Foreign Affairs Committee
Tuesday 27th October 2026
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10:16
10:16
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10:17
10:17
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Thank you very much for coming. What we're going to do is, is have this evidence session for about an hour, if that's all right. And I'm going to start off by asking the first question, but other members may well have questions as well, if that's all right. And we may not ask everyone to answer every question because we may not have time to do that. But we want to try to use our time as efficiently as possible and to get as much evidence from you and from your the huge expertise that we have in front of us.
And we're really proud and pleased to have you. Thank you very much for coming. So I suppose the first question is really a general one, which is that the Foreign Secretary has argued that climate change and nature loss should be viewed as national security threats. And I know that there are campaigns around this issue. Do you agree with this framing? And perhaps should I start with Beatrice? Marcello?
And we're really proud and pleased to have you. Thank you very much for coming. So I suppose the first question is really a general one, which is that the Foreign Secretary has argued that climate change and nature loss should be viewed as national security threats. And I know that there are campaigns around this issue. Do you agree with this framing? And perhaps should I start with Beatrice? Marcello?
10:17
Abtisam Mohamed
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Abtisam Mohamed
Yes. Thank you for the question. I think it's an important framing and an important recognition that climate change and nature loss are not just environmental issues. So the framing of them as national security issues is important to move them beyond this kind of silo ization of how they are treated and therefore how they are responded to. And it really helps elevate them in the agenda and the political and decision making agenda, and highlights the, in a way, systemic nature and how the impacts of climate change, the impacts of nature, biodiversity loss, really have consequences for everything that underpins our economies and society, societal functions, our security eventually, from food production to health to water security, like our drinking water, we've seen the impacts of climate change very vividly on our doorstep this summer, and we'll see them even more going forward.
So I think this framing is an important recognition of the systemic nature of these threats, of these impacts, and therefore of the need for systemic responses across government. But also, I think it really helps highlight the fact that it's a security issue, not just at home, but the impacts of climate change on us abroad as well. And that's how it becomes a foreign policy question will have repercussions for, for for the UK at home, both in terms of the cascading risks and impacts of, say, a drought in a key food producing region that will cause food prices to spike, with repercussions for the cost of living here in the UK, and in terms of climate impacts, potentially, or actually we have evidence of this happening in many contexts kind of contributing to driving the social, economic, political factors that cause conflict and violence in in specific regions.
So we kind of contributing to a more regional and global instability that obviously has implications for the UK in terms of its development, humanitarian stabilization, peace building, conflict prevention kind of engagements. And I'll stop here.
So I think this framing is an important recognition of the systemic nature of these threats, of these impacts, and therefore of the need for systemic responses across government. But also, I think it really helps highlight the fact that it's a security issue, not just at home, but the impacts of climate change on us abroad as well. And that's how it becomes a foreign policy question will have repercussions for, for for the UK at home, both in terms of the cascading risks and impacts of, say, a drought in a key food producing region that will cause food prices to spike, with repercussions for the cost of living here in the UK, and in terms of climate impacts, potentially, or actually we have evidence of this happening in many contexts kind of contributing to driving the social, economic, political factors that cause conflict and violence in in specific regions.
So we kind of contributing to a more regional and global instability that obviously has implications for the UK in terms of its development, humanitarian stabilization, peace building, conflict prevention kind of engagements. And I'll stop here.
10:20
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Can I can I just ask perhaps Laurie Laybourn, the questions about I mean, I understand about climate change, but the arguments are not so front and centre when it comes to to nature loss being a national security threat. And I wondered if perhaps in in answering the more general question, you could focus in on that too, please.
10:20
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Of course. So I agree with you there that nature has been the the poor sibling, as it were, to climate when it comes to our understanding of the security consequences. This has been unfortunate because at the end of the day, we are facing really an earth system crisis. The planet has a number of different systems, like a human body does a heart, the respiratory system and so on. And they've all got to work in harmony for us to have stable and secure societies and all of those systems that climate system, water, as Beatrice was saying, have been, are being knocked out of that stability.
So really what we're what we need to be talking about here is a is an earth system security threat. And nature is, of course, a huge part of that earth system and has been relatively under focused on in the past. That is, of course, changing. And I think the latest, greatest example of that was the, I think, seminal report from the UK government on the security implications of changes in biodiversity and potential ecosystem collapse. That really is a world leading document that has clearly shown the vectors by which we would have national security threats here in the UK.
And they are very clear. The food system is a very good example of that, where places that we rely on to import food from are facing ecosystem changes, changes to their nature, to their biodiversity that could fundamentally threaten our food security here at home. So for me, the overall national security threat framing, I think is increasingly appropriate just because climate change and the loss of nature have now reached such a severe extent that they are beginning to press up against our areas of national security concern. Food is a is, I think, the latest and greatest example of that, with our domestic harvest being some of the worst on record so far this decade in the 2020s.
And there are these growing threats abroad that could echo back to us through supply chains. Of course, as I'm sure we'll get into the question is, as that as those national security threats begin to play out, what type of securitisation is it that we end up developing here in the UK? And what implications does that have around the world? And just to throw one thing in there before, I'm sure we go into that in more detail. That's got to understand that security is a shared construct construct. When you are facing a system. Threats, we cannot pull up the walls to the loss of biodiversity and to the breakdown of the climate system.
And so our securitisation, that is inevitably going to happen as climate change and nature loss graduate to national security threats, that type of securitisation, and what it is and how we define that in Britain is crucial for what comes next.
So really what we're what we need to be talking about here is a is an earth system security threat. And nature is, of course, a huge part of that earth system and has been relatively under focused on in the past. That is, of course, changing. And I think the latest, greatest example of that was the, I think, seminal report from the UK government on the security implications of changes in biodiversity and potential ecosystem collapse. That really is a world leading document that has clearly shown the vectors by which we would have national security threats here in the UK.
And they are very clear. The food system is a very good example of that, where places that we rely on to import food from are facing ecosystem changes, changes to their nature, to their biodiversity that could fundamentally threaten our food security here at home. So for me, the overall national security threat framing, I think is increasingly appropriate just because climate change and the loss of nature have now reached such a severe extent that they are beginning to press up against our areas of national security concern. Food is a is, I think, the latest and greatest example of that, with our domestic harvest being some of the worst on record so far this decade in the 2020s.
And there are these growing threats abroad that could echo back to us through supply chains. Of course, as I'm sure we'll get into the question is, as that as those national security threats begin to play out, what type of securitisation is it that we end up developing here in the UK? And what implications does that have around the world? And just to throw one thing in there before, I'm sure we go into that in more detail. That's got to understand that security is a shared construct construct. When you are facing a system. Threats, we cannot pull up the walls to the loss of biodiversity and to the breakdown of the climate system.
And so our securitisation, that is inevitably going to happen as climate change and nature loss graduate to national security threats, that type of securitisation, and what it is and how we define that in Britain is crucial for what comes next.
10:22
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
The problem might be that if we talk about it in terms of a security threat, that you end up with it being framed as that, and it will just it could end up being just about short term crisis management and not about looking at the the issue in, in more depth. I wonder, can I, can I possibly I don't know if anybody wants to address that issue. Yeah. Your your your indicating.
