Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 26th February 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I signed the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and agree entirely with the principle of both these amendments. I was particularly drawn to the notion of having a threshold and notification, as provided by the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. He circulated it for comment and therefore I signed it after some negotiations with him.

Put simply, if the deficit is large and the effort to close it is too small—smaller than the dividend—the payment of the dividend becomes a notifiable event. The sequel to that would surely be what the noble Lord, Lord Flight, has just pointed out: that it be looked at and perhaps in certain cases, though not all if there are other things that could be taken into account, the dividend payment be stopped. The point is that it is brought to the regulator’s notice, rather than the regulator potentially having to look at an awful lot of dividends and payments being made. Indeed, how will the regulator even find out about them? The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, solves that little loop of how the regulator gets to know about them and has a reasonable number to look at rather than being overwhelmed.

In our negotiations, we tried to find a formula to keep the momentum going to close the gap, even within the five years, as a lot can go wrong in that period. I got as far as something like “the ratio of the dividend to deficit not being greater than the reciprocal of the remaining years and not conveniently commutative”. I concluded that, if I carried on in that way, I would have to put in a job application to Dominic Cummings.

More seriously—I refer here to the helpful meeting I had with the Minister and officials yesterday—I want to see some specific push in the Bill for the regulator to be tougher, including in setting the contribution schedule for paying down the deficits. As has already been explained by other noble Lords, TPR has come forward with a set of principles, but maybe it needs something to back them up and get them over the line in enforcing them.

In the meeting yesterday, it was pointed out that more powers are being given to the regulator in the Bill and that regulations will be forthcoming. That is well and good, but something has to make sure that the regulator is urged to use those powers and to be strong, especially in standing up to larger and more forceful companies and individuals. We know that the record there is not necessarily all that good. The policy impetus needs to come from government and Parliament; otherwise, there may be more power but no enforced policy shift.

We also know that boards will take advice on these kinds of matters and be told what the market norms are, or at least what other companies have done. If the dial is to be shifted, the advice has to be shifted. The way to ensure that advice is shifted is for there to be an indication of the policy in the Bill, because an adviser cannot go against that in their duty to advise the companies.

It was very good to hear that the new offences that we discussed on Monday—which seems a long time ago now—are wide enough to embrace advisers, but you have to get at what their duty is to those they are advising. There are lots of reasons to have something in the Bill to make sure that the principles already outlined by TPR have that backing to be enforced and have that effect. As I said on Monday, it should not be normal to accept overly long continuation of deficits just because a company is well capitalised.

There can be many claims on and reasons for that extra capitalisation—there may be lots of tentative reasons why they need it. There might be plans to spend it to buy another company. All kinds of things could be going on, and what looks like a good capital margin could actually be shoring up many other things as well as the pension deficit. What is the excuse to the Pensions Regulator? What excuse might be given to other sources? Some of the clever analysts may work out what is going on; the ordinary investor and the ordinary pensioner is unlikely to do so. Therefore, I support the principle of both the amendments: something should go in the Bill to push or shore up the Pensions Regulator in its actions.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly—I have added my name to one of the amendments—to support the concept that has been so well explained already by noble Lords and to echo the warnings that this is a very important time in our defined benefit pension system, as we still have employers attached to schemes and, in some cases, members contributing. Some schemes are still not completely closed. Once a scheme has closed to new members, it will not be too long before it closes to new accruals and it will effectively be in run-off. While there are still employers with an interest in the scheme and before we get to the period, which will come in the next 10 years or so, when there is no economic interest between the employer and the scheme and it is seen merely as a major liability—with more and more companies looking for ways to get around the deficits—now is the time to be collecting as much money as possible.

Obviously, one does not want to damage the ongoing viability of the employer, but there needs to be more recognition of the fact that the pension scheme is a debtor of the company—not all companies see it in that way—and the choice between dividend payment and deficit funding should not be just between the interest of shareholders and the interest of pension scheme members. The pension deficit has people’s lives attached, so there is a higher importance here.

When one looks at the provisions of the Companies Act 2006, in particular with reference to Amendment 84, Section 830 says that a company should not be permitted to pay out a dividend if it has not made sufficient profit to cover its costs or if there are losses in the company. What is not explicit, but is made explicit in the amendment, which was originally part of my noble friend Lord Balfe’s Private Member’s Bill, is that the accounting measure of the pension deficit does not reflect the actuarial reality as estimated by a scheme actuary, or perhaps by trustees, of the true scale of the obligation—in other words, potential losses—that the company faces. Therefore, redefining the accounting measure and taking account of the actuarial measure would put the payment of dividend on a different plane. That is to be reflected in Section 830A, which would be added after Section 830, in terms of justification for payment of a dividend that might otherwise look viable.

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[Baroness Stedman-Scott]

Of course.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

The point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, is similar to the point that I was going to make. Some of the answers the Minister gave, in particular to my questions, were good and comprehensive, but they rely on having an appropriate plan in place. The point is that there are times when the appropriate plan is no longer appropriate, and at that point it all falls apart. I think what the Minister has said is that in regulations there will be things that will allay some of our fears, but it would be nice to have something about that in the Bill, because otherwise we are taking it on trust. It is not that we inherently mistrust the Minister or her officials. Of course there have been previous framework provisions that have been remarkably empty of policy, but that does not make it correct. The Government and this Parliament make policy. Regulators do not make policy; they shy away from it. There is no greater making of policy than putting it in the Bill.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

I would also like to be involved in the further talks. We have to try to find a way of dealing with big risks between recovery plans without gungeing up the system for the regulator so that it cannot focus on what matters rather than on what does not matter with the bureaucracy overtaking the objective.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I am sorry to interrupt but this is specifically on the government amendments. Like others, I welcome what is there and I hear the Minister referring to the matter as urgent and important. I just come up against a block when I see that it says “Regulations may impose”. Why can we not have “must” if there is an intention that these things are to be done? From the particular point of view of justice, in new Sections 41C and 41D, the reference to what would be your right of appeal to a tribunal still comes under “may”. I know that it is a standard formulation but it really does not appear to be right, because nothing is actually promised when it says “may”. Why can we not have “must”, and certainly have “must” when it comes to defences and reference to tribunals?

[Baroness Stedman-Scott]

In answer to the noble Baroness, subject to the passage of the Bill we will consult extensively this summer on the content of new regulations, which will likely include the content of these new requirements and the timing thereof. When we lay regulations and when they come into force will depend upon the outcome of the consultation, but we will respond to that within a year of its launch.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

That still does not mean that something will definitely happen then. I understand that the regulations’ shape depends upon the consultation but they should be regulations that do something, with a promise that we are going to have them—that there will be some, not that there “may”.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott]

As I understand it, we have to consult before we can make that decision.

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[Lord Sharkey]

My Lords, I shall be very brief. Amendments 29, 30 and 32 in my name are all probing. Their purpose is to allow discussion of the reasoning behind the choice of penalties written into Clauses 112 and 115. In each case, I would be interested to know two things: what comparisons, if any, did the Government make in deciding on the penalty amounts, and what was done to assess the likely effectiveness of these amounts? In other words, are the upper limits really large enough to influence behaviour, and what has convinced the Government that they are?

At Second Reading, I noted that the Government seem uncertain about the merit of the £1 million upper limit contained in new Section 88A, inserted into the Pensions Act 2004 by Clause 115. Subsection (2) of new Section 88A is where this £1 million is set, but the very next subsection allows for secondary legislation to change this upwards without limit. As far as I can tell, this power to adjust upwards by regulation does not apply to the penalty upper limits in Clause 112, and I think that that deserves an explanation. Why are the Government confident that they will not need to change upwards the lesser penalties in Clause 112 but feel that they might have to do so for the major penalty in Clause 115? Surely it is not wise to allow unlimited power to raise penalty levels by regulation.

