Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lord Sharkey

Committee stage
Monday 22nd June 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 33, 35, 37, 42 and 43 in this group. All these amendments, and my Clause 7 not-stand-part question, relate to the FOS and its regime. I will try very hard not to repeat too much of what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, was saying a moment ago. The proposed reforms of the FOS regime are extensive and fundamental, but there is nowhere a clear and convincing explanation of why such fundamental changes are necessary. In fact, I see no real evidence at all of the need for reform on the scale being proposed here.

What we see, looking at the far-reaching proposals in the Bill, is an assault on the four key pillars designed into the FOS by Parliament: independence, speed and simplicity, time limits on bringing complaints, and the “fair and reasonable” test for determining those complaints. Taken together, Part 2 replaces each of those pillars with subordination to the FCA, a rather undefined change to time limits, and a heavy qualification of the “fair and reasonable” test amounting to its entire abandonment. This raises the question of why such a radical reform can be seen as necessary and/or beneficial. At Second Reading, I asked the Minister what evidence there was of systemic failure in the current operation of the FOS, and for evidence, for example, that the FOS was acting as a quasi-regulator. I have had no reply.

The obvious question in all this is: who benefits? The answer is: not the ordinary consumer. My amendments are aimed at eliminating, or at least reducing, the weakening of consumer protection. To that end, my Amendments 33 and 35, to Clause 6, address the time limits for complaints to the FOS, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has dealt with extensively; I agree with most of what he said. What my amendments offer as an alternative to his is that they are perhaps not quite as strong—that might be their virtue. It is often very difficult to get things written into a Bill; it is sometimes easier to deal with them via secondary legislation, as I do rather obliquely.

In Part 2, the Bill proposes other very substantive changes to the way in which the FOS operates. One of these changes, in Clause 7, sets out the circumstances under which the FOS must notify the FCA of a matter relating to a complaint, under which the FOS must request an opinion from the FCA as to the interpretation of FCA rules. It then sets out in detail how consultation should take place on the matter. There really is detail: five whole pages of the Bill set out in great detail the various stages required in the referral process. It adds complexity for no obvious gain and subordinates the FOS’s judgments to the FCA’s. I have no doubt that the byzantine array of subclauses or qualifications will, overall, introduce greater complexity for no foreseeable benefits and will greatly increase the workload of the FCA. The FCA is already under pressure and is planning to absorb the PSR. The last thing we need is the creation of new systems, rules and powers that show no clear promise of benefit, or at least no benefit to the retail complainant.

On necessity, we have to take into consideration whether the current FOS methods are faulty or unproductive. I have seen no compelling evidence that this is the case, only a rather unconvincing summary of the consultation responses. The FOS received 214,000 new complaints in 2025-26. It is projecting a resolution of 207,000 complaints in the coming year, of which 206,000 concern banking and consumer credit companies. It has a target of 70% of cases being resolved within three months and 90% within six. It does not seem as though it is having difficulty operating, and I am not aware of any significant problems for the average consumer. I hear from the industry that the FOS acts inconsistently and that it has strayed into becoming a quasi-regulator, but I have seen no evidence of that, and I am unconvinced by the simple assertion. Taken as a whole, Clause 7 in effect subordinates the FOS to the FCA, removing yet another foundational pillar: independence. We should remove Clause 7.

I turn now to the proposed amendments to Clause 8. I will speak to Amendments 37, 42 and 43, which deal with how a complaint to the FOS is to be determined. This is a controversial matter; the Bill proposes very significant changes. This has already provoked calls to have the whole clause removed from the Bill, and I recognise the strength of feeling behind that.

How the FOS decides on complaints is absolutely critical to its operations and to their general acceptability. At the moment and historically, the FOS rules on complaints on the basis of what is fair and reasonable under all circumstances. The Bill changes that. It says:

“A complaint may be determined in favour of the complainant only if, in the opinion of the Financial Ombudsman … at the time the disputed act or omission occurred, either … the act or omission did not comply with an FCA rule applying to the respondent, or … there was no FCA rule applying to the respondent that related to the act or omission, and the disputed act or omission was not fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case”.


This adds one of two requirements not present now, in addition to the “fair and reasonable” test. In essence, it removes the FOS’s current and critical independent status and reduces the FOS’s scope to a subset of FCA rules. If you ask who benefits from all this, the answer, it seems to me, is not likely to be the consumer.

The small print of the Bill makes the situation for the complainant even less attractive. The Bill specifies a long list of other requirements to be considered in making a determination, most of them tilting the scales in favour of FCA rule-based compliance. This long list includes

“any other matters specified in regulations made by the Treasury”

and the general principle that consumers should take responsibility for their decisions. Here, we are a very long way from the “fair and reasonable under all circumstances” test.

