Draft Carbon Capture Revenue Support (Directions, Eligibility and Counterparty) Regulations 2024 Draft Carbon Dioxide Transport and Storage Revenue Support (Directions and Counterparty) Regulations 2024

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Monday 13th May 2024 General Committees

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution; as ever, it was thoughtful and thought provoking. The two draft instruments we are discussing are broadly administrative in nature, as I am sure everyone will have judged, but they outline the vital operational procedures for enabling Government’s proposed business models for carbon capture, transportation and storage.

To respond to the hon. Gentleman’s first point, I, too, look forward to that episode of “The Reunion” on Radio 4. Indeed, to extend his analogy, if hon. Members were ever on “Desert Island Discs”, I am sure they would find the Hansard of our proceedings and discussions on the Energy Act an essential tool to take with them to the desert island. I would suggest that an audio version might be useful in getting some sleep on said desert island.

On the hon. Gentleman’s questions about a counterparty, as he said, the Low Carbon Contracts Company is expected to be the counterparty to the RSA. On his specific point about whether it has already been appointed, the LCCC is the existing counterparty for the contracts for difference for low-carbon electricity. It is the resource-efficient and cost-effective option to act as the RSA counterparty, and stakeholders can therefore be confident in the LCCC’s ability to carry out the counterparty functions.

[Dr Whitehead]

Has it been designated?

[Andrew Bowie]

As I just said, it has already been designated as the existing counterparty for contracts for difference, and there is an assumption that it will be designated for the transportation and storage moving forward.

[Dr Whitehead]

So the answer is no.

Large-scale Solar Farms

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Thursday 18th April 2024 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero (Andrew Bowie)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Henderson. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson) on securing this incredibly important and timely debate on large-scale solar and the impact of the plans on rural England.

It has been fantastic to hear the passionate and well-informed speeches of my hon. Friends the Members for Redditch (Rachel Maclean), for Buckingham (Greg Smith)—he talked about the benefits of small modular reactors, which was music to my ears—and for North Wiltshire (James Gray).

My right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) talked about the positive benefits of further investment in nuclear power, which is why we unveiled the civil nuclear road map earlier this year—the biggest investment in nuclear in 70 years. He would struggle to find a bigger advocate of the benefits of our domestic oil and gas industry than me. I assure him that, despite my Scottish Presbyterian upbringing, I associate myself much more with the cavaliers than the roundheads. We also heard from my right hon. Friends the Members for Haltemprice and Howden (Sir David Davis) and for Suffolk Coastal (Dr Coffey). I think I have engaged with just about every one of them individually on various energy infrastructure projects, not least recently on solar.

It was also good to hear the concerns of communities raised in the interventions of many other Conservative Members, including my right hon. Friends the Members for Newark (Robert Jenrick), for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), for Ludlow (Philip Dunne) and for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley) and my hon. Friends the Members for Devizes (Danny Kruger), for North East Bedfordshire (Richard Fuller), for Sedgefield (Paul Howell) and for Cleethorpes (Martin Vickers).

I represent a vast rural constituency that encompasses some of the best farmland north of the border, which is itself looking at significant energy infrastructure build over the next few years, so I completely understand those concerns and have heard them myself from local communities worried about what that build will mean for the countryside in which they live and of which they are so fond.

Three years ago, the Government adopted our sixth carbon budget with the world’s most ambitious climate change goal—to reduce emissions by 77% by 2035, compared with 1990 levels. We also committed to fully decarbonising the electricity system by 2035, subject to security of supply. Renewables such as solar and wind, alongside other low-carbon technologies such as nuclear, will underpin the UK’s transition from a reliance on fossil fuels to a new, secure, clean energy system. Solar is an important part of the energy mix, and its deployment is a key part of the Government’s strategy for energy independence and clean growth.

As set out in the British energy security strategy and the energy security plan, we are aiming for up to 70 GW of solar capacity by 2035. To achieve that, we need to deploy both rooftop and ground-mounted technology. Ground-mounted technology is one of the cheapest forms of electricity generation and is readily deployable at scale. As such, the Government consider that there is a strong need for increased ground-mounted solar deployment, as reflected in the recently published energy national policy statements.

However, the Department and I recognise that, as with any new development, solar projects may impact on communities and, indeed, the environment. The planning system must allow all views to be taken into account when decision makers balance local impacts with the national need.

Because of the quasi-judicial role of Ministers in determining planning applications, I hope that Members will appreciate that it would not be appropriate for me to comment on any specific matters in relation to specific projects in the planning system. Nor can I comment on the merits or harms of any particular proposals, as that could be perceived as prejudging the subsequent outcome. However, the Government recognise that solar projects can impact on land use, and I can speak to that. It is important that the Government strike the right balance between those considerations and securing a clean energy system for the future. Again, the planning system must take those issues into account.

As the recently published national policy statement for renewable energy infrastructure sets out, solar developers

“should, where possible, utilise suitable previously developed land, brownfield land, contaminated land and industrial land. Where the proposed use of any agricultural land has been shown to be necessary, poorer quality land should be preferred to higher quality land avoiding the use of ‘Best and Most Versatile’ agricultural land where possible.”

If it is proposed to use any land falling under Natural England’s best and most versatile agricultural land classification—grades 1, 2 and 3a—developers are required to justify using such land and to design their projects to avoid, mitigate and where necessary compensate for any impacts.

It is clear to me and to the Government that concerns remain about the scale and volume of projects that are being applied for on BMV land in specific areas of the country, particularly in areas with historic and established grid connections. We have concerns that not all developers are properly considering those requirements. That is something that needs to be rectified. We want to see that, following the new EN-3 publication. Although I can say little of detail in this Chamber, I want to assure hon. Members that we are listening and that work is ongoing to see what can be done to ensure that balance is met.

Reference has been made to the fact that there are no Liberal Democrat Members in the Chamber this afternoon. My hon. Friend the Member for Redditch described their policy as “bananas”, which means, “Build absolutely nothing anywhere ever.”

[Dr Whitehead]

Near anybody.

[Andrew Bowie]

Near anybody—sorry. However, that is not actually the case. The Lib Dems’ proposal, which was voted on at their conference last year, is to remove restrictions on new solar and wind to accelerate deployment of renewable power. It is quite clear why there are no Liberal Democrats in the Chamber today; they would ride roughshod over the views of rural communities around the country to increase the deployment at pace and scale of solar and other technologies.

The reason why there are not many Labour Members in the Chamber is, as the hon. Member for Southampton, Test (Dr Whitehead) suggested, that not many of them represent rural communities, and they are not seeing the impact of the applications. I am now of the opinion, however, that they are just as confused about the Labour party policy on this issue as we all are, following what was a very interesting speech from the Opposition spokesperson.

Solar and farming can be complementary, supporting each other financially, environmentally and through shared use of land. Analysis shows that even in the unlikely scenario that all additional solar needed to meet the British energy security strategy ambition of 70 GW were to come forward as ground-mounted solar, which is not going to be the case, it would be less than 1% of all types of UK utilised agricultural land that was needed to accommodate it. However, as I have referred to, the concentration of so many of those projects in specific areas is concerning, and UK-wide analysis cannot take that into account. Again, although I am unable to say anything specific at this time, I can assure colleagues that we are listening.

The Government consider that improving our energy security is urgent and of critical importance to the country. I do not think that there is any disagreement on that, but it must be achieved together with maintaining food security for our United Kingdom. Solar projects and agricultural practice can co-exist. For example, the science of agrivoltaics is developing, in which solar is integrated with arable farming in innovative ways. That is coming on in leaps and bounds. Solar energy can also be an important way for farmers to increase their revenue from land less suited to higher-value crop production. Again, on that there is very little disagreement.

What we ultimately want to achieve is protecting our environment, backing British farmers and delivering long-term energy security with more low-carbon energy. I guarantee that this Government and this Department will not countenance the industrialisation of our green and pleasant land. It is possible to maintain and increase our food production in a more sustainable way in some areas and to see land use changes in others.

I turn briefly to the issue of cumulative impacts, which has been brought up multiple times. The planning system sets out how applicants and decision makers should consider cumulative impacts. When preparing an application for a development consent order, applicants for solar deployments and developments under the NSIP regime

“should consider the cumulative impacts of situating a solar farm in proximity to other energy generating stations and infrastructure.”

It is then a matter for the examining authority to consider cumulative in-combination effects with the other solar farm proposals and other developments in a locality when conducting an examination of a particular NSIP solar project. During the examination, the views of interested parties, which will include advisory bodies and local planning authorities, will be taken into account in the examining authority’s recommendations. Again, I assure colleagues that we are looking at that issue.

The Department and I appreciate the concerns raised about the clustering of projects around grid connections in some areas. As we bring more new energy infrastructure online to meet the demand for clean, secure electricity, so too must we increase grid capacity. As set out in the spring Budget, the Government are working with Ofgem and network companies to release more network capacity and prevent speculative projects from obtaining and retaining network capacity. That should result in more capacity across the country and help to reduce the clustering of projects.

Community engagement has also been raised. It is vital—this is where Conservative and Labour party policies differ dramatically—that communities have a voice in decisions about their local areas. There are established routes in the planning system to consider the impact of solar projects and to enable communities to raise concerns about developments. I know that there are concerns about how effective those routes are, but I will set out the policy as it stands.

The national planning policy framework, which underlies the planning system for projects below 50 MW, encourages developers, including those proposing solar projects, to engage with local communities before submitting an application. Local authorities will consider a range of factors when assessing applications, including visual and environmental impacts. Members of the public can submit their views to the planning authorities, and significant concerns will be taken into account as part of the local decision-making process. Developers taking larger projects through the NSIP regime must complete considerable community engagement before any approval is granted, giving communities ample opportunity to feed in their views. The level and quality of community engagement, among other factors, will be taken into account by decision makers.

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[Andrew Bowie]

My right hon. Friend knows that I am no longer the Minister responsible for the network or the national grid, but I will ensure that her concerns are passed on to the relevant Minister. Ofgem and the electricity system operator are engaged in a considerable review of how connections are offered across the country, because there is a problem with that system. That is recognised and is being addressed.

Let me briefly touch on community benefits, which have also been raised. It is important that communities can participate in and benefit from the deployment of new low-carbon energy technologies in their local area. However, the Government do not have a formal role with regard to community benefits for solar and other large-scale renewable energy projects. We believe that those are best agreed at a local level, between the renewable operator and the local communities, so that they can be tailored to each community’s individual needs. They cannot be taken into account and, I am afraid, are not relevant to the planning decisions. A number of solar developers already provide community benefits on a voluntary basis. We are working with Solar Energy UK, the industry body, to provide further guidance and advice on community benefits for solar developers and communities and to develop a more consistent approach across the country that is fair to all parties.

[Dr Whitehead]

Does the Minister accept that under the present trading arrangements for energy, a developer cannot provide a trading benefit for a local area only and has to treat it as though it were a national benefit? Is the Minister interested in changing that so that benefits can come to local areas, rather than simply being spread across the national grid, as hon. Members have said?

[Andrew Bowie]

As I said, we are working with the solar industry now to develop proposals and give guidance and advice on how best to support local communities and deliver community benefits, so that communities that host these projects on behalf of the wider nation see a benefit. We are not closing our minds to any suggestions that might benefit such communities moving forward. This is a wholesale change in how we deliver energy across the UK, so we should be open to thinking about how we do that in the most appropriate fashion.

I assure right hon. and hon. Members that we are deploying rooftop solar. It remains a key priority for the Government, and continues to be one of the most popular and easily deployed renewable energy sources. We want to see more rooftop solar on industrial and commercial properties, such as warehouses, factories and buildings, to make maximum usage of the available surfaces for business as well as for the environmental and climate benefits. There will be more on that in the solar road map, which will be published in the next few months.

The issue of forced labour was raised. I addressed that in the Chamber just the other evening in response to a debate that was secured by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns). However, as it has been brought up again, I reassure Members that the Government are committed to tackling the issue of Uyghur forced labour in supply chains, including in the mining used for the manufacture of solar panels, and are taking robust action. Over the past two years, we have introduced new guidance on the risks of doing business in Xinjiang, introduced enhanced export controls and announced the introduction of financial penalties for those who fail to report as required under the Modern Slavery Act 2015. That followed our announcement in September 2020 of the package of changes to section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act. These changes will require large businesses and public bodies to report on specific areas within their modern slavery statements, including their due diligence processes in relation to modern slavery. There will be yet more on that within the solar road map on what the industry is doing to ensure that it is not reliant on forced labour anywhere in the world, but particularly in China.

We need an increase in ground-mounted solar alongside rooftop solar over the next decade to meet our energy security and net zero goals and to reduce the cost to consumers. But it is clear to me, the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero and His Majesty’s Government in general that this growth must be sustainable and enabled by a robust planning system that balances the wider benefits with the local impacts, that local communities are listened to and that food security concerns are addressed. That is what we are committing to do. I look forward to the publication of the solar road map, which is the result of the solar taskforce’s work. The document will set out deployment scenarios as well as key actions needed to address challenges in several priority areas, including the grid, rooftop supply chains and skills.

Once again, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham for bringing forward this debate—

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[Andrew Bowie]

I assure my hon. Friend that it is imminent. We will see the publication within the next few weeks.

[Dr Whitehead]

Spring or summer?

[Andrew Bowie]

Spring. I close by thanking my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham for bringing forward this important debate. The contributions have been enlightening and well informed, and show the passion with which Members, who I am proud to serve with, have for the local communities that they are honoured to represent in this place.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Tuesday 27th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

Contrary to propaganda from the Conservative side, the last Labour Government handed over a detailed nuclear development plan that ran up to 2025, with 10 sites identified for nuclear development, early discussions with nuclear developers, and a plan for a deep and secure nuclear repository. Since then, over 14 years, not one electron of new nuclear power has been produced, Hinkley C is now at risk of further delays and no progress at all has been made on the establishment of a secure storage site for nuclear waste. What assurances can the Minister give that lessons have been learned from that frankly fairly lamentable stewardship of the previous plan, and that the latest plan is set up to deliver?

[Andrew Bowie]

I have never been accused of propagandising before. It is a matter of pride on the Conservative Benches that every single nuclear project that has ever been completed in this country has been completed under a Conservative Government—it does not look as though that is likely to change any time soon, despite the protestations and near-Damascene conversion of Labour Front Benchers on nuclear over the past few years. We are carrying on with our nuclear revival; we have set out our nuclear road map; and we are encouraging, enthusing and investing in our civil nuclear sector. I am very excited about the progress that we have made and what will take place in the sector over the next few years.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Tuesday 4th July 2023 Commons Chamber

[Andrew Bowie]

I will take no lectures from the Labour party on developing renewable electricity. When Labour left office in 2010—[Interruption.] They do not like to hear this, but when Labour left office in 2010, less than 7% of the grid was accounted for by renewables. Now it is 43%.

[Dr Whitehead]

I think maybe the Government should take lessons from Labour. It is now generally understood that the Government consultation is likely to lead to only minimal relaxation of planning rules and that onshore wind will effectively remain banned. Tory peer Lord Deben, chairman of the Climate Change Committee, said of the consultation on Saturday that it is simply unacceptable that the Government are still discussing whether they are in favour of onshore wind or not when it is widely recognised as one of the cheapest forms of energy generation. He is right, is he not?

[Andrew Bowie]

I really wish the Labour party would stop talking down what we are doing on renewable electricity. I remind the House that the consultation on onshore wind finishes on 7 July.

Draft Electricity and Gas (Energy Company Obligation) Order 2023

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Monday 3rd July 2023 General Committees

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank both my counterparts. Obviously they have not spent enough time locked in a Committee Room over the past six weeks, so they wanted to come back for some more today. It is a pleasure to be back with them both this afternoon.

Improving the energy efficiency of our homes is the best long-term solution to reduce energy bills and therefore to tackle fuel poverty. That is why the Government have set a new and ambitious target to reduce final energy demand from buildings and industry by 15% by 2030, and are committed to ensuring that homes are warmer and cheaper to heat by investing £12 billion in Help to Heat schemes such as the home upgrade grant and the social housing decarbonisation fund. The Government remain committed to helping low-income and vulnerable households to reduce their fuel bills and heat their homes. The Great British insulation scheme will be a crucial element of that help over this winter and for years to come.

The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun asked why a smaller number of all properties are projected to be insulated and why we are not focusing on solid wall insulation. The scheme will focus on the most cost-effective insulation measures to ensure that as many households as possible can receive support. Solid wall insulation remains eligible for the scheme, but as it is a high-cost measure, it is more likely to require a consumer contribution.

The Government are absolutely determined to reach our energy efficiency ambitions by 2030. We need to balance the ambition of the scheme with the impact of consumer bills and the ability for existing supply chains to deliver measures quickly. This Government are taking action now, led by the energy efficiency taskforce, and building on what has already been achieved through more efficient use of energy in the UK.

Let me address the points raised by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test. Why is the number of homes estimated to be upgraded through the insulation scheme lower than was originally estimated? Compared with the modelling undertaken for the consultation stage impact assessment, the final modelling has incorporated higher-measure cost assumptions. These updated cost assumptions were informed by independent surveys of installers and have been the primary factor in causing the estimated number of homes treated through the scheme to fall.

I accept the hon. Gentleman’s statement that ECO4A, ECO4+ and the GBIS are the same scheme. He asked whether a minimum of two standard assessment procedure band improvements would be required, which might create problems for the insulation scheme. The GB insulation scheme has no minimum improvement requirement; it will target the most cost-effective single measures to make the biggest difference to the most energy-inefficient properties.

Should we support fully those who are on the lowest incomes and are the most vulnerable? We want to extend support to a broader pool of households who are currently ineligible for support through existing schemes but are also likely to be struggling to pay higher energy bills. At least 20% of the obligation will focus on low- income households, targeting those on means-tested benefits, living in the least efficient social housing or referred by a participating local authority or energy supplier and considered to be on a low income or vulnerable. The remainder will be open to households in the lower council tax bands: A to D in England and A to E in Scotland and Wales, equivalent to EPC rating D to G.

Has a comparative assessment been made of the cost assumptions for the ECO4 scheme and of those set out in the Great British insulation scheme consultation? We are monitoring ECO4 delivery against the current cost assumptions and will consider changes if necessary. However, changing the cost assumptions may require either a change to the overall energy bill reduction target, the estimated funding scheme policy details or a combination of all three. Such changes would require public consultation, and possibly regulatory change.

[Dr Whitehead]

I think the Minister has just indicated, in his very last sentence, that another SI may be on its way. If so, what is the timescale?

Energy Bill [ Lords ] (Eighteenth sitting)

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Thursday 29th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

The Minister said, “Watch this space”. It would be very helpful if he were to give us an outline of what the content of the space might actually look like.

[Andrew Bowie]

Far be it from me to spoil the enjoyment for hon. Members! I said this when we debated it last week, and I say it again: we continue to work on this. We continue to look at what more the Government can do to support community energy projects across the United Kingdom, and I will commit to provide an update on the next steps ahead of Report. I hope that is suitable for hon. Members. I do not believe that this new clause would add any value, so I encourage—indeed, I humbly beg—the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam to withdraw her new clause.

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[Dr Whitehead]

I would agree if that were not my metaphorical way. Of course I do not believe that the former Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy is going to take the Minister into a cupboard and do him over; it is a metaphor that I hoped might convey some of the possible lingering influence of the right hon. Member for North East Somerset on our present considerations. I am sure that the Minister will want to put that lingering influence out of his mind when considering what to do today.

After all the work that has been done on getting this clause back into the Bill, I confidently expect the Minister to greet it with acclamation. He does not have to do any work on it now, because it is ready to go. He can proceed with a Bill he can be proud of through its remaining stages in this House.

[Andrew Bowie]

For the record, let me make it absolutely clear that I have only the greatest respect for my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset and that he has never expressed any desire to take me into a cupboard and, metaphorically or not, do me over. We enjoy a very good relationship. Although we disagree on some points of principle, we are broadly in agreement on the general direction of travel that is needed for the betterment of this country. I put on record my thanks for his service in supporting the Government in the various offices in which he served.

I also thank the hon. Member for Southampton, Test for tabling new clause 88. I note that it reflects the clauses that were in this Bill when it was first published in July last year, as he has pointed out. However, I am sure that it will not have escaped his notice that a great deal has happened to energy prices since then. Last September, the Government announced a massive package of support for consumers. As part of the work to deliver that package, the Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Act 2018 was modified by the Energy Prices Act 2022, which received Royal Assent on 25 October.

Those modifications were made so that the tariff cap could function both as a cap to ensure that prices are efficient and as the reference price for the subsidy payments to households under the energy price guarantee. Although energy prices have now fallen below the level at which energy price guarantee payments are being made, it will remain in force until the end of March 2024 to protect households from price spikes. To ensure that the support rates under the energy price guarantee could be set and delivered effectively and quickly, the Energy Prices Act removed the requirement on Ofgem to carry out a review and to produce a report and recommendation to inform annual decisions by the Secretary of State on whether to extend the cap. As a result, there is now no automatic end date for the cap and the Secretary of State will give notice of when the tariff cap will end, but that does not change the fact that the tariff cap was always intended to be a temporary measure. It remains so, for now; as stated in the Government’s energy security plan, we intend to consult later this summer on the future of the price cap. In the light of my remarks, I hope that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test will feel that he can withdraw the new clause.

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[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Committee will be delighted to know that I do not intend to detain it for any length of time on the new clause, which follows on from our earlier debate about the setting up of the independent system operator.

We think something is missing from the otherwise pretty comprehensive and good arrangement for the setting up, organisation and running of the independent system operator, which we completely support; although we would like to see the independent system operator playing more of a system architect role than is presently envisaged, in general we are absolutely for setting up the ISOP in the way that has been described. What ought to follow is at least a consideration of whether the arrangements between the ISOP and the distributed network operators, on which we tabled some amendments at the time, are sufficiently robust to enable a system operator function to operate at all levels of grid delivery. As I said a little while ago, there are decreasing distinctions between the lower-level grid operated by the DNOs and the high-level grid, which is the function of the National Grid ESO at the moment.

The possibility arises that it will be possible—more than possible—to establish regional independent system operators to perform, in conjunction with the ISOP, the same sort of function that is presently envisaged for the ISOP itself. That would be a slightly different function, inasmuch as the regional system operators could be responsible for what is increasingly likely to happen with regional balancing, ancillary services and other such things that are part of the emerging structure of the grid as a whole, as we move from a centralised to a much more decentralised grid arrangement.

RISOs, as I call them, would be able to play a substantial role in that. All new clause 88 suggests is that the Secretary of State produce a report on the advisability of establishing regional independent system operators. I called them RISOs a moment ago, but RISOs are actually duplicating machines favoured by those with left-wing tendencies producing leaflets; these would be RISOPs, which could be established to provide that important link arrangement between the high-level grid and the low-level grid for the future.

That is all, really, as far as the new clause is concerned. It does not require anything earth-moving to take place in the immediate future—just consideration of this arrangement. It may well be that just by raising the matter I will have put the thought in the Secretary of State’s mind that maybe we should consider going in that direction; it is certainly a direction the Opposition would consider going in if our roles on these Benches were reversed. My purpose in tabling new clause 89 was to raise the issue and see what the Minister has to say about it; I certainly do not intend to press it to a vote.

[Andrew Bowie]

For the record, may I point out that it is not just leaflet publishers of left-wing tendencies who are au fait with risograph printers? I have spent many hours standing by a RISO producing leaflets for those of centre-right tendencies.

I may be wrong but, according to my notes, this is the last new clause or amendment the hon. Member for Southampton, Test will speak to, so I thank him and the shadow team for the very collegiate way in which they have proceeded through Committee stage. I look forward to engaging with the hon. Gentleman again on Report and Third Reading, and indeed in the interim, when I am sure we will be corresponding. I thank all hon. Members for their contributions thus far.

New clause 89 speaks to the creation of a new set of bodies to deliver regional system operation and planning, and in many ways repeats the intentions of amendment 97, which the hon. Member for Southampton, Test tabled. As with that amendment, the new clause creates powers relating to the operation of distribution systems.

Ofgem has recently consulted on the future of local energy institutions and governance, with a focus on the creation of regional system planners specifically. That consultation closed on 10 May, and I suggest that this new clause prejudges the outcome of that work.

Alongside Ofgem, the Government will carefully consider the proposals we are consulting on. If we then proposed legislative or licence changes that affected the relationship between the ISOP and distribution networks, any additional functions accruing to the ISOP would be covered by the wording in clause 119(2)(b) and clause 134(3)(a). That is because those clauses allow for other functions to be conferred on the ISOP under, or by virtue of, legislation other than part 4.

I hope that puts the mind of the hon. Member for Southampton, Test at ease and that he feels able to withdraw his new clause.

[Dr Whitehead]

I have no further comments to make, other than to thank the Minister for his comments. There are indeed consultations under way through Ofgem, and I look forward to seeing what those have to say. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 90

Objections by planning authorities to applications for consent under section 36 or 37 of the Electricity Act 1989

“(1) Schedule 8 to the Electricity Act 1989 is amended as follows.

(2) Omit paragraph 2.

(3) In the cross-heading before paragraph 3, omit ‘by other persons’.

(4) In paragraph 3, omit sub-sub-paragraph (2)(a).”—(Alan Brown.)

This new clause would remove the ability of a local planning authority automatically to cause a public inquiry to be held by objecting to an application to the Secretary of State for consent under section 36 or 37 of the Electricity Act 1989, instead leaving Ministers to decide whether a public inquiry should be held.

Brought up, and read the First time.

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[Andrew Bowie]

Thank you, Mr Sharma, for your excellent chairing of the Committee this morning, and thank you to Mr Gray, Dr Huq and Ms Nokes for their equally excellent chairmanship over the course of the Committee.

I pay special tribute to the Clerks and to my officials for their tireless work on what is quite a hefty piece of legislation. I also thank Members on both sides of the Committee for the constructive, thoughtful and insightful debate on this landmark Bill. I have already thanked the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, for his overall support, and for our way of working in Committee, which has been collegiate and good mannered—well, not good mannered. [Interruption.] Bad mannered! [Laughter.] Although we have not agreed on every detail, I thank him for his knowledgeable contributions.

The Energy Bill will provide a clear, more affordable and more secure energy system. It will liberate private investment, including in technologies, reform our energy system so that it is fit for purpose, and ensure its safety, security and resilience. I look forward to working with everyone present to take the Bill through Report stage and on to Royal Assent.

[Dr Whitehead]

I associate myself with the Minister’s remarks concerning your excellent chairing, Mr Sharma, and that of your colleagues the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray), my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing Central and Acton (Dr Huq) and my constituency neighbour the right hon. Member for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes). I hope that you can convey to them the thanks of all Committee members for their excellent work in bringing the Committee to its conclusion.

I also thank, beyond the normal level of thanks, the Committee Clerks, who have been of tremendous assistance to me in bringing forward the sinews for debate by way of the amendments and new clauses, all in perfect order and debated accordingly. In my relatively long experience of taking Bills through the House, their work has been way beyond the call of duty, for which I am very grateful to them.

I believe the Minister is the record holder of fastest House of Commons runner in the London marathon ever.

[Andrew Bowie]

No—just in one year, I am afraid.

[Dr Whitehead]

I think it was ever, but perhaps we should have a rerun. It is rather appropriate that we have got through this marathon Bill in good order and in good time. The Minister is very substantially responsible, not least with his speed-reading skills, for managing us through that lengthy process, and I thank him for that. I also thank him for his good humour, collegiality and careful consideration of the points that we have put forward.

We of course do not agree with everything that has come out of the Committee, and we will pursue some of those things during the Bill’s later stages, but I hope that I can say on behalf of the whole Committee that, overall, we have between us delivered a Bill that fundamentally we pretty much agree on through to its next stages in relatively good order. That is not always the case in this place, and it is something we can all be quite proud of. That is the end of my thanks. I hope that everyone will be happy with having the afternoon off, now that we can move forward to Report stage.

Energy Bill [ Lords ] (Sixteenth sitting)

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

In his reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol East, will the Minister expand briefly on his understanding of the meaning of the word “pause” in relation to the forcible installation of prepayment meters by energy companies? As far as I am aware, there is no time set for that, nor is it subject to any other actions that the Government may take. Is it the Minister’s understanding that the pause is strictly time-limited and that practices may start again at the end of it?

[Andrew Bowie]

The pause will be until Ofgem has finalised the review of supplier practice in relation to prepayment meter customers. That is what we expect, anyway, because in addition to what I have said this morning, the Secretary of State has told Ofgem to toughen up on energy suppliers and to investigate customers’ experiences of how their supplier is performing. Following that, Ofgem established a new customer reporting system for households to pass on their experiences of how they are being treated. We are approaching this across the board. We believe, however, that any ban on the forced installation of prepayment meters would risk a build-up of customer debt. Unpaid debts increase costs for all energy consumers and could pose a risk to supplier stability.

To address issues around the forced installation of prepayment meters, Ofgem has recently published a new code of practice, as I mentioned. The code has been agreed with energy suppliers to improve protections for customers being moved involuntarily to a prepayment meter. It ensures better protections for vulnerable households, increased scrutiny of supplier practices, and redress measures where prepayment meters were wrongly installed. It includes provisions to prevent involuntary installations for all high-risk customers, including those dependent on powered medical equipment, people over 85, and households with residents with severe health issues. It also includes a requirement for suppliers to reassess whether prepayment remains the most suitable and preferred payment method for a customer once they have repaid debts. Suppliers must agree to any request from a prepayment customer who is clear of debt to move off a prepayment meter.

The rules to which suppliers must adhere regarding the installation of prepayment meters are set out in the licence conditions set by Ofgem as the independent regulator. Ofgem will undertake a formal statutory consultation process to modify suppliers’ licence conditions in line with the code ahead of this winter. This will allow Ofgem to use its full enforcement powers to enforce compliance with the code, ensuring that consumers are protected and that the poor practices that we have seen will not happen again.

It is vital that, as the independent regulator, Ofgem continues to set the rules to which energy suppliers must adhere in licence conditions. New clauses 2 and 38 would risk taking that power away from Ofgem. Allowing the Government to set rules outside the licence conditions would threaten Ofgem’s independence and its ability to regulate suppliers effectively.

The Government have always been clear that action is needed to crack down on the practice of forcing people, especially the most vulnerable, on to prepayment meters. We will continue to work closely with Ofgem and industry to see that the code leads to positive changes for vulnerable consumers. I hope that hon. Members are reassured by my explanation and that they might feel able to withdraw their new clauses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

Indeed there is a feeling welling up in me that we are not able to proceed with the new clause, given that the Minister said—and I agree—that such a change cannot be made easily with a quick stroke of a pen, and that a number of other things need to be considered alongside that. I am pleased that he indicated that, as we speak, there are serious people with towels round their heads working through the implications and looking at how we can best do it. That was the intention of the new clause, but perhaps I was rather optimistic in thinking that the name change could be written in easily. I appreciate that it cannot.

I also appreciate that the transition authority has the green light from Government to start undertaking things relating to transition. It is beginning to pursue that, and that is all good, but I say gently to the Minister that at some stage we will need to push this together. If the gentlemen with wet towels round their heads—

[Andrew Bowie]

And ladies.

[Dr Whitehead]

And ladies, indeed. If they can undertake their work in a reasonable fashion, I hope we will have a solution that is good for all of us, as far as the transition is concerned. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 44

Maximum economic recovery in the North Sea

“(1) The Petroleum Act 1998 is amended as follows.

(2) Omit sections 9A to 9I.”—(Dr Whitehead.)

This new clause removes reference to Maximum Economic Recovery in the North Sea as placed into the Petroleum Act 1998 by section 41 of the Infrastructure Act 2015.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

I could not agree more that there are financial risks. That is probably why, just this morning, so many businesses expressed their worry at Labour’s Just Stop Oil plans, which were outlined a couple of weeks ago and which the former Labour leader of Aberdeen City Council described as even worse for an industry than the actions of Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s. That is from a member of the Labour party who resigned due to Labour’s policies on oil and gas.

[Dr Whitehead]

I would be grateful if the Minister withdrew that comment about Labour’s “Just Stop Oil plans”. There are no Labour Just Stop Oil plans. Indeed, Labour has condemned the activities of Just Stop Oil protesters, because Labour does not wish just to stop oil. We specifically said this morning that we do not wish to do that, and that we see a substantial role for the North sea oil and gas industry out to 2050. We would support that future, so I hope the Minister will not resort to these easy gibes and will address the issue rather more seriously today. That would be helpful.

[Andrew Bowie]

I should probably turn to the new clause, but I welcome the welcome and support that the hon. Gentleman—and now, it seems, the Labour party—will give to our offshore oil and gas industry. He should probably inform the members and founders of Just Stop Oil who have donated so much money to his party.

The objective of maximising economic recovery in the North sea forms the basis of the North Sea Transition Authority’s regulatory functions, and removing them could significantly undermine its ability to operate as intended. It would also lead to a significant lack of clarity about the authority’s regulatory role. Maximising the economic recovery of oil and gas need not be in conflict with the transition to net zero, and the North Sea Transition Authority is already doing a great deal of work to support an orderly transition that delivers on our climate commitments and supports workers.

In December 2020, in accordance with section 9A of the Petroleum Act 1998, the North Sea Transition Authority published a revised strategy, titled “The OGA Strategy”.

[Dr Whitehead]

Ah!

[Andrew Bowie]

It is rather ironic, given what we have just been discussing. Through the revised strategy’s central obligation, the North Sea Transition Authority must

“secure that the maximum value of economically recoverable petroleum is recovered from the strata beneath relevant UK waters; and, in doing so, take appropriate steps to assist the Secretary of State in meeting the net zero target”.

The strategy therefore already provides a basis for the North Sea Transition Authority’s ongoing work to help drive the energy transition.

Under the revised strategy, the North Sea Transition Authority has also introduced new expectations for how North sea oil and gas assets will be managed in the least polluting way, and it will consider the full societal carbon cost when taking decisions. The North Sea Transition Authority will continue to work with Government, industry and other regulators to help accelerate the move to net zero while meeting the UK’s energy demands and need for energy security.

Section 9D of the Petroleum Act 1998, on reports by the Secretary of State, was repealed by paragraph 10 of schedule 1 to the Energy Act 2016, which means the repeal happened before any reports needed to be produced.

I pay tribute to our offshore oil and gas industry, particularly Offshore Energies UK and its “Vision 2035” plan, which means the North sea will become the world’s first net-zero basin. With these explanations, I hope the hon. Gentleman feels able to withdraw his new clause.

[Dr Whitehead]

I thank the Minister for clarifying the position on reports, because I must admit that I had not read that paragraph of the 2016 Act. It rather underscores my point that this is a performative piece of legislation. There were requirements to report, but the Government presumably realised that they were even sillier than the original imposition on the 1998 Act and decided, one year later, that reports would not be necessary. It could have been a bit embarrassing if the reports came out, so they decided that the reports were not necessary. I thank him for that clarification, but he is rather speaking to my point instead of his.

I am very disappointed that the Minister has sought to characterise our debate as one side of the Committee being against oil and gas and the other side being in favour; he thereby swerves the important point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hallam. On the overall position that maximum economic extraction could lead us—

Energy Bill [ Lords ] (Fourteenth sitting)

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Andrew Bowie]

I now return to part 4 of the Bill, which relates to the independent system operator and planner, or ISOP.

Clause 132 introduces schedule 7. The purpose of the schedule is to empower the Secretary of State to make transfer schemes to create the ISOP and give it the capacity to carry out its functions. As discussed already, the ISOP will be founded on the existing capabilities and functions of National Grid Electricity System Operator and, where appropriate, National Grid Gas. That will require several transactions between Government, National Grid plc and other relevant parties, because the property that the ISOP requires is not currently owned by a single entity. The transfers could include matters such as personnel, IT systems, physical assets, methodologies, models, data, and other resources and inputs used by the existing entities in performing their functions.

Schedule 7 sets out a set of principles, procedures and expectations in relation to the transfer scheme that will help provide clarity to affected parties. For example, it outlines that the Government are required to consult the transferor or transferors when the transfer scheme power is expected to be used. Not all the detail of the scheme can be determined in advance, so the Bill also includes a small number of time-limited powers to make regulations, which include regulations to provide further details to all parties, including third parties, on procedures for agreeing and paying compensation.

Government amendment 19 makes a minor procedural amendment to clause 275, to include the Treasury in the list of persons that can make regulations under the Bill. Amendment 20 clarifies that, because regulations under paragraph 9 of schedule 7 deal with financial matters, they can only be annulled in the House of Commons.

Clause 133 introduces schedule 8, which relates to pensions. As part of the transfer of functions, some employees will transfer into the ISOP. The purpose of the schedule is to allow the Secretary of State to separate the pension arrangements of the ISOP and to provide scope for various forms of reorganisation that may be appropriate in the light of the transfer. That includes making provision for the responsibility for the affected employees’ qualifying pension schemes and protecting the value of their benefits during the transfer. In exercising powers, the Secretary of State must ensure that the arrangements made for each employee’s pension provision is, in all material respects, at least as good immediately after any transfer-related changes are made as they were before that point.

Clause 134 grants the Secretary of State the power to provide financial assistance to the ISOP—that is, to draw on the financial resources available to Government in the kind of circumstances when the existing electricity system operator and gas system operator would have relied on the financial strength of their corporate group to raise capital sums. The Secretary of State will have the power to set conditions on the financial assistance provided, which may include conditions about repayment with or without interests or other return. In the highly unlikely situation that the ISOP faces financial difficulty, the power would also allow the Secretary of State to step in and avoid any disruption to the electricity and gas sectors.

Finally, clause 135 removes the barriers, in section 7 of the Electricity Act 1989 and section 7B of the Gas Act 1986, to payments raised in one sector being used to benefit consumers in the other. It also introduces a provision, in each Act, to expand licence holders’ statutory duties and require them to have regard to the interests of consumers of the other energy sector where directed by their licence. The removal of such barriers is fundamental, because it will enable the ISOP to co-ordinate and ensure strategic planning across the energy sector more effectively.

[Dr Whitehead]

We come to a part of the Bill that we should have discussed a couple of weeks ago: clauses 132 to 139. When we discussed the rest of the business relating to the ISOP, these debates were moved by the Government towards the end of the consideration of later clauses in the Bill. At the time, I thought that was because there was some blockbusting new clause that the Government were thinking of introducing, which was not quite down the slipway at that point. I thought it would appear when we considered the clauses today.

I was disappointed to see that nothing has appeared. There are two Government amendments that were there previously, and nothing in the way of new clauses. I assume the reason for discussing the provisions now—although the Minister may have an interesting explanation up his sleeve—may well be because Ofgem has just produced a consultation—[Interruption.] No, the Minister is shaking his head. In any event, had the Minister consulted with Ofgem about whether it was going to produce a consultation on transfers and various other things, then he would have found that they have produced a consultation, “Funding the transition to a Future System Operator”, which was published today. The Minister will understand that not a great deal of time has elapsed since the publication of that consultation.

That consultation is very relevant to the provisions we are discussing. If the Minister did think the consultation would be published in time, it would have been helpful of him to bring that to the Committee’s attention. Apparently, however, there are different reasons for discussing these provisions later in the Committee cycle than planned.

A headline in Utility Week said the full costs of the transition to a future system operator could come to about £392 million. I read that headline but I am too mean to go behind the paywall of Utility Week to read the rest of the article. I sought out the Ofgem consultation instead and got the full picture. The consultation indicates that this level of cost for the transition is accurate. In clauses 132 to 139, provision is given for the bringing together of the various agencies’ present responsibilities for what would be the new independent system operator. That extends beyond just taking the National Grid ESO away from National Grid and putting it into ISOP. It involves other agencies—the Minister is absolutely right.

In this instance, however, the prime issue of the transition is of course the ESO itself. At the moment and for a long time, the ESO has had a relationship with National Grid involving separation by Chinese walls. It was, in effect, owned by National Grid and so was part of the National Grid family of companies, but over the recent period, since the ESO was set up, its operation has been separated from that of National Grid. Previously, we have discussed the extent to which the Chinese walls were strong enough for what ESO was doing in relationship to what National Grid might be doing—for example, potential conflict on interconnectors, with National Grid owning at least part of an interconnector while ESO was planning for interconnectors overall.

The fact that the separation will take place and that the business of the ESO will be transferred fully into the ISOP is important. That will complete the process of setting up the ISOP properly, so that it can operate fully independently from day one—in Committee, we have expressed strong interest in ensuring that. However, with the Ofgem consultation, the issue of compensation for those transfers arises to some extent. According to the consultation, part of the transfer arrangements relates to transferring personnel across and part to what assets and so on will be transferred. What is not entirely clear in the consultation is also alluded to in the provisions in the group, in particular schedule 7.

Paragraph 8 of schedule 7, headed “Compensation”, appears to start talking about compensation in general terms for, as it were, the loss to National Grid of its ownership of the ESO, as well as of the various things relating to the transfer of assets and individuals. Compensation would be couched in two parts: literally, which desks and pot plants are going over to the ISOP, with personnel and various other things, and what the compensation for that is, presumably; and compensation for the fact that the ESO was part of the National Grid corporate family and no longer will be.

I am not clear whether the provision on compensation encompasses that consideration. If so, what might that consideration be? Do the Government have a figure in mind for compensating National Grid for its losing ESO to the ISOP? Is that facilitated through these clauses or a separate arrangement to be arrived at? In other words, do the clauses deal just with compensation relating to bodies, pot plants and desks, or with compensation more widely?

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Inspiration has arrived.