The Government implicitly acknowledge that that is the case by setting limits on the face of the Bill. Then they do a reverse ferret by giving themselves unlimited discretion to revise upwards in one case. I can see why the Government might lack confidence in the proposed £1 million limit, given the resources of those upon whom the penalty might fall, but surely it would be better to have in the Bill a limit that we think might work, or at least a limit on how far the initial amount may be raised or a proportional system, as proposed by the amendment of my noble friend Lady Bowles.

In any event, it would be very helpful to know how the Government alighted on all these upper bounds, especially the £1 million limit, and especially as they all seem intuitively to be rather on the low side. I look forward to the Minister’s response. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group—Amendment 31 is my own. The broad principle is not to let the fines simply be a cost of doing business for the wealthy and especially large companies. Inevitably, large fines give rise to concern among those who would be the bottom end of any range of fines, with respect both to the seriousness of their offence and their resources. It is clear that proportionality is key—proportionality both to the severity of the offence and the resources of the offender. The fine must also be a sufficient deterrent, not just a cost of doing business.

It does not seem to be customary to recite proportionality in legislation, as it is presumed. For my part, I would not see it as damaging to include wording on proportionality, and anyway it would always be part of any appeal. That is why, in Amendment 31, I changed the new Section 88A fine from “£1 million” to

“twice the employer’s pension deficit or 4% of the employer’s annual global turnover (whichever is greater)”.

The fines may not be these amounts; they are the maximums. These fines can be for egregious matters that put pension funds at risk—and, therefore, the livelihood and well-being of pensioners and future pensioners—and potentially impose on taxpayers. They are fines for being a social pestilence.

I thought that the size of the deficit was relevant—maybe I should have made it three times the size, because my inspiration was US-style triple damages that can apply for monstrous offences. I have made it clear that I think doing bad things to pensions is pretty monstrous.

Turnover-linked criteria are also not new. They are in use in the UK, having been recently introduced for the Information Commissioner; that is what I have copied. They have, of course, been in play for some time for competition offences. The Information Commissioner penalties also have a numerical option, although again that is not limited to the turnover side of the penalty. I left out the number in my amendment to emphasis the proportionality point, but I would have no problem adding in the amendment of my noble friend Lord Sharkey so that we have a numerical measure in there as well.

It would seem from something that was said to me—in one of the meetings, I think—that the £1 million fine level was inspired by “similar fine provisions” by the FCA. Well, I can suggest several responses to that. First, the FCA may be the one out of line with modern thinking, the fine having been set a while ago. Also, it has perhaps been undermined because it always has to do consultations and, strangely, has to consult those who might be fined. But, as a matter of consultation, I note that the ABI has supported my amendment.

[Baroness Sherlock]

My Lords, these amendments offer a good opportunity to explore whether the penalties in the Bill are of the right kind and scale. I hope the Minister will take this opportunity to set out the thinking behind the decisions that the Government have reached. I read the DWP policy brief for the Bill; it says that, in developing the new sanctions, the main priority had been getting the right balance between increased deterrents and protection for members, minimising any negative impacts on industry, and ensuring that the new sanctions are in line with the wider statute book. So one of the questions is: has it done that?

The first question, raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, is: are the penalties set at the right place and why are they set at that place? What is the argument —why £50,000 and not £100,000? Why £l million and not £10 million or £50 million? Was this done to mirror provisions elsewhere? If so, which ones? If not, what work—what modelling—was done to lead Ministers to believe that they have landed in the right place?

Interestingly, the policy brief then says that the DWP considered the level when establishing the new penalty of up to £1 million. It says that the level had to be proportionate for local individuals and businesses of different wealth levels and appropriate for a wide range of behaviours, provide a stronger deterrent than the current regime and work alongside the new criminal offences for non-compliance, under which an unlimited fine can be issued. I need the Minister to help me here because this is not my area of expertise: if the maximum fine is £1 million, why does the maximum fine have to take account of a wide range of behaviours and wealth of individuals or businesses? Presumably, the maximum fine applies only to the people at the top of the scale, either those who have the most money or have done the worst thing. How does that balance work in setting a maximum fine? There may be a really good reason—maybe you have to be proportionate; I do not know—but could she explain it to me?

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

33: After Clause 115, insert the following new Clause—
“Report for the purposes of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986
(1) The Pensions Regulator must make a report to the Secretary of State under this section if the circumstances in subsection (2) apply.(2) The circumstances in this subsection are where—(a) a person has been convicted of an offence under this Act or another offence related to a pension scheme,(b) it appears to the Pensions Regulator that a person has committed an offence under this Act or another offence related to a pension scheme, or(c) a person is fined under section 88A of the Pensions Act 2004.(3) In the report under subsection (1) the Pensions Regulator must—(a) identify the person,(b) identify, where the person is a corporate body, any person who was a director of it at the time any offence was committed or appears to have been committed,(c) report on any facts which appear to the Pensions Regulator to be relevant to the Secretary of State for the purpose of making a decision under section 8(1) of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, and(d) state whether the Pensions Regulator considers that, having regard to the need for public confidence in the system of pensions regulation, it would be expedient in the public interest for any person so identified to be the subject of a disqualification order.(4) But the Pensions Regulator is not to be required to make a report to the Secretary of State in respect of a person if—(a) that person is a director who is the subject of a disqualification order under section 2 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 in respect of a criminal offence, or(b) in the case of a fine under section 88A of the Pensions Act 2004, it appears to the Pensions Regulator that no public interest would be served in making a disqualification order against that person.”

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, this amendment aims to utilise an existing provision in the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. Section 8(1) of that Act was broadened in 2015 so that the Secretary of State for BEIS may, in the public interest, apply to the court for a disqualification order. It used to be the case that Section 8(1) was activated by a report after certain specific investigations, one of which was an investigation by the FCA. The change in 2015 recognised that the reports did not need to be so restrictive. What I propose follows the theme of the original procedure and suggests that when there has been a serious offence committed regarding pensions, the Pensions Regulator should make a report to the Secretary of State for BEIS for the purposes of the Company Directors Disqualification Act.

The Pensions Regulator would be required to identify the person, or, if a body corporate, the directors at the time when the offence was committed, and,

“state whether the Pensions Regulator considers that, having regard to the need for public confidence in the system of pensions regulation, it would be expedient in the public interest for … a disqualification order.”

It would then be up to the Secretary of State to decide whether to refer it to the court for disqualification. The fact that I have had to explain what this is all about to others outside the Committee, and that it is already envisaged or in law, indicates that it needs a nudge to make it active and that the regulator needs to be empowered and encouraged to make reports.

My proposed new clause is constructed so that all offences can trigger such a report from the Pensions Regulator, whether criminal offences or fines. But under its subsection (4), the Pensions Regulator has discretion not to make a report if a disqualification is already proceeding, which is possible in the event of a criminal offence being decided against an individual, or if the offence is a fine rather than a criminal offence. These new provisions would be particularly relevant when a company has been found guilty. It would mean that the actions of the directors would be investigated. Again, I note that the ABI has indicated support for this amendment.

The inspiration for the amendment comes from the fact that there are certain financial instances or breaches of competition law where the directors are always investigated. Pensions is a significant social issue on which hearing from the relevant regulator should also be a matter of course. There is no automatic disqualification or even an automatic reference to the court—that is up to the Secretary of State—but at least for a criminal matter there would always be a report concerning the circumstances and an added incentive for board scrutiny of matters relating to pensions. I beg to move.

