Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Baroness Chakrabarti and Lord Jackson of Peterborough

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly on this amendment. It is quite an ingenious and intelligent amendment that is quite superficially attractive. I know the Minister will give it proper and due consideration.

My only problem is that it draws an analogy that does not really stand up to close scrutiny. I defer to the noble Baroness’ greater legal expertise, but when you are employed, there is a personal contract between the employee and the employer that you have freely entered into. It may be that, in the course of that contract, your pay falls behind and there are societal and economic reasons why you are paid different amounts of money. We could be here all week discussing that.

However, it is not the same as the relationship you have with a nuclear power station, where you have the expectation that you will be kept safe from accidents and drastic events; with your local water authority and the expectation that you will not be flooded; or when you go on an aeroplane that, God forbid, that aeroplane will not crash. You do not have that direct contractual relationship with those bodies. In other words, you essentially defer that responsibility legally to other bodies to intercede on your behalf. Therefore, this amendment, in a circuitous way, undermines the very concept of a one-on-one contractual relationship, so I do not think it is analogous.

Having said that, I would not particularly oppose this amendment. It is ingenious and interesting but, with all due respect, I do not think the noble Baroness draws an accurate analogy between the two.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for taking the argument so seriously. Of course, I disagree with him. When you go to eat in a restaurant, go to school or buy a can of baked beans, you may well have a private, contractual relationship with the supplier of that good or service. None the less, the state has decided that it needs to intervene because these power relationships are not all equal and there is a public good in the baked beans being safe to eat, the school delivering a good service, et cetera.

So, from the moment the UK Government and the UK people took the democratic decision that there should be laws to protect school standards, food safety, health and safety and non-discrimination in pay—supported by people from all parties, including in your Lordships’ House—it is not just a matter of private contract between two parties anymore; it is actually a matter of public policy and a wider rule of law point. The non-discrimination point has been non-partisan in this country for some years.

Most equality legislation has, perhaps, been promoted by Labour Governments, but the disability rights Act is the obvious exception. There has been a bipartisan consensus that we should not discriminate against people because of their sex, including in pay. We just have not been delivering on pay as well as we have been delivering in other areas of women’s lives. Therefore, the analogy with school standards, health and safety standards and food standards works. If we want to achieve equal pay, we have to take it seriously in enforcement.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Just to come back to the noble Baroness, would she therefore extend the provisions of her amendment to all protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Yes, I would.

Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Baroness Chakrabarti and Lord Jackson of Peterborough

Committee stage
Monday 19th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment ably and comprehensively moved by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, which would, as he explained, insert a new clause. It is an eminently sensible amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, described the arguments put by this side in the previous debate as straw man arguments. He was like Don Quixote tilting at windmills, because his claim that they were straw man arguments was comprehensively eviscerated by my noble friend Lord Young of Acton. They were substantive arguments and substantive concerns, notwithstanding the noble Lord’s comments and those of noble Lords on the Government’s side.

Clause 20 could be described as a hologram or a chimaera because it does not provide very much in the way of detail about the practical ramifications and impacts of this clause on businesses, particularly smaller businesses. The amendment is very sensible. In section 10 of the cost-benefit analysis in the Employment Rights Bill: Economic Analysis that the Government published last October, one is hard pressed to see any detailed empirical evidence from reputable economists or other academics which would sustain the likely costings that the Government have prayed in aid in favour of this part of the Bill. We are told that the universal cost of the Bill to business will be a very speculative £5 billion, but the source of that figure is not very clear; in fact, it is quite opaque. I do not believe that figure. For a number of reasons, the data is suspect, which is why we need the proper impact assessment so persuasively argued for by my noble friend on the Front Bench. We have not had a proper analysis of the detail in a risk assessment of section 10 of the cost-benefit analysis.

We also have not had a proper consultation process on the Bill. We have not had the opportunity to look at the likely impacts that flow from this clause. I say at the outset that, like my noble friend Lord Young of Acton, I am a proud member of the Free Speech Union, which has made a similar case about consultation.

