Immigration and Asylum Bill

Thursday 15th October 2026

(began 13 hours, 51 minutes ago)

Share Debate
Watch Live
Skip to latest contribution
This debate has concluded
11:29
11:31
None Portrait Speaker 2
-

Thank you very much, Mr. Stewart. It's good to see you again this morning. And good morning to all colleagues today. We start our debate by moving on to part two of the bill, which relates to article eight of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article eight the right to a family life is an important protection, but it is a qualified right. That means it can be balanced against the public interest, such as the safety of the community or the security of our borders, where this outweighs an individual's personal rights.

 We will not step away from our belief that the right to family and private life must be respected and upheld. However, we have been clear that we must strike the right balance between the rights of the individual and fairness to the UK public. And crucially, as we bear down on abuse of the system as set out in our impact assessment, each main applicant granted first time on article eight grounds, carries an estimated lifetime cost to the taxpayer of around £141,000, equating to approximately £4.9 billion for those granted in 2025 alone.

 Indeed, Home Office analysis suggests that 71% of first time grants on the basis of article eight were to individuals who had entered illegally and or overstayed. If the same applied to the 42,000 estimated first time grants in 2025, this would mean 30,000 overstayers and illegal entrants would have been allowed to stay last year on the basis of article eight. Between the 1st of April 2016 and November 2021 of 1011 foreign national offender deportation appeals that were allowed on human rights grounds, 70% were solely on article eight grounds and with 77,000 applications granted on article eight grounds last year, it is having a significant effect on our ability to enforce our immigration rules.

 Therefore, in this bill, we are changing how article eight is applied in the UK immigration system to restore public confidence and ensure that the UK application of rights is in line with the Strasbourg court. The application of article eight will be tightened to prevent misuse of the system and ensure that the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control carries proper weight in immigration decisions. As the Home Secretary has made clear, the abuse of human rights law does not just erode the public support for our immigration system, it erodes their support for the very idea of having such laws at all.

 For those who believe these laws matter, it is essential that we reform them to end their abuse. The reforms will put more emphasis on compliance with our rules and contribution to our economy and to our society. So starting first today with clause 17, this aims to bring greater clarity and control to entry clearance applications which engage article eight protecting genuine family relationships while preventing weak or tenuous claims from undermining public confidence. Taken with the reforms of clauses 18 and 19, which we'll come to in forthcoming groups which tighten key elements of the article eight assessment.

 It strengthens our ability to enforce the immigration rules and create a fairer, more controlled system. So clause 17 amends the definition of a human rights claim in the 2002 Nationality and Asylum Act to create a sponsor human rights claim. This will lay the foundations to allow UK based sponsors to make an entry clearance application for an overseas family member to join them in the UK, if the application relies on the sponsors. Article eight right to family life.

 It will also enable the sponsor to appeal to the immigration tribunal if the Home Office refuses their application. I want to be very clear that only individuals with a specified status, including British citizens and those of other lawful residents, will be able to make a sponsor human rights claim. They need to establish a genuine family life claim and show that refusal would disproportionately interfere with their article eight rights. These reforms do not create a new migration route or entitlement to come to the UK.

 They simply ensure a correct process that is based on the UK sponsor, not the family abroad. The clause will affect sponsors who wish to rely on article eight family life because their family member does not meet the entry clearance requirement under the family routes in immigration rules, enabling the UK based sponsor to apply will focus attention on the circumstances in article eight. Rights of the sponsor rather than the overseas family member. This reflects the established legal position that is the sponsor who is within the UK jurisdiction for the purposes of article eight decision making.

 The focus on the rights of the UK sponsor is intended to reduce expansive interpretation of where article eight rights are found to exist, and prevent article eight becoming a route for those with tenuous family links to the UK. Too often the focus can be on the circumstances of the applicant's abroad, whereas the main legal question should be whether there is a disproportionate interference with the family life of the UK based sponsor. I will, Melanie.
11:35
11:36
11:37
11:37
None Portrait Speaker 2
-

The honourable member makes a really important point, but the and this is why we're actually trying to narrow the definition, particularly to those who are here in the UK, because for far too often it's been a very tenuous link that family members can put in a claim from abroad to come to the UK. This narrows that definition while still ensuring that we maintain our obligations under article eight rights. The recent Court of Appeal judgment in. I provided helpful clarification around the correct tests to determine where article eight family life exists, especially between extended family members.

 But this judgment addressed an issue with article eight family life being applied to a broader set of circumstances and relationships which risked undermining our systems and rules. And despite these helpful findings, there remains a risk of inconsistent decision making where the primary focus is not on the article eight rights of the family member in the UK the person within the UK's jurisdiction. According to case law, the clause will add greater weight to the findings of the Court of Appeal and bring more clarity to decision making for entry clearance cases which engage.

 Article eight family life. The Court of Appeal in I a also reaffirmed the importance of the government's immigration policy when striking the right balance between an individual's rights and the public interest. Clause 17 in combination with the reforms at clauses 18 and 19, make it clear where the government's policy position lies in relation to the application of article eight and where it expects the rules to be enforced. This will create a clearer, fairer, more controlled system.

 Details of the application process, including forms and evidential requirement, will be set out in immigration rules and supporting guidance. Given the complexity of this clause, I will give members an overview of each of the subsections. Subsection one creates a sponsor human rights claim in law by adding to the existing definition of a human rights claim at section 113 of the nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. This has the effect of permitting a UK based sponsor to appeal against a decision to refuse a human rights claim to their overseas family member.

 This is the starting point for future changes to the rules, forms and guidance. Subsection two explains that further amendments are required to the 2002 act for clause 17 to operate properly. These changes are set out in subsections 3 to 7. Subsection three makes changes so that a sponsor human rights claim cannot be deemed inadmissible or not suitable to be considered. This is necessary because the clause 17 reforms make the UK sponsor the applicant, not the overseas individual, who requires entry clearance.

 And as I will cover in relation to amendment 95, it would be inappropriate to simply refuse to consider a human rights claim because the UK sponsor is a national of a safe country. Such safeguards are designed to prevent improper protection claims from nationals of these countries. Subsection four makes further changes linked to the fact. Clause 17 makes the sponsor the applicant, not the person overseas. The effect is that at appeal, the courts will hear all matters relating to the family member seeking entry to the UK and not include any immigration matters related to the sponsor.

 Subsection five creates an exception so that sponsor human rights claims do not need to have their appeals considered within the time frame set out in the statute. This is because an individual will not be able to act as a sponsor if they are liable to deportation action. Subsection six prevents a sponsor human rights claim being certified and denied an appeal , simply because the UK based sponsor is entitled to live in a safe state, primarily European countries. This would not be a fair application of the power where a right to family life was being relied on.

 The clause does not prevent a claim being refused and denied an appeal where matters under consideration are clearly unfounded, for example, because the relationship was a sham, subsection seven ensures that sponsor human rights are not treated as abandoned or cancelled because the UK sponsor holds permission to be in the UK. Instead, an appeal is abandoned if the overseas family member is granted leave to enter or remain in the UK. Just yes of course.
11:42
11:42
None Portrait Speaker 2
-

The honourable lady has an important point. And basically, I mean, anyone who is a British citizen, I believe is will be eligible to to become a sponsor. Forgive me. I don't want to mislead her by getting the wrong answer, but actually, yes, I was right. Sorry. Individuals with specified status in the UK, including British citizens, settled persons and those with certain