Modern Slavery Bill

Lord Alton of Liverpool Excerpts

Monday 8th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

The noble Lord is right in saying that the measures we have put in train should avoid that situation arising again. We are seeking to identify the victims before prosecutions are brought, to ensure that all the relevant evidence is there and that all the concerns about their situation are brought to the fore in any legal case.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for the responses she gave to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy. She will have seen the representations by the Refugee Children’s Consortium, which refer to the link between the compulsion test and the reasonable test. Specifically, it says:

“Now the compulsion test no longer applies to children, the reasonable person test in relation to children is obsolete and should also be removed”.

As the noble Baroness goes away to reflect on the points made in this very helpful debate, will she promise us that she will look specifically at the representations made by the consortium?

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

My Lords, we will, indeed, look at them very carefully because it is important to get this right.

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[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I, too, would like to raise one or two questions about Schedule 3, since my noble friend Lady Kennedy of Cradley has given us the opportunity to consider it.

As I understand it, under Clause 45, a victim is not guilty of an offence only if they have done the act which constitutes the offence because they have been compelled to do that act, the compulsion is attributable to slavery or the relevant exploitation and a reasonable person in the same situation as the person, and having the person’s relevant characteristics, would have no realistic alternative to doing that act. If the victim has managed to meet these requirements, Clause 45(1) still does not apply if the offence committed is listed in Schedule 3, which, as has already been pointed out in another way, extends to six and a half pages of offences. Some are easily understandable for being on that list, such as murder, manslaughter and kidnapping, but others are not so obvious bearing in mind the requirements under Clause 45 that the victim will already have had to meet in order to use Clause 45 as a defence.

In view of that, how does the Minister justify the need for such an extensive list of offences for which a victim can be found guilty even though they have met the three requirements to which I have already referred under Clause 45(1)? How and against what criteria was this list of offences compiled? To look at one example, included in the list is an offence under Section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971 of assisting unlawful immigration to a member state, which is an offence one might normally associate with a trafficker rather than the victim. Is there evidence that victims of trafficking are committing this offence of assisting unlawful immigration to a member state unrelated to their being trafficked themselves? If there is, is it also appropriate that they could be found guilty of such an offence, despite meeting the requirements in respect of compulsion and the reasonable person test under Clause 45(1) to show that they cannot be guilty of an offence unless it is listed in Schedule 3?

[Lord Alton of Liverpool]

My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I am puzzled by this. In Part 5, Clause 45(1) seems clearly to set out, in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), under what terms prosecution would ensue or not ensue. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, has rightly told us, the danger with lists is that there may well be things that have not been included on the list that might in due course pertain. I simply ask what may be an entirely innocent and naive question: why is it not possible to put in the Bill a generic term rather than having to have all these details in the legislation?

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, for tabling Amendment 83A and for asking whether Schedule 3 should stand part of the Bill, which relate to the offences excluded from the statutory defence for victims. I also thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lords, Lord Alton and Lord Rosser, for their contributions.

As we have previously discussed, Clause 45 establishes a statutory defence for slavery or trafficking victims where they have been compelled to commit an offence as a direct consequence of their slavery or trafficking situation. As we discussed in the previous group, this builds on the existing use of prosecutorial discretion by the CPS backed up by bespoke guidance. Ultimately, the courts can stop an inappropriate prosecution of a victim as an abuse of process.

Noble Lords questioned how Schedule 3 was drawn up. It was drafted very carefully in consultation with the DPP and CPS. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned in his previous intervention, it is very important that we get involvement from the DPP and CPS in drafting these pieces of legislation. As I have said, it was with approval and consultation that this list was drawn up. There is a need for appropriate safeguards to ensure that a new defence is applied effectively and is not open to abuse, for example by organised criminals, even if they once have been trafficked themselves. There is a delicate balance to be struck and we want to get that balance right.

Amendment 83A, together with the suggestion that Schedule 3 should not stand part of the Bill, would mean that the defence could apply to any offence, including serious sexual and violent offences such as murder and rape. People who have been enslaved or trafficked may commit criminal offences in a wide variety of circumstances and it will not always be the case that a defence is justified. We must not create a defence so wide that it amounts to a loophole in the law. It is important that we protect not just victims but also society. As we developed the statutory defence, our approach was always to ensure that we covered the types of offences often committed by those who are enslaved or trafficked. We have taken detailed advice from the Crown Prosecution Service on this point. As I have mentioned, the offences listed in Schedule 3 reflect those discussions and discussions with the DPP.

The defence is therefore designed to provide an effective protection against prosecution in the types of circumstances that actual victims of modern slavery find themselves in—for example, cannabis cultivation. The list of excluded offences in Schedule 3 can be amended by statutory instrument if experience shows the offences listed are not right and fail to protect vulnerable victims. But, in order to avoid creating a dangerous loophole for serious criminals to escape justice, we think it is right that the defence is not available in the cases—mainly serious sexual and violent offences—as listed in Schedule 3. This does not mean that a victim who commits a Schedule 3 offence in a modern slavery context will automatically face prosecution. Where the defence does not apply because the offence is too serious, the Crown Prosecution Service will still be able to decide not to prosecute if it would not be in the public interest to do so. It is right that in very difficult cases involving very serious crimes, including rape and murder, the Crown Prosecution Service carefully considers both the victim of trafficking and the victim of a very serious crime, and seeks to act in the public interest.

