Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 22nd June 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Blackwell (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as a significant shareholder in Lloyd’s Banking Group, of which I was formerly chairman.

Although I recognise the concerns raised by my noble friends, it is important that we tackle the confusion caused by the dual roles of the courts and the regulator in the regulation of consumer credit. The regulation of consumer credit is not a black and white issue. A balance has to be made all the time between the level of protection offered to consumers and the costs of compliance borne by the institutions, and the risk that, if the courts are unpredictable in the way they interpret the Consumer Credit Act, suppliers will either withhold products or build an insurance premium into the costs.

We have had too many incidents over the past few years where what financial institutions thought was a settled issue, as determined by the regulator, has been altered retrospectively by decisions in the courts. We can have a choice one way or the other, but it is important that we tackle the confusion caused by the dual responsibility. As I see it, the Consumer Credit Act is an outdated piece of legislation, as the Government have set out. It was based on conditions that have changed radically. We have since set up the financial services regulator, with devolved responsibilities for regulation. We may or may not think that the regulator is doing well or want to increase supervision of it, but the Government should try to make it clear through these amendments to the Consumer Credit Act whether the result will be, as I hope, to make it clear that there is a single definitive source of regulation for the Consumer Credit Act, which is the balance struck by the Financial Conduct Authority, and that the courts, so far as possible, no longer have a role.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, this and the following group dwell on the same territory; I will make my main intervention in the next group alongside my detailed amendments. I am sorry that I had to separate them out, but that was only because of the Chief Whip’s speaking-time restrictions on non-movers, which ironically mean that the debate will take longer overall. I have both general points and points on the substantive amendments. I agree very much with many other speakers, and in particular the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Noakes. Overall, the Bill is extraordinary for the manner in which it does and undoes many things with questionable process.

My general approach on the point about the Consumer Credit Act is straightforward: I do not object to using the FCA to modernise and speed up redress mechanisms. We are already seeing that in practice with the motor finance commission cases, but that experience also contains a very clear warning. Here I depart from what the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, would wish to have. In the first instance, the FCA made rules that were not in line with statute. It said that commission did not have to be disclosed unless asked about. We have ended up with a situation where firms which thought they were following the rules have been caught out because the statute said something different.

The moral lesson is simple: if you find yourself thinking, “Oh good, I don’t have to tell them about this nice little earner”, something is already unfair. In practice, some car salesmen discussed bonuses, quotas and commissions with customers, sometimes linking them to discounts. I have personal experience of that. But if the statute had not existed, what would have happened? The logic is that the old way, non-disclosure, might have continued because the FCA rules permitted it and it had not spotted the unfairness. For all that we have some very capable regulators, we have been shown that they are not infallible and they are not legislators—a point we will return to repeatedly as we go through the Bill. From time to time, they hit the barriers of their remits, perimeters and institutional roles.

Our system is not to delegate unconstrained power to regulators. Parliament sets the framework, regulators operate within it and, when necessary, the court interprets. Yet here, we are being asked to legislate for an automated substitution to set in train an unseen process that Parliament can no longer influence, that has no predetermined scope and whereby courts lose jurisdiction. That is constitutionally unsound and unsupportable. I will return to the detail in the next group but the principle is clear. As the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, said, Parliament should not sign away rights and protections without knowing what will replace them.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

It is a great privilege to wind up for the Lib Dems. People will know from Second Reading that I am very strongly of the same mind as the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes and Lady Bowles, and I think the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, takes a very similar view on this first clause. The others speak with some sense of diplomacy; I will be slightly more direct, because, from my perspective, the Bill, by repealing the CCA, basically removes consumer credit protection from law and moves it to the FCA rulebook with no meaningful accountability and, frankly, little visibility.

Peers will remember that in 2021, many of us in this House and the other place were getting very frustrated with the FCA. It had some very good people but it was definitely neglecting consumer protection, and this House consequently passed an amendment to instruct the FCA to consult on a duty of care. The FCA chose not to consult on a duty of care, despite that direct instruction. It consulted instead on what it said was the equivalent, which was a consumer duty, the key difference being that a duty of care has a meaning in law, with a private right to action. In other words, an individual can turn to the courts if he or she believes that they have been wronged. This is a right that, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, the FCA, at the behest of the industry, did not want the consumer to have, despite it being a long and very well-established tradition in English law.

The Bill now achieves the wholesale removal of credit protection from the law and into the rulebook of the FCA, and it is obviously an extension of that deliberate process to remove paths to redress for consumers. The Committee will be aware that consumers cannot take civil action against the FCA: it is immune. It is correct that it should be immune from action by those whom it regulates in the market, but it is also immune from action by consumers. As we go on through the Bill, will see that same process of undermining redress in future groups of amendments—very much so when we are dealing with the FOS.

When I have talked to members of the Government on this issue, they seem surprised at my comments because they see the FCA as a real champion of the consumer. Indeed, the industry will say the same thing. However, perhaps I have a longer memory, as does this Committee.

Do Members here remember the issue of payday lenders—the very widespread abuse of individuals who were entering into incredibly high-priced credit and were finding themselves continuously in debt trouble? When the issues were put to the FCA by Members of Parliament, by complainants and by whistleblowers, the only action that the FCA agreed to take was to make some minor adjustments to the rules on rollover. It argued that payday lenders had an important part to play within our credit system. It took action in this House in 2015, when a Minister broke with the Government’s perspective and decided to support a move that had been made from the Labour Benches by the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell. It was the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, who spoke for the Government, and he decided that enough was enough and that the only way to deal with payday lenders was to shut them down. That action was put into law, and it improved the whole credit environment that we live in today and eliminated a really serious abuse. As I read the Bill, people will lose that opportunity. When people claim that the FCA is a champion of credit, and they cite the consumer duty, they do not realise that it does not incorporate that very traditional English right to turn to the courts.