[Dr Whitehead]

Good.

As I was saying, this is potentially important, because the clauses in this part of the Bill relate to the Secretary of State’s ability to provide the ISOP with finance. Will the ISOP undertake the job of providing the compensation due under the clause—presumably it would be provided with money by the Government to do that—or will the Government deal with that separately before the ISOP is set up?

There is also an important point about compensation for the loss of the ESO to the ISOP. It would seem inappropriate for the ISOP to pay compensation to National Grid, given its removal from National Grid in the first place. I therefore assume that other mechanisms will be in place to provide that compensation. If that compensation is paid, there are provisions in the Bill allowing for such payments to be recovered by companies involved in the process in the course of their activities. [Interruption.] I will pause for a moment while the Minister consults his Whip.

[Dr Whitehead]

This is something I specifically want the Minister to say something about. It is important that we get it right.

Assuming that compensation is given for the loss of the ESO and the companies concerned can recover that, do the Government intend for the ISOP to have a part in the mechanism whereby costs are recovered through standing charges on bills? As the Minister knows, standing charges are substantially made up of a combination of charges for TNUoS and DUoS—transmission network use of system and distribution use of system—and a balancing charge, and, as he and other hon. Members will know, standing charges are increasing substantially as a proportion of our electricity bills. They are now about 25% of our energy bills.

It looks as if the compensation, if it can be recovered by somebody—I assume it could be recovered one way or another by National Grid in its network charges, or by the ISOP in what it eventually contributes to the standing charge—will eventually work its way into the standing charge, and hence on to customers’ bills. That makes it important to understand what the Government have in mind about what compensation should be paid to National Grid for the loss of ESO and its transfer to the ISOP.

It may be that there has been a nice agreement that no one will pay anyone compensation, and National Grid will just hand over ESO to the ISOP. I suspect that is not the case, but I have not seen anywhere—and it is not explicit in the consultation—what the level of compensation might be, who will pay it, how it might be transferred to bills and standing charges, if necessary, and how the process overall might work. It would be helpful if the Minister could give us an understanding of all that. It would certainly enable us to better judge schedule 7, as it relates to the process of how those transfers take place and what their consequences are.

[Andrew Bowie]

On the question of why we have returned to these clauses, I am sorry that I was unable to turn up today with a blockbuster moment for the Committee. I know they were all expecting it and waiting with bated breath. Unfortunately, it is a simple matter of procedure. We temporarily skipped over the remaining clauses in part 4 to ensure that the necessary Ways and Means motion could be agreed by the House. I am pleased to confirm that the resolution was obtained on Tuesday, allowing us—I was expecting a “Hear, hear!”—to continue with clauses 132 to 139.

The Ways and Means resolution was necessary as a result of provisions that confer power on the Treasury to make regulations setting out the way taxes have effect in connection with a transfer of assets from one body to another. It was impossible to proceed with debate on the clauses until the motion was passed by the House. That has now been done, so we can proceed.

On the consultation that was published this morning, I cannot mandate when Ofgem publishes its consultations, so unfortunately that was not a consideration. However, we note that the Ofgem consultation launched today, and I will of course consider it in detail. I am happy to provide hon. Members with more detail in writing should they wish.

The hon. Member for Southampton, Test spoke about transfers. The Bill provides multiple steps for agreement on the value of compensation: first, simple agreement between parties—in this case the Secretary of State, National Grid and the owners of National Gas—secondly, in a situation of non-agreement, the joint appointment of an independent valuer to assess the value of the assets to be transferred; or, thirdly, as a fall-back option, the appointment of an independent valuer by the Secretary of State on behalf of both parties. The framework of considerations to be made by the independent valuer will be set out in regulations to be made under the Bill.

The entire process is an ongoing commercial transaction, so the Government are limited in the extent of the information they can provide at this point, although I recognise the importance of the hon. Gentleman’s questions. I will respond specifically to his point about the standing charge and his worry that that could have an effect on bills. We do not expect costs to rise at all as a result of the establishment of the ISOP. The ISOP will be funded by Government, and its ongoing operations will continue to be supported by funding from the network balancing charges at a level determined through a price-control mechanism, much like the current gas and electricity system operators are. However, we expect the ISOP to enable a long-term reduction in costs compared with the status quo.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

I think the Minister just said that he expects compensation to be included in network charges, which means that in the end it will go on standing charges for customers. There will be an effect on customers’ bills.

[Andrew Bowie]

I reiterate that we are not expecting any increase in customers’ bills as a result of the creation of the ISOP. There will be no increase. We expect the ISOP to enable a long-term reduction in costs, so its creation will have the opposite effect on customers’ bills. Future network decisions will be built on the expert and impartial advice of the truly whole-system body that many in the industry and outside it have been calling for for some time.

[Dr Whitehead]

I appreciate that the Minister cannot tell me—presumably because of an ongoing discussion relating to commercial companies—what the compensation for National Grid is likely to be. However, I assume that, in stating that he cannot tell me, he has confirmed that that will be part of the transfer arrangements. I was trying to distinguish between the compensation for pot plants and desks, and compensation for the loss of the ESO by National Grid.

That leads us to an unsatisfactory position in which we do not know how much the compensation will be. Presumably, we have to take it on trust that the Government will be fairly rigorous about ensuring that the compensation is proportionate to the actual loss, but I am not sure how it will be determined. Sorry, Mr Gray, this is a long intervention.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Clause 136 ensures that when carrying out various functions in relation to the ISOP under the Bill, the Secretary of State and Ofgem must have regard to their principal objective and general duties as defined in the Electricity Act 1989 and the Gas Act 1986. The principal objective of the Secretary of State and Ofgem can be characterised as protecting the interests of existing and future electricity and gas consumers. General duties include promoting effective competition in the energy sector, having regard to security of supply and securing a healthy energy market.

It is relatively common to extend the application of those principles where a new Act gives new, freestanding functions to the Secretary of State or Ofgem. The clause states that the Secretary of State must have regard to the principal objective and general duties when carrying out new functions relating to designation under clause 120 or when making an order that an existing transmission licence becomes the ISOP’s electricity system operator licence.

Clause 137 introduces schedule 9, which contains necessary consequential amendments to the Gas Act and Electricity Act to enable the ISOP and its licensable activities to be integrated into the existing framework of the energy system regulated by Ofgem.

Clause 138 contains provisions on the interpretation of terms used in part 4 of the Bill. I draw hon. Members’ attention in particular to subsection (3), which is intended to make it clear that whenever part 4 includes a proposition about the ISOP’s functions, that is to be understood as applying to any and all of the ISOP’s functions, whether provided by the Bill, by other legislation, or as functions ancillary to them.

Clause 139 concerns the limited regulation-making powers in part 4. Government amendment 18 is consequential on Government amendment 20, which we have already discussed. It ensures that regulations made by the Treasury under schedule 7(9) are not subject to the negative procedure. As these are financial regulations, the intention is for them to be laid before the House of Commons only and approved by the House of Commons alone.

[Dr Whitehead]

These measures are essentially consequential on those we have already discussed. I have no particular comment to make on them other than to say hooray; I am happy to let them go through undiscussed.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 136 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 137 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 9 agreed to.

Clause 138 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 139

Regulations under Part 4

Amendment made: 18, in clause 139, page 122, line 32, at end insert—

“(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to regulations under paragraph 9 of Schedule 7.”

This amendment excludes regulations made by the Treasury under paragraph 9 of Schedule 7 from the provision about negative procedure in Parliament made by clause 139. This is consequential on Amendment 20.—(Andrew Bowie.)

Clause 139, as amended, agreed to.

New Clause 8

Key definitions

“(1) This section applies for the purposes of this Chapter.

(2) ‘Carbon storage licence’ means a licence granted, or having effect as if granted, by the OGA under section 18(1) of the Energy Act 2008 (and references to a ‘licensee’ are to a person who holds such a licence).

(3) ‘Exploration operator’, in relation to a carbon storage licence, means a person who is responsible for organising or supervising—

(a) the carrying on of exploration, within the area within which activities are authorised under the licence, with a view to, or in connection with, the carrying on of activities within section 17(2)(a) or (b) of the Energy Act 2008, or

(b) the establishment or maintenance in a controlled place (as defined in section 17 of the Energy Act 2008) of an installation for the purposes of such exploration.

(4) ‘Carbon storage information’ means information acquired or created by or on behalf of a licensee in the course of carrying out activities under the licensee’s carbon storage licence.

(5) ‘Carbon storage samples’ means samples of substances acquired by or on behalf of a licensee in the course of carrying out activities under the licensee’s carbon storage licence.

(6) ‘Sanctionable requirement’ means a requirement imposed on a person by or under a provision of this Chapter which, by virtue of the provision, is sanctionable in accordance with this Chapter.—(Andrew Bowie.)

NC8 to NC28 and NS1 and NS2 make provision about carbon storage information and samples, and the powers of the OGA, corresponding to the provision made by Chapters 3, 5 and 6 of Part 2 of the Energy Act 2016 in respect of offshore petroleum. They are intended to form new Chapter 4A in Part 2. This new clause defines key terms for the purposes of the intended new Chapter.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Andrew Bowie]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Andrew Bowie]

New clause 8 provides the key definitions for the purposes of this new chapter, enabling the effective understanding of all carbon storage information and samples provisions. The powers provided by this chapter specifically support the Oil and Gas Authority, the business name of which is the North Sea Transition Authority, in its role as a regulator of carbon storage.

New clause 9 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make regulations on the retention of information and samples acquired by carbon storage licensees acting under the authority of the NSTA. The provisions will align carbon storage information requirements with existing petroleum licensing provisions, as established in the Energy Act 2016.

The specific type of information and samples that licensees will be required to retain will be set out in regulations. That will be alongside the form and manner in which they are to be retained, the period of retention and the events that trigger the commencement of such requirements. The various exploration, appraisal and monitoring activities that will be carried out on and under the seabed by carbon storage licence holders will yield important information, supporting the NSTA to carry out its regulatory functions.

New clauses 10 and 11 establish requirements for the preparation and agreement of information and samples plans. These are agreements between the NSTA and a carbon storage licence holder that set out what should happen to carbon storage information and samples held by the licence holder before the occurrence of certain carbon storage licence events. Provisions involving information and samples plans were introduced for petroleum licences in the Energy Act 2016. We therefore expect them to provide the same benefits for carbon storage licence events.

New clause 12 establishes provisions for the designation of information and samples co-ordinators, which will monitor compliance with obligations imposed under the new chapter, uphold the requirements of any information and samples plans, and help to protect against the risks of data loss during a licence event. Information and samples co-ordinators are expected to prove a valuable aid in respect of data reporting compliance. That is evident in the instrumental role they currently play in relation to petroleum licensees under the Energy Act 2016.

New clause 13 establishes powers for the NSTA to obtain information and samples collected through carbon storage activities to support its regulatory functions. This includes information and samples held by persons in accordance with regulations made under new clauses 9 and 10.

New clause 14 prohibits the NSTA from disclosing any information and samples it holds in accordance with the powers in this chapter, subject to the provisions of new schedule 1 and the power of the Secretary of State to obtain information from the NSTA in new clause 15. This will provide carbon storage licensees with the reassurance that any information and samples provided to the NSTA in support of their regulatory functions will not be allowed to be disclosed, except in specified circumstances.

New schedule 1 sets out the circumstances in which, to whom, and for what purposes the NSTA can disclose information. This includes providing for disclosure in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State that may permit protected material to be published, or made available to the public, after a specified period. The public disclosure of this information after a suitable period of confidentiality will support effective regulation by the NSTA.

New clause 15 provides powers to the Secretary of State to require information and samples held by, or on behalf of, the NSTA. It will align powers for carbon storage information and samples with the equivalent powers established for petroleum information and samples under the Energy Act 2016. This power will be used to enable the Secretary of State to carry out statutory functions, to monitor the performance of the NSTA, or to provide information for the purposes of parliamentary proceedings. Carbon storage licences return to the Government once storage sites have been closed for a designated period, and the Government are liable for any potential future leakage.

I turn now to new clauses 16 to 25. New clause 16 provides the NSTA with powers to issue sanction notices to persons who fail to comply with the requirements imposed on them under this chapter of the Bill. Such sanction notices can be in the form of an enforcement, a financial penalty, a revocation or operator removal notices. New clauses 17 to 20 make the necessary provisions for each of those types of notice. Importantly, new clause 21 places a requirement on the NSTA to issue a sanction warning notice ahead of any sanction notice that it proposes to issue under the powers established in new clause 16.

New clause 22 establishes that the NSTA may publish details of any sanction notices issued under new clause 16, including details of any sanction notice that is cancelled or withdrawn. New clause 22 also provides that the NSTA may not publish information that it considers to be commercially sensitive, not in the public interest or otherwise inappropriate to publish. New clause 23 places a restriction on the NSTA issuing more than one sanction notice in respect of the same contravention. New clause 24 provides the NSTA with the power to withdraw any sanction notices issued. Finally, new clause 25 enables the NSTA to require specified documents or information to support an investigation into whether a sanction notice ought to be provided under new clause 16.

New clause 26 introduces new schedule 2 to the Bill. Alongside new schedule 22, new clause 26 provides for an appeal to be made to the first-tier tribunal against any decision made by the NSTA. This is in relation to the NSTA exercising its new power to require carbon storage information samples. As I am sure Committee members will agree, the right of appeal for licence holders is a necessary and important part of conferring new regulatory powers on the NSTA.

New clause 27 will require the NSTA to determine and publish the procedure it proposes to follow in its decision making when issuing a sanction notice under new clause 16, which ensures public transparency in how the NSTA will enforce the sanctionable requirements and provides clarity for licence holders in respect of the NSTA’s procedures.

Finally, new clause 28 provides definitions to aid the interpretation of the provisions relating to carbon storage information samples detailed in this chapter. The definitions cross-reference the relevant existing legislation where appropriate.

[Dr Whitehead]

This group consists primarily of new clauses that the Government introduced. A substantial number of new clauses relate to the very sensible business of securing samples and various other things that can be of use in the regulation of the process and quality control, and in various other things relating to carbon capture and storage activity. So far, so good. These are certainly sensible clauses that establish arrangements for disputes and various other things, such as sanctions for when samples are not properly provided and so on—all good stuff.

However, there is an important point about the collection and retention of samples, as set out in the factsheet, which was subsequently published, that the Minister kindly provided me with when he said he intended to produce these new clauses. By the way, the factsheet refers to the NSTA, but the legislation refers to the OGA—again, maybe that is something we can discuss later. The Government say:

“We are legislating to provide the NSTA with appropriate powers to require carbon storage licensees to retain and report information and samples gathered as part of activities associated with the geological storage of carbon dioxide, and to enable the NSTA to publicly disclose this information after a suitable confidentiality period.”

I understand and appreciate the need for a suitable confidentiality period, but it is really important that the samples and data collections are available publicly for the greater benefit of the sector as a whole, in terms of its future development of carbon capture and storage. Government new clause 14 has a fairly fierce title: “Prohibition on disclosure of information or samples by OGA”. It effectively prohibits disclosure except under slightly unclear circumstances set out in new schedule 1, which states that the material may nevertheless be published and put into the public domain, but there is no real definition of how that may be done.

Energy Bill [ Lords ] (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Andrew Bowie]

That is a good question. In fact, I was just coming to the process. The GDF siting process is a consent-based approach that requires a willing community to be a partner in the project’s development. The siting process is already under way. Four areas have entered the process: three areas in Cumberland—in Copeland and Allerdale—and one in East Lindsey in Lincolnshire.

Government amendment 120 removes superfluous wording in new section 3A of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965. A licensed disposal site, as defined for the purposes of the new section, is not a nuclear installation within the meaning given by section 26(1) of the Act, so does not need to be mentioned explicitly in subsection (3). The amendment therefore removes it from the clause to correct this error. Amendment 121 is consequential on amendment 120 and removes the unnecessary definition of a licensed disposal site from new section 3A of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965.

The UK’s nuclear decommissioning programme is accelerating as older nuclear sites approach the end of their life cycle. As the first major nuclear sites will reach their final stages of decommissioning in the 2030s, it is essential that our nuclear legal framework is fit for purpose, while continuing to ensure an absolute focus on safety and security as the key priority. The Nuclear Installations Act 1965, which provides such a framework for nuclear safety and nuclear third-party liability, was written before serious consideration was given to decommissioning.

Clause 257 will amend the procedures for exiting nuclear third-party liability. Currently, the 1965 Act has the effect of requiring nuclear sites to remain subject to nuclear third-party liability for longer than is required by internationally agreed standards. The clause implements an alternative route based on internationally agreed recommendations and will apply to nuclear installations in the process of being decommissioned. It adopts a simpler and equally safe route out of the NTPL regime for non-nuclear parts of the nuclear site, such as laboratories, workshops, offices, car parks and land.

Clause 257 changes procedures for ending nuclear licences and regulation by the Office for Nuclear Regulation. It will require the licensee to apply to the ONR to end the licence and will require the ONR to consult the Health and Safety Executive before accepting an application. The ONR will accept an application when it considers that all nuclear safety matters have been resolved. Once the licence has ended, the ONR’s regulation of the site will cease. HSE will pick up responsibility for regulating the health and safety of work activities, while the relevant environmental agency will continue to regulate environmental matters for years or even decades after the end of the nuclear licence.

The clause has the effect of removing a barrier to the on-site disposal of suitable low or very low-level radioactive waste and avoiding the unnecessary excavation and transport of this material. Demolition work results in the creation of large amounts of rubble and waste, a small percentage of which may be lightly contaminated with radioactivity. Excavating that material can create radioactive dust, which is a hazard for workers. Transporting waste to disposal facilities can have noise and traffic impacts for local residents.

The existing environmental legislation, which the clause does not modify, was developed with land remediation in mind. It allows the operator to apply to the relevant environmental agency for a permit to dispose of suitable low or very low-level radioactive waste on site. Applications are subject to robust analysis, and an environmental permit would be granted only if disposing of the waste on site would be a safer and more sustainable option than excavating it and transporting it to disposal facilities elsewhere.

Finally, the clause will allow operators to apply to the ONR to exclude those disposal facilities for nuclear waste that do not require a nuclear licence from the nuclear licensed site boundary. To be clear, the clause does not constitute a relaxation in the standards for public protection. It aligns with UK radiological protection law, international standards and UK Health Security Agency guidance.

Clause 258 will bring an international agreement on nuclear third-party liability into UK law. Its aim is to lower the financial and regulatory burden on low-risk radioactive waste disposal facilities. Sites that meet the criteria will be exempted from the requirement to make provision for third-party claims. Injuries or damages will instead be covered by ordinary civil law, which is robust, proportionate and established. The clause allows the Secretary of State to set out by regulation the conditions that must be met to be excluded from nuclear third-party liability under the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency’s criteria.

The clause includes limits for radioactivity concentration that disposal facilities must meet. Only facilities with sufficiently low concentrations of radioactivity and negligible nuclear risk will be exempted from the requirement to hold nuclear third-party liability. The measures will help to ensure that the UK has sufficient disposal facilities for low and very low-level waste as the decommissioning of the UK’s legacy facilities accelerates and new nuclear projects are developed.

Clause 259 gives effect to schedule 20, which amends the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 to enable UK accession to a second international nuclear third-party liability treaty called the convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage. Nuclear third-party liability regimes aim to ensure that victims of a nuclear incident have access to adequate compensation. They also support investor and supply chain confidence by channelling liability to the nuclear operator and placing limits on their liability. The UK already has a robust nuclear third-party liability regime, being party to the Paris and Brussels agreements. The schedule 20 amendments to the 1965 Act that enable UK accession to the CSC will enhance the existing UK regime. Accession to the CSC enhances several of the benefits of our current nuclear third-party liability regime.

Government amendments 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129 and 132 make minor and consequential changes to schedule 20 to ensure the accurate implementation of the CSC. They will ensure that, following accession to the CSC, the UK does not inadvertently close off routes to compensation for nuclear damage. That applies to countries and victims that are currently able to claim under our existing nuclear third-party liability regime. To establish that, they seek to remove unnecessary consequential amendments as a result of the further amendments tabled. The changes also ensure that victims from a non-nuclear CSC state can claim under the appropriate conventions.

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Dr Huq. It is also a pleasure to hear the Minister rattle through the Government amendments at really high speed. As he identified, this part of the Bill is about civil nuclear sites. Among other things, it is about the repository that we do not have at the moment—in other words, we have not yet found a repository. It would be helpful if the Minister were able to tell us where we are in that search. Does he think the clauses take that process further forward? Or do they impede or lengthen that search?

I am sure the Minister recalls that, some while ago, his party indicated that no new nuclear development would be signed off and authorised until a repository had been located and established. Now, of course, two civil nuclear sites are under active development. Hinkley C is under active development—the reactor core is in place and connected works are under way. I visited the site a little while ago and it really is in a very advanced state, so we can anticipate that nuclear power will come on stream in, I guess, about 2026. I have been guessing that it will come on stream every year since 2017, but we hope that will happen.

Advance discussions and some initial site works have been done for Sizewell C. The reactor that is going in is essentially the twin of the Hinkley C reactor, and a lot of the site works are being replicated to speed up that process a bit. I have not visited Sizewell C yet because—rather like in the story I told a while ago about the underground cable—there is not a great to deal to see at the minute, but we can anticipate that we will have four new nuclear reactors onstream by the early 2030s. All that is taking place alongside a process for a nuclear repository—a final solution for the issue of long-term nuclear waste.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

I appreciate that Sizewell B is already storing nuclear waste, and I understand that it is doing so quite effectively, although I have not actually been to see it. Obviously, Sizewell B is the newest nuclear power station in the fleet, even though it is not that new. The storage of newer nuclear waste is pretty good and, as the hon. Member rightly points out, the amount of nuclear waste is much lower than in, say, the old Magnox reactors. The issue of the storage of nuclear waste is largely about legacy waste, not new waste, but that is not to say that a fair amount of both high-level and low-level nuclear waste will not arise in the operation of new power stations—Sizewell C and Hinkley C—and, as is clear in the amendments that the Bill makes to nuclear legislation, there is still an obligation, upon full decommissioning, to ensure that there is no hazard whatever on the site from any radiation. That is quite a high bar. I am sure that is something we would all support.

Do the planners and organisers of new power stations—Hinkley C and Sizewell C—plan for on-site storage over the next period and for forms of disposal upon decommissioning that are not geological disposal sites, as a contingency in the event that we still do not have a geological disposal site when those plants are up and running? Or do they rely on the idea that there might be a geological site coming along, although we do not quite know when? We think it might be in the not-too-distant future, but we have not quite got there yet.

As the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun correctly points out, that creates quite a difficulty in planning contingency, when building a nuclear power station in the first instance, for decommissioning and the safe storage and disposal of waste nuclear material. I am not sure how that has been resolved in the protocols that have been agreed with the power stations that are under way at the moment, and nor am I exactly up to date with where we are on the geological disposal site. I think I am up to date to the extent that we have not actually found one yet and that, although we have offered favourable terms to several communities to host a nuclear geological disposal site, we have yet to receive support to get it under way.

It would help us to judge the clauses a little better to get a brief rundown of where we are in that process and what plans the Government have either to accelerate it or to determine it in the end, so that as we develop our new nuclear programme we can be reasonably certain that the protocols in place for disposal and decommissioning will be reliable in future. I would be grateful if the Minister would let the Committee know that information.

I have a query and concern of a rather different order about schedule 20. As the Minister said, schedule 20 is about accession to the convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage. That international convention, which eventually came into force in 2015, having been agreed, I think, in 1997, sets out the supplementary compensation for nuclear damage on an international tariff basis, so that there is consistency in how compensation is dealt with in the event of accidents or other problems at civil nuclear installations in different parts of the world. So far, so good—it is a good convention and it is important that we are part of it. Indeed, the schedule ensures that we are fully a part of that convention.

There is a bit of a puzzle here. The Government have inserted into the Nuclear Installations Act some proposed new subsections about

“further non-CSC-only claims to compensation”

and have denominated all those claims, and how the provisions about them work, in euros. That is in the Bill. Proposed new subsection (3BA), for example, states that

“the appropriate authority may be required to satisfy them up to the equivalent in sterling of 1,500 million euros”.

Proposed new subsection (3BB) states:

“To the extent that further non-CSC-only claims for compensation are CSC claims, the appropriate authority may be required to satisfy them up to the equivalent in sterling of the aggregate of 700 million euros”.

Proposed new subsection (3BC) states:

“To the extent that further non-CSC-only claims for compensation are both special relevant claims and CSC claims, the appropriate authority may be required to satisfy them up to the equivalent in sterling of the aggregate of 1,500 million euros”.

I do not know whether this is the secret explanation for why the then Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the right hon. Member for North East Somerset (Sir Jacob Rees-Mogg), withdrew the Bill during its passage through the Lords—because he thought that this was a plot to move against Brexit—but it is a bit odd that compensation is denominated in euros, when of course the rate is variable and we would be in a position to vary claims according to the relationship of sterling to euros. In any event, this is an international convention. Perhaps there is a simple explanation, which I hope the Minister has in front of him, but we are signed up to an international convention, not a European convention.

It may be—I do not know—that these measures are a hangover from our membership of Euratom, which we of course de-acceded from at the time of Brexit. It be that if we were a party to Euratom, Euratom would take the place of national membership of the convention and therefore everything would be denominated in euros, but of course we are not now a member of Euratom—we are our own actor, as far as various conventions relating to nuclear safety and activity are concerned—yet we are still denominating things in euros.

While I do not wish to amend the Bill so that we do not denominate claims in euros—I am concerned that the Minister’s career may be in jeopardy if he does not do the job of creating instruments that get us out of being in thrall to the EU and euros—I gently point out that it looks a bit odd. Is there an intention at any stage to regularise that procedure?

[Andrew Bowie]

The hon. Member’s concern for my career is welcome, and I thank him for expressing it in such kind terms. However, I reassure him and every person in this room—and, indeed, anybody else who might be following the proceedings—that the Government are not secretly taking us into the eurozone through accession to the CSC. It is not an EU treaty. The reason that the sums involved are denominated in euros is simply that the moneys referred to in the treaties that we are currently signed up to—the Paris convention and the Brussels supplementary convention—are expressed in euros. This is just a continuation of the same process. The CSC is an international convention, and we are therefore using the same denominations as in those other conventions. I am sure the hon. Member will be relieved to hear that there is no secret plot. The CSC, of course, is under the International Atomic Energy Agency.

[Dr Whitehead]

So the Minister can state that all signatory countries to the CSC denominate their compensation in euros, just the same as we do.

[Andrew Bowie]

I would think that those that are signatories to the Paris and Brussels conventions may. I am led to believe very strongly that it is not the case that all signatories denominate in euros, but we do, as a result of our current membership of the Paris and Brussels conventions.

[Dr Whitehead]

So we do not have to denominate these things in euros, because a number of signatories to the CSC do not, and presumably their membership of the CSC is not in jeopardy as a result. Presumably, we would have the opportunity not to use euro denomination, like those other members, but we nevertheless we do.

[Andrew Bowie]

I feel that we may be going round in circles. The Paris convention is a base convention. That is why there is carry-over into the new convention that we are acceding to—the CSC—to maintain the denomination in euros. However, I would suggest that those who are seeking compensation do not really care in which denomination their compensation is paid as long as they receive it in the end for any damage that is caused. I think we have spent quite enough time debating the denomination in which people will receive compensation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

I hope that my comments about the fact that we do not yet have a community that has said it will support a geological waste facility does not necessarily mean that there is not support for the facility to be sited in various parts of the country. It is just that, as I understand it, no authority has actually said, “Yes, we’re happy to have this facility in our area and we wish to proceed with it.” I assume that that is a factor in the question I was trying to get at: when can we expect a geological facility to be timetabled, developed and finally established, and to what extent does that timeline cohere in the context of the nuclear power stations that we are presently commissioning and will bring online in the future?

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question and for clarifying his earlier comments. As I said, we are at the beginning of the process of identifying a geological disposal facility. Surveys are under way. We are working with communities that have already expressed an interest and we will continue to do so as we move forward.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 256 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 257

Decommissioning of nuclear sites etc

Amendments made: 120, in clause 257, page 223, line 15, leave out

“or a licensed disposal site”.

This amendment corrects a minor and technical drafting error in new s.3A of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965: a licensed disposal site (as currently defined for the purposes of the new section) is not a nuclear installation (within the meaning given by s.26(1) of the Act) and so the carve out in subsection (3) is not necessary.

Amendment 121, in clause 257, page 224, leave out lines 5 to 8.—(Andrew Bowie.)

This amendment, consequential on Amendment 120, removes the unnecessary definition of “licensed disposal site” from new section 3A of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965.

Clause 257, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 258 and 259 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 20

Accession to Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage

Amendments made: 124, in schedule 20, page 374, line 9, leave out sub-paragraph (4).

This amendment and the Minister’s other amendments to Schedule 20 make minor and consequential changes to that Schedule to ensure accurate implementation of the CSC.

Amendment 125, in schedule 20, page 375, line 7, leave out

“, (3BA), (3BB), (3BC), (3BD) or (3BE)”

and insert

“or, in a case where the relevant reciprocating territory is also a CSC territory (as defined by section 16AA), (3BB)”.

See the Minister’s explanatory statement for Amendment 124.

Amendment 126, in schedule 20, page 377, line 4, at end insert—

“(c) a country mentioned in section 26(1B)(b),

(d) an overseas territory mentioned in section 26(1B)(c) or (d), or

(e) a relevant reciprocating territory.”

See the Minister’s explanatory statement for Amendment 124.

Amendment 132, in schedule 20, page 378, line 11, at end insert—

“(as amended or supplemented from time to time)”.

This amendment ensures that the definition of “the CSC” in Schedule 20 is to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage as amended or supplemented.

Amendment 127, in schedule 20, page 379, line 13, leave out

“In section 26 of the 1965 Act (interpretation),”

and insert—

“(1) Section 26 of the 1965 Act (interpretation) is amended as follows.

(2)”.

See the Minister’s explanatory statement for Amendment 124.

Amendment 128, in schedule 20, page 379, line 27, at end insert—

“(e) after the definition of ‘overseas territory’ insert—

‘“the Paris Convention” means the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964, by the Protocol of 16 November 1982 and by the Protocol of 12 February 2004;’.”

This amendment sets out a definition of the Paris Convention for the purposes of the amendments to the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 to which Amendment 129 relates.

Amendment 129, in schedule 20, page 379, line 27, at end insert—

“( ) In subsection (1A)(a)—

(a) in the opening words, for ‘a relevant international agreement’ substitute ‘the Paris Convention’;

(b) in sub-paragraph (i)—

(i) for ‘relevant international agreement’ (in each place it appears) substitute ‘Convention’;

(ii) for ‘agreement’ (in the third place it appears) substitute ‘Convention’;

(iii) for ‘agreement’s’ substitute ‘Convention’s’;

(c) in sub-paragraph (ii), for ‘relevant international agreement’ substitute ‘Convention’.”—(Andrew Bowie.)

See the Minister’s explanatory statement for Amendment 124.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

If we go to room Q, we will find out more, but civil nuclear constables are special police. They are recruited and trained in a different way, their responsibilities are different, and the activities they undertake are normally different. That gives rise to questions about whether civil nuclear constables can easily be transferred to other police authorities. I assume that the rental agreement would state whether they should undertake the ordinary activities that constables in comparable authorities undertake. Are they to be rented out on the basis that they will become ordinary police constables in a particular authority, or on the basis that they have special arrangements? They clearly will not have special arrangements concerning arresting people, so I imagine that the arrest rate of a police authority that had recruited police constables from the Civil Nuclear Constabulary for additional services would not go through the roof. Such constables are routinely armed, so there is also a question about whether they would be disarmed for the purpose of undertaking their duties in other police forces.

The answers to such questions do not appear in the clauses before us. There is just an arrangement that police constables can be rented out, that compensation can be paid for them, that the Secretary of State can intervene if he or she thinks there are problems, and that the police authority has to be consulted about renting out and, as it were, de-renting—that is all that the clauses cover.

I do not necessarily imagine that our amendments will be pursued to a great extent, but I would very much like to hear the Minister’s response to what they are trying to do. On the renting out of police, amendment 162 would clarify that

“the provision of the additional police services in question is within the competence and in accordance with the usual operational practices of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary”.

That is, those police who are rented out are not to be turned into ordinary police, and the circumstances of the renting out should be within the competence of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, so we should not reasonably expect them to turn out to be ordinary policemen in other police authorities.

Also, we want the Civil Nuclear Police Authority to be rather more involved in decisions as to whether to continue renting out, so amendment 163 would add the words “or the Police Authority” after “Secretary of State”. We are trying to tighten up both the concept and the practice of these arrangements, to ensure that there is respect for the fact that the Civil Nuclear Constabulary is a specialist service, with staff who have special skills, qualities and qualifications that may differ from those of police in other forces. Renting-out arrangements should respect that. We should be a little careful to ensure that we do not put a square peg in a round hole through this renting out, even though there may be circumstances where a freer interchange of police between the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and county police forces could take place, and would benefit both sides.

I appreciate that clauses 260 to 263 to some extent supply what was left out from the Energy Act 2004, in which the Civil Nuclear Constabulary was defined, but I am not sure that the clauses do the job completely, and make sure that the strengths and qualities of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary are properly reflected in any renting-out arrangement, and that its constables are not expected to do things for which they are not trained, or in which they do not have experience, if they are seconded to other constabularies.

[Andrew Bowie]

First, as the Civil Nuclear Constabulary will be in room Q, Portcullis House, at midday today, at a meeting hosted by my hon. Friend the Member for Workington, I pay tribute to all the officers and staff who serve so diligently in that constabulary. I had a very enjoyable and informative meeting with Chief Constable Simon Chesterman and the chairman of the Civil Nuclear Police Authority, Susan Johnson, a couple of weeks ago. The constabulary serves this country and does incredibly important work protecting our civil nuclear fleet. It is incredibly well trained for that.

The hon. Member for Southampton, Test, referred to “ordinary” policing. Yes, Civil Nuclear Constabulary officers are highly trained in armed policing, and in the specialties that they have to be trained in to carry out their job, but they are also trained in what he described as ordinary—unarmed—policing, and are held to stringent College of Policing standards, such as those set out in the authorised professional practice armed policing guidance. That is consistent across the organisation, regardless of which site an officer is deployed to, and that would remain the case if there was any expansion of the constabulary’s services.

The Secretary of State must consult the chief constable before providing consent to the constabulary providing additional services. That ensures that the views of the person who is arguably best placed to assess competence and operational arrangements is taken into consideration. Should the CNC take on additional responsibilities outside the civil nuclear sector—we have been talking about that today—the chief constable will be responsible for ensuring that any additional training requirements are identified and delivered. I hope that addresses the concerns of the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, on that point.

The Civil Nuclear Constabulary is a crucial component of our civil nuclear security system, as the specialist armed police force dedicated to the protection of our most sensitive civil nuclear facilities, and of civil nuclear material in transit. In the evolving national security and energy landscape, we want to ensure that we are making the best use of our resources to protect the UK’s essential services and critical national infrastructure, as well as our wider national security interests.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

The Minister addressed the overall subject of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary well, but I do not think that he entirely addressed our questions, which were not about the competency of the constabulary, or its establishment or function. Our questions were about the new provision that the Government are seeking to introduce regarding the extent to which police personnel could perform a wider function, depending on circumstances in the Civil Nuclear Constabulary.

By the way—this may be a reasonable topic for discussion in a drop-in—I would not like the Civil Nuclear Constabulary to be assumed to be an ancillary police force with some special responsibilities. It is clearly a very specialised and highly trained police force with a particular set of duties. By and large, it should have the necessary number of police constables to perform its duties. If over time—this may be something for the Department to consider, since it has special responsibility for the constabulary—the general conclusion is reached that this is a police force to which, to put it a bit unpleasantly, other forces can help themselves when they are in periods of stress, that would not be very good for the future of the constabulary.

There is another alternative. As the Minister mentioned, the police authority has to carry out three-year reviews. If during those reviews it is thought that substantial numbers of the police force had been rented out over the review period, there may be a temptation for a future Secretary of State—not present Ministers; I am sure they have a very close eye on what the Civil Nuclear Constabulary is doing and how it carries out its role—to say, “The Civil Nuclear Constabulary does not need all these people. Let’s reduce its size. Let’s cut it down to a smaller number, because that will do for its operations—we can see that it is renting out quite a lot of its force for other purposes.” That would be a retrograde step.

The Minister prayed in aid, as a reason not to pass the amendment, proposed new section 55A(4)(c) of the Energy Act 2004, in which the Secretary of State must judge that

“it is reasonable in all the circumstances for the Constabulary to provide those services.”

That is a bit of a problematic, I would have thought; how do we judge what is

“reasonable in all the circumstances”?

For that to apply, the officers must be “surplus to requirements”, but most reasonable judgments would be, “Well, they are not surplus to requirements. They are a key part of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and they are doing a good job.” I would therefore expect that there would be a fairly high bar as to what was

“reasonable in all the circumstances”,

but that is not defined. Our amendment attempts to define that effectively, by saying that the release of these officers would be

“within the competence and in accordance with the usual operational activities of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary.”

We do not want to press the amendments to a vote, but I would like the Minister to give some assurance on the record that the

“reasonable in all the circumstances”

judgment would, in practice, be a full and close partner to the definition we attempted to apply to the leasing arrangement through amendment 162. Unless that is stated on the record, we will worry about the temptation to play fast and loose with the Civil Nuclear Constabulary when there are pressures elsewhere.

[Andrew Bowie]

To clarify, the expansion of the CNC will not in any way affect the CNC’s core mission. We are absolutely not playing fast and loose with the Civil Nuclear Constabulary. The CNC’s priority and core function will remain the protection of civil nuclear sites and material, in line with the UK’s international obligations. Before granting consent for the CNC to take on additional services, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the CNC’s core nuclear supervision will not be prejudiced in any way. This legislation includes an ongoing statutory duty for the CNC’s chief constable to ensure that that remains the case. I hope the hon. Member will withdraw his amendment on that basis.

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[Andrew Bowie]

The hon. Gentleman heard my answer to that very point. I do not think I need to labour it much more.

[Dr Whitehead]

Is the Minister saying that we should have access to those supplies in order to back the system up? And by the way, I do not think that tripping out, which came up a little while ago, was just about coal.

[Dr Whitehead]

It was a gas turbine that tripped out. It was not about coal, as far as I understand.

Is the Minister saying that we should have access to those supplies until, but not after, 2024? We will not have anywhere to burn them after 2024 because the intention is to have phased out coal by then. What exactly is the Minister saying? By the way, coal is unlikely to be burned in a UK power establishment in the future, if such establishments survive.

[Andrew Bowie]

This is the Energy Bill, so I understand why the focus has been on energy and energy security. However, coal is not just required for energy purposes, and that is another reason why we will vote against the clause.

Energy Bill [ Lords ] (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Thursday 15th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Andrew Bowie]

The clause amends existing powers to allow for the making of a charging scheme in respect of decommissioning functions, under part 4 of the Petroleum Act 1998, to charge for regulating decommissioning of offshore oil and gas. The decommissioning of offshore oil and gas installations and pipelines on the United Kingdom continental shelf, or UKCS, is regulated through the 1998 Act, and the responsibility for ensuring that the requirements of that Act are complied with rests with my Department.

Owners of oil and gas installations and pipelines are required to decommission their offshore infrastructure at the end of a field’s economic life. The current powers allow us to charge for regulating offshore oil and gas decommissioning activity at only two fixed points in the regulatory process. The existing charging framework is no longer fit for purpose. Currently, the Government are unable to recover the full costs of undertaking the regulatory functions from industry, leaving the taxpayer liable for the shortfall. Furthermore, the current regime is too inflexible and will be unable to recover the full costs of decommissioning the offshore carbon storage infrastructure of the project.

Clause 253 will amend the 1998 Act to allow for the establishment of a new charging regime for activity related to the regulatory functions for the decommissioning of offshore oil and gas installations. The clause will also make amendments to future-proof the cost recovery mechanism in line with the “polluter pays” principle of environmental law, as already established. Maximising our cost recovery will enable us to ensure a sufficiently resourced regulator. That will ensure that we do not cause the industry to delay decommissioning projects, which would adversely affect the industry’s contributions to reducing emissions and achieving their net zero ambitions.

Further details of the new charging regime, including how it works and what rates will be charged, will be set out in the scheme itself, which will be established administratively and then published. The charging scheme is intended to be in line with other charging schemes operating for complex regulatory functions within my Department and elsewhere across the Government.

[Dr Whitehead]

I have a question on clause 253, which makes provision for decommissioning where, clearly, the decommissioning of new forms of offshore installation cannot be undertaken. When the well is exhausted—obviously there is not a well to exhaust under these circumstances—the decommissioning has to be under other circumstances. An example would be when the carbon capture and storage site has been agreed to be full, and is capped off.

On traditional oil and gas decommissioning, there are provisions for sanctions on companies that have responsibility for decommissioning but do not actually carry out the decommissioning. Does that carry across to the new forms of offshore activity? Or should there be legislation to ensure that when someone is up for decommissioning, they really do it and do not abdicate their responsibility? That is not just a question of charging; it is a question of responsibility for the future.