10:23
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10:23
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So yes, I agree with the framing, but I do agree that there is this perception risk from the terminology of security. And I think this is a it's a perception risk that is separate to, but also very related to the resourcing risk. So I think framing climate and nature loss as a security risk, it doesn't mean necessarily that it's going to lead to militarized responses, but there is a perception that this could be the case. There's also a kind of a strong lobby that this could be the case, and that there is a risk that perceptions and that that kind of reductive that comes with the framing can then lead to these kind of responses, because perceptions can then shape policy.
So I think unless the government is explicit in what responses look like, and it's likely that we could fall into this, this path of this securitization leading to very short term risk response and perhaps risk management, but certainly not prevention. So I think the security label, if we leave it unqualified, it does invite a harder security reading things like kind of increased defence spending and militarized contingency planning. But I think if we ensure that this framing is paired consistently and very visibly in the public space with investment in what is essentially soft security responses, mitigation, adaptation, investing, continuation, and investing in loss and damage finance.
This, this can kind of be the corrective to, to the risk of militarized responses. So I think very much underscoring what Laurie said about ensuring that this is a systemic response, but also making sure that within the security framing, it's very much people centred, certainly ecosystem and biodiversity facing, including these kind of systemic risks. But I think to ensure that we don't fall into that trap of a harder security pathway and path dependency, I think ensuring that human security and people and people centred approaches alongside nature and nature loss and biodiversity can be a corrective to a potential securitization of of climate responses.
So I think unless the government is explicit in what responses look like, and it's likely that we could fall into this, this path of this securitization leading to very short term risk response and perhaps risk management, but certainly not prevention. So I think the security label, if we leave it unqualified, it does invite a harder security reading things like kind of increased defence spending and militarized contingency planning. But I think if we ensure that this framing is paired consistently and very visibly in the public space with investment in what is essentially soft security responses, mitigation, adaptation, investing, continuation, and investing in loss and damage finance.
This, this can kind of be the corrective to, to the risk of militarized responses. So I think very much underscoring what Laurie said about ensuring that this is a systemic response, but also making sure that within the security framing, it's very much people centred, certainly ecosystem and biodiversity facing, including these kind of systemic risks. But I think to ensure that we don't fall into that trap of a harder security pathway and path dependency, I think ensuring that human security and people and people centred approaches alongside nature and nature loss and biodiversity can be a corrective to a potential securitization of of climate responses.
10:26
10:26
Alex Ballinger
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Alex Ballinger
Well, it was actually a follow up on something that Doctor Marcello said about our kind of food security and the national security threat to our food resilience that has been identified. And I just wanted to get your perspective a bit more on whether we should be treating our ability to produce food here in the UK as more of a food security priority and a proper national strategy. On that.
10:26
10:26
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
If I may. Thank you. So I'd like to make make answer two questions if I can. Firstly, on the securitisation question, I think it's important to recognise that security apparatus is already engaged in this space to a degree. If we think about environmental crime, such as illegal logging, illegal fishing and wildlife trafficking. So there is a security dimension there already. Yes, we would want to avoid an over securitized response. You think of the example of the war on drugs and the kind of problematic kind of outcomes on the kind of counter-narcotics side. But there are security, hard security dimensions to a lot of this.
And these need to be analysed. They need to be assessed, and if appropriate, they need to be mitigated with the driver towards conflict and the rise to violence. We need to recognise that militaries have a significant carbon footprint. And so actually stabilization, conflict prevention, negotiation are all crucial responses. And obviously diplomacy has a key role in delivering those things. Think about the kind of dual use opportunities that exist in this space as well in terms of defence, engagement, defence, diplomacy, security, diplomacy. So things like rotary winged aircraft, helicopters effectively are both useful from a national security perspective, because you can move equipment and and forces around, but also very useful in accessing areas that have been hit by a natural disaster, can move aid around and can help with kind of communications and, and logistics.
A really good example, even better than that, I think, is what's becoming known as defensive rewilding, which is effectively where you take areas of critical national infrastructure and you restore them. So you rewet, marshlands, peatlands and so on. And the Baltic Defence Line with from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is a good example. Poland's Green Shield is another really good example where man made fortifications are being enhanced through the rewetting of these of these landscapes, which obviously act as an obstacle to the movement of armour and logistical vehicles, you know, and obviously the reasons why that's happening in those areas is, is, is clear.
But the dual use of that is these areas track carbon, they create biodiversity corridors. So so they're a good thing. And so investment in those kind of areas are kind of outsized because they are because they're dual use. On the question of food security. This is a massive, massive problem at home, at home and abroad. Ultimately, people are fed largely through their own soil or through trade. And so supply, trains and soil need to be need to be preserved.
There's all kinds of issues currently.
And these need to be analysed. They need to be assessed, and if appropriate, they need to be mitigated with the driver towards conflict and the rise to violence. We need to recognise that militaries have a significant carbon footprint. And so actually stabilization, conflict prevention, negotiation are all crucial responses. And obviously diplomacy has a key role in delivering those things. Think about the kind of dual use opportunities that exist in this space as well in terms of defence, engagement, defence, diplomacy, security, diplomacy. So things like rotary winged aircraft, helicopters effectively are both useful from a national security perspective, because you can move equipment and and forces around, but also very useful in accessing areas that have been hit by a natural disaster, can move aid around and can help with kind of communications and, and logistics.
A really good example, even better than that, I think, is what's becoming known as defensive rewilding, which is effectively where you take areas of critical national infrastructure and you restore them. So you rewet, marshlands, peatlands and so on. And the Baltic Defence Line with from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is a good example. Poland's Green Shield is another really good example where man made fortifications are being enhanced through the rewetting of these of these landscapes, which obviously act as an obstacle to the movement of armour and logistical vehicles, you know, and obviously the reasons why that's happening in those areas is, is, is clear.
But the dual use of that is these areas track carbon, they create biodiversity corridors. So so they're a good thing. And so investment in those kind of areas are kind of outsized because they are because they're dual use. On the question of food security. This is a massive, massive problem at home, at home and abroad. Ultimately, people are fed largely through their own soil or through trade. And so supply, trains and soil need to be need to be preserved.
There's all kinds of issues currently.
10:29
10:30
10:30
10:30
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
But but but I would say on, on kind of food security, more, more, more generally, what we're seeing around the world is partly because of water security, but partly because of soil degradation, biodiversity loss, loss of pollinators and pest predators and so on. We're seeing a reduction in viable agricultural land that's both horticulture land and land for grasslands, for livestock. Because of that, populations are already starting to to respond. You know, you either you die, you move, or you secure access to those to those resources. And what we're seeing already, we're seeing colonization of new territories, annexation of, of agricultural land, the creation of militias to protect resources.
We're seeing overextraction as communities try to create a surplus, which obviously is then kind of problematic because you've overextracted. And also a point that's often missed is buying food production infrastructure in other countries. And lots of countries have been very good at this . Quietly. China, in particular, over the last three decades, has been buying up a huge amount of food production infrastructure all over the world, in Africa, in Asia, and also in North America. To the extent that Smithfield's food, for example, a few years ago was bought out by a Chinese company effectively bought out by the Chinese state, which gives China control of, of, of 1 in 4 pigs in America.
So quite remarkable things are happening, largely unrecognized. But countries are quietly securing access to to food. And I think one of the one of the things we need to be kind of conscious of is that we need to do a lot of friend shoring around our own supply chains. So basically making those supply chains more robust because when stress and crises hit, we're going to need to be able to ensure access to access to food. And my final point that is not without issues and diplomatic issues because as we saw with the Covid crisis over PPE, for example, if there is a a change to supply and demand, when you start extracting from an area, and then that host community doesn't have access to those things anymore because they can't afford the kind of inflated, inflated price that causes problems.