Even if today one accepted that the FCA, in its currents design and with the relevant people in place, was indeed a consumer champion, that could easily change, because we are relying totally on FCA culture. In the 1990s—I often go back to that decade—the financial regulators demonstrated the most extraordinary degree of deference to the financial sector. Frankly, the 2007 crash could not have happened without that deference. Many of the lessons of that crash are being undermined by this Bill, throughout which there is a return to deference—this time in the name of growth.

--- Later in debate ---

This opposition to Clause 1, together with my opposition to Schedule 1, would remove the changes to the Consumer Credit Act 1974.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I oppose Clause 1 and Schedule 1 standing part of the Bill. I shall speak also to my detailed amendments to the schedule, which appear as Amendments 4 to 17.

We all know how consumer agreements work, whether for credit or anything else. There is always an asymmetry of power between the provider and the consumer. Nowadays, it is often impossible to speak to a person rather than a bot. If you do get a person, it is a call centre with scripted questions and answers, often including a recital of terms and conditions faster than it is possible to understand. You cannot get to the next stage without saying, “Yes, I have understood and agreed”, when, in truth, you have not. You do not even see the terms and conditions until after you have clicked “Yes”, then you are given a time-limited right to withdraw. This back-to-front impatience to get boxes ticked first is now a feature of the modern consumer environment—one that I fear we have now replicated in the legislative procedures in the Bill, only here, once Parliament ticks the box, there is no cooling-off period and no right to withdraw.

The Bill repeals parts of the Consumer Credit Act. It gives the Government open-ended regulation-making powers before there has been any consultation and before we have seen the shape or operation of any FCA rules. I cannot support that. It goes too far, too fast and too unseen. That is not the way to make irrevocable changes. So I will not tick the box. I want to know what I am signing up to, just as the consumer must. I want to know that what are presented as rights are, in fact, rights.

Clause 1 repeals statutory rights before replacements exist. The Government take powers to make regulations before consultation. At the very least, that is a reason to take a great deal of notice of what is being said by Parliament. I also question whether this approach meets the Government’s own statutory duties under the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, which requires regulation to be proportionate, accountable and transparent. Repealing rights before replacements exist does not seem to meet those tests. This is a fundamental change from the status quo, where rights are in statute and rules are made to assist in negotiating the statute.

Clause 1 reverses that. It removes statutory protections now and offers only a possibility of regulatory rules later. Rules are not rights. Rules can be changed by the rule-maker, whereas rights bind everyone, including the regulator. The Government’s approach is, therefore, constitutionally backwards. Parliament is being asked to repeal rights without knowing what will replace them. It is like signing a credit agreement without knowing the terms, and we are being asked to sign it on behalf of the public.

My solution would be to preserve a statutory floor, both now and in future, and not a temporary one that could be slowly eroded at the whim of the Government or a regulator. My amendments to Schedule 1 are intended to show how this can be done; I thank Which? for its assistance in preparing them. They aim to preserve important provisions in relation to notices of arrears and default sums, as well as the unenforceability sanctions attached to them in the Consumer Credit Act. These are the legal backstops—the protections that ensure that rights are real.

I shall explain what my amendments do and why they matter. First, they would preserve the requirement to serve notices of arrears and default sums and the statutory consequences of failing to do so. These provisions apply, for example, where a borrower has fallen behind on payments. A default notice must be served before a creditor can take certain drastic steps such as terminating the agreement, demanding early repayment or recovering goods and land. Default notices also play an important part in determining when debts become statute barred, because, once served, lenders have six years to take court action. Secondly, they would keep these protections in legislation but allow the FCA to modernise the form and content of the notices. That is the right balance. Technology changes, as does the way in which information is presented, but the underlying rights do not and should not.

The Government’s approach is to repeal the majority of the CCA provisions with the suggestion that they could be recast into FCA rules at some future point, subject to consultation. That means there will be no parliamentary scrutiny of what these protections might look like once they are repealed. My amendments would guarantee that the core protections remained mandatory legal requirements while allowing the FCA to update the way in which information is provided. That is what the legislation should have done from the start—modernise the form, not abolish the substance.

I turn to sanctions, which is where the Consumer Credit Act is at its strongest and where the Bill is at its weakest. The sanctions in the CCA were included in 1974 because Parliament recognised the significant imbalance of power between a consumer and a creditor. Parliament wanted proactive compliance with the law, not a system where an individual consumer must detect a breach, voice a complaint, and then pursue slow and time-consuming legal or ombudsman remedies, particularly when those consumers are likely to be vulnerable, stressed or in financial difficulty.

The sanctions ensure that a creditor cannot take steps against a debtor while the creditor is non-compliant with the law. They are automatic. They work because they require compliance up front, not after the harm has occurred, and they cannot be replicated in FCA rules. Without those sanctions, consumers may face new threats from being pursued for debts, particularly when debts are sold to unauthorised debt purchasers. The burden shifts on to the consumer to detect breaches and seek redress. Vulnerable consumers are disproportionately harmed, and the automatic reprieve that Parliament deliberately created is lost.

My amendments would ensure that those sanctions on arrears and default notices remained in legislation while allowing the FCA to modernise the way information was presented. That would preserve vital individual rights while recognising that flexibility is needed in a digital age. That is not an unusual approach. The CCA and the FCA’s existing consumer credit rules already operate in a complementary way.