[Baroness Sherlock]

My Lords, I can add little to that careful explanation of the amendment; I know a lot more than I did five minutes ago. However, as the Minister responds, perhaps she could tell us a little more about what happens both now and when the Bill becomes law: that is, what the TPR does when someone has committed an offence, what is its understanding of to whom this should be reported, in what circumstances, and how its enforcement team works with the supervision team and with the FCA’s enforcement supervision arrangements. That is not directly the point which the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, was making but I very much endorse her approach, which is to put the importance of pensions on a par with the importance of threats in other parts of the economy. That is interesting, and I am interested in the Government’s response to it.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for tabling this amendment, which would require the Pensions Regulator to provide a report to the Secretary of State for the purposes of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. Director disqualification is within the remit of the Insolvency Service, which has the powers, resources and expertise to disqualify directors. As such, the Pensions Regulator does not have the power to disqualify directors, as this would be unnecessary, costly and inefficient. However, the Pensions Regulator is already able to share information with the Insolvency Service if it meets the “gateway” criteria as outlined in its restricted information regime under Section 82 of the Pensions Act 2004. The regulator can use this gateway in circumstances where the sharing of information is with a view to instigating director disqualification proceedings.

As such, the regulator is already able to share information with the Insolvency Service where it has identified persistent wrongdoing by a director or where it has already taken regulatory action. Under Section 8 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, the Insolvency Service is then able to apply to the court for a disqualification order on behalf of the Secretary of State, based on investigative material provided by other agencies or departments. Whether or not the Insolvency Service takes action to disqualify a director on the basis of information provided by others, such as the Pensions Regulator, will depend upon its assessment of the case in question. The Pensions Regulator and the Insolvency Service regularly engage with each other to discuss areas of joint interest. They continue to monitor the effectiveness of the disclosure process and are taking steps to streamline it when necessary. This will help to ensure that the organisations are able to work together to achieve successful outcomes and better protect the public.

In summary, the amendment is looking to introduce a process which is already in place. The Pensions Regulator and the Insolvency Service continue to work closely together to streamline this disclosure process and ensure that both organisations have a good working knowledge of each other’s remits. On that basis, I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I thank the Minister for that explanation. I think that there are two provisions within the Company Directors Disqualification Act: the ones with the Insolvency Service tend to be based around purely financial mechanisms. I will carefully read the response in Hansard to see whether it covers everything that I envisaged it should. I am a little suspicious that it does not; there would otherwise not be the provision of Section 8(1) and its very careful amendment in 2015. As the Committee might expect, I have had some communication with QCs who deal with these kinds of issues. If it is covered, I am happy; if not, I would like to see whether we can tighten it up. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 33 withdrawn.

Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting : House of Lords
Monday 24th February 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I support all three amendments. I have added my name to Amendment 2 —so excellently moved by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey —which intends that any CDC scheme that is applying for authorisation must have a considered strategy for the long-term intergenerational fairness considerations that we have just discussed. The scheme would need not just buffers—we will talk about buffers in the next group—these would also be required against scheme failure and scheme wind-up. In this case I would prefer to think of these as risk margins, to recognise the long-term risks to remaining members, most particularly if scheme members transfer out. That is the particular aim of my Amendment 7, which would also impose on the scheme, when calculating benefits, a requirement to consider how it will recognise the risks in future years if somebody cashes in the pension today.

The cash equivalent transfer value is not really a benefit under the scheme. If the member is in poor health, for example, they will be selecting against the scheme, because the scheme will assume a certain life expectancy. Some will have less and some more, but if all those who have lower life expectancy transfer out at full value, then clearly the pensions in payment are too high. If they take money when markets are performing well, they may receive more than if they had waited longer and there was a market correction, so the remaining members, again, will bear the cost.

Given that a CDC scheme is designed specifically to pay a pension rather than a lump sum as an alternative, without the same draconian guarantee requirements on employers, to the defined benefit system that we have had traditionally in this country—which as the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, rightly says, is the gold standard—we would not want this to be at the detriment of defined benefit but rather as an alternative to defined contribution. However, those members who transfer out are not placing their trust in the scheme; they are not saying, “I want my pension to come from the scheme,” and they are leaving the remaining members to bear an extra risk. I remind noble Lords that we have seen this in defined benefit schemes with the minimum funding requirement, and also with the rules around scheme surpluses. In the short term it was judged that an amount in the scheme was sufficient to pay a specific level of pension over the long term and it turned out that that was not the case, because assumptions were incorrect, markets changed or demography changed. Therefore, it is wholly inadequate to assume that whatever is happening today should be reflected, for example, in cash equivalent transfer values.

As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said, it is not just intergenerational fairness; it will select against today’s pensioners, potentially, because if over the next couple of years markets are weak, pensions will need to be reduced more to reflect people who transferred out at what seemed to be fair value two years previously. I hope my noble friend will consider the thrust of these amendments and perhaps look at whether we can introduce some requirements for schemes when members transfer out or when market values are judged to be at a certain level. Can we insert some risk margins that will protect members who rely on this scheme for their lifetime pension in the future?

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, like others, I speak in favour of all three amendments. In fact, I signed Amendments 6 and 7 but too late for it to show on the Marshalled List in respect of Amendment 7. I was one of the many noble Lords who mentioned intergenerational fairness, and fairness more generally, at Second Reading because, as has been explained, a significant number of members, particularly older members but not necessarily just them, transfer out after some good times for investments in the investment cycle. That leaves others bearing the brunt of later down cycles, hence the Ponzi analogy. I am actually not quite sure what “fairness among all members” actually means—it is difficult because of, for example, the different longevities between men and women—but I signed Amendment 6 because that was the closest thing to saying, “You’ve got to look widely at everything.”

I have come to the conclusion that the only way in which you can have fairness is to have some kind of buffer, which we will come to later on, or some kind of risk margin as proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, or maybe both. In the interests of fairness, those who are transferring out should have to take their share of the risk; otherwise, if you are a good market-watcher you could perhaps spot your moment to make your move, and then that is perhaps unfair on the rest.

I, along with others, think that something must be enabled for these measures to be required. It is nice to know that something is already envisaged for the scheme, but there needs to be something for every scheme. There should at least be a requirement for that, and actually I think there should be a permission for things such as buffers and risk margins, rather than a prohibition.

[Baroness Janke (LD)]

My Lords, I too signed Amendment 2, which my noble friend Lord Sharkey so ably introduced. I will be brief because I think all the arguments have been very well covered. The only thing that I would add is that the importance of transparency in a scheme such as this seems fundamental. I know we are talking about communications and ensuring that members are fully aware of what they are signing up to, both the benefits and the disbenefits later on, but, as part of the arguments that have been put forward in favour of this group of amendments, there is the whole issue of explanation and ensuring that members are fully aware of their position under this type of scheme. I particularly support the idea that in order for a scheme to be registered, the explicit prerequisite is to show what the strategy is to address the whole issue of intergenerational fairness. I know we will be talking about capital buffers later on, but the amendments address the interests of transparency and fairness and the welfare of all members of the scheme, and I support them.

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I recognise noble Lords’ concerns—

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I would like to intervene at this point because a lot has been spoken about. When there is a calculation of the percentage of the value of the assets for an individual transferring out, which is done on various actuarial calculations, will those actuarial calculations be able to take into account long-term market risk so that there is an element of the fact that if you are withdrawing at a time of high markets, you may be getting more, as I said, than would have been your long-term due? If there is no such mechanism, have we learned nothing from mutual funds running on net-asset value, where there are runs and the people who are slowest to move and get their money out are the ones who are trapped with low value? We have invented things such as gating mechanisms to cope with that. There is potentially such a thing as a run on a pension fund, so how will we guard against that?

[Baroness Stedman-Scott]

The noble Baroness is renowned for her forensic abilities. I am advised that we will need to write to her on that particular question. In fact, we are meeting this week, and I hope we can get her an answer that is accurate and share it with other noble Lords, if that is acceptable.

