Sri Lanka

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Amanda Milling]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for welcoming me to the Dispatch Box to answer this question. Frankly, I answer many questions on behalf of the Foreign Office, so it is not very unusual to find me at the Dispatch Box for an urgent question.

I am more than happy to respond to the hon. Lady’s letter after the debate. I will not go over many of the things that I have said before. I will say that there are a number of stories relating to the situation on the ground, and I do not want to speculate. The situation is fast-moving and fluid, and we are monitoring it very closely. The Minister responsible for South Asia, Lord Ahmad, has been working very closely on this matter and does raise human rights issues.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

Clearly, the dire economic situation forced by ex-President Rajapaksa and his outfit lies at the heart of what is going on in Sri Lanka. Given Sri Lanka’s indebtedness to China and the prospect of cheap fuel from Russia, does the Minister agree that the risk is that Sri Lanka stands every chance of falling within the maw of malign jurisdictions? Will she therefore do everything in her power to ensure that the International Monetary Fund is engaged to try to sort this out, particularly given that part of the issue would appear to be uncosted, unfunded, populist and inflationary tax cuts from 2019 that I am sure the IMF will take a very severe view of?

[Amanda Milling]

I reassure my right hon. Friend that UK economic support is forthcoming through multilateral institutions such as the IMF.

NATO Accession: Sweden and Finland

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Vicky Ford]

I remind the House that the UK has played an absolutely central role in providing military assistance to Ukraine. Indeed, only last week the Prime Minister announced a further £1 billion-worth of military support to Ukraine, and we will be adding additional cutting-edge multiple launch rocket systems. On training, which is important, over the past decade we have trained over 22,000 Ukrainian troops. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point about making sure that, where possible, there is a joint approach in the support for Ukraine, but I also point him to what was agreed at the Madrid summit last week, which was a historic agreement by all NATO partners to step up support for Ukraine and to provide it with advice, training and equipment.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I draw attention to my entry in the register.

I very much welcome this statement. Does the Minister recognise that notwithstanding Sweden and Finland’s non-aligned status, since 1997 they, along with Austria, have been active participants in NATO’s Partnership for Peace? Will she pay tribute to that programme and say which other members of Partnership for Peace she anticipates making similar overtures in the near future?

[Vicky Ford]

As I said in my opening remarks, Finland and Sweden have been working very closely with NATO for a considerable period. On other partners, every country has its own path towards NATO membership, and no third party has a say in that process. Ukraine, among other countries, is currently an enhanced opportunity partner, and NATO remains firmly committed to the open-door policy. I cannot be more specific at this point.

Iran’s Nuclear Programme

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Thursday 30th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe). I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) on giving us this opportunity. I listened carefully to everything he said, and I agree with all of it.

In June 2019, I went to Tehran as Middle East Minister while Tehran was sinking shipping throughout the Gulf. I went there to remonstrate at its malign regional activities and to insist that it meet its JCPOA commitments, including the limits imposed on its enriched uranium stockpile. In hindsight, it was probably not the best use of my time; the truth is that the deal had been moribund since President Trump withdrew in 2018. Attempts to revive it have failed, and now it is comatose.

I suppose we should not turn off the life support entirely, but in my view we have no need to bust a gut trying to revive the plan. What we need is a stronger, longer deal. Indeed, with every day that passes, the JCPOA becomes less attractive: while Iran’s technical capabilities advance, the original terms become redundant and sunset clauses loom large. Some of those clauses have lapsed or shortly will—the UN arms embargo from October 2020; restrictions on ballistic missile-related goods next year; and, the year after, restrictions relating to Iran’s advanced centrifuge R&D. In 2031, the ban on weapons-grade uranium ends.

That said, we should not be seen to be a guilty party or a co-author of the plan’s coup de grâce. We have to stick with it, I suppose, to the bitter end. Iran too—at least, the potentially reconcilable part of it—wants to be perceived as keen to talk, but, with artful duplicity, says one thing and does another. The reported tenor of ongoing discussions is very much true to form. On Sunday, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited poor Josep Borrell of the European Commission to Tehran. His plaintive line following the meeting was that

“the more supply of oil, the better for the energy prices.”