So I'll give you some examples. Ethiopians haven't forgotten that during the famine in the 1980s that Europe was was still importing huge amounts of sugar snap peas, for example. That hasn't been forgotten. It still shapes diplomatic relationships. If we want to think intergenerationally, we can think about the the Holodomor in Eastern Europe, where the Soviets were extracting food and creating, creating famine there, and also the Indian famine during World War two.
These things are diplomatic realities that we still live with to this day.
We're seeing overextraction as communities try to create a surplus, which obviously is then kind of problematic because you've overextracted. And also a point that's often missed is buying food production infrastructure in other countries. And lots of countries have been very good at this . Quietly. China, in particular, over the last three decades, has been buying up a huge amount of food production infrastructure all over the world, in Africa, in Asia, and also in North America. To the extent that Smithfield's food, for example, a few years ago was bought out by a Chinese company effectively bought out by the Chinese state, which gives China control of, of, of 1 in 4 pigs in America.
So quite remarkable things are happening, largely unrecognized. But countries are quietly securing access to to food. And I think one of the one of the things we need to be kind of conscious of is that we need to do a lot of friend shoring around our own supply chains. So basically making those supply chains more robust because when stress and crises hit, we're going to need to be able to ensure access to access to food. And my final point that is not without issues and diplomatic issues because as we saw with the Covid crisis over PPE, for example, if there is a a change to supply and demand, when you start extracting from an area, and then that host community doesn't have access to those things anymore because they can't afford the kind of inflated, inflated price that causes problems.
So I'll give you some examples. Ethiopians haven't forgotten that during the famine in the 1980s that Europe was was still importing huge amounts of sugar snap peas, for example. That hasn't been forgotten. It still shapes diplomatic relationships. If we want to think intergenerationally, we can think about the the Holodomor in Eastern Europe, where the Soviets were extracting food and creating, creating famine there, and also the Indian famine during World War two.
These things are diplomatic realities that we still live with to this day.
10:33
10:33
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
I want to go back to what Lori and Jelani were saying about national security as a framing, because you can see how it can create a sense of urgency in terms of international cooperation or national action to respond to a challenge. But I wondered if any of the experts could reflect on what impact that framing would have on public support for the actions that government need to take to address the big issues?
10:33
10:33
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
I think maybe we'll go back to Lori on that one, because you said, Lori, you were talking about how the potential to sort of draw the walls up could be a negative consequence of this type of framing. And, and obviously, there's a risk, I think, when you talk to the public about a securitised approach to climate change and nature loss, it's something that's so big and quite disempowering most of the time that the instinct is to retract inwards.
10:34
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Thank you very much. The question, which I think gets to the heart of the matter, it's a it's going to be a delicate tightrope that we're going to have to walk along because on one hand, there is that potential knee jerk emergency, hard security, tactical response where you see threats to food security, and then you seek to, you know, score supplies in a zero sum way from others, like Tim was inferring. But then on the other side, we do we we will we're anticipating a near future in which climate change and nature loss have become so severe that they are automatically national security issues, because they are simply adversely impacting the fundamentals of our national security and being able to toe the line, basically between the response to the symptoms of that world and ensuring that we still stay focused on what is causing all of that, I think is actually going to be how we manage to well, where we will have to get that balance, because really our concern or the concern from others about a potential militarized or authoritarian securitization alongside the harm that that could cause the de-democratization that could cause fundamentally, we're probably worried about it because it means that we are overly focused on the symptoms of the climate change world we're in, at the cost of dealing with the causes of that.
And that really is would lead us into a potentially a catastrophic situation globally, because it would mean that we are as things get worse, we are increasingly failing to focus on what is causing that and the need therefore to reduce emissions and so on. So we're in some ways facing a situation where securitization in some ways is inevitable because climate change has been allowed to get this bad. The question is whether we can fashion some kind of progressive or networked idea of what that securitization could be. That would then, for the public, mean that you are in a situation where you're saying, okay, the story that you've heard for decades now, that if if left suitably unchecked, this could become so bad?
Well, that story has unfortunately now come true. And our food security is stressed. Our, you know, ability to ensure that there's geopolitical cooperation globally. Those systems have been stressed not just by decisions of various leaders, but by climate change. And so that means now it is the priority that a number of people it's going to have to be the priority. The number of campaigners have always said it's got to be. And I think there's a way of telling that story that that ensures that you can mitigate that potential for more of a hard security response.
But this is coming down the line at us, unfortunately, because as we go over 1.5 degrees, our key elements of our security, economic, food, water, and so on will experience such severe impacts that they will automatically become national security concerns.
And that really is would lead us into a potentially a catastrophic situation globally, because it would mean that we are as things get worse, we are increasingly failing to focus on what is causing that and the need therefore to reduce emissions and so on. So we're in some ways facing a situation where securitization in some ways is inevitable because climate change has been allowed to get this bad. The question is whether we can fashion some kind of progressive or networked idea of what that securitization could be. That would then, for the public, mean that you are in a situation where you're saying, okay, the story that you've heard for decades now, that if if left suitably unchecked, this could become so bad?
Well, that story has unfortunately now come true. And our food security is stressed. Our, you know, ability to ensure that there's geopolitical cooperation globally. Those systems have been stressed not just by decisions of various leaders, but by climate change. And so that means now it is the priority that a number of people it's going to have to be the priority. The number of campaigners have always said it's got to be. And I think there's a way of telling that story that that ensures that you can mitigate that potential for more of a hard security response.
But this is coming down the line at us, unfortunately, because as we go over 1.5 degrees, our key elements of our security, economic, food, water, and so on will experience such severe impacts that they will automatically become national security concerns.
10:36
10:36
Edward Morello
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Edward Morello
Thank you, chair. I think I'll probably direct this to interested in other takes as well. Obviously, climate change is driving in political instability, conflict and food security issues, but it's also driving irregular migration, especially towards rich countries like the UK. And then obviously, we've got the whole food security issue that we're talking about. And I'm just wondering whether or not the cuts to the UK international aid budget, which large, large amounts were spent on stability and climate resilience in developing countries with the aim of giving people a place to stay rather than feel they need to move?
Does that is that adversely, you know, is that causing more irregular migration and greater issue in country? And does it impact our our ability to carry out climate diplomacy when our contribution to conflict, combating climate change now is so constrained?
Does that is that adversely, you know, is that causing more irregular migration and greater issue in country? And does it impact our our ability to carry out climate diplomacy when our contribution to conflict, combating climate change now is so constrained?
10:37
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Yes. Is is the answer. Clearly, prevention is better than cure. And if ecosystems, if landscapes, terrain becomes uninhabitable or the kind of carrying capacity of that land is compromised in some way, those people will have to move. And the studies demonstrate that lots of people move internally. So internally, internal displacement first. But there are, you know, motivations for moving kind of more , more widely. And that is something that is politically problematic in lots of lots of countries. There's also the issue when it comes to migration that. Migrants usually have a sense that they will return home at some point in a kind of scorched earth kind of environment.