I recognise and share noble Lords’ concerns. I assure your Lordships that the Government are not oblivious to the potential risk in CDC schemes. I hope my explanation has reassured your Lordships that our proposed legislative framework is designed to ensure that both employers and trustees are alive to these threats when designing their CDC schemes, and that the Pensions Regulator is able to undertake appropriate scrutiny both before and after granting authorisation. With that, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Baroness Stedman-Scott]

Noble Lords must forgive me for turning to my friends. This is my first Bill. The answer to that question is no, it should not be.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

Now I am confused. In the previous group, when we were talking in anticipation about buffers and intergenerational fairness, the Minister said that there would be headroom funding. I understood that to be up front, getting the scheme up and running, but the Minister then said that that was going to be spent. I do not think she said what it was going to be spent on, or have I got the wrong end of the stick?

[Baroness Sherlock]

I think this is a language question. The problem that my noble friend Lady Drake raised at Second Reading and which we are trying to raise here is not about a capital buffer to deal with the intergenerational questions of benefits and payments at a time. It was the equivalent in master trust regulations where the sponsoring employer has to put money up front in a safe place so that if things go wrong and the scheme collapses the fallout can be funded without raiding members’ benefits. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, is describing something slightly different.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

There is nothing that needs to be added; it has already been said. I just want it to be noted that I, too, support the principle behind the amendment.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott]

I thank noble Lords for raising these amendments that relate to events which can occur in an authorised CDC scheme and which must be notified to the Pensions Regulator. The amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Hutton and Lord McKenzie, would require the trustees of an authorised CDC scheme to notify the regulator where a person assumed a role that was subject to the fit and proper persons assessment. This notification would be required within two weeks of the change. The regulator would be required to assess whether the new person met the fit and proper persons requirement. Where it was not satisfied, the amendment would require it to consider withdrawing authorisation from the scheme.

The fit and proper persons requirement is set out in Clause 11 and is one of the authorisation criteria. The aim is to ensure that only suitable people are involved with a CDC scheme in order to protect the interests of members. It is also worth noting that the Bill already includes a power in Clause 30 for the regulator to withdraw a scheme’s authorisation if it is not satisfied that the authorisation criteria are met. The regulator will need to be satisfied that this is the case on an ongoing basis, including that the fit and proper persons requirement continues to be met. Some events would still warrant consideration by the Pensions Regulator because they could affect the ability of an authorised CDC scheme to continue to meet the authorisation criteria.

Clause 28 covers such “significant events”, which must be notified

“as soon as reasonably practicable”

to the Pensions Regulator. The draft illustrative regulations that we shared with noble Lords, and which have been placed in the House Library, provide an indicative list of potential significant events. Noble Lords may be reassured to know that the event in their amendment is contained in the illustrative regulations. We will work with the Pensions Regulator and others to develop the CDC significant events; we will also consult on the draft regulations in due course.

Amendment 11, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, would mean that the decision of any employer or relevant former employer

“to withdraw from the scheme”

would automatically be considered a triggering event. It may be helpful to point out that the triggering events listed in Clause 31 are already intended to capture withdrawal events that pose a significant risk to the future of a CDC scheme. For example, the withdrawal by the employer from a single employer-established CDC scheme or the largest employer in a connected employer scheme may trigger the winding up of a scheme. The withdrawal may also have arisen as a result of employer insolvency. In this scenario, it is clear that such a decision could risk destabilising the scheme. As such, it should be treated as a triggering event and be subject to greater scrutiny and oversight by the Pensions Regulator to ensure that the trustees are taking all necessary steps to address the issue and protect members.

Not every withdrawal of an employer, however, may pose such a significant threat to the scheme. For example, the impact of a small connected employer deciding to withdraw from a CDC scheme may be minimal on the viability and sustainability of the scheme; it may not warrant a decision to wind up the scheme as a whole. Such an event would be more appropriately dealt with as a significant event. We intend that such events should still be reflected in the continuity strategy, so that the regulator is aware that this risk has been considered and planned for.

We propose that regulations would provide for such events to be a significant event, which would need to be notified to the regulator. Such a notification will allow the regulator to engage with the trustees to ascertain the impact on the scheme’s viability and continuity, and whether this should lead to a formal triggering event or other regulatory action. This approach allows the regulator to retain appropriate oversight of withdrawal decisions and resulting actions, while providing some flexibility and proportionality in approach where the withdrawal of the employer is not expected to impact significantly on the scheme. I am also pleased to advise the Committee that the regulator will engage with the scheme to look at the options before withdrawing authorisation. For the reasons I have set out, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, I should have added my name to this amendment; I apologise for not getting around to it. It is important, as has been explained.

Another question triggered in my mind is: what information relating to the lifetime allowance will be provided for the member? You get information from a defined benefit scheme; you know what you are expected to get—though, as we know from the NHS, you can get into difficulties if, suddenly, you are earning a little too much. If you pay into personal pensions, or whatever they are called nowadays, you get a number for the pounds that you are likely to have as a transfer value, but what will you get here, especially as you will perhaps be at risk? For example, you may think, “Well, I’d quite like to run a personal pension alongside this just in case.” How are you going to calculate whether you are at risk of breaching the lifetime allowance? If you did breach it and then got a tax charge, but then the scheme started to pay you less pension for whatever reason, would you get that tax charge back?

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I agree entirely with what has been said about the need to communicate and the basis on which to do so. I simply raise that, in 2018, we had extensive discussions on the Financial Guidance and Claims Bill, as it then was. A key point was the lack of full understanding of financial matters of the general public. I have forgotten the statistics, but there was a House of Lords review of financial inclusion, and its conclusions were stark. This is not a reason not to communicate; it is a reason to communicate even more intensively. In how we communicate, we need an understanding of how people might receive these messages and we should not assume they can operate in an environment like this—as many, we know, cannot.

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[Baroness Stedman-Scott]

My Lords, we are committed to protecting members of workplace pension schemes from unfair charges. This is why we introduced a 0.75% cap on charges in the default funds of money purchase schemes used for automatic enrolment. This cap, which received cross-party support, has proved successful, with average charges in schemes used for automatic enrolment reducing by a significant margin. We want to ensure that members of collective money purchase schemes in Great Britain and Northern Ireland can be similarly protected, which is why we are tabling these amendments.

Our response to the consultation on delivering CDC schemes confirmed our intention to implement an annual CDC charge cap set at 0.75% of the value of the whole CDC fund, or an equivalent combination charge. The response also confirmed our intention that the scope of the CDC cap will be the same as the existing charge cap. Unlike the existing charge cap, which applies at member level, our intention is that the CDC charge cap will apply across the whole of the fund. This reflects the collective nature of these schemes and means that the CDC charge cap will apply to all members in the collective money purchase scheme, including pensioner members. Again, this reflects the collective nature of the schemes and the fact that the same fund will provide members with a variable pension income in retirement. We want to ensure that members of CDC schemes also benefit from other existing charge control measures, such as the member-borne commission ban and the early exit charge cap.

I will speak first to Amendment 15, which will amend the Pensions Act 2014 to ensure that the powers in that Act, under which we are able to provide for a charge cap and other charge control measures, can also be used in the case of collective money purchase schemes in Great Britain. We are amending paragraph 1 of Schedule 18 to that Act, which provides a power to prohibit by regulations certain charges in relevant schemes. This is to make clear that regulations under this power can also be made in relation to collective money purchase schemes. As with the existing default fund charge cap for DC schemes, it is appropriate to use regulations to define the details of the cap and how it will apply. We will of course engage with the regulator and stakeholders in developing these details and will then consult on the draft regulations. We aim to align the application of the CDC charge cap with that of the existing charge as far as possible.

