Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Anonymity is an important enabler of freedom of assembly and association. While, as we will see later, there is a problem with the police deploying live facial recognition at protests per se, a prohibition on face coverings at protests could represent a step towards the possibility of widespread biometric surveillance at protests as well. I am afraid there is no presumption that the right to protest is secure in today’s political climate, never mind under a future Government, and if the clauses in the Bill are not reined in, the right to protest will be even more fragile.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I agree with much of the discussion about this important group, but I remember that this is Report. While I share particularly the concerns about cumulative disruption, because it is Report, not Committee, I will confine my remarks to one speech in this group, with no interventions, and focus on Amendments 369 and 369A as briefly and succinctly as I can.

I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Strasburger, Lord Pannick and Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about Amendment 369A. These arguments were rehearsed with great precision in Committee. The example was given of an Iranian dissident protesting and being concerned about reprisals—and you could substitute other countries and their embassies for Iran, that was just the one that came up that day.

In the clause, the Government acknowledge that there should be some defences to the offence of wearing a mask on a protest—I have concerns about the offence itself because it presupposes that protest is a slightly dodgy thing to begin with, and I do not agree with that—and included health, religious observance and work as justifications for concealing identity, but fear of reprisals was not included. The reasonable excuse defence proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and his colleagues is a proportionate one, given what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said earlier about balancing rights. I urge my colleagues in government to think seriously about the noble Lord’s amendment because the defences currently to the offence of concealing your identity at a protest do not include the fear of reprisals, whether you are a battered woman, someone who disagrees with their employer or, crucially, a dissident outside the embassy of your homeland. I urge my noble friends in government to think again about that.

Just briefly on Amendment 369—I am still at just over two minutes—and enshrining the right to protest as a free-standing clause, even though it is acknowledged by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that we have Articles 10 and 11 of the convention incorporated into the Human Rights Act, I say in friendship and gently to him that I think this kind of duplication may be a mistake we would come to regret. He is quite right, of course, as are the Government on other matters to do with Article 8, that you can, and should, be more precise in your domestic legislation when attempting to safeguard rights and freedoms, but this is not that much more precise. In effect, this proposed new clause pretty much replicates Articles 10 and 11 of the convention but for the removal of morals. Frankly, I think that morals is a dead letter these days.

As a fellow human rights person—I have been working with the convention and with some Members of your Lordships’ House for over 30 years—I say that that kind of almost duplication is dangerous in legal terms. I urge the noble Lord not to press that one, just as I urge my colleagues in government to support him and others who have signed up to broaden the defence in Amendment 369A to the offence of wearing a face covering at a peaceful protest.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, can I ask her gently to explain why she does not accept that the margin of appreciation permits the Government to do things outside what we would want to see? I know that she and I both are great advocates for the ECHR, and she knows that, but the problem is that the margin of appreciation can be taken advantage of to allow restrictions we would not want to see. The first and principal point I might make in relation to the duplication point is that having the right to protest enshrined in domestic statutory law does away with the possibility that the margin of appreciation should allow restrictions that this Parliament would not wish to see.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I was trying to be brief—this is Report—but, with the leave of the House, I will answer, again as briefly as I can. I know that not everyone agrees and not every jurist agrees, but as far I am concerned, the margin of appreciation was always intended to be an international concept for an international court. Once you get to Strasbourg, it is quite right that a margin of appreciation applies so that Strasbourg respects the legislation and the jurisdiction of domestic legislators and judges.

I do not see it as a domestic legal principle at all, so I do not see that it is for even the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom to be operating a margin of appreciation when it applies the Human Rights Act domestically. I do not see that as the problem that the noble Lord does. The way that you put meat on the bones of human rights protections is with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, with the detail of the public order statute book; hence I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, about having a proper defence to face concealment. That is the detailed meat on the bones, not drafting a right to protest that pretty much replicates Articles 10 and 11.

If the concern—and I would understand this—is that a future Government will come in and scrap the Human Rights Act and pull out of the ECHR, why then have colleagues piggy-backed on to Section 6 of the Human Rights Act in the way that they drafted the right to protest? That is a mistake. I do not want to give up on the Human Rights Act and the ECHR; I will defend them as long as I have breath in my body. That is the approach because it is a hostage to fortune to have free-standing replication of particular rights in particular statutes, when we have the precious protection of an overarching Human Rights Act that applies to the interpretation of all law.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, the right to protest is an interesting concept. We all agree, on all sides of the House, that there is a right to protest. But, as with most rights—the right to free speech or the right to assemble, for example—in English common law it is not part of our law but part of our common law. We have an absence of fundamental liberties; you are free to do things unless the law otherwise prevents them. So it would be slightly odd to have the right to protest, without any of these other rights, simply inserted into our law. How would it work?

The point about public order legislation is that it always has to balance various interests: the right to protest, along with the right of those affected by those protests—third parties—and of course the police, who have to enforce what is often very difficult and complex legislation. It has to respect those various rights. The European convention did not invent these rights, but they are reflected in its Articles 10 and 11, both of which are qualified rights, not absolute rights. As Strasbourg has made clear, it is perfectly acceptable for individual Governments to determine, by reference to the circumstances that obtain in their countries, what limits are reasonable to place on those rights. Strasbourg has said a number of times that it is not likely to interfere with those. So imposing on top of our public order legislation this right to protest would, I respectfully suggest, cause only confusion in our law, making it difficult for courts and the police.