(6 days, 5 hours ago)
Lords ChamberOn the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and I put forward, as was alluded to in a number of speeches, including by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, the reason why we raised equality issues as regards financial payments is the potential role of Chagossians within the trust fund. There is a widespread concern at present that we are simply hoping that Mauritius does the right thing with that. I appreciate that the Minister is perhaps not in the position today to give any level of direct assurances. However, can she at least go away and come back before Report with the Government’s thoughts or information—perhaps after discussions with the Mauritian Government—as to how we can inject a level of Chagossian direct involvement and control over that trust fund? That would be very helpful for whenever we reach Report.
That is not too much to ask. We are talking to the Mauritian Government about this, because we want the same thing as the noble Lord. I had hoped that we would be able to say something a little bit more detailed about that by now. We have not quite got there, but we will use best endeavours to get there before Report. I understand the motivation behind this, and it is right that we do what we can to make sure that noble Lords have the assurances they need by Report.
(6 days, 5 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will briefly make two points. First, on behalf of my noble friend Lord McCrea, who has had to leave for a family wedding, I will speak to Amendment 57, which principally brings to the Committee’s attention the role of British legal firms in this issue.
We have been critical in this House of the current and, to some extent, the previous Government. Those criticisms are not entirely without merit on the issue of sovereignty. There has also been further British involvement in any number of aspects, the four most significant legal interventions being two cases in connection with UNCLOS; one relating to the advisory opinion of the ICJ; and one on the drafting of the UN security resolution. In each of these four cases, the Mauritius Government used British firms as their legal representation in order to further their aims. In effect, British firms acted on behalf of a foreign Government to challenge British sovereignty, British defence rights and the wishes of British citizens. We cannot do anything about what happened in the past, but I suppose the amendment queries whether there is an appropriate way forward in terms of that level of support for Mauritius. Raising my noble friend Lord McCrea’s amendment gives the Government an opportunity to respond to it.
I want to deal briefly with the wider point. We do not always see eye to eye, but I agree with at least one phrase that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, used: he said that we have to be careful about words, and words matter. One of the major concerns, as highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, and others, might be described as the precedent and the ripple effect. It is undoubtedly the case that in the past we as a nation have made mistakes in dealing with overseas territories. In particular, we have sent out the wrong signals on both the Falklands and Gibraltar. It is probably the case that some, at different points within Governments in the past, would have been quite happy to see those territories dispatched to another sovereign territory on that basis. They can best speak for themselves but, fortunately enough, in each case we have drawn back from what might be described as a fatal mistake. The danger with this is that it crosses the line in handing over that level of sovereignty.
Mention has been made of a range of overseas territories. The one thing that largely unites them is that whatever discussions we have had with different Governments, about whatever level of co-operation, they have ultimately respected the self-determination and the inhabitants’ will for sovereignty. That is what at times has drawn us back. I think this goes beyond that and moves towards a situation regarding the wishes of the Chagossian people and their right to self-determination—and that self-determination may, because we do not know definitively, express itself in them saying, “We want to be part of Mauritius”. If that is their self-determination, so be it. I think it is unlikely to be the case; nevertheless, so be it. The concern is the signal that this sends out to the outside world.
The Minister mentioned the arrangements as regards Gibraltar. I think there has been work ongoing with both this Government and the previous Government to try to find arrangements that are in the best interests of Gibraltar. I entirely acknowledge that, while it is sometimes easy to criticise when looking from outside, the Gibraltar Government themselves have been supportive of those actions and have backed the moves made so far.
It is really important that there is not a dispute with regards to Gibraltar. There is an arrangement that is agreed with Spain and it is not in question at all, in any sense.
Absolutely. I have taken the Minister and the Government to task on a range of things, but this may be one issue on which we are in vigorous agreement. I do not question the Government’s bona fides as regards Gibraltar or the Falkland Islands. I know there is a strong commitment to both. I fully acknowledge that and believe it would be the case under a future Government, but this is not a concern over the attitude of this Government or other UK Governments over the ripple effect. It is the danger of what message will be sent out; as the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, said, there is a ripple effect towards Madrid and Buenos Aires, which might take a very different approach in future.
I am really sorry, but we have an agreement with Spain. The matter is settled. Madrid takes the same view that London takes; it is the same view that the Government of Gibraltar take. It is settled, and it is beyond unhelpful for noble Lords—unintentionally, I realise, as this is a relatively recent development—to suggest in any way that that is not the case.
I am not querying that. What I am saying is from experience and from having spoken directly to Gibraltarians in relation to this. They know that a very good agreement may have been done with this Government, but Spanish Governments down the years have sometimes tended to blow hot and cold as regards Gibraltar.
Yes, but part of the problem is that sometimes in this country we fall into a trap where we see agreements as final settlements. There are sometimes other Governments who either see them as a process or, while they may be fully committed to them, cannot say whether a future Government would feel bound in their attitude towards them.