The amendments I have tabled focus on arrears and default notices because that is where the greatest harm would arise if protections were removed, but they are only exemplary. They show the balanced approach that should have been taken across the whole reform of the Consumer Credit Act: move form and content to the FCA rules where appropriate but keep the substantive protections in legislation. I am looking for that complete reform.

There are other areas, such as the form and content of credit agreements, the duty to provide information under fixed-sum and running-account agreements, and the sanctions for improperly executed agreements, where the same balanced approach could and should be taken. I would be happy to meet to discuss those. The Government’s own consultation on CCA reform was meant to have two phases. Phase 1, on information requirements and sanctions, took place, but phase 2, on key consumer rights, was scrapped. That is not a sound basis for repealing rights now and promising rules later.

The CCA was ground-breaking for creating automatic protections, even if at times those protections have been bitten for trivialities. That is a reason for modification, not cancellation. Their purpose is still relevant: ensuring active compliance, preventing regulatory creep and protecting vulnerable consumers. They cannot be replaced with certainty in FCA rules. Their removal shifts the burden on to consumers. This is a regression in consumer protection at a time when modern communications already curtail the time for circumspection.

If the Government were bringing forward a coherent replacement for the Consumer Credit Act, it would look something like this: statutory principles of fairness, transparency, good faith and protection against unequal bargaining power. Those are not exotic ideas; they exist in other jurisdictions. Australia’s unconscionable conduct regime is one example. At the end of the day, businesses must think and exert conscience and play fair, but that is not what Clause 1 does. It removes rights without replacing them. Modernisation is possible but I will not tick the box on behalf of the public until I have seen the replacement and until I know that it preserves rights now and in the statute. I beg to move.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I must apologise: I was not in the country for Second Reading, so this is my first intervention on the Bill.

I support wholeheartedly the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the rationale that she has just explained. I thank Which? for the work that it has been doing on the Bill and to try to help consumers.

I cannot support this leap in the dark for parliamentary scrutiny and I cannot support imposing this leap in the dark on consumers. At the end of the day, that is what the provisions in Schedule 1 are at risk of doing. I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, with her amendments, and the amendments that we have seen from other noble Lords in the first group, are seeking to help the Government to achieve their aims more safely for consumers. I believe that what the Government are trying to do has the right motive; it is about whether the manner in which this is being done is safe for us to agree to—and I do not believe that it is.

If we think one step ahead, what protection will consumers have against the FCA making a significant error in its regulation? What protection will consumers have if the asymmetry of information and power that we know already exists in the financial services industry, especially for retail customers, continues along its current lines? I hope that the Government and the Committee will recognise that leaving consumer protection to the regulators is not a safe thing to do if you want to improve consumer protection—and, as I say, I believe that is what the Government would like to do.

The FCA has a peculiar regulatory style. For example, if it has discovered or suspected wrongdoing, it does not, as you might expect, do mystery shopping on behalf of consumers. It will ask firms generally to investigate how they behave and then to report to the FCA. That may work but it will not always work, and there is no fallback protection such as we have in the Consumer Credit Act if the consumer experience is not as it has been portrayed or as the FCA might have expected. There is a consumer panel as part of the FCA, but, in my experience with a number of financial scandals or problems that have arisen for consumers, the FCA consumer panel has little or no power. It is not listened to and does not form part of the FCA regulatory decision-making process that perhaps one would need to be confident that it represents in the case of passing on this protection to the FCA.

I hope that the Minister and the Government will listen carefully to the arguments that have been made so far in the first two groups and recognise the damage that could be done by pursuing the proposed actions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for the opportunity to set out the Government’s position on this important set of issues. I start by addressing why Clause 1 and Schedule 1 should stand part of the Bill. However, I do not want to duplicate what I said on the previous group, where I set out at length the Government’s policy for the CCA. Suffice it to say that the case for reform is straightforward. The Consumer Credit Act is more than 50 years old and was enacted long before the creation of the FCA. It no longer delivers as it should for today’s consumers, who engage with modern products in an increasingly digital world. That is why the Bill continues the work that began in 2012 of repealing this outdated legislation, such that it can be replaced with updated rules that better meet the needs of consumers and are fit for this digital age.

I understand the strength of feeling on the question of delegation, but I note that the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, said that this is not a consensus. As I have said, this is entirely consistent with the model of regulation established by Parliament in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The Government strongly believe that those replacement rules should, in the main, reside in the FCA rulebook, not in primary legislation.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, expressed concern about how the FCA will replace some key protections, including information requirements. In the last group, I already explained the process that the FCA will follow. As I said, in practice, Parliament, the sector and consumer groups will see the FCA’s detailed proposals at the consultation stage, before the new regime takes place. I am happy to assure the noble Baroness that the FCA’s recent public statement confirmed that it aims to consult on key information requirements, rights and protections, including cancellation and withdrawal, the termination of agreements, including early settlement, and on looking across the consumer credit journey, with this approach being underpinned by the consumer duty. This will be supported by consultation and cost-benefit analysis, consumer research and stakeholder feedback.

Amendments 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 16 would retain information requirements and related sanctions in legislation or limit the FCA to prescribing only the form and content of notices. That would preserve the rigidity we are seeking to address. I cannot accept these amendments, as the provisions are not fit for the digital age. The Bill repeals these rigid statutory requirements so that the FCA can develop a more effective, rules-based regime. This is not about reducing information but about improving its timing, its quality and its clarity. The aim of the regime is that it provides consumers with better information in a clearer form and at a time that is most useful to them.