[Andrew Bowie]

In answer to the hon. Gentleman’s important question, it is the intention, through this regulation and the existing regulations, that those who are responsible follow through with their commitments to decommission—the “polluter pays” principle has been well established. Nothing in this regulation would stand in the way of that. Nor, we hope, would it put barriers in the way of that. What the regulation seeks to achieve is a new updated charging regime to enable the decommissioning to take place in such a way and in such a fashion that it does not leave the taxpayer liable for any shortfall from the operator who is liable for the decommissioning of an asset in the North sea.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 253 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 254

Model clauses of petroleum licence

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

Currently, the North Sea Transition Authority can only retrospectively challenge a change in control of a petroleum production licence. Clause 254 will allow the NSTA to consider a proposed change of control of a petroleum production licensee before it takes place, to ensure that the governance, technical and financial capability of a licensee in possession of a such a licence remains appropriate.

Companies that wish to drill and extract petroleum must do so under a petroleum production licence granted by the NSTA to the licensee under the Petroleum Act 1998. Prior to issuing these licences, the NSTA satisfies itself that the prospective licensee company and any parent company are fit to hold the licence and will meet their obligations.

At times during the life of a licence it may be the case that the ownership and control of a licensee should pass to a new parent company or person. An undesirable change of control could undermine investor confidence in the commercial environment, making the United Kingdom continental shelf a less attractive place for investment. The NSTA is currently able to take remedial action to a change of control of a licence holder only after such a change has occurred. This is seen by both the NSTA and industry as being inefficient and of limited effectiveness in preventing harms, both to wider industry and the Government.

Clause 254 sets out the amendments that schedule 19 will make to the model clauses in the Petroleum Licensing (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations 2008 and the Petroleum Licensing (Exploration and Production) (Landward Areas) Regulations 2014. The changes will introduce new before-the-event powers for the NSTA regarding the change of control of a licensee in possession of current and future seaward or landward petroleum production licences. The clause also sets out how provisions inserted into a petroleum production licence by schedule 19 may be altered or deleted.

Schedule 19 amends existing legislation to replace the current after-the-event powers in relation to a change of control of petroleum production licensees with powers intended to apply before a change of control has taken place. The schedule has a similar effect to that which schedule 6 has in relation to carbon storage licensees.

The schedule will introduce a requirement for licensees to apply in writing to the NSTA for consent to a change of control at least three months before the planned date of the change. Following receipt of an application, the NSTA may give unconditional or conditional consent, or refuse consent to the proposal. Conditions imposed may be financial and/or relate to the timing of the change of control and/or relate to the performance of activities permitted by the licence.

In the case of conditional consent or refusal, the NSTA must give the licensee the opportunity to make representations and must consider those representations. The NSTA must decide an application within three months of receiving it, unless it writes to interested parties to notify them of a delay in its decision making. The NSTA’s decision on an application and any conditions must be given in writing.

The schedule also introduces amendments in respect of the NSTA’s powers of revocation and partial revocation of a licence, intended to replace the existing after-the-event powers with before-the-event powers. The NSTA will be able to revoke a licence if its prior consent has not been obtained for a change of control. The NSTA will therefore be able to regulate the suitability of petroleum production licensees in a more robust and timely manner. This will reduce risk and boost confidence in a sector that will play a key part in helping the UK to achieve its net zero goals.

Clause 255 introduces information-gathering powers in relation to a change or potential change of control of a petroleum production licensee in the same way that clause 101 does for carbon storage licensees. Currently, the NSTA does not have information-gathering powers to assist it in considering a change of control in respect of a petroleum production licensee. In some instances, the NSTA is therefore limited in conducting proper due diligence to determine whether a change of control of a licensee is undesirable.

Clause 255 will allow the NSTA to request that a relevant company or person provide it with any information it may require in exercising its functions in relation to a change or potential change of control of a licensee. The information will help the NSTA to consider the financial and technical capability, operational and commercial plans, and governance and fitness of the licensee in relation to its proposed controlling entity. This will provide the NSTA with the necessary information to appropriately consider an application for consent, or when considering whether to revoke a licence where a change of control has occurred without consent.

Information that would be protected from disclosure or production in legal proceedings on grounds of legal professional privilege or, in Scotland, confidentiality of communications is not included under clause 255.

[Dr Whitehead]

I do not have much to say about the detail of the clauses, inasmuch as they appear to be sensible measures, but I gently point out to the Minister that when he presented the clauses he referred repeatedly to the NSTA as the authority, but of course the NSTA does not exist other than as a trading name. Indeed, clause 254 specifically mentions the Oil and Gas Authority, which is of course the real name of the organisation, as opposed to its trading name. We will come to that later in our deliberations, but I highlight to the Minister that issue or problem, which may be germane to his thoughts when we get to that discussion. Other than that, I have no issue with the substance of the clauses.

Energy Bill [ Lords ] (Tenth sitting)

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Thursday 15th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero (Andrew Bowie)]

It is a pleasure to serve yet again under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. The clause—the final clause in part 10—simply sets out the interpretation of terms used in the clauses on the energy savings opportunity scheme, which we discussed at length on Tuesday. It also explains where provisions fall within devolved competence for the purposes of this part of the Bill.

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

Welcome to the Chair again, Dr Huq; it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. The clause concerns just the interpretation of previous clauses—I am sure that they are great interpretations and will go down in history as such—and I have no comments on it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 221 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 222

General objective

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 223 stand part.

[Andrew Bowie]

The clause marks the start of part 11, which concerns core fuel sector resilience. By “core fuels” we mean the essential liquid and gaseous fuels used for transport and other purposes, whether derived from crude oil or renewable transport fuels.

Ensuring resilience and security of supply for such fuels has become even more critical given the change that we are experiencing in the energy sector globally. Although renewable technologies are making inroads—electric cars, for example, are of growing importance—core fuels still account for more than 95% of the energy used for transport, and over 1.5 million households use heating oil or liquefied petroleum gas for heating. The Government are determined to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels, but that will take time, and it will be a challenging time for the industry.

Analysis by His Majesty’s Government has shown that there are already single points of failure in the fuel system that are critical to regional fuel supply, and those risks require better management. Recent events, such as covid-19, the tanker driver shortages of 2021 and protest activities at oil terminals, have demonstrated the level of risk to fuel supplies. It is therefore a responsible approach for the Government to take powers to ensure that fuel supplies remain secure.

Existing powers are available to Ministers under the Energy Act 1976; however, those are essentially reactive and may be used only when a disruption to fuel supplies is an actual or threatened emergency. The purpose of these measures is to enable us to mitigate risks before they develop into actual disruptions to supply.

Risk management is at the heart of these measures. Not all risks can be eliminated, but a resilient system is more likely to withstand shocks and to recover from them faster. The Government seek to strengthen the resilience of the sector, now and through the net zero transition, and to proactively minimise and address risks that could cause disruption to the supply of fuel.

Clause 223 provides clarification on the scope of the powers and who they can be applied to. The intention is to cover all the critical operators in the supply chain for core fuels, including refiners, infrastructure operators, suppliers, hauliers and wholesalers. The clause sets out which products are considered core fuels, including conventional transport fuels from oil—such as petrol, diesel and jet—heating oil, liquefied petroleum gas and renewable transport fuels.

[Dr Whitehead]

We have reached an important part of the Bill, concerning core fuel sector resilience. As the Minister stated, we need to ensure that our core fuel supplies are not cut or interrupted by external circumstances, that we have resilience in our supplies, and that we can be assured at all times that petroleum and so on is getting to and from refineries, and to where it is supposed to go. The Minister has reflected already on past disruption to fuel supplies, which hon. Members will recall. It is understandable that we wish to be assured that supplies are secure.

The Minister also stated that we have powers already to ensure that, where disruption takes place, action can be taken to secure resilience. However, these measures on the principle of core fuel resilience go further than that. As the Minister says, this is about trying to anticipate potential disruption and problems as far as core fuel sector resilience is concerned, and then providing the Government with powers to respond proactively, rather than reactively, to the anticipated issues.

I suggest that one needs to be very careful in how one drafts something for that purpose. I assume that what we do not want, although perhaps the Government do, is to get into the situation in the film “Minority Report”, quite a while ago, in which the lead actor, who happens to be Tom Cruise—not that I regularly watch Tom Cruise films—

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

I do not want to stray into Captain Mainwaring and Lance Corporal Jones territory, but I think we have been delving into the realms of fantasy. Just for the record, I should state that Tom Cruise is a fine actor and director. The “Top Gun” films, the “Mission: Impossible” series, “Jerry Maguire” and “Minority Report” are all excellent films that I enjoy watching, and Tom Cruise does a very good job acting in them.

The hon. Gentleman is right to mention the existing powers, but those are reactive; we are seeking to be proactive in order to mitigate the risk to the supply of fuel. Some of us—I was still at school—remember the fuel crisis of 1999 under the last Labour Government. Of course, we would not like to see anything like that happen again. There have been disruptions more recently, and we need to take action to mitigate them.

The power in part 11 allows the Government to regulate the sector, but the intention is to have an effective power to preserve fuel supply for end users. A narrower power would risk missing the next unexpected event, and we would end up with an extensive list of possible risks and actions, which we do not want. The hon. Gentleman is right to say that, in most circumstances, the sector acts voluntarily. However, we must remember that such companies are commercial entities and will always act in their interest. Therefore, it is the Government’s role to ensure that there is a protection in place nationally to support the supply of fuel and ensure that this essential service continues for the British people.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 222 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 223 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 224

Directions to particular core fuel sector participants

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 116, in clause 224, page 191, line 17, at end insert—

“(9) The Secretary of State may not issue directions to core fuel sector participants that are in contravention of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.”

This amendment sets in legislation the need for the Secretary of State to act in accordance with the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 when dealing with core fuel sector participants.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Industry participants would be companies, the industry as a whole, trade union bodies and so on. They are absolutely part of the entire process and, of course, if any of them had an issue with the direction being issued, they would have the right to appeal such a decision.

Clause 224 gives the Secretary of State the power to issue directions for the purpose of maintaining or improving core fuel resilience or to recover from or reduce the risk of a disruption to continuity of core fuel supplies. The past few years have demonstrated that the resilience of the core fuel sector needs to improve significantly. We have seen queues at pumps and stock-outs at petrol stations more often than we should. The supply of fuel remains critical to the operation of the country’s economy and essential services.

The individual companies in the supply chain are flexible and manage their own risks. In extreme cases that are out of these companies’ control, it is likely that they can declare force majeure, meaning that because of the extenuating circumstance, they will not be held liable for their failure to perform contractual obligations. It is therefore crucial that the Government have the power to direct key players in the sector to take actions necessary to manage the risk of disruption to fuel supply that could arise.

The clause gives the Secretary of State the power to issue a person carrying on core fuel sector activities, or a facility owner in the core fuel supply sector, with a direction in three different circumstances. The first is to maintain or improve resilience. It is important to note that this power can be used only if the Secretary of State considers that insufficient progress has been made by the proposed recipient to take the steps necessary to address the issue.

A direction can also be issued to restore continuity of supply or to reduce a significant risk of disruption to supplies. Such directions can be issued without waiting for the sector to make progress voluntarily, given the impact that a disruption or significant risk might have on the public. A direction will be issued only if circumstances mean that it is not practicable to make regulations. That could be because of the urgency of the issue or because of the number of cases—if they are not sufficiently numerous to justify making regulations.

A direction can be issued only to persons carrying on core fuel sector activities in the course of a business with capacity in excess of 500,000 tonnes or to a facility owner if the facility has capacity in excess of 20,000 tonnes. That will cover refineries, terminals, pipeline operators and hauliers when a disruption associated with an individual company could have a significant impact on the continuity of supply of core fuels in our United Kingdom. The direction might be to take an action or to stop the recipient doing something that could have an adverse impact on the resilience of the sector. There is a requirement to provide written notice to the recipient and the reason for the direction, so the sector should be reassured that the recipient will be duly informed and will have the opportunity to make representations regarding such a decision.

The power is designed to cover a broad range of scenarios, because the range of conceivable risks is wide and inevitably uncertain. For that reason, we are unable to provide guidance as to the circumstances in which the power will be used. However, I emphasise that His Majesty’s Government intend to work with industry on a voluntary basis whenever possible and that the power can be considered as only a backstop power where a voluntary approach is not effective.

Clause 225 sets out the procedure to be followed before issuing a direction. The recipient of the direction must be given a written notice that sets out the proposed direction, the reason why the direction is being issued and when the direction is intended to come into effect. They will also get an opportunity to make written representations in respect of the proposed direction.

Given that directions will relate to sites covered by regulations for the control of major accident hazards, it is also appropriate that the relevant competent authorities —such as, in England, the Health and Safety Executive and the Environment Agency—are consulted to ensure that the direction does not inadvertently compromise safety. There is also provision to consult other persons whom the Secretary of State deems appropriate. The Secretary of State will consider any representations from the recipients, or those authorities, when deciding whether to issue the direction.

Clause 226 sets out the consequences for failing to comply with a direction. There could be severe impacts to the security of supply if there is non-compliance. It is therefore essential that there are criminal as well as civil sanctions to deter businesses from failing to comply. The offences set out in this clause are criminal offences and they serve as a deterrent measure so that they can provide credibility to the direction power.

The clause sets out both summary and indictable offences for either imprisonment or a fine, or both. The severity of the offence will determine whether it will be a summary conviction or a conviction on indictment. There has always been a history of compliance in the sector. Our hope is that the provisions will be a strong deterrent to future non-compliance and that businesses will realise that it is cheaper and more responsible to comply.

[Dr Whitehead]

I put what I hoped was a fairly reasoned case for amendment 116. I understand what the Minister has said about the circumstances in which directions would be given and the aim of working on a voluntary and collegiate basis with the industry and ensuring that things proceed, as far as possible, on a voluntary basis. However, the circumstances about which we are talking may tempt the Government to remove themselves from that principle. The Minister may say that is his aim, but I always think that we have to legislate for the worst circumstances, not the best.

It would be a good idea to have the requirement in the amendment in the part of the Bill that talks about directions. I am not particularly satisfied by what the Minister has said about how the clause will work generally and would like a Division on the amendment, because we want it on the record that we think it is important. It is not because we wish to undermine the Bill’s progress in any way, but the amendment relates particularly to what the Minister said about the circumstances under which he thinks directions should or should not be made. We may discuss some of those things in the debates on other clauses as they come up, but at this point I wish to press the amendment to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Clause 228 introduces a power for the Secretary of State to require information from individuals or companies in the core fuels supply sector. It will enable the Government to have an accurate picture regarding the resilience of the sector.

Currently, the Government rely on the sector to voluntarily provide the information necessary to assess, mitigate and respond to any disruption to the core fuels sector. Although most companies comply with requests, some do so only partially and there is a lack of consistency in the quality of some information collected. There is a risk that that leaves the Government unprepared and unable to assess a situation that might impact security of supply.

Clause 228 will apply to operators with throughput in excess of 1,000 tonnes, which encompasses the majority of key sector players. The type of information requested can vary given the circumstances. It may include information around site infrastructure, operations, supply capacity and volume supplied.

The notice to require information specifies the way that the information must be provided, ensuring that the quality of information provided is consistent. The Secretary of State must notify the proposed recipient of the notice in advance to allow them to make representations, and must consider any such representations before deciding whether to issue such a notice.

Clause 229 places a duty to report a notifiable incident and outlines a clear protocol for businesses to inform the Government, should they identify or suspect a potential risk of disruption. It is expected that businesses should be required to report only a notifiable incident relating to an incident that disrupts or causes failure to—or, indeed, creates a significant risk of the same—the continuity of supply of core fuels.

Guidance is currently being developed, following engagement with industry representatives, to set out the parameters for incident reporting. Examples of the sorts of incidents or risks that might be included are physical and operational issues with infrastructure, industrial action and insolvency. The duty is imposed on core fuel sector players with throughput in excess of 500,000 tonnes, such as refineries, major oil terminals and oil hauliers, but that list can be expanded through regulations.

Clause 229 also permits the Secretary of State to seek further information from the person who has reported the incident. That will aid the Government in identifying supply issues before they develop into emergency situations and in taking appropriate action when necessary. The Secretary of State must notify the proposed recipient of the notice in advance to allow them to make representations and must consider any such representations before deciding whether to issue a notice.

Clause 230 creates an offence where there has been a failure to comply with the requirement to provide information when notice has been given to do so. It also creates an offence when there has been a failure to report incidents and a failure to provide further information about a reported incident on request. The Secretary of State has the right to request information from the sector by written notice for the purpose of ensuring resilience. Failure to comply with those requirements without reasonable excuse means that an offence has been committed. Similarly to clause 226, the offences are criminal offences and are designed to act as a deterrent.

Clause 231 allows the Secretary of State by regulation to require information to be provided at specified intervals. The Government currently conduct periodic reviews of resilience in the system through a voluntary approach. The current reporting scheme does not provide sufficiently detailed information to allow the Government to understand fully the risks and capabilities of the sector, and the voluntary nature of the approach carries the risk that the industry could stop providing the information needed at any time, without notice.

The provision of information at specified intervals—for example, annually—will allow the Government to monitor the supply chain, anticipate pinch points in the system and identify any potential issues. The information provided will then be used by the Government to better monitor resilience and to support decision making in relation to determining whether further action, such as issuing a direction, should be taken. Much like other clauses in this part, there are powers to create criminal offences relating to non-compliance with any regulations.

Clause 232 sets out the circumstances in which the Secretary of State may disclose information provided under clauses 228, 229 or 231 to any Government Department or devolved Administration for the purposes of maintaining sector resilience or restoring a disrupted supply, or, if necessary, for the purpose of a criminal proceeding. The clause does not give the Government the right to contravene the Data Protection Act or certain limits under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.

Clause 233 sets out that His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs has the power to disclose information to the Secretary of State solely for the purpose of facilitating the Secretary of State’s functions relating to core fuel sector resilience. HMRC currently collects data from core fuels operators on the volume of fuel sold to customers, which provides information on their market share and is important in the assessment of their resilience. The power would allow HMRC to disclose that information when needed for the purpose set out in the clause. That will help to ensure that the Department has a robust and reliable understanding of the state of fuel supply and resilience across the sector and can take appropriate action if needed.

The power is important in ensuring that the Government do not seek the same information from the sector twice, and helps to reduce any administrative burden imposed by His Majesty’s Government. It is also worth noting that protections are in place to prevent the disclosure of information if it breaches provisions under Data Protection Act and certain parts of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Dr Whitehead]

I have no further comments on the clauses; we are happy for them to proceed.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 228 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 229 to 233 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 234

Appeal against notice or direction

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

The clause sets out the appeal options available to a person who has been issued with either a notice under clause 224 or, under clauses 228 and 229 respectively, a notice to provide information or a notice to provide further information about a reported incident. I commend the clause to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

I am a little puzzled by what the Minister has said previously about the extent to which there has been consultation and discussion with industry and employers in this area. The Committee needs to be clear that he is now advocating Ministers undertaking enforcement of directions that, as we have discussed, apparently have sanctions, certainly for conviction on indictment, of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years—or 12 months in Scotland and six months in Northern Ireland, given the respective general limits in magistrates courts.

In other words, we are discussing sanctions on employers—one might say that is an interesting turnaround from sanctions on employees—that could lead to their being imprisoned for a time. That appears to be disproportionate to what is suggested as far as enforcement undertakings are concerned, in particular in view of the arrangements that we have already agreed on regarding the circumstances of a direction and the situation that an employer may or may not find him or herself in as far as trying to comply with those directions is concerned.

Certainly, were I an employer or a company engaged in this area, I might well say to the Minister or the Secretary of State: “Yes, we understand that you may be placing on us particular actions in relation to anticipated disruption, but we would be pretty unhappy if failure to comply with a direction, which might not be entirely in our own hands as a company, could result in us as the directors going to prison for two years.” I would not like that to be a consideration were I a director of such a company.

I am therefore a little surprised, because either those companies have perhaps not read the detail of the Bill—although this bit has been around long enough—or the Government simply have not drawn their attention to it, or consulted them, or discussed the circumstances under which such exist. Have the Government just conjured up these important undertakings and the penalties attached to them as a list in the Bill, or was it the result of iterative discussions with the industry as to what is and is not proportionate for the industry?

[Andrew Bowie]

I do not wish to go over the same ground in too much detail, but a consultation took place in 2017 and an open discussion and debate continues with the industry on this and many other issues. I know the hon. Gentleman speaks with the best of intentions, but he did mention the detail of the Bill, and it is in that detail that there is a choice to enforce either criminal offences or civil sanctions. In many cases, it is in the interests of both parties and the public to use civil penalties to guarantee enforcement, and that would be appropriate. However, there will be cases in which criminal offences are better for enforcement. The Department will consult on guidance and sanctions, which are also subject to parliamentary scrutiny after Royal Assent, so we will have another chance to debate this. The best way to avoid a sanction or, indeed, going to prison is not to break the law.

[Dr Whitehead]

That’s what Tom Cruise says. [Laughter.]

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 239 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 18 agreed to.

Clause 240

Guidance: criminal and civil sanctions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 241 stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

I hear what the Minister says. It is certainly a balanced approach that the power should be used only in exceptional circumstances, and is not a general bail-out or financial handout. I still have some residual concerns about the way the clause was originally worded. As a result of the amendment, it is to be worded marginally differently. The explanatory statement states that the amendment

“does not alter the substantive effect of clause 242(1).”

I am reminded of the following statement by an analytical philosopher whose name escapes me:

“A difference which makes no difference is no difference at all.”

I did not get a clear answer when we talked about clauses 103 and 134. The Minister moved an amendment to clause 103 to take out the words

“out of money provided by Parliament”,

leaving the clause to state that financial assistance may be provided in general. Is there a difference to clause 242 as a result of this similar amendment? If the Government may draw on moneys that have not been provided by Parliament for the purpose of financial assistance, where are they likely to come from, and what controls would Parliament have?

The present wording of clause 242 provides control, inasmuch as if moneys are provided by Parliament, Parliament has the ability to scrutinise and account for them. If removing that element of the clause gives rise to moneys provided not by Parliament but by, say, the Government of Kazakhstan, might that not worry us a little, or is there no need to worry because the Government’s ability to raise money by non-parliamentary means is tempered by other things?

[Andrew Bowie]

There is absolutely nothing for the hon. Gentleman to worry about. That is what I say in response to his question on parliamentary oversight and ensuring that there is scrutiny of where the money comes from. We are currently in the process of agreeing a protocol with the Energy Security and Net Zero Committee. We propose that the Secretary of State will write to the Chair of the Committee to notify them of instances where the Department has provided financial assistance under the power, so there will be parliamentary scrutiny throughout the process. I am reliably informed that this is a consistent point with respect to Bill drafting.

Amendment 22 agreed to.

Clause 242, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 243

Power to amend thresholds

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

The clause contains a power for the Secretary of State to amend or modify the threshold for capacity in excess of which these measures can be applied. Capacity refers to the tonnage of oil that the operator has handled in the previous calendar year. This would not change the person to whom the powers under this part could apply.

The core fuel sector is dynamic, and our net zero goals may change the landscape of the sector in the future. We therefore need to future-proof the legislation to account for potential changes that may occur in the sector such that the thresholds may need to be changed over time. It is important to stress that any regulations made under the power are subject to the affirmative procedure.

[Dr Whitehead]

I have no particular comments on the clause, although my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol East has reminded me that the philosopher was William James.

[The Chair]

Fastest finger first—Kerry McCarthy.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 243 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 244

Interpretation of Part 11

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

The clause identifies several key terms that are used throughout part 11, and lets readers know which sections contain the corresponding definitions. It is therefore intended solely as an aid in interpretation.

[Dr Whitehead]

I have no comments other than that the word “anything” does not appear in the definitions. That is a minor observation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 244 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Joy Morrissey.)

Energy Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Whitehead]

Further to that point of order, Ms Nokes. I thank the right hon. Member for Elmet and Rothwell for his point of order, which related to mine. Far be it for me to downplay his importance in proceedings but, although he is quite right, the material difference is that I was quoting what the Secretary of State said, even though the right hon. Gentleman was clearly well informed in what he said to the Committee.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero (Andrew Bowie)]

Further to that point of order, Ms Nokes. I said in Committee at the time, in response to contributions from the hon. Member for Southampton, Test and other right hon. and hon. Members, including on the Government Benches, that we are listening and carefully considering the situation regarding that specific clause. We are listening to all the concerns raised in Committee, on the Floor of the House on Second Reading and in the other place. I gave that commitment in this Committee and see nothing that contradicts that in what the Secretary of State said to Politico this morning.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

It is an absolute pleasure to serve once again under your chairmanship, Ms Nokes. I thank the hon. Member for Southampton, Test for his amendments; he is of course right to consider the security impacts of load control devices. We share his concern that grid security should be protected, which is why I am happy to reassure him that we have already spent considerable time preparing means to manage the risks associated with hostile actors and the transformation of our energy system.

The outcome of our recent consultation on delivering a smart and secure electricity system confirmed our intent to regulate all organisations that remotely control large electrical loads, using the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018, or the NIS regulations. Under those regulations, load controllers would be required to take appropriate and proportionate security measures to manage risks to their network and information systems. They would also be required to report to the relevant authority incidents that disrupt the continuity of services and take action to rectify those incidents.

The application of the NIS regulations in the energy sector in Great Britain is based on outcome-focused principles, using the cyber assessment framework developed by the National Cyber Security Centre. This approach focuses on proportionate risk management. Moreover, the licensable activities established through the powers in the Bill could impose security requirements on those organisations within its scope. The licence would complement our separate enhancements to the NIS regulations made through the Bill.

Finally, the National Security and Investment Act 2021 includes a broad range of powers enabling the Secretary of State to intervene in transactions that give rise to national security concerns. That includes the power to scrutinise transactions based on national security risks for electricity purposes. That incorporates acquisition of ownership of load controllers, who control electricity on behalf of their customers. On that basis, a power to direct a load controller on national security grounds, which new clause 40 would introduce, would be excessive in comparison with the rest of the electricity sector.

The Secretary of State does not have powers to direct private companies outside of an energy emergency or crisis scenario. Establishing such a precedent may risk undermining the development of the sector, with little compensatory benefit in additional security protections. Given our existing measures to control foreign investment, and our intentions to increase the cyber-resilience of load controllers, an additional power for the Secretary of State to direct on national security grounds would be disproportionate.

Amendments 160 and 161 centre on alleviating any security risks posed at the device level in the provision of load control. Amendment 160 would give the Secretary of State the power to regulate or prohibit the provision of load control by or to appliances supplied by vendors that are deemed to be high risk. Amendment 161 would define that group as

“vendors of appliances that pose potential or actual security and resilience risks to energy networks”.

I assure the hon. Member for Southampton, Test that measures to maintain the security of energy smart appliances are already in place. For example, the Electric Vehicles (Smart Charge Points) Regulations 2021, which are already in effect, require most private charge points for domestic and workplace use to meet minimum device-level cyber-security requirements. In addition, we committed through our response to the consultation on delivering a smart and secure electricity system to ensure that licences for the purpose of domestic and small non-domestic load control should include cyber-security requirements. We are confident that, taken together, the existing regime is sufficiently robust and that a further power to amend the licensing condition is unnecessary. I hope that with those reassurances the hon. Member will be able to withdraw his amendment.

Clause 199 sets out how the Secretary of State may modify conditions of licences granted under the Electricity Act 1989 and certain licences granted under the Gas Act 1986 for purposes of load control. It also provides powers for the Secretary of State to modify industry codes that are maintained under those licences for such purposes. More generally, the powers give the Secretary of State the flexibility to amend existing regulatory arrangements to reflect the introduction of a new licensing regime for load control. That new licensing regime will be introduced using the powers provided for in schedule 17.

Clause 200 sets out the process that the Secretary of State must follow before making changes to the conditions of licences, or documents maintained under them, for load control or related purposes, as set out in clause 199. The requirement to consult the parties listed in subsection (1) before making changes to licence conditions or documents maintained reflects standard practice in such cases and is consistent with other clauses. When modifying the conditions of a licence, the Secretary of State must specify the date on which the modification will take effect and publish the details of any modifications as soon as reasonably practicable after they are made.

Clause 201 establishes that the Secretary of State may make a modification to a standard condition of a licence using clause 199. It also establishes that that does not prevent any other part of the condition from continuing to be regarded as a standard condition. In essence, the power will allow the Secretary of State to make targeted changes to parts of a licence, without changing the overall status of that licence, or changing any other standard conditions to that licence. When the Secretary of State makes changes, the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority will amend future licences so that the amended standard conditions apply to future licensees. The authority will also publish the modification to the licence.

Clause 202 extends the regulatory provisions in relation to licensing that were established in the Gas Act and the Electricity Act to load control. The clause amends the Gas Act, the Electricity Act and the Utilities Act 2000 to apply several provisions of those Acts to the Secretary of State’s exercise of regulatory powers to load control. More specifically, the clause will extend several of the duties and obligations on GEMA within the Acts, particularly those in relation to protecting the interests of current and future consumers of electricity. GEMA would need to apply to the Secretary of State when exercising powers under clauses 195 to 197. Finally, clause 202 defines “gas licence” and “electricity licence”.

Clause 203 introduces schedule 17, which makes provision for the regulation of the load control of energy smart appliances. Schedule 17 amends the Electricity Act, allowing the Secretary of State to make regulations that amend the list of activities subject to the licensing framework to include activities connected with load control. The schedule sets out the terms of that regulation-making power, including the extent to which the regulations can make consequential or transitional provisions.

[Dr Whitehead]

I heard what the Minister had to say about the amendments. I am pleased to hear that the Government are taking this seriously, and I hope that the measures that he suggests by which they will do so are sufficient for the purpose. I think that the Secretary of State in question for the National Security and Investment Act is the Chancellor and not the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, so the option to do anything about it will be at one remove from his Department, although I am sure the Secretary of State would be able to communicate with the Chancellor were there serious issues.

On the understanding that the Government are going to pursue this as a serious issue as part of the development of energy smart networks, and will incorporate that view at the heart of the arrangements, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 199 to 203 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 17 agreed to.

Clause 204

National Warmer Homes and Businesses Action Plan

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

The Government have carefully considered the effect of the clause, which was added on Report in the Lords. On 17 May, I tabled an amendment indicating my intention to oppose the clause. The Government do not consider that it would be effective in helping to deliver our commitments to improve the energy performance of buildings and to deliver net zero. However, I know that opinions among Committee members differ, and I look forward to the discussion that we may well be about to have.

The heat and buildings strategy, published in autumn 2021, sets out how the Government plan to reduce emissions from buildings and provides a clear long-term framework to enable industry to invest and deliver the transition to low-carbon heating. The Climate Change Committee already plays a key role, providing independent advice and scrutiny, and holding the Government accountable by publishing statutory progress reports to Parliament. Those are comprehensive overviews of the Government’s progress. The clause would simply duplicate those efforts.

The Government have already set out our aim to phase out the installation of new and replacement natural gas boilers from 2035, in line with natural replacement cycles, while scaling up the installation of low-carbon heating. We recognise that there are many options with the potential to play an important role.

The Government remain committed to the aspiration for as many homes as possible to reach energy performance certificate band C by 2035 where cost-effective, affordable and practical, as set out in the clean growth strategy. There has been good progress towards achieving that aim, with 47% of homes in England having reached EPC band C, up from a measly 14% in 2010.

In our net zero growth plan and energy security plan, the Government announced that we will publish a consultation on options for upgrading houses in the owner-occupier sector by 2023. The content of the consultation has not yet been finalised, and we need to gather further evidence on the potential impacts of interventions in that sector. More time is needed to ensure thorough consideration of options in this area, and the clause would not allow that time.

We are also taking significant steps to encourage businesses to reduce their energy demand through voluntary schemes and regulations. In the 2020 energy White Paper, the Government proposed that the trajectory for the minimum energy-efficiency standard for non-domestic rented buildings should be EPC band B by April 2030, with an interim milestone of EPC band C by April 2027.

We are evaluating the responses to our consultation and will publish the Government response in due course. It is important that the impacts, such as those on business and supply chain readiness, can be fully considered. The clause would pre-empt the response and commit the Government to a timeframe for implementation different from the one that has been consulted on.

The Government have set an aspiration to introduce the future homes standard by 2025. We will publish a full technical consultation for it in 2023. We intend to introduce the necessary legislation in 2024, ahead of implementation in 2025.

I thank Baroness Hayman and Lord Foster of Bath in the other place for raising these matters.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

It is a pleasure to respond to the debate. There is some confusion at the minute. Indeed, I was slightly confused at the beginning of the debate, given that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test seemed at one stage to be whipping on behalf of the Government and giving advice to Conservative Members— I urge all colleagues on this side not to listen to his words. If I am not mistaken, he was suggesting that the clause we are against was tabled by the Government in the other place; Baroness Hayman is a Labour peer and Lord Foster of Bath is a Liberal Democrat peer.

[Dr Whitehead]

For clarity, I did not say that it was introduced by the Government, nor would I say that, because it certainly was not. The point I was trying to make was that it is now a part of the Bill, not that it was introduced by the Government in the other place.

[Andrew Bowie]

I am glad that is clarified for the Committee. For further clarification, we are seeking to revise the Bill back to its original state as drafted and remove an amendment that was made by Labour and Liberal Democrat Members of the House of Lords. I believe that is a relatively regular occurrence for the House of Commons. There should be no confusion on that.

Again, as they were when we were talking about smart meters, the Opposition are such a glass half-empty kind of party. We have made huge progress in the energy efficiency of UK homes. I understand why the Opposition do not want to speak about this: when they left office only 14% of homes had an EPC grading of course; now, after 13 years of Conservative Government, the proportion stands at 47%, and we are driving forward to get it over 50% soon. As for the suggestion that we do not have a plan to move forward, the Government do have a plan. We have set out a heat and buildings strategy and we have announced further measures in the net zero growth plan, which was announced just recently.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Clause 205 will provide the Secretary of State with the power to make changes to the existing Energy Performance of Buildings (England and Wales) Regulations 2012 to ensure that they are fit for purpose and contribute effectively to improving the energy efficiency of premises. Following the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union, it is necessary to create new primary powers to permit changes to be made to the 2012 regulations, as that power was lost with the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972.

Clause 206 will enable the Secretary of State to make changes to the Energy Performance of Buildings (England and Wales) Regulations in relation to new premises. That includes new premises in the process of being constructed or changed, as well as new premises whose construction or adaption is planned but has yet to be started. The changes will ensure that the anticipated energy usage and energy efficiency of new premises are taken account of.

Clause 207 enables us to ensure that we have an effective enforcement regime underpinning the energy performance of premises policy by amending existing requirements. We will review the current enforcement regime to ensure that there are sufficient enforcement options in place, with a view to improving compliance with the energy performance of premises framework. The existing regime includes civil penalties, and the clause enables us to amend those penalties or provide for new civil penalties by enforcement authorities up to a maximum of £15,000.

Finally, clause 208 provides that the regulations made under part 9 may amend, repeal or revoke provisions made in primary legislation and that this must be done through the affirmative resolution procedure. It also provides that the affirmative resolution procedure will be used if new criminal offences or civil penalties are created. This will ensure that there is parliamentary oversight of the uses of the power. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Dr Whitehead]

Clause 205 is the beginning of the part of the Bill on the energy performance of properties. I must admit that I thought for a moment there was going to be a spectacular U-turn on the previous clause, but I was sadly disappointed when the Minister decided which way he was really going to vote. I fear the same result in respect of this part of the Bill.

Let me speak briefly to our new clauses 41 and 42, which would considerably strengthen the Bill’s provisions on the energy performance of premises. They relate specifically to energy performance regulations for existing premises. Rather like clause 204, which is now not in the Bill but contained previous Government aspirations and claims in respect of outcomes, new clause 41 relates to things the Government have already said about energy performance certificates for properties in the private rented sector, about what should happen in respect of the improvement of properties in that sector to bring them up to an appropriate band, and about the amount specified in legislation that private landlords should spend on getting their properties up to that level before they are exempted from having to make further improvements.

The really important bit in new clause 41 would require the Secretary of State to make regulations

“amending the Energy Efficiency (Private Rented Property) (England and Wales) Regulations 2015 (S.I. 2015/962) to require that, subject to subsection (2)”—

which contains exemptions—

“all tenancies have an energy performance certificate (EPC) of at least Band C by 31 December 2028”.

The new clause would also require the Secretary of State to make regulations

“amending the Energy Efficiency (Private Rented Property) (England and Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2019”—

which Members will recall introduced a £3,500 cap on the cost to landlords of achieving band E—to raise to £10,000 the amount that should be invested before landlords are exempt.

Those are reasonably ambitious outcomes for the private rented sector, but they were completely presaged by the Government’s previous proposals, which we supported at the time. Specifically, in September 2020 they consulted on improving the energy performance of privately rented homes in England and Wales. The consultation had proposed outcomes at its heart, but—well I never—there has not yet been a Government response. Only three years have gone by. We hope that there may be a response one day fairly soon, so that progress can be made.

The proposed outcome of the consultation—the favoured option at the time—was exactly as set out in subsection (1) of new clause 41: raising the energy performance standard of private rented properties to band C, a phased trajectory to get there by 2028, and a £10,000 average per-property spend under a £10,000 cap. Everything in the new clause is already there in what the Government said they would do in respect of private rented sector energy efficiency. The only difference is that the Government have not actually done anything about it.

I recently looked up the reaction to the proposals, and a number of commentators and advisers are saying, “Well, landlords, you perhaps ought to get yourselves steeled up to the idea that your properties, to be lettable in future years, will have to be band C, and that you may have to spend up to £10,000 to make your properties lettable at that point.” By the way, that seems a relatively small amount to have to spend, bearing in mind that this is essentially a question whether a property is of merchantable quality. In any other area of commerce, if it were not of merchantable quality, it would not be sold. These measures, if implemented, would ensure that properties were merchantable for letting purposes as far as efficiency standards are concerned, and landlords would be required to spend that relatively small amount before they were exempted and to use every endeavour to get their properties up to that point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Member for Southampton, Test and my right hon. Friend the Member for Elmet and Rothwell for their comments on the new clauses. In answer to the question of why we have not produced a full response to the consultation, we are committed to raising standards in the sector in line with our ambition, set out in the clean growth strategy, and we will publish a summary of responses to the consultation on improving standards in the private rental sector this year.

[Dr Whitehead]

This year?

[Andrew Bowie]

Yes, this year.

We are continuing to refine the policy design to ensure that the costs and circumstances relating to energy efficiency improvements are fair and proportionate for landlords and tenants, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Elmet and Rothwell pointed out. The economic headwinds that have been buffeting us, and the changing circumstances in the private rented sector in particular, have made it difficult at the minute, but as I said, we will be publishing our response—a summary of responses, anyway—this year.

New clause 41 seeks to require the Secretary of State to make regulations in relation to energy performance in existing rented premises. His Majesty’s Government agree on the need to improve the energy efficiency of buildings to lower energy bills and deliver carbon savings to meet our net zero and fuel poverty targets. Indeed, this is reflected in the Government consultation on proposals to raise the minimum energy efficiency standard for privately rented homes. Under the Energy Act 2011, the Secretary of State already has powers to amend the private rented sector regulations in order to raise the minimum energy efficiency standards and set the dates by which landlords must comply with the new regulations. The new clause would not allow us to reflect the valuable feedback that the Government received from the consultations in the final policy design, which is essential to ensure that the final policy design is fair and proportionate for landlords and tenants. As I have said, the Government have committed to publishing the summary of responses by the end of this year.

Let me turn to new clause 42. In September 2020, we published the energy performance certificate action plan, in order to ensure that consumers can trust energy performance certificates and to make sure that certificates are accurate and reliable. Certain actions are expected to require regulatory change under the new powers to be implemented. The energy performance certificate is designed to rate the energy performance of a building, as considered as an asset that passes from one occupant to another during sale or rental.

As those occupants may or may not possess energy optimisation technologies or an electric vehicle with bi-directional charging capability, it is not currently considered appropriate to assume a benefit from this in the calculated energy performance rating. Including this nascent technology, which relies on consumer behaviours and equipment not integral to the premises, would increase the complexity of the EPC scheme. Bi-directional charging is a promising technology, but it is not yet viable for use in the mass market.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 205 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 206 to 208 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 209

Energy savings opportunity schemes

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

We now turn to part 10 of the Bill, which deals with the energy savings opportunity scheme, which I will refer to as ESOS.

Clause 209 provides a power relating to ESOS. ESOS mandates energy audits of large undertakings at least once every four years, which cover their buildings, transport and industrial processes. The audits result in cost-effective recommendations for improving energy efficiency. The power would replace the repealed power in the European Communities Act 1972, under which the UK established ESOS in 2014, and without which ESOS is a frozen scheme and cannot be updated.

ESOS is important to the UK’s plans to meet net zero targets and reduce energy costs for businesses. The existing scheme’s net benefit is estimated at £1.6 billion. The power covers four core options, as set out in the July 2022 ESOS consultation response: to standardise ESOS reports, improve the quality of audits, add a net zero element to audits, and require public disclosure of information from ESOS reports. It also covers two potential longer-term options to mandate action and extend ESOS to medium-sized enterprises, which are for future consultation. The power will enable the amendment of ESOS, or the establishment of such a scheme, and sets out the general provisions to make regulations.

Clause 210 sets out the application of ESOS, including in relation to geographical application and determining responsibility for energy consumption for the purposes of ESOS. It allows regulations to set the description of undertakings that fall within scope of ESOS, and to provide for two or more participants to be treated as a single participant. It would allow ESOS to extend to a far wider range of undertakings, subject, of course, to future consultation. I therefore commend clause 209 to the Committee.