How pathetic is that? It looks as though the European External Action Service, in its quest for purpose and relevance, has been all too eager to swallow a pro-Iran line that conveniently gets its members out of a tight temporary fix. Not for the first time, it is grossly misreading the Iranians in a disappointing display of naivety and self-service.

Borrell’s line suggests that the EU is prepared to swap Russian for Iranian energy, so the Doha talks go on with the Americans and the Iranians, bizarrely, in separate rooms. The reality is that Iran’s demands for compensation and guarantees are intractable. Those who believe Iran will settle for a deal in order to trade with the west misread the ideological basis of the regime and its President. They seek nothing less than the complete Islamisation of society and the elimination of western influence. Tehran has no desire to be our partner, even less our friend. Let us be quite clear in separating the good and great people of Iran from the regime: the two are plainly different things, as recent shows of unrest have demonstrated, and we should encourage the one and not the other.

Meanwhile, Iran ratchets up its pressure on the international community through the expulsion of IAEA officials. The day after Borrell’s meeting in Tehran, it showcased a missile launch, and we contemplate a uranium breakout time probably in weeks, certainly not months. The Iran of 2022 is very different from the Iran of 2015. Hardliners and the IRGC have tightened their stranglehold over the state and the economy. President Raisi has populated Ministries with Guards commanders responsible for atrocious acts of terrorism. We recall, as has been recalled already today—correctly so—his participation in the 1988 death committee, and in the extrajudicial murder of some 4,000 political prisoners.

Sanctions work. Tony Blair’s Institute for Global Change has revealed that, following the first wave of sanctions relief in 2014, Iran’s terrorist and military activity increased significantly. Kasra Aarabi writes:

“The number of militias created by the IRGC surged after this period, and the Guard’s presence abroad peaked, with the Quds Force expanding its operations in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.”

If that occurred under the previous relatively benign regime, what effect will sanctions relief—estimated to mean an immediate $90 billion windfall, and as much as $800 billion over five years—have on the zealots now in control? I suggest that sanctions relief at this time would not be a good move at all.

US special envoy Rob Malley called for a “stronger and longer” deal shortly after his appointment, and he is right. Alternatively, we could offer less for less, but we cannot offer more for less. The integrated review points the way. It says:

“Alongside our allies, the UK will hold Iran to account for its nuclear activity, remaining open to talks on a more comprehensive nuclear and regional deal.”

There is no specific mention of the JCPOA, which is very sensible. If we managed to reheat the JCPOA in its current form, we would have a stop-gap agreement at best, but the prospects of definitive talks and a long-term solution led by Washington will evaporate. Iran expert Professor Ali Ansari suggests we play it cool, and I agree.

Although we should not be complacent, we should not be worried about a no-deal scenario. The Iranian regime is struggling to rid itself of Israeli infiltration, which is preventing it from advancing its nuclear apparatus and security state. We all remember the killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh last year. Most recently Hossein Taeb, IRGC head of intelligence, has been dismissed, and on 22 May IRGC colonel Sayyad Khodaei was shot dead outside his home.

Nobody goes to Iran without being lectured about Britain being the source of all the country’s woes; the grievance culture stoked by the regime makes the SNP look rather like rank amateurs. It is mildly flattering to think that Iran’s rulers believe we are still so influential, albeit in their minds entirely malignly. Historically, however, the villain has been seen to lie elsewhere. This debate takes place amid Putin’s imperial war. He invokes Peter the Great, by reclaiming lost territory and advancing autocracy. There is no doubt that revanchist Russia and Iran have grown closer under Putin’s leadership. It has developed from a transactional, military relationship to one of shared ideological outlook, in so far as both countries despise the western world order and its culture, have a theological sense of mission for their countries, and talk in Anglophobic terms of grievance and resistance. Their shared paranoia about democracy has grown collaboration and suppression at home—and also abroad, notably in Syria.

However, it has not always been so. Professor Ansari points out that

“the greatest sleight of hand achieved by the Russian state with respect to Iran has been to reinvent its relationship from that of imperial predator to a fully fledged member of an axis of resistance against the west.”

Indeed, there is a strong argument that Russia—certainly not Britain—has been the chief cause of historic Iranian humiliation, imposing capitulatory treaties in 1808 and 1828, which lasted until 1921. Nascent Iranian democracy was stamped out by Colonel Liakhov of the Cossack Brigade in the early 20th century, as he shelled the Majlis in Tehran and executed constitutionalists. The parallels with the present day are pretty clear.