It is entirely appropriate that members of collective money purchase schemes benefit from similar charge control protections that apply to members of individual money purchase schemes. This amendment makes clear that regulations made under the powers in Schedule 18 to the Pensions Act 2014 can provide for controls on the charges borne by members in collective money purchase schemes. The amendment to paragraph 1 of Schedule 18 to the Pensions Act 2014 means that where a scheme which provides CDC benefits has more than one section, each section offering CDC benefits will be treated as a separate scheme for the purposes of the charge cap provisions. This is consistent with other provisions about how sections of schemes offering CDC benefits are to be treated and ensures that sections offering CDC benefits do not cross-subsidise other sections of the scheme.

The amendment to Section 54 of the Pensions Act 2014 means that the first regulations under paragraphs 1 or 3 of Schedule 18 made in relation to CDC schemes will be made by the affirmative resolution procedure. Section 54 already provides for the first regulations under these paragraphs to be made by the affirmative procedure, but regulations have already been made under these paragraphs. We wish to ensure that the first regulations made in relation to charge caps for CDC schemes have the same level of parliamentary scrutiny as those regulations did. Turning briefly to Amendment 16, this makes corresponding changes to Northern Ireland legislation to provide for a charge cap for CDC schemes in Northern Ireland. This will ensure parity of member protection for members of CDC schemes across the UK. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, I have no objection to making things the same everywhere, but last time I came across this 0.75% cap I did not ask a question, so I will now. What exactly does it cover? Compared to some SIPP investor platforms and so forth, it seems rather high. Does it cover all the trading charges as well? You can get 0.15% from Vanguard, 0.25% from AJ Bell and up to 0.45% with all your trading charges covered from Hargreaves Lansdown. I could go on. If you go to some of the insurance companies —I will go on—they tend to be greedier, up to 0.3%, but that is far short of 0.75%, so what is this paying for?

[Baroness Altmann]

I shall raise similar points. Will ask my noble friend say how the 0.75% charge cap was arrived at, given that the purpose of the CDC scheme, as I understood it, is to provide members better value than if they had their own defined contribution fund and to benefit from the economies of scale of collective management and administration, which clearly should be much lower per member than an individual defined contribution scheme?

Another point my noble friend mentioned is that that there should be no exit penalty. If that were the case, the issue we were discussing earlier about potentially reducing or applying a risk margin to transfer values would become impossible. Intergenerational fairness, which we were concerned about in our earlier discussions in Committee, may be undermined if there is an express prohibition on what may be called an exit penalty, but which to others is a risk margin or buffer against future market dislocations or changed assumptions.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

17: Clause 107, page 90, line 24, after “person” insert “wilfully, recklessly or unscrupulously”

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, this important group of amendments deals with the definitions of new criminal offences and new regulatory fines, and with the defences to the criminal offences. I will also speak to my Amendments 18 and 22 as well as to Amendments 23 to 26 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hutton.

Amendments 17 and 22 are probing amendments. They would require that, for the criminal offences of avoidance of employer debt and risking accrued scheme benefits, the person has to have behaved wilfully, recklessly or unscrupulously. I want to say a few words about each of those terms, which is where the probing comes in.

I do not think that “wilfully” changes much in the sense of the clauses because later, in subsection (2)(b) of the respective new sections, it is stated that the person intended the actual course of conduct to have such an effect. It could be argued that the wording of the subsections further highlights the necessity for a greater understanding of the consequences but, in my view, the insertion of “wilfully” would make those subsections redundant. My Amendment 18 and Amendment 24, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hutton—to which I have put my name—would delete those subsections.

It gets a little more complicated when it comes to considering “recklessly” but it is important to consider that term because, as several noble Lords pointed out at Second Reading, the Government consulted on “wilfully” and “recklessly”. As I see it, “recklessly” does not require the same degree of intent as to outcome, so it broadens the scope. It implies a lack of due diligence or a high degree of negligence. One could perhaps express it almost as wilfully negligent—that is, not bothering to have proper checks in place and caring even less.

These are egregious matters we are considering, when pensions are put at risk either deliberately, without caring or for ulterior motives. To my mind, it would be unthinkable to allow unscrupulous individuals to get off the hook of criminal charges with the defence of “I didn’t know” because they had not made, and had no intention of making, the right kind of checks. “Recklessly” is not the same as “accidentally” or “incidentally”; “recklessly” is “I don’t care” and it should be covered. It should not require that the precise end effect was intended, which is why both subsections (2)(b) in the offences, which say that the person intended the actual course of conduct to have such an effect, need to be deleted because they would negate recklessness as an offence.

Of course, having appropriate checks and procedures in place would be an obvious defence, just as they are in the various “failure to prevent” types of offences that have come into being, such as for bribery and money laundering.

Now I come to probing the third term: “unscrupulously”. This may not be a normal legal term, but everyone knows what it means. It is used in describing the objectives of those whom it is wished to catch. It is used about the new offences—starting at the bottom of page 7 of the Explanatory Notes, which state:

“They will provide additional deterrents for unscrupulous behaviours and will enable the Regulator to punish abuse and wrongdoing within the occupational pensions industry appropriately.”


That is exactly what we want to be able to do: punish unscrupulous behaviours.

Compared with some of our Commonwealth colleagues, we in this country are rather a soft touch. Australia has an offence of unconscionable conduct in commerce. It works under common law and shows that expressions describing bad behaviour do not need to be shunned in legislation. Yes, it is a catch-all phrase, but we should be starting to give it serious thought when it accurately describes the underlying behaviour.

As a little thought experiment, what happens if we apply the three words “wilfully”, “recklessly” and “unscrupulously” to driving fast in a 30mph zone? What would we get? “Wilfully” means that there was an intention to drive faster. “Recklessly” might mean not bothering to look or have regard to surroundings or missing the sign. What might be “unscrupulous”? I have had some fun thinking about this. Here are a few possibilities: blanking out your number plate with a fancy gizmo or having false number plates; getting a friend to remove the 30mph sign; or perhaps making someone else the fall guy, saying that you were not the one driving. These may be wilful acts but while it is questionable whether they are specifically wilful at the time of the actual offence or what the precise intended effect was, they are certainly unscrupulous.

I turn briefly to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hutton. I apologise for going ahead of the mover but there are words in common. In his amendments, “wilfully” and “recklessly” are used in a slightly different place but what I have said about their meaning also applies. There is also the consequence of needing to delete the subsection reciting intent.

Amendments 23 and 25 are applied to deal with the criminal offence and civil fine relating to putting accrued scheme benefits at risk. The wording

“detrimentally affects in a material way”

appears and has caused some concerns, which were referenced at Second Reading. I think that the positioning of the wording works well and support the addition of those words to the fine offence. Obviously, it is possible to merge the noble Lord’s proposal and my own with regard to the criminal offence of risking the accrued scheme benefits.

More broadly, it seems that “wilfully” or “recklessly” could be usefully incorporated into the financial penalty on avoidance of employer debt, so that it was in all four of the new offences, including the two criminal ones and the new fines. Then there would be no playing off about different meanings. But I will listen carefully to the Committee, particularly to see whether the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, has a different nuance to mine.

The other amendments in this group, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Sherlock, relate to defences and call for guidance. I sympathise with the general intent but have some reservations; however, I will speak to them later when we have heard from the movers, as their wording is not interconnected like my amendments and those of the noble Lord, Lord Hutton. I beg to move.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

My Lords, I refer to my entry in the register of interests and shall speak to Amendments 19 to 21, which are grouped with those of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. My amendments are also in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, who sadly cannot be in her place today. We are concerned that the powers in Clause 107 may be drawn too widely. This is a concern shared by a number of those involved in the pensions sector—indeed, it was touched on by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, a great expert in pensions matters, at Second Reading.

In the same debate my noble friend the Minister helpfully said that the intention of the clause was,

“to punish those who wilfully or recklessly harm their pension scheme”.—[Official Report, 28/1/20; col. 1353.]