[Dr Whitehead]

I do not have anything to say on these clauses, other than to note that we are now into the energy savings opportunity scheme, and that the Minister is indeed right that schemes would have been frozen under EU regulations. However, I am not yet sure whether what would have been the case under the EU regulations is reflected accurately in the things coming forward. I hope that it is. The scheme looks okay to me, but I would like an indication from the Minister that, in effectively updating the scheme for the purposes of this legislation, nothing has been lost from what previously was there.

[Andrew Bowie]

I am happy to give that guarantee. Indeed, one of the benefits of our now not being in the European Union is that we can devise and implement schemes that are fit for businesses and, indeed, homeowners—people within the United Kingdom—depending on the circumstances that we are facing at the time.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 209 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 210 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 211

Requirement for assessment of energy consumption

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Clause 211 makes provision for regulations to set out when, how and by whom an ESOS assessment should be carried out, and other requirements. It introduces a new power for future details from ESOS reports to be published to increase the transparency of the scheme and promote the uptake of energy efficiency measures.

Clause 212 enables regulations to set out functions and requirements relating to ESOS assessors, including who may be an assessor, the maintenance of assessor registers, and requirements on designated bodies that maintain assessor registers. New powers are provided to the Secretary of State or the scheme administrator to ensure the standards of assessors. The powers will allow intervention where there is evidence that an assessor or designated body is not carrying out its responsibilities under ESOS regulations appropriately, to improve the overall quality of ESOS reports.

Clause 213 includes a power to introduce new requirements for ESOS participants relating to the production and publication of an ESOS action plan covering intended actions to reduce energy use or greenhouse gas emissions. The requirements aim to increase participants’ engagement with ESOS and stimulate greater uptake of energy efficiency measures.

Clause 214 introduces a power to impose new requirements on ESOS participants to achieve energy savings or greenhouse gas emissions reductions. It sets out two approaches: ESOS regulations may either require participants to take specific actions, or may set out other requirements, such as the public reporting of actions, that aim to encourage participants to take those actions. Regulations would be able to specify that the requirements should refer to a cost-benefit analysis. As stated in the Government response to the ESOS consultation, the former approach would be subject to further consultation before any decision was taken regarding its introduction. Regulations making such provision would, under clause 218, also be subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure.

[Dr Whitehead]

I have nothing to add to what the Minister said. I am happy for the clauses to stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 211 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 212 to 214 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 215

Scheme administration

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 216 and 217 stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

Clause 215 is about administrators and the administration of schemes, and those administrators will have at their elbow action plans determined by previous clauses. It is good to see in the context of this afternoon’s discussions that a part of the Bill has action plans as a requirement and that those action plans will be positively administered. Having a plan seems to be a bit of a sine qua non for administrators; we do not seem to have that in other parts of the legislation. The Opposition have been assiduous in trying to put that idea forward, but it is nice to see that that line has been breached at least as far as these clauses are concerned.

[Andrew Bowie]

I am very happy that the hon. Gentleman is very happy.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 215 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 216 and 217 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 218

ESOS regulations: procedure etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

This is another short one. Clause 219 provides the Secretary of State with a power to give directions to a scheme administrator, with which it must comply—for example, when views differ over the interpretation of legislation or when the Secretary of State wishes to order a scheme administrator to remove an individual from its designated register of persons who may be appointed as a lead assessor. Clause 220 enables the Secretary of State to provide or arrange for financial assistance to scheme administrators and ESOS participants.

[Dr Whitehead]

I will just mention in passing that there is an interesting progression in clause 219, relating to directions. Subsection (1) says:

“The Secretary of State may give directions to a scheme administrator.”

So far, so good. Subsection (2) says:

“The power to give directions under this section includes a power to vary or revoke the directions.”

From that, it appears that the Secretary of State has the power to revoke their own directions—

[Andrew Bowie]

He has the power to change his mind.

[Dr Whitehead]

Indeed, but presumably if the Secretary of State changed his mind, he would not start with subsection (1) in the first place, so it is a bit of a strange formulation. I think that had the Opposition moved that as an amendment, the Minister would have said it was superfluous and unnecessary. I do not know why that particular formulation has been put in but we know that subsection (3) says:

“A scheme administrator must comply with any direction given to it under this section”—

however confusing—so it is probably all right then. But I must admit that subsection (2) looks a bit odd.

[Andrew Bowie]

I understand the hon. Member’s question and the direct answer is yes, the Secretary of State can revoke his own direction. I think it is important to set that out in the Bill and, indeed, there is precedent for it in comparable provisions in section 51 of the Climate Change Act 2008, passed by the then Labour Government.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 219 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 220 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Joy Morrissey.)

Energy Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Whitehead]

We have tabled two amendments to clause 181. As far as I understand it, the clause adds to the heat network system, which, as I have said, has evolved over the years into a number of heat networks in various parts of the country.

A good idea for future heat network development would be to have a much more systematic approach and an understanding of where our heat networks may be most appropriately sited and the best conditions for them to be established. We know a number of potential good and bad conditions for heat networks. For example, a certain density of population, buildings and so on is needed for heat networks to be efficient, although there are in existence small heat networks that serve very small communities. Indeed, heat networks can range from being marginally larger than a few properties to covering large parts of cities.

There are five major heat networks in my city of Southampton, one of which serves the whole city centre and surrounding areas, and has an 18 km heat delivery pipe network. It is connected to a geothermal scheme in the city centre, so it efficiently provides heat to that whole area. It is connected not just to domestic properties but to a number of commercial users, which I think includes the nation’s only geothermally heated supermarket, civic centre, health authority centre, and so on.

One component of a decent heat network is what is in the network to validate the load that is supplied. A heat network may be just for domestic properties, as is the case in some housing developments in Southampton, but that is not the most efficient way of developing a heat network because the load from domestic properties changes seasonally. If a heat network is connected both to a number of properties—an estate or whatever—but also has industrial or commercial users, the load can be spread out and equalised over the years.

The Southampton schemes operate quite efficiently within the right places for zones. Nevertheless, it is—or should be—a function of local circumstances that heat networks are more likely to be applied in constituencies where there is a considerable gathering of industrial and commercial activities and population zones, and are less applicable in large rural constituencies, although there are some heat networks in small towns and villages. Within that zone understanding, there may be arrangements that pertain to local circumstances: for example, zones may be organised in such a way that ensures the likelihood of success for the heat network is relatively high.

I understand that this section of the Bill seeks to ensure that local authorities are required to look at research, to consider where it would be good to have a heat network and to produce a heat network zone plan, so that as we develop heat networks for the future we have a much better picture of where the schemes would work well, where investment may best go and the extent to which success is likely to be high, rather than someone perhaps taking a flyer on something that probably will not work well for the future.

We are happy with the idea of heat network zones being put into the Bill, that we approach them in the way that I have described and that they complement the regulation of the system in as much as the whole system now is much more in the mainstream of energy planning and energy futures as a whole. I hope that our amendments are complementary to the general scheme of things. They simply try to align the regulation of the heat zone development process with that of heat zones themselves, proposing that the process of heat zone discovery and development should be regulated by the same regulator that regulates heat as a whole: the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority.

It is important that there should be a regulator for this particular activity so that it does not stand alone from everything else happening as far as heat networks are concerned. I do not think that would impede the development of heat networks—on the contrary, it would assist them by making sure that the way we were bringing forward heat zone arrangements was generally of assistance to heat networks as a whole.

What if a local authority or similar body involved with developing heat network zones were not interested in heat networks? It might locally regulate heat zones in a way that did not take seriously the whole question of heat network development. The regulation of heat zone arrangements under the circumstances that I am discussing would ensure that there was a pretty uniform approach as far as heat network development was concerned. Those engaged in it would know that someone was looking over their shoulder to make sure that they were doing the job properly. That is all we want to add to the measure and I think the Minister will agree that it is a pretty positive addition. It certainly does not detract in any way from the validity of the heat network process and the idea that there are right and wrong places for heat networks. We must get them in the right places so that they can succeed for customers as well as they possibly can.

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Member for his amendments, all of which are designed to ensure that the regulatory frameworks for heat networks and the building-up of capacity in this country for heat network zoning gets to a place that will support the growth of the industry in the future. I resist the amendments only because I feel that the powers in the Bill meet the required level of engagement and regulation necessary at this stage for what is currently a nascent but will in time become an incredibly important part of the wider energy mix.

I turn first to amendment 102, which relates to designating GEMA as the heat network zones authority. The zones authority will be a national body responsible for zoning functions that require national-level standardisation or are most efficiently or effectively carried out at a national level. This approach will allow for national standards and consistent rules to apply in the initial identification of a potential heat network zone.

As for who could fulfil the zones authority role, clause 181(3) is explicit that

“The Secretary of State may, but need not, be designated”

as the zones authority. Therefore, the clause, as drafted, already provides that regulations may appoint GEMA as the zones authority.

The zones authority will fulfil a different function from the heat network regulator, which we propose, as set out in clause 172, should be fulfilled by GEMA for Great Britain. That role will cover all heat networks, both within and outside heat network zones. We do not envisage a separate regulator for heat network zones in England.

We will specify the zones authority’s functions and responsibilities within the regulations when they are brought forward. That will be subject to further consultation in due course as we continue to develop our policy proposals, and we look forward to engaging with Parliament on that. Appointing the zones authority in regulations will allow for amendment, should that be required, as and when its functions change over time and as heat networks become more established throughout the United Kingdom. I hope that has helped to clarify our proposed approach and the scope of the powers already provided for in the Bill.

I turn to amendment 115, regarding the relationship between the Heat Network Zones Authority and the heat network regulator. As I have said, we intend for GEMA to fulfil the heat network regulator role in Great Britain. The zones authority will be a national body responsible for certain zoning functions. We will consult on who should fulfil the zones authority role in due course, but we do not consider that the zones authority should itself be subject to oversight by the heat network regulator. I hope this has helped to clarify our proposed approach regarding the zones authority and how its role relates to the heat network regulator, and I therefore ask the hon. Member for Southampton, Test to find it within himself to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Clause 183 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations to establish the process for creating heat network zones, which we have just discussed. In the legislation that is referred to as identifying and designating a zone. The clause also gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations to establish the process for the review of zone designations. A review of zones could lead to changes in the boundary—for example, making the zone larger or combining two existing zones.

Subsection (2) provides that the regulations must require the identification of zones to be done in accordance with the zoning methodology, which is established under clause 184. Subsection (3) outlines further matters that the regulations may specify in relation to the designation of areas as zones. Subsection (4) outlines what may be specified in regulations regarding changing or revoking zone designations. Subsection (5) outlines regulations that can be made about the review of zone designations.

Clause 184 gives the Secretary of State the power to establish a methodology for identifying heat network zones. The methodology will standardise the identification of zones nationally. Proposals for the use of, and approach to, that national methodology received widespread support from stakeholders during the Government consultation.

Clause 185 allows the Secretary of State to make regulations about the ability of the zones authority and zone co-ordinators to request the information required to support the national methodology for the identification, designation and review of heat network zones. The clause, and the regulations that follow, will facilitate the zones authority and zone co-ordinators in requesting and receiving the necessary information to ensure that heat network zones are situated in the right locations. As I discussed in the context of zone reviews under clause 183, the location of heat network zones can be changed as necessary to reflect the impact of changing technologies and neighbourhoods over time.

[Dr Whitehead]

The Minister reflects that circumstances may change over time so it is necessary to have such a power. He is right that circumstances are not static; indeed, we may well miss a lot of good opportunities if we place too much emphasis on the static nature of what we have designated for the future. I think that we will debate, in a future clause, circumstances concerning the development of heat networks within zones, but on the changes that may be necessary in order to keep heat network zones up to date, this is a sensible provision that we support.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 183 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 184 and 185 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 186

Heat networks within zones

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss that clause 187 stand part.

[Andrew Bowie]

Clause 186 allows the Secretary of State to make regulations about heat networks within heat network zones. That includes specifying which buildings may be required to connect to a district heat network within a designated zone. Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b) allow regulations that specify the types of buildings within zones that will be required to connect to heat networks, when they must connect, and how they are notified of that requirement.

Subsection (2)(c) allows the regulations to specify when and how the zone co-ordinator can grant exemptions from the requirement to connect to the heat network. Subsections (2)(e) to (2)(h) allow regulations to make provision about requiring heat sources in zones to connect to a heat network. Subsections (2)(i) and (2)(j) allow regulations that provide for the zoning co-ordinator to set local limits on emissions from heat networks and any grace period to comply with that limit.

Subsection (5) allows regulations to specify when the zoning co-ordinator may or must ask a heat source to connect to a heat network, the types of heat source that can cover, and how the heat source owner can appeal against the requirement to connect. Subsection (6) allows regulations to specify how local limits on emissions from heat networks in zones are set. Subsection (7) provides details about what regulations can be made about grace periods for local emissions limits.

Clause 187 allows the Secretary of State to make regulations about the delivery of district heat networks within heat network zones. Those regulations will give structure to the zoning co-ordinator’s role and responsibilities. “Delivery” refers to the design, construction, operation and maintenance of heat networks. His Majesty’s Government recognise that there are several feasible models for delivering heat networks in zones depending on local circumstances, including the level of involvement of the zone co-ordinator. The clause, and the regulations that flow from it, aim to provide a flexible approach to zone delivery.

The engagement we have had with the heat network industry and with local government has highlighted a desire for flexibility in how heat networks are delivered within zones, as there are a range of ownership and delivery models that could be employed in the future. The Government’s expectation is that the regulations will define what decisions zoning co-ordinators and other bodies can take regarding zone delivery, with guidance from the zones authority to help inform their decisions. The clause provides that regulations may determine when zone co-ordinators may decide what heat networks are delivered in their zones, and by whom, including circumstances in which the zoning co-ordinator may deliver heat networks themselves.

The Government recognise that there is a risk that leaving decisions about zone development solely in the hands of zone co-ordinators could risk a heat network zone not being developed. Therefore, subsection 5(g) allows regulations to define the circumstances in which zone co-ordinators may lose the ability to make decisions about heat network delivery in zones. The intent is that that will happen if the zone co-ordinator has not taken certain steps to develop the zone following a set period after the zone designation.

[Dr Whitehead]

Clause 186 rather reminds me of Bertrand Russell’s definitions of propositions that are automatically members of their own class and propositions that are not automatically members of their own class, but I do not think we will debate that to any great extent this morning.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Clause 191 is the final clause in chapter 2, which concludes part 7 and the clauses on heat networks. The clause covers definitions for the heat network zoning clauses.

[Dr Whitehead]

I have nothing to add, other than “Hooray, we’ve got to the end of that part!” We now have lots of regulations in place, which is a good thing.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 191 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 192

Energy smart appliances and load control

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

Clause 192 introduces part 8 of the Bill, which relates to energy smart appliances and load control. It defines the key concepts relating to that part, namely energy smart appliances, energy smart function, load control signals and load control.

The smart energy market is in its early stages but is growing rapidly, as we discussed in detail on Thursday. As the take-up of electric vehicles and other devices such as heat pumps increases, we need to remain agile in responding to new developments in the market. This is to ensure that we maintain grid stability and protect consumers from cyber-security risks. Transitioning to a smart and fully flexible electricity system will play a vital role in decarbonising the power system by 2035. Such a transition could reduce costs by up to £10 billion a year by 2050.

I will briefly set out some key definitions. Energy smart appliances are electrical consumer devices that are communications-enabled and capable of responding automatically to signals such as energy price changes. In response to such signals, they can adjust their electricity consumption or production in line with consumer choice and cost preferences. Load control refers to the act of sending and receiving those signals and adjusting the consumption of the product in response.

Subsequent clauses in part 8 will limit powers to make regulations to products with functions such as refrigeration, cleaning, battery storage, electrical heating, and air conditioning or ventilation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

I am not able to give any firm dates right now, but the Government’s hope is that we will move quickly to consultation on the regulations as soon as the Bill receives Royal Assent.

Relevant economic actors will be required to monitor and report on their compliance with the terms of the regulations, as well as to take specified steps to remedy any non-compliance. Clause 195(2) includes provision for a range of investigatory powers to track and assess non-compliance for use by enforcement authorities. Those include powers of entry, inspection, search and seizure, and powers to enable the testing of energy smart appliances by enforcement authorities. Finally, the Secretary of State may make payments or provide resources to the enforcement authority for the purpose of enforcing the energy smart regulations.

Clause 196 establishes that energy smart regulations may impose a range of sanctions for non-compliance. A full list of offences will be set out in the final regulations, on which the Government will consult publicly and which will be subject to debate in both Houses. I hope that answers the question from the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun. The clause sets out several offences, including contravening requirements imposed by enforcement authorities or knowingly providing false information to enforcement authorities. Punishments for such offences will be provided for in regulations. The punishments will not include imprisonment. Regulations may also allow enforcement authorities to recover their costs by means of civil fines.

Clause 197 makes provision for the regulations to include a right of appeal to a court or tribunal against a requirement or civil penalty made by an enforcement authority. The right of appeal to a court or tribunal against a requirement or penalty for non-compliance, as set out in energy smart regulations, can include, but is not limited to, provisions set out in subsection (2). The right of appeal can be extended by the regulations beyond those parties against whom the requirement has been imposed. The Secretary of State may revoke or amend subordinate legislation, including an Act of the Scottish Parliament or the Senedd, where they consider it appropriate for the purpose of any provision falling within subsection (2).

Clause 198 sets out the procedure by which energy smart regulations will be made. The clause begins by setting out that energy smart regulations made under clause 193 may provide for exemptions or exceptions in their coverage. It requires the Secretary of State to consult before making regulations that subject a specific type of energy smart appliance to regulations or that amend the list of relevant purposes in clause 193. It also sets out the cases in which the affirmative scrutiny procedure is to be used when making regulations under clause 193. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 193 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 194 to 198 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 199

Power to amend licence conditions etc: load control

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 160, in clause 199, page 170, line 3, at end insert—

“(f) regulate or prohibit the provision of load control in relation to appliances that are provided by high risk vendors.”

Energy Bill [ Lords ] (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Thursday 8th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero (Andrew Bowie)]

Clause 121 sets out the ISOP’s main objectives—on net zero, security of supply, and efficiency and economy—and introduces the concept of a relevant activity. The conflict in Ukraine, the climate crisis and rising fossil fuel energy costs all underline the serious need to transition and decarbonise our energy system in an efficient and secure manner. The ISOP will play a central role, as we have all agreed so far, in helping us to meet these challenges and fulfil our energy ambitions.

The clause imposes a duty on the ISOP to carry out its functions in a way that it considers will best achieve the three central objectives. It does not give any weighting to any objective relative to any other, so the ISOP will have discretion to make appropriate trade-offs where they conflict. It is worth noting that the ISOP will not be a final decision-making body on policy. Making high-level strategic trade-offs between the objectives will be for Government, but it will be for the ISOP to balance them at an operational level and to advise Government or the regulator on them.

The first of the three objectives is net zero. The ISOP will drive net zero outcomes by proactively identifying and creating opportunities to facilitate the transition through its functions. The second objective is to ensure the security of supply, which refers to the ISOP’s core function of keeping the lights on. It will ensure that electricity and gas supply can meet demand and that they are appropriately resilient, including the consideration of national and cyber-security. The third objective is focused on promoting an efficient, co-ordinated and economical electricity and gas system. That is a continuation of the existing statutory objectives for the network operators and will become increasingly important to ensure that consumer bill payments are kept as low as possible.

Subsection (5) defines “relevant activity”. The definition allows ISOP to consider a wider set of business actors, including those relating to hydrogen and carbon capture, usage and storage, which we fully expect to be important in future.

Clause 122 sets out specific matters to which the ISOP will be required to have regard when carrying out its functions. Those include: the need to facilitate competition; the desirability of facilitating innovation; and the energy system as a whole. Some regulated activities in the energy sector are monopolies. However, the Government’s view is that where competition is possible, it should be introduced and fostered. ISOP will have a duty to think about how to make competition more effective where it exists, and to consider whether it should be introduced where it does not. That will underpin ISOP’s potential role as a tender body for electricity network competition.

It is worth clarifying that in this clause the Government are not referring to “consumer impact” as the need to deliver value for money to consumers. That is addressed by the “efficiency and economy” objective in clause 121. Rather, ISOP will need to have regard to two key matters: first, how consumers are affected, or likely to be affected, by the behaviour of those energy sector businesses engaged in “relevant activities”; and secondly, the impact of consumers’ behaviour on those activities. ISOP is also to be cognisant of the kinds of products and services that consumers want, and the effects of consumer behaviour on products, services and the markets in which they operate.

The intent of the duty relating to the whole-system impact is to enable ISOP to take a more joined-up approach across the whole energy system, including electricity, gas—onshore and offshore—and other emerging markets. On the innovation duty, the intention is for ISOP to be alive to the possibilities of new and better ways of doing things. Examples could include working with industry on the improved collection and use of data and various digital technologies to improve consumer experience and outcomes.

Finally, clause 123 imposes a duty on ISOP to have regard to the strategy and policy statement defined in part 5 of the Energy Act 2013. This duty helps to clarify the link between ISOP and the Government’s energy priorities. The intention is that ISOP will act independently, but in the context of wider energy sector policy and the Government’s objectives. The Government will use the SPS, once designated, as a tool to provide strategic focus to ISOP and ensure that it, and Ofgem, are aligned with the strategic priorities of the Government’s energy policy.

Clause 123 also imposes a requirement on ISOP to notify the Secretary of State if at any point it thinks that a policy outcome in the SPS will not be met. The notice must include the reasons behind the conclusion and any steps that ISOP will or might take to deliver the policy outcome. The Secretary of State also has an obligation to consult the ISOP when reviewing or preparing the SPS. The SPS is expected to set out a number of priorities for both Ofgem and ISOP, and it is not anticipated to fundamentally change the organisation. I commend clause 121 to the Committee.

[Dr Whitehead]

This debate enables us to count off a few clauses—clauses that are all good stuff. They clarify and facilitate the role, function and activity of ISOP. We have indicated that we would like ISOP’s remit to be widened as far as possible. On the high-level objectives in clause 121, an objective on net zero could shape the widening of ISOP’s responsibilities, because obviously that is what we are all about now, as far as the grid and various other things are considered. A wider remit for ISOP in facilitating net zero is clearly to be desired; that may be a basis on which to build on ISOP’s powers and activities in future.

[Alan Brown (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (SNP)]

As I said earlier, I support the principle behind ISOP, and I support clauses 121 to 123, and will not vote against them. I want to explore a point with the Minister. The explanatory notes on the clauses highlight possible conflicts and tensions between the role of ISOP and the impact of Government policy—of what the Government do. For example, paragraph 345 of the explanatory notes outlines that there is

“a duty on the ISOP to carry out its functions in a way that it considers is best calculated to promote…net zero”.

It also acknowledges that while ISOP is not making decisions on generation mixes, it should still be

“proactively identifying and creating opportunities to facilitate the transition”

to net zero.

Paragraph 347 to the explanatory notes confirms the imposition of a duty on ISOP

“to carry out its functions in a way that it considers best calculated to promote a coordinated electricity and gas”

grid in the interests of the efficiency and economic operation of the grid. Paragraph 352 says:

“The ISOP will take a whole-system approach to coordinating and planning Great Britain’s energy system”.

That is all very logical, and I agree with the principles set out there—they are certainly the most important functions of ISOP in many ways—but how does the Government regulator allow for that, and how do the Government take into account the ISOP’s recommendations?

The Minister rightly pointed out the differences between what the ISOP is looking at and the fact that policy and implementation is the role of Government. To give an example, the National Grid Electricity System Operator already predicts that there will be less nuclear in the grid in any future scenarios compared with what the Government are promising about new nuclear, and that in 2024-25 a quarter of electricity generation will be from nuclear. The reality is that that will not happen. The National Grid ESO does not allow for that in future scenarios, yet the Government still tell us that that is their policy. That is already a clear conflict before the ISOP is up and running.

What if the ISOP says to the Government that instead of spending £35 billion to £40 billion on a new nuclear station at Sizewell C it could much better balance the system by recommending extra energy efficiency measures, battery storage, pumped-storage hydro or a smarter grid, which we keep hearing about in the plan going forward? What if the ISOP says that we should upgrade the grid urgently between Scotland and England, which would help to better balance the system and deploy renewables better, and get rid of the £4.6 billion in constraint payments that National Grid ESO paid last year to turn windfarms off because there was not sufficient grid capacity? How do the Government deal with the recommendations of the ISOP? Some of the suggestions that I have outlined would meet the aims outlined in clauses 121 and 122 and in the explanatory notes.

We are still to come to clause 131, but in this context it puts a duty on the ISOP to monitor and review developments, including technological changes and Government policies. It seems to me that the Government can make policies that undermine the ISOP’s recommendations; then the ISOP has the responsibility to review Government policy and start all over again. That does not seem very efficient, so the Minister needs to give a bit more clarity on that.

Clause 123 is on the strategy and policy statement, which is long overdue from the Government. On 30 March, in answer to a written question that I submitted, I was advised:

“The Government has consulted Scottish and Welsh Ministers on a draft SPS and taken their comments into account. The Government intends to publicly consult on an updated draft soon.”

When will we get that draft, given that clause 123 reiterates the responsibility of the Government to provide that strategy and policy statement?

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

The clause amends the Electricity Act 1989 for four main purposes: first, to define the new electricity system operation licensable activities; secondly, to create the ISOP’s new electricity system operator licence and empower the Secretary of State to grant the first licence; thirdly, to ensure that the holder of the electricity system operator licence also holds the gas system planner licence; and finally, to ensure that if a person ceases to hold the gas system planner licence, they cease to hold the system operator electricity licence.

Clause 125 also relates to licensing. It is too early to determine the best course of action to create the ISOP’s electricity system operator licence. The Government consider it prudent to ensure that they have flexibility to ensure a smooth and efficient transition to the ISOP. One option is to revoke the existing licence and grant a completely new electricity system operator licence, but this clause offers another approach. It empowers the Secretary of State to direct that an existing transmission licence becomes the ISOP’s electricity system operator licence. If that power is used, the Secretary of State can make appropriate modifications to the existing licence when making such a direction, and the direction must be published.

Clause 126 covers the licensing of gas system planning activity. It makes amendments to the Gas Act 1986 that mirror the electricity licence in clause 125, but in respect of a gas system planner licence.

Clause 127 empowers the Secretary of State or Ofgem to make changes to licences and codes and revoke licences in preparation for, in relation with or in consequence of the designation of the ISOP.

Clause 128 sets out the process and rules for making licence modifications under the power in section 127. Before making any modification to licences or codes, the Secretary of State or Ofgem is required to publish a notice explaining the reasons for the changes, the proposed modifications and when they will take effect. The persons listed in subsection (2) must be notified, and their representations, if made within the specified period in the notice or before the changes take effect, need to be considered.

[Dr Whitehead]

This is all terrific stuff. I do not have much to say on this, other than that I was struggling to keep up with the Minister’s speed reading; I think I just about made it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 124 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 125 to 128 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 129

Provision of advice, analysis or information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

The clause imposes a duty on the ISOP to provide advice, analysis or information requested by the Government or Ofgem. The Government and Ofgem will have to make important policy and regulatory decisions across many areas of the energy system to enable progress towards net zero. As a trusted independent entity, the ISOP will be well placed to provide expert and technical advice to decision-making bodies.

There are no provisions in legislation that oblige the current electricity and gas system operators to provide advice to the Secretary of State on request. Ofgem currently has more generalised powers to request information from its regulated bodies, but only for the purposes of monitoring and enforcement. The content of the advice, analysis or information requested should be on matters related to the ISOP’s functions, main objectives or matters that the ISOP must have regard to. The requestor should be able to provide some reasonable terms in respect of when and how the advice, analysis or information should be provided, which the ISOP must comply with in its response.

The Government recognise and agree with calls from respondents to the future system operator consultation that the ISOP’s expertise will be useful to the wider energy industry and consumers. That is why the Government plan to build on the existing responsibilities of the ISOP in licences or associated documents to enable the ISOP to share expertise and provide guidance to others where it considers it beneficial to consumers.

Clause 130 provides the ISOP with a power to request information, including data, where it is needed to help it fulfil its functions. Information can be requested from those engaged in, or those whom the ISOP reasonably considers intends to engage in, relevant activities as defined in clause 121(5).

Clause 131 imposes a duty on the ISOP to keep under review information about any policy initiatives or other developments in the energy sector that may be relevant to its functions. The clause is drafted by reference to the ISOP’s functions, and the obligation it imposes will align with those functions. We must ensure that the ISOP is horizon scanning and monitoring how markets and regulation may develop in the shorter or longer term. As discussed in the debate on clause 123, the ISOP will be required to have regard to five-yearly strategy and policy statements. The duty to keep under review is important for the ISOP to keep up-to-date with developments in the intervening five years. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Whitehead]

I have nothing to add. I am happy to agree to the clauses.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 129 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 130 and 131 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 140

Designation of codes etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Part 5 of the Bill deals with the governance of gas and electricity industry codes. The energy codes are documents that contain the detailed rules of the electricity and gas systems. The rules cover everything from how buyers and sellers must interact in commercial markets, to the technical specifications required to connect to the grid. The codes are currently governed by industry parties such as electricity suppliers and gas transporters. The Government will create a new governance framework for the energy codes, which will move that responsibility to one or more newly created code managers. The code managers will be directly accountable to Ofgem rather than industry, which will allow Ofgem to drive strategic change across the codes, for the benefit of consumers and competition.

Clause 140 plays a central role in establishing the new framework, by allowing the Secretary of State to identify which codes and engineering standards fall within its scope. It does so by granting the Secretary of State the power to create and amend lists of documents that are critical to the operation of our electricity and gas systems. Once a document has been designated, all the enduring functions of the new governance framework will immediately go live for that document. At the same time, all the transitional powers granted to the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority by schedules 10 to 12 will cease to apply.

The Secretary of State may only designate documents that are maintained in accordance with the conditions of specified gas and electricity licences. The Secretary of State will not be able to expand the scope of the new governance framework beyond the gas and electricity sectors in Great Britain without a legislative change.

Clause 141 defines a “code manager” as the holder of a code manager licence in relation to a document that has been designated by the Secretary of State. Code managers are intended to replace the industry-led bodies that currently govern the code change process. The clause also defines a “code manager licence” as a licence under new section 7AC of the Gas Act 1986, or new section 6(1)(g) of the Electricity Act 1989. Once those sections are added to those Acts by clauses 136 and 137, it will become a criminal act for any person to manage a designated document without a licence or an appropriate exemption. The GEMA will be empowered to grant the two types of code manager licence—one in connection with electricity and one in connection with gas.

Clause 142 empowers the Secretary of State to identify which central systems fall within the scope of the governance framework in this part of the Bill. It does so by granting the Secretary of State the power to create and amend lists of relevant central systems, and enables the Secretary of State to identify the person responsible for operating, or procuring the operation of, those systems.

A “central system” is defined as an IT system that either supports the operation of an energy code, or processes, transmits or stores data in connection with the operation of that code. Once a system has been added to the list, the only practical effect will be to make the body responsible for operating the system eligible to receive directions from the GEMA, to ensure that the body complies with its obligations under the codes and, where necessary, takes steps to ensure the efficient operation of the code. The enforcement of the directions will be made possible by the amendments in schedule 10, which will allow the GEMA to treat relevant bodies as regulated persons in this specific context.

The Bill specifies that the Secretary of State may only designate central systems that support the operation of a designated document, such as an electricity or gas code. All changes to the initial list of designations will require receipt of an appropriate recommendation from the GEMA. As the market continues to adapt and evolve, it is likely that new systems will need to be developed, and that existing systems may need to be decommissioned. The Secretary of State’s ability to create and maintain a list of central systems will help to future-proof the framework. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Dr Whitehead]

We now turn to energy codes and their managers, probably one of the most baffling and tedious parts of the entire energy spectrum. I understand that people who have gone into codes and code managers have on occasion subsequently been found miles from home in a distressed state, unable to remember their name or how they got there. The Minister has been speaking in a pretty chirpy voice, though, so he might not fall into that category, or perhaps he has not got too far into codes.

I seek some elucidation from the Minister. One purpose of clause 140 is to facilitate the bringing together of codes and the operation of those codes under new licensing—ownership, we might say—arrangements. That needs to be put in the context of where we are at the moment with codes. We have no fewer than 11 different codes for different parts of the industry, including the balancing and settlement code, the connection and use of system code, the distribution connection and use of system agreement, the grid code, the system operator transmission owner code and, more recently, a consolidated retail energy code under a new company called the Retail Energy Code Company—an imaginative name for such a firm.

The point about all those disaggregated and sometimes very much stand-alone codes is that they are owned by different actors. Some of the code management ownership is in the hands of companies that are active in the energy field, some in semi-free-standing, not-for-profit organisations, and some in entirely free-standing, not-for-profit organisations. There is no consistency in who manages the codes at the moment.

I hope that, as a result of these clauses being passed, the Government will have the opportunity systematically to make a much more coherent and integrated system of codes. It is important, however, to have a principle in that process for who will actually own the code management system. I hope and expect that the Minister will say that that will, at the very least, be independent, free-standing, not-for-profit companies or organisations, rather than at least part of the code management being kept in the hands of the industry that is itself bound by the codes. That looks a bit circular.

If the Minister is able to elucidate on that a bit, then I think we will be happy to ensure that this part of the Bill passes in an expeditious manner.

[Andrew Bowie]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. We do not want to introduce anything that makes reaching our net zero goals or the future governance of the energy system any more complicated or circular—to use his word—than it already is. He went through some of the 11 codes and engineering standards: the balancing and settlement code; the connection and use of system code; the distribution connection and use of system agreement; the distribution code; the grid code; the retail energy code; the smart energy code; the system operator transmission owner code; the security and quality of supply standard; the uniform network code, and the independent gas transporters uniform network code. It would be wrong to do anything that further complicates an already complicated area; he is right in what he says about finding ourselves miles from home, forgetting our own name.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

It gives me great pleasure to speak to clauses 143 to 147. Clause 143 establishes code management as a licensable activity within the gas sector. The primary responsibility of the code managers, once licensed, will be to make arrangements for the governance of their respective codes. The GEMA’s ability to license code managers is a central feature of the new governance framework established by this part of the Bill. Clause 143 makes it possible for the GEMA to license code managers by making three sets of amendments to the licensing regime in the Gas Act 1986. Clause 144 serves the same purpose for the Electricity Act 1989, and the two should be seen as working together to establish the new licensing framework.

The first set of amendments makes it a criminal offence to perform the activity of code management in the gas sector without a licence, unless an exemption has been granted. That is necessary to ensure that no more than one person is able to make lawful arrangements for the governance of a gas code at the same time. The second set of amendments makes it possible for the GEMA to grant code manager licences to qualifying persons through the code manager selection processes established elsewhere in the Bill.

Finally, the third set of amendments will require the GEMA to grant licences for codes that contain both gas and electricity provisions at the same time. That requirement will prevent inadvertent breaches of the prohibition on code management in the electricity sector, which is set out in the clause 144. Without the combined effect of these three sets of amendments, it would not be possible for the new code governance framework established by this part of the Bill to function as a licensable activity.

Clause 144 establishes code management as a licensable activity in the electricity sector. The responsibilities of these code managers will be the same as those licensed in the gas sector, as outlined in clause 143. Clause 144 makes it possible for the GEMA to license code managers by making three sets of amendments to the licensing regime in the Electricity Act 1989. Those amendments serve the same purpose as the three outlined in the previous clause to the Gas Act 1986.

My arguments in recommending clause 143 apply equally to clause 144, so I will not labour those points. Without the combined effect of these sets of amendments, it would not be possible for the new code governance framework established by this part of the Bill to function as a licensable activity.

Clause 145 empowers the GEMA to select code managers on a competitive or non-competitive basis. The selection method will be informed by regulations that may be made by the Secretary of State. It is important that the GEMA has the flexibility it needs to select the right body for each role.

Code managers will play a central role in the new governance framework. Their primary responsibility will be to make arrangements for the governance of their respective codes. They will support the delivery of any strategic direction published by the GEMA. Any person who is selected for the role will need the right mix of code-specific knowledge and expertise to be effective.

Due to the differences between the codes, it may be difficult to determine a single best-fit selection method. Some codes may benefit from a competitive tender process, whereas others might find a direct selection process to be more efficient. That variation exists because the codes have evolved independently to occupy unique positions in the market. It would be beneficial for the selection options available to the GEMA to be equally varied.

The Secretary of State may wish to inform the GEMA’s choice of selection method by specifying in regulations the criteria that it would need to apply. Those regulations will allow the Government to ensure that the selection process will produce suitable candidates, while enabling the GEMA to make the final decision on which selection method to use and, indeed, who to select. The details of the regulations are still subject to public consultation. Potential criteria could include minimum conditions that a body must meet to qualify for selection.

The GEMA’s ability to select and license code managers is a central element of the new governance framework. To ensure that the process works as expected, it will be vital for the Secretary of State to have the option of creating regulations to inform how code managers are selected and who should be eligible for the role.

Clause 146 empowers the Secretary of State to make regulations about the non-competitive selection of code managers by the GEMA. Those regulations may be used to make provision about the selection of code managers other than by competitive tender, such as who may or may not be eligible for selection.

Clause 147 allows the GEMA to draft regulations about the selection of code managers by competitive means, which would then require approval by the Secretary of State. Those regulations would be used by the GEMA if it ever decided to select a code manager by running a competitive tender process.

[Dr Whitehead]

I have no comments on the clauses. I am happy for them to stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 143 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 144 to 147 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 148

Strategic direction statement

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to debate clause 149 stand part.

[Andrew Bowie]

Clause 148 places a duty on the GEMA, which is getting quite the airing this afternoon, to publish an annual strategic direction statement about the codes. It also sets out various process requirements and empowers the Secretary of State to supplement the list of required content via regulations.

The purpose of the strategic direction statement is to set out how the codes will or may need to evolve over the following 12 months. At a minimum, it will be required to include a strategic assessment of Government priorities and wider developments in the energy sector relating to codes. The Secretary of State will have the ability to add to the minimum list of content by regulations.

The publication of the annual statement will serve as a framework for code managers when they develop their annual delivery plans. It will also provide interested parties and the Government with information regarding pending code changes, allowing insight into the overall direction of travel. Finally, it will be the primary vehicle by which Government policy priorities are factored into the future development of the energy codes. That will be achieved by regulations, whereby the Secretary of State may add to the list of content that the GEMA must include in its statement. However, any decisions regarding what decisions to take based on that content will always remain with the GEMA.

The clause also sets out the processes that the GEMA must follow when drafting and publishing the statement, including a requirement to consult with all persons who are likely to be affected and to send notice to various consumer-focused organisations. The strategic direction statement is a central element of the new governance framework. To ensure that it continues to meet these purposes, it is important that the Secretary of State has the option to update the list of required content over time.

Clause 149 allows the Secretary of State to permanently transfer the GEMA’s new duty to produce an annual strategic direction statement to the ISOP through regulations. This power has been included to future-proof for a scenario in which the ISOP may emerge as the most suitable entity to take on this duty. While the GEMA is currently the best placed organisation to publish the strategic direction statement, the ISOP, created by part 4 of the Bill, which we discussed earlier, may emerge to be better placed to take on the duty in the future.

Once it is fully established, the ISOP will have various advisory capabilities, an overview of the full energy system, and dedicated planning functions. That may make it a better candidate to publish a strategic direction statement for the codes. However, when the ISOP is first established, it may not have the capabilities or operational maturity in its system-wide strategic and planning functions to take on such a duty. The electricity system operator may therefore remain a code administrator for multiple codes—at least until a new code manager is selected for them. This role could therefore present an undesirable conflict of interest were the ISOP to write the strategic direction early on in the process. As a result, any transfer would be unlikely to take place until the ISOP is fully established and the wider code reforms are complete.

The Secretary of State may make regulations to effect the transfer in duty. Clause 149 sets out the specific changes to legislation that those regulations must make to update references from the GEMA to the ISOP in clause 148. The wording of the clause will ensure that the regulations are used only for a specific purpose, which is important given that they would modify primary legislation. The Secretary of State will be required to consult with the GEMA, the ISOP and other affected parties before making any regulations. In addition, the regulations would need to be laid using the affirmative procedure to ensure the appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny.

[Dr Whitehead]

We certainly have no objections to the clauses. I commend to the Committee clause 149, which enables the transfer of functions on strategic direction between the GEMA and the ISOP. That is a wise and prudent element to include. I accept what the Minister says about the maturity of the ISOP in its early years to carry out the functions. That provision means that the changes can be made at the right time, and on a permanent basis, and I welcome that.

[Andrew Bowie]

I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s welcome.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 148 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 149 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 150

Modification of designated documents by GEMA

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

Clause 150 empowers the GEMA to modify codes directly in certain circumstances to ensure the smooth operation of and transition to the new governance framework. It also empowers the Secretary of State to make regulations setting out how and when the power may be used, and to act as a necessary backstop to clarify and frame the scope of the use.

Clause 151 sets out the practical steps that the GEMA must follow before it can make a direct modification under the circumstances set out in clause 150. Clause 152 empowers the GEMA to issue directions to the bodies that are responsible for operating, or procuring, the critical IT systems that underpin the energy system. Clause 153 sets out the procedural steps and associated controls that the GEMA must follow when making a direction to a central system delivery body, under the powers granted in clause 152.

[Dr Whitehead]

I have no comments on the clauses, and commend them to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 150 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 151 to 153 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 154

Principal objective and general duties of Secretary of State and GEMA under Part 5

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 155 stand part.