Lord Curzon described “avowedly hostile” Russian activities in Iran, and pointed out that

“piece by piece, partly by open war and partly by furtive nibbling, Russia has appropriated more and more of Persian soil.”

There are historic continuities in the Iran-Russia relationship, namely in Iran’s junior status, and Iranian popular sentiment against Russia. The 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay ensured that Iran became a de facto vassal state, with strictures outlining Russia’s preference for the Qajar succession. Now, as then, Iran’s presidential candidates and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders court Putin for his approval. In line with that junior status, we learn from Minister Javad Zarif’s leaked audio tape on the war in Syria that Russia

“entered the war by air force, but dragged Iran’s ground force to war too. We didn’t have ground forces in Syria by then.”

It is a candid assessment of Putin’s disregard for Iranian life, and reluctance to spill blood when he can use those he sees as inferiors. We see that, too, in Putin’s feeding the Ukrainian meat grinder preferentially with troops from east of the Urals.

But if the regime wants that kind of partnership, the Iranian people do not. The popular mood in Iran is antithetical to the Russians; we have seen that most recently in protests against Russia’s invasion. Meanwhile, the regime blunders on, blaming NATO and the west, and defending Russia and the UN. Again, that bifurcation has precedent. An Iranian member of the Majlis once wrote of the

“dislike of the Persian people for the Russians,”

which was based on

“wars…cruelty and aggression…encouragement given by them to the extravagancies of the Persian court…the ascendency they had gained by promising to maintain the succession…the many concessions they had obtained from the Persian Government…the undue influence exerted by them.”

He concludes that Russia is

“the home and centre of autocracy and ancient foe of all liberal ideas.”

That was more than 100 years ago, but it resonates with us today. That is why it is so important—so imperative—for us to call this partnership out, reveal its weak foundations, learn from the past, and support the good and great people of Iran in their struggle against a wicked regime.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 27th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Simon Hoare]

If the hon. Gentleman will allow me, I want to make a few more points.

This Bill represents a failure of statecraft and puts at risk the reputation of the United Kingdom. The arguments in support of it are flimsy at best and irrational at worst. The Bill risks economically harmful retaliation and runs the risk of shredding our reputation as a guardian of international law and the rules-based system. How in the name of heaven can we expect to speak to others with authority when we ourselves shun, at a moment’s notice, our legal obligations? A hard-won reputation so easily played with—

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

rose—

[Simon Hoare]

I give way to my constituency neighbour.

[Dr Murrison]

My hon. Friend and constituency neighbour is making a good speech. Of course, the Bill is permissive legislation; meanwhile, negotiations are ongoing. He referred to a failure of statecraft—whose failure?

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Thomson]

Well, it seems to me that whether it disadvantages or not is not something that Her Majesty’s Government get to decide. While I am clear that there are problems with the protocol, clearly there are aspects of it that are working very well, as indeed those on the Treasury Benches have admitted. I will set out some of the examples, particularly over trade, where it is not having the impact that we are told, in all aspects, that it is. I come from the point of view that trust has been broken between the UK Government and the people of all these islands, as well as between the UK Government and our international partners. That gets right to the nub of the issues about trying to renegotiate it.

We should not really need to say this, but it is absolutely vital that the UK Government should be able to respect the international obligations that they enter into freely. Lord Butler, who was head of the civil service for 10 years, has said that this country has repeatedly criticised states like Russia and China for breaking the rules-based international order and yet now holds that it is perfectly justified in breaching international law itself. It seems that in this Bill we are going from a “limited and specific” breach to something that is potentially extensive and egregious. General Sir Richard Barrons, the former chief of joint forces command, who served in Afghanistan, Iraq and Northern Ireland, has said that

“what the government is proposing is short-sighted tactics which will do much harm strategically in the wider world. In fact what is being done is particularly stupid.”

He went on to warn that these moves will empower our adversaries as

“it will undermine us with our enemies by giving them the opportunity to accuse us of hypocrisy when we call them out for breaking the rules-based international order. It will also undermine us with our allies who will doubt whether they can rely on us to keep to an agreement, keep to our word.”