The consequence of repealing these information requirements is that certain related sanctions will fall away. These sanctions were designed for a different era. The Office of Fair Trading had limited powers for supervision and enforcement, so the regime was designed to be draconian to act as a robust deterrent. The sanctions apply automatically, regardless of the seriousness of any breach or whether any consumer harm has arisen. For example, a lender that used the incorrect wording in an arrears notice is required to refund any interest and fees charged from the point at which that breach was originally made, even if the error was in no way harmful to the borrower. Much has changed over the years since these sanctions were designed, and this approach is poorly suited to the modern approach to regulation. The FCA has strong supervisory and enforcement powers, and under consumer duties firms must deliver good outcomes. Unlike when the CCA was enacted, any consumer who suffers harm can straightforwardly access redress through the Financial Ombudsman Service, the FOS.

I recognise the concern behind Amendment 2, which seeks to ensure that FCA rules can supplement but not replace or diminish rights and remedies in the CCA. However, the Bill already preserves statutory rights that need to remain in legislation. Because FCA rules are not capable of eroding such rights, the amendment is not necessary.

I have already set out, in the last group, several examples of protections that remain in primary legislation, including Section 75 and provisions connected to criminal offences, which must of course remain in legislation. Amendments 6 and 15 would retain withdrawal, cancellation and early settlement rights in the CCA rather than allowing them to be recast into FCA rules. These rights are an important feature of consumer credit products that ought to be preserved. However, the current framework is complex and outdated and, as a result, not always well understood by consumers. The purpose of reform is to ensure that these protections work better for consumers, which is why the FCA has committed to consider cancellation rights alongside other rights including withdrawal, termination of agreements and early settlement, as part of its future framework. The amendments would prevent the FCA taking forward this vital work.

Lastly, Amendment 17 covers certain important rights, such as time orders, and seeks to retain these provisions within legislation without changes. However, changes to these provisions are necessary to ensure that they work together with the new information requirements recast into FCA rules.

I hope that I have been able to reassure noble Lords that the Government are taking forward these changes for the benefit of consumers, and convince them that the changes the Bill makes are necessary to modernise our protections and ensure that they are serving their intended purpose of protecting consumers. I acknowledge that we will come to the scrutiny of the regulators, especially the FCA, in future groups. I therefore propose that Clause 1 and Schedule 1 stand part of the Bill and respectfully ask the noble Baroness not to press her opposition to them.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and all who have spoken in this debate. I am sorry that, to some extent, having it in two separate bits has made it more awkward. We are at a kind of impasse here. The Minister replies as though we are saying that nothing in the Consumer Credit Act can be changed and it will all have to stay there. In fact, all I am saying is that there are some basic core rights in statute, similar to the sorts of core rights that exist in many other Commonwealth countries, that should remain, because you do not have rights with the regulator. As my noble friend Lord Sharkey explained, the consumer duty does not give you any rights. It is about the opinion of the FCA, and it can change how it will apply it.

The main thing that we are objecting to is that the Bill is shoot first, ask questions later: “Give us all the power now and we’ll consult and tell you what we’re actually going to do later”. That is not the way to make legislation right—it is not how you would hire a telly, for heaven’s sake. We are being asked to tick the box on behalf of the public for something that is fundamentally unseen. The Bill does not retain core rights. It says that some things will change and gives an open-ended power to change everything else automatically when the Government want to. The fact that the Government are not taking rights away now does not mean that they cannot take them away later.

That is the impasse that we are at. We need some core rights that stay. The rest can all be simplified, streamlined and handled by the FCA and made more modern. The two should be able to work together, but it is not a simple fix. This has been pushed through without that second consultation, and that is why it is now falling apart as unsatisfactory. I will return to this when we come to Report, but, for now, I will not press my opposition to Clause 1 standing part of the Bill.

Clause 1 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

These amendments are all directed at the same underlying concern. Consumers need a system that is fair, timely and capable of delivering redress where it is properly due. Firms need a system that is clear, predictable and not retrospective in effect. The wider market needs confidence that regulatory powers will be exercised within defined and proportionate limits. I hope that the Minister will be able to provide the clarity that we seek. This is very much a Committee-style discussion, and I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I would like to join in this discussion because it is probing thoughts. I shall make a few comments on Amendment 17A, because the issue overlaps with an amendment of mine that comes later in the main FOS group.

Amendment 17A raises an important point about limitation periods and the concept of when a relationship ends. It seeks to preserve the six-year limitation period for unfair relationship claims, running from the end of the creditor-debtor relationship. I understand the intention, but it exposes a deeper difficulty. The end of a relationship is not, or may not be, the same as the end of rights and it is certainly not the same as the end of enforcement powers. In many cases, firms retain continuing benefits or enforcement rights long after the consumer’s remedies have expired. Debts can be sold, pursued, securitised or enforced years after the practical relationship has ended, yet the consumer’s ability to challenge an unfair relationship may already have fallen away. That is an asymmetry.

As I said at Second Reading, while I understand the industry’s desire to get a grip on long-tail risk and liabilities, especially where regulators are interested in it, that cannot be done off the back of consumers. If we are to move parts of the Consumer Credit Act into the FCA rules, at the very least those rules must be required to secure, as far as reasonably practicable, symmetry between the duration of rights, remedies and redress available to consumers and the duration of rights, remedies, enforcement powers or continuing benefits to firms arising from the same act, omission or relationship. Without that symmetry, we risk creating a regime where firms retain long-tail powers but consumers lose long-tail protections. Limitation periods cannot be considered in isolation from the underlying rights. The two must move together or we distort the balance that Parliament intended. That is why the statutory framework has a place.

