Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Earl Howe Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting : House of Lords
Monday 24th February 2020 Grand Committee

The Minister’s reply to this group is of particular importance. I have tried to point out the specific hurdles he will have to jump over, but it will be important for him to give us as clear an answer as he can to each point to help us—and the many people who will be listening to this debate and reading the transcript—to understand where the Government are going. We have no desire to undermine the ability of the regulator to pursue those who put at risk the hard-earned funds of pension savers; equally, we need to be sure that appropriate safeguards are there. I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, this is quite a large group of amendments, all having as their subject matter Clause 107. I want to do justice to them so I therefore hope the Committee will forgive me if my reply is somewhat longer than might be welcome or the norm.

Let me briefly set out what this clause seeks to do. Clause 107 introduces two new criminal offences into the Pensions Act 2004, in new Sections 58A and 58B, and provision in new Sections 58C and 58D for mirroring financial penalties. These provisions strengthen the deterrent and punishment for certain conduct which puts pension schemes at risk. My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, asked what sorts of acts we are targeting. The types of acts that could fall within the criminal offences—and which, incidentally, the Pensions Regulator has previously encountered—are, for example, the sale of an employer with a defined benefit scheme without replacing an existing parental guarantee over the employer’s Section 75 debt, resulting in the loss of the guarantee, including failing to tell the trustees about the sale in advance. That might be one example.

A second example would be the purchase of a company, subsequent mismanagement of that company and extraction of value prior to it going into administration, while a third might be the stripping of assets from the employer, resulting in a substantial weakening of support for the scheme. I do not mean to suggest that that is an exclusive list, but I hope it gives the Committee a flavour of the actions that we are targeting.

If found guilty of an offence under these new sections, a person would be liable to a fine on summary conviction or, on conviction on indictment, a fine or imprisonment for up to seven years. Where a financial penalty is issued in respect of these provisions, the person may receive a penalty of up to £1 million. The noble Lord, Lord Hutton, asked me why we had drafted it so that the offence could be tried either way. I think that, in sum, the reason is that it gives the Pensions Regulator discretion to focus on all ranges of what might be considered bad behaviour or wilful or reckless behaviour, not just the most severe. It gives the regulator that flexibility.

I realise that Amendments 17 and 22 are probing amendments. They seek to probe whether and how far the two new offences should apply to any person whose conduct is within the scope of the offences, and they suggest that they might apply only to a person who wilfully, recklessly or unscrupulously does an act or engages in such conduct. I will say something about the words “wilfully” or “recklessly” in a moment, but is it is important first to understand that the new criminal offences and financial penalty provisions target conduct that avoids employer debt to pension schemes or risks accrued scheme benefits being paid. It is the conduct that we are focusing on here. It is an offence only if the person intended to harm the scheme or should have known that the conduct would have that effect and has no reasonable excuse for their actions.

In proposing these criminal offences, it is absolutely not the Government’s intention to interfere with routine business activities. The Pensions Regulator also continues to be responsible for making sure that employers balance the needs of their defined-benefit pension scheme with growing their business. However, it is important that where the elements of the offences are met, no matter who has committed them, the Pensions Regulator should be able to respond appropriately. Any restriction of the persons would create a loophole for these people to act in such a way.

Leading on from that, Amendment 18, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seeks to remove the requirement in the new criminal offence in new Section 58A for the Pensions Regulator to prove that a person intended an act or course of conduct to have the effect stated in the offence. The amendment would significantly change the nature of the new offence. It would also duplicate many elements of the new offence contained in new Section 58B. In practical terms, new Section 58A as introduced applies only where wilful behaviours have occurred. That is evident as the section requires that

“the person intended the act or course of conduct”

to have the effect as set out. It is worth my adding that this offence also mirrors the existing main purpose test in the contribution notice regime and has been worded accordingly.

The noble Baroness made reference at Second Reading to the difficulty, in her view, of proving intent in the corporate environment. I have to say that I am not with her on that. Proving that a person’s behaviour was intentional is something that the regulator currently does under the main purpose test in the contribution notice regime, so we are confident that this should not be cause for concern.

In contrast to some of the earlier amendments, Amendments 23, 24, 25 and 26 would change the basis of the new criminal offence, as included in new Section 58B, making the scope of the activities caught by the offence wider than as set out in the Bill. Mirroring changes have also been made to the corresponding financial penalty provision, as included in new Section 58D. As introduced in the Bill, the basis of the test in these new sections is whether a person does an act or course of conduct which,

“detrimentally affects in a material way the likelihood of accrued scheme benefits being received”.