[Dr Murrison]

I am listening to the hon. Gentleman with a great deal of interest. He is right to defend international law and international treaties. Did he raise the concerns he has just expressed when the European Union was busy breaking those treaties—for example, over subsidies to Airbus?

[Joanna Cherry]

Whataboutery!

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

It is always a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bristol South (Karin Smyth), although I profoundly disagree with the implication that those of us who decided Britain’s place in the world was best served by leaving the European Union view the EU—let alone the Republic of Ireland, for goodness’ sake—as “the enemy”, to use her words. Clearly, that is not the case.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, who is winding up, will be spoilt for choice when it comes to commenting on speeches. If I may say so, however, in a brief period of time the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Sir Jeffrey M. Donaldson) pretty much nailed it with his assertion in an intervention on the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry). The status quo is clearly not compatible with the Good Friday agreement and the Acts of Union, and the doctrine of necessity certainly applies in this case.

It is remarkable, is it not, that the protocol’s supporters appear to be the opposition parties, while those who drafted it and are trying to change it sit on the Conservative Benches? I also enjoyed the remarks of one or two Opposition Members who appeared trenchantly to support the other place in the hope that it will defenestrate this Bill, which I sincerely hope it fails to do. That said, though I welcome this Bill, I hope it will be improved in Committee and in the other place, and in particular that some of the swingeing powers that it gives Ministers will be clipped.

I have to say to Ministers, while assuring them of my support this evening, that I remain somewhat bewildered by their refusal to consider in a meaningful way triggering article 16. That is already available to them, and nobody has marshalled a creditable argument—certainly not one that satisfies me—that it could not or should not be done. The grounds for triggering article 16 are clearly there, in that we do not have anything approaching proper governance in Northern Ireland—not at all. Despite the May elections, the Assembly has failed to assemble and the institutions are not working.

Surely to goodness, those are grounds—the strongest grounds possible—for triggering article 16. They are far stronger, I must say, than the grounds chosen by the President of the European Commission early in 2021 to trigger this thing, albeit very briefly and ignominiously, on the grounds of trying to prevent vaccines from transiting from the Republic of Ireland to Northern Ireland.

[Sir Robert Neill]

My right hon. Friend makes a very important point. Does he agree that, from a legal perspective, if article 16 were to be triggered, at least we would be able to argue that we had used all means available to us under the protocol, as is necessary to meet the necessity test—in other words, that the state has exhausted all the options open to it before it acts unilaterally? That is exactly the value of using article 16.

[Dr Murrison]

I absolutely agree with that. It is argued—of course it is—that triggering article 16 is meant to be temporary. Those of us who have been around a bit realise that temporary very often turns into something far more permanent. However, that would certainly be a reasonable first step in dealing with this situation, which pretty much all of us—apart from the SDLP—agree is unsatisfactory. I am still unsure, despite the earlier remarks of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, why the Government are not doing that. The Secretary of State, when he winds up, may like to address that.

I would also like to know where in this legislation there is a threat to the single market. Trade between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland is pretty much a rounding error—a point that has been made by others. Companies such as Sainsbury’s do not exist in the Republic of Ireland, so goods going to Sainsbury’s in Northern Ireland from GB cannot possibly land up on Sainsbury’s shelves in the Republic, because there are none. There are more checks on this border than on the border with Chile, and checks for what? It is not clear to me why we need checks at this point in time, since we have an agreement on tariffs and we have standards and regulations that have not yet had the opportunity to diverge.

Many contributors today have talked about the doctrine of necessity, but what they have not mentioned is that there is a second part to that doctrine; it is a lesser part, but it is germane nevertheless. It does not deal with grave or imminent peril; it allows parties to rescind an obligation if to do so would not

“seriously impair an essential interest of the states towards which the obligation exists or of the international community as a whole.”

Where in this Bill, and where, indeed, in triggering article 16, would the threat to the single market come from? Indeed, I would argue, as Ministers certainly have, that the Bill is helpful in many respects to the single market, and it certainly is to the internal market.

So why is the EU doing all this? Why is it not giving Mr Šefčovič the powers he needs in order to negotiate properly with, first, Lord Frost and, secondly, the Foreign Secretary? We can all suggest geopolitical reasons for not doing that, and of course some member states are perfectly happy, for their own benefit, with the status quo. The Republic of Ireland is probably rather enjoying the current export opportunities as a result of Northern Ireland being unable to get what it needs from GB. But we have to hope that the EU, even at this stage, will recognise the damage this is doing to the Good Friday agreement and the prospects of ongoing peace and harmony in Northern Ireland, and that it will, even at this late stage, consider the interests of the people of Northern Ireland first, in which case this Bill will not be needed.