The FCA has already announced, a year or so back, a shift in emphasis to allow more risk in the interests of growth, which is a recurring theme. That was an important statement by the FCA and it feeds into the need for proportionate regulation and acceptance that there may be more failures, which Parliament must accept, but it cannot mean a bias advantage towards business in ways where firms retain recourse against consumers while consumers lose recourse against firms.

Under that process, companies may enjoy growth by escaping the consequences of some bad actions, but that gain is extracted from consumers and effectively added to the cost of living. Fleecing consumers is not growth, but I fear that this may be the consequence of the asymmetry in rights that could arise under Amendment 17A. I may return to this issue with my own amendment on Report.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

It is very nice to be back to do another Financial Services and Markets Bill. As it is the first time I have spoken, I should declare a registered interest in Fidelity National Information Services, Inc., which is a large American company that provides services and software to a wide range of financial services companies around the world.

I have tabled Amendment 26 and given notice of my intention to oppose that Clause 3 stand part of the Bill. I have also added my name to a number of amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.

I have another interest to declare. I lost my local bank branch in my village some years ago, and I have just been informed that the last remaining bank in my nearest town is also about to close. To visit a bank branch for me will now involve a 100-mile round trip, so I am sympathetic to the idea that we need to do something to ensure continuation of access to banking services, especially in rural areas such as mine. At the same time, I am conscious that I probably visit a bank branch less than a couple of times a year, so I understand why banks feel it necessary to close them. They are not economic. We need to find a sensible balance to this. I accept that we may need to do something, but what?

There is the old joke: “We need to do something; this is something, so let’s do it”, but Clause 3 is not even something. It is just a vague—I was going to say promise, but it is not even that—intention to do something completely unspecified at an unspecified time, or indeed times, in the future. This Government have an unfortunate track record of putting sweeping powers into legislation before deciding what they actually intend to do with them, and this is yet another example. As the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee pointed out really strongly, this is a very sweeping power with no meaningful limitations at all other than, as we have heard, the need to have regard, and only to have regard, to the independent review currently being undertaken by Richard Lloyd.

Clause 3(3), which has only examples rather than limitations, is one of the widest I have seen. It includes the express ability to make changes to any Act of Parliament, a really strong Henry VIII power. It starts by saying:

“Regulations under subsection (1) may (among other things)”


do the things listed below that. Will the Minister explain what these other things might be? Am I being old-fashioned to suggest that this is not the right way to create law? It would surely be better to wait until after the review has been undertaken, decide what is needed and then legislate—if legislation is actually necessary, since, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, says, we got these banking hubs without legislation—and have the legislation subject to proper scrutiny by Parliament, which it will not be if we go down this route.

The Minister will no doubt try to reassure us about how this power will be used. Of course I—and, I am sure, everybody else in this Room—will have complete faith that the Minister would not try to misuse the power, but he will not always be the Minister. That may be a comment that has particular resonance today. Who knows? It is even possible that this Government may not always be the Government, but this power is unlimited and will be the law for the foreseeable future. Who knows what a future Government might wish to do with such an unlimited power? Indeed, as written, they could even use it to reduce the rights of access to banking.

I have a few specific questions for the Minister. First, will he explain in more detail how the Government currently expect, subject of course to the review, to use this power? What do they expect to do with it and when? Secondly, will he explain which Acts of Parliament he has in mind that might be changed under Clause 3(3)(b) and what changes he would expect to make to them? I put on record now that if I do not get a very convincing answer as to why this wide Henry VIII power is required, I will push Amendment 26, which would remove the power to amend primary legislation, to a Division on Report.

Finally, the Explanatory Memorandum recognises that this is a broad power. It says it is “necessarily broad”. At the same time, and in contrast to that, it also seems to recognise that it is broader than really needed, as it goes on to say,

“the Government would expect to narrow it once the review has concluded”.

I am somewhat baffled by that. We are in Grand Committee now, and the timetable for the Bill seems pretty tight. Will the Minister explain how it would be possible to narrow it, given that the Bill is likely to have completed all its stages before the review is completed and they have worked out what they want to do with it? Once the Bill has become law, the power cannot be narrowed.

This is another example of the Government trying to show they are doing something before they have decided what they want to do, and therefore giving themselves inappropriately broad powers that avoid proper scrutiny when they do finally decide. It is not the right way to make laws that will outlast this Government, and I do not believe this clause should stand part of the Bill without at least very significant narrowing and safeguards.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 24 and 27 in my name. I support what has just been said by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. To some extent, we are again fishing in the same constitutional pond that regulators are not Parliament. Parliament should not give away powers it cannot get back, and it should not make decisions before we know what we are deciding about.

Amendment 24 would ensure that any regulations made under this clause can only make provision that arises directly from the statutory review. A review is not a blank cheque. If Parliament asks for a review of access to banking services, the regulation-making power should be, if not confined to, at least in some way related to what the review identifies and not what a future Minister or regulator might wish to do. That is my real target. It may be that I have drafted he amendment a little too tightly but, as has been explained, this is a very open-ended power to do anything. Looked at constitutionally, the fact that the consultation has not yet been completed and assessed more than stretches proper procedure.

Amendment 27 addresses a different but related concern. As drafted, the Bill creates machinery in which FCA rules effectively drive changes to legislation, including primary legislation. The FCA pulls the lever, the Treasury presses the button and the law moves to reflect the regulator’s rulebook. The Government will no doubt say that Parliament can always reject the regulations, but we all know how that plays out: Parliament is presented with take-it-or-leave-it unamendable statutory instruments, and if it dares to reject them, we are told we are precipitating a constitutional crisis. That is not meaningful parliamentary control.