There's been decimated by, by, by climate change that that isn't possible. So, so there's no prospect of kind of going home. So that creates a kind of intergenerational kind of obligation. We've seen lots of issues in the past by infrastructure in urban areas becoming becoming overwhelmed. The Syrian civil war, lots of complicated drivers of that. But it's no coincidence there was a multi-year drought before that happened, and it saw lots of people removed from they're kind of rural communities and moving into cities with grievances and, and kind of so on. I think food inflation reached something like 26% in in Egypt before Mubarak was overthrown.
You know, so there's lots of examples that we can kind of speak to speak to here in terms of Oda funding and kind of infrastructure, you know, serious kind of cuts in terms of UK programming and, and reach. And, and I think so, for example, I've got a, an example I could kind of speak to in terms of climate security. So from January 2024 to the middle of this year, was directing a project in Jordan building the, the world's first climate security intelligence capability, which was really highly regarded, highly sought, lots of really good impact, lots of access, developed engagement with the highest levels of of the Jordanian state, including the Hashemite court , municipalities, ministries, and so on.
After the the strategic review settlement climate, climate security was taken out of out of play. So effectively the program had to had to end. Despite this thing having been built, there have been huge amounts of buying locally huge amounts of value, both for the British Embassy and Oman and elsewhere. Regional interest in actually building a network of these things in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, all the kinds of places that that this kind of insight would be really viable. And the project, effectively the tap was turned off, the project had to end, and we were able to kind of keep a level of support going through some, some funding that we're able to find through the University of Oxford.
But that's a suboptimal situation to, to be in. And the the implication of taps going on and off is that you lose access, you lose diplomatic trust and engagement, and you lose access to different parts of the state, which could be useful from a security perspective, but also from a development perspective as well. And, and, and migration in Jordan, that was one of the biggest issues that they were dealing with. And one of the grievances that was repeated often through many, I won't name names, but through many of the individuals that me and my team were working with was that the UK had committed to support the influx relating to Syrian refugees over a sustained period of.
Time and again the taps were. The taps were turned off. So there was there was a frustration there. There was a diplomatic fallout from that.
There's been decimated by, by, by climate change that that isn't possible. So, so there's no prospect of kind of going home. So that creates a kind of intergenerational kind of obligation. We've seen lots of issues in the past by infrastructure in urban areas becoming becoming overwhelmed. The Syrian civil war, lots of complicated drivers of that. But it's no coincidence there was a multi-year drought before that happened, and it saw lots of people removed from they're kind of rural communities and moving into cities with grievances and, and kind of so on. I think food inflation reached something like 26% in in Egypt before Mubarak was overthrown.
You know, so there's lots of examples that we can kind of speak to speak to here in terms of Oda funding and kind of infrastructure, you know, serious kind of cuts in terms of UK programming and, and reach. And, and I think so, for example, I've got a, an example I could kind of speak to in terms of climate security. So from January 2024 to the middle of this year, was directing a project in Jordan building the, the world's first climate security intelligence capability, which was really highly regarded, highly sought, lots of really good impact, lots of access, developed engagement with the highest levels of of the Jordanian state, including the Hashemite court , municipalities, ministries, and so on.
After the the strategic review settlement climate, climate security was taken out of out of play. So effectively the program had to had to end. Despite this thing having been built, there have been huge amounts of buying locally huge amounts of value, both for the British Embassy and Oman and elsewhere. Regional interest in actually building a network of these things in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, all the kinds of places that that this kind of insight would be really viable. And the project, effectively the tap was turned off, the project had to end, and we were able to kind of keep a level of support going through some, some funding that we're able to find through the University of Oxford.
But that's a suboptimal situation to, to be in. And the the implication of taps going on and off is that you lose access, you lose diplomatic trust and engagement, and you lose access to different parts of the state, which could be useful from a security perspective, but also from a development perspective as well. And, and, and migration in Jordan, that was one of the biggest issues that they were dealing with. And one of the grievances that was repeated often through many, I won't name names, but through many of the individuals that me and my team were working with was that the UK had committed to support the influx relating to Syrian refugees over a sustained period of.
Time and again the taps were. The taps were turned off. So there was there was a frustration there. There was a diplomatic fallout from that.
10:42
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
I'm going to go to John, but I'm also just want to remind committee we've got we're still on sort of officially the structure being the first question. And we have half an hour left. So if we could possibly have shorter questions and perhaps shorter answers generally. With that in mind. No, I'm not saying that the quality of the answers are extremely high, and I'm very grateful. And I think this has been a very useful part of the session.
But if we can break up a bit.
But if we can break up a bit.
10:42
John Whittingdale
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John Whittingdale
I'm not quite sure how you answer this briefly. I'm sure you can have. Again, I'm. The consequences of climate change are made more complicated by all the phenomenon which will be affected. I mean, I'm thinking of Amok and El Nino, etc. if if you look ahead and we get to the sort of worst case scenario, which is now becoming more of a possibility, where in the world is going to be worst affected, which regions is it going to become so acute that we are looking, for instance, at really mass migration as a consequence? Doctor Clark.
10:43
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
So there's a brilliant map produced by the one of the IPCC reports, which basically forecasts areas that effectively become uninhabitable because of water scarcity at the point of 2070. And that map, as you would expect, I suppose. Has a lot of red around the equator, sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, and so on. It's a really densely populated areas, areas with high population growth currently. And, and, and those areas are effectively going to see large scale movement. Now, there are there are lots of estimates in terms of what those numbers might look like. The UN Antonio Guterres said a billion people by 2050.
I think that's probably oversizing the the kind of risk. But we're talking about a really high level of unprecedented human mobility that we that we haven't seen previously. And and those individuals will effectively need to go need to go somewhere. And, and there will be I can see Laurie would like.
I think that's probably oversizing the the kind of risk. But we're talking about a really high level of unprecedented human mobility that we that we haven't seen previously. And and those individuals will effectively need to go need to go somewhere. And, and there will be I can see Laurie would like.
10:44
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt you, but very quickly. So alongside this, if we are talking about worst cases, there are now a number of wild cards we. We cannot rule out. Unfortunately, one was mentioned just there, the Amoc. This is the Atlantic overturning circulation, which means that we have vineyards in England at roughly the same latitude as Canada has polar bears. We now cannot rule out that this thing could basically stop moving heat northwards, and that would be disastrous for the UK. And then the climate refugees would be British people and Irish people and people in in northwestern Europe.
So if we're talking about the range of possibilities that are now on the table, because climate change has got this bad, and we're talking about migration, there are a number of dimensions. One is the story of the tropics that we've heard there from Tim. That is, of course, an area of significant institutional concern all around the world. But we also must remember that that migration within Britain and potentially out of Britain is something that we need to increasingly have on our minds.
So if we're talking about the range of possibilities that are now on the table, because climate change has got this bad, and we're talking about migration, there are a number of dimensions. One is the story of the tropics that we've heard there from Tim. That is, of course, an area of significant institutional concern all around the world. But we also must remember that that migration within Britain and potentially out of Britain is something that we need to increasingly have on our minds.
10:45
10:45
Abtisam Mohamed
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Abtisam Mohamed
Yes. Just. Sorry. A very quick addition to what Doctor Clark and Laurie have been saying here in terms of where the kind of hotspots where we should be concerned about, I think and, you know, the recent situation with the Iraq conflict has made that. And the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has made it very clear it's not just about not just the climate change impacts, which would be bad enough. It's how climate change impacts interact with a lot of the geopolitical conflict, fragility dynamics. And there's a lot of research that has gone on into understanding where these different drivers of vulnerability overlap.