The Government, in my view, signed the Northern Ireland protocol in good faith. They were entitled to receive the same back from the EU, but after 18 months it is plain as a pikestaff that that reciprocation has not happened. It is not as if there are not technical solutions to the current problems. I wrote about this in my report when I chaired the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee. It distresses me that, all this time later, nothing appears to have been done about the recommendations that I made, and that others have made subsequently, to deal with this perfectly elegantly. Of course, things may very well get worse, with the SPS offset through the movement assistance scheme likely to be viewed as ultra vires by the European Court of Justice, and the prospect of energy VAT—I hope very much that it will be reduced in GB—not being reduced in Northern Ireland, completely contrary to the Good Friday agreement and the Acts of Union.

The right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn), who is no longer in his place, said that the EU “needs to move”. It does, but it will not; I hope this legislation gets it moving.

Ukraine Update

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Thursday 16th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

The hon. Gentleman is right to point out the major world hunger issues we face as a result of Russian actions. That is why the UK and our partners have stepped up with the largest-ever World Bank financial commitment to developing countries, to support them in the face of this economic hardship that results from the appalling war in Ukraine. In our aid strategy and aid budget we have moved funding into humanitarian aid and are one of the leading funders into Ukraine, but we are also annually increasing our budget into Africa to support those countries at this very difficult time. I am in regular contact with the United States Secretary of State Tony Blinken, talking precisely about how we can provide direct support, both humanitarian and military, to Ukraine.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

The geopolitical consequences of hungry people in poor countries are not lost on our NATO ally Turkey, which is preparing plans to escort merchant vessels out of Ukrainian ports using its resources. What assistance can we give the Turks in that respect, particularly given our long and distinguished history of mine clearance on land and at sea? What naval assets can we offer to assist them in their plan, and will we continue to assist efforts to ship grain overland to Baltic ports and ports in Poland, to extract grain through that route also?

[Elizabeth Truss]

I can assure my right hon. Friend that we are in talks with Turkey and our G7 allies about all the assistance we can give and all the UK resources that we can deploy, both for the sea route and, as he mentions, the rail routes. There is more that we can do to increase the capacity on those rail routes to get grain out faster, but ultimately to get the full harvest out, we need to use the sea routes as well, and that is why we are in talks with the Turks, and with our G7 allies.

Northern Ireland Protocol

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Tuesday 17th May 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

I have been very clear in my statement that we are bringing forward legislation to sort this issue out and to deal with the bureaucracy that we are seeing—the requirement for customs declarations and customs codes from businesses that are simply operating within the United Kingdom. That is why we want to create the green lane that allows properly protected goods to move freely within the United Kingdom, and we are committed to that legislation. In the meantime, if the EU is prepared, in parallel, to move to a negotiated settlement to resolve the very issues that the hon. Gentleman raises, we are of course open to those talks, but we will not allow it to delay our taking the action we need to take to restore the primacy of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

In the last Parliament, the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, under my chairmanship, produced a comprehensive set of alternative arrangements that were workable and high-tech and that would erase the need for the current perniciously applied checks that most in this House agree are unnecessary. Given that they would satisfy the EU’s stated objections, why does she think that the EU have stonewalled them?

[Elizabeth Truss]

I am not going to speculate as to why the EU has not changed its negotiating mandate, but it is very clear that there is a solution—my right hon. Friend worked very hard on that—that satisfies the requirement to protect the EU single market and, at the same time, restores the primacy of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. We need to make sure that we move forward as fast as we can to that solution.

Ukraine

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

My right hon. Friend is right that it is absolutely crucial that we cut off Russian funding from hydrocarbons. That is currently accounting for a third of the Russian economy, so it is a target of the United Kingdom to get others to follow our lead. We are ending all imports of coal, oil and gas by the end of 2022, and we want to see a timetable for others to do the same. It will only be when we cut off that supply of money from hydrocarbons that Putin will no longer have the funding he needs to supply his war machine.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

The Foreign Secretary is right to encourage the freezing of assets both by ourselves and by others, but what will be the conditions for unfreezing those assets? Does she agree with me that all the billions owned by the kleptocrats and oligarchs ought to be turned to good purpose in due course, because we are going to need a Marshall plan eventually to rebuild Ukraine and undo the mess as best we can that the killer Putin has imposed?