The net effect for the Bill’s proposals will inevitably be to increase bureaucracy and to increase a remoteness from practical circumstances and a reliance on box-ticking procedures. It will convert the independent FOS into a compliant subsidiary of the FCA. We have not seen spelled out any evidenced justification for such a radical narrowing of the FCA’s reach and independence. I ask the Minister again to provide the evidence that supports these radical changes. By “evidence”, I mean hard data, not simply a headcount of consultees’ opinions, as interpreted by HMT.

As I noted at Second Reading, the UK’s financial sector thrives not merely because it is competitive but because it is trusted. For it to be trusted, consumers must have confidence that, when things go wrong, there is an independent, accessible and effective route to redress. We have one of those already: the FOS. My Amendments 37, 42 and 43 would remove the new bureaucratic and complex restrictions, qualifications and subordinations in the Bill. In their place, the amendments would restore a simple and clear operating framework. They would restore the primacy of the “fair and reasonable” test, and they would update the list of things that the ombudsman must or may take into account.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, my Amendment 34 again concerns symmetry of enforcement and redress periods. The Bill introduces a 10-year hard stop on complaints to the Financial Ombudsman Service, but the problem is that the 10-year figure is already riddled with exemptions: for long-dated instruments, for latent harms, for products with extended maturities and for situations where the consumer could not reasonably have known they had a claim. The Government have already conceded that the 10-year period cannot sensibly apply in a wide range of cases. I have a concern that, once Parliament writes “10 years” into statute, that becomes the headline. Consumers may assume they have 10 years, even when they are in one of the many categories where the long stop does not apply. That creates a real risk that people will time themselves out because they believe the headline rather than the detail.

Then there is the deeper structural issue that I have referenced before: firms’ enforcement rights do not end at 10 years. They can enforce debts, pursue arrears, securitise portfolios and benefit from long-tail revenue streams well beyond that period. Yet the consumer’s ability to challenge an unfair relationship or to bring a complaint may fall away far earlier. That is the same kind of asymmetry that I raised before. My solution is that at least the starting point should be that the duration of rights, remedies and enforcement powers for firms must be aligned with the duration of rights and remedies for consumers arising from the same act or relationship.

I have addressed only that aspect of asymmetry in my amendment; I have not attacked the 10-year hard stop and the impact that that might have on consumer perception. My amendment would not interfere with the exemptions that the Government have already accepted. It would simply ensure that, where a firm retains enforcement rights beyond 10 years, in various circumstances, the consumer retains the corresponding right to challenge the fairness of that relationship for the same period—in other words, symmetry. I need not say any more, as we have been around this loop, but it is the same argument in a different place.

Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lord Sharkey

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I did not expect to lead this group, but due to the diligence of the Public Bill Office in tracking down consequential amendments, my Amendment 90 has come to the top.

My Amendment 110, which is my main amendment in this group and on which I will focus my remarks, seeks to delete new Section 28C of FSMA. At the heart of new Section 28C is the asset allocation definition, which is flawed not because of its aspiration but because it rests on a complete misunderstanding of what investment trusts or listed investment companies actually invest in, and it excludes them.

Last Monday, I explained the anti-competitive and reputational effects of encouraging the flow of investment exclusively via the new LTAF vehicle and excluding the long-standing listed investment company structure. Today I have touched on the role that they play in valuation. Before turning to the wider reasons why this clause is fundamentally flawed, I will dispel another misconception I hear in circulation: “Investment trusts do not do infrastructure”. Well, I do not know what you call the Thames Tideway Tunnel, Sizewell C, utility-scale onshore and offshore wind, schools, hospitals, hydroelectric schemes, solar and nuclear energy, space, communications and satellites—but I call them infrastructure. All are substantially invested in, at the building stage, by investment trusts. Perhaps the Minister would accompany me to see some of these, although maybe not in space.

I also hear the claim that they do not do the big infrastructure projects that the Government are focused on. That is not really true, but there is nothing in the asset list of private equity, private debt, venture capital and interests in land that says, “Only the mega size”, or that stops them being qualified assets when held by another route. Anyway, we all need all scales of infrastructure investment and ongoing funding for expansion.

On Monday this week, our much-vaunted new prospectus rules came into effect; they make it easier, cheaper and faster to raise both IPO and follow-on capital. This applies to listed investment companies, too. What was this for? It was precisely so that companies can grow faster, bigger pools of capital can be raised more efficiently and larger infrastructure projects and bigger funds can be built. What is the point of celebrating our new financial market regulation if the Government then block the very vehicles it was designed to support? Why are some people in charge of investment—yes, some of them are to blame, too—still of the mindset that investment trusts do not do primary investment, at the very moment when rule changes are being made to build on the boom in primary infrastructure investment that has come through this route in recent years?