And essentially all the fragile and conflicting contexts are also the ones that are most climate vulnerable. So you have these compound risks and that that need to be taken into account, and that shine a spotlight on regions like the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Lake Chad, and other regions that are already deeply into conflict and where the humanitarian situation is already extremely dramatic. And then on top of that, you have the impacts of climate change.
And essentially all the fragile and conflicting contexts are also the ones that are most climate vulnerable. So you have these compound risks and that that need to be taken into account, and that shine a spotlight on regions like the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Lake Chad, and other regions that are already deeply into conflict and where the humanitarian situation is already extremely dramatic. And then on top of that, you have the impacts of climate change.
10:46
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I also very quickly add, sorry, just along with those those stresses, we're also already facing lethal heat and humidity. So it's not just a Nino and, and the potential amok implications. And this is affecting South Asia, parts of the Middle East and North Africa, the Amazon basin, sub-Saharan Africa. And it's only projected to increase. So this is making just outdoor temperatures, wet bulb temperatures un unlivable from a human health perspective. And that also covers so much of the world's food production. So I think it's not just about thinking about what this means for the people living there in terms of migration and mobility.
And just to underscore the point there on, on what the research shows, most of the research that we have now shows that people are not moving as a result of climate change. Regionally, it's predominantly from rural areas to urban areas or within the same country or over just kind of domestic borders, but not not in terms of what UK based constituents might be concerned about. It's not so much pointing to in terms of the the research on drivers of mobility. It's not kind of sub-Saharan Africa into Asia or from Central America and Latin America into the US, for example.
So we're not seeing this. But I think looking at some of these compound risks in terms of what this might mean for regional fragility in in those contexts that I just mentioned, and also food production and, you know, access to fertilisers, things like this, I think those compound and cascading risk pathways are definitely something we need to better understand.
And just to underscore the point there on, on what the research shows, most of the research that we have now shows that people are not moving as a result of climate change. Regionally, it's predominantly from rural areas to urban areas or within the same country or over just kind of domestic borders, but not not in terms of what UK based constituents might be concerned about. It's not so much pointing to in terms of the the research on drivers of mobility. It's not kind of sub-Saharan Africa into Asia or from Central America and Latin America into the US, for example.
So we're not seeing this. But I think looking at some of these compound risks in terms of what this might mean for regional fragility in in those contexts that I just mentioned, and also food production and, you know, access to fertilisers, things like this, I think those compound and cascading risk pathways are definitely something we need to better understand.
10:48
10:48
Speaker 6
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Speaker 6
Thank you chair. I'm interested in the ranking of the risks because, I mean, you've all given very good examples of terrible things that will happen around the world, from water scarcity to the UK changing its temperature to food insecurity all over the sort of equator. Is there any work that's been done on on ranking those risks and which ones we should be most concerned about and most focus on as the UK? And I know, I know , Laurie's done some work on this.
I can see that Doctor Clark has indicated first, so maybe.
I can see that Doctor Clark has indicated first, so maybe.
10:49
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
You can. Well, I mean it's partly it's a question of prioritisation isn't it, that effectively it's it's to do with perspective. So actually, you know, what would be a priority for a state in sub-Saharan Africa might be different from what would be a priority for a climate migrant in the Middle East and for the UK. I would suggest with a sense of the kind of political landscape that there are the, the, the economic security consequences of this are right up there for for the UK. We're studies have shown that we are looking at costs of approximately 20% of GDP per year within the next three decades.
That's a huge amount of money that has to be found by the state in order to.
That's a huge amount of money that has to be found by the state in order to.
10:49
10:50
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
That's that's to do with system restoration. It's to do with adaptations that need to go in place. It's to do with hardening of infrastructure that suddenly becomes unviable at certain temperature levels and, and, and so on. Climate induced shifts to the cost of capital are already occurring. The insurance market is is becoming very concerned about what these realities will look like in both the short term and the longer term appetite for investment is shifting. There's also the issue of capital flight, which is particularly problematic in parts of the global South, which are very vulnerable to, to, to these changes, because ultimately, commercial enterprises need to recognise that there is that they're not vulnerable and they're going to be able to make, make, make, make money.
And actually, if they're going into, into areas that are particularly fragile, that, that, that that isn't going to be possible with huge diplomatic consequences, actually, you know, because who will these countries start to blame under those under those situations? So economic impacts, obviously, conflict is the primary national security issue. Climate change is a driver. It's not a singular driver. When you mix in sectarian economic identity type situations, you mix in food security, water security, energy security, migration. You've got a real constellation of problems there which are going to, you know, amplify the amount of conflict that we're going to see around the world.
We can point to a longitudinal study that demonstrates this. So University of California, Berkeley, and Stanford a few years ago did a, a study looking at incidents of civil war in sub-Saharan Africa over I think it was a 30 year time slice. And for every increase in temperature of one degree, incidents of civil war went up by 4.5%, which actually is a is a huge problem. That's just sub-Saharan Africa. And we can talk about, you know, pressures over fresh water and agricultural land in those in those contexts. I won't just for reasons of time, but there's lots of studies that can be pointed to could be pointed to there.
So you've got the economic situation, I think at the top. You've then got the the conflict situation, stabilization situation, and then you've also got, I think, what you might call kind of gray zone kind of threats, which is things like the, the theft of green intellectual property, the weaponization of ESG reporting, lawfare , creating, you know, problems linked to legal liabilities and risks, the, the disinformation dimension as well, the Fimi, the foreign information manipulation and, and interference, which you states are already active, very active in this space, suggesting that climate change is a form of colonialism or neocolonialism, that the West is responsible, that the West has poisoned wells, that it's stolen water, that it's growing cash crops, it's degrading irrigation systems.
And actually, if they're going into, into areas that are particularly fragile, that, that, that that isn't going to be possible with huge diplomatic consequences, actually, you know, because who will these countries start to blame under those under those situations? So economic impacts, obviously, conflict is the primary national security issue. Climate change is a driver. It's not a singular driver. When you mix in sectarian economic identity type situations, you mix in food security, water security, energy security, migration. You've got a real constellation of problems there which are going to, you know, amplify the amount of conflict that we're going to see around the world.
We can point to a longitudinal study that demonstrates this. So University of California, Berkeley, and Stanford a few years ago did a, a study looking at incidents of civil war in sub-Saharan Africa over I think it was a 30 year time slice. And for every increase in temperature of one degree, incidents of civil war went up by 4.5%, which actually is a is a huge problem. That's just sub-Saharan Africa. And we can talk about, you know, pressures over fresh water and agricultural land in those in those contexts. I won't just for reasons of time, but there's lots of studies that can be pointed to could be pointed to there.
So you've got the economic situation, I think at the top. You've then got the the conflict situation, stabilization situation, and then you've also got, I think, what you might call kind of gray zone kind of threats, which is things like the, the theft of green intellectual property, the weaponization of ESG reporting, lawfare , creating, you know, problems linked to legal liabilities and risks, the, the disinformation dimension as well, the Fimi, the foreign information manipulation and, and interference, which you states are already active, very active in this space, suggesting that climate change is a form of colonialism or neocolonialism, that the West is responsible, that the West has poisoned wells, that it's stolen water, that it's growing cash crops, it's degrading irrigation systems.