We also do not know anything about the opportunity cost. Not everyone is an economist, but opportunity cost is what may have happened if this Bill had not come along. I suspect that employers, including smaller employers, would have taken on more staff, had there not been the encumbrances in this clause. In other words, they will be risk averse: they will not wish to run the risk of taking people on, given the litigation and vexatious claims which may well arise from this clause.

The figure the Government have put forward for the number of employment tribunals does not stand up to scrutiny, given the pressure that this will put on the tribunals themselves, as well as the other courts that will be responsible for adjudicating on this litigation. Indeed, as my noble friend said, this will exacerbate the already very significant problem of backlogs in the employment tribunals.

I turn to the kernel of this amendment. If I take the Minister and, indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, who supported her from the government Benches, at their word, I do not know why they would not wish to support the free speech caveat in this amendment. Although they have not properly identified what harassment is—they have not defined it—they are going after people who are committing acts of harassment. They are not seeking to stifle or curtail free speech.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. I would suggest that the so-called “free speech caveat” is Section 6 of the Human Rights Act, which requires all public authorities, including courts and tribunals, to interpret all other legislation in a way that is compatible with convention rights, including—for the purposes of the present debate, as I understand the noble Lord’s concerns—Article 10 of the convention on human rights.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I defer to the noble Baroness’s expertise on human rights legislation, but we are considering this specific, bespoke legislation. There will not necessarily be a read-across between that and—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

There will.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Well, the noble Baroness will not be present at every employment tribunal and hear and adjudicate every case. As my noble friend Lord Young of Acton has said, there is a significant threat of inadvertent issues arising from this legislation, which, as my noble friend Lady Cash has said, is very poorly drafted. As subsection 2(a) of the proposed new clause sets out, it is important to look through the prism of free speech at Clauses 19 to 22.

It is also important to look at the likely costs to employers. This is the central point of my remarks: we do not know what those costs will be. It is certainly appropriate that Ministers be required to tell Parliament what the ramifications are in terms of cost. This is a Government who are committed to growth and to supporting businesses in all their endeavours. Therefore, it would be sensible to consider a review of how these issues impact on businesses.

On proposals for mitigations, there have been no ideas, no protocols, no concordats, and no policies put in place to give any guidance to smaller businesses—I am not necessarily referring to the smallest micro-businesses—to cope with the problems deliberately arising because this Labour Government have chosen to put these encumbrances and burdens on businesses. They are not giving any support to businesses to help cope with this. The costs will fall on the shareholders, on the businesses, and ultimately on the workforce—and it will cost jobs. For that reason, I support the amendment. It does not detract from the important commitment to protect ordinary working people, who deserve to be able to go to work without being bullied, harassed or treated unfairly or egregiously. We all agree with that, on which there is a consensus. It would not detract from that to make an amendment that would provide extra protections against people who are vexatious or malicious, or who cause difficulties in the long run, for no apparent reason. It is a sensible amendment that would protect business and would also protect the workforce.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Baroness Chakrabarti and Lord Jackson of Peterborough

Report stage
Wednesday 6th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly in support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the amendments in this group. I do so for three reasons.

First, whatever one’s views about international law, parties to any dispute must have some access to interim relief—whether neighbourhood disputes or business disputes, and particularly in relation to human rights concerns. The Government are resisting interim relief in our domestic courts, but they really cannot do that in relation to the European Court of Human Rights as well, or there will be no interim relief for mistakes that can lead to very dire consequences—as has happened in the past, even in immigration cases in this country.

The second reason I support the amendments in the group is this. When the Government originally raised concerns about Rule 39 last year, it was because of natural justice concerns about the procedure of the courts not always allowing Governments to be heard, or not allowing them to be heard after interim relief had been granted. Those procedural concerns have now been addressed, not least thanks to the efforts of Foreign Office Ministers, including the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, for which he is to be commended.

