Baroness Butler-Sloss
Main Page: Baroness Butler-Sloss (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Butler-Sloss's debates with the Home Office
(10 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support Amendment 66, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Warner, partly because I was a member of the pre-legislative scrutiny committee. The noble Baroness, Lady Cox, is right to say that there should be at least some reference to overseas: we should not be seen as looking at slavery exclusively within the United Kingdom. How far that should go, through high commissions and embassies, is probably a matter for Government to look at, but I think there should be some reference. I shall also speak about Amendments 67ZC and 68ZA, both of which are in my name.
I went to the European Commission anti-slavery trafficking meeting this morning as the first speaker. One of the other speakers, apart from the Minister in the Commons, Karen Bradley, was Kevin Hyland, so I took the opportunity to ask him how he sees his role. He has just sent me a long e-mail, which I shall summarise. He sees himself as exercising a very large degree of freedom. He sees himself as independent. He says that victims are at the forefront of his plans. He is very concerned about wrongful arrest, particularly of children. He is making a survivor of human trafficking one of the panel of the group that he is using. He is recruiting a policy lead externally, by advertisement, with the agreement of the Home Office; so the number 2 will come from outside, with experience of NGOs, experience on the NRM and experience of supporting victims.
The Bishop of Bath is advising Kevin Hyland on the ecumenical response, in relation to all faiths. He has a group of lawyers to look at issues and best practice. He has a group from the NHS working to look at health issues and he has asked business leaders to form another group, all of them being there to advise him. He sees his office as independent. I must say, regardless of what the words are, listening to Kevin Hyland today I was enormously heartened by what he had to say. This does not mean that we should not put the words to the deeds, but we actually have the deeds. I thought that the House would like to know that, and I thought that it was very good news.
I will add a few things to the duties of the commissioner. My Amendment 67ZC deals with the supply chain. It is splendid—the Government are to be congratulated on it; they talk about the necessity for companies to check right down the ladder and to write reports. However, nothing at the moment in that part of the Bill says who should monitor it. My amendment would allow the commissioner to have oversight and a monitoring role. I also suggested, perhaps slightly cheekily, that he should have the power to impose penalties. I am not sure whether the commissioner will have that power, but we have not yet heard from the Government who will impose penalties if companies are not prepared to obey Clause 51.
It is very important that the commissioner should receive copies of the statements required from commercial organisations so that he can check on what is going on. The commissioner seems to be the ideal person to know what commercial organisations are doing on the ground, which their reports will have to state. Of course, if they do not like doing the reports, he could be the person to pick up the phone to say, “Why haven’t you done it?”.
The other point, which is perhaps not of the most immediate importance but which is a crucial part of any commissioner’s job, is the collection of data. It is quite interesting that as far as I can see, so far in this Bill nobody has a duty to collect data. We know that the human trafficking organisation in Birmingham does not consider itself to be the data collection organisation. Now that we have the NRM report from Jeremy Oppenheim, entirely new groups will deal with that, according to the Government, who I believe say that they accept the report on the NRM. However, there will be about eight of those panels, and at the moment there is nothing to show who will collate the data on who the victims are, what is happening to them, where they come from, and so on, and the commissioner is the obvious person to do that. Therefore I would like to see those amendments in the Bill.
My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in my name and the name of my noble friend Lord Rosser. In doing so, I also warmly welcome the other amendments in this group. We certainly subscribe to the evidence-based views of the Joint Committee on the role of the commissioner, as do other noble Lords who have spoken this afternoon. I also find of great interest the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, on the international aspect, and I would certainly like to see that explored further.
The commissioner’s role, set out in Clause 41, is narrowly centred on promoting good practice in law enforcement and the identification of victims, which in practice also involves law enforcement agencies to a large degree. That focus on prosecutions and investigations has been emphasised by the appointment of a police officer as the commissioner-designate. Of course I note what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, and warmly welcome that the commissioner-designate is determined to be independent and all the various aspirations that she cited, and that he will take advice from a very wide circle of people. However, it should not be up to the judgment of that one man to decide what his remit is and how he acts. It is extremely important for the future—for future commissioners and Home Secretaries—that the definition that we consider fitting should be in the Bill.