In the light of that, it seems that the criminal offence is really aimed at parties whose conduct is extreme and lies outside the range of ordinary reasonable conduct. If so, we believe that the thought could be captured better by applying the offence only where,

“no reasonable person having regard to all of their duties and all relevant circumstances”,

would have acted as they did. The change from “reasonable excuse” to “no reasonable person”, as in Amendment 19, may not sound like much of a change; however, I assure noble Lords that it is important. I am advised that a substantial body of case law makes it clear that the two are very different. The former potentially creates a fine objective judgment, while the latter recognises that there is a range of conduct that can be seen as reasonable. Our Amendment 20 proposes for consideration today a list of factors that could be taken into account by the courts.

Finally, Amendment 21 proposes an exemption, drawing on an idea in the Pensions Act 2004. It would provide a system of binding comfort that could be given by the regulator or the Pension Protection Fund. Given the gravity of the criminal offences those involved in the pension world will potentially face as a result of the Bill, there seems to be a strong case for examining this. We want good, honest people to be involved in the sector and not deterred from any involvement. These amendments deal with new Section 58A of the Pensions Act 2004, but obviously if the argument were accepted by the Government, a similar change would be needed to new Section 58B.

In responding to these amendments, would the Minister —I think it will be the deputy Leader—give more detail and further examples of the harms we are trying to remedy in this part of the Bill? Much mention was made at Second Reading of BHS and Carillion, but these companies had unique factors that went way beyond pensions. The impact assessment assumes up to five cases every year. Is there other evidence in recent years that justifies criminal penalties and these estimates?

In closing, I shall make a wider point. We need to get this legislation right, and we have been trying to do that today, because the costs of getting it wrong, and the inevitable legal costs, will fall on pension schemes and therefore leave less for the very pensioners we are trying to help with the Bill. The new criminal offences appear to cover not only the employer but trustees, advisers, third parties and possibly the regulator. They could embrace routine debt funding necessary for a viable business, or changes to investment strategy designed by trustees to improve their fund. The perverse effect of getting the arrangements wrong—this is a theme I always return to—could be cost and delay, which might be problematic in a tight financial situation and push more businesses into the Pension Protection Fund, which is exactly what we all want to avoid. It could also deter trustees from taking on the responsibility for pension funds. My noble friend Lord Eccles, who I am sorry to see is not in his place, made this point in relation to the wider regulation-making power in Clause 51, although I very much understand the difficulties that my noble friend faces in this area.

[Lord Hutton of Furness]

My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendments 23, 24, 25 and 26. It was clear at Second Reading and has been again today that most Members of your Lordships’ House accept the need for this new criminal offence: I certainly do. Recent events have confirmed that there is a gap in the law and we should try to fill it—that is our responsibility. However, when it comes to the creation of new criminal offences, there are always some important questions to be clear about, from the beginning. Who are we aiming this new criminal offence at? Have we got that right, and are we clear, in the way the offence has been drafted, that we are catching or bringing within the net of this new offence those people and those people alone?

We need to be clear who can prosecute. It is interesting to look at the origins of this offence, and the way it came about in the consultations. It is clear in the Green Paper and the White Paper that the Government, rightly, had in mind that the Pensions Regulator would be the prosecuting authority. That is not the case in the Bill, where we have the rather unsatisfactory state of affairs that not just the Pensions Regulator but the Secretary of State and the Director of Public Prosecutions can prosecute. As I said at Second Reading, that does not clearly set out where the prosecuting authority lies, which is why I support Amendment 35, tabled by my noble friend Lady Sherlock.

There is a parallel here with other offences. This is a new offence, complicated in nature and unclear in its precise scope. When Parliament is creating new offences such as this, it has a responsibility to the general population—and, in this case, to those concerned with the governance of pension schemes—to help them understand what is covered by this new legislation and what actions people need to take to make sure they stay on the right side of the law. Amendment 35 would help us clarify some of those issues.

There is a general problem with the way this clause has been drafted, which has been a familiar theme of the comments of the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Bowles. I support much of what they said. I am concerned that this offence, in its current form, is drafted too widely. When it was envisaged, and the Government did their consultation, it was going to be an offence to catch the behaviour of unscrupulous employers or directors of companies. That is the origin of this offence. We do not need to go into the detail of the case, but we all know what we are talking about.

It is clear, from a cursory reading of this clause, that this offence would cover more than just employers and company directors. It could cover scheme trustees, actuaries or advisers, or pretty much anyone in a position to give advice on the management of a pension scheme. I genuinely doubt that was the intention of the Government when they consulted on this clause. They have made this provision too broad in scope. They should have another look at the way that this clause has been drafted.

They should definitely have another look at who the prosecuting authority should be. Generally, in our system, it is very unusual for the Secretary of State to be able to bring a criminal prosecution against another person. There may be one or two examples I am not aware of, but I am sure the Minister is well advised about how many situations there are in which the Secretary of State has such a power. Generally, it is best to leave criminal prosecutions in the hands of criminal prosecutors. With the best will in the world, and the high regard I have for the Secretary of State, she is not a criminal prosecutor. I would not want her to be in the position of being advised to bring a prosecution. I would like the Minister to set out how that process would work within the department. It would be unusual. As a Secretary of State, I was never advised to bring a criminal prosecution. Particularly if the DPP and the Pensions Regulator both decided not to bring a charge, it would be extraordinary for the Secretary of State to be able to carry on with a criminal prosecution none the less.

The third question about criminal offences is pertinent to this offence. What is the penalty for the wrongdoing that we have in mind? To go back again to the Green and White Papers, the origin of this offence was the behaviour of unscrupulous employers, who deliberately put at risk scheme members being able to acquire their scheme benefits. By its very nature, that is a serious offence and the draft statute we are discussing has a sentence of up to seven years’ imprisonment for such an offence. Bring that on. That is an appropriate statutory offence.

What I do not understand about this offence, in what would be new Section 58B(9)(b) of the statute, is that it could be tried either way. It could be tried on indictment, where the statutory sentence of imprisonment would kick in, or it could be tried on a summary conviction. But by its very nature a summary trial implies that an offence is not as serious as a charge that can be brought before a jury in a Crown Court. For the life of me, I cannot understand why this offence has mutated into a serious and a less serious offence at the same time. That is incomprehensible to me. This is a serious offence that should be tried on indictment by an appropriate criminal prosecutor.

I am afraid that in my humble view this clause needs a complete rethink. It is too wide of the mark and obtuse in what it is covering, and the sentencing arrangements are indecipherable; they are an inherent set of contradictions. This should be an offence triable on indictment only, period, because we are talking about serious offences.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Bowles, both referred to the wording used to describe this offence. I have simply tried to bring into the Bill the wording that the Government themselves consulted on when the offence was being talked about and conceived. It was about wilful or reckless behaviour; in fact, I think the Government used the phrase “grossly reckless behaviour” in their consultation. In the way that this offence has been drafted, I absolutely accept that the Government are trying to ensure that the offence is based on wilful or reckless behaviour, but there is almost an obligation on the Government when they have consulted on a particular offence to stick as closely as possible to how that consultation was done, developed and extended, and to bring forward legislation that as closely as possible represents that offence in any new legislation. I think there is a way that the Government could do that. My amendment is one simple way of doing it, although there may be a better way. I think it is incumbent on the Government to try as far as possible to stick to what they consulted on, but there is a very real danger that this clause will not do that. I hope the Minister will be able to offer me and other Members of the Committee some reassurance that the Government might be willing to have another think about the nature of this new offence.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, I am sorry to rise again but I did warn the Committee. I agree that it is necessary to look again at the precise wording. I do not think that “recklessly” is covered, and it should be. It may well be a solution to remove trustees from the scope.

