Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Brinton
Main Page: Baroness Brinton (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Brinton's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMany things could be added to the Bill and many could be taken away but the general thrust of the law, as my noble friend well understands, being a barrister of considerable experience, is that where a burden is placed upon a defendant in a criminal matter, it is set to the civil standard of proof.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, for explaining his amendment in such helpful detail. However, my focus is on suggesting that Clause 63 should not stand part of the Bill. The principal reason—much of which we debated the other day, so I will not go into it in great detail—is the effect on the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller community. It is particularly about the use of the vague and expansive provisions of significant “disruption” and “distress”. “Damage” may be easier to define, but there are perhaps some issues about that as well.
Clearly, a range of provisions is already on the statute book which criminalise committing criminal damage. Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 allows courts to grant injunctions against people engaging in antisocial behaviour—I could go on. The real concern is that this is clearly targeted at the Gypsy and Traveller community. To repeat a point that I made the other day, the definition of “significant” is not clear in the Bill. The Supreme Court recently characterised “significant” as follows:
“like the skin of a chameleon, the adjective takes a different colour so as to suit a different context.”
However, “disruption” itself has also been controversial in the context of public order legislation and is hugely open to interpretation. Part 4 directs authorities to focus exclusively on disruption caused by roadside camps, rather than inviting this to be balanced against the relative disruption caused by evicting Gypsy and Traveller families, to ensure that the response is proportionate.
“Distress” is also a broad and highly subjective category. The National Police Chiefs’ Council asked, in its evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights,
“whose distress? Is it the landowner’s? Is it a perception?”
This nebulous term may, in this context, also be informed by stereotypes and prejudices against Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. We heard noble Lords last week making assumptions about the distress that the presence of camps alone may cause—of having an encampment nearby—and that this was also the source of crimes. Most noble Lords who said this also said that they could not prove it, but certainly among the community there is considerable distress already.
As I said, there are existing powers to address this. Section 61 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 gives the police the power to remove people from land where the landowner or occupier takes reasonable steps, and Section 62A allows the police to direct trespassers to remove themselves and their vehicles and property from land where a suitable pitch or relevant caravan site is available within the same local area. This is particularly important in terms of the data that we heard about the other day—that there are fewer authorised encampments available. There are more unofficial ones, but it is a real problem for people travelling from one area to another and intending to carry out their lawful business if they cannot find somewhere to go. The difficulty with Clause 63 is that it heaps further problems upon them but uses terms which are not well defined and are utterly nebulous, and which put this community at further risk of having their way of life criminalised.