[Elizabeth Truss]

I do agree with my right hon. Friend. We are looking at what we can do in the long term with those assets, and I am working very closely with the Treasury on that. We have also put asset freezes on 18 major Russian banks, and we would like to see other countries follow us. We have barred over 3 million Russian companies from raising money on our capital markets.

What has been very important in all of these efforts is that they have been closely co-ordinated across the G7, with the EU and with other partners around the world, including the Singaporeans, the Australians and the South Koreans. We have also taken decisive action on trade. We have cut Russia off from World Trade Organisation terms. We have banned high-tech exports and we have announced a ban on all new outward investment into Russia.

However, we cannot stop here; we have to keep increasing the pressure. As was asked about earlier, we do need to stop the imports of Russian hydrocarbons, and we need a new wave of sanctions. We are working on that with our partners to make further progress and put further pressure on the Putin regime. There are some people who say that the west cannot afford this, but we simply cannot afford not to do it, because if we do not end Putin’s war in Ukraine and we do not see Putin lose, we will see even worse consequences for the whole of European security.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that this is one of those domino moments where we can hold the advance and prevent the next one from falling, or we can watch a series of them going down.

[Dr Murrison]

My hon. Friend spoke of victory. I wonder what he thought victory looked like. Given that it is unlikely that Putin is going to capitulate, how do we provide an off ramp for him to secure some sort of peace? Does it mean, for example, insisting that he gets out of Crimea? Does it mean insisting that he gets out of Donbas? Does it mean providing a guarantee that we will not entertain Ukraine’s membership of the European Union or NATO?

[Tom Tugendhat]

My right hon. Friend knows extremely well that we have no say either on anybody’s membership of the EU or on how the Ukrainian Government decide to assert their sovereignty over their sovereign territory. That is a matter for European Union members, of which we are not one, and for the Ukrainian people, of whom we are not some. So it is essential that we leave that to them to decide. On the NATO question, again I would argue that free countries and free peoples can associate freely with whoever they like. They can choose to make alliances or not to make alliances as they wish. We exercised that sovereignty only a few years ago in changing an alliance position, in changing a relationship with a large bloc, and it is for the Ukrainian people to have the same right and sovereignty to make those choices. It is not for me to tell them how to do it, and I am sure nobody in this House would make that choice for them. I did not actually use the word “victory”, my right hon. Friend did, but I am very happy to address it, because what he is touching on is: where does this end up? That is a very difficult question to answer. However this ends up, Putin already could, if he chose, sell this as victory at home. He could easily turn around and, using his propaganda machine, say that the dysfunction and disturbance he has caused in Ukraine—undermining the west, the disruption to our lives and the incredible violence he has brought to the people in Ukraine—has already, as he would put it, ended its move to the west. He could claim that as victory. The fact that he chooses not to do so should not mean that it is up to us to construct a story for him to lie to his own people. It is up to him to construct his own dishonesty. It is up to him to deceive his own people. It is not up to us to help him to do it.

Our job is to stand by those free people who are showing remarkable courage under the extraordinary leadership of President Zelensky. What is up to us is to decide where our line is. Today, for the people of the United Kingdom, we should be very clear—I am very glad that the Government are—that the people of Ukraine are on the frontline of freedom. What they are doing is defending fundamentally not just our interests in defending the rule of law, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of alliance and the sovereignty that we pride ourselves on so much on in our own country; they are also defending the rule of law and the freedom of trade and commercial agreement that defends fundamentally our economy, our people and our interests.

This is the final stage—forgive me, I have taken a little longer than I hoped—that we need to be looking at. Three great revolutions have happened in the past few years: Brexit, covid and the Ukrainian war. Each has pointed to the need for us to have greater resilience. Each has taught us the absolute imperative for us to look at our own country and see what lessons need to be learned here at home. The lessons on resilience are clear. They are about being able to produce and manufacture the essential items we need, whether personal protective equipment or weaponry, here at home. They are about the essential need to be able to support our own domestic agricultural economy, whether that is growing more of our own food or producing more of our own fertiliser. They are about the need to make sure that our economy, our country, is resilient—through education, economic output, manufacturing and agriculture—and reliant on itself as much as possible and with partners we can rely on and trust. That is a lesson the three revolutions have taught us and it is about time we learnt it. The very clear lesson from Ukraine is that we may not get a fourth lesson. The fourth lesson could come in a way that surprises us all and leaves us all exposed.