I am not opposed to the FCA modernising rules or streamlining processes—far from it—but where those rules have the effect of altering rights or obligations that were created by Parliament, the change must meaningfully come back to Parliament. Otherwise, we risk creating a system where the regulator can, in substance, rewrite Acts of Parliament by changing its rulebook. That is not proportionate regulation; it is law-making without accountability. Again, this seems not to be the sort of thing expected under the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act. These amendments do not prevent modernisation; they simply ensure that modernisation happens within a statutory framework, with Parliament retaining oversight of the rights it has created. It does not mean going into the detail, but it does mean monitoring the rights. I hope the Minister will recognise that these are modest but important constitutional guardrails.

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 22 in my name. I apologise for not being able to speak at Second Reading, as I was overseas on a parliamentary delegation. I declare an interest as a member of the Financial Inclusion Commission and president of the Money Advice Trust.

My amendment is specifically about banking hubs, a subject I have been very interested in ever since they came on the scene. There is a need, as I see it, for a far clearer definition of what constitutes a banking hub. Looking at the range of other amendments in this group, I am pleased that we are having a broader and much-needed debate on access to banking and, in particular, in-person services than we managed to have on the 2023 Act, despite my best efforts, which did not really get us anywhere.

To explain why a definition of “banking hubs” is so important, I will briefly look at the context. As we all know, over the past decade banking in the UK has changed profoundly. More than 6,700 high street bank branches have closed since 2015. Of course, at the same time, the way that people pay for goods and services has shifted dramatically: 10 years ago, more than half of all payments were made in cash, and today that figure is closer to one in 10.

For many people, that transition has been quite manageable, and indeed welcome, if they like the convenience of digital banking online, apps or card payments. But, for others, the shift away from local branches and cash-based services has created real barriers. For someone who cannot use online banking, the closure of a local bank branch can mean losing independent access to their own money. For someone who is blind or partially sighted, inaccessible digital systems can make everyday banking difficult or, frankly, impossible. For an older person without reliable transport, the nearest banking services may simply be out of reach. For those who use cash to budget—a proportion of people still do—or to pay carers, support relatives and retain control over household spending, the disappearance of in-person banking is not just a minor inconvenience; it can affect that feeling of control, autonomy and financial security.

Banking hubs emerged as a response to this new reality, providing shared in-person access to basic banking services, including cash withdrawals and deposits, as well as a limited amount of face-to-face support. I welcome banking hubs, as I have throughout this debate. I have been pleased to visit one and see what it involved. The Government have committed to rolling out 350 hubs by 2029. For me, the questions around banking hubs are: what do they actually do? Are they doing enough and being rolled out quickly enough? Are they addressing the needs of the people who need them most? These questions are ever more pressing following the announcement, which I very much welcome, of an independent review into the impact of bank branch closures, looking at what further interventions might be needed to protect access to in-person banking services.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, raised whether this is all about nostalgia and looking back to how it was in the old days—a sort of “Dad’s Army” view of banking—but we really need to recognise that it is not a question of nostalgia for traditional banking. Banking services have and will continue to evolve, and digital services will remain central, in my view, to the future of financial services, but inclusion has to be built into that transition. At the moment, we have not seen quite enough emphasis on inclusion. That key gap remained and was baked into the 2023 legislation, which is why it is so important that the independent review looks at this and comes up with good recommendations, so that the FCA can specify what a banking hub is and what qualifies as one.

Frankly, at the moment, the industry could meet all the terms of regulation without a single banking hub. It can offer services virtually, in theory—namely, through video conferencing—which might have some merit in setting out the minimum requirements for a hub and holding the industry to them in the long term. The FCA might also choose to define hubs to suit rural areas. It might be a lighter-touch model. We have to make sure that this does not impact on the Post Office and that it allows further rollout. All the evidence I have seen so far has pointed to the importance of sustainability for the Post Office and the basic banking services that it provides under the framework agreement.

Moving forward, there are big challenges. At a recent meeting of the All-Party Group on Fair Banking, there were strong calls for the FCA to prevent closures of banks—the last branch in town—until replacement access is in place. There was a feeling that the current approach is frankly too reactive, with a response often coming only after the closure occurs, and there were questions of whether communities losing their final branch should automatically receive a hub, so that there should not have to be a review. The Post Office was very much recognised as a key national asset in supporting access to cash and basic banking services.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to Amendment 30 in my name, which would introduce a fiduciary-style duty on firms in their dealings with consumers and small businesses.

This group is about affordable credit and consumer protection. The problem that we see time and again is not that firms set out to behave badly but that good intentions drift under pressure to increase revenue, under pressure from internal incentives and, sometimes, under pressure from government to deliver growth. When that drift occurs, the cost is pushed on to consumers and, as I said earlier, passing costs on to the people is not growth in any meaningful, national sense.

Motor finance, the example that keeps on giving, shows this clearly. The FCA did not intend to create misalignment, firms did not intend to breach the law, but because the rules were not anchored in a well-understood legal framework, the system drifted. The FCA’s rules permitted the non-disclosure of commission unless asked. The statute required disclosure. The gap widened over time and nobody noticed until the consequences were enormous.

We see similar patterns in insurance add-ons and premium finance arrangements. These products did not begin as bad faith practices, they began as convenience, but over time, margins accumulated, incentives shifted and the products drifted into a place where the consumer’s interests were no longer the anchor. That is not malice but drift, the same drift that we saw in motor finance, and it happens when rules are not anchored in well-understood legal principles. This is what happens in a rules-based system—that is what we have, however we may pretend—rather than a principles-based system.