Finally, I think back to yesterday’s debate, which did your Lordships’ House such credit. I remind noble Lords that there are currently Rule 39 interim measures in place to prevent the Russian Federation executing Ukrainian prisoners of war. It will do our arguments and moral authority no good at all if we start saying that we can pick and choose which Rule 39 measures we accept.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley—in relation to his question to the noble and learned Lord—that he might like to look at today’s Politico, where Dunja Mijatović, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, has criticised not just the present Bill but the French state for the very case that he referred to. The French were wrong to do what they did and we must do better.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose Amendments 36, 37, and 38 in respect of Rule 39 interim measures. I am afraid that I will not observe or respect the admonition that we should brief necessarily. We are discussing the substantial and significant issue of parliamentary sovereignty, and the right of the British people to have their views respected and not blocked by an unelected House, especially when the elected House, the other place, has been able to make a decision in significant numbers.

In deference to the sensitivities of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, I will, for the avoidance of doubt, be referring to “an international” rather than “a foreign” court. I am sure he will be pleased about that. These are fundamentally blocking or wrecking amendments, designed to make the Bill inoperable. They are designed to thwart the will of the people, expressed through an electoral mandate and the will of the other place, to reduce immigration and to fulfil the primary duty of government, which is to protect its borders and its people and, more importantly—I look to the Lords spiritual in this respect—the moral imperative to save lives in the channel and destroy the business model of evil people traffickers.

More specifically, these amendments subvert and traduce the long-held principle that our laws are made in Parliament and implemented by the courts—simply, the concept of parliamentary sovereignty—in favour of a nebulous, opaque concept of “the rule of law” and the ECHR as a living document. The former is essentially uncodified and lacks precise consensual meaning, but it is used to advance judicial activism by unelected, unaccountable jurists in an international court, undermining faith and trust in the court system, parliamentary democracy and government in this country and destroying the delicate equilibrium between the Executive, the legislature and the judiciary. There is but one rule of law, and that is made in Parliament by elected representatives. That confers legitimacy on our proceedings. These amendments will assist in furthering the trend towards the politicisation of the judiciary.

Even the concept of the separation of powers, much lauded in this House, is itself alien to the constitutional settlement of the UK, and is certainly an evolving issue. It is unclear and prey to subjective interpretation, as we established earlier this week on Report when we discussed the deeming presumption of a safe list for asylum seekers, including Greece, in the case of Nasseri v Secretary of State in 2009. This was ultimately found by the Appeal Court and the House of Lords, under Section III of the ECHR and the Human Rights Act in respect of inhuman treatment, not to have violated those pieces of legislation. That was the Blair Government, who created an unrebuttable presumption that a list of countries was safe, so there is a precedent already set many years ago.

I wish to ponder briefly the idea of the rule of law, Rule 39 interim measures and the implications for parliamentary sovereignty and the myth of the ECHR, which is eulogised with rapture by so many noble Lords in the context of our own Parliament and judicial system. Advancing the rule of law as superior to parliamentary sovereignty—“the rule of lawyers”, as my noble friend Lord Lilley said in his excellent opinion editorial in the Daily Telegraph two days ago—is what we are looking at. It is about the subjective fiat of another court, over which we have no control. It is a modern phenomenon, as opposed to parliamentary sovereignty, and an example of judicial mission creep. That said, even Lord Bingham stated, after the case of Jackson v Attorney-General on the Hunting Act 2004:

“The bedrock of the British constitution is … the supremacy of the Crown in Parliament”.


He echoed the thoughts of such eminent jurists as Lord Denning and AV Dicey, to whom I referred in Committee.