I want to address the concerns I have about defining “reasonable excuses”. Sometimes you can end up forcing unintended interpretations that can work both ways, either giving loopholes to bad behaviour or unintentionally limiting the scope of excuses. That means, if you like, it can work for the prosecution or the defence, but it means you do not get what you thought you had got. If anything is specified or picked out as an example, it needs to be clear that it may not be binding in all circumstances and that the examples are not an exhaustive list, so that if something else is brought forward as a defence it is legitimate for it to be considered.

There are certainly regulators that have fallen into the trap of too many guidelines. The FRC was criticised in the Kingman report for the detrimental effect on reporting and audit of too many guidelines, resulting in boilerplate recitations rather than thoughtfulness. In this subject, we are also interested in thoughtfulness and people thinking about what they are doing. We debated the FCA report into GRG in the Chamber on 27 June last year, and the FRC gave a line-by-line report of how its published interpretation of “fit and proper” had greatly narrowed what in my personal experience was always held out to be a wide-in-scope basic test. It was even described to me by some people as our version of “unconscionable conduct” in that bad conduct would not be fit and proper and that was the way in which we went about getting bad behaviour. However, in the GRG case and the report from the FRC we found that not to be the truth because of the guidelines and training that were put around those words. So what we do here needs to be done with care.

Concerning Amendments 19 and 20, it should not be a reasonable excuse to do something just because someone else has or might have done it. That is an excuse for a race to the bottom and to disengage from responsibility. It is reasonable to have regard to market practice but the competitive urge to do what others do or to push it a bit further has to be resisted—such behaviour was among the causes of the financial crisis.

I fully accept that there are difficult matters to balance for business; these are in part explored in later amendments relating to dividends. Perhaps the law has not been clear enough so far about what are the right priorities; in the past, pensions have been put at the bottom of the pile, with deficits paid down slowly and surpluses raided and holidays taken rather more eagerly, with a lax attitude when the company is generally well capitalised. That has been the wrong message. I believe it is now the right time to clarify that obligations rank ahead of options in the balance of legitimate interests and call on capital.

[Baroness Sherlock]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 35 in my name and respond to the debate on the other amendments. In doing so, I remind the Committee of an historic remunerated interest as the former senior independent director of the Financial Ombudsman Service.

At the outset, I say that we on these Benches place a high priority on ensuring that the regulator has the powers and sanctions that it needs to tackle bad behaviour in the operation of pension schemes. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles: conduct that puts at risk the assets that people have worked for all their lives is serious behaviour indeed. It can have a dramatic effect on the lives of millions of people and push them, in the end, into a retirement based in penury rather than the security that they could have reasonably expected. Of course, allied to that is a public policy interest: it may discourage people from saving if they do not feel that the vehicles are secure and that their money will be safe. So we welcome the introduction of the new offences and the focus on preventing bad behaviour and stepping in before the consequences get too serious or, even, the situation becomes irrecoverable.

In the Committee, at Second Reading and outside, I have heard some concerns about the Bill’s drafting, especially around what reasonable behaviour is and what conduct causes material detriment. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, expressed that point well. I accept that there is a balance at stake here and that the drafting must strike a balance. It is right to expect those charged with managing or overseeing pension funds to do so with appropriate skill and knowledge, and with care and integrity. However, I am also conscious that the Government would not want inadvertently to discourage good, capable people from, for example, serving as pension scheme trustees if they feared the unforeseen consequences of making reasonable judgments in good faith; nor would they want to foster unhelpful levels or types of risk aversion.

There is a need to have more clarity, for Parliament and the sector, as to how these provisions will operate in practice. Reading the impact assessment, it seems clear that the Government expect the criminal offences in particular to catch hardly anybody. It is based on one person a year being convicted, so the clear expectation in the minds of those drafting this is to have a nod that a safety net will go out—unless I have misunderstood, in which case please correct me.

Amendments 17 and 22 propose the formulation “wilfully, recklessly or unscrupulously”. I do not need to revisit this but I would be interested to know whether the Minister agrees with the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, in her probing approach on what that phrase means. Also, why did Ministers decide not to go with “wilfully” or “recklessly”? What did they think was changing between that and the formulation that they used in the Bill in the end?

The amendments tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Noakes, are interesting. I hear that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, regards the current reasonable test as being too low. Many people would regard the test that no reasonable person would do something as very high indeed. I wonder whether the Minister has a sense of how easy it would be for anyone to be convicted on a test of that nature. That is the judgment.

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[Earl Howe]

It will be made clear—in practice, if anything—but the Secretary of State will reserve the power for the rarest of occasions, I imagine, in the circumstances that I outlined. The normal course would be for the traditional prosecuting authorities to act. Only where the Secretary of State sees an egregious example of someone likely to get away without prosecution for reasons beyond the control of the prosecuting authorities will he or she step in. I cannot generalise about the circumstances. That power is there, as in the other Acts that I mentioned, very much as a long-stop provision.

Amendment 35, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, proposes a new clause requiring the Pensions Regulator to publish guidance on how it intends to use the new criminal offences. We think this amendment is unnecessary. The Pensions Regulator already has a general prosecution policy in place which sets out the matters it considers when using its prosecution powers. The Pensions Regulator intends to issue further specific guidance explaining its approach to prosecuting the new offences under Part 3 of the Bill.

I fear there is also a practical difficulty, because it is unclear how the amendment could be implemented. The amendment would require the Pensions Regulator to publish guidance pertaining to the new offences at the point of Royal Assent. The problem with that is that the provisions in Part 3, which include the new criminal offences, are subject to changes up to the point of Royal Assent and it would be unwise to pre-empt the will of Parliament by preparing guidance based on draft provisions. It is expected that, following Royal Assent, the regulator will consult on the contents of the guidance for the new offences and expects to publish this guidance prior to commencement. It is clearly important that the industry’s views are sought on what is contained in the guidance, and the timing requirement proposed in this amendment would mean the regulator would consult before the offences are finally settled.

A further reason the amendment is unnecessary—indeed, I would say inappropriate—is due to the inclusion of the phrase

“guidance … concerning the operation of law”.

This phrase has a very specific meaning, and implies that the intention behind the amendment is that it will be for the Pensions Regulator to determine how the legislation should be interpreted. This is of course a matter for the courts, which will make the decision as to whether an offence has been committed in a particular case. Therefore, while the regulator’s guidance will provide assistance as to how the regulator intends to use the new criminal offences, it will not be definitive; nor could it or should it be, since something deemed to be reasonable in one case, for example, may not be reasonable in another. I should mention, for completeness, that there are a number of technical issues with all these amendments which could cause confusion. I shall not go into them here, but I can explain the details to noble Lords if necessary, outside the Committee.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe asked what kind of estimate we make of the number of people who might go to prison under these criminal offences. Clearly, irresponsible treatment of pension schemes is rare; however, it is important that where we have wilful or reckless behaviour, appropriate sanctions are available. The Pensions Regulator has successfully brought 16 convictions over the past two and a half years—it is of course for the courts to decide who gets convicted and what the penalty should be. I hope it is widely accepted that the Pensions Regulator must meet a higher threshold before a criminal prosecution can be commenced. As the Pensions Regulator has already commented, it would use these new powers only in the right circumstances.

The noble Lord, Lord Hutton, asked a further question about the words “any person” and what other legislation uses that phrase. It is the norm for criminal offences across the statute book to be drafted as applying to “any person” and I can give him examples—I would be happy to write to him.

It is clear that the majority of employers want to do right by their scheme. However, we must ensure that there are sufficient safeguards to protect members’ pensions from the minority who are prepared to put them at risk. If the category of persons whose conduct is within the scope of the offences as set out in Clause 107 were to be narrowed in the way that some of the amendments propose, we believe that the deterrent provided by the offences would be weakened, as indeed would the safeguards built into them. In contrast, making the scope of the activities caught by the offences wider, as separately proposed by other amendments, not only risks removing a key consideration of the level of impact of the conduct but also reduces safeguards. The Government have therefore sought to strike a balance to ensure that members’ benefits are protected while taking into account impacts on business.

