Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Garnier
Main Page: Lord Garnier (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Garnier's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Shrewsbury and to the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, for signing my Amendment 150 to Clause 63. Unfortunately, he is unable to be here today because of an unforeseen medical appointment, but has read my speech in draft and has told me that he agrees with it. Whether it comes out as I wrote it is entirely a different matter. In any event, it comes with the usual caveat—the mistakes are mine; the support is his, and I am grateful for it.
The amendment is simple and straightforward. There is no reason in principle or justice why it should not be accepted. That said, I am not so naive as to think that, just because I am arguing for it, it is perfectly drafted or that the Government or the majority of the Committee will agree with me. I will not press it to a Division, but I shall listen carefully to what my noble friend the Minister says in response before deciding whether and how to take the matter forward beyond Committee.
Clause 63 of the Bill amends Section 68 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. I have nothing to say about the policy behind Clause 63 but, since it is there, as I indicated at Second Reading, it gives me an opportunity to right a wrong contained in Section 68 of the 1994 Act. That section defines the offence of aggravated trespass. In so far as it is relevant to my amendment, it provides, first, that:
“A person commits the offence of aggravated trespass if he trespasses on land and, in relation to any lawful activity which persons are engaging in or are about to engage in on that or adjoining land, does there anything which is intended by him to have the effect—
(a) of intimidating those persons or any of them so as to deter them or any of them from engaging in that activity,
(b) of obstructing that activity, or
(c) of disrupting that activity.”
Section 68(2) says that:
“Activity on any occasion on the part of a person or persons on land is ‘lawful’ for the purposes of this section if he or they may engage in the activity on the land on that occasion without committing an offence or trespassing on the land.”
Many things could be added to the Bill and many could be taken away but the general thrust of the law, as my noble friend well understands, being a barrister of considerable experience, is that where a burden is placed upon a defendant in a criminal matter, it is set to the civil standard of proof.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, for explaining his amendment in such helpful detail. However, my focus is on suggesting that Clause 63 should not stand part of the Bill. The principal reason—much of which we debated the other day, so I will not go into it in great detail—is the effect on the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller community. It is particularly about the use of the vague and expansive provisions of significant “disruption” and “distress”. “Damage” may be easier to define, but there are perhaps some issues about that as well.
Clearly, a range of provisions is already on the statute book which criminalise committing criminal damage. Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 allows courts to grant injunctions against people engaging in antisocial behaviour—I could go on. The real concern is that this is clearly targeted at the Gypsy and Traveller community. To repeat a point that I made the other day, the definition of “significant” is not clear in the Bill. The Supreme Court recently characterised “significant” as follows:
“like the skin of a chameleon, the adjective takes a different colour so as to suit a different context.”
However, “disruption” itself has also been controversial in the context of public order legislation and is hugely open to interpretation. Part 4 directs authorities to focus exclusively on disruption caused by roadside camps, rather than inviting this to be balanced against the relative disruption caused by evicting Gypsy and Traveller families, to ensure that the response is proportionate.
“Distress” is also a broad and highly subjective category. The National Police Chiefs’ Council asked, in its evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights,
“whose distress? Is it the landowner’s? Is it a perception?”
This nebulous term may, in this context, also be informed by stereotypes and prejudices against Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. We heard noble Lords last week making assumptions about the distress that the presence of camps alone may cause—of having an encampment nearby—and that this was also the source of crimes. Most noble Lords who said this also said that they could not prove it, but certainly among the community there is considerable distress already.
As I said, there are existing powers to address this. Section 61 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 gives the police the power to remove people from land where the landowner or occupier takes reasonable steps, and Section 62A allows the police to direct trespassers to remove themselves and their vehicles and property from land where a suitable pitch or relevant caravan site is available within the same local area. This is particularly important in terms of the data that we heard about the other day—that there are fewer authorised encampments available. There are more unofficial ones, but it is a real problem for people travelling from one area to another and intending to carry out their lawful business if they cannot find somewhere to go. The difficulty with Clause 63 is that it heaps further problems upon them but uses terms which are not well defined and are utterly nebulous, and which put this community at further risk of having their way of life criminalised.
My Lords, I have said all along, and the proponents of the amendments that we have discussed have underlined, that the absolute majority of the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller community are law-abiding people, so this is not something that disproportionately impacts on them. It is about people who cause destruction to other people’s land and property.
My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have spoken in this debate. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, for their qualified support for the principle behind my Amendment 150.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gently chided me—or if not me then a class of people—for being unsophisticated. It may well be that it was my lack of sophistication that annoyed the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who, not for the first time—we saw it again last Wednesday—tilted at a windmill. I thought I had made it clear in the course of my speech that proposed new Clause 68(3A)(a) in my amendment was there in error and we should concentrate on proposed new paragraph (b). She is of course perfectly entitled to make whatever remarks she wishes, but the gravamen of my amendment was to reverse the burden of proof in relation to the unlawful activity point in paragraph (b) and not, as I think I had accepted, in relation to who should prove the trespass. Having cleared up that point, I think we can make a lot more progress.
I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Hailsham for his support. Beyond that, I have nothing to say because, as I said in my opening remarks, the policy behind Clause 63 is for the Government to defend and to persuade this House and the other place about. However, there is some room for discussion. I know the Minister has had an enormous amount of work to do in dealing with the Bill, and indeed has a lot yet to do, so she has my every sympathy. However, if she can find time perhaps to have a quiet discussion with me and others of like mind about proposed new Clause 68(3A)(b) in my Amendment 150 regarding the unlawful activity point, I would be most grateful. That having been said, this debate has now reached its natural conclusion for today’s purposes and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.