As we know, and as my noble friend Lord Lilley alluded to earlier, the French have taken an altogether more robust view of the authority and sanctity of their own domestic legislation vis-à-vis the perverse and sometimes dangerous and damaging rulings of the ECHR. In November 2023, Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin removed an Uzbek national, MA, who was allegedly a radicalised Islamist extremist, despite a Rule 39 interim measure against this being done, the first time that the French Government have openly defied such an interim measure. Indeed, they also defied the Conseil d’État, the equivalent of the Supreme Court.

The French elite is more likely to question and challenge the état de droit, the French equivalent of the rule of law. In an article in Le Figaro—

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Baroness Chakrabarti and Lord Jackson of Peterborough

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I think that is a moot point, in so far as—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Oh!

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I am always delighted to amuse the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

Articles 26 and 27 of the ECHR expressly limit the competence of a single judge vis-à-vis the Chamber of the Court or the Grand Chamber. I agree that in a case such as Hirst v UK (No. 2) [2005] on prisoner votes, we—as a Government, Ministers and the Executive—specifically set our face against a decision of the Grand Chamber. That was liable for criticism.

But the fundamental question here is: is the use of Rule 39 interim measures at the heart of what you would call international law? As I will set out very briefly, that is not necessarily the case, because the ECHR makes express provision for the constitution of the court and its jurisdiction. A single anonymous judge at the court breaches the limit of what the ECHR establishes as the competence of that single judge as the legal authority. Indeed, interim measures are not, in effect, de facto rulings of the Strasbourg court at all, and the Minister is therefore not in breach of “international law”. I make reference again to Articles 26 and 27 of the convention.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. I am very interested in his points about international law and so on. As a matter of basic common sense and logic, does he understand why there is value in the interim measures of any court, domestic or international? Does he understand why it is sometimes necessary to have some kind of mechanism for preventing a case becoming totally academic and preventing the outcome being decided before the case has been properly and finally heard, whether in a domestic or an international court? If he agrees that there is sometimes value in that, and if he has concerns about the way the Strasbourg procedures work, does he not think that the first thing to do would be to try to negotiate reforms to those procedures, rather than just taking domestic powers to ignore them?

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I say, gently, to the noble Baroness that this issue with unrestricted, unprecedented levels of geopolitical change and immigration is sui generis. Therefore, one has to see it through that prism. Yes, broadly and in principle, it is better to negotiate than to withdraw from a convention or another legal regime. But you cannot always use the case that, because Putin has been beastly, we self-evidently and axiomatically have to deal with his breach of international law. After all, invading a sovereign country such as Ukraine is a bit different from some of the other cases the noble Baroness used. It does not mean that you cannot be critical of the overall application of the legal regime we are discussing.

In fairness, my noble friend Lord Hailsham’s amendment is very fair-minded, enabling the Government potentially to present the evidence that, hitherto, they were not able to do in the 2022 case. Indeed, the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coker, is eminently sensible—actually, it is rather otiose, because one would always assume that the Home Secretary would seek the advice of the Attorney-General in proceeding in these small number of cases.

Two of the amendments the noble Baroness put forward are clearly wrecking amendments. The amendment that would disapply Section 55 of the Illegal Migration Act would specifically remove the express parliamentary sanction and authorisation of non-compliance with the interim measure, which, in itself, is a draconian move. Amendments 58 and 60 go to the heart of what we assume to be international law, in terms of what is justiciable in domestic law.

Let us be honest and put our cards on the table. This is about tying up the Bill in endless judicial reviews to stop any people being removed and to stop us tackling one of the biggest, endemic, troubling issues in politics. It is about bringing this back under the purview of domestic legislation in order to establish a roadblock via judicial review.

My final point is about the Human Rights Act 1998. It does not give legal effect in domestic legislation to the Strasbourg court’s Rule 39 practice, which is grounded in Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights and is not one of the Commission rights set out in Schedule 1 to the 1998 Act. For those reasons, therefore, there is a very big question mark over the use of Rule 39 interim measures. Are they really international law as we would define it? Noble Lords would be wise to consider that when they come to vote for these amendments.