I come on to mandation more generally. I am not against the underlying intent of encouraging more pension investment in private assets. However, there is already a far greater awareness of the need to do that. The policy argument is won, but we have only just got to setting up LTAFs and the listing rule changes. The Government have not given the financial industry the chance to show what it can do. It is hardly a vote of confidence in our largest industry—financial services. What message does that send to the world? It says, “Go somewhere else; we have to bully to get things done in London”. What does it say about our famous and canny asset management in Edinburgh? If the Government want to add encouragement, use “comply or explain”—or, better still, “always explain”—to add transparency and understanding to the system. My goodness, neither the Government nor parts of the pensions industry seem to know what goes on in the wider asset management industry. Do not just ask the same people who have driven the old pension investment strategies.

Then we come to trustees. I have amendments elsewhere in the Bill aimed at clarifying that they can and should look to wider systemic and economic effects, but they should not be overridden. At their core, members’ interests are paramount for trustees. New Section 28C does not have members’ interests paramount. It threatens deauthorisation and the disruption and cost that that would cause if, in the judgment of trustees and in full knowledge of the characteristics of their members, they consider that a little less infrastructure or private equity is appropriate. What if the phasing of big projects means that there is a dip when investments exit? What if you are still in the J-curve dip? If some things perform badly, or the rush to invest exaggerates prices, do trustees have to keep pumping money in at poor value? No, that is the moment for explanation and perhaps a modification of strategy, not compulsion or deauthorisation.

Let us be clear: a deauthorisation power of this kind is not neutral. It creates a structural pressure towards consolidation. If a scheme risks losing authorisation simply because its trustees judge that a different phasing or balance of assets is appropriate for its members, they get closed down or forced to merge. That is backdoor consolidation, not member-focused governance.

These are some of the reasons why I want to remove new Section 28C entirely. It does nothing but harm. It is economically inept, competitively unfair, legally unprincipled and blind to the regulatory opportunities that have only just come on stream. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow—and I did—my noble friend discussing the reserved mandatory powers in the Bill. I will speak to my Amendments 111, 161 and 162. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for adding his name to all three and the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, for adding his name to the first.

The purpose of these amendments is to remove the reserve power of mandation from the Bill. The case against these reserve mandatory powers has been set out by a large number of important institutions. Most criticism seems to focus on the issue of conflicts with fiduciary duty. Critics of mandation have argued, correctly in my view, that directing trustees to hold a fixed share of specified assets conflicts with the trustees’ duty to act solely in the interests of their members. Mandation of investment in specific asset classes for policy reasons rather than on a risk/return consideration risks subordinating members’ interests to political objectives.

This also exposes trustees to legal liability for breaching their duty, especially if the investments are seen as politically motivated or fail to deliver competitive returns. The lack of legal clarity around the scope of fiduciary duty, particularly regarding systemic risks or broader economic impacts may well exacerbate trustees’ concerns about litigation and regulatory risk.

I know that the Government are alive to the fiduciary duty issue and have promised to produce statutory guidance to help. At our meeting before Second Reading, I asked the Minister whether this guidance would have binding provisions. The answer was no. The guidance will have, apparently, the same force as the many other “have regards” in our financial services sector. I also asked the Minister whether we could see a draft of this guidance before the end of Committee, but I have not had a reply to date. I therefore ask the Minister again whether we will see draft guidance so that we may scrutinise it before the end of Committee, or at least on Report. It is easy to understand, in these circumstances, why some legal experts and industry groups have called for a statutory clarification of fiduciary duty and argue that only primary legislation can provide the cover that trustees need to invest confidently, as the Government wish, without breaching their duties.

There is also the question of definition. What is the appropriate test for “productive” when applied to mandated assets? What is the appropriate test for “UK investment”, or even “qualifying assets”? Can the Minister say what these tests are and when they are likely to be available to Parliament for examination? There are other significant concerns with mandation. For example, it may produce lower returns and higher costs if it drives crowded trades, pushing schemes into lower-quality or overpriced assets simply to hit targets. As the large DC providers have noted, if there are not enough good-quality opportunities in the mandated classes, schemes may be forced into illiquid or sub-optimal funds. This concern has been made clear as a condition of voluntary participation in the Mansion House Accord. Then there may be a risk in reducing diversification. Concentrating pension assets in restricted geography or restricted asset classes inevitably increases vulnerability to UK-specific economic shocks.