[Andrew Bowie]

Clause 154 extends the principal objectives and general duties set out in the relevant sections of the Gas Act 1986 and the Electricity Act 1989 to all the new functions granted to the Secretary of State and the GEMA under this part of the Bill. The extension includes an obligation on both the Secretary of State and the GEMA to carry out their new functions in a way that protects the interests of existing and future consumers. That obligation will place consumers at the heart of our new code governance framework.

Clause 155 updates the GEMA’s reporting requirements so that it must include an overview of any developments or decisions relating to codes in its annual report. It does that by inserting relevant provisions into the list found in section 5 of the Utilities Act 2000.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 154 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 155 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 156

Regulations under Part 5

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 98, in clause 156, page 135, line 26, after “section” insert “146 and”.

The section presently is all under negative SI formation, with the exception of clause 149, which is positive. However, other sections in the part, including section 146, look as if they should have affirmative treatment because of the Secretary of State powers in respect of those sections. As such, this amendment seeks to include it as an affirmative exemption from the rest of the part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

I will speak strictly to the amendment. I advise Members not to go anywhere near schedules 10 to 12, because they might not come back in the same state in which they started to read them.

Amendment 98 is part of my largely forlorn mission to ensure that Parliament is fully involved in decision making, with regulations being made on an affirmative rather than negative basis. The Committee will observe that, in clause 156, the affirmative procedure is specified for regulations only as far as clause 149, which we have already briefly discussed and relates to the transfer of functions from GEMA to the ISOP for strategic purposes. However, it seems to me that there are other clauses in this area that Members ought to have more of a say in, at least in terms of the product of those clauses coming before them through the affirmative procedure, and thus to be debated in the House before being put into place. For example, the selection of a code manager on a non-competitive basis by GEMA might be something that Members might like to have a rather more serious look at, rather than the process being done under the negative procedure, whereby, if a Member is lucky, they might spot that it has been published and then have a certain number of days in which they can do anything, but otherwise the regulations will just go into force.

I think it would be a good idea to extend the protections for Parliament, as it were, under clause 156 to some of those other clauses. It is not something that I would want to go to the wall on, but I hope that the Minister will have a look to see whether he thinks that some of those being subject to the affirmative procedure rather than the negative might be a better way to proceed.

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his amendment. The regulations established in part 5 will be technical in nature, with a focus on describing the different types of direct selection options, such as appointment of an existing licensee and any constraints on their use. In determining the suitable procedure, we have considered the impact on parliamentary time and the precedents in similar regulations in other areas of statute. For example, similar powers for the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority under section 6C of the Electricity Act 1989 have no parliamentary procedure in relation to offshore transmission owner tenders.

The regulations will provide for variations of the direct selection route already spelled out in the Bill. We do not think that parliamentary time will be effectively used by subjecting these regulations to the affirmative procedure. I hope that the hon. Member feels suitably reassured and will therefore be content to withdraw his amendment—notwithstanding what he just said a few minutes ago.

I will now turn to clauses 156 to 159. Clause 156 confirms that the regulations established under part 5 will be subject to the negative or the affirmative procedure. Clause 157 identifies several key terms that are used throughout part 5 and explains which sections contain the corresponding definitions. It is therefore intended solely as an aid to interpretation. Clause 158 introduces schedules 10 and 11 to the Bill, which contain various transitional provisions that may be exercised in connection with this part. It is intended solely to convey that the contents of those schedules exist and will be critical to the implementation of energy code governance reform.

Clause 159 introduces schedule 12, which contains details of various amendments required to other Acts as a consequence of this part of the Bill. The purpose of schedule 12 is to set out the details of the relevant amendments, which deal with one of two topics. The first topic relates to clause 152, which, as we have already heard, empowers GEMA to issue directions to the bodies that are responsible for operating, or procuring the operation of, the critical IT systems that underpin the energy system. I therefore commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Dr Whitehead]

The Minister has not entirely satisfied me on this. In general, regulations should be affirmative, unless there is a good reason for them to be negative—not the other way around. The Minister has suggested this afternoon that the other way around appears to be the default for his Department in this respect. I do not think that that is good practice for legislation in general, but who am I to take on the entire forces of parliamentary legislation writers all by myself? I hope that we can perhaps get a better outcome for such things in future, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 156 to 158 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedules 10 and 11 agreed to.

Clause 159 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 12 agreed to.

Clause 160

Competitive tenders for electricity projects

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his amendment, which I believe is intended to be helpful—as are all of his amendments. However, I gently disagree with him that we might be heading in the wrong direction on this.

The Government recognise the importance of clarifying which projects are within the scope of competition and which are to be exempt, and steps have already been taken to provide that clarity. We are already seeking powers for the Secretary of State to set criteria to determine whether projects are eligible for competition through clause 160. The underlying guiding policy in their design is whether there is a consumer benefit to competing any given project.

The Government recognise that their application could cause some uncertainty in the immediate term. That is why, last year, we committed to exempting certain strategic projects from competition. Ofgem, the independent regulator, published in December 2022 a decision on which projects are exempt—projects worth approximately £20 billion—and is working with industry to accelerate those network projects so they are ready for 2030.

Therefore, I believe that, sadly, the amendment is unnecessary. It would duplicate existing policy work to exempt certain strategic projects and would create an unnecessary avenue for exemptions, beyond the existing criteria that Ofgem will apply to determine eligibility for competition. For those reasons, I hope the hon. Gentleman feels able to withdraw this amendment.

Clause 160 gives effect to schedule 13 to the Bill, which sets out the mechanism for enabling competitive tenders to take place in onshore electricity networks. To ensure energy security for Great Britain, significant investment is needed in our electricity network to meet an estimated doubling in demand up to 2050. The electricity networks strategic framework, published in August 2022, sets out the estimated additional £100 billion to £240 billion of investment required in the onshore network to meet net zero.

Under the current system, network companies that are regional monopolies build, own and operate our network. They are regulated to do so efficiently through Ofgem’s price control processes, but it is vital that we guarantee value for money by ensuring that network investment is cost-efficient and strategic. That is why clause 160 is important.

I turn now to clause 161 and schedule 14. The first part of the clause introduces schedule 14, which establishes the new energy network special mergers regime. The regime is designed to enable the Competition and Markets Authority to assess whether a merger between certain energy network enterprises in Great Britain substantially prejudices Ofgem’s ability to carry out certain regulatory functions. Specifically, it relates to the price control process by which Ofgem determines how much energy network companies can spend and, therefore, how much they will pass on to consumers through energy bills.

The Government have estimated that introducing the regime could save energy consumers up to £420 million over 10 years by avoiding excess profits for energy network enterprises.

[Dr Whitehead]

The Minister may well be right—I do not say that very often, but I will say it on this occasion. This amendment, by the way, was initially drafted in the long-distant period when the Bill first emerged over the horizon, beyond the timeframe of most of our memories now, and it has been superseded at least partly by what Ofgem has been doing as far as ASTI is concerned. I am happy to withdraw it on that basis, but I hope we will keep that clear distinction for the future. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 160 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 13 agreed to.

Clause 161 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 14 agreed to.

Clause 162

Licence required for operation of multi-purpose interconnector

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 163 to 167 stand part.

That schedule 15 be the Fifteenth schedule to the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

Multi-purpose interconnectors are assets that combine electricity interconnectors between Great Britain and other jurisdictions with electricity transmission connections for offshore wind. They can help us achieve our net zero target by further integrating renewables into the grid. However, the existing legal framework does not enable the operation of a multi-purpose interconnector. Without a legal definition, there is a lack of clarity over their treatment.

Clause 162 introduces the definition of a multi-purpose interconnector into the Electricity Act 1989. It also amends that Act to ensure that a person who operates a multi-purpose interconnector will be required to hold a licence or exemption. To minimise conflicts of interest, the clause also ensures that the same person may not hold a multi-purpose interconnector licence while simultaneously holding a licence for electricity generation, transmission, distribution or supply. It also prohibits the same person from simultaneously holding multi-purpose and standard interconnector licences.

Multi-purpose interconnectors are a nascent technology, and the clause ensures that the definition of a multi-purpose interconnector is broad enough to account for the range of technologies involved in their operation, including future technologies. For example, although early multi-purpose interconnectors look to combine electricity interconnection with offshore wind, future multi-purpose interconnectors may link with energy islands or include the electrification of offshore oil and gas and CCUS platforms.

Clause 163 introduces the requirement for the Secretary of State to set the standard conditions for the multi-purpose interconnector licence, ensuring Government oversight. It outlines the requirement for the Secretary of State to publish the standard conditions, with the publication to be done in the manner considered appropriate by the Secretary of State. The clause contains a provision for specific standard conditions included in the multi-purpose interconnector licence to not have effect until brought into operation. It also includes a provision for the suspension of the effect of specific standard conditions included in the multi-purpose interconnector licence, as well as a provision to reintroduce the effect of suspended standard conditions. That may be necessary due to changes in trading arrangements, for example.

To ensure the standard conditions determined by the Secretary of State are incorporated, clause 163 will amend the Electricity Act 1989. That amendment will need to be commenced by secondary legislation to allow sufficient time for development of the standard licence conditions. Once commenced, the Secretary of State will not be able to further modify the standard conditions; however, they may veto proposals made by the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority to modify the standard licence conditions. The procedures detailed in the clause are in line with those that were introduced for interconnector licences.

Clause 164 amends the Electricity Act 1989 by inserting new section 10NA, which ensures that any person who operates a multi-purpose interconnector has been certified by Ofgem to be independent from electricity generation and supply activities, reducing the risk of conflicts of interest. That Act already provides for standard interconnectors to receive certification from Ofgem, and it is thus considered appropriate to extend that provision to multi-purpose interconnectors. Certification is a necessary precursor to the award of multi-purpose interconnector licences.

Clause 165 details the power of the Secretary of State to grant MPI licences to existing operators developing pilot project MPIs. The Government and Ofgem have continued to support pilot MPI projects to develop, as it is the Government’s intention to encourage operators to move towards a more co-ordinated and efficient offshore network. The clause enables the Secretary of State to grant an MPI licence to existing operators who hold an interconnection or offshore transmission licence for the purposes of developing a multi-purpose interconnector. That licence will replace operators’ existing interconnector or offshore transmission licence.

The clause also reads in minor modifications to the Electricity Act 1989, so that relevant sections will apply to the exercise of the Secretary of State’s power in this clause. It also includes a requirement for the Secretary of State to consult the potential MPI licensee and the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority prior to granting a licence. Furthermore, this provision mirrors existing powers that were brought forward through the Energy Act 2004. Those powers allowed the Government to grant interconnector licences to persons who were operating interconnectors under transmission licences. Reflecting that standard, clause 165 will allow the Government to grant MPI licences to persons who are operating MPIs under interconnector or transmission licences.

Clause 166 essentially enables the Secretary of State to amend existing legislation to ensure that multi-purpose interconnectors are not accidentally impacted by current laws. As MPIs—as I have already said—are a nascent technology, there is the potential for some aspects of the regulatory frameworks, market trading arrangements, and operational processes to transform once MPI activity commences.

The full detail of any possible necessary changes is difficult to identify at this stage. Following the pilot MPI projects, the Government will be in a better position to understand the full range of changes needed. The Secretary of State must consult GEMA before bringing forward any regulations. Any regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure. In this way, the Government can adequately balance the need to be flexible in a changing landscape with the need to ensure that there is appropriate parliamentary scrutiny.

Clause 167 introduces schedule 15, which makes minor and consequential amendments to existing Acts. The majority of the consequential amendments will be made to the Electricity Act 1989, which makes provision regarding the supply, generation and transmission of electricity. Other Acts affected include the Energy Act 2004, the Utilities Act 2000 and the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. The changes will ensure that the legal framework for multi-purpose interconnectors functions properly alongside existing legislation.

I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Dr Whitehead]

The Minister obviously had to read all that stuff out, so I will try to simplify it a bit for the Committee. At the moment, we have a number of interconnectors, which basically go from A to B. They go from Norway, Belgium, Holland and France and between England, Wales and Ireland. They are very much A to B, two-way connectors. When I say that they come from Norway, France and so on, it is a potential two-way process.

However, under regulation, the interconnectors have very much stayed exactly as that. For the next stage of our development, as far as low-carbon renewables are concerned, we need interconnectors that can actually take what is coming from, say, the North sea and bring it on board to the interconnector—possibly via an energy island, as the Minister said—and then send the resulting electricity in any direction. Currently, that is effectively banned. A two-way interconnector cannot be interrupted for that purpose. Having multi-purpose interconnectors not only enables that, but, as we try to develop a much better grid system in the North sea, it enables a great deal of use to be made of those interconnectors. That means being used not only for the purpose of landing offshore wind, but, as the Minister said, for, for example, repowering North sea oil and gas rigs. In other words, that means integrating all the things happening in the North sea into a big energy endeavour. Multi-purpose interconnectors are absolutely vital for that.

I very much welcome the clauses, but I would say just one thing. I am pleased to hear that the Minister will pursue an iterative process in developing regulation for multi-purpose interconnectors, or MPIs, as we will call them from now on, but interconnectors go between two jurisdictions and sometimes have to deal at both ends with slightly different electricity markets in order to carry out the functions of the two-way electricity flow—that is the same for gas interconnectors, by the way. We may therefore get into the position where they will straddle different jurisdictions in terms of their operability to gather and collect what is going to that interconnector, but without landing directly and then going to another country. For example, MPIs may well interface between the UK and Norwegian offshore zones, while potentially straddling UK and Dutch offshore zones, and so on. Therefore, the matter of who is responsible for what is coming into and out of the system could be much more complicated than it is at the moment with the current A to B interconnectors. Multi-purpose interconnectors could even serve several different countries’ territorial areas across the North sea.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Electricity storage can enable us to use energy more flexibly and decarbonise our energy system cost effectively. For example, it can help to balance the system at lower cost, maximise the use of intermittent renewables, and reduce the need for network upgrades and new generation. However, the regulatory framework for electricity was not built with technologies such as electricity storage in mind; they did not exist. Without a definition there is a lack of legal clarity over its treatment, which can disincentivise investment and hence the deployment of storage.

The clause clarifies that electricity storage is a distinct subset of generation in the Electricity Act 1989. It also defines storage as energy that was converted from electricity, and is stored for the purpose of its future reconversion into electricity. The measure removes current ambiguities and provides long-term clarity over electricity storage’s treatment within the existing frameworks and possible future frameworks. By doing so, it facilitates the deployment of storage.

[Dr Whitehead]

All I can say is: hooray! I have spent quite a lot of time on previous occasions attempting to get the House to legislate on separate electricity storage licences—freestanding without the current restrictions on storage. It is regarded as being both in and out, and therefore potentially subject to separate licences. An important change will come about as a result of this clause.

To go back to our previous discussion on codes, quite a lot of energy storage is likely to be further hampered by the existence of the codes themselves, which are very restricted to battery storage, long-term storage and the arrangements that go with that. It is important that we look at those codes at the same time to ensure that they are as up to date as possible, in line with new licences that may be put out. However, the fact that we at last have a category for storage in licensing, which will greatly facilitate the rise of particularly long-duration storage, is only to be applauded.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 168 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 169

Payment as alternative to complying with certain energy company obligations

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

The clause enables the Secretary of State to introduce a voluntary buy-out mechanism under the energy company obligation—ECO—scheme, through amending the Gas Act 1986 and the Electricity Act 1989.

Under the ECO scheme, there is currently an exemption for energy suppliers with fewer than 150,000 domestic customer accounts. The exemption is contentious, and the Government committed to consulting on how it could be reduced without smaller suppliers incurring disproportionate costs. We are proposing to do so through a buy-out mechanism. The clause provides the powers to create buy-out, with secondary legislation required to establish the details of the said mechanism. The measure enables small suppliers to meet their ECO obligations by simply making a payment to an approved third party for an approved purpose.

The clause also enables the Secretary of State to determine and publish the buy-out price, which can be set differently for different periods or scheme phases. By doing so, it ensures that the buy-out price is based on the most up-to-date information on the estimated cost of the promotion of measures. The final part of the clause sets out that the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers can impose criteria for approving third parties and purposes. There are no limitations in primary legislation on such criteria, because the use of the buy-out will depend on the wider policy goals behind the administration of future schemes, which are subject to change over time.

By introducing the buy-out mechanism and obligating more suppliers under the ECO, the costs of meeting the obligations will be shared across a larger customer base. That will result in a fairer energy market by reducing any current distortions between obligated and non-obligated suppliers, and it will spread the cost of the ECO more equally across customers’ bills.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 169 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 170

Smart meters: extension of time for exercise of powers

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 100, in clause 170, page 146, line 7, at end insert—

“(5) Within six months of the date of this section coming into force, the Secretary of State must produce and lay before Parliament a report setting out options for securing a guaranteed roll-out of smart meters to at least 70% of premises in all regions and nations of the United Kingdom by 2025.

(6) The report under subsection (5) must consider, among other options—

(a) obligatory smart meter installation,

(b) transfer of responsibility for smart meter roll-out to Distribution Network Operators, and

(c) time limits for phasing out meters which are not smart meters.”

The purpose of a report under this amendment is to emphasise that the Government should be aiming for at least 70% coverage in all regions and nations of the UK by 2025.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank Members for their contributions on amendment 100. The situation in the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam’s constituency over the winter period sounds dreadful. My heart goes out to all those affected and I would be happy to arrange meetings with the relevant Minister in the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, if she has not already had one, because it cannot be that we find ourselves in that situation again, should that event take place—we hope not—in her constituency or, indeed, in any other constituency throughout the country. That has to be addressed.

On the amendment more widely, I like to think of myself as a glass half-full, positive guy. I think we should be celebrating the fact that more than 32.4 million houses, homes and residences in the United Kingdom now have smart meters. That is nearly 54% of homes and we should celebrate that. Indeed, on the point about older smart meters not being able to connect to the network, I am happy to tell the Committee that more than 12 million SMETS1 meters have now been connected to the Data Communications Company’s network, which enables communication with all energy suppliers so that consumers regain and retain their smart devices. That work continues at pace and, indeed, I can inform the Committee that through the wonders of modern technology the upgrade is happening remotely without consumers needing to take any action themselves. That is all good stuff and I hope people can join me in being positive and congratulate the work of officials and everybody in the industry who has been in charge of the roll-out thus far.

I thank the hon. Member for Southampton, Test for his amendment. I know that it comes from the right place and that he wants to see an increase in the pace and scale of our smart meter roll-out in the United Kingdom, for all the reasons he set out. I reassure the Committee that His Majesty’s Government have already taken measures to normalise smart metering as the default meter offer across Britain. Indeed, under the smart meter targets framework, which began only in 2022, energy suppliers have minimum annual installation targets for smart meters until the end of 2025. We believe that will drive the highest possible levels of smart meter coverage. I know, however, that the hon. Gentleman disagrees. Those targets are binding and Ofgem is responsible for regulating suppliers against them, with a range of enforcement tools at its disposal.

Energy suppliers have a long-standing obligation to take all reasonable steps to install a smart meter when a meter is fitted for the first time or an existing meter needs to be replaced. Their installation targets for 2022 and 2023 have already been set and, as the Committee may be aware, we have recently consulted on suppliers’ minimum installation targets for 2024 and 2025—here is a number that we can all cheer about—at coverage levels over and above the 70% called for in the amendment. We are currently considering the evidence provided by stakeholders and industry, and the Government will issue their response in due course. That work supersedes the need for the report requested in the amendment.

The amendment also calls for the report to consider the transfer of responsibility for the smart meter roll-out to distribution network operators. The Committee might recall that the option of a DNO roll-out was carefully considered and consulted on in 2009, at the start of the smart meter programme, when another party was in government. It was discarded as an inappropriate model for a roll-out that has, rightly, always prioritised consumer benefits. Who am I to question the decisions of the then new Labour Government?

A supplier-led roll-out will deliver more benefits for Great Britain. Metering has also been the responsibility of energy suppliers which, unlike network operators, have an existing direct relationship with their consumers. To change the approach at this stage would slow down roll-out progress considerably, reducing the crucial resultant benefits for consumers and our energy system.

Finally, the amendment proposes mandating smart meters or a date-limited phase-out of non-smart meters. You will be interested to learn, Ms Nokes, that such an approach to installations would present considerable practical barriers. For those who refuse, energy suppliers would in practice need to obtain forced powers of entry, which would be costly and highly intrusive for consumers.

I have already described the comprehensive regulation in place that is driving industry to deliver the highest levels of smart coverage, without mandating consumers. There remains good consumer demand for smart meters and, as I have explained, making smart meters mandatory is unnecessary and counterproductive, given the current high levels of uptake. I hope that, given the reassurances I have provided, the hon. Member for Southampton, Test will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Let me turn briefly to clause 170. As I have said, 32.4 million energy meters in homes and small businesses across Great Britain were smart by March 2023. That is a significant achievement in one of the most ambitious upgrades to our energy infrastructure for a generation, but there is still more to do.

On 1 November 2023, the regulatory powers that the Secretary of State has in relation to smart metering are due to expire. Those vital powers have been used by the Government to establish and develop the framework necessary to support a successful smart meter roll-out across Great Britain, giving households and small businesses the information they need to feel in control and manage their energy usage. Clause 170 would extend by five years, from 1 November 2023 to 1 November 2028—we will be coming to the end of this period of Conservative government then—the period within which the Secretary of State can exercise the powers in relation to smart metering contained in the Energy Act 2008, the Electricity Act 1989 and the Gas Act 1986.

The powers provide Government with the ability to modify energy licence conditions and documents maintained in accordance with the energy licence conditions—for example, industry codes—and create new licensable activities or veto a proposed transfer of the whole or any part of a smart meter communication licence. The clause does not change the nature of the existing powers. So far, the powers have enabled the Government to drive significant progress in the smart meter roll-out, realising huge benefits for consumers and our energy system. They have been used to require energy suppliers to use smart meters that are interoperable and meet robust security requirements, and to ensure that consumers receive energy efficiency advice at the point of installation.

Clause 170 will also enable us to deliver the four-year targets framework for smart metering through to December 2025, ensuring that energy suppliers’ smart meter installation targets remain robust and effective, after which we must maximise the long-term benefits of a Great Britain-wide smart metering system, following a post-implementation review.

There is robust evidence from the roll-out to date that consumers are achieving sustained savings using their smart meters and in-home displays. Unleashing the full potential of smart systems and flexibility in our energy sector will reduce the costs of managing Britain’s energy system by up to £10 billion a year by 2050. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Whitehead]

The Minister is not just a glass half-full guy; he is a glass overflowing and going down the side of the glass on to the table kind of guy. I am not sure I can work out the best metaphor. This is like someone being just over halfway round a marathon course and noticing that all the officials have gone home and everyone else has packed up. This person is unlikely to complete the course because everybody has gone and they are not quite sure how to get to the end, but then they sit by the side of the road and say, “Yippee, I have done 14 miles. That is a great achievement. We should all be proud of ourselves for doing that.” That was never the purpose of the smart meter roll-out; the purpose was to get full smart meter coverage in the shortest time. That was what the Government said at every stage of the process.

Some very early consultations took place when the last Labour Government were in office, but no legislation was passed and no formal material about legislation was published until the Conservatives had been in power for two years. I really do not think it is much to do with the previous Labour Government, though it was a good try.

I am disappointed, to be honest. The Minister has given us a Panglossian version of the smart meter world, but I am sure he knows that things are not well at all in that world. There is no gainsaying the really hard work of officials, companies, installers and everyone who has done such good, hard work to get the roll-out complete—I am not saying anything about them. I am saying that the original goal of the smart meter programme is so far off beam now as to make it really difficult to achieve its original purpose in the time that is left for us to get our act together and get those smart meters in place.

I know we are all about to go home—I hope we are all about to go home—so I hope the Committee will not feel too bad about being detained for another five minutes to have a brief Division on this amendment, because it is important that we put on the record that we really want something more to happen in respect of smart meters than is currently happening. I am sure, Ms Nokes, that you will be in the unenviable position of having to decide on the tie and where we go next. That is an exciting duty. [Interruption.] Oh yes, sorry—the SNP spokesman slipped out unnoticed; that is not like him at all. We would still like to push the amendment to a vote, even though it is likely to be negatived, for the reasons I have outlined.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Energy Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Thursday 8th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Whitehead]

A little bit—a road at the top of my constituency has you, Ms Nokes, as MP for half of it, while I am the MP for the other half. We are indeed close neighbours.

As has been discussed, the Government have kindly tabled a number of new clauses relating to Great British Nuclear and energy-intensive industry assistance. That brings to four the number of areas on which the Government have introduced new clauses while the Bill has been proceeding. This is beginning to resemble those episodes where people book a holiday in Spain, thinking they have a nice hotel, only to get there and find that it is a building site, with no rooms booked in sight.

That aside, given that the clauses have been tabled, it would be helpful to have an indication of when the Government intend to consider them. I say that because the Opposition need to properly scrutinise them, and may want to introduce amendments. The Minister will know that the deadline for tabling such amendments is today, so if the Minister was considering dropping those clauses into the Bill next week, that would obviously prevent us from tabling amendments in the usual manner. I would be grateful if the Minister clarified his intentions.

[Andrew Bowie]

I guarantee that the new clauses will be debated at the end of our process in Committee. I am sure there will be adequate time to debate them in depth. It may resemble a building site, but we are on the route to building a luxury, all-inclusive, five-star resort through this Bill, so he has nothing to worry about in that regard.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

The clause relates to the question of the installation of heat pumps, as the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun correctly drew attention to. The intention of the amendment, had it been moved, was to place the Government’s own targets in the legislation. There is a question about the difference between those targets and what has actually happened so far with the boiler upgrade scheme, for example, with 30,000 heat pumps per year being underwritten for a three-year period, leaving a difference between the target and the number of heat pumps likely to be installed under that scheme of more than 500,000.

There is a considerable difference between Government targets, how many heat pumps have already been installed and how many heat pumps are likely to be installed over the next few years. One of the purposes of the amendment, which was not moved, was to stiffen the Government’s resolve in that respect by placing those targets on the face of the Bill, so that the question of how the gap is made up is rather more focused in the minds of the Government now and, indeed, any future Government.

It is important that we start the process of filling in the gap between target and actuality. I would be grateful if the Minister could give us a few brief views on how that might be done, and what he intends to do, possibly on the basis of this legislation, to make that gap clearly reachable and incorporate it into the progress that has already been made with heat pump installations.

[Andrew Bowie]

To answer the hon. Gentleman’s substantive point on why we are not incorporating the Government’s own target of 600,000 heat pumps per year by 2028, there are compelling reasons why we believe it would be unwise to set any particular target in the enabling powers in the Bill. The setting of scheme targets is best suited to the making of regulations. That is in part because that is when the best assessment of the relevant market conditions can be made, so that targets do not exceed what is viable and result in unintended consequences, which we would be worried about had we put the target on the face of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Nokes. Clauses 107 to 113 detail the administration, enforcement, penalties and appeals related to the low-carbon heat schemes. Clause 107 sets out the various operational, administrative and monitoring features of the scheme that the regulations may provide for. As set out in a recent second policy consultation, the Government believe that it is important that the scheme enables participants a degree of flexibility to meet the targets. To that end, the clause allows the regulations to specify how scheme participants may meet or partially meet targets, other than directly selling low-carbon heating appliances themselves, such as through trade in certificates with other parties. The clause also provides for regulations to specify the consequences and options for scheme participants who fail to meet a target under the scheme.

Clause 108 enables the appointment in regulations of an administrator for a low-carbon heat scheme and the conferral of functions on that scheme administrator. The clause sets out that one or more public authorities may be appointed as scheme administrator. That would include the Secretary of State, as well as public bodies and regulators such as the Environment Agency and Ofgem. The clause also provides for regulations to authorise an appointed administrator to arrange for functions to be carried out by a third party.

Clause 109 provides for the assessment, enforcement and sanctioning of non-compliance with a low-carbon heat scheme. It enables the administrator to conduct a range of enforcement activities and provides for the regulations to establish sanctions for non-compliance, such as the failure to produce the required documentation or to make a necessary payment. That could be in the shape of both civil penalties, and potentially criminal offences where warranted. Clause 110 sets out that regulations may determine how any payments made by virtue of the penalties set out in clause 109, or by virtue of the payment framework provided for by clause 107, are to be used.

Clause 111 provides for the regulation to establish an appeals process against decisions by the administrator of a low-carbon heat scheme, or against penalties or other enforcement action taken for non-compliance by a scheme participant. Such an appeals process is relatively commonplace for obligations and trading schemes of that kind, so that disputes can be settled, enhancing confidence in decision-making processes related to scheme administration.

Clause 112 establishes procedural requirements for the making of low-carbon heat scheme regulations. The affirmative parliamentary procedure will be used for statutory instruments that first establish a low-carbon heat scheme. The affirmative procedure will also apply for regulations that make substantive changes to the fundamental parameters of a scheme—that is to say, the parties in scope of the targets or the heating appliances that the scheme is designed to encourage. Where the regulations are more administrative in nature, and the fundamental elements of a scheme are not being altered, the negative resolution procedure will apply. That will include, for instance, adjustments to the requirements for the keeping or provision of information, year-to-year adjustment of targets, or adjustments to the rules around the certificate trading between parties.

The clause also stipulates a requirement that before making scheme regulations the Secretary of State must consult the relevant Ministers in the devolved Administrations, so far as the regulations apply in relation to those respective nations. The Government have constructive engagement with our counterparts in the devolved Administrations at both official and ministerial level on the development of the clean heat market mechanism. We look forward to continuing to work closely and consultatively as we move forward with the scheme’s development. Finally, clause 113 provides definitions of key terms within the chapter.

[Dr Whitehead]

These are sensible provisions, following the initial clauses about low-carbon heat schemes, and they will help greatly with the regulation of the schemes generally. I have nothing to say about the clauses, other than that I was so excited by the Minister’s oratory a moment ago that I knocked my glass of water over.

[The Chair]

I am not sure that the Minister needs to respond to that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

The clause defines what we mean by a hydrogen grid conversion trial and expands the duty of the gas transporter running the trial to participants to undertake work without charge. It also extends certain powers of entry contained in the Gas Act 1986 so that they apply for the trial. That will facilitate the effective and safe delivery of a large village hydrogen heating trial by 2025, which will provide crucial evidence to inform future decisions on the role of hydrogen in heat decarbonisation.

Taking timely strategic decisions on heating is critical to meeting future carbon budgets and the UK’s net zero target. Subsection (1) allows the Secretary of State to designate a hydrogen grid conversion trial and ensures that both clause 114 and clause 115 are narrow in scope and would apply only for the purposes of such a trial. Clause 114 also makes certain modifications to the Gas Act 1986 to build on existing provisions concerning powers of entry. That will ensure that the organisation running the trial has clear grounds to enter private properties to carry out any essential works, including replacing appliances and installing and testing safety valves; undertake inspections and tests for the trial, such as safety checks; and safely disconnect the gas supply in a property.

Gas transporters already have powers of entry into properties through the Gas Act. We are extending those powers in a very limited way to conduct the necessary work to set up and deliver the trial. Gas transporters will use the extended powers only ever as a last resort, once all other attempts to contact property owners and reach an agreement are exhausted. The existing rules on powers of entry requiring the gas transporter to obtain a warrant from a magistrates court will continue to apply. No one in the trial location will be forced to use hydrogen.

The gas transporter delivering the trial will develop an attractive consumer offer for participants, as well as viable alternative options such as electric cookers and heating systems, for consumers who do not wish to or cannot participate in the trial. Finally, I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that most responses to the Department’s 2021 public consultation on facilitating a hydrogen village trial were broadly supportive of our proposals to change the legislation in this way.

Clause 115 focuses on establishing consumer protections for people taking part in this first-of-its-kind hydrogen village trial. It will do so by giving the Secretary of State two delegated powers to make regulations that require the gas transporter running the trial to follow specific processes to engage and inform consumers about the trial and ensure that consumers are protected before, during and after it.

Consumer engagement and support are vital for the successful delivery of the trial. The Department is working closely with the gas transporters as they develop their plans for consumer engagement and protection. Regulations will ensure that the gas transporter running the trial takes the necessary steps to inform consumers about how they will be impacted. That means that people will have the information they need to make an informed choice about whether to connect to hydrogen or accept the alternative offer during the trial. The gas transporter will also need to give adequate notice about the requirement to disconnect properties from natural gas.

The power to introduce regulations for consumer protections will work alongside existing protections such as the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and the Gas (Standards of Performance) Regulations 2005. I am sure that Members of the Committee will agree that the provisions in clause 115, which were well received by stakeholders when we consulted on them in 2021, are crucial to ensure the fair treatment and protection of people in the trial area. The powers will also allow the Department to set out the enforcement requirements for the regulations, which may include civil penalties but will not create any new criminal offences.

[Dr Whitehead]

The clause addresses some very important issues with the process of hydrogen trials, which are in fact already under way in a couple of parts of the UK. It relates to the first part of the ambition that the Government set out in the energy security strategy: to have village trials, leading perhaps to town trials later and, by the end of the decade, a city trial. Of course, to some extent that is subject to what may be decided in 2026 about whether hydrogen will go into heating systems in general. Even if the decision ends up as a negative and the Government decide not to universalise hydrogen for heating at that stage, the trials will of course be necessary should there be circumstances in which hydrogen can be used on a grid-isolated basis for heating in particular places, and it will be necessary to have the appliances and equipment capable of taking that hydrogen. The Minister will be aware that a number of boiler companies are already producing hydrogen-ready boilers and the like, some which are being used in the village trials.

There are two village trials under way at the moment: one in Ellesmere Port and one in Redcar. Interestingly, public appreciation of those trials is markedly different. One is trying to get everybody on board straight away. In the other, the company running the trial has taken a different approach to universal involvement. We might think that all the properties in a particular area need to be in the trial for it to be entirely valid, but that is not necessarily the case. One company is intending, at rather a late stage of the trial, to introduce a separate hydrogen main into the area. The other trial company is trying to get people on board without modifying the main and will use what was the gas main for carrying the hydrogen. That creates a considerable issue for participation in the trial.

The Minister said that no one would be forced to take part in trials, but at the same time spoke about enhanced powers of entry and various other things, which suggests that the powers could be used to force everyone to take part. That is what amendment 118 is concerned with. It states:

“where a gas transporter is conducting a trial involving a fully alternative grid for the purpose of hydrogen delivery”.

If we wish to adhere to the principle that not everybody has to take part in a trial—there might be many good reasons why people do not want to do so—there must be guaranteed arrangements for the installation of other forms of low carbon heating or indeed for no low carbon heating at all if an alternative main is put in place for people who do not wish to take part in grid conversion trials. Under subsection (4), the amendment would require companies undertaking trials to guarantee the installation of other forms of low-carbon heating, such as heat pumps or low-carbon gas heating. That would enable the trials to bring valid results, and give people in those areas the ability not to take part if they do not wish to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Transport is the largest emitting sector of greenhouse gas emissions, producing 26% of the UK’s total emissions in 2021. Low carbon alternatives to traditional fuels such as petrol and diesel will play an important role in our energy transition. The renewable transport fuel obligation and the forthcoming sustainable aviation fuel mandate supports our policy on decarbonising transport by encouraging the production and use of renewable fuels that do not damage the environment.

Clause 117 will enable two types of low carbon to be treated as though they were renewable for the sole purpose of those schemes, helping the UK to further decarbonise transport. The two low carbon fuels are recycled carbon fuels, produced from otherwise unrecyclable waste plastics or industrial waste gases that cannot be avoided, reused, or recycled, and fuels derived from nuclear energy.

Currently, powers under the Energy Act 2004 only permit renewable fuels to be supported. The clause has been carefully drafted so that it does not classify recycled carbon fuels and nuclear-derived fuels as renewable fuels, ensuring these fuels are treated as though they were renewable for the sole purpose of part 2, chapter 5 of the Energy Act 2004. That allows schemes such as the renewable transport fuel obligation and forthcoming sustainable aviation fuel mandate to support the use of those types of fuels. It does not grant them wider consideration as renewable fuels.

Both fuel types have the potential to deliver significant carbon savings over traditional fossil fuels and are a vital replacement for difficult-to-decarbonise sectors such as commercial aviation and heavy goods vehicles.

[Dr Whitehead]

I have nothing to say on the clause, but I believe that my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hallam does.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

This is a very short clause. The purpose of the clause is to enable engineered removals of greenhouse gas emissions to count towards our carbon budgets by amending the definition of UK removals in the Climate Change Act 2008. This amendment follows a direct recommendation from the Climate Change Committee in their sixth carbon budget report on greenhouse gas removals. In the net zero strategy, we set the ambition of deploying at least 5 million tonnes of CO₂ per year of engineered removals, such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage and direct air carbon capture and storage, by 2030, in line with assessments made by the Climate Change Committee and the National Infrastructure Commission. This amendment provides for these removals to be included in the calculation of carbon budgets.

[Dr Whitehead]

This is another stand-alone clause. We have discussed the question of DACCS and other forms of mechanical greenhouse gas removal before, and our consensus of understanding was that potentially this could be quite an important element of carbon removal in the future. It is therefore important that it is included in definitions and calculations, and we certainly support the change to achieve that outcome.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

I do not disagree. As the hon. Member knows, I am a passionate advocate of carbon capture, utilisation and storage and the clusters emerging across the United Kingdom. As I know he supports and champions, we have already spent over £40 million supporting the Scottish cluster as a UK Government.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 118 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 119

The Independent System Operator and Planner (“the ISOP”)

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 95, in clause 119, page 108, line 34, at end insert

“including the oversight of efficiency and loss reduction in cabling”.

This amendment would give the Independent System Operator oversight of cabling efficiency and loss reduction in cabling.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Member is absolutely right. I think the figure is around 6%—sometimes a bit higher—but part of the issue with that loss is not just the general inefficiency of the system; under certain circumstances, we are using cables for transmission that are much less efficient than they should be.

I visited—this shows the exciting things that I do as shadow Energy Minister—a test site of a highly efficient cable system. I will not mention the company’s name, but as far as I know it is pursuing a much more efficient cable system with a number of DNOs. When I got to the site, there was not very much to see because the cable had been buried underground; I was pointed to a field. There was, however, in the corner of the field, a hut in which calculations on how the cable was performing, and how it would perform in conjunction with other forms of cable, were being undertaken. I was able to see for myself an increase in the efficiency of the cable of about 15%, just by having that cable design as opposed to others.

It seems to me quite important that the cabling introduced to our new system be as efficient as possible. It needs to be clear to the companies that will put the closed cables in that that is what will be expected of them. That is why we would like an additional function to be added to the ISOP’s concerns: oversight of efficiency and loss reduction in cabling.

We have tabled other amendments, which concern the relationship with the DNOs. It is important that we do not make an artificial distinction in terms of what we are doing with the ISOP in the high-level system and others. I am afraid that the Bill, whether intentionally or not, appears to create that divide. The DNOs can get on with their activities, and the high-level grid will have a different system of governance and management. That is why amendment 96 would add

“and of distribution systems in conjunction with licenced distribution system operators”

to the end of line 3, in clause 119. Amendment 97 would add the same words. That would create a much better system of co-operation and collaboration between the DNOs and the new system operator.

I appreciate that we will not vote on new clause 37 today. It is important for the independent system operator really to be independent, and not a creature of either the energy companies or the Government, so that it has its own ability to look at the system, to produce recommendations and arrangements, and to oversee the development of the system as its own master within that.

We therefore suggest in new clause 37 that an independent advisory board be set up to ensure the independence of the ISOP. There are other ways of doing this, but we are suggesting one particular way of ensuring that the ISOP operates in the genuinely independent way that we all want it to in pursuit of the future of grids and connections.

I hope that the Minister and the Committee understand that our amendments and new clauses all seek to help with the ISOP. I hope that the Minister will respond positively by saying that there are different ways of achieving what we want to achieve with the ISOP’s powers, or that, although he might not be able to accept the amendments today, he is actively minded to have a good think about them. By the way, I am grateful for the note that the Minister wrote to me last night about the fact that the Government have done just that with one particular amendment to the Bill. That sort of process could easily be followed in such circumstances in future.

[Andrew Bowie]

Before I expand on the Government’s position and explain why we will not accept new clause 1 or the hon. Gentleman’s amendments, I will acknowledge absolutely that connections and connection timelines are the biggest challenge we face—for electrification to grid, for driving our economy forward in the way we seek to and for reaching our net zero goals. Every single day for the past few months, but in particular this week, I have been engaging with DNOs, transmission operators, Nick Winser who conducted the independent review, Ofgem and the National Grid ESO about what we can do to drive down those timelines. At a critical point, part of that will be the creation of the ISOP. For the benefit of those who might be slightly confused, that is what we refer to outside the Bill as the future system operator—ISOP and the future system operator are one and the same thing.

I will now turn to the question asked by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test about why an advisory board would make ISOP risk-averse and not fully independent. We are concerned that, rather than enhancing independence, the members of such a board would likely hold various energy sector conflicts. That could crystallise in many ways, including resistance to systematic reform, advice to pay compensation to energy sector participants or an incumbent bias that would seek to frustrate new market entrants. Establishing an industry-led advisory board for the ISOP would be similar to establishing one for the Climate Change Committee—it is not required for an organisation that needs to remain independent, such as the Climate Change Committee, which we are using as the basis for how we proceed.

A prime consideration of the ISOP consultation was that the body should be independent from day-to-day Government control and from other energy sector interests. That is why we need to ensure that the ISOP is a trusted and independent voice within the energy sector.

Energy Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Tuesday 6th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Dr Whitehead, do you wish to speak to the clause?