Parliament has been here before. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has already explained, when this House supported my noble friend Lord Sharkey’s proposal of a duty of care, the intention was to create a principle, a relationship-based obligation, that firms must not exploit unequal bargaining power or information asymmetry. What emerged instead was the FCA’s consumer duty. Is it valuable? I suppose so, but fundamentally it is a rules-based construct, shaped in part by industry pressure for something that their compliance departments could tick. Rules can be changed, narrowed or reinterpreted. Principles such as duty of care and fiduciary duty are legally understood, durable and resistant to drift.

My amendment does not attempt to rewrite the consumer duty. It would simply provide a well-understood statutory anchor—a benchmark against which to assess products and detect the kinds that end up exploiting imbalance. The test becomes, “Is it fair?”, and not merely, “Is it the next step on a path that might already have drifted?” In other words, it is about fairness versus incrementalism.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as a shareholder and a director of financial services companies in asset management and wealth management.

I have considerable sympathy with the objectives that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is seeking to advance. Access to affordable credit is a genuine problem in this country, as in many others, and the Committee is right to view financial exclusion as a problem. However, I am unable to support Amendments 28 and 29 on the grounds that the proposed solution will not solve the problem and may in fact exacerbate the issue that the Bill is partly designed to alleviate: excessive and complex regulatory demands on our financial institutions, which are making us less competitive.

My first concern is one of basic commercial economics. Banks and building societies are not lending to certain sections of the community, however deserving they might be, not because of a lack of understanding of the opportunity or a lack of data; they are not serving those clients at scale because the risk-adjusted returns of lending to higher-risk borrowers at affordable interest rates, and indeed the compliance risk of so doing, do not work commercially. A rating framework published by the FCA will not change that calculus, but it creates yet another compliance exercise, another box to be ticked and another issue to be managed without addressing the underlying economic reality that makes such lending unworkable.

My second concern is the risk of unintended consequences. A rule that would rate banks on their willingness to provide credit to financially-excluded populations—in some cases, very high-risk borrowers—could create an implicit incentive to lend more to people and companies who cannot really afford the loan. The amendment contains no credit quality safeguard and no minimum standard of affordability assessment, yet banks could be incentivised to lend just to improve their ratings. The pressure to improve ratings would not be cost free, of course. In practice, banks will not be carrying out this lending for solid financial reasons, so if they feel forced to extend credits into markets with reduced or zero margins, they will seek to restore those margins elsewhere, through higher charges on other products, reduced rates on savings or increased lending spreads in other parts of the business. The cost will not disappear; it will be redistributed invisibly to existing clients, who also deserve protection.

Moreover, I draw noble Lords’ attention to the stated purpose of the Bill, which is to reduce regulatory burden, not add to it. Yet here we are, being invited to add a new mandatory framework, new data collection requirements, new publication obligations and new performance ratings, all enshrined in primary legislation. This is precisely the regulatory ratchet: the cumulative, seemingly endless new measures that damage our competitiveness. The Financial Services Regulation Committee of this House, chaired by my noble friend Lady Noakes, concluded in its report last June that:

“The cumulative burden of regulatory compliance in the UK is perceived to be disproportionately high, diverting resources that could otherwise support … growth”.


As a serving practitioner in the sector, I strongly agree with this finding. Diverting lending from growing businesses to those effectively in financial need is not going to improve our economy. If anything, it will lead to loan losses for the banks and encourage excessive borrowing from those who cannot afford it, while piling even more costs and regulatory obligations on financial firms. We should resist the urge to reach for intervention every time a market imperfection is identified. Not every problem has a regulatory solution. Indeed, those solutions can often have unintended consequences that increase bureaucracy and undermine growth, so I cannot support the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 33, 35, 37, 42 and 43 in this group. All these amendments, and my Clause 7 not-stand-part question, relate to the FOS and its regime. I will try very hard not to repeat too much of what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, was saying a moment ago. The proposed reforms of the FOS regime are extensive and fundamental, but there is nowhere a clear and convincing explanation of why such fundamental changes are necessary. In fact, I see no real evidence at all of the need for reform on the scale being proposed here.

What we see, looking at the far-reaching proposals in the Bill, is an assault on the four key pillars designed into the FOS by Parliament: independence, speed and simplicity, time limits on bringing complaints, and the “fair and reasonable” test for determining those complaints. Taken together, Part 2 replaces each of those pillars with subordination to the FCA, a rather undefined change to time limits, and a heavy qualification of the “fair and reasonable” test amounting to its entire abandonment. This raises the question of why such a radical reform can be seen as necessary and/or beneficial. At Second Reading, I asked the Minister what evidence there was of systemic failure in the current operation of the FOS, and for evidence, for example, that the FOS was acting as a quasi-regulator. I have had no reply.

The obvious question in all this is: who benefits? The answer is: not the ordinary consumer. My amendments are aimed at eliminating, or at least reducing, the weakening of consumer protection. To that end, my Amendments 33 and 35, to Clause 6, address the time limits for complaints to the FOS, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has dealt with extensively; I agree with most of what he said. What my amendments offer as an alternative to his is that they are perhaps not quite as strong—that might be their virtue. It is often very difficult to get things written into a Bill; it is sometimes easier to deal with them via secondary legislation, as I do rather obliquely.