I apologise again for speaking at such length, but I hope that the comments I have made will allow noble Lords to feel comfortable in not pressing their amendments.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I thank the Minister for his comprehensive reply. I had intended to probe especially around the words “wilful” and “reckless”; I had a little add-on for fun. When I first thought of putting those words in after “person”, I rapidly came to the conclusion myself—I think the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, was there—that in the end they did not make any difference. However, I am not actually sure that that is quite true with regard to the offence of the avoidance of employer debt. New subsection (2)(b) states

“the person intended the act or course of conduct to have such an effect”

but that has to be applied to the examples that might be targeted given by the Minister. In the case of sale of the employer and a parental guarantee not being replaced, that might be done through negligence rather than intent and then it would not be caught because the words “ought to have known” do not appear in the new Section 58A offence, although they do in the new Section 58B offence. So the Government have caught recklessness in new Section 58B but not in new Section 58A. Maybe the words “ought to have known” or something like them could be put there.

[Earl Howe]

It might be helpful to the noble Baroness if I clarify. New Section 58A is intended to capture the concept of wilfulness and new Section 58B the concept of recklessness.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I see. I do not see why we could not have them caught in both. Anyway, we have debated this long enough. I thank the Minister for his replies, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 17 withdrawn.

Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 2nd reading (Hansard)
Tuesday 28th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I only very recently decided to speak on the Bill. Unfortunately, due to other commitments, I was unable to attend any of the meetings with the Minister—but that will be forthcoming in due course. But here are my initial thoughts on what I have found out so far as, I suppose, a newcomer to pensions.

I agree with all the Bill’s general intentions, but there are some areas where I do not think it has gone far enough and many where pensioners’ security will depend on regulations that we have very little policy guidance on, or reassurance about, in the Bill. I note that the Minister said that we will have illustrative regulations, but we need the shape of the policy and how far in the future those regulations can or cannot go outlined in the Bill. I hope that, once they are written, something can be adduced from them and reflected backwardly.

Collective money purchase schemes seem entirely sensible for well-known reasons that have already been explained. They enable longevity and other risks to be pooled, and they potentially allow a more consistent investment policy. That is the theory, at least, but it has to be recognised, especially in the potential case of smaller schemes, that the pooled advantages can be undermined by too many transfers out, or even the equivalent of a run by older members. What safeguards are there? Can the Minister say whether this will be kept under watch and count as an “event” to trigger the operation of some safeguards or a continuity plan?

It is clear that a person who has the power to take decisions under the scheme, or a trustee, can intervene to indicate that, for example, the fund should be wound up—but what if they do not give such an indication? How is the regulator to know and intervene; is it only through obtaining valuations and making directions under Clause 23, or are there other mechanisms that make sure that the regulator is well informed?

What is the role of the viability statement in this regard? Is it a specific matter to be reported to the regulator, and, if not, why not? Will schemes be expected to have provisions for lock-in periods or redemption windows? The questions now being asked about investment fund redemptions, following the run on the illiquid Woodford funds, are mirrored here—with the slant, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and others, have pointed out, that the older generation has the whip hand. I agree very much with the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, that these new schemes are a halfway house. Something is missing, some kind of capital provision or buffer so that when there is trouble, there is something to call on, rather than seeing those still in the scheme left in the lurch by those old enough to do a runner.

Turning to penalties, I found 20 recitations to do with the new collective scheme, when only the small civil penalties under Section 10 of the Pensions Act 1995 can be invoked. Some of these things deserve greater penalties, especially if done repeatedly or deliberately: for example, not taking actuarial advice; not getting valuations; not carrying out a continuity strategy; not properly dealing with the discharge of liabilities and winding up; or not dealing with directions regarding failures. Seriously, should the maximum fines for what could be pretty egregious omissions really be just £5,000 for an individual or £50,000 for companies?

While researching, I looked at the recent fines levied on the regulator’s website. They were all smaller than the Section 10 maximums. I raised an eyebrow at the FCA pension scheme’s fine, but today’s Times says that the £2,000 fine is the highest possible fine for lack of information to members in a chair’s report. Irrespective of what fine the FCA merited, it is another pretty derisory maximum for what could be a serious lack of information provided to members. These fines are lower than the cost of taking advice on whether you have got your report right. What kind of incentive is it to get your report right?

Elsewhere in the Bill, there are new escalating fines for failing to provide information or allow site inspections. Of course, by that stage things will have got pretty serious, but should the escalating concept be widened for repeat offences and more serious matters related to the viability or stability of a scheme? Early warnings are key, before things get to notifiable or dangerous status. Also, can the Pensions Regulator remove persistent repeat offenders on the basis that they are no longer fit and proper persons? We found out from the FCA’s report on the GRG that removing people as fit and proper was not all that easy, because they put lots of other rules around it that were not necessarily infringed. So what is the situation with the Pensions Regulator and that possibility?

Going up in amounts, of course I note the new £1 million fine that the regulator will be able to apply in what are the worst instances of behaviour around deficit matters in defined benefit schemes, or providing false and misleading information. But this is way too small for all circumstances, given the deficits revealed with BHS—Philip Green eventually put back £363 million of the £571 million deficit, which was just about his dividends, but we are still way off—and £2.6 billion for Carillion. Last year, the UK’s direct benefit pension scheme deficit increased by another £60 billion to £260 billion. Companies with deficits are continuing to increase dividends significantly, without pro-rata repayment of deficit. I, too, welcome the initiative the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, is taking on this matter.

Against that background, £1 million looks like an affordable cost of doing business for larger organisations. I consider that it would be relevant to apply fines that match, for example, a multiple of the unpaid deficit, or based on turnover, such as the fines for offending against the GDPR or competition law. Putting employees’ pensions at risk or raiding the public purse via the Pension Protection Fund is egregious behaviour and deserves no less penalty than those other policy areas where larger fines can be levied. There are precedents beyond financial services, which are behind the game on what fines should be for egregious matters.

I realise that there are new criminal offences and there is always nervousness about them, especially by the people who probably never risk being caught by them. We have to try to make them work against the people we need to catch, but we know how difficult it can be to prove mens rea in the collective decision-making of the corporate environment. Frankly, I think that prosecutors and judges can recognise wrongdoing when they see it and so I do not take so strongly as the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, the cautions in this regard.

Finally, I come to the pensions dashboard. Yes, it is a good idea to have somewhere where you can access all your information. I have already done some of the voluntary ones on platforms where I have got pensions—I have filled things in and got things popping out at the other end—but, in the longer term, there are lots of ideas around these things that we are thinking of. There is the nudge effect that such dashboards can have on encouraging more savings into pensions. Commercial platforms enabling you to act on the nudge may well be more successful than just getting a message to save more somewhere. For example, it may turn out that banks are better placed to nudge regularly as people log-in online to banks more frequently, and there is already the open banking experience to model upon.

The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, is right: we have to take great care when we introduce any kind of transactional dashboard. Even before that, whatever the rules say, once there is a dashboard other people will come along with their dashboard, which may not be a qualifying dashboard. So we have to make sure that we can catch scammers and other dashboards where you catch your own data, because they will not fall within the rules of a non-qualifying platform.

You cannot rely on entities being regulated. We have had plenty of experience of highly regulated entities, such as banks, where wrongdoing has not been caught because the activity itself was not regulated. For example, again with GRG, the FCA report says that it was unable to act against bankers because the activity of commercial lending is unregulated. So the only way to catch perpetrators who in some way abuse the concept of dashboards is for dashboard activity—whatever it is in a wider sense—to be regulated in a widely defined way so that regulators can act. It is just too risky to leave wriggle room with matters as precious as people’s pensions.