The test requires that the person knew or ought to have known that the act or course of conduct would have this effect. However, the amendments as tabled would mean that the test is met where a person,

“wilfully or recklessly puts at risk accrued scheme benefits being received”.

There are two main points I would like to address on these amendments and on why their wording is not appropriate. The first is a point of clarification around why we have not drafted the new offence and corresponding financial penalty in terms of the words “wilful” and “reckless” conduct. We have listened to feedback following consultation around the application of a test and we concluded that there would be too much uncertainty regarding what the words mean for us to legislate on this basis. Instead, the provisions have been drafted in such a way that it should be clear whether the test is met.

Secondly, changing the basis of the test to “puts at risk” could cause uncertainty within the industry. We consciously used the existing contribution notice tests as the basis for the new sanctions, as they target similar behaviours and are already familiar to the industry. By comparison, changing the basis of the test at new Sections 58B and 58D to “putting at risk” would create a new concept. Our view is that this would create uncertainty and a lack of clarity about the application of the new sanctions. In particular, changing the basis of the test could raise questions around the interpretation of the legislation, which the Bill, as introduced, already seeks to address.

It is clear that the types of conduct that either,

“detrimentally affects in a material way the likelihood of”,

benefits being received or, as per the amendment, “puts at risk” benefits being received, could be wide-ranging. This is why the Bill, as introduced, includes the concept of materiality, as a means to indicate that consideration will need to be given to the level of impact the conduct has on the likelihood of accrued scheme benefits being received. The concept “puts at risk” does not include any indication that the level of impact should be considered at all. Therefore, if the amendments were to be accepted, it could be argued that conduct that puts benefits at risk by even a fraction of a per cent could be in scope, which would go beyond the policy intention.

Amendments 19, 20 and 21 seek to provide further clarity around the way in which the reasonable excuse defence will work and to provide protection from prosecution if an act or course of conduct has been approved by the Pensions Regulator or the Pension Protection Fund. I believe that Amendments 19 and 20 are unnecessary and will set out why.

The existing phrase in the Bill “reasonable excuse”, which is to be removed by Amendment 19, has an inherently wide meaning in practice and could be interpreted to include the factors being presented in the amendment. It is therefore unnecessary to set out those factors. The factors that the prosecuting authority would consider when determining whether there is a reasonable excuse would depend on the individual circumstances of each case. Amendment 20 could, however, limit the factors the prosecuting authority and the courts could consider when determining whether there is a reasonable excuse and may potentially result in unintended consequences. For example, a person may have a reasonable excuse that does not fall into one of the factors to be considered. It is the age-old problem of including a list in legislation—a problem with which my noble friend is very familiar, I am sure.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hutton of Furness]

I hear what the Minister says about prosecuting authorities but can he turn his remarks to the subject of why in those circumstances the Secretary of State should be considered a legitimate prosecuting authority? He has not mentioned that. I understand his points about the DPP and the Pensions Regulator but what about the Secretary of State?

[Earl Howe]

I was coming to that but I will deal with it now. The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions can institute proceedings for an offence under new Sections 58A and 58B in England and Wales only. This drafting mirrors the legislation of similar offences, such as insider dealing in the Criminal Justice Act 1993, as well as offences in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the Insolvency Act 1986, where the Treasury or the Insolvency Service could bring prosecutions.

The inclusion of the Secretary of State here enables the Government to ensure that the most serious conduct that harms pension schemes will remain punishable in the future. For example, if the ability of the regulator to bring about proceedings is hindered or the regulator ceases to exist—or exists in a different form—this provision could cut in. It is not envisaged that the Secretary of State will institute prosecutions where the Pensions Regulator or, where relevant, the Director of Public Prosecutions has decided against it. Further, where the power to institute prosecutions is exercised, the guidelines from the Code for Crown Prosecutors will apply.

[Lord Hutton of Furness]

Where will that be set out? If the Secretary of State will not prosecute in those circumstances, how will that be made clear?

[Earl Howe]

It will be made clear—in practice, if anything—but the Secretary of State will reserve the power for the rarest of occasions, I imagine, in the circumstances that I outlined. The normal course would be for the traditional prosecuting authorities to act. Only where the Secretary of State sees an egregious example of someone likely to get away without prosecution for reasons beyond the control of the prosecuting authorities will he or she step in. I cannot generalise about the circumstances. That power is there, as in the other Acts that I mentioned, very much as a long-stop provision.