The limited remit of the commissioner reflects the fundamental flaw in the original draft of the Bill, which has been ameliorated to some extent already, although there is further to go: namely, the absence of measures to meet the needs of victims. Our Amendment 67ZAA seeks to widen the remit of what the commissioner must encourage in relation to good practice. The Government have raised concern that there should be no overlap with the work of the Victims’ Commissioner. However, like the noble Lord, Lord Patel, we believe that is not beyond the two commissioners in question—and I am delighted that the noble Baroness is in her place—to set clear protocols to guarantee smooth and constructive working.
My Lords, it is entirely understandable that Schedule 3 should be part of the Bill. It is important that the serious offences should not be included in a defence. However, listening to what the noble Baronesses, Lady Kennedy and Lady Hamwee, said, and looking through Schedule 3, it seems to me that a great deal of it is utterly unnecessary. I remember discussing this with the former Attorney-General, Dominic Grieve, at a time when he was eventually agreeing that there should be a defence at all. He said that Schedule 3 would apply and I cheerfully said, “Yes, of course it will apply”, but I did not read all the way through. It was not until this version of the Bill came, with all these exceptions to the defence, that one sees that this really goes beyond what is necessary, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, has put out extremely effectively. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, says, that may be a problem.
I would have thought that this was absolutely a situation in which the Government, with the assistance of the Director of Public Prosecutions, could sort the wheat from the chaff. A great deal of these offences are not applicable or appropriate for victims of slavery, although they are entirely appropriate in other areas of criminal law where you should not have a defence on these issues. The Government should look at this and consider whether they want the whole of Schedule 3.
My Lords, I, too, would like to raise one or two questions about Schedule 3, since my noble friend Lady Kennedy of Cradley has given us the opportunity to consider it.
As I understand it, under Clause 45, a victim is not guilty of an offence only if they have done the act which constitutes the offence because they have been compelled to do that act, the compulsion is attributable to slavery or the relevant exploitation and a reasonable person in the same situation as the person, and having the person’s relevant characteristics, would have no realistic alternative to doing that act. If the victim has managed to meet these requirements, Clause 45(1) still does not apply if the offence committed is listed in Schedule 3, which, as has already been pointed out in another way, extends to six and a half pages of offences. Some are easily understandable for being on that list, such as murder, manslaughter and kidnapping, but others are not so obvious bearing in mind the requirements under Clause 45 that the victim will already have had to meet in order to use Clause 45 as a defence.
In view of that, how does the Minister justify the need for such an extensive list of offences for which a victim can be found guilty even though they have met the three requirements to which I have already referred under Clause 45(1)? How and against what criteria was this list of offences compiled? To look at one example, included in the list is an offence under Section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971 of assisting unlawful immigration to a member state, which is an offence one might normally associate with a trafficker rather than the victim. Is there evidence that victims of trafficking are committing this offence of assisting unlawful immigration to a member state unrelated to their being trafficked themselves? If there is, is it also appropriate that they could be found guilty of such an offence, despite meeting the requirements in respect of compulsion and the reasonable person test under Clause 45(1) to show that they cannot be guilty of an offence unless it is listed in Schedule 3?
No, I do not think for a moment that there are examples of victims having committed all those offences in Schedule 3. This is simply set out for public protection, in order to ensure that serious crimes are not automatically given a free ride as a result of the criminals being victims.
Looking at paragraph 33 of Schedule 3, I think that the last three offences seem improbable for somebody who is compelled to act as a slave: “exposure”, “voyeurism” and “sexual penetration of a corpse”. I do not really see that those three are likely to arise in the circumstances of a victim of slavery.
My Lords, I think, perhaps, that we will need to discuss this further before Report, because, as I said, this list was drawn up in consultation with the DPP and the CPS. I presume there was a reason for putting those particular items there; it is subject to review and the discretion of the people concerned.
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 102. The Government recognise the importance of providing victims of modern slavery with appropriate protections and support. Currently, victims of trafficking are able to apply for civil legal aid for advice and representation in relation to certain immigration matters and damages and employment claims arising from their trafficking exploitation under paragraph 32 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. Following the pre-legislative scrutiny committee’s recommendation that victims of slavery should be provided with enhanced access to legal assistance, the Government committed to extending this provision to cover victims of all forms of modern slavery; that is what these amendments seek to do. I know that there is significant concern across this House that victims should receive appropriate access to legal aid, so I hope that noble Lords will agree that this measure is both necessary and welcome. I beg to move.