10:53
10:53
10:53
10:53
10:53
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Constraints, I think we've had a fairly comprehensive and alarming picture, very well painted by by our four witnesses. And I just wondered, with Alex's permission, if I can move on to because it's really we also need to talk about about, you know, about cop and about what the international response to all of this ought to be. Otherwise we could spend the whole session, I fear, comprehensively looking at at what climate change is doing to us now and will do in the near future. So can I move on to Fleur? I know has got some questions on on.
10:53
Speaker 8
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Speaker 8
Thanks. Thanks, chair. I'd just like to declare that I am the chair of the all party parliamentary group on the environment, and I traveled to Kenya earlier this year to look at the impacts of climate. And I used to work for WaterAid. So I looked a lot at the water insecurity in northern Kenya, but also what the what the British government are doing and how they're supporting some environmental projects, especially in Nairobi. So I just want to ask all of you a question about what our priorities should be for Cop 31 and for chairing the G20.
So I'm going to come to each of you in turn. It's like a quickfire round. What would success look like for the UK at both Cop 31 and then also in chairing the G20? Because there are all these competing priorities, as we've just highlighted in that that question as well from Alex. Is it about should they be focusing on on weather systems, like we've talked about the Amoc and El Nino, should they be concentrating on regions? Should it be about the sub-Saharan Africa we've talked about, but the Bay of Bengal, there's the rainforests, or should it be issues like air pollution, one of the biggest killers in the world, causing 7 million premature deaths a year.
Clean access to clean water, big driver of conflict, but also sanitation issues as a health one it should it be about carbon emissions, which our diplomacy has really focused on a lot up to now. Or should it be food or should it be something else? So that's a taster of what we'd like to hear from just from, from each of you very briefly on those issues. And so how it focuses down. Giannini I'd love to hear about your membership of the UK Task Force on National Security and Resilience, Risks of a Changing Climate and Nature loss, not the snappiest name of a task force I've ever heard.
but really excited to see it met very recently that you're on it as well. And just maybe your thoughts on do we have a joined up policy as the UK does that task force, but internationally, are we joined up? So can I whiz around each of you in turn, Doctor Clark.
So I'm going to come to each of you in turn. It's like a quickfire round. What would success look like for the UK at both Cop 31 and then also in chairing the G20? Because there are all these competing priorities, as we've just highlighted in that that question as well from Alex. Is it about should they be focusing on on weather systems, like we've talked about the Amoc and El Nino, should they be concentrating on regions? Should it be about the sub-Saharan Africa we've talked about, but the Bay of Bengal, there's the rainforests, or should it be issues like air pollution, one of the biggest killers in the world, causing 7 million premature deaths a year.
Clean access to clean water, big driver of conflict, but also sanitation issues as a health one it should it be about carbon emissions, which our diplomacy has really focused on a lot up to now. Or should it be food or should it be something else? So that's a taster of what we'd like to hear from just from, from each of you very briefly on those issues. And so how it focuses down. Giannini I'd love to hear about your membership of the UK Task Force on National Security and Resilience, Risks of a Changing Climate and Nature loss, not the snappiest name of a task force I've ever heard.
but really excited to see it met very recently that you're on it as well. And just maybe your thoughts on do we have a joined up policy as the UK does that task force, but internationally, are we joined up? So can I whiz around each of you in turn, Doctor Clark.
10:55
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
So not not joined up in terms of the big ticket items. I would I would suggest get the messaging right, build a consensus, communicate the risks. I think that's that's important. Show leadership drive implementation and demonstrate a commitment to and and urgency about the about the response. I would also say that it's important not to underestimate just how much how much public support there actually is for protecting nature, biodiversity, responding to responding to, to, to climate. You know, polls have consistently shown that 60, 70%, even in places like the US, there is a sense that this is that this is important and should be prioritised.
If we think of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, people want to be cool, they want to be fed, they want to be watered, they want to have shelter in all of these things. And all of these things come into come into play. Businesses want a stable investment environment. They want a productive workforce. They want they, they, they, they want resilience. So I, I.
If we think of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, people want to be cool, they want to be fed, they want to be watered, they want to have shelter in all of these things. And all of these things come into come into play. Businesses want a stable investment environment. They want a productive workforce. They want they, they, they, they want resilience. So I, I.
10:56
10:57
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
It's obviously then preservation of critical national infrastructure. So actually making the case to protect soils, protect biodiversity and ensure the kind of the the winds that kind of fall out, fall out from that. I would say we're in a slightly tricky situation with the messaging. I just want to mention kind of party political issues. But we we have just given concessions at kind of jackdaw and kind of so on, and that hasn't been missed around the world. And that will obviously be be part of the discussion, no doubt at at Cop from a security perspective.
10:58
10:58
10:58
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Okay. Thank you. So on cop. I think the UK should use Cop for coalition building. I think so much of this needs to be done through partnerships, through alliances. I think the UK being outside of the EU now, there's a real well, there's there's a lot of scope to build build coalitions. And I think this is a really important geopolitical moment. UK is one of the very few countries that's sending a head of state. So I think it is leading by example, showing that this is a priority for the UK. I think it should build on what's already there.
I think kind of building out what what was set up at the Unga with Kenya and the EU, and then kind of building out from there, potentially looking at priority partners such as the EU, like the group of friends on for an ambitious climate diplomacy building out with Kenya through the African Union. So I think I think using. The kind of climate diplomacy tool to, to really strengthen these. It could be through through thematic channels, but I think definitely using cop this cop as a chance to show that this isn't just a national security led agenda, not just kind of the UK looking inwards to, to make climate a, a UK domestic issue, which we touched on this earlier.
I think that particularly the most affected countries outside of the annex one group would be really concerned that the the framing of the taskforce, the framing of climate as national climate and nature loss as a national security issue by the Foreign Secretary could give out messages that this is about kind of nationalism, doubling down, borders up, you know, export bans, etc.. But I think this is a real opportunity to show that this is about building new alliances and also just really walking the talk with the with the climate finance pledges and on. On G20, I think there the UK should focus on where it's actually got kind of a good track record in global leadership.
I think finance, disaster risk finance and anticipatory action for climate and climate vulnerable states would be a really interesting thing. I think the insurance industry is looking at this already. I think there's a lot of opportunity to to scale things like this up, exploring how this can be done through some of the initiatives, such as the UN's Early Warning for all initiative, which exists in the G20. And this could really sit within the G20 kind of formalising it. It makes so much sense because it is really about reducing kind of climate conflict, cascading risks through prevention, and really providing those social safeguards both domestically and internationally.
I think the G20 could also, through the finance sector, UK's finance sector, kind of convening power, could look at debt treatment reform tied to climate resilience and push reform of something like the G20 common framework, so that debt restructuring for fragile and climate exposed states really kind of sits within how we understand climate security risk and, and building that resilience globally. And probably the third priority, I would say, for the G20 would be climate resilient food system investment. So kind of working through the G20 Agriculture Working Group and look at, you know, look at the UK's own food import exposure, but also looking at this within the.
The grouping of the G20 to really invest in climate resilience in specific exporting regions for the UK, and looking at how the G20 economic security is, is pegged to this and maybe also just one one final thing.
I think kind of building out what what was set up at the Unga with Kenya and the EU, and then kind of building out from there, potentially looking at priority partners such as the EU, like the group of friends on for an ambitious climate diplomacy building out with Kenya through the African Union. So I think I think using. The kind of climate diplomacy tool to, to really strengthen these. It could be through through thematic channels, but I think definitely using cop this cop as a chance to show that this isn't just a national security led agenda, not just kind of the UK looking inwards to, to make climate a, a UK domestic issue, which we touched on this earlier.