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

indicated dissent.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 79 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 80

Enforcement

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

Thank you, Mr Gray. I was unable to finish my mint imperial; I was rather hoping that the Opposition might have something to say on the previous clause.

The clause enables regulations to make provision for the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority and the Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation to enforce hydrogen levy requirements imposed on relevant GB and Northern Ireland market participants respectively. It will allow the regulators to, for example, issue orders to secure compliance, impose financial penalties and, where other enforcement measures are insufficient, consider possible licence revocation. It is critical that the levy is supported by a suite of enforcement measures. This will help reduce the risk of defaults on levy payments and help ensure that the levy administrator can collect the moneys required to fund the hydrogen business models.

The clause also provides the Secretary of State with the power to make provision in regulations for the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority to enforce requirements that may be imposed on the independent system operator and planner as a hydrogen production allocation body. That may include requirements that relate to Northern Ireland. The clause helps ensure a consistent regulatory regime for the independent system operator and planner.

[Dr Whitehead]

I am sorry, Mr Gray, but I am going to have to leave the Minister with a mint imperial in his mouth as I do not have anything to say on this clause either.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 80 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 81

Consultation

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

Mint imperial completed. The clause requires the Secretary of State to consult the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland and Scottish and Welsh Ministers before making revenue support regulations where the matter being consulted on is within the legislative competence of the relevant devolved legislature. In addition, the Secretary of State must consult other persons as they consider appropriate. This provides an opportunity for those directly affected by the regulations and those with special expertise to express their views on their design. The clause also requires the Secretary of State to consult those persons he considers it appropriate to consult before publishing standard terms under clause 70.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 82 and 83 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 84

Shadow directors, etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

I will keep this brief. Clause 84 makes it clear that in exercising their functions under chapter 1 in relation to a revenue support counterparty, neither the Secretary of State nor an allocation body are to be deemed to be managing or controlling a counterparty in a way that would class them as, for example, “shadow directors”.

Clause 86 caters for a scenario where the independent system operator and planner—also known as the ISOP—is appointed as the hydrogen production allocation body. The clause will allow the Secretary of State to modify the electricity system operator and gas system planner licences expected to be held by the ISOP, as well as related documents, for the purposes of facilitating or ensuring the effective performance of hydrogen production allocation and related functions.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 84 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 85 to 87 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 88

Financing of costs of decommissioning etc

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 88, in clause 88, page 79, line 4, at end insert—

“(9A) Guidance by virtue of this section shall have regard to the circumstances under which a prospectively decommissioned carbon capture and storage facility came to be established and what relation that point of establishment had with provisions under part 4 of the Petroleum Act 1998.”

This amendment seeks to clarify the position of decommissioned oil and gas plants that are not fully decommissioned before they are transitioned to a carbon capture usage and storage plant, and where financial responsibility then lies at the end of the CCUS lifecycle when it is due to be decommissioned. This amendment says that the Secretary of State must have regard for this complexity and assess where the responsibility lies.

We now come to chapter 2 of part 2 of the Bill, which deals mainly with decommissioning of carbon storage installations. That is likely to be of concern rather later in the day than currently, but it is important to get it right from the outset. Many carbon capture and storage installations will not have been set up just for the purpose of carbon capture and storage; they will have been recommissioned from a previously decommissioned oil and gas facility, or one that was not entirely decommissioned but put to use as a repository for carbon dioxide, usually offshore. As we go through that sequence, there will be many circumstances where what we had in place previously with respect to North sea oil and gas decommissioning, and the responsibilities of the company that has been producing oil or gas in a particular field as it moves to decommissioning, may become a little blurred.

Abandonment of offshore installations is covered by part IV of the Petroleum Act 1998. There is a lot in there about the circumstances under which those who operate offshore oil and gas facilities have a legacy duty to decommission the well from which they have been producing. They have responsibilities in that respect. They have to decommission the well to proper standards, ensuring that it is properly capped and that the plant has gone from the production platform. The platform itself may be towed away and scrapped in a Norwegian yard somewhere. The cycle is therefore complete as far as that oil and gas decommissioning is concerned.

One increasingly apparent issue is that we no longer want that to happen completely if we are to have successful carbon capture and storage facilities, under the North sea in particular. We want to see to what extent we can take those installations and turn them to another purpose—carbon capture and storage. They are adaptable for such purposes, and we will certainly use a lot of transferred facilities. I imagine that we will produce little in the way of brand-new carbon capture and storage facilities, but for some infrastructure—pipelines and so on. The pattern for carbon capture and storage has already largely been laid down by what we do in the North sea now.

One task for the future will be unrolling some of the decommissioning activity, which is a big business now, with a lot going on. One concern is that if the decommissioning of infrastructure continues at the pace it is going at the moment, when we come to concentrate our production in the North sea into smaller fields that have already been discovered but not yet exploited, we might well find that a lot of the infrastructure for the larger fields that we have decommissioned will have to be recreated all over again to allow the economic exploitation of the smaller fields, which are effectively in existing fields that have had the infrastructure stripped from them already.

That is one reason why we should not continue the decommissioning regime exactly as it is. The second reason, which is as or more important, is the extent of the infrastructure as a whole. I emphasise that this is a question not just of capping off oil wellheads and leaving the field alone when it is exhausted, but of trying to keep the infrastructure in place to allow for the transportation, landing and all the rest of the carbon capture activity to take place within the framework that was there before.

At the very end of the decommissioning process—for example, once a carbon capture and storage institution created from a depleted field is full, which I appreciate is quite a long way off—we will have to have a decommissioning programme in reverse. The question then arises: what sort of legacy duty will arise for those people who used the field in other circumstances, if it has been extended for carbon capture purposes and must then be decommissioned? Is there a joint legacy duty between the previous oil and gas users and the current carbon capture and storage users, or do the carbon capture and storage users take over completely the legacy duty for the previous field as far as decommissioning is concerned? Is there some kind of shared responsibility?

The amendment seeks to instruct guidance on such matters to have regard to those kinds of circumstances. I will read its exact wording:

“Guidance by virtue of this section”—

that is, clause 88, on decommissioning—

“shall have regard to the circumstances under which a prospectively decommissioned carbon capture and storage facility came to be established and what relation that point of establishment had with provisions under part 4 of the Petroleum Act”.

The amendment would link the carbon capture and storage activity straight back to the Petroleum Act, so that there is a continuous skein of commissioning, use and decommissioning, with the responsibilities that go with all that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Amendment 88, tabled by the Opposition spokesperson, seeks to expand the scope of guidance on the decommissioning fund. He has explained why he is presenting this amendment, and we should acknowledge his point about the complexities where a former oil and gas installation is repurposed for carbon storage purposes. It is important to get the question of who is responsible for decommissioning right.

The Petroleum Act 1998 is the principal legislation governing decommissioning offshore and the decommissioning of offshore carbon capture, usage and storage infrastructure, and provides a framework for the decommissioning of offshore pipelines and installations. However, it is not necessary to rely solely upon the guidance we are setting out in the Bill to deal with the situation in the North sea, because of what I have just set out: the existing law in the 1998 Act, combined with amendments to sections 30 and 30B of the Energy Act 2008 provided for by clauses 91 and 92 of this Bill. We believe that those already provide the necessary safeguards, because under part 4 of the Petroleum Act, the Government can call upon the previous owner of an asset to fulfil the decommissioning obligation if the current owner is unable to do so. That creates a chain of liability throughout the asset’s life, which would extend into carbon capture, usage and storage if an asset is reused. Previous oil and gas owners therefore continue to be liable for decommissioning a repurposed asset, unless the Secretary of State has designated the asset as eligible for change of use relief and other qualifying requirements are met.

The conditions to qualify for change of use relief are set out in sections 30A and 30B of the Energy Act 2008. In turn, it is proposed that sections 30A and 30B be updated by clauses 91 and 92 of the Bill. The amendments made by clauses 91 and 92 mean that, to qualify for the relief, the previous oil and gas owner would need to pay a top-up amount into the decommissioning fund to reflect the decommissioning liability that that previous owner is being relieved of. In addition, a decommissioning notice under section 29 of the Petroleum Act 1998 must have been served on other persons, such as the CCUS operator who will ultimately have to decommission the carbon storage installation at the end of its life.

The Government do not rule out the possibility of guidance providing additional explanation and detail on that and other matters pertaining to it, but we do not believe that it needs to be stated in the legislation, for the reasons that I have given. I therefore humbly ask the hon. Member for Southampton, Test to consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

The Minister has set out admirably the sub-controls and clarifications that can be provided by texts outside part IV of the 1998 Act, but with respect, those address circumstances in which the operator of a carbon capture and storage facility cannot meet their liabilities and obligations. In those circumstances, as the Minister says quite correctly, the previous owners will have some liability to step into the breach. By and large, as the new owners of carbon capture and storage facilities invest in them, they will not want to have liability, unless they go bust—that is effectively what the Minister is saying—and they presumably do not intend to go bust during the life of the carbon capture and storage plant. If their only lifetime guarantee from the repurposed body is that someone will come to their aid if they go bust, that is not really sufficient to establish the chain throughout the whole process. That is essentially what we are seeking through our amendment.

I appreciate that the Minister thinks that that can be done outside the Petroleum Act, but I would like an assurance that he has taken my point on board. When additional guidance is supplied, it should address the whole cycle, ensuring a good outcome for everybody, rather than a distressed outcome for certain people. If the Minister can give that assurance, I will be happy withdraw the amendment.

[Andrew Bowie]

As I said, additional guidance will be forthcoming. We do not believe it necessary, in this Bill, to legislate for what we are discussing. These are serious points, and in speaking to clauses 88 and 89, I will go into more detail about subsequent support for decommissioning, who is responsible, and so on. I hope that that is acceptable for the hon. Gentleman and that he feels able to withdraw his amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 89 to 93 stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

I have no particular objections—indeed, I strongly support the strategy and policy statement and everything that goes with it as far as the CCUS is concerned. As the Minister has pointed out, this does not cut across any other strategy and policy statement; conversely it should be guided by other strategy and policy statements where appropriate. Later, we will debate the extent to which the regulator, Ofgem, may have a strategy and policy statement of its own that gives it a carbon reduction net zero imperative in its operations. I assume that under those circumstances this particular strategy and policy statement would be subject to that strategy and policy statement as far as its operation is concerned. Will the Minister confirm that?

[Andrew Bowie]

I am happy to confirm that. The economic regulator, Ofgem, would be required to take into account the strategic priorities set out in any CCUS strategy and policy statement when carrying out its CCUS-related functions. Clause 40, which we have already debated, requires Ofgem to publish a document as soon as is reasonably practicable after a strategy and policy statement has been designated, setting out the strategy it intends to adopt to further the delivery of the policy in the statement and how that will be implemented. I am very happy to confirm that that would be the case.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 94 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 95 to 97 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 98

Specified provisions in carbon dioxide storage licences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Clause 98 will allow the Oil and Gas Authority, whose business name is now the North Sea Transition Authority, to consider a proposed change of control of a holder of a carbon storage licence before it takes place to ensure that the governance, technical and financial capability of such a licensee remains appropriate. At present, the NSTA issues licences to give the right to store carbon dioxide in offshore geological formations; prior to issuing the licences, the NSTA satisfies itself that the prospective licensee company and any parent company are fit to hold the licence and will meet the obligations.

At times during the life of a licence, the ownership and control of a licensee may pass to a new parent company or person. An undesirable change of control could undermine investor confidence in the commercial environment, making the UK continental shelf a less attractive place for investment. Currently, the NSTA is able to take remedial action regarding a change of control of licence holder only after such a change has occurred. This is seen by both the NSTA and the wider industry as being inefficient and of limited effectiveness in preventing harms to the wider industry, the Government and the economy. The existing remedy is also time-consuming, typically taking a year or more, during which a potentially undesirable owner of a licensee could harm investor confidence in the commercial environment.

A requirement will therefore be introduced through schedule 1 to the Storage of Carbon Dioxide (Licensing etc.) Regulations 2010 for current and future licensees to apply in writing to the NSTA for consent to a change of control at least three months before the planned date of the change. Following receipt of an application, the NSTA may give unconditional or conditional consent, or indeed refuse consent to the proposal. Conditions imposed may be financial, relate to the timing of the change of control, and relate to the performance of activities permitted by the licence. In the case of conditional consent or refusal, the NSTA must give the licensee the opportunity to make representations and it must consider those representations. The measure will also allow the NSTA to revoke a licence where its prior consent has not been obtained for a change of control. The NSTA will therefore be able to regulate the suitability of carbon storage licensees in a more robust and timely manner.

Clause 98 also sets out how provisions inserted into a carbon storage licence by schedule 6 may be altered or deleted. Clause 99 clarifies that where a carbon storage licence is revoked, the NSTA also has the power to revoke the permit. Without this clause, an undesirable investor might argue that they are able to continue to operate under the permit, and investor confidence in the commercial environment will be harmed.

Where the NSTA is the licensing authority under section 18 of the Energy Act 2008, it also approves and issues storage permits. The granting of a licence allows the licensee to carry out various activities in the licensed area; to carry out storage of carbon dioxide or to establish and maintain installations for the purpose, a storage permit must also be issued. Clause 98 will create a requirement for carbon storage permit holders to seek consent from the NSTA at least three months before a change of control is due to occur. Where that procedure has not been followed and a change of control has occurred without its prior consent, the NSTA will be able to revoke carbon storage permits.

Together, clauses 98 and 99 will ensure that the new approach will apply for both licences and permits, as is intended. This will ensure that the basin continues to attract investment while protecting the taxpayer from funding liabilities not met by potential undesirable investors.

Clause 100 inserts a new subsection into section 23 of the Energy Act 2008, ensuring that a licensee does not commit an offence due to a failure to obtain the prior consent of the NSTA in relation to a change of control. Section 23 covers offences relating to carbon storage licences, including setting out that a licence holder commits an offence if

“a thing is done for which the licence specifies that the prior consent of the licensing authority or any other person is required, without that consent first having been obtained”.

Section 23 was designed to address situations where the action of seeking consent from the NSTA and the “thing” being done is within the licensee’s full control. Applying section 23 to a change of control of licensee would be inappropriate, because often a licence holder cannot prevent such a change of control or have any control over the timing of such a transaction. For example, section 23 could be applied to those who have control over the company, such as directors or high office holders. However, in relation to a change of control event, a director may have no control over such a transaction taking place, and it may be the case that they had no way to prevent the change of control or influence the timing. This clause will amend the existing legislation by clarifying that section 23(1)(a) or (1)(b) will not apply in respect of a change of control of licensee. Without that clarification, directors or high office holders of a carbon storage licence holder could be fined up to £50,000 and/or jailed for up to two years for failing to obtain the consent of the NSTA prior to a change of control occurring.

Clause 101 will allow the NSTA to request that a relevant company or person provide it with any information it may require in exercising its functions in relation to a change or potential change of control of a licensee. Currently, the authority does not have information-gathering powers to assist it in considering a change of control in respect of a carbon storage licensee. In some instances, the authority is therefore limited in conducting proper due diligence to determine whether a change of control of a licensee is undesirable.

The information will help the NSTA to consider the financial and technical capability, operational and commercial plans, and governance and fitness of the licensee in relation to its proposed controlling entity. That will provide the authority with the necessary information to appropriately consider an application for consent, or when considering whether to revoke a licence where a change of control has occurred without consent.

Information that would be protected from disclosure or production in legal proceedings on grounds of legal professional privilege or, in Scotland, confidentiality of communications is not included under this clause.

[Dr Whitehead]

I congratulate the Minister on his speed-reading abilities this afternoon, which help the progress of the Committee considerably. I do not object to the clause, but we ought to be clear about the nomenclature used in it. The Minister invoked the name of the North Sea Transition Authority on a number of occasions in connection with carbon capture and storage provision. Of course, the North Sea Transition Authority is just the North Sea Transition Authority in name. It is not the North Sea Transition Authority in law; it is the Oil and Gas Authority in law.

Indeed, it has a whole lot of responsibilities specified by the Energy Act 2016, which include, among other things, overseeing the maximum economic extraction of oil and gas in the North sea. One might say that the provision of carbon capture and storage and maximum economic extraction of oil and gas in the North sea do not necessarily fit well together. Indeed, this is a debate we will come to later in our consideration of the Bill, but we need to be clear that as things stand, the supervision, licences and so on that are set out in this clause appear to rely on a slightly inappropriate authority. That does not necessarily mean that it is not going to work okay, but it does mean that it would be a good idea to have the actual name of the North Sea Transition Authority in law, as well as in characterisation.

After all, let us say that someone called Andrew Bowie decided that he wished to be known as Ziggy Stardust in future. Provided he could get people to agree that he really was Ziggy Stardust, that would be fine, except under circumstances where the law came to be applied. Mr Ziggy Stardust would find that under those circumstances, he had to refer to himself as Andrew Bowie. That is where we are with this transition authority at the moment. It is intention rather than fact, and it concerns me that we are writing into the Bill a number of references to the Oil and Gas Authority as if it were the North Sea Transition Authority, when the North Sea Transition Authority is an authority in name only. As I say, this is not something that one goes to the wall on—we do not oppose the clause—but I think it would be a good idea if the Government at least took some steps towards regularising the legal name and the daily name of the Oil and Gas Authority, so that its future purpose fits its legal position. Obviously, this is a bit of a precursor to a debate we will have later.

[Andrew Bowie]

I will not be drawn on whether or not a certain individual will be changing their name, and what position that would give them legally. However, I get the hon. Gentleman’s point regarding the legal entity that is the Oil and Gas Authority and the references we are making to the North Sea Transition Authority in the Bill, and indeed in other pieces of legislation. I agree with him: there should be some clarification to that effect. I will have to go away and explore exactly what work would have to be done, presumably through legislation—primary or secondary—to effect a legal name change from the OGA to the NSTA, but I think it would help us all if that were undertaken. I will explore how exactly that would take place and the work that would have to be done.

In terms of whether an organisation that was set up following the oil price crash in 2014-15 with the explicit aim of supporting the oil and gas industry and maximising economic recovery can work, and can have within its purview licences being issued for carbon capture, usage and storage, I disagree: I think that they are perfect bedfellows. One complements the other; in fact, the skills and requirements of the companies involved in oil and gas extraction are very much involved in the operation, or potential operation, of CCUS and other connected technologies. Therefore, I think that the OGA, the NSTA—call it what you will—is the perfect authority that should hold the power to issue those licences and have regulatory control over that industry as we move forward.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 99 to 101 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 102

Access to infrastructure

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Government amendment 21 amends the financial assistance power in clause 103 by removing the words

“out of money provided by Parliament”.

Those words are not considered necessary, and their removal ensures a consistent approach with the power to provide financial assistance under clause 134.

Clause 103 enables the Secretary of State to incur expenditure and provide financial assistance for the purpose of encouraging, supporting or facilitating activities for carbon capture, transport and storage, the production of low carbon hydrogen, and the transport and storage of hydrogen. This will enable the Government to deliver on their commitment of £20 billion investment in CCUS and support the establishment and subsequent expansion of the first two industrial clusters by the middle of this decade, and a further two CCUS clusters by 2030. Government support for CCUS will incentivise private investment, economically benefit our industrial heartlands and support in the region of 50,000 jobs by 2030.

It will also help enable the Government to deliver on their ambition for up to 10 GW of new low-carbon hydrogen production capacity by 2030, subject to value for money and affordability. That has the potential to unlock up to 12,000 jobs and £9 billion of private investment and could play a critical role in the UK’s commitment to net zero by 2050. It could be supported by the development of hydrogen transport and storage infrastructure, which represents the critical next step in the growth of the hydrogen economy to meet our levelling- up ambition. I commend Government amendment 21 and clause 103 to the Committee.

[Dr Whitehead]

I am a bit puzzled. Government amendment 21 takes the words

“out of money provided by Parliament”

out of clause 103(1). It would then read: “The Secretary of State may provide financial assistance to any person for the purpose of encouraging” and so on. Those purposes are the transportation and storage of carbon dioxide, carbon dioxide capture facilities, low carbon hydrogen production and so on—all the things we have been talking about. The implication of taking those words out is that the Secretary of State may, from other money, provide this assistance. So it will come from somewhere else.

I would have thought that it is not particularly superfluous to actually set out where the money is coming from, which is Parliament, as it should be. It may be that in the Minister’s zeal to simplify the Bill, which it certainly needs, he has gone a bridge too far with the amendment. That may allow a construction to be placed on the Bill that might not be what he intended, or what I would intend, but could be read into the Bill in the future.

I do not know where the Minister might get money from if not from Parliament—certainly not in the sums necessary to provide this kind of assistance—but we could conceivably say that the Minister might get the money from, for example, a large overseas donor. It is important that we specify where the money is coming from, and “provided by Parliament” does that. I do not think it is superfluous. We do not want to go to the wall and divide on the amendment, but I have some questions about it, and I think the Minister ought to have some questions in his mind as well.

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions. The reason why we no longer consider the wording necessary is because, subject to parliamentary agreement of the Bill’s provisions, clause 103 will provide for expenditure from the public purse on carbon capture, carbon dioxide transportation and storage, low-carbon hydrogen production, and hydrogen transport and storage. It is not necessary to specify that such expenditure will come from moneys provided by Parliament, so it is simply a case of simplifying the Bill. Financial assistance may be provided through grants, loans, guarantees or indemnities, or by provision of insurance, and it may be provided subject to conditions provided under a contract, but we feel that the wording in the Bill is superfluous, given that such assistance will be agreed, through the Bill, by Parliament in the first instance.

Amendment 21 agreed to.

Clause 103, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 104

Low-carbon heat schemes

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 89, in clause 104, page 98, line 35, at end insert

“which must include provision for—

(a) a ban on the installation of unabated gas boilers in new properties from March 2025; and

(b) a ban on the sale and installation of unabated gas boilers in all properties after March 2035.”

This amendment would mean that any scheme the Secretary of State wanted to bring in would have to be based on the above timescales for banning the use of gas boilers by 2025/2035.

We now come to a new part of the Bill, which concerns new technology. The chapter that we are discussing concerns low-carbon heat schemes, and the clause allows the Secretary of State, by regulation, to make

“provision for the establishment and operation of one or more low-carbon heat schemes.”

The clause also talks about targets and so on in relation to low-carbon heat schemes.

We think it might be a good idea—not that this is our policy—for the targets to which the clause refers to be specified in terms of what the Government have determined as their targets on the sale and installation of unabated gas boilers between March 2025 and March 2035. After all, those targets are in the public domain. The Government have stated them in the future homes strategy, the future homes standard and the energy security strategy. The Government have stated the targets in two forms: one is a ban on the installation of unabated gas boilers in new properties from March 2025, and the other is a ban on the sale and installation of unabated gas boilers in all properties after March 2035.

As things stand, those targets, which the Government have explicitly stated and which we would certainly go along with—we might want them to be a little more advanced, but we think they are about right—do not have any force. They are just aspirations. We think that putting them on the face of the Bill—after all, they are already Government policy—would not be hard for the Government to accept, but would enhance the validity and scope of those targets by ensuring that they are in the part of the Bill on low-carbon heat schemes, so that we can see everything together. It is a very modest and friendly suggestion, which I am sure the Government will have no problem adopting.

[Andrew Bowie]

As ever, I thank the hon. Gentleman for his well-thought-out remarks. The amendment would require that, in order to introduce a low-carbon heat scheme such as the planned clean heat market mechanism, the Government would also have to legislate for a ban on the installation of gas boilers in new build and existing properties respectively.

Committee members will know that the Government are introducing a future homes standard in 2025, which will require that new properties be equipped with low-carbon heating and high levels of energy efficiency from the outset, avoiding the need for future retrofitting. In addition, the Government have set out clearly the intention to phase out the installation of new natural gas boilers from 2035 in existing properties. There is therefore no disagreement that fossil fuel heating appliances have no long-term role. The recent volatility in global natural gas markets only makes that logic more apparent—on that, I think we are all in agreement.

However, the Government are firmly of the view that it would not be appropriate or helpful to make the ability to make regulations to launch a low-carbon heat scheme conditional on an entirely separate legislative measure such as an appliance ban, as the amendment proposes. Creating such a dependency would risk delaying or even forestalling the introduction of the planned clean heat market mechanism scheme altogether. Perversely, that would have the effect of constraining the development of the very markets and supply chains whose growth would be a prerequisite of phasing out natural gas boilers. I therefore respectfully and humbly urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

I hear what the Minister has said. I am a little sorry that the Government cannot place their own policy in the Bill, but I hear that they will make plans to take that into account, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments on his amendment. The Government have been clear that a range of low-carbon technologies will be needed to play a role in decarbonising heating and reducing the nearly 50% of UK fossil fuel gas demand that heating represents. District and communal heat networks with low-carbon heat sources have an important role to play in all future heating scenarios, as do heat pumps. Work is ongoing with industry, regulators and others to assess the feasibility, costs and benefits of converting parts of gas networks to supply 100% hydrogen, for example, for heating. Other technologies such as solid biomass and liquid biofuels, as well as direct electric heating where appropriate, may also play a supporting role.

Although the proportion of UK buildings technically suitable for heating with a heat pump is very high—indeed, an estimated 90% of UK homes are technically capable of being heated by heat pumps—there is a small proportion of buildings for which a heat pump would not be an appropriate solution. The Government are working to develop strategic and policy options for all these technologies and for different building types. That work includes: trials and research and development to build towards strategic decisions on the role of hydrogen for heat in 2026; work on heat network zoning; and the forthcoming biomass strategy, which will assess the amount of sustainable biomass feedstocks available in the UK, including for biofuels, and the most strategic uses of those across the economy. It also includes action such as the green heat networks fund to scale up key markets where that is of strategic importance in all scenarios.

The clean heat market mechanism provided for by this measure is another key part of our policy action. Ultimately, it will be for the market—and consumers and building owners—to determine the best solutions and combinations of technologies within the performance standards and market signals that it is the role of His Majesty’s Government to provide. Through establishing a strategic approach to developing that policy framework while building up key supply chains, the Government’s “Powering Up Britain” plans have set us on track for net zero. Another plan seeking somehow to prescribe the right solution for every property is not what is needed right now. I therefore respectfully urge the hon. Member for Southampton, Test to withdraw the amendment.

Together with clauses 105 to 113 in this chapter, clause 104 provides for the establishment of a low-carbon heat scheme to encourage the installation of low-carbon heating appliances, such as electric heat pumps. As nearly half the UK’s fossil fuel gas consumption each year is used to heat buildings, it is important that we accelerate the transition to clean, efficient alternatives, thereby bolstering our energy security.

The Government back the dynamism of industry to meet the needs of British consumers, which is why we are taking a market-based approach that puts industry at the heart of leading a transformation of the UK heating market, while keeping consumers in the driving seat with choice. Through the planned low-carbon heat scheme—the clean heat market mechanism—we will provide the UK’s world-leading heating appliance industry with a policy framework that provides the confidence and incentive to invest in low-carbon appliances. That will make heat pumps a more attractive and simpler choice for growing numbers of British households.

Similar to other such market-based mechanisms, such as the UK emissions trading scheme, this provision enables targets to be set so that companies can act to develop the market. That will allow them to build up key supply chains with the confidence that all actors in the market are facing the same incentives and policy conditions. Together with wider policy action, the clean heat market mechanism will help to create the conditions for rapid innovation and investment in the sector. That will support the creation of new products and services that work for British consumers and building owners, and help to encourage companies to find efficiencies in time and cost as this and other markets grow.

In addition to providing the overarching regulation-making power, the clause also establishes a set of relevant low-carbon heating appliances to which such a scheme could apply. The subsequent enacting regulations for a scheme will then determine whether that scheme will apply to all the appliances in the clause or just a subset of them. As has been recognised by respondents to the first policy consultation on the proposals, a low-carbon heat scheme as provided for in this measure has the potential to kick-start a transformation of the heating market in the United Kingdom. That will mean that by the end of this decade, it is easier for millions of households to slash their energy consumption by making their next heating appliance an ultra-efficient electric heat pump.

The purpose of clause 105 is to require regulations that establish a low-carbon heat scheme to make certain provisions as to the scope of the new scheme. It also allows regulations to make further provisions in relation to how a scheme will apply to parties that are in scope. In particular, it requires the regulations to set out the scheme participants to whom targets will apply, the types of low-carbon heating appliance that will qualify towards meeting those targets, and the period or periods of time for which targets will be set.

Relatedly, clause 105 also enables the scheme regulations to specify circumstances in which credit for activities carried out outside a given period may be allowed to qualify in that period. That would, for instance, allow for an approach taken in several comparable trading schemes, where a degree of credit carry-over and target carry-over from one period to another is sometimes allowed, which is sometimes referred to respectively as “banking and borrowing”. This and similar scheme design features could help to maximise the opportunity for scheme participants to successfully meet the scheme standards and build the heat pump market. That, of course, is a core aim of His Majesty’s Government.

[Dr Whitehead]

I do not think I have anything further to say. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 104 and 105 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Energy Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Tuesday 6th June 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Andrew Bowie]

I confirm to the hon. Member for Southampton, Test that the new clause on energy-intensive industries will be tabled tomorrow, and the new clause on Great British Nuclear will be tabled early next week. It is a delight to return to the Committee and to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Gray.

The amendments that I will outline are consequential on the amendments made to introduce hydrogen transport and hydrogen storage business models. Hydrogen business models are required to encourage investment in, and the development of, hydrogen transport and storage infra-structure, alongside the existing provisions in clauses 61 and 62 for hydrogen production business models. The development of hydrogen transport and storage infrastructure, such as pipelines and salt caverns, represents the next critical step in the growth of the hydrogen economy.

Government amendment 23 makes it clear that existing references in clause 59 to transport and storage relate to the transport and storage of carbon dioxide and not to hydrogen. New clauses are to be added to make specific provision for hydrogen transport and storage. Government amendments 28, 29, 36, 38, 40, 42 to 52, 60 and 73 are consequential on Government amendment 23. The amendments substitute new definitions for existing definitions to distinguish carbon dioxide transport and storage from hydrogen transport and storage. Clause 56 provides the meanings and definitions of various terms used in chapter 1.

Government amendment 30 supports the establishment and operation of revenue support contracts as part of the hydrogen transport and hydrogen storage business models. That amendment, alongside other amendments to chapter 1 of part 2 of the Bill, provide the Secretary of State with the power to make regulations to enable hydrogen transport and storage revenue support contracts to be put in place. Those revenue support contracts, as part of the business models, will remove market barriers, most notably high up-front costs and uncertain financial investment returns. The overcoming of those barriers should encourage investment in, and the development of, hydrogen transport and storage infrastructure.

Clause 57 provides the Secretary of State with a power to make regulations about revenue support contracts, which will be known as revenue support regulations. A number of provisions throughout the chapter set out matters that regulations made under the overarching power in clause 57(1) may cover. Revenue support regulations are intended to underpin relevant business model schemes and to help to ensure that revenue support contracts are allocated and managed effectively, and that stable funding flows are in place.

Government amendment 53 seeks to clarify that contracts can be offered only to eligible low-carbon hydrogen producers and that, after the point of contract signature, it is for the contracts to stand on their own two feet and to set the parameters of the ongoing support that they provide. That approach is similar to that of the contracts for difference for renewables, in respect of which it has worked to great success. The amendment ultimately helps to ensure that projects and their investors are absolutely clear on the terms of their support and should help to inspire significant confidence in the new regime. Government amendments 26, 32, 33, 54 and 55 are consequential on Government amendment 53.

Government amendment 56 seeks to clarify that contracts can be offered only to eligible carbon capture entities and that, after the point of contract signature, it is for the contracts to stand on their own two feet and to set the parameters of the ongoing support that they provide. That approach is similar to that of the contracts for difference for renewables, in respect of which, again, it has worked to great success. The amendment ultimately helps to ensure that projects and their investors are absolutely clear on the terms of their support and should help to inspire significant confidence in the new regime. Government amendments 25, 34, 35, 57 and 58 are consequential on Government amendment 56.

Government new clause 29 will enable the designation of a counterparty to administer hydrogen transport revenue support contracts. The delivery of the hydrogen transport revenue support contracts is intended to be via private law contracts between eligible hydrogen transport providers and a hydrogen transport counterparty. The counterparty, which is the subject of the new clause, will manage the contracts and act as a conduit for funding.

The proper functioning of a revenue support counter-party is fundamental to the stability of the revenue support contracts. As the counterparty will be responsible for managing large amount of funds to meet its payment obligations, it is essential for the Secretary of State to exercise a degree of control over how it operates. Government new clause 29 allows the Secretary of State to designate a consenting person to be a counterparty for hydrogen transport revenue support contracts.

Government new clause 30 confers powers on the Secretary of State to issue a direction to a hydrogen transport counterparty. The counterparty will offer a contract to a hydrogen transport provider with a proposed project that the Government wish to support. That will enable a hydrogen transport provider to receive revenue support, which will help to remove market barriers associated with its infrastructure project. In turn, this should see the deployment of hydrogen transport infrastructure in the UK, thereby further supporting the hydrogen economy.

Government new clause 30 will ensure that revenue support regulations can make further provision about a direction, such as the terms that may or must be specified in said direction. Those regulations must include the meaning of “eligible” in relation to hydrogen transport providers with whom the counterparty may enter into a contract. Additionally, the powers are expected to be exercised in relation to successful projects that apply for revenue support under the hydrogen transport business models.

Government new clause 31 will enable the designation of a counterparty to administer hydrogen storage revenue support contracts. The delivery of the hydrogen storage revenue support contracts is intended to be via private law contracts between eligible hydrogen storage providers and a hydrogen storage counterparty. The counterparty, which is the subject of the new clause, will manage the contracts and act as a conduit for funding.

The proper functioning of a revenue support counterparty is fundamental to the stability of the revenue support contracts. As the counterparty will be responsible for managing large amount of funds to meet its payment obligations, it is essential for the Secretary of State to exercise a degree of control over how it operates. Government new clause 31 allows the Secretary of State to designate a consenting person to be a counterparty for hydrogen storage revenue support contracts.

Government new clause 32 confers powers on the Secretary of State to issue a direction to a hydrogen storage counterparty. The counterparty will offer a contract to a hydrogen storage provider with a proposed project that Government wish to support. That will enable a hydrogen storage provider to receive revenue support, which will help to remove market barriers associated with its infrastructure project. In turn, this should see the deployment of hydrogen storage infra-structure in the UK, thereby further supporting our growing hydrogen economy.

Government new clause 32 will ensure that revenue support regulations can make further provision about a direction, such as the terms that may or must be specified in said direction. The regulations must include the meaning of “eligible” in relation to hydrogen storage providers with whom the counterparty may enter into a contract. Additionally, the powers are expected to be exercised in relation to successful projects that apply for revenue support under the hydrogen storage business models.

I commend to the Committee the Government amendments, Government new clauses 29 to 32 and clauses 56 and 57.

[Dr Whitehead]

Most of the provisions in this group deal with the establishment and terms of a hydrogen counterparty. The establishment of the counterparty is clearly important in the raising and distribution of the hydrogen levy, which we will discuss later. The raising of the levy goes through the counterparty—that is, the counterparty will be responsible for raising the demands of the levy upon whoever is liable to pay it. The counterparty has a substantial role in holding those amounts and distributing them to those who are developing, in this instance, hydrogen production. Of course, that is why it is called the hydrogen production counterparty.

It is a method similar to that adopted by the Low Carbon Contracts Company for arranging to levy charges on, in that instance, the electricity suppliers, and then distributing that to those in receipt of that levy. Those in receipt will primarily get money coming to them through the counterparty by means of the difference between the strike price for what it has been decided to levy on and the reference price—the general price for electricity after the strike price has been agreed. We do not yet have an indication of what the strike price for hydrogen production will be, but we have in front of us the experience of the likely reference price for electricity, which is likely to pertain over the years when the hydrogen levy will be administered by the hydrogen contracts counterparty.

The experience of the Low Carbon Contracts Company is that it is not always the case that money simply comes in and is then disbursed, because on occasions, and indeed on recent occasions, the LCCC has found itself in the position where the reference price and the strike price have inverted—that is, the organisations responsible for paying into the LCCC no longer get a payout from the LCCC because the relationship between the strike price and the reference price is positive. In this instance, then, the LCCC is actually accumulating amounts that it would normally not put into its funds because it would return them straight to the people who have contracted for a difference between the strike price and the reference price but at that point have an obligation to pay into, rather than expect to collect out of, those funds.

There has been some issue with the LCCC in terms of what happens to the money that goes into its funds but is not distributed out. Does that money accumulate in the funds of the LCCC perpetually? Or is it redistributed? If it is redistributed, to whom is it redistributed and on what terms? I do not see any provision for that sort of arrangement to take place, or, indeed, for it to take place in a secure way in the particular interests of consumers—we will talk about the interests of consumers later—in the Bill or in the Government amendments we have debated this morning.

It is important that as soon as the counterparty is in place, the full set of contingent and possible arrangements for the operation of that counterparty are clearly set out. Depending on how electricity prices change over the next few years, the hydrogen production counterparty may well, at a fairly early stage, be in the same sort of position of accumulating additional funds that the LCCC has been in recently. It is therefore important that there are clear provisions, preferably spelled out in the Bill, as to what the counterparty does under those circumstances. Have the Minister and his Department thought about that eventuality? If they have, how does the Minister envisage the hydrogen production counterparty operating under those circumstances? Why has he decided not to put anything in the Bill that gives us greater guidance as to how the counterparty will function?

[Andrew Bowie]

Let me clarify for the hon. Gentleman that later this morning we will come to clause 67, which specifically enables regulations to make provision for amounts to be paid to levied market participants by the relevant counterparty or hydrogen levy administrator. That includes the pass-through of payments received by the relevant counterparty under revenue support contracts, such as payments made by a hydrogen producer to a hydrogen production counterparty. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s questions in more detail. We will return to this matter later this morning.

Amendment 23 agreed to.

Amendments made: 25, in clause 56, page 50, line 21, for “63(3)” substitute “64(4)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 58.

Amendment 24, in clause 56, page 50, line 21, at end insert—

“‘eligible hydrogen storage provider’ is to be interpreted in accordance with section (Direction to offer to contract with eligible hydrogen storage provider)(4);

‘eligible hydrogen transport provider’ is to be interpreted in accordance with section (Direction to offer to contract with eligible hydrogen transport provider)(4)”.

This amendment adds definitions to the list in clause 56 in consequence of NC29 and NC31.

Amendment 26, in clause 56, page 50, line 23, for “61(3)” substitute “62(4)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55.

Amendment 27, in clause 56, page 50, line 36, at end insert—

“‘hydrogen storage counterparty’ has the meaning given by section (Designation of hydrogen storage counterparty)(3);

‘hydrogen storage provider’ has the meaning given by section (Designation of hydrogen storage counterparty)(7);

‘hydrogen storage revenue support contract’ has the meaning given by section (Designation of hydrogen storage counterparty)(2);

‘hydrogen transport counterparty’ has the meaning given by section (Designation of hydrogen transport counterparty)(3);

‘hydrogen transport provider’ has the meaning given by section (Designation of hydrogen transport counterparty)(7);

‘hydrogen transport revenue support contract’ has the meaning given by section (Designation of hydrogen transport counterparty)(2);”.

This amendment is supplementary to NC29 and NC31.

Amendment 28, in clause 56, page 51, leave out lines 3 to 6.—(Andrew Bowie.)

See the explanatory note relating to Amendment 23.

Clause 56, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 57

Revenue support contracts

Amendments made: 29, in clause 57, page 51, line 16, after “a” insert “carbon dioxide”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

Amendment 30, in clause 57, page 51, line 16, at end insert—

“( ) a hydrogen transport revenue support contract (see section (Designation of hydrogen transport counterparty)(2)),

( ) a hydrogen storage revenue support contract see section ((Designation of hydrogen storage counterparty)(2)),”.—(Andrew Bowie.)

This amendment adds hydrogen transport revenue support contracts (see NC29) and hydrogen storage revenue support contracts (see NC31) to the definition of “revenue support contract”.

Amendment 31, in clause 57, page 52, line 5, after “60(3),” insert

“(Direction to offer to contract with eligible hydrogen transport provider)(2) or (4), (Direction to offer to contract with eligible hydrogen storage provider)(2) or (4),”.

This amendment provides for regulations under the specified powers to be subject to affirmative procedure.

Amendment 32, in clause 57, page 52, line 5, leave out “61(3)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 53.

Amendment 33, in clause 57, page 52, line 6, after “62(2)” insert “or (4)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 53.

Amendment 34, in clause 57, page 52, line 6, leave out “63(3)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 56.

Amendment 35, in clause 57, page 52, line 6, after “64(2)” insert “or (4)”.—(Andrew Bowie.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 56.

Clause 57, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58

Duties of revenue support counterparty

Amendments made: 36, in clause 58, page 53, line 2, after “a” insert “carbon dioxide”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

Amendment 37, in clause 58, page 53, line 3, after “counterparty,” insert

“hydrogen transport counterparty, hydrogen storage counterparty,”.

This amendment and Amendment 39 make provision for ensuring that hydrogen transport counterparties and hydrogen storage counterparties can meet their liabilities under revenue support contracts.

Amendment 38, in clause 58, page 53, line 4, after “any” insert “carbon dioxide”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

Amendment 39, in clause 58, page 53, line 5, after second “contract,” insert

“hydrogen transport revenue support contract, hydrogen storage revenue support contract,”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 23.