It is said that it is only when the tide goes out that we know who has been swimming naked. Let us hope the tide does not go out too soon.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

What a pleasure it is to take part in this debate, but what a pity that we are forced to have it. There is a grinding inevitability about where we are going with Mr Putin’s war. It is clearly going to escalate, and we need to be prepared for that. It is also a time to take stock of what Mr Putin has achieved, because no doubt those around him have been doing the same. One of the things that Putin wanted to do was to deny Ukraine’s statehood. Well, states are built out of conflict very often. Their founding mythologies often emerge from conflict. What a fine job Putin has done in forging a state in eastern Europe, if it did not exist already, because this conflict has given Ukrainians a sense of added statehood and of nation, and my word should they be proud of themselves.

Putin wanted to contain NATO. Well, that has gone well, hasn’t it? Sweden and Finland are applying for membership and Germany is at long last spending more than 2% of its GDP on defence and galvanising the alliance. Putin no doubt thought that it was an opportunity to display the might of Russia’s military. Well, that has gone well, hasn’t it? There are 15,000 dead without NATO having fired a single shot; a swathe has been taken through Russia’s starred officers; and there has been a decimation of its materiel and the sinking of the flagship Moskva.

As a cold war warrior, I have to ask why we were quaking in our boots all those years. Where is the threat of those Russian tanks sweeping across the central plains of Europe? My word, at this rate, they would struggle to wheeze their way through the Smolensk gate, let alone the Suwalki gap.

Why has Ukraine confounded our expectations? One reason is that it has something that Russia does not, which is what we pompously talked about in staff courses as the moral component of warfare. Ukraine has it; Russia has not. As Napoleon said,

“The moral is to the physical as three to one.”

He should jolly well know, and the people of Russia should know too, as a country with an acute sense of its own history.

The moral component has three elements: motivation, leadership and sound management. Together, they produce the will to fight, as we have seen graphically displayed in Ukraine. They are all contained, happily, within UK doctrine, which is why our armed forces are so good. The moral component is sadly lacking in a country that treats its own as dirt. People should not let the pompous goose-stepping theatre of 9 May fool them. From the sinking of the Kursk two decades ago to the destruction of the Moskva and its crew, the Kremlin has shown a cynical disregard for its people and their people.

Russia’s non-commissioned officer cadre is not a middle management cadre that we would recognise in our armed forces. The fixers, the doers, the cajolers, the junior leaders, the men who get things done—they are largely absent from Russia’s armed forces, which is part of the reason we have seen the destruction of the Russian army and its divisions. We should feel for Russia’s private soldiers, who are directionless, demoralised and disoriented. Bonaparte was correct: I would swap three Russian squaddies for a single Ukrainian any day.

None of that is necessarily good news, however, because a cornered animal lashes out. My right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) did not mention Goliath’s ultimate cosh—the thing that he has hidden behind his back. Russia’s Comical Ali, Sergei Lavrov, hints at nuclear escalation and we must steel ourselves for that. That he has even hinted at it shows how bad things are in the Kremlin.

The key, of course, is China, which could switch off this barbarism in a heartbeat. Where will Beijing stand when the Geiger counters start clicking over way beyond eastern Europe? Its soft power, regional and global ambitions, and attempts to present a more positive image to the global community have all taken a severe knock. Its supposed neutrality is not being borne out by its actions, but coercing, cajoling or bullying it is unlikely to be helpful.

Turkey has been doing its best, but it needs a great power to broker some sort of deal or off ramp, given that we are unlikely to be favoured with the Kremlin’s capitulation. Putin’s use of a low-yield nuclear weapon to awaken the Chinese dragon may just be what is needed in this scenario, but it may equally be his greatest misstep and the beginning of the end for him. All that then will be left will be for him to join his fellow mass killers Hitler and Stalin in the annals of infamy, and for his cronies to crawl away under whichever stones they can find, awaiting judgment and retribution from the world’s civilised communities. Slava Ukraini.