I think that particularly the most affected countries outside of the annex one group would be really concerned that the the framing of the taskforce, the framing of climate as national climate and nature loss as a national security issue by the Foreign Secretary could give out messages that this is about kind of nationalism, doubling down, borders up, you know, export bans, etc.. But I think this is a real opportunity to show that this is about building new alliances and also just really walking the talk with the with the climate finance pledges and on. On G20, I think there the UK should focus on where it's actually got kind of a good track record in global leadership.
I think finance, disaster risk finance and anticipatory action for climate and climate vulnerable states would be a really interesting thing. I think the insurance industry is looking at this already. I think there's a lot of opportunity to to scale things like this up, exploring how this can be done through some of the initiatives, such as the UN's Early Warning for all initiative, which exists in the G20. And this could really sit within the G20 kind of formalising it. It makes so much sense because it is really about reducing kind of climate conflict, cascading risks through prevention, and really providing those social safeguards both domestically and internationally.
I think the G20 could also, through the finance sector, UK's finance sector, kind of convening power, could look at debt treatment reform tied to climate resilience and push reform of something like the G20 common framework, so that debt restructuring for fragile and climate exposed states really kind of sits within how we understand climate security risk and, and building that resilience globally. And probably the third priority, I would say, for the G20 would be climate resilient food system investment. So kind of working through the G20 Agriculture Working Group and look at, you know, look at the UK's own food import exposure, but also looking at this within the.
The grouping of the G20 to really invest in climate resilience in specific exporting regions for the UK, and looking at how the G20 economic security is, is pegged to this and maybe also just one one final thing.
11:02
11:02
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Just to finish the sentence, it's also using G20 to explore how to institutionalize climate security, kind of risk planning, risk assessment and foresight methodology through a joint G20 risk assessment. Because this isn't just a national endeavour, it's really something that can be strengthened through joint planning.
11:02
11:02
Speaker 9
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Speaker 9
Thank you very much. I was just reflecting there on Cop26, which was in my home city of Glasgow, which seems like a whole different geopolitical era ago. But for the next cop, we've spoken about where we have leverage and advantage. We really think the highest areas of priority are in terms of countries for diplomatic engagement. And given the new era that we live in now, what is what is success look like and defined for Cop 31 for the United Kingdom? Yeah.
11:03
Abtisam Mohamed
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Abtisam Mohamed
If I may just jump in on Cop 31 second, everything that my colleagues have already mentioned in terms of, you know, the messaging, the leadership, the coalition building. So thank you for your question on coalitions that should be prioritized. To me, a key area of engagement beyond the ones that have already been mentioned for the UK, Cop 31 is the one around adaptation and climate finance more generally. And I think the Foreign Secretary statements in Bangkok, when he attended the meetings of the world Bank and the International Monetary Fund, in terms of the focus on prioritizing climate finance and ensuring that finance can also reach the conflict and fragile context.
So kind of working on this question of accessibility of finance as well are really important areas and also areas that have been plagued by sort of mistrust and kind of really played a dividing role in previous Cop. So this is an area where there is a lot of need for engagement, coalition building, and where the UK also because the UK is where a lot of the private finance also sits, right? We have the City of London, we have a lot of engagement from the private sector and the private finance kind of area that also that will have to play an important role in adaptation finance, because clearly the numbers that we're talking about are not numbers that can be matched only by public spending.
So these kind of area of engagement is an essential one. And in June, we had London Climate Action Week, which has been an a surprising, surprisingly big engagement with tens of thousand people organisations at present. And I think the energy that was at London Climate Action Week, again, the private sector presence, the insurance sector, the risk sector, the local communities, the civil society organisations, the local work and action that is happening in a lot of your constituencies. I think transmitting that energy to cop and using it to leverage coalitions, not just with other countries, but also with other kind of civil society without a private sector on issues around adaptation, resilience, food systems, water security.
I think that the water security, not just because I spent a good part of the last 20 years working on water security, but that's a super important area where we're seeing a lot of the climate risks materializing, but also where we're seeing a lot of entry points for cooperation and collaboration. And, you know, historically, when we look at conflicts over when we look at shared water resources, data tell us that it's more common than people cooperate rather than enter into dispute or conflict over water resources. So using that kind of energy and that kind of shared interest to build coalitions and foster action, I think would be would be really important.
And this year is an important year for water as well. With the water conference happening in Abu Dhabi in December and the whole kind of water governance process undergoing at the moment towards 2028. So there's a big momentum for the UK that has been a very active player in the water security space to join these agendas as well. And just one quick last point. That's also a big priority for the G20.
I think the water security kind of focus, in addition to what John was saying on food security and the disaster risk finance priorities.
So kind of working on this question of accessibility of finance as well are really important areas and also areas that have been plagued by sort of mistrust and kind of really played a dividing role in previous Cop. So this is an area where there is a lot of need for engagement, coalition building, and where the UK also because the UK is where a lot of the private finance also sits, right? We have the City of London, we have a lot of engagement from the private sector and the private finance kind of area that also that will have to play an important role in adaptation finance, because clearly the numbers that we're talking about are not numbers that can be matched only by public spending.
So these kind of area of engagement is an essential one. And in June, we had London Climate Action Week, which has been an a surprising, surprisingly big engagement with tens of thousand people organisations at present. And I think the energy that was at London Climate Action Week, again, the private sector presence, the insurance sector, the risk sector, the local communities, the civil society organisations, the local work and action that is happening in a lot of your constituencies. I think transmitting that energy to cop and using it to leverage coalitions, not just with other countries, but also with other kind of civil society without a private sector on issues around adaptation, resilience, food systems, water security.
I think that the water security, not just because I spent a good part of the last 20 years working on water security, but that's a super important area where we're seeing a lot of the climate risks materializing, but also where we're seeing a lot of entry points for cooperation and collaboration. And, you know, historically, when we look at conflicts over when we look at shared water resources, data tell us that it's more common than people cooperate rather than enter into dispute or conflict over water resources. So using that kind of energy and that kind of shared interest to build coalitions and foster action, I think would be would be really important.
And this year is an important year for water as well. With the water conference happening in Abu Dhabi in December and the whole kind of water governance process undergoing at the moment towards 2028. So there's a big momentum for the UK that has been a very active player in the water security space to join these agendas as well. And just one quick last point. That's also a big priority for the G20.
I think the water security kind of focus, in addition to what John was saying on food security and the disaster risk finance priorities.
11:07
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Thank you. Emily, I'd like to come back to the UK's infrastructure around responding to the security risks around climate change and nature loss, and a lot of our responses have to be joined up across a number of government departments. The ICF facility, the UK task Force all require inputs from lots of different government departments, so I wondered if the experts may be giving you a part of the task force can reflect on how we. Are we able to sufficiently join up those various pieces across government and given to be a disaster about alliances? Who should we be looking to for best practice in this context?
11:08
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I think it's it's wonderful to have this task force. I think actually a lot of countries are looking to the UK for for best practice as a result of this. Certainly I'm sitting in in Germany and there's a lot of interest and a lot of other countries have have reached out Finland, the Netherlands on how to do how this can come about, how this kind of cross ministerial conversation can be happening. So I think we can be quite proud that there is some leadership already there. I think the we can have a really great joined up strategy, but there is also a challenge that's worth naming that if we get something that's really kind of cross-departmental and make climate security so cross-cutting, it can actually lose ownership and it kind of becomes everything, and then it kind of becomes nothing.