Amendment 40, in clause 58, page 53, line 8, after “a” insert “carbon dioxide”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

Amendment 41, in clause 58, page 53, line 8, at end insert—

“(aa) a hydrogen transport counterparty (see section (Designation of hydrogen transport counterparty)(3));

(ab) a hydrogen storage counterparty (see section (Designation of hydrogen storage counterparty)(3));”—(Andrew Bowie.)

This amendment adds hydrogen transport counterparties and hydrogen storage counterparties to the definition of “revenue support counterparty”.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

Clause 58 sets out the duties of a revenue support counterparty and the Secretary of State’s ability to exert control over the activities of a revenue support counterparty, given that its role is critical to the effectiveness of a revenue support contract. It includes, for example, a duty for a counterparty to act in accordance with revenue support regulations and a power for the Secretary of State to specify in regulations things that a counterparty must, can, or cannot do.

The proper functioning of a revenue support counterparty is fundamental to the stability of the revenue support contracts. The counterparty will be responsible for managing large amounts of funds to meet its payment obligations under a contract. It is therefore important for the Secretary of State to exercise a degree of control over how it operates. I therefore commend clause 58 to the Committee.

[Dr Whitehead]

The clause does indeed provide for a number of duties of the revenue support counterparty. I particularly note the requirement that it

“must exercise the functions”

conferred on it

“by virtue of this Chapter so as to ensure that it can meet its liabilities under any revenue support contract to which it is a party.”

In order to do that, as the Minister has said, the counterparty must be buoyantly funded—shall we say—both in terms of the money coming in and out and the money to enable it to perform its functions.

What regulation is there on the counterparty to ensure that it is carrying out its obligations with its funding, in such a way that there is not too much in the bank, and not too little in the bank to meet its liabilities? As the Minister has said, we will later debate on how that works in with the possible restitution of funds from the counterparty at particular junctures. Is the Minister satisfied that the regulation of the counterparty is sufficient to ensure that it actually operates in that economical way, as far as the use and disbursal of its funds is concerned?

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Member for his question. Again, it is a very pertinent, sensible and serious question, and one on which I am happy to give more clarity. The Government anticipate that the LCCC, which is the existing counterparty for contracts for difference, will be the counterparty for the hydrogen production, industrial carbon capture and waste industrial carbon capture business models—subject to successful completion of administrative and legislative arrangements, obviously.

The LCCC already has experience in similar types of contract management from its role as counterparty to contracts for difference; it is already established in that respect. The LCCC is also anticipated to be the counterparty for the carbon dioxide transport and storage revenue support contracts—again, subject to successful completion of administrative and legislative arrangements.

To address the specific point, in taking the decision to proceed with LCCC as the counterparty, the Secretary of State considered, among other things, its ability to deliver the required functions, and its experience and track record in contract management. Those considerations would be made on any future decisions, which would also be subject to normal principles of public decision making.

The envisaged greenhouse gas removals business model would also require a counterparty to manage the contracts, and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero is currently assessing options as to the most appropriate organisation to perform that function.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 58, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 59

Designation of transport and storage counterparty

Amendments made: 42, in clause 59, page 53, line 14, after “for” insert “carbon dioxide”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

Amendment 43, in clause 59, page 53, line 15, leave out “‘transport” and insert “‘carbon dioxide transport”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

Amendment 44, in clause 59, page 53, line 17, after “a” insert “carbon dioxide”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

Amendment 45, in clause 59, page 53, line 19, after “a” insert “carbon dioxide”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

Amendment 46, in clause 59, page 53, line 22, leave out “‘transport” and insert “‘carbon dioxide transport”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

Amendment 47, in clause 59, page 53, line 28, after “a” insert “carbon dioxide”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

Amendment 48, in clause 59, page 53, line 30, after “a” insert “carbon dioxide”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

Amendment 49, in clause 59, page 53, line 32, after “a” insert “carbon dioxide”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

Amendment 50, in clause 59, page 53, line 36, after “any” insert “carbon dioxide”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

Amendment 51, in clause 59, page 53, line 38, after first “a” insert “carbon dioxide”.—(Andrew Bowie.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

Initial licensed carbon dioxide transport and storage companies are expected to be supported by a revenue support agreement, which is a contractual arrangement to be entered into by a counterparty. The clause will enable the Secretary of State to designate a consenting person to be a counterparty for carbon dioxide transport and storage revenue support contracts. A counterparty will be responsible for managing the contracts and making payments to the contract holders, as well as collecting any necessary payments from contract holders, as set out in the contracts.

Clause 60 confers a power on the Secretary of State to issue a direction to a carbon dioxide transport and storage counterparty to offer to contract with an eligible person. It also ensures that revenue support regulations can make further provision about a direction—for example, the terms that may or must be specified in a direction. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Dr Whitehead]

The clause designates a transport and storage counterparty to perform a similar function to that of the hydrogen production counterparty or, indeed, to that of the LCCC. In the case of the hydrogen production counterparty, the Government’s intention is to roll the function in with the LCCC, so that the LCCC has an expanded role. I am not quite so clear about the Government’s intention for the carbon dioxide transport and storage counterparty. Is it the Government’s intention that that counterparty will also be rolled into the LCCC? If so, does the Minister not think that that will be a rather giant organisation responsible for different streams of funding in different ways? In such circumstances, are the Government satisfied that the streams could be sufficiently separate from each other to ensure the efficient running of all the different strands that will increasingly come under, in effect, one counterparty company?

[Andrew Bowie]

The hon. Gentleman is right to point out the inherent risks in the model. However, it is incumbent on the Secretary of State, the Department, the Government and indeed Parliament to assess and to keep watch continually on the arrangements to ensure that they are fit for purpose as we proceed and develop our hydrogen industry to the extent that we want to in future. The LCCC already does similar types of contract management in its existing role as the counterparty to the contracts for difference, so I do not envisage that as being as big a challenge as the hon. Gentleman sets out, but I accept the inherent risks, in particular in what we will be doing under the Bill, which is something completely new. Of course it is right for Parliament to have a role in scrutinising the Government to ensure that the model that we establish keeps pace and is fit for what we seek to do in future.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 59, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 60

Direction to offer to contract

Amendment made: 52, in clause 60, page 54, line 3, after “a” insert “carbon dioxide”.—(Andrew Bowie.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

Clause 60, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 61

Designation of hydrogen production counterparty

Amendments made: 53, in clause 61, page 54, line 18, leave out from second “contract” to “was” in line 22 and insert—

“to which a hydrogen production counterparty is a party and which”.

This amendment modifies the definition of “hydrogen production revenue support contract”.

Amendment 54, in clause 61, page 54, line 25, leave out subsection (3).—(Andrew Bowie.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 53.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

The Minister kindly wrote to me a little while ago about the questions raised in this Committee about the UK seabed, which is the subject of Government amendment 4. I was grateful that he wrote to me so quickly after that debate, but his letter did not entirely set my mind at rest about the problem we raised on that occasion, which is also pertinent to hydrogen production.

As the Minister stated, it is entirely possible and feasible that hydrogen production could take place at sea, either on energy islands, converted rigs or specific platforms set up for that purpose, in conjunction with offshore wind farms. A number of those wind farms and installations will be well beyond the limits of the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom.

My question in the previous debate that prompted the Minister’s letter to me was: what is the jurisdiction in relation to what is in the UK economic zone up to 200 miles, but beyond the 12-mile territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom? In his letter, the Minister effectively repeated the idea that the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom was indeed the 12-mile zone. Does the Minister have any further clarification this morning about the relationship of the two different zones, and how they interact in terms of effective jurisdiction for these activities?

[Andrew Bowie]

I do indeed have an answer for the hon. Gentleman. As the hon. Gentleman and I have set out in Committee and in the letter, the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom is the sea that extends 12 nautical miles from the low-water line along the coast, as defined in section 1 of the Territorial Sea Act 1987. However, the renewable energy zone extends from the boundary of the territorial sea to an area within the UK’s exclusive economic zone.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

Thank you, Mr Gray.

Opposition amendment 84 would amend the definition of “carbon capture entity” in clause 63(8). We tabled it because we considered that definition insufficient to encapsulate what is now increasingly likely to be at least part of carbon capture and storage activity: DACCS, which involves carbon that has been captured from the air, or indeed from the sea. The DACCS process is up and running in the UK on an experimental basis and will undoubtedly become quite a substantial element of carbon capture in future, so we thought it important that direct air capture technologies should be included within the definition of “carbon capture entity”.

I thought we might have a bit of discussion about that point this morning, but I observe that, subsequent to our tabling amendment 84, the Government have tabled amendment 10, which results in similar wording. My first point is a positive one: well done to the Government on that. My second, slightly less positive point is, “Why couldn’t you have done that in the first place?”

My third point is one for the record: it may be that the Government and the Opposition’s thoughts were running along entirely parallel lines at precisely the same moment. Alternatively, it may be that the Government looked at our amendment and thought, “Oh, we haven’t done that—maybe we ought to, but of course we can’t accept an Opposition amendment, so we’ll have to use our own.” It might have been nice for the Government to say, “You’re absolutely right, so we’ll accept your amendment,” but I am fairly graciously saying that I am pleased that they have managed to table amendment 10. On that basis, it does not seem necessary to proceed with our amendment 84 this morning. We can rest satisfied that we maybe played a small part in the general progress of the Bill through the House.

[Andrew Bowie]

All I would say to the hon. Gentleman is that, of course, imitation is the most sincere form of flattery. While I do not deny that the Government and the Opposition were thinking along the same lines at exactly the same time, and therefore came to the same conclusion, I am glad that he is not going to press amendment 84 to a vote, and that he accepts that the definition in our amendment covers the definition of direct air capture and carbon storage. We share the view that greenhouse gas removal technologies will be essential to reach net zero, and I am glad that, as has so far been the case with most of the Bill, there is broad cross-party agreement about where we are headed, and definitions required to get there.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

For clarity, I group various things together in one group when it is convenient to discuss them together. The Minister moves only the first clause in that group. Therefore, in this case the Minister moves only clause 69.

[Dr Whitehead]

These are all riveting clauses, which seem to be pretty well put together. We have nothing to say about them, other than that we trust they will be part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 69 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 70 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 71 to 76 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 77

Further provision about designations

Amendments made: 70, in clause 77, page 66, line 35, after “59,” insert “(Designation of hydrogen transport counterparty), (Designation of hydrogen storage counterparty),”.

This amendment together with Amendments 71, 72 and 74 make supplemental provision about designations under NC29 and NC31.

Amendment 71, in clause 77, page 67, line 3, after “59,” insert “(Designation of hydrogen transport counterparty), (Designation of hydrogen storage counterparty),”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 70.

Amendment 72, in clause 77, page 67, line 9, after “59(1),” insert “(Designation of hydrogen transport counterparty)(1), (Designation of hydrogen storage counterparty)(1),”

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 70.

Amendment 73, in clause 77, page 67, line 12, after “a” insert “carbon dioxide”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

Amendment 74, in clause 77, page 67, line 12, after “counterparty,” insert “hydrogen transport counterparty, hydrogen storage counterparty,”.—(Andrew Bowie.)

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 70.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

Clause 77 enables the Secretary of State to revoke a counterparty designation by notice. A designation will also cease to have effect if the counterparty withdraws consent to the designation by giving not less than three months’ notice in writing to the Secretary of State. Subsection (4) enables the Secretary of State to make provision in regulations enabling a person who has ceased to be a revenue support counterparty to continue to be treated as such a counterparty, including provision about the circumstances in which, and the period for which, such a person may be so treated. I recommend that clause 77 stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 77, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 78

Application of sums held by a revenue support counterparty

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 86, in clause 78, page 67, line 31, at end insert—

“(4A) Revenue support regulations may make provisions for the return of sums held by a revenue support counterparty that have been secured from gas shippers over and above necessary reserve levels to energy supply customers.”

This amendment would guarantee that, where shippers have above what is in reserve provision, the difference would be restored directly to customers from the shippers (in contrast to the way the LCCC works with retailers/customers now).

The amendment follows on from the discussion that we had earlier in Committee about the role of the hydrogen production counterparty in administering the sums that may come its way. We have already had some discussion about the counterparty, which will potentially be enormous in terms of its likely new duties both in hydrogen production and in carbon capture and storage. The counterparty will have a very large amount of money coming in and out, and possibly staying in its reserves and being allocated for the purposes of what the counterparty is being set up for—to develop hydrogen production in this instance, but also carbon capture and storage development.

What is the position at the moment with the LCCC, which, as we have agreed, is likely to be the designated body for the counterparty for various things? The position at the moment is that there is no position on what the LCCC does with sums over and above what is necessary for it to hold in reserve or as contingency for the pay-out of sums to hydrogen production bodies, which is an important omission, because there is no specific guidance or legislative certainty. In practice, the LCCC hands over money greater than its reserves where it has accumulated additional sums of money because of the periodic inversions of strike price and reference price—hence there is money coming into it, rather than being paid out of the LCCC. It does pay those sums out, but there is no certainty as to where they go. Indeed, there is no certainty that anything should be paid out. At the moment, it would be quite possible for the LCCC to say, “We need more reserves, so we’re not paying any money out,” or it could pay that money back to industry or to certain parts of industry. I understand that the LCCC pays out that money to energy suppliers, but, again, there is no certainty that even the money paid out by the LCCC to those energy suppliers ever reaches the customer.

For surpluses over and above what is necessary for reserves and operational costs of the LCCC—the counterparty—if the principle is that the customer pays the levy, which we sincerely hope it is not, but if it is, should there be surpluses within that levy, the customer should get the money back one way or another. Similarly, if the Consolidated Fund is the source of a levy, the Consolidated Fund should get that money back one way or another. It should not be used for other purposes or sit in a bank account somewhere. It should be actively used, either for restitution of customer bills or for further use via the Consolidated Fund for the future.

The amendment would ensure that the revenue support regulations provide for the return of sums held by a revenue support counterparty, which have been secured over and above necessary reserve levels, to energy supply customers. It makes a very specific directional instruction, as it were, in the Bill, about what the destination of those funds should be over and above the reserves for the counterparty. I think that is a useful addition to the Bill and a useful clarification of what levy money for the future we are contemplating entrusting this very large body with.

It is a clear instruction as to what that body should do. It is a clear instruction from the Committee of what it wants to ensure happens when the Bill becomes an Act of Parliament. That is why we have tabled this amendment. I think the Minister will agree that the situation at the moment with the LCCC is a little shadowy, although it works okay in practice. That allows us to be much clearer for the future about not only how these things will work in practice but how they should be directed in principle.

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Member for his amendment. I probably would not use the same language and describe the LCCC as a shadowy organisation, but I understand the spirit in which he makes those comments. The Opposition are absolutely right to focus on ensuring that the Bill can make provision for fair and efficient payment and reconciliation arrangements. However, I would like to reassure the Opposition and anybody else following our proceedings today that the existing provisions in the Bill already enable regulations to provide for such arrangements.

As previously discussed, clause 67 explicitly enables regulators to make provision for the amount to be paid to levied market participants by a relevant counterparty or hydrogen levy administrator—in this case the not-shadowy LCCC. That includes the pass-through of payments received by a relevant counterparty under revenue support contracts, such as payments made by a hydrogen producer to a hydrogen production counterparty. We would expect that in such instances the levied market participants would pass these payments on to their customers.

However, to provide extra assurance on this matter, subsection (3) of clause 67 also enables the Secretary of State to make regulations requiring that the customers of levied market participants benefit in accordance with those regulations. I hope this provides the hon. Member for Southampton, Test with the assurance he requires to withdraw his amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

I think it is incumbent on me to ask the Minister a question. Yes, the Minister will have the power to make regulations, but will he commit himself to making those regulations should the Bill pass? As he knows, making regulations is something Ministers may do, but they can sometimes sit on their hands and not make them. It is important to be clear on that.

[Andrew Bowie]

I am suggesting that the Secretary of State make regulations. I am not quite the Secretary of State, but maybe one day. The Government are committed to working to ensure that the design of the levy enables fair and efficient payment and reconciliation arrangements. Work on the detailed design of the levy, including decisions related to calculation, is ongoing. We will consult on the detailed design of the levy before laying the regulations that introduce it.

Energy Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting)

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Thursday 25th May 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. Hopefully, the passage of the rest of the Bill will be pacific and friendly under your chairmanship and that of the other Chairmen. Members know how closely I was kept to order by the Chairman we had earlier this week, and I am sure you will do exactly the same, Dr Huq, although I do not intend to stray off today’s exciting business.

The clause and schedule are concerned with the enforcement of licence holders’ obligations. The schedule goes into greater detail about how that enforcement works. I do not have any particular objections to them, but I would like to know from the Minister what the process for a final order under the schedule will be. We talked in Committee previously about termination events, and the subject raises its head again this morning. As I understand it, a final order under this schedule may or may not precipitate a termination event. Is that right?

There is a process in the schedule for provisional orders and final orders. A final order is presumably where a termination event occurs. Perhaps the Minister can say something about whether there are any procedures beyond that final order for the persons to whom the order has been served. We will come to some of the reasons why orders may be made in the next clauses, but it is important to clarify at what point that final order is operational, what happens then and what happens up to a termination event. I would be grateful for the Minister’s clarification.

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Member for his questions. It is important to get the definition absolutely right. When Ofgem is satisfied that a regulated person has contravened or is contravening any relevant condition or requirement, it may impose a financial penalty or, in the words of the Bill, issue a “final order”. In terms of the appeal process, before imposing that financial penalty or issuing the final order, the economic regulator must publish a note stating its intentions and the relevant condition of requirements to be imposed. The notice should also specify the act or omissions that, in the economic regulator’s opinion, justify the penalty, and there should be a period of at least 21 days from publication in which objections can be made. The economic regulator must consider any objections made before imposing the penalty.

Schedule 3 provides for regulated persons to be able to appeal to the courts against the imposition of a penalty by Ofgem, the amount of the penalty or the timeline within which any penalty is required to be paid. An appeal must be made within 42 days of the penalty notice.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3 agreed to.

Clause 33

Making of false statements etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

To ensure that the Secretary of State and the economic regulator can secure the provision of information necessary to conduct their respective functions in relation to carbon dioxide transport and storage, the clause establishes an offence if a person, either knowingly or recklessly, provides false information. A criminal sanction ensures that there is suitable redress for the making of false statements and should act as a disincentive to doing so. This is important and necessary as falsifying information could conceal issues or concerns that would otherwise be material to the decision making of the economic regulator or Secretary of State. Without knowledge of such information, there could be less effective decisions and less effective protections for users of the networks.

[Dr Whitehead]

Yet again, the clause appears to be relatively straightforward, but I would like to unpack the meaning of “false statements”. The Minister has given a general outline of what it means, but as far as I can see it potentially concerns the making of false statements or declarations, or whatever, at all stages of the licensing process. Presumably, that could be where a false statement is made in order to receive a licence, and the false statement comes to light after the licence has been provided. In that case, I presume the licence would be terminated on the basis of the false statement. Alternatively, it could apply to false accounting or false statements during the carrying out of the licence. Does the clause concern false statements made at the commencement of a licence or the granting of a licence, or does it concern false statements made during the operation of the licence as well? What procedure does the Minister envisage for those false statements coming to light?

The clause states that a person who makes a statement that that person

“knows to be false in a material particular, or recklessly makes any statement which is false in a material particular, is guilty of an offence”,

and is liable on summary conviction to a fine. Presumably the question of whether a false statement is sufficient for a process leading to a conviction is in the hands of the regulator. That is, if the regulator is worried about a false statement, it presumably has some discretion about the extent to which that false statement invalidates the process of the licence. Is that the Minister’s understanding? Is the process on a conveyor belt, as it were, such that a statement that appears to be false leads absolutely to a conviction? Or are there shades of grey about what a false statement is, how false that statement might be and how material that is to the continuation of the licence?

[Andrew Bowie]

Again, I thank the hon. Member for his questions. On his question about when a false statement might be made, it can be throughout the entire licence. On when an offence might be deemed to have occurred, it would be at the point that the statement was made. Schedule 2(10)(4) establishes that it is an offence to wilfully alter, suppress or destroy a document that the Competition and Markets Authority has required a person to produce as part of considering an appeal against a licence qualification decision by Ofgem. I think that what we seek to define as an offence and when we expect that offence to have been determined to have been made are quite clear.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34

Liability of officers of entities

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

Part 1 establishes certain criminal offences in relation to the economic licensing of carbon dioxide transport and storage, where transport and storage activities can take place both onshore and offshore. Clause 34 clarifies that, where an offence is committed by a corporate entity with either the consent or collusion of an officer of the company, or as a result of neglect by an officer, that officer, as well as the company itself, is culpable of the offence. The clause defines a company officer as any director, manager, secretary or similar officer of the body corporate, or any person purporting to act in that capacity.

Clause 35 clarifies that proceedings under part 1 can be brought anywhere in the UK. That ensures that an offence arising by virtue of the provisions of this part that is committed in an offshore place may be prosecuted in the United Kingdom. Criminal proceedings in relation to offshore activities may be instituted only by the Secretary of State or by, or with the consent of, the Director of Public Prosecutions.

[Dr Whitehead]

This is another fairly straightforward clause about criminal proceedings, but we ought to focus on the statement at the end of clause 35 about the definition of “offshore place”. Obviously, in the context of carbon capture and storage, there will be considerable concern about offshore places as well as onshore places, because presumably criminal offences can be committed during the transportation and sequestration of the carbon dioxide. As we know, those offshore places may be in repositories that are fairly far offshore but within the UK zone as far as, in principle, jurisdiction is concerned. However, as the Minister will know, there are different definitions of the territorial waters of the United Kingdom. Indeed, the Bill describes them as

“the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Member for his pertinent and important question. For the purposes of the Bill and the industry we are discussing, the territorial sea is up to 12 nautical miles. The Gas Importation and Storage Zone (Designation of Area) Order 2009 sets that out, which is why we have taken the step of disapplying, for the purposes of the Bill, section 3 of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878. That section requires the consent of a principal Secretary of State, or a Governor in the case of the dominions and overseas territories, to institute proceedings for criminal offences within scope of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878. Disapplying section 3 enables proceedings for an offence that is alleged to have been committed in an offshore place to be instituted without the consent requirement. As set out in the 2009 order, offshore waters are defined as up to 12 nautical miles.

[Dr Whitehead]

That is a bit of a worrying definition, because it suggests that outside the 12-mile zone, the offence would not be prosecutable. A lot of carbon capture and storage installations are in the UK economic zone but outside the territorial zone, so there appears to be a bit of dissonance between what the Bill says about offences that may occur at any stage of proceedings, and these provisions, which, as the Minister says, cover the territorial 12-mile zone. Of course, the 1878 Act did not take any account of economic zones. Territorial waters were closely defined under that Act, but since then, we have moved considerably on what we might regard as territorial waters for the purpose of economic activity; that might not be the same as territorial waters as defined by the 12-mile limit. Is there a gap there that needs filling?

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. While I understand the concern, it is important to stress that the zone, which is up to 12 nautical miles from shore, is a continuation of the gas importation and storage zone as designated under the 2009 order. It would be outwith the scope of the Bill to change the 2009 definition, because that is the definition with which the industry has been working since then.

[Dr Whitehead]

That does not address the fact that carbon capture and storage, and the repositories for it, are way out to sea. Putting a pipe at the bottom of those repositories, and connecting it to an evacuated oil field or whatever, may mean that there is a platform at the head of the pipe on which offences could be committed. The Bill does not appear to get up to speed with where carbon capture and storage will take place, where the repositories will be, and what the jurisdiction of the UK will be in those circumstances. Is that not a problem? Does the definition require further amendment?

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

It is important to stress that the definition in the Bill is not only a continuation of the definition in the 2009 order, but the same as that used for other gas activities in the North sea. It is important that we stick to the same definition.

[Dr Whitehead]

It is a wider gap, basically.

[Andrew Bowie]

Yes.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 36

Functions under the Enterprise Act 2002

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

Ofgem has the power, concurrently with the Competition and Markets Authority, to carry out market studies and make market investigation references in relation to the gas and electricity markets in Great Britain under part 4 of the Enterprise Act 2002. Other sectoral regulators have the same powers in relation to the sectors for which they are responsible. Under the Enterprise Act, the CMA and Ofgem may undertake market studies in relation to the gas and electricity markets in Great Britain, and may make market investigation references to the chair of the CMA for the constitution of a CMA group to conduct an in-depth market investigation of competition in the market or markets concerned. The purpose of those investigations is to examine the markets and implement appropriate remedies where competition problems are identified.

Clause 36 confers the same powers on Ofgem in its capacity as the economic regulator for carbon dioxide transport and storage. That will enable Ofgem to undertake market studies and make market investigation references to examine potential distortions that may give rise to restrictions in competition in relation to carbon dioxide transport and storage. As provided for in clause 38, neither the CMA nor Ofgem shall exercise functions under part 4 of the Enterprise Act in relation to any matter if such functions have been exercised in relation to that matter by the other. Clause 37 additionally provides for the economic regulator to exercise certain functions under the Competition Act 1998 concurrently with the CMA. Enabling the exercise of those Competition Act functions allows the economic regulator to deal with anti-competitive agreements or abuses of a dominant position in the carbon dioxide transport and storage sector.

To ensure that the powers are used efficiently, clause 38 requires the economic regulator and the CMA to consult each other before exercising the functions. Clause 38 is also clear that the power may be used only by either the economic regulator or the CMA in relation to a particular matter. If there is a question as to whether the economic regulator has concurrent powers under clauses 36 or 37 in relation to a particular case, this clause provides for the Secretary of State to make that determination.

[Dr Whitehead]

Try as I might, I cannot find much at fault with this chapter of the Bill. On the contrary, I actually think it is rather well drafted. I am happy to sit down, having said nothing about these clauses whatsoever, and allow business to proceed.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 36 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 37 and 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 39

Forward work programmes

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 40 and 41 stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

I can confirm to the hon. Gentleman that it has had an impact. Obviously, we continue to assess the impact of the special administration regime in the instance that he refers to. Lessons learned from that process and procedure feed directly into how we have thought about and developed the process for the Bill.

Clause 48 grants the Secretary of State the power by regulations to apply or make modifications to existing insolvency legislation in relation to this chapter of the Bill. The power will help to ensure that the special administration regime for carbon dioxide transport and storage networks fulfils its purpose to protect users of the network.

The power enables the Secretary of State to make modifications to insolvency legislation should, for example, practical experience highlight difficulties in the application of the regime, or should a change in general insolvency law necessitate a change to the special administration regime. The ability to do that is important given the expected long operational lifetime of a licensed carbon dioxide transport and storage network, and the potential for changes to broader insolvency law during this time.

Clause 49 defines relevant terms for interpreting chapter 4 of part 1 of the Bill. The terms refer to definitions in relevant existing primary legislation where it is appropriate. I commend clauses 42 to 49 to the Committee.

[Dr Whitehead]

We are now dealing with orders that follow from material we have considered previously in relation to false statements, the insolvency of companies and various other things. Clause 42 provides for orders to be made through the court that effectively place the licence holder into administration.

Under what circumstances can a transport storage and administration order be made? In view of what we have discussed, I assume that in addition to the insolvency of a company, a number of offences could lead to such an order. Normally, if a company cannot meet its obligations under the licence and therefore has effectively wound itself up, or seeks to do so, an order will be made through the courts to set up the regime that the Minister has described.

However, I am not entirely clear about the triggering point at which an order will be applied for and put before the court, who does that or the criteria under which the order is put into action. There are a number of circumstances in which one might concede that an order may be appropriate, but it might not have been applied for yet. The question that needs some clarification is when one might think that such an order is appropriate. Under what criteria may an order be offered before the court?

It will be pretty straightforward when a company has completely gone bust and someone has to rescue it, its assets or its operations. However, other circumstances under which an order may be required are less clear. Although this chapter provides that an order may lead to the rescue of the company as a going concern, other provisions—particularly clause 42(3)—show that an order may be used to transfer the operation of that company to another company. That is reasonably standard in provisions concerning the administration of a company, but it is not entirely clear how the treatment of the company will be decided. The court will make an order, but a decision will have to be made about whether the company should be salvaged or its assets transferred to another company.

We had a similar debate in the Bill Committee for the Nuclear Energy (Financing) Act 2022. We discussed what happens when a company that is developing a nuclear reactor goes bust during development or operation, and how we may have to deal with different circumstances surrounding the transfer of assets and ongoing activities depending on which stage the company is at. That will be more complicated during a production and operation phase than in a development phase.

It is important to be clear about the decision making process for what is done with each company, and it does not seem to me that the Bill gives the courts a view. I presume it is more likely that the Secretary of State or the regulator will say, “It looks like the assets need to be transferred to another company, rather than the company being salvaged, and that is how we will proceed.”

That leads to a further issue. If a decision is made to transfer the licence to another company, or to two or more companies, who decides which companies will take it over? Is that done on a tender, or is it done administratively by the appointment of a company to take over the licence arrangement? If the latter, who takes the administrative decision to appoint that company, and what are the criteria by which it is appointed? The provisions do not quite run to a fit and proper persons test, but they constitute a test on the suitability of a company to take over. Presumably, the scrutiny of that is in the purview of the Secretary of State, but it may be for the regulator or a combination of both.

Finally, I echo the point that the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun made in his intervention about the status of the special administration regime. Before I do that, it has been remiss of me not to congratulate him on the relative success of his team.

[Andrew Bowie]

Compared with Southampton.

[Dr Whitehead]

I was about to say that. I can reveal that the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun was seen in the Library yesterday evening wearing a Kilmarnock shirt, which attested to his slight nervousness and fervour for his cause. I would not have worn a Southampton shirt in the Library, bearing in mind our ignominious exit from the premier league this year, but we will let that pass.

I want to mention the lessons learned from the special administration regime as it applied to Bulb. The Minister was not in post then, but I spent a lot of time tabling successive written questions to try to get some clarity and transparency about the process. I appreciate that under those circumstances, and quite possibly under these, considerable matters of commercial confidentiality and various other things might be involved in an order, including a transfer to another company, but I found the special administration regime as it applied to Bulb to be completely non-transparent.

We did not know what the Government’s liabilities were for the special administration regime; we did not know when it was likely to come to an end; we did not know how the decisions on the assets and arrangements related to Bulb were going—that is important, in terms of transfer to another company—and I got pretty frustrated trying to get any light into the proceedings. I would not like to think that that is how these arrangements might be conducted if it were necessary to transfer assets to another company. Indeed, the opacity of the Bulb proceedings led to an unsuccessful High Court challenge from several companies that felt they had been excluded from the transfer of liabilities and assets.

A clear intention that these proceedings will operate with the utmost transparency would help the progress of the Bill. The lesson that may be learned from Bulb is that it is generally not a good idea to undertake proceedings as if they were a state secret. On the contrary, disclosure and transparency, within the limits of commercial confidentiality, should be the watchword for such proceedings. When the Minister undoubtedly enlightens us with comments on my previous points, will he also reflect on how the regime might work best?

[Andrew Bowie]

Let me answer the hon. Gentleman’s questions in order and, I hope, in enough detail to satisfy him and the Committee. The aim is for a special administration regime to be used only in the instance of an insolvency. As we all know, it allows for the protection of essential services in a company solvency scenario to ensure that those services continue.

It is worth reflecting on the fact that in the absence of such a regime, if a carbon dioxide transport and storage company were to become insolvent, an administrator or liquidator working under the standard objectives—they include achieving a better result for creditors than winding up—would not necessarily have cause to keep transport and storage services running, or to secure the ongoing safety and security of the network. That is why we believe an SAR is relevant, and it would only be used in the instance of insolvency.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

The regulator will have the power, under clause 17 of the Bill, to terminate a carbon dioxide transport and storage licence in certain circumstances. The circumstances in which the economic regulator can terminate a licence will be set out in the licence itself. Those circumstances could include where a licence holder has contravened or failed to comply with enforcement orders made by the regulator, or by the courts where the licence holder has ceased to carry on as a transport and storage business or has become insolvent.

If a licence is being terminated due to company insolvency, the economic regulator or the Secretary of State have the option, under the provisions of chapter 4, to apply to the courts for a special administration order, as we have just discussed. Where a licence is to be terminated for non-insolvency reasons, clause 50 allows the Secretary of State the option to make a statutory transfer scheme. A transfer scheme would allow the Secretary of State to transfer relevant property, rights or liabilities of a licence holder either to another appropriate body or to the Secretary of State himself.

The aim of the transfer scheme is to secure the ongoing operation of the network, so that emitters that are attached to a network can continue to have their carbon dioxide emissions transported and stored in an economic, safe and secure manner. Where the ongoing operation is no longer viable, a transfer scheme would enable the Secretary of State to ensure that the safety and security of the network is maintained. As set out in clause 50, the Secretary of State cannot make a transfer scheme without the consent of the current licence holder and the persons to whom the licence and associated property, rights or liabilities are proposed to be transferred.

Clause 51 states that, before making a statutory transfer scheme under clause 50, the Secretary of State must consult both the licence holder—the transferor—and the person to whom the licence and associated assets are to be transferred—the transferee. If the proposed transferee is not a public authority, the Secretary of State must consult the economic regulator and other listed public bodies before making such a scheme, as well as the relevant carbon storage licensing authority. That is intended to ensure that the proposed transferee is able to meet the requirements of the licensing authorities.

Clause 52 gives effect to schedule 4, which makes further provision about transfer schemes made under clause 50. Schedule 4 sets out the scope and obligations for any statutory transfer that is made by the Secretary of State in relation to a carbon dioxide transport and storage licensed company. The schedule sets out that a scheme is capable of transferring property, rights and liabilities, including those that would not otherwise be capable of being transferred or assigned.

The provisions of the schedule enable transfers that are affected by the scheme to take effect as if there were no requirement to obtain a person’s consent under the relevant contract, licence or permit that is being transferred, and the transfer will not create any liability due to the apparent contravention of restrictions on transfer that would ordinarily apply. The exception to that is that the transferor and transferee company would be required to provide consent to a transfer. The intention is that, in effect, a transfer scheme is capable of seamlessly parachuting the transferee in the place of the transferor.

On the day on which a scheme comes into force, which would be the date appointed in the scheme, the transferee or transferees must pay to the transferor, or the transferor must pay to the transferee or transferees, such sums as may be agreed.

[Dr Whitehead]

Yet again, there are some sound provisions in the Bill on transfer schemes and how they might work. We have had the debate about how transfer schemes might follow from orders and how that all works through. As I have said, it is important, however, to think about the circumstances under which transfer schemes might arise. Normally, as the Minister has outlined, transfer schemes will come about because the company was unable to fulfil its obligations as the licensee because it did not exist any more or was in such a dire financial situation that it could not be seen as properly carrying out its licence obligations.

As I have said, there are other circumstances under which a transfer scheme could arise. Clause 51 sets out the question of consultation on transfers and that the company that is subject to having its assets and activities transferred has to be consulted. Obviously, if the company no longer exists, it might be difficult to consult that company. Clause 50 goes further and states in subsection (5):

“The Secretary of State may not make a scheme without the consent of…the licence holder”.

It appears that the licence holder—the company having the assets transferred from it—has a veto on whether the transfer scheme goes through.

If a company exists in reasonable working order, but it has contravened its licence for reasons that are not wholly to do with insolvency, that company might be pretty aggrieved about the process of the transfer. Under those circumstances, it might simply refuse to co-operate. The clause appears to confirm, in the way it is written, the potential non-co-operation of that company.

I do not know whether there is anything elsewhere in the Bill that modifies this statement, but it does look rather stark as it stands:

“The Secretary of State may not make a scheme without the consent of”

that company. I do not know whether that needs to be looked at, or whether there are circumstances—say a company is unreasonably refusing to co-operate or unreasonably withholding consent—in which that can then be overcome. I frankly do not know whether those circumstances or arrangements exist.

Deep in the recesses of schedule 4 is paragraph 10, on compensation for third parties. It deals with circumstances in which an innocent third party, as it were, has had dealings with the licensee that has gone bust or otherwise failed to carry out the terms of its licence, and is financially or otherwise inconvenienced—or has a loss attached to it—as a result of a transfer scheme.

For those who are desperate to read it, paragraph 10(1) on page 269 says that, under those circumstances,

“the third party is entitled to compensation in respect of the extinguishment of the third party’s entitlement.”

That means that when the third party had a reasonable expectation that something was going to happen as part of the licence arrangement, which has been extinguished because of a transfer scheme, and, I assume, it has not proved possible for the entitlements and expectations to be transferred to, say, another company that will undertake the licence activities, with all the procedures we have discussed, that third party is entitled to compensation.

Further down in the schedule, though, we see where that compensation comes from. Paragraph 10(3) states:

“A liability to pay compensation under this paragraph falls on the Secretary of State.”

Does it not in any way fall on the recovery of some of the assets of the company that failed to carry out its licence? Are there procedures whereby that might be done first, perhaps by the Secretary of State? Or is it an absolute requirement that if compensation is required, that is the end of the involvement of the company that is losing its licence and the Secretary of State must find that compensation, howsoever that has been arrived at? I do not know the answer to that—I am not asking the Minister a trick question—but it seems to me that a company that is losing its licence should be expected to provide at least some of the compensation to which the third party is entitled.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions, which again are pertinent and important to the Bill’s passage and implementation. I will answer them in turn.

When the Secretary of State considers making a transfer scheme, he may opt to do so when a network operator’s licence is expected to revoked. The purpose would be to transfer the ongoing operation of the transport and storage network to another operator. Pertinent to that is the hon. Gentleman’s question about the balance of power between the economic regulator and the Secretary of State. He asked whether they will both have the power to initiate a transfer scheme. Only the Secretary of State has the power to make a statutory transfer scheme under the provisions of chapter 5. Unless the Secretary of State is proposing to bring the assets within his own control, he must consult the economic regulator, Ofgem, when making a transfer scheme under the provisions of chapter 5.

On the question of whether the provisions go against the rights of a private company to which the assets belong, clause 50 confirms that the transfer scheme should take effect only with the consent of the transferor and the transferee. The consent of a licence holder to a statutory transfer scheme in the event of a licence termination, and the basis for the valuation of any compensation in the particular circumstances, is expected to be agreed to as part of the licence condition.

[Dr Whitehead]

With respect, that slightly misses the point about the question of the consent of the pre-existing licence holder. My question was: does the fact that the Bill says the Secretary of State

“may not make a scheme without the consent of”

the pre-existing licence holder mean that the pre-existing licence holder effectively has the whip hand as far as any subsequent scheme is concerned? In other words, if the licence holder simply says, “No, I’m not going to consent,” is that the end of the matter, or are do other things happen? I am not clear about that. If other things can happen, how can they?

[Andrew Bowie]

The hon. Gentleman asks another appropriate question. It is my understanding that, under the Bill, that would be the end of the matter. However, as he says, there is a more general point, and we will be working to add more detail to the procedure in future. I am happy to keep in touch with the hon. Gentleman as we do that over the next few months.

[Dr Whitehead]

Are we not going to talk about the schedule?

[Andrew Bowie]

I am terribly sorry; I missed the hon. Gentleman’s question about the schedule.

[Dr Whitehead]

I was getting so into the weeds that that is not surprising. My question concerns compensation for third parties and the extent to which the Secretary of State appears to be liable for that compensation, rather than at least attempting to involve the previous licence holder, who may have assets that could add to that compensation. Schedule 4 appears to provide that the previous licensee has no part in the proceedings. It states at paragraph 10(3):

“A liability to pay compensation under this paragraph falls on the Secretary of State.”

Are there circumstances in which the force of that particular statement may be mitigated? Alternatively, does the Minister regard it as good practice that, as far as the previous licensee is concerned, that is the end of it?

[Andrew Bowie]

As with my answer to the hon. Gentleman’s previous question, there are details that still need to be worked through. On his specific question, there will be mitigations in terms of the responsibility being wholly on the Secretary of State and in terms of whether the previous licence holder should be responsible for paying that compensation. I will keep in touch with the hon. Gentleman about the issue as we work up the specifics of the provision.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 51 and 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 4 agreed to.

Clause 53

Cooperation of storage licensing authority with economic regulator

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Clause 54 gives effect to schedule 5, which makes amendments to other Acts that result from measures in part 1 of the Bill.

Schedule 5 makes consequential amendments to existing legislation to reflect the functions and powers conferred on Ofgem as the economic regulator of carbon dioxide transport and storage under part 1. They include amendments to the Utilities Act 2000 to make it clear that requirements in that Act relating to Ofgem’s work programming and annual reporting functions do not include the functions in relation to carbon dioxide transport and storage conferred on Ofgem by the Bill. That is necessary because the Bill makes separate provision for Ofgem to prepare a forward work programme and annual report on its transport and storage functions, as we discussed earlier.

The restriction on the disclosure of information in section 105 of the Utilities Act is amended to provide that the unauthorised disclosure of information obtained under the provisions of part 1 is a criminal offence, except where disclosure is for the purpose of facilitating the performance of Ofgem’s statutory functions under part 1. Amendments are also made to the Enterprise Act 2002 to reflect the market investigation powers being given to Ofgem in respect of the carbon dioxide transport and storage sector. The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 is amended to ensure that appeals to the CMA in relation to licence modification decisions are heard by a specialist panel. That will ensure that people with the most appropriate expertise are involved in an appeal.

Clause 55 sets out the definitions of terms used in part 1, including include technical definitions relating to the geological storage of carbon dioxide, which are consistent with definitions used in the existing carbon storage licensing legislation.