Amendment 35, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, proposes a new clause requiring the Pensions Regulator to publish guidance on how it intends to use the new criminal offences. We think this amendment is unnecessary. The Pensions Regulator already has a general prosecution policy in place which sets out the matters it considers when using its prosecution powers. The Pensions Regulator intends to issue further specific guidance explaining its approach to prosecuting the new offences under Part 3 of the Bill.

I fear there is also a practical difficulty, because it is unclear how the amendment could be implemented. The amendment would require the Pensions Regulator to publish guidance pertaining to the new offences at the point of Royal Assent. The problem with that is that the provisions in Part 3, which include the new criminal offences, are subject to changes up to the point of Royal Assent and it would be unwise to pre-empt the will of Parliament by preparing guidance based on draft provisions. It is expected that, following Royal Assent, the regulator will consult on the contents of the guidance for the new offences and expects to publish this guidance prior to commencement. It is clearly important that the industry’s views are sought on what is contained in the guidance, and the timing requirement proposed in this amendment would mean the regulator would consult before the offences are finally settled.

A further reason the amendment is unnecessary—indeed, I would say inappropriate—is due to the inclusion of the phrase

“guidance … concerning the operation of law”.

This phrase has a very specific meaning, and implies that the intention behind the amendment is that it will be for the Pensions Regulator to determine how the legislation should be interpreted. This is of course a matter for the courts, which will make the decision as to whether an offence has been committed in a particular case. Therefore, while the regulator’s guidance will provide assistance as to how the regulator intends to use the new criminal offences, it will not be definitive; nor could it or should it be, since something deemed to be reasonable in one case, for example, may not be reasonable in another. I should mention, for completeness, that there are a number of technical issues with all these amendments which could cause confusion. I shall not go into them here, but I can explain the details to noble Lords if necessary, outside the Committee.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe asked what kind of estimate we make of the number of people who might go to prison under these criminal offences. Clearly, irresponsible treatment of pension schemes is rare; however, it is important that where we have wilful or reckless behaviour, appropriate sanctions are available. The Pensions Regulator has successfully brought 16 convictions over the past two and a half years—it is of course for the courts to decide who gets convicted and what the penalty should be. I hope it is widely accepted that the Pensions Regulator must meet a higher threshold before a criminal prosecution can be commenced. As the Pensions Regulator has already commented, it would use these new powers only in the right circumstances.

The noble Lord, Lord Hutton, asked a further question about the words “any person” and what other legislation uses that phrase. It is the norm for criminal offences across the statute book to be drafted as applying to “any person” and I can give him examples—I would be happy to write to him.

It is clear that the majority of employers want to do right by their scheme. However, we must ensure that there are sufficient safeguards to protect members’ pensions from the minority who are prepared to put them at risk. If the category of persons whose conduct is within the scope of the offences as set out in Clause 107 were to be narrowed in the way that some of the amendments propose, we believe that the deterrent provided by the offences would be weakened, as indeed would the safeguards built into them. In contrast, making the scope of the activities caught by the offences wider, as separately proposed by other amendments, not only risks removing a key consideration of the level of impact of the conduct but also reduces safeguards. The Government have therefore sought to strike a balance to ensure that members’ benefits are protected while taking into account impacts on business.

I apologise again for speaking at such length, but I hope that the comments I have made will allow noble Lords to feel comfortable in not pressing their amendments.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I thank the Minister for his comprehensive reply. I had intended to probe especially around the words “wilful” and “reckless”; I had a little add-on for fun. When I first thought of putting those words in after “person”, I rapidly came to the conclusion myself—I think the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, was there—that in the end they did not make any difference. However, I am not actually sure that that is quite true with regard to the offence of the avoidance of employer debt. New subsection (2)(b) states

“the person intended the act or course of conduct to have such an effect”

but that has to be applied to the examples that might be targeted given by the Minister. In the case of sale of the employer and a parental guarantee not being replaced, that might be done through negligence rather than intent and then it would not be caught because the words “ought to have known” do not appear in the new Section 58A offence, although they do in the new Section 58B offence. So the Government have caught recklessness in new Section 58B but not in new Section 58A. Maybe the words “ought to have known” or something like them could be put there.

[Earl Howe]

It might be helpful to the noble Baroness if I clarify. New Section 58A is intended to capture the concept of wilfulness and new Section 58B the concept of recklessness.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I see. I do not see why we could not have them caught in both. Anyway, we have debated this long enough. I thank the Minister for his replies, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.