I understand the concern of noble Lords that victims should not be inappropriately criminalised; we agree on that, but that is why we are strengthening protections for victims in the Bill. We must be careful, however, that we do not create a loophole for very serious criminals. In the most serious cases, it is right for the CPS to use its discretion—and I emphasise that there is always discretion in these cases—to act in the public interest, based on the specific facts of the case. We are, of course, open to further discussion before Report, but I hope that these assurances will enable the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

I congratulate the Government on that; I think it is splendid.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool]

I add my congratulations to those of my noble and learned friend. The Government have listened to the representations that have been made and their response is to be greatly welcomed.

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I understand the motive behind the amendments in their attempt to ensure that the Secretary of State makes the necessary regulations to bring the subsection into force. However, I have concerns that the amendments would force the Secretary of State to make regulations potentially bringing the provision into force before the evaluation of the trial has been completed and she has reported back to Parliament on her approach as required under Clause 47(6).

[Lord Alton of Liverpool]

My Lords, rather in parenthesis, a few moments ago the Minister introduced a new component into the debate when he talked about the financial implications that might be involved were we to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord McColl. Can he give us a figure? He has talked about the financial implications and must have some idea of what the cost might be. I was surprised to hear that argument being produced in your Lordships’ House. Does he have a figure that he can share?

[Lord Bates]

I think that what I am getting at there is self-evident. If you extend the service of child trafficking advocates, clearly there is a cost implication. I was not suggesting at any stage that that was in any way an argument for or against. I was simply saying that it ought to be taken into account before we embark on an extension of the scheme. I am happy to write and come back on that, with further information about the basis of our assessment.

On the points made by my noble friend Lord McColl, it is intended that the functions and role of advocates in any national scheme will be set out in regulations. This will give the advocates the desired legislative basis without forcing us to make decisions about their role prior to the outcome and evaluation of the ongoing trial. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee accepted our approach—a point I have already made. We accept that a different approach has been taken in Northern Ireland, where an advocates scheme has not been trialled prior to setting out details of it in the Bill. It is our position, however, that the detail of advocates’ roles covered in the Northern Ireland Bill can be covered in our regulations, should this be supported by the findings of the ongoing trial. This takes in the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, when she said that there was a description effectively set out in the Northern Ireland legislation; that could be taken into account. We know that the pre-legislative scrutiny committee acknowledges that there is no one-size-fits-all in terms of advocacy schemes.

This is worth underscoring briefly. We accept that this is not a homogeneous group. This is not a group of people who have had similar experiences or who have similar needs. They are a very heterogeneous group and have different needs that must be addressed. That ought to be taken into account. The report highlighted that the Scottish system, which works very well without any legislative basis, would not necessarily translate well into England and Wales because of the different circumstances regarding trafficked children in different areas.

While we are concerned about child victims of modern slavery, the current trial and the provision in the Bill are focused on a particularly vulnerable group—namely, trafficked children. We know that trafficked children need to receive consistent support and protection to avoid them going missing and being retrafficked. We agree with my noble friend that the Bill is not the appropriate place for measures to extend the provision of advocates to all unaccompanied children, given its specialist focus on modern slavery.

I have dealt with the points raised in particular by my noble friend Lord McColl. I am aware that other points were raised. As I said when we discussed previous amendments, we will reflect on those points very carefully. I am sure that my noble friend Lord McColl, who accurately anticipated my response to his amendment, will probably tell us that he wants to revisit this issue later in our proceedings—which of course is his right. Perhaps in the interim we could have more discussions about how we can ensure that these child trafficking advocates work in the best way possible. We might also be able to share some interim findings from the trial that started in September, which would help inform the debate. With those assurances, I ask the noble Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment.

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[Lord Hylton]

My Lords, Amendment 86M, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McColl, is important in its own right and I am happy to support it. The amendment includes a period for reflection and recovery, which will be particularly helpful to overseas domestic workers who have been exploited or abused and who may have little or no English. I believe the amendment could be a ladder by which these overseas domestic workers in England, and particularly in London, could have access to legal aid and due process in civil cases as provided for by the Government’s Amendment 85, which was accepted earlier. In particular, if applications on behalf of aggrieved persons could be made by NGOs and law centres, the thing might be made to work and it would help those who particularly need it. For years we have seen bad and vicious employers enjoying a large measure of impunity. This must be ended. The amendment seems to agree with the Government’s stated wish to improve protection for victims.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool]

My Lords, I would like to be associated with the remarks from my noble friend Lady Cox concerning the potential gaps that people could fall through and her remarks and questions about the national referral mechanism and legal representation for those who are caught up in trafficking.

I particularly support Amendment 86J, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and Amendment 86M, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McColl. There is a link between these amendments because the noble Baroness quite rightly identifies those who may have been psychologically traumatised by their experiences. She rightly said that people could be extremely vulnerable and very badly damaged. Any of us who have met people who have been trafficked know that that must be true. If people have been concealed in a vehicle, smuggled into the country and exploited in the ways that have been described in speech after speech in Committee, these grotesque experiences will have maimed them psychologically. Hence it is important that there should be some psychological assessment and support for people who may be suffering from acute trauma and mental illness of one kind or another—something that is always neglected anyway in the National Health Service for our own citizens, let alone for people who have come through these kinds of experiences.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is right to say that people should be assessed psychologically during the investigation of the offence. That theme is picked up in Amendment 86M, in subsection (6)(c) of the proposed new clause, where the noble Lord, Lord McColl, would make provision,

“to assist victims in their physical, psychological and social recovery”—

a point returned to in proposed new subsection (10)(c) with,

“medical treatment, including psychological assistance”.

This is a recurring theme in these two amendments and I am surprised that provision is not being mandated anyway by the Bill and wonder whether it is not possible to do what the noble Baroness and the noble Lord have argued for. What do the Government intend to do to safeguard people who may be suffering from mental illness and who may have been traumatised through their experiences?