In Part 2, the Bill proposes other very substantive changes to the way in which the FOS operates. One of these changes, in Clause 7, sets out the circumstances under which the FOS must notify the FCA of a matter relating to a complaint, under which the FOS must request an opinion from the FCA as to the interpretation of FCA rules. It then sets out in detail how consultation should take place on the matter. There really is detail: five whole pages of the Bill set out in great detail the various stages required in the referral process. It adds complexity for no obvious gain and subordinates the FOS’s judgments to the FCA’s. I have no doubt that the byzantine array of subclauses or qualifications will, overall, introduce greater complexity for no foreseeable benefits and will greatly increase the workload of the FCA. The FCA is already under pressure and is planning to absorb the PSR. The last thing we need is the creation of new systems, rules and powers that show no clear promise of benefit, or at least no benefit to the retail complainant.

On necessity, we have to take into consideration whether the current FOS methods are faulty or unproductive. I have seen no compelling evidence that this is the case, only a rather unconvincing summary of the consultation responses. The FOS received 214,000 new complaints in 2025-26. It is projecting a resolution of 207,000 complaints in the coming year, of which 206,000 concern banking and consumer credit companies. It has a target of 70% of cases being resolved within three months and 90% within six. It does not seem as though it is having difficulty operating, and I am not aware of any significant problems for the average consumer. I hear from the industry that the FOS acts inconsistently and that it has strayed into becoming a quasi-regulator, but I have seen no evidence of that, and I am unconvinced by the simple assertion. Taken as a whole, Clause 7 in effect subordinates the FOS to the FCA, removing yet another foundational pillar: independence. We should remove Clause 7.

I turn now to the proposed amendments to Clause 8. I will speak to Amendments 37, 42 and 43, which deal with how a complaint to the FOS is to be determined. This is a controversial matter; the Bill proposes very significant changes. This has already provoked calls to have the whole clause removed from the Bill, and I recognise the strength of feeling behind that.

How the FOS decides on complaints is absolutely critical to its operations and to their general acceptability. At the moment and historically, the FOS rules on complaints on the basis of what is fair and reasonable under all circumstances. The Bill changes that. It says:

“A complaint may be determined in favour of the complainant only if, in the opinion of the Financial Ombudsman … at the time the disputed act or omission occurred, either … the act or omission did not comply with an FCA rule applying to the respondent, or … there was no FCA rule applying to the respondent that related to the act or omission, and the disputed act or omission was not fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case”.


This adds one of two requirements not present now, in addition to the “fair and reasonable” test. In essence, it removes the FOS’s current and critical independent status and reduces the FOS’s scope to a subset of FCA rules. If you ask who benefits from all this, the answer, it seems to me, is not likely to be the consumer.

The small print of the Bill makes the situation for the complainant even less attractive. The Bill specifies a long list of other requirements to be considered in making a determination, most of them tilting the scales in favour of FCA rule-based compliance. This long list includes

“any other matters specified in regulations made by the Treasury”

and the general principle that consumers should take responsibility for their decisions. Here, we are a very long way from the “fair and reasonable under all circumstances” test.

The net effect for the Bill’s proposals will inevitably be to increase bureaucracy and to increase a remoteness from practical circumstances and a reliance on box-ticking procedures. It will convert the independent FOS into a compliant subsidiary of the FCA. We have not seen spelled out any evidenced justification for such a radical narrowing of the FCA’s reach and independence. I ask the Minister again to provide the evidence that supports these radical changes. By “evidence”, I mean hard data, not simply a headcount of consultees’ opinions, as interpreted by HMT.

As I noted at Second Reading, the UK’s financial sector thrives not merely because it is competitive but because it is trusted. For it to be trusted, consumers must have confidence that, when things go wrong, there is an independent, accessible and effective route to redress. We have one of those already: the FOS. My Amendments 37, 42 and 43 would remove the new bureaucratic and complex restrictions, qualifications and subordinations in the Bill. In their place, the amendments would restore a simple and clear operating framework. They would restore the primacy of the “fair and reasonable” test, and they would update the list of things that the ombudsman must or may take into account.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, my Amendment 34 again concerns symmetry of enforcement and redress periods. The Bill introduces a 10-year hard stop on complaints to the Financial Ombudsman Service, but the problem is that the 10-year figure is already riddled with exemptions: for long-dated instruments, for latent harms, for products with extended maturities and for situations where the consumer could not reasonably have known they had a claim. The Government have already conceded that the 10-year period cannot sensibly apply in a wide range of cases. I have a concern that, once Parliament writes “10 years” into statute, that becomes the headline. Consumers may assume they have 10 years, even when they are in one of the many categories where the long stop does not apply. That creates a real risk that people will time themselves out because they believe the headline rather than the detail.

Then there is the deeper structural issue that I have referenced before: firms’ enforcement rights do not end at 10 years. They can enforce debts, pursue arrears, securitise portfolios and benefit from long-tail revenue streams well beyond that period. Yet the consumer’s ability to challenge an unfair relationship or to bring a complaint may fall away far earlier. That is the same kind of asymmetry that I raised before. My solution is that at least the starting point should be that the duration of rights, remedies and enforcement powers for firms must be aligned with the duration of rights and remedies for consumers arising from the same act or relationship.

I have addressed only that aspect of asymmetry in my amendment; I have not attacked the 10-year hard stop and the impact that that might have on consumer perception. My amendment would not interfere with the exemptions that the Government have already accepted. It would simply ensure that, where a firm retains enforcement rights beyond 10 years, in various circumstances, the consumer retains the corresponding right to challenge the fairness of that relationship for the same period—in other words, symmetry. I need not say any more, as we have been around this loop, but it is the same argument in a different place.