike; it is working; but it has an interrelationship which I think is important.

Giving the Lord Chancellor a role in these appointments is not new. As has been said, he already has a role in deciding whether to accept or reject the recommendation of a selection panel. The question is, therefore, how should that input be realised? I understand the different views put forward in the debate, but the Government’s view is that, for these two most senior appointments, given their significant role in the administration of justice, the most appropriate way of achieving this input is to allow the Lord Chancellor to sit on the panels. He can then consider the views of other panel members, submit his own views and engage with the panel members in a meaningful discussion about candidates.

The current system allows the Lord Chancellor to veto a selection panel’s recommendations. This is in itself a major role, but may be viewed as something of a nuclear option—that is what it says in my briefing notes. I think that that option is the one that could only be used in exceptional circumstances and with potentially a heavy price for the relationship with the judiciary and perception of political interference. I do not necessarily agree that these perceptions would be justified, but they are certainly factors which would inhibit the use of the veto. In place of the veto, Schedule 12 provides for a more effective engagement.

A fear has been expressed that this would give the Lord Chancellor disproportionate influence and that the present Lord Chancellor would dominate the proceedings. Perish the thought. Being on the panel, or even having that Lord Chancellor on the panel, would not necessarily mean that the Lord Chancellor would ultimately get his way on the individual appointed, but it would mean that he would have the opportunity to be engaged in the process and make his views known to the other panel members. We are talking about a panel of heavy hitters—a lay chair, plus senior members of the judiciary and appointment commissioners who are strong and independent-minded individuals. They will not simply fall into line with the Lord Chancellor of the day. The Lord Chancellor would have an opportunity to make his case but could also be persuaded of a contrary case by other panel members. However, where the Lord Chancellor does make a persuasive case of the merits of a particular candidate, this could be weighed in the balance in the same way by other panel members.

There are, of course, other possible ways of securing the input of the Lord Chancellor, but we do not consider that any are as effective as our proposal. We could, for example, allow the Lord Chancellor to select a candidate from a shortlist, or through some form of parliamentary hearing. However, we consider that the risk of politicisation of the process from these options is far more acute.

Another option would be to consult the Lord Chancellor at the start of the process. There is nothing wrong with that, but we consider that this is not as effective as having the Lord Chancellor be a member of the panel and be able to put forward his views, listen to the views of others and engage with them in a meaningful way.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

I wonder whether the Minister could answer a point that he has not yet answered, which has been made by several people. There is a perception that if the Lord Chancellor is on the panel, the appointment will be politicised. For those who do not know the process but see that the Lord Chancellor has been one of those who has appointed the Lord Chief Justice, there will be a perception, certainly among lawyers and much more widely, that the Lord Chancellor has had a very large part to play in making that person the Lord Chief Justice and that it would be the sort of person who would suit him.

[Lord McNally]

I was about to come to the interventions of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar. I do not think that my noble friend Lady Falkner got it wrong at all, despite her being bullied by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McNally]

There is no deception; I have nothing up my sleeve.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

I am sorry—this is only my second intervention but it is my last one. Something as important as this should not be put in a regulation. Why can there not be a government amendment on Report so that we know where the Government stand?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jay of Paddington]

My Lords, I do not accept my noble friend’s comments. As the noble Lords, Lord Hart of Chilton and Lord Pannick, said, we went into this in some detail in the Constitution Committee. For all the reasons advanced very eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I support the amendment, particularly because of the potential for increasing diversity both in the Supreme Court and, indeed, further down. Both noble Lords have expressed the potential for opening up more opportunities for people who have come through what is described as the non-conventional career path to reach the top of the profession. I—and many members of the Committee —have a personal interest in the concept that 70 is the new 50, so 75 should be the new 55.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, if 70 had been the retirement age for Supreme Court judges, particularly the judges in the House of Lords, we would have lost Lord Bingham before he even got to the House of Lords. We would have lost the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, the present president of the Supreme Court, who goes at 75. He is almost the last of those who are entitled to stay until 75. The first solicitor to get to the Supreme Court, who was of enormous value to it, left after 18 months because he was caught by being aged 70. He was as valuable as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, but he went at 70.

The Supreme Court is losing people who cannot even get there, or who get there for 18 months if, as has already been said, we allow time for people to get through the High Court and the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court. I think only two judges have gone straight through and one judge came straight from the Bar. Normal process means that we are losing people who are extremely valuable. This has been brought up in Question Time on a number of occasions and the Government really should be looking at it. The previous Government were asked to look at it but, if I may say so, they pushed it to one side. It would be very good if this Government would take it up.