And if every department is told to prioritize climate security, then there is no accountability. No, no department actually holds this. This, this ownership. So I think you get diffusion rather than coordination. And it looks or sounds like mainstreaming, but it doesn't actually have substance. So I think the, the thing I would prioritize would be really having you can have a strategy across government strategy, but within this, there needs to be clearly defined climate security mandates that confer to like not having generic risks. And the term that's just thrown in, as you often see in mandates, but rather translating this into specific terms within the mandate of the specific ministries and and agencies.
So that it's, it's very, very tangible. So you look at kind of critical mineral supply chain resilience and clean power investment. You look at kind of basing resilience for the mod, you look at border and displacement, operational resilience or readiness for and how to ease those pressures within the Home Office. I think it needs to be very, very tangible. And that means really unpacking these compound and cascading risks
And if every department is told to prioritize climate security, then there is no accountability. No, no department actually holds this. This, this ownership. So I think you get diffusion rather than coordination. And it looks or sounds like mainstreaming, but it doesn't actually have substance. So I think the, the thing I would prioritize would be really having you can have a strategy across government strategy, but within this, there needs to be clearly defined climate security mandates that confer to like not having generic risks. And the term that's just thrown in, as you often see in mandates, but rather translating this into specific terms within the mandate of the specific ministries and and agencies.
So that it's, it's very, very tangible. So you look at kind of critical mineral supply chain resilience and clean power investment. You look at kind of basing resilience for the mod, you look at border and displacement, operational resilience or readiness for and how to ease those pressures within the Home Office. I think it needs to be very, very tangible. And that means really unpacking these compound and cascading risks
11:10
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
And then kind of placing some of that ownership in a specific named ministries, because otherwise the challenges that climate. security is mainstreamed. But there's no no one. institutional home, there's no, no accountability. I think there are good. . That exist in terms of, I actually have to say, I would come back to the UK for good practice because how this sat in with kind of cabinet, Cabinet Office leadership and then the, the relevant ministries coming in. That's actually a model that is quite unusual outside. It's outside of the UK. There is a real value in having the kind of the the leadership.
And you saw this with the Glasgow cop as well, that climate and the the the. coordination was was .
And you saw this with the Glasgow cop as well, that climate and the the the. coordination was was .
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Abtisam Mohamed
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Abtisam Mohamed
Been addressed, but I did have a different question, and that was in relation to inter investor state dispute settlement. And I think, Doctor Clark, you mentioned earlier. jackdaw 80 billion at the moment. globally goes through. ISDs and it diverts public money away. towards polluters. So I think my question is how do we address this through the national. security lens. And you know, where British companies perhaps are suing other countries. So shell, I think, has launched a claim against the Netherlands. In the UK, there's a proposed coal mine that was never established in Cumbria, where a company is now suing the UK for 300 million.
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Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Going to undress Doctor Clark? A possible because he's a huge question. I refer the other one. But but but I think yeah we're seeing that that that that area ever further kind of toxified this whole notion of kind of lawfare is kind of happening. And, and states are. competing through the courts as much as they are through, through, through kind of public opinion and, and diplomacy. I think ultimately we need to work out as a country where our red lines are both publicly and and. privately in order to get a sense of what our our position is, because at the moment, the.
communication is that we're putting out there. diplomatically is incoherent. And that's that's problematic. So, you know, what are we doing about energy security? We need to work out what that looks like. And then we will have a strategic calculus around that. And that will then allow us to. You know, respond appropriately. I would, I, I think we also need to have a, a policy on the US position. I think we need to work out what we're doing there. The US is ruining a lot of NATO's work in the climate security space and has been for a number of years.
We need to work out what we are going to do with allies about that and what, what what that means, if I may just very, very quickly just on, on, on the point about kind of.
communication is that we're putting out there. diplomatically is incoherent. And that's that's problematic. So, you know, what are we doing about energy security? We need to work out what that looks like. And then we will have a strategic calculus around that. And that will then allow us to. You know, respond appropriately. I would, I, I think we also need to have a, a policy on the US position. I think we need to work out what we're doing there. The US is ruining a lot of NATO's work in the climate security space and has been for a number of years.
We need to work out what we are going to do with allies about that and what, what what that means, if I may just very, very quickly just on, on, on the point about kind of.
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Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
I think there's a lot of understanding in across HMG currently, there's been multiple inquiries. Hcdc EC, there's been an APG for climate, nature and security that's been in existence since 2022. That's been pushing out really good, really good reports. There's been lots of workshops, policy papers and, and so on . In terms of.
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Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Laurie wanted to answer it too, because I think what we've been circling around here is that there is an opportunity for UK leadership to really define what it now means by climate security. We've heard lots of different ways in that we could define that here. It's about peace building and climate vulnerable places, particularly in the tropics. It's about what the Mod does in the face of climate change. The list goes on. I think in the the leadership that the Foreign Secretary has shown. recently has been a really positive development. What could come for the cop and then in the context of G20 presidency, is to now.
define what we might mean by climate.
define what we might mean by climate.
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Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Where on one hand, we've understood that British national security is now increasingly under threat, directly and indirectly, but also we have our obligations to the wider world, and those two things have got to exist together. So I think there's an opportunity to actually to say, okay, now we've pointed to this as a as a bigger issue on our agenda. This is what we mean by definition of climate. security that recognises the threat to our.
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Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
But is compatible with the need for collective action to get us out of the situation. And stemming from that would mean more assessments to better understand the surprises that are coming down the line. We have the the nature bit of that through the world leading UK government assessment, but that's just one part of an overall earth system puzzle, as I was talking about. A second area is then through carpal G20 to take some of the risks that were identified in that and other reports and say, well, here are some.
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Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
That model how we are going to protect our national security in a way that is generally globally collaborative. And, and recognising that resilience starts abroad as well as at home. And then the third area is beginning to use or evolve existing UK leadership on some of the more really surprising things that could come down the line. And we've talked a number of times about amok in this conversation. The UK government, through its Advanced Research and Invention.
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Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Yeah, and we went to Greenland and visited the boat. Yeah. Right. And and a great boat it is. And the there's opportunity to expand that leadership further by working with the Nordic countries who now consider this a national security issue. And that is an area where we don't just need new alliances to focus on the threats that we absolutely know are guaranteed, like food security threats and how we do that collaboratively with Britain, collaboratively with Britain, and then people who are connected to our supply chains.
But then these bigger, surprising things down the .
But then these bigger, surprising things down the .
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Really big one. Okay, good. Well, look, thank you very much. I, I, I would normally say if there was any final remarks you'd like to make, but given the amount of time we have left, I'm so sorry that I am not able to give you that opportunity. But but I would like to to thank you all very much. And if you think that there's anything that you should have said and that we should have asked and further evidence that you'd like to give us, please do take the opportunity to write to us. We'd be very interested.
As you can see, this is a subject that obviously ought to exercise us all, and we on this committee are very interested in. So that concludes our our session on climate diplomacy. And thank you to all the. witnesses for giving evidence today.
As you can see, this is a subject that obviously ought to exercise us all, and we on this committee are very interested in. So that concludes our our session on climate diplomacy. And thank you to all the. witnesses for giving evidence today.
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