[Dr Whitehead]

We come to the part of the Bill where we go through all the definitions and talk about the various amendments that have been made to other pieces of legislation. I always worry slightly about that, in as much as that without actually referring to those bits of legislation, we do not quite know whether someone has smuggled through the revocation of our rights under Magna Carta or whatever in a small amendment to a Bill far away. As far as I can see, everything is in order and the Bill does the right thing to tidy up all the relevant ends, so I am very happy for it to proceed.

[Andrew Bowie]

I confirm that we are in no way revoking the hon. Gentleman’s rights under Magna Carta.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 54 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 5 agreed to.

Clause 55 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Joy Morrissey.)

Energy Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Tuesday 23rd May 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Whitehead]

My knees get worse as the afternoon goes on.

The clause is, as the Minister said, about the power to create a licence type. I appreciate that that is in the gift of the Secretary of State in the first instance; the power will be transferred subsequently, as we said when debating clause 7. This clause, however, appears to do two things, and possibly goes far wider than the Minister envisages. It allows for regulations so that

“different types of licence may be granted…in respect of different descriptions of activity falling within section 2(2).”

Clause 2(2), as we have discussed, defines activities that are prohibited if unlicensed. Those are:

“operating a site for the disposal of carbon dioxide by way of geological storage”;

and

“providing a service of transporting carbon dioxide by a licensable means of transportation”.

We mentioned the possibility of an amendment that would have covered carbon dioxide usage as well, as the Minister will be aware. The power under clause 8 would allow different licence types within that overall framework. As the Minister said, different activities may emerge. Various activities will fall well within clause 2(2), and others will be to the side of that.

As far as I can see, the power in clause 8 allows the Secretary of State to sweep up what is both central to and to the side of the activities in clause 2(2). That may be good for the Secretary of State, but it is not good for the companies developing carbon capture and storage, who are not sure whether this power will or will not sweep them up—they do not know. They are not sure whether the activity they are carrying out on the margins of the licensing arrangement is non-licensable, or will become licensable if and when the Secretary of State decides by regulation that different kinds of licences can be provided. A lot of that depends on what the regulations say. If they are broad, as this power to create licence types appears to be, companies will not have any assurances about what they are doing. When the regulations come out, they might prefer a menu of the different licence types in the Secretary of State’s mind.

I appreciate that we are in the realm of known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns, but a menu of different licence types that are reasonably close to licensability in the mind of the Secretary of State would be very helpful for companies operating in this sphere. Will they be more or less likely to need to apply for a license? Would the licensing situation hold up their activities in any way, or could they go ahead with what they were doing on the margins, not within the new license type? Could the Minister comment on what is in his mind about the regulations? Will he provide that menu? If so, what might it consist of?

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Member for his questions. I do not think the former Defence Secretary of the United States would have expected to be mentioned so much in the UK’s Energy Bill Committee—we have talked about known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns. The hon. Member is correct: we are dealing with a lot of unknown unknowns when we talk about exactly how and when the industry and technology will develop. As they develop, a decision will be taken at an appropriate point about what will and will not be licensable, and what types of licence will and will not apply.

The hon. Member talks about the regulations and whether there will be a menu of options. Clarity is good for everyone, especially when developing a new technology and deciding whether to invest in carbon capture, usage and storage. We will be as clear as we can in regulations about what will and will not be licensable and what licences will apply. However, I would not like to be drawn at this stage on what will be in the regulations. That will be for Government and industry to work up together as we move toward the date when they will apply.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Procedure for licence applications

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 77, in clause 9, page 10, line 6, after “the Secretary of State” insert

“must ensure that licences are only granted to fit and proper persons, and”.

The aim of this amendment is to put the onus on the Secretary of State to personally deem the individual as “fit and proper”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his amendments. They seek to place responsibility on the Secretary of State to ensure that individuals obtaining a carbon dioxide transfer and storage licence are fit and proper. The amendments would affect the licence application, the licence transfer, the special administrative regime and transfer schemes.

It is clear that the Opposition and the Government share the same desire here, requiring the utmost standards for those wishing to engage in the transport and storage of carbon dioxide, in support of the Government’s ambitions to scale up the deployment of CCUS and its important role of achieving our net zero target. I therefore support the hon. Member for Southampton, Test’s aim; however, as addressed in the other place, the specific inclusion of “fit and proper” within the drafting of clauses across part 1 is actually unnecessary. That assurance is already inherent within the Secretary of State and the economic regulator’s role within the licensing regime. Despite sharing the desire, I ask for the amendment to be withdrawn because I believe that it is superfluous in this instance.

Amendments 82, 83 and 87, which were also tabled by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, seek to make the Secretary of State responsible for ensuring that an individual designated as a hydrogen production counterparty is deemed “fit and proper”. The Government anticipate that the Low Carbon Contracts Company Ltd, or LCCC, which is the existing counterparty for contracts for difference and the planned counterparty for the dispatchable power agreement, will be the counterparty for the low-carbon hydrogen agreement, subject to its successful completion of administrative and legislative amendments.

In taking the decision to proceed with LCCC as the counterparty to the low-carbon hydrogen agreement, the Secretary of State considered, among other things, LCCC’s ability to deliver the required functions and its experience and track record in contract management. Those considerations would bear on any future decisions, which would also be subject to normal principles of public decision making. Again, I agree with and share the same aim and desire as the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, but the amendments are superfluous. I politely ask that he withdraw his amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

Naturally, the fact that the Minister did not eagerly grasp and endorse the substance of the amendments and run off to the Table Office is disappointing, but I accept that he has perhaps looked in detail at how the legislation will work and is satisfied that an equivalent of the “fit and proper person” test can effectively be carried out under the provisions of the Bill. However, that has not been the judgment of other parts of Government, which have found that particular wording to be of great help in underlining what their responsibilities are. It also ensures that the judgments that they make in exercising their responsibilities are fairly bomb-proof: if the Secretary of State presses the “fit and proper person” button, there is not too much an aggrieved party can do about it. I appreciate that that is different for different licences.

The Government have effectively decided that the LCCC, which I think is a fit and proper person, will be the hydrogen counterparty, although that is still to come in legislation—so we are legislating for something that we think will happen later, but not right this minute. I leave that with the Minister. He has not agreed to amendment 77; he thinks it superfluous. I slightly disagree—I think it would be useful—but that is to some extent a matter of judgment. Perhaps in a few years’ time, when a Minister becomes seriously unstuck with a particular appointment, we will get together again and see what can be done about it. For now, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Andrew Bowie]

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 9, page 10, line 15, leave out subsection (10) and insert—

“(10) Section 10(6) (meaning of ‘appropriate devolved authorities’) applies for the purposes of subsection (3) of this section as it applies for the purposes of section 10(3).”

This amendment corrects a drafting error in the definition of “appropriate devolved authorities”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

As the hon. Gentleman knows, we have launched a track 2 process; there will be an update on timings in the summer. Of course, we want to open up the process to as many companies and organisations seeking to get into this technology as possible, but it is really important that the appropriate steps are followed to get to that stage. That is why we are proceeding at pace with track 2 and why we will update everybody concerned with that in the summer.

Whether a competitive process is appropriate in the enduring regime will depend on how the CCUS market develops, including the anticipated number of market participants—that relates to the answer I just gave to the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun. Any regulations that may be made under the power would first be subject to consultation with the economic regulator and the devolved Administrations, and they would be subject to the affirmative procedure.

[Dr Whitehead]

This is a bit unsatisfactory, to be honest. I appreciate that the Minister has very carefully said that this is a discretionary power for the future and the Department may, as the CCUS market develops, consider making—I presume—some licences viable on a competitive basis, and that the Government may do that by regulation; I am pleased to hear that the regulation will be subject to the affirmative procedure, should the Government do that. Nevertheless, that seems to leave huge gaps in the procedure by which competitive licences might be determined. Is the determination based on, for example, how much money a company gives for the licence, and would the competitive licence mean that the highest bidder won the licence regardless of their suitability for the purpose?

Would the judgment on the creation of the licence be subsumed in other factors such as finances, or would the competitive licence be tendered on the basis of who is geographically most able to do something in terms of the viability of the body or company complying with a licence? Would there be a financial test? Once a competition has been entered into and the terms are not carefully set, we may get to a situation of “Beware your wishes; they may come true.” What we get as an outcome of a competitive tender may not be what we wanted to happen, but if we set it in train through the competitive process and have not defined it carefully enough, there will be no going back at that point.

It will be necessary to think through this way of doing things very carefully before proceeding, even with discretion being exercised. I am concerned that there is not enough in the legislation to guide us on how that thinking process might be carried out. Perhaps the Minister will give us a little guidance on the sort of things that would be to the fore should the competitiveness process be undertaken, and indeed the things that he would not consider in such a process. I am delighted to see that he has received bit of guidance on the matter. That may well help us all.

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Member, and completely understand his concerns and where he is coming from. Ultimately, however, the appropriateness of a competitive approach to licence allocation will be considered, taking into account the learning from both the track 1 and the ongoing track 2 licence allocation processes, as well as the wider developments in CCUS markets and technology. This is not without precedent. In gas and electricity, Ofgem runs different processes for allocating different licence types. Some are allocations that are run competitively, such as offshore transmission licences, and other licence types are not.

The power in clause 8 also enables consequential amendments to be made to the Bill should they be considered necessary to facilitate the making of different licence types, but as the hon. Member pointed out, and as I said, the power is discretionary, and it should be for the Secretary of State to choose whether to exercise such powers.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11

Conditions of licences: general

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

A number of conditions will be appropriate to include as standard in all licences of the relevant type. The power in clause 12 enables the Secretary of State to specify what those standards are. The Secretary of State will be required to publish the standard conditions in an appropriate manner once they have been determined, and they will then be automatically included when a licence is granted.

To allow for the possibility that the standard conditions may need to be tailored to the circumstances of a particular licensee, the clause also enables standard conditions to be either excluded or amended in an individual licence. That can be done only if both the licence holder in question and other holders of the same licence type would not be unduly disadvantaged as a result.

Notice must be given of the intent to modify or exclude standard conditions in an individual licence, setting out the proposed modifications or omissions and the reasons for them, with sufficient opportunity for representations or objections to be made. Any objections or representations must be fully considered. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Whitehead]

The Minister has set out what the standard conditions of licences are likely to be and how they are going to be determined by the Secretary of State, but the clause goes a bit further than that. It says in subsection (2) that

“the Secretary of State must”

—that is a good thing—

“publish any standard conditions determined under subsection (1)”,

which says:

“The Secretary of State may determine the conditions that are to be the standard conditions of licences”,

and subsection (2) then says the Secretary of State must publish the conditions

“in whatever manner the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”

That is a bit of an odd formulation. I am more used to the idea that the Secretary of State must publish any standard conditions determined under subsection (1)—full stop.

The question of publication has always been important when conditions are to be published that licence applicants will be expected to look at and know about. The onus is, or should be, on the Department to publish those conditions as widely as possible, whereas this power appears to narrow that substantially. I am not suggesting that in any way the Minister would seek to restrict the public’s free access to information, but under this formulation it is possible that, just as publications are set up specifically for the purpose of obscuring the publication of various things from the general public, the Secretary of State could decide to publish the conditions in something like The Competitors Journal. Indeed, they could be published as—I don’t know—a TikTok video, as I mentioned earlier, or in some other way that is inappropriate to the circumstances under which their publication should appear, which should give those who apply for licences the maximum amount of, and ease of access to, the information that would be necessary to inform their application.

We have not moved an amendment to strike out the second part of subsection (2), but I would like from the Minister at least an assurance that he will place an emphasis on the first part, which requires the Secretary of State to publish the conditions, and that, in pretty much all circumstances, “publish” means that the publication is widespread and easily accessible in the public domain, so that it can be digested and read by all concerned.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Yes, I agree with my right hon. Friend. It is precisely about what he was touching on earlier: we are able to provide in the legislation the flexibility to allow the technologies for which we are legislating the space to grow, develop and become commercially viable. That is why it is essential to strike the balance between regulation and ensuring freedom for companies to operate. That is exactly why we would like the clause to stand part of the Bill.

As I was saying, allowed revenues must be set at a level that covers the companies’ costs and allows them to earn a reasonable return, subject to their delivering value for consumers, behaving efficiently and achieving their targets as set by the economic regulator. The amount of allowed revenue that an operator is able earn is set out in the licence conditions, which will need to be updated to reflect the outcomes of the periodic regulatory reviews and to keep pace with the evolution of the market more broadly. The power provides for the economic regulator to make such licence modifications, subject to an appropriate consultation process.

Before making any modifications to licence conditions, the economic regulator must give notice of the proposed modifications, the rationale for them, and an appropriate timeframe within which representations may be made. Any representations that are made must be duly considered. As Exchequer support will be available to certain users of the networks, the Secretary of State must be consulted on licence modification proposals and retains the power to direct that a modification may not be made.

Should the Secretary of State object to a particular modification, the economic regulator would need to consider whether to pursue the modification in an alternative form, which would require restarting the process of notifying and consulting on the new proposals. As is the case in other regulated sectors, licensees should have the right of appeal regarding modifications that are made to licences after they have been granted. The Bill provides for that later in chapter 1.

Clause 14 requires that, where the economic regulator has made a licence modification under clause 13 to a standard licence condition, the standard conditions of all future licences of that type should similarly be modified. That ensures a consistent approach to standard conditions across licences of the same type.

Clause 15 makes provisions for the Competition and Markets Authority or, as may be the case, the Secretary of State, to modify licence conditions in specific circumstances in relation to company mergers. Where there is a merger between licensed entities, that may necessitate licence modifications to ensure compliance with competition law. The power enables the CMA or the Secretary of State to modify licence conditions accordingly. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Dr Whitehead]

I have a question more than anything. Will the Minister state on the record this afternoon who the economic regulator actually is? The reason why I ask is that there does not seem to be any definition in the Bill of who the economic regulator is. It appears to be the CMA, but it might not be, because clause 20, on “Appeal to the CMA”, is under the heading “Appeal from decisions of the economic regulator”, so those do not appear to be the same thing in the Bill’s construction. It is not further defined, so perhaps the Minister will clarify that for us.

[Andrew Bowie]

I am happy to clarify that the economic regulator to which I and the Bill refer is of course Ofgem. Appeal to the CMA relates to what I have just discussed: occasions when there is a merger between two licensed entities, which may necessitate modifications. That is where the CMA comes into it. To be absolutely clear, Ofgem is the economic regulator.

[Dr Whitehead]

I point out, therefore, that there are inconsistent references to Ofgem, to the CMA and to the economic regulator. They are one and the same but referred to in different ways in different parts of the Bill. That might be a drafting issue more than anything else.

[Andrew Bowie]

I have just been reminded by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield that clause 1 sets out that the economic regulator to which we refer is Ofgem.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 14 and 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Interim power of Secretary of State to grant licences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

The clause and schedule 1 provide the Secretary of State with the power to grant carbon dioxide transport and storage licences during an interim period, as has been discussed already this afternoon.

In the enduring regulatory regime, we expect the economic regulator to take decisions on who should be granted a carbon dioxide transport and storage licence. That is provided for by clause 7. However, it is the Secretary of State who will determine the first carbon dioxide transport and storage networks to be granted a licence—through the Government’s CCUS cluster sequencing programme—and the terms and conditions of those licences. That is appropriate given the Exchequer support available to the first CCUS clusters.

The CCUS cluster sequencing process is specifically designed for first-of-a-kind projects. The interim period during which the Secretary of State has the power to award licences will end on a date to be set in regulations, once the industry is sufficiently mature. After that interim period, the economic regulator will have sole power to grant licences.

Government amendment 2 corrects a cross-reference and renumbers a subsection in schedule 1 to ensure that the schedule is read correctly. Schedule 1 provides the Secretary of State with the power to grant carbon dioxide transport and storage licences during an interim period. The interim period during which the Secretary of State has the power to award licences will end on a date to be set in regulations made under schedule 1, once the industry is sufficiently mature. I think that answers some of the questions asked by the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun earlier. After that interim period, the economic regulator, Ofgem, will have sole power to grant licences. I commend the clause and the schedule to the Committee.

[Dr Whitehead]

The clause itself is brief, but refers to schedule 1 and to the interim power of the Secretary to State to grant licences. As the Minister said, that power will come to an end on a date to be determined at a point when the industry is well established and the Secretary of State therefore no longer has to exercise the interim power. Who decides when the industry is well established? If that is the Secretary of State, is it not a rather circular way of bringing to an end the power of the Secretary of State to grant licences on an interim basis? If the Secretary of State decides that the industry is not that well established, he or she will presumably continue to grant interim licences forever.

Presumably, we want to reach a point when the Secretary of State does not grant licences in his or her own right and Ofgem or the economic regulator does, but we do not appear to have any mechanism in the Bill, other than something to be determined at a particular date, whereby the Secretary of State switches off his or her own power and switches on an Ofgem power. It would be helpful if the Minister could clarify that. There may be something in the legislation that I have not noticed, but it appears from schedule 1 and the clause that there is not a clear switch-off mechanism, other than the intention to do so when the market is mature.

[Alan Brown]

To follow on from that point, and the point that I made earlier, I know that the Minister said that he would write to us, but I am interested in how he envisages the sequencing and the interim period coming to an end. Although he said that in terms of value for money it is up to Parliament, and us as parliamentarians, to hold the Government to account, if the interim period goes on for a long while and individual licences are granted effectively on an ad hoc basis, it will be almost impossible for parliamentarians to hold the Secretary of State to account. We will continually be told that the information is commercially sensitive, so we will be unable to access it. I want a bit more clarity on how this will all come together in a more transparent manner.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

The clause concerns termination events, stating:

“If the economic regulator considers that a termination event has arisen, or is likely to arise, the economic regulator must notify the persons mentioned in subsection (2) as soon as reasonably practicable.”

The Minister has given company insolvency as an example of a possible termination event, but I am sure he will agree that there are a number of others.

Subsection (5) says that a

“‘termination event’ means a state of affairs in which the economic regulator is authorised to revoke the licence.”

That explains precisely nothing; it does not give examples of termination events or explain the circumstances in which the economic regulator is authorised to revoke a licence. It does not take us very far.

Is there a roster of termination events? Is there a list of likely termination events that the Minister could put into a menu? Insolvency is one such event, but I can think of a number of other circumstances in which termination may take place either voluntarily or involuntarily. For example, a company may request that the regulator terminate its licence, stating that it cannot carry on with its licence arrangement for reasons other than insolvency.

The clause does not list any circumstances that could constitute a termination event. Is the Minister satisfied that the rather circular definition in the clause is sufficient? Or does he think that more clarity on what a termination event could constitute and how one might be dealt with is required?

[Andrew Bowie]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point. However, I think it is fairly well recognised and understood within the industry that the termination of a licence will come in the event that a licence holder ceases to carry on as a transport and storage business and therefore no longer requires a licence; if it becomes insolvent; or if it contravenes or fails to comply with enforcement orders made by the economic regulator or, in certain situations, the courts. I am not sure what would be added by setting that out in the Bill. I suspect that it is fairly well understood across the industry.

To answer the question of what would happen in the event of licence termination, the Bill provides certain step-in rights for the Secretary of State in a licence termination scenario to be able to transfer the ongoing operation of the transport and storage network to another operator or, where that is not possible, to ensure the safe decommissioning of the infrastructure. If a licence is terminated because of the insolvency of a transport and storage company, the Bill enables the application of a special administration regime to support the ongoing operation of the transport and storage network, prioritising its rescue as a going concern and securing the ongoing safety and security of the network. I reassure the hon. Gentleman that a great deal of consideration has gone into this specific element of the Bill, and we are happy that it is clear in its intent.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18

Transfer of licences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Bowie]

We are powering our way through this afternoon. Clause 18 enables carbon dioxide transport and storage licences to be transferred from one legal entity to another, subject to the consent of the economic regulator, Ofgem. Carbon dioxide transport and storage licences will be granted to a legal entity, and they cannot be bought or sold separate from that legal entity. Circumstances may arise in which it is appropriate or necessary to transfer a licence to another legal entity, and the clause provides for that. For example, a licence may need to be transferred as a result of a company merger or acquisition, or a company restructuring, where the legal entity that is proposed to carry on the licensable activity is not the same legal entity to which the licence was awarded. A transfer may relate to the whole or any part of the licence. The regulator’s consent is required for any licence transfer.

Clause 19 sets out the process that the economic regulator must follow before giving consent to any transfer. That includes public notice of the regulator’s intent to consent to a licence transfer, the reasons for it, any conditions to be attached to the consent to transfer, and a time period within which objections or representations can be made. The economic regulator must also notify the Secretary of State of an intended transfer, and the Secretary of State has the right to direct that a transfer may not be consented to. That is appropriate, as there may have been contractual financial support agreements in place between the Secretary of State and the current licence holder pursuant to the licence.

[Dr Whitehead]

The clauses deal with transfer of licences when, as mentioned in the previous clause, a termination event takes place. Subsequent to such an event, the licence will have to be put into action again and will be transferred. I am interested to see whether I can get the words “termination event” into common language, so that I can say to people, “That is a bit of a termination event”. However, I will not do that this afternoon.

The transfer of licences under such circumstances, as we have emphasised, needs to be put under the general heading of “fit and proper people”, whether we explicitly say that or not. A termination event may have occurred because someone has proven not to be a fit and proper person—for example, if they were gambling the company’s proceeds on local casinos—and therefore the company or person has been determined not to be able to carry out the term of the licence. The licence therefore needs to be transferred at least to a better kind of person.

Will the Minister expatiate briefly on the circumstances under which transfers will be judged? We need to be sure that when a licence needs to be transferred after a termination event, no one can say, “You over there—you will do. We are in a bit of a fix as far as the licence is concerned, so you get on with it.” I am sure that that is the last thing on the Minister’s mind, but it could conceivably happen if someone wished to cut corners and keep a licensed line of activity going. If the Minister could give an assurance about how licences will be transferred, that would be helpful.

[Andrew Bowie]

I am glad that we are not going to focus too much on termination or even extermination events during our debate. Indeed, it is to be hoped that we will not need to refer to this aspect of the Bill very much, if at all. However, we have to legislate in the expectation that at some point, there may be termination events for a licensed entity. That is why we have set out the provision for a licence transfer in the Bill.

The hon. Member for Southampton, Test referred to his earlier point regarding the inclusion of the phrase “fit and proper person”. As I said, we believe that the Bill sets out exactly how the Government will determine that a company or an individual is well placed to be a licence holder and carry out their duties as they relate to the Bill. However, let us say that they are not—we hope that that will not be the case—and a transfer takes place. A new licensee will be found, and if they intend to commence the licensable activity shortly after consent is granted, the regulator—Ofgem, in this case—may ask them to demonstrate, for example, that arrangements to accede to relevant codes by the proposed transfer date are in place. I understand why the hon. Member asks these questions, and it is right to do so. It is right that we state on the record today exactly what we expect in the event that a termination event takes place in regard to a licensed entity.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

Appeal to the CMA

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

I was tempted to refer the hon. Member to the Energy Prices Act 2022, which was recently passed—I think, to paraphrase the Minister, not on his watch. The Act allows the Secretary of State to do pretty much anything that he or she wants in the energy sphere. I do not know whether that applies to the circumstances that the hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden suggested, but we are particularly concerned about the powers in that Act, and whether they need to be rowed back a little in this Bill.

I draw the Committee’s attention to the process of appeal from the economic regulator to the CMA. It appears to be a linear process. The appeal is set up by the CMA, effectively, and there is no going back afterwards. There is not a circumstance in which the economic regulator can say, “Actually, we think the CMA didn’t work as well it should in terms of casting that appeal. Can we appeal the appeal—not necessarily the substance of the appeal, but the way in which it has been carried out?”

What is apparent in terms of the CMA’s powers regarding appeals is that they give the CMA a lot of ability to misstep. Clause 20(4) states:

“The CMA may refuse permission to bring an appeal only on one of the following grounds”.

The CMA, actually on fairly wide grounds, can therefore refuse to bring an appeal. It appears to have pretty widespread powers to make a determination without any comeback. For example, clause 22(4) states:

“The CMA may allow the appeal only to the extent that it is satisfied that the decision appealed against was wrong on”

various grounds, including, among others,

“that the decision was based, wholly or partly, on an error of fact”.

Various things in the clauses emphasise the linear nature of the appeal process—that is, the CMA decides, and no one is looking at what the CMA is doing in terms of its appeal processes. I would like to hear whether the Minister thinks that that is adequate or whether a little more attention ought to be paid to what the CMA is doing in those circumstances, and whether the relationship between the CMA and the economic regulator under those circumstances is as good as it could be.

[Andrew Bowie]

Turning first to the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden, who does treat both parts of his constituency with equal diligence—having visited, I have seen that at first hand—he is right: the Secretary of State does not have the power to directly modify licence conditions once they are granted, but he does have a veto over Ofgem decisions. That is set out in clause 13(6).

I genuinely understand the concerns of the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, but the provisions and procedures directly mirror the appeals process in respect of electricity and gas licence modification, set out in the Gas Act 1986 and the Electricity Act 1989. We believe that it will ensure consistency of approach for the economic regulator Ofgem and, indeed, the Competition and Markets Authority, which will provide confidence for the sector, and indeed sectors, as we move forward.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clauses 22 to 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 26

Provision of information to or by the economic regulator

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

They would be subject to the same stringent actions as have been set out, and in the interim the Secretary of State would determine what action should be taken in that respect.

Clause 27 gives the Secretary of State a power to require information directly from a carbon dioxide transport and storage licence holder, to ensure that he has access to information needed to support the effective conduct of his CCUS functions. The clause does not enable the Secretary of State to share or publish the information. To ensure protection of sensitive information, information provided to the Secretary of State will remain protected under the Data Protection Act, and an information request cannot be made to obtain information protected by legal professional privilege or, in Scotland, confidentiality of communications.

[Dr Whitehead]

The Minister’s final few words appear to show—the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun may have a few things to say about this—that there are different conditions for disclosure or production in legal proceedings in England and Wales and in Scotland. I am not a lawyer, so I do not know exactly what the difference is likely to be, but it appears that there is greater protection for the licence holder with respect to information provision in Scotland than in England and Wales. Perhaps I am reading that wrong. Is it the case that, in effect, the two conditions are the same and the wording of the Bill just bows in the direction of the formulation in Scotland, or is there a material difference?

[Andrew Bowie]

There is no material difference at all. As the hon. Member suggests, it is just a reference to the different regulations that apply in Scotland and in England and Wales, as a result of the devolved legislature in Edinburgh legislating slightly differently from the way that we have for the rest of the United Kingdom. That is the only difference. As this is a pan-UK Bill that affects each area of the United Kingdom, we have to make clear in the Bill the different regulations that will have to be conformed to. That is why the language of clause 27 is as it is.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28

Monitoring, information gathering etc

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

Clauses 28 to 31 relate to other functions of the economic regulator. Starting with clause 28, as I have already said, carbon capture, transport and storage are nascent industries in the UK and, indeed, globally.

The economic regulation framework for carbon dioxide transport and storage, established by part 1 of the Bill, is focused on the transport of carbon by pipeline for the purposes of geological storage. Through that framework, our aim is to both provide certainty for investors and protect user interests.

As the CCUS market becomes established, we may need to keep the framework under review—for example, on how it is applied to non-pipeline forms of carbon transportation and the most appropriate licensing structure for different types of onshore and offshore infrastructure. To help inform such considerations, clause 28 requires the economic regulator to keep the carbon dioxide transport and storage market under review.

The economic regulator may collect information for the carrying out of such monitoring functions. The regulator is also obliged to share relevant information with the Secretary of State or the CMA if requested to do so, to assist their competition and market functions. Clause 29 establishes the procedure for requesting such information and establishes a penalty if a licence holder does not comply with a request for relevant information.

Where the economic regulator is considering implementing proposals that may have a significant impact on licence holders, on others who are involved in related CCUS activities, on the general public or on the environment, clause 30 requires that the economic regulator carries out an impact assessment ahead of implementing the proposals. The economic regulator is required to carry out and publish an assessment of the likely impact of implementing the proposal or set out why it considers it unnecessary to carry out such an assessment.

An impact assessment for a proposal must be published in an appropriate manner and provide an opportunity for those who are likely to be significantly affected by the proposal’s implementation to make representations. In its annual report, the economic regulator must report on the impact assessments undertaken in the relevant financial year and the decisions taken as a result of those assessments.

Lastly, to ensure transparency of decision making, clause 31 establishes that, for certain decisions, the economic regulator and the Secretary of State must give reasons for the decisions taken. The reasons must be set out in the published notice and sent to the relevant licence holder. Before publishing a notice, the economic regulator or the Secretary of State must give regard to the need to exclude information that could seriously and prejudicially affect the interests of an individual or body.

[Dr Whitehead]

I must say that these passages are so dry that I may be hearing the Minister’s voice in my sleep this afternoon, rather than tonight. Having said that, I assure you, Mr Gray, that I am wide awake and listening to what is being said.

When considering any piece of legislation, I always think that the first thing we should look at is the impact assessments, because they have to tell the truth about what is going on. It is, therefore, always useful to have impact assessments. Indeed, it is important that an impact assessment is available as often as possible both for Bill Committees and for secondary legislation.

Clause 30, however, appears to be rather vague about whether impact assessments should actually be undertaken. On the duty to carry out impact assessment, it states that

“the economic regulator is proposing to do anything for the purposes of, or in connection with, the carrying out of any function exercisable by it under or by virtue of this Part, and…it appears to the economic regulator that the proposal is important”,

but the clause does not specify what is meant by “important”. It goes on to say:

“but this section does not apply if it appears to the economic regulator that the urgency of the matter makes it impracticable or inappropriate for the economic regulator to comply with the requirements of this section.”

In other words, if the economic regulator thinks that an issue has some significance—subjectively judged, I assume, by the economic regulator—it may carry out an impact assessment. On the other hand, if there is no time to do it or it does not appear to be terribly appropriate to the economic regulator, it does not have to do it anyway. Therefore, we might get an impact assessment, or we might not.

There are a number of grounds in the process under which the impact assessment can be voided or avoided. Although subsection (2) attempts to define what “important” means in connection with a proposal, it also states:

“A proposal is important for the purposes of this section only if its implementation would be likely to do one or more of the following”.

and thereby further downgrades the question of what is still a rather subjective view of what constitutes importance.

I assume that the Minister shares my view that impact assessments are really important not just for important subjects but for most things. Although we have not tabled an amendment, will the Minister consider tightening the wording so as to ensure that carrying out impact assessments is the norm and not something to be decided by the regulator? To use the word “important” again, it is important that we are clear about impact assessments. Indeed, that has been set out in guidance to Ministers, who should seek to undertake impact assessments at all times, where possible, and should not hide behind speed issues or other circumstances in order to avoid them. However, it appears that that is not the case for the economic regulator, and that is not satisfactory.

[Andrew Bowie]

The Government are always open to suggestions and ideas about how we can improve legislation. As I said earlier, it is important for the industry, nascent as it is, that there is as much clarity as possible about how it is governed and about the regulatory process that it must follow. We must also understand that, as the market and the technology grow, evolve and develop, we will need to keep that under review. However, I am happy to give a commitment to the hon. Member that we will consider whether it is possible to tighten up the language so that exactly what is meant is made clear to industry.

Energy Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Committee stage
Tuesday 23rd May 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. I would be happy to give a thorough explanation of exactly how the carbon capture and storage will proceed; I am sure we will get to that in the course of our debate on the Bill, and in other places. However, I am not sure where that would fit within the context of this debate, other than to say that the technology being developed by companies, organisations and clusters around the UK is world leading. When it comes to being able to store in the future the carbon dioxide being produced in the UK now, the North Sea is of course the greatest asset that we have as a country. The oil and gas industry will be able to play a pivotal role in that development as we move forward.

Given the reasoning I have set out, I hope that the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test will be withdrawn.

[Dr Whitehead]

I appreciate what the Minister has said this morning. Frankly, though, I am not wholly convinced that the processes have been fully accounted for. I emphasised the various uses of carbon dioxide. The Minister is right that not all those uses lead to eventual sequestration. However, most of the uses that do not lead to additional sequestration do, on occasions, sequester the carbon dioxide in the process itself.

For example, carbon dioxide used in horticulture is substantially sequestered during the process of growing the plants. There is potentially an important use of carbon dioxide in processing hydrogen and in producing sustainable aviation fuel. Those processes sort of sequester the carbon in producing a different product, which is itself then burned. We then have to sequester the whole lot again, but the product has been used in the meantime.

It is important to concentrate on aligning the processes within carbon dioxide use as closely as possible with the process of sequestration, not simply allowing the carbon dioxide to escape. One thing that concerns me is the use of carbon dioxide in the process of the enhanced recovery of oil, because unless that carbon dioxide can be sequestered at the point it is injected into a well, although it produces greater amounts of oil it leaks into the atmosphere again, so we have a net negative outcome. We have produced more oil, but arguably it should have been left where it was in many instances.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

I believe that that was made clear. As I said earlier, we are working with Ofgem to ensure that it has the capabilities to deal with all of this. In terms of a national policy statement for Ofgem moving forwards, there will be a series of announcements over the next few months and, indeed, the year that will enable Ofgem and the future service operator to get into a position where they are able to deal with what we introduce through the Bill and other statements.

Clause 1 establishes Ofgem as the economic regulator for carbon dioxide transport and storage. It also establishes the principal objectives and statutory duties for both the Secretary of State and Ofgem in carrying out their functions under part 1 of the Bill. Transport and storage networks will act as the enabling infrastructure for carbon capture and storage from a range of sources, including power plants, industrial facilities, low-carbon hydrogen production and, potentially, direct air capture.

The economic regulation model provides long-term revenue certainty for network operators while protecting network users from monopolistic behaviours, as has already been described. The Government consider that Ofgem is the most appropriate body to act as the economic regulator for carbon dioxide transport and storage, due to its experience and expertise in the economic regulation of the overall energy sector. The selection of Ofgem as the regulator has received broad support from the industry. The principal objectives set out in clause 1 reflect the balance of considerations for a nascent carbon dioxide transport and storage sector.

[Dr Whitehead]

Clause 1 concerns the appointment of Ofgem as a regulator for these activities—in particular, carbon capture and storage. The new clauses that we have tabled seek to gather together what is in the Bill and provide it with a purpose clause, and to suggest to the Secretary of State that the Bill’s contents might be encapsulated, for future direction and use, in a strategy and purpose document.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank the hon. Member for his careful and considered contribution, which reflected the careful and considered discussions that His Majesty’s loyal Opposition and the Government have been having on the Bill and on the wider issue of net zero and energy security over the past few months and years. He is absolutely right: this is not a partisan debate, and there is very little to distinguish the Opposition’s approach to this issue from that of the Government. We all agree that our overarching aims, though this Bill and through the other actions that we as a country are taking, are to reduce emissions, reduce bills, strengthen our energy security, and create and secure new British jobs in the process, which will be to the benefit of this country and help us to lead the way in the world.

The hon. Member spoke with great purpose. I find very little to disagree with in the substance of what he said about the purpose clause, but he also admitted that the Bill is stuffed full, to use his phrase, of clauses that explain exactly what we are striving to do. For that reason, I suggest that despite the good intentions behind this specific purpose clause, it would be superfluous to the Bill at this stage. However, it is something that we are willing to consider moving forward.

With regard to the hon. Member’s comments on the strategy and policy statement, the power of the 2013 Act was not specific to the measures contained in that Act but covered all of the Government’s strategic energy priorities. That is why we published the consultation on an SPS just 13 days ago.

[Dr Whitehead]

Nearly 10 years later.

[Andrew Bowie]

Well, we got around to it eventually. The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun asked whether the strategy and policy statement covers Ofgem. Yes, it does, and Ofgem will have regard to the SPS consultation that we are working on right now.

As I said, we intend to designate a final strategy and policy statement by the end of this year. That will be a decision for Parliament, not the Secretary of State, whichever party the Secretary of State happens to be from at the time. The new clauses are therefore superfluous to the Bill, despite the fact that they are well intentioned and that there is very little in their contents that I can disagree with. That is why I ask the hon. Member for Southampton, Test not to press his new clauses.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Tuesday 23rd May 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

Will the Minister explain how, on his watch, things have got to such a wretched state with grid development? The grid apparently cannot now connect renewable energy plants to the system until after 2035, the date by which the Government say in the energy security strategy

“we will have decarbonised our electricity system”.

Presumably they envisage that system will be connected to the grid by that point. Has he been unaware that there is a serious problem, or was he aware, but did nothing about it?

[Andrew Bowie]

My watch began only in February. However, I believe the United Kingdom is a victim of its own success, as this is what happens when new renewable electricity production is developed at such scale and pace. We understand the challenges facing the country and the grid. That is why we are meeting with Ofgem and have commissioned the Winser review, which we will publish in the summer. We are determined that we will meet that 2035 target.

[Dr Whitehead]

The Minister says that some things are beginning to happen, but does he recognise in this context the figure of £30 billion, which is the investment the energy system operator considers is necessary to make the system fit for offshore wind and other renewables coming on to the system, not by 2035 but by 2030? Is he prepared to commit now to find that amount of investment, one way or another? If he cannot do that, how can we take his assurances on action at all seriously?

[Andrew Bowie]

This Government are determined to face up to the challenges that we have. We have moved forward at such pace, having inherited a disgraceful situation in terms of how much renewable electricity was being produced under the last Labour Government. That is why the grid is facing such challenges today and why we have commissioned Nick Winser to produce a review in the summer to see how we can move much faster to achieve our goals. I would welcome the hon. Gentleman and the Labour party being more supportive, talking up this country and our success in developing renewable electricity, and working with us to tackle the challenges that he so rightly brings to the Floor of the House today.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Tuesday 18th April 2023 Commons Chamber

[Andrew Bowie]

The east of England does do a lot of heavy lifting for renewables—almost as much as the north-east of Scotland—but this is not a competition. I am delighted to inform my right hon. Friend that I am visiting East Anglia next week to meet communities in the area. Indeed, I met producers and manufacturers yesterday to see what they can do to mitigate the impact on her local community and other communities in the region.

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

If we are prevented from building renewable power in the first place, connection times become rather a moot point. Will the Minister explain why he has failed to lift the ban on onshore wind, despite the Government saying that it would be lifted by the end of April?

[Andrew Bowie]

This Government are committed to onshore wind as a huge part of our renewable energy mix—14 GW, in fact. We are also committed to new renewables offshore and to new nuclear, which the Labour party opposed for such a long time. It will be a whole collection of those new technologies and infrastructure projects that will help us drive our way towards our net zero ambitions and the cleanest and cheapest electricity in Europe.

[Dr Whitehead]

That wasn’t very good, was it? The Government’s own offshore wind champion Tim Pick said last week that we will miss our 2030 offshore wind ambitions by more than 10 GW because of poor grid connections. Even with the lifting of the onshore ban—if we believe the Minister—developers will not invest given the prospect of a 13-year delay in grid connection. When will the Minister commit to a speedy programme of grid capacity building, to give onshore and offshore wind a good chance of success?

[Andrew Bowie]

As I said, this country is leading the way in investment in new renewable technology. We acknowledge that there are difficulties connecting to the grid, and we are investing in improving that. Nick Winser’s report is coming in June, which will give recommendations to Government on how to reduce the timescale for connecting those new projects to the grid. That is the focus of this Government, not playing politics. We are taking real decisions to benefit this country, to cut our carbon emissions and to reduce energy bills across the piece.

Draft Electricity Supplier Obligations (Green Excluded Electricity) (Amendment) Regulations 2023

Debate between Andrew Bowie and Alan Whitehead

Monday 27th February 2023 General Committees

[Andrew Bowie]

I thank hon. Members for their contributions. The hon. Member for Southampton, Test, made some good and sensible points on the SI and the policy. It is only right and proper that companies provide evidence that they are importing electricity. This SI was brought forward following extensive consultation with industry, and we expect companies to do the right thing. In terms of sustaining extra costs, those suppliers who have used the exemption will pay the scheme a cost in closer proportion to their market share. There are more suppliers who will benefit from this change than not. The change is considered to be very minor. The extra cost that the companies will pay will be minor, and we do not suspect that it will be in any way a disincentive for them to declare that they are importing energy.

I welcome the fact that the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun put on record that he considers CfD to be a success. I agree: it certainly has been a success. Indeed, we have only to look at my constituency and the number of wind turbines springing up off the coast of Aberdeenshire. On grid connections and the cost for electricity generation in Scotland, he knows that there is a trade-off, and that consumers in Scotland pay less as a result of the higher charges being placed on electricity generation. That is not to say that there are not issues that need to be addressed. I agree that there are, and we should look at them. I hear loud and clear his comments on tidal stream energy. In fact, I have been to see the exciting developments in Orkney, and I look forward to doing more on this.

[Dr Whitehead]

Will the Minister give way?

[Andrew Bowie]

I will, given that we have taken up so little time so far.

[Dr Whitehead]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He passed over my point about whether the suppliers will get a payout from the LCCC when the difference between the strike price and reference price is inverted from its normal position. If they will, how much will that come to?

[Andrew Bowie]

I am terribly sorry: I will have to write to the hon. Member on that point, but I will get an answer to him in the next couple of days, because it is important that it is answered.

I hope that I have given hon. Members the necessary assurances to approve the statutory instrument. As I said, the changes in these regulations will mean that a supplier in GB will pay a proportion of the CfD scheme cost that is closer to its market share; will remove the condition imposed on the British scheme by the European Commission; and will remove the incentive for GB suppliers to import EU-generated renewable electricity. They must be made now, ahead of the end of the scheme’s reporting period on 31 March, so that electricity suppliers and the scheme administrators can plan accordingly.

Question put and agreed to.