[Baroness Bottomley of Nettlestone]

This has been a most exhilarating debate. I hope that the Minister will be able to use this experience to talk to other colleagues in government about why, for example, a non-executive director on a board has to have annual re-election once over 70. Recently, an Oxbridge college appointed a principal who is 72 and the articles of association had to be changed. I declare an interest because the late Lord Bingham’s son is the best person who works for me in my professional activity so I am, of course, brainwashed in this regard. I never thought of the Lords as pioneers of radical equality measures but I feel that this debate has great potential for professional groups across the economy and society, and certainly across government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neuberger]

My Lords, perhaps I may add to the debate as another non-lawyer. Indeed, I totally agree with the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and I very much hope that the Government will take this on board. I know that the Minister has himself been involved in the judicial diversity task force, of which the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor are in fact members. One of the criticisms that the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity has made since it reported two years ago is that progress by that task force has in fact been remarkably slow. Although it has met, not a great deal has happened. I know that the Minister feels much the same. It therefore seems to me all the more important that there be a statutory duty on the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice, as well as on the Judicial Appointments Commission, to promote diversity. I really hope that the Government will take that on board.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

As a former judge I very strongly support the amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I would particularly like to endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, with which I entirely agree. It is a very good thing when we get some non-lawyers reminding us, but he can be assured that former senior judges support him on this.

[Baroness Jay of Paddington]

My Lords, like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, I rise really for the sake of the record and because my name is on this amendment. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said in introducing the amendment, this was one of the very strong recommendations that the Constitution Committee made in its report on judicial appointments. The Minister has referred to his kindness in coming once again to speak to the Constitution Committee between Second Reading and Committee. He gave a very strong indication —and I do not think I say anything inappropriate—that he was favourably disposed to matters which we suggested counted as leadership matters in the question of diversity. He will remember the remarks he made on Monday when we spoke again about gesture politics in relation to another amendment, where he said that this was not about gesture politics, but about leadership and political leadership. I hope he will be consistent in his reply on this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Prashar]

I, too, support the amendment. The JAC wrote to the then Lord Chancellor about this in 2008. If we are committed to promoting diversity, it is vital that some movement takes place. There has been no progress on this over the past few years. If the responsibility was taken seriously by the Lord Chancellor, there would have been some movement.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. There is an overlooked pool of potential future judges—or of what used to be called chairmen of tribunals, who are now judges. It is time that that group in government service of one form or another was seen as a potential. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the numbers of both women and ethnic minorities is significant. I support the amendment.

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the amendment, because it allows me to clarify an important area: those who work in government legal services, the Crown Prosecution Service and other government legal offices. The intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is extremely helpful, because it puts on record what a rich seam there is to be mined in those public appointments, and counterpoints the point that I have made several times from this Dispatch Box: that the public service has managed to make far more progress in promoting diversity over the past decades than has the private. We may learn lessons from that.

The Government are keen that members of the employed legal professions should take up judicial roles for which they are eligible, as like noble Lords, we are of the view that this could be a useful route to increasing diversity as well as ensuring that the Government can attract the best lawyers.

However, it has been the policy of successive Lord Chancellors that Crown Prosecution Service and other government lawyers when holding judicial office do not sit on cases involving their department. For CPS lawyers, this means that they cannot sit as recorders in the criminal courts, as the overwhelming majority of cases are prosecuted by the CPS.

Under the previous Administration, in 2003 the restrictions on applications by government lawyers were relaxed partially, and CPS lawyers became eligible for appointment as deputy district judges in magistrates’ courts. However, this was still on the basis that they did not sit on CPS-prosecuted cases, and therefore few roles are available.

The policy is based on the need to comply with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides that litigants are entitled to be heard in front of an independent and impartial tribunal. Given those constraints, we need to think more creatively around the concept of a judicial career and how experience in one area can support subsequent appointment to judicial office in another area.

Opportunities are available for government lawyers to apply for judicial office. The published Judicial Appointments Commission programme for 2012-13 includes more than 300 vacancies for fee-paid office, which would be open to government lawyers to apply for. It is therefore important to communicate those opportunities available to government lawyers and to encourage them to take up judicial roles for which they are eligible—not least as this could be another useful route to increase diversity in the judiciary.

I am personally committed to playing a part in raising awareness of these opportunities. I recently met the Treasury Solicitor to discuss the best way to communicate them. I am also happy to consider any suggestions for changes to the current restrictions that apply to government lawyers to see whether we can go any further than the current practice—without, of course, infringing the rights to an independent and fair trial. When I met the Treasury Solicitor, I said that I was willing to write articles, go to seminars, or whatever, to raise the profile and awareness of those opportunities. As this is a probing amendment, I hope that the noble and learned Lord will believe that we are responding in this area and withdraw it.