Iran Detainees

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Wednesday 16th March 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

On the individual whom the right hon. Gentleman named, I must respect the individual’s request of whether their case should be raised in public. That is why we mention publicly only those individuals who have asked to be named. Of course, we continue to supply support to all British nationals who have been unfairly detained. As I said, there are many issues over which we do not have agreement with Iran, but I will continue to talk to the Iranian Foreign Minister and work with him to ensure that we do resolve issues between us that pertain to the British national interest.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

This news is like sunshine on a rainy day. Congratulations to all involved. Does the Foreign Secretary agree with me that particular tribute needs to be paid to Sayyid Badr and the Omani Government, who are establishing themselves as interlocuters and mediators par excellence in the region? Will she say what assurances she has got that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will simply not replace Nazanin, Anoosheh and Morad with other dual nationals? Will she reiterate her warnings to dual nationals who may fall within the Iranian jurisdiction that they should tread very carefully indeed?

[Elizabeth Truss]

Minister Badr and the Omani Government have been incredibly helpful in assisting us with this issue and I want to pay tribute. They flew the detainees out to Muscat. I have been in regular touch with Minister Badr since I first met him in December last year and they have been instrumental in making this happen. They are true friends of the United Kingdom. My right hon. Friend is right in what he says about dual nationals, but fundamentally we need to change the incentives on the system so people can travel freely without fear of unfair detainment.

Russia

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Thursday 6th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

I do not agree with my right hon. Friend. The UK remains supportive of Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations, in line with the 2008 Bucharest summit declaration. As I have already pointed out, NATO is a defensive alliance, as the Russians know perfectly well. We should not buy into the narrative that somehow NATO is the problem. The problem is the troops that are being amassed on the Ukrainian border. We have to be absolutely clear that those troops are being amassed by Russia, not by NATO.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I very much welcome the statement, but I encourage my right hon. Friend to be far more robust in defence of pro-democracy forces in Kazakhstan and to condemn unequivocally the collective security treaty organisation intervention there in support of a highly questionable regime. What discussions has she had with players in the wider region about the instability that may be caused by Russia’s intervention in mid-Asia, in particular Azerbaijan, in which we have significant interests? What are the implications of what is going on in the region for the recently concluded ceasefire in relation to Nagorno-Karabakh?

[Elizabeth Truss]

On the subject of the violent clashes in Kazakhstan, as I have said, we condemn those acts of violence, but I think it important to remember that Kazakhstan has a sovereign choice when it comes to whom it chooses as its allies. Any forces deployed must have a clear mission and must act proportionately in any use of force to defend the legitimate security interests in Kazakhstan. It is important that, while regretting these acts and ensuring that our thoughts are with those who have lost their lives, we respect the fact that Kazakhstan has that sovereign choice.

FCDO Staffing

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Thursday 16th December 2021 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

The situation in Afghanistan remains terrible, which is why we have doubled our financial support to it, for the very reasons that the hon. Lady highlighted. We will continue to work through diplomatic channels both internationally in support of stability and improvement in Afghanistan and with the countries immediately neighbouring it. Our commitment to Afghanistan remains undiminished, notwithstanding the fact that we no longer have a military presence there, and we will encourage the Taliban to do the right thing to abide by the commitments they have made with regard to such things as girls’ education, women’s freedom and not being a home for terrorism. We will judge them on their actions, not their words.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) on securing his urgent question and thank the Minister for the Middle East and North Africa—my successor—for the reassurances that he has given. There can be little doubt, however, that over time, the FCDO has been diminished, although it remains formidable. Given that the talent base has been reduced over time, what thought has the Minister given to widening the net from which senior appointments overseas are drawn, noting particularly the need to promote trade and commerce as part of our international effort and the actions and appointments of countries with which we can reasonably be compared, such as France and Germany?

[James Cleverly]

I thank my right hon. Friend and predecessor for that point. Diplomacy and the nature of international relations are changing. We have to invest in future-facing resources, which means things like IT, most obviously, as well as ensuring that we have a network of experts across a wide range of fields, including commerce. In response to his former point, we already see a very close integration in London and around our overseas network of trade, development, aid and diplomacy. I can only assume that that will continue to be the case when it comes to our people.