I add my congratulations to those of my noble and learned friend. The Government have listened to the representations that have been made and their response is to be greatly welcomed.
My Lords, I have put my name in support of these amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich. He and I have battled for three years—he having taken the lead—and this is a great moment. The Government are to be congratulated on Clause 47. They are to be congratulated on going as far as they have, but they have not gone far enough.
One of the most important points made by the noble Lord, Lord McColl, was on the child advocate having an absolutely clear statutory position. I remember discussing this with representatives of Barnardo’s who had had to work from time to time with local authorities on children in whom they had an interest and who found that some local authorities would not help them because they had no statutory power. This is a serious matter. You have to be able to say to a local authority, “You’ve got to give this to me”, and not, “Please would you mind giving it to me?”. It is a crucial distinction. In Clause 47(4), to which the noble Lord referred, the fact that it says:
“The Secretary of State may make regulations about functions”,
and about,
“requiring public authorities to co-operate with, and provide information to, child trafficking advocates”,
is not good enough. The word has to be “must”; “may” will not do.
As the noble Lord, Lord McColl, also pointed out, certain basic things are to be found in our Amendment 86H, the majority of which have to be in primary legislation. However, I can see that much of Amendment 86 could be done by regulation. It seems to me that the Government should go away and have a look at these two amendments. Some provisions could appropriately be made by regulation but the really important ones need to be made in primary legislation to give the child trafficking advocate the jurisdiction, to use a legal word, or actual control over what they wish to do for the child by working with local authorities, the police and other agencies, including the National Health Service. They would need to have the right to require those agencies to provide them with documentation and information about the child who is a trafficked victim. Other than that, each of these agencies may, and probably would, be very difficult about supplying the information. That information is crucial for the advocate, who should be there from the beginning of the identification of the child to the moment when the child is settled. With these amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McColl, three years on from when we started, we have got a long way, but the Government need to listen to see that it is not quite sufficient. We need to give the child trafficking advocate the powers as well as the duties.
My last point is about the power to appoint and instruct legal representatives. It is also absolutely crucial to give that child trafficking advocate the powers that these children—mainly brought over from other countries, although there are also some internal children—actually need from them. For those reasons, I strongly support these amendments. As I say, some provisions could be in regulation but there are basic points that have to be in primary legislation.
I support Amendment 85A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Patel, to which I was pleased to add my name. I also express my support for the case made by the noble Lord, Lord McColl, and pay tribute to him for his role in bringing us as far as we have got.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights made the case for a guardian or advocate system for all unaccompanied migrant children in its report Human Rights of Unaccompanied Migrant Children and Young People in the UK. In that report we pointed out that,
“the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child called for the establishment of a system of guardianship in its General Comment No. 6. It says a guardian should be present in ‘all planning and decision-making processes’ to provide ‘the continuum of care required by the child’. The presence of a guardian was also a specific recommendation to the United Kingdom in the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s State Report in 2008, which called for an independent system to ensure that a child’s best interests was considered throughout the decision-making process. The UNHCR insisted that a guardian would help ‘best interests remain a primary consideration throughout the procedure’”.
We repeated our recommendation in our report on the Modern Slavery Bill. In essence, the argument is very much that put by Sarah Teather MP in the Public Bill Committee that any unaccompanied child is vulnerable. This is recognised in other European countries, including Scotland. Indeed, these children become vulnerable to trafficking, a point made by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. It argued that unaccompanied children and children without parental care living in residential institutions are at higher risk of being trafficked. In response to the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord McColl, I suggest that that is perhaps one reason why it is appropriate for this amendment to be in the Bill.
I understand the Government’s fear, as expressed in the Public Bill Committee, that this would risk diluting the advocates’ skill set and expertise and that spreading the expertise too thinly could mean trafficked children not receiving the support that they need, a point made by the Minister, Karen Bradley. However, I think that this argument is weakened by the powerful argument put by the noble Lord, Lord Patel—it is an argument that civil society groups, particularly those in the Refugee Children’s Consortium, have put to us—that we do not always know who is a trafficked child. In order to ensure that trafficked children are not falling through the net, it is important that the advocate or guardian is not restricted only to helping trafficked children. Again, I hope that that meets the reservation expressed by the noble Lord, Lord McColl. It is essential for trafficked children for this to be widened. I hope that the Minister will address this argument and think a bit further about the argument about dilution, which I think is misplaced.