I appreciate that we have it in black and white as regards Gibraltar and I do not doubt the actions taken by the Government. I fully support them, beyond any question mark of doubt, but we have been told by Gibraltarians that sometimes what happens in Madrid can run contrary to what happens in the border provinces with Gibraltar, which want to have a much stronger relationship. Depending on what attitude they want to take, they can turn hot and cold on the relationship. I have no doubt that the Government have done a very good job in nailing down that agreement but, again, I just express the concern for a future situation—perhaps it is more pertinent for Buenos Aires, which down the years has had a much more volatile approach to some of these issues—over the signals that we inadvertently send by way of this to other Governments. I have no question over the bona fides of either this Government or future UK Governments in relation to that.
(1 week, 6 days ago)
Lords ChamberI know the Minister was not attracted by the charms of the Front Bench, so I will try slightly differently. I suppose what we are trying to establish first of all is the percentage breakdown between the FCDO and the MoD. It matters because if this is not additional money, there will be a level of opportunity cost. If, for example, we are eating into the MoD budget, that money could be spent on other things. I think, from what I have gathered from what the Minister has said, that the bulk of the money would come from the MoD because of restrictions, but it would be useful to have percentage terms.
Okay, I will see whether we can get that. I do not know that that will be consistent over time, and I do not know whether the Treasury will want to be making that clear from now on. The MoD is deciding to buy itself some capability with this money. It is a significant investment, but it is not beyond the realms of what the MoD would spend on a capability such as this. That is my understanding. Exactly how much comes from each department will be published as we go along, because these things are published in the ordinary run of things.
The confusion in my mind comes from the interchangeable use of “ODA” and “FCDO”, and they are clearly different things. I look after the ODA budget, but the FCDO spends an awful lot more than just ODA. The MoD spends the ODA, too, as does DESNZ, the Department of Health, Defra and many other departments. Does this help noble Lords? Are we getting somewhere?
On Amendments 70, 74 and 75, all tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, I repeat that Parliament has already agreed the principles of the treaty and has not decided to vote against ratification. Any requirement for further approval from Parliament for the payments ignores the thorough and correct process that the treaty and Bill have already gone through and risks undermining the treaty, since non-payment by the UK is a ground for termination.
Regarding Amendment 74, I reassure noble Lords that there are no impacts on the cost of running the base from Article 10. This article pertains to the normal contractual arrangements, with any preference being to the maximum extent practicable and consistent with existing policies, requirements, laws and regulations.
Finally, regarding Amendment 75, I remind noble Lords that an annual payment to Mauritius is a fundamental part of the agreement, and this principle, and the amounts of those payments, were published in full on the day of treaty signature. I hope that in the light of this, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
I agree in that, obviously, the situations that the right reverend Prelate refers to are deeply rooted in history. Many of us understand and study this and appreciate what he is saying, but I cannot respond to anything that mentions 7 October without saying that that most hideous of attacks changed the nature of that conflict. It was always going to lead to a response from Israel. What is happening now, though, is beyond what anybody anticipated would happen as a consequence of that heinous attack, but nothing should diminish the appalling events of that day. The accounts and footage from that day that many of us have seen will haunt us forever. Perhaps if there were similar accounts and footage from Sudan that were as visible to us all now, we would at least be having a different set of conversations. But I agree with the right reverend Prelate about complexity and the need to understand the historical origins of these conflicts.
My Lords, I think we all see the appalling humanitarian crisis. I welcome the Government’s intervention in terms of the medical support they are providing and propose to provide via this Statement. However, I wish to go back to the issue of recognition and an earlier point made about why there are no conditions or prerequisites on the Palestinian Authority—and not simply regarding a level of balance on the release of hostages being a precondition, which has been highlighted.
We have seen, for example, that the Canadian Government—with which our Government have often been in lockstep—have made a number of preconditions on the Palestinian Authority around democratic reforms before they will consider recognition. Why have the UK Government not made that a precondition of recognition?
For the Palestinian Authority, it is not a condition of recognition, as the noble Lord knows, but we are working with the Palestinian Authority to bring about the reforms that we think are necessary to enable it to administer a state in the future. We do not claim that it is ready to do that now. However, as I have made clear, the decision around talking about recognising Palestine at the UN General Assembly is around preserving the viability of the two-state solution. People can disagree about whether that was the right or wrong thing to do. We feel that this is not the circumstance in which we wanted to recognise Palestine; we wanted it to be part of a much more positive process and to have included the negotiations that noble Lords have said that they want to see leading towards a lasting settlement. That is not where we are, as we all know. We have taken the decision now, because we felt that unless we did, the prospects of the future state would be further jeopardised —and look at what is happening with E1 too. We have not done this in the circumstances that we would have wished, but I agree with the noble Lord on the need to see further reform of the Palestinian Authority.