Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

422E: Clause 208, page 254, line 25, leave out from “1929” to end of line 26 and at end insert “—
(a) proceedings for an offence shall not be instituted against a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, who must exercise personally any function under this section of giving consent;(b) proceedings to which this section applies may not be commenced after twelve months from the date of the offence to which the proceedings relate.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to add the requirement of DPP consent for the institution of the criminal proceedings in Clause 208 against a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy and reduces the limitation period for the offence.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 422E and, additionally, do so on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, KC, who has a prior appointment in The Hague this week. He was the author of the probing amendment on this topic in Committee. At that stage, the Minister signalled some reservations about it and subsequently wrote to him with additional data, which has proved to be most helpful, so we thank her. The noble Baroness, Lady Wolf of Dulwich, has appended her name to this amendment and will speak to it, along with her other amendment.

Noble Lords will be aware that Clause 208, which was inserted into this Bill in the other place at a late stage, has attracted numerous amendments. Our intention with Amendment 422E is that, where opinions are a matter of individual conscience, we should attempt to offer the House a compromise between the Commons position—Clause 208—and Amendment 424, which seeks to leave out the clause entirely. I point out that Amendments 423, 423ZA and 423A would be pre-empted if this amendment was agreed on Division.

The amendment would do two things. First, it would require the personal consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions before any proceedings may be instituted against women acting in relation to their pregnancy. Secondly, it would provide that such proceedings must be commenced within 12 months of the alleged offence. The version we debated in Committee provided for the consent of the Attorney-General rather than the Director of Public Prosecutions. The Minister observed that offences where Attorney-General consent is required tend to be in the national security or international spheres, while DPP consent is required to address a wider range of concerns, including, as the Minister explained, where there is a risk that the institution of proceedings might violate convention rights or cause a defendant “irreparable harm”. There are some offences in areas other than national security or international matters where AG consent is required, as the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, argues—for example, contempt of court under the strict liability rule, pursuant to Section 7 of the Contempt of Court Act. Nevertheless, on balance, it seems proportionate and in keeping with existing practice to replace Attorney-General consent with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Our amendment would, however, require that the DPP exercises the function of giving consent “personally”. That language is taken from the Bribery Act, where some offences impose a similar condition on the DPP. Without this additional requirement, we understand that the consent of the DPP to institute proceedings could be given by a Crown prosecutor by virtue of Section 1(7) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. So requiring the DPP to exercise that function personally provides, in our view, a better guarantee against the risk of abuse, error or overzealousness.

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[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, I should like to ask the noble Baroness—

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

I do not think that we take interventions on Report, if I may refer to the Companion—but perhaps the Whip could assist us.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

I can clarify for your Lordships’ House that the noble Baroness is able to take interventions, or not, as she wishes.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

I would like to proceed and conclude my argument. I will be happy to listen to the noble Baroness once I have finished.

Because the police do not know when they find a lifeless body which of the situations they are confronted with, even with decriminalisation of abortion offences for the women acting in relation to her pregnancy, she may still be investigated. If it was a case of stillbirth, for example, for that woman the investigation will inevitably be a cause of stress. She might be worried that the evidence will not support her or she will not be believed. However, what else are the police supposed to do in these cases, other than try to establish the facts?

Therefore, it is not possible to remove women acting in relation to their pregnancy from any criminal process, even if you decriminalise abortion offences for them. What is possible is to introduce further guarantees, as we are attempting to do with this amendment, that would add an additional layer of personal assurance from the DPP that the facts in context of terminations are taken into account, and that after 12 months, in any event, proceedings will not be brought against the pregnant woman. It ensures that the decision to prosecute in relation to the woman is taken at the highest level—the DPP—and applies the certainty of a limitation period.

No solution in this area will ever be flawless, but when the evidence before us is so limited and the broader picture so uncertain, wholesale decriminalisation would be a disproportionate response to a problem which, in any event, needs careful and thoughtful steps for resolution. This amendment offers a more balanced and workable path to the problem that we all want to resolve satisfactorily. It provides meaningful safeguards for women, ensuring that any decision to prosecute is taken at the highest level, as well as the certainty of a limitation period, while not upending the balancing of principles and values underlying the Abortion Act 1967. I hope that both those who oppose criminalisation and those who are rightly troubled by the distressing cases we have discussed will see that this approach represents a principled and proportionate compromise, and will feel able to support it.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her points, which I am sure your Lordships’ House will want to take into account when deciding whether, as a matter of policy, to vote for or against the various amendments. I remind the noble Baroness that these are not government amendments—the Government are neutral—but I am sure that everyone in your Lordships’ House has heard them and will take them into account in various ways.

Amendment 425 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, is identical to one tabled in Committee. I raised at that stage the Government’s concerns about workability and operational difficulties, and they remain. In short, the effect of Amendment 425 might be to reduce access to early medical abortion due to resource constraints on the ability of abortion providers to hold in-person consultations.

Amendment 426D, tabled by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester, is new, but it carries similar possible operational effects to those I set out in Committee in relation to Amendment 425, about which I spoke a moment ago. The proposed new clause in Amendment 426D may have a detrimental impact on abortion provision and access for under-18s, including those who live in remote areas or who have difficulties in attending a clinic. It should also be noted that it is unclear whether this amendment would require under-18s to have all consultations face to face, including any initial contact with the service. If so, this would further increase the workability concerns, including resourcing constraints on providers and access to abortion provision for young people.

Amendment 426B, in the name of my noble friend Lady Thornton, is once again very similar to an amendment tabled in Committee. The duty on the Secretary of State, as drafted, poses substantial operational and resourcing implications. There is no centrally held record of women who have been convicted of, cautioned for, arrested for or investigated on suspicion of abortion offences. Therefore, the Secretary of State would be unable to comply with the duty to direct the specified bodies to delete such details from records. If this is the will of Parliament, consideration will need to be given to how to deliver the objectives of this amendment in a way that is operationally workable.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, I appreciate that the hour is late and very charged emotions have been expressed, so I do not intend to delay the House with a long response. I simply point out to those Members who are not familiar with the Companion and were surprised that so many of us did not take interventions that this was not due to any lack of respect for their positions. The Companion says at 4.29 that a Member

“may justifiably refuse to give way, for instance … in time-limited proceedings”.

I wanted to make that clear.

I have heard what the Minister has said about Amendment 422E. I will go away and consider that. This was meant to be a compromise. I know that Members want to get to other substantive amendments. I therefore do not wish to test the opinion of the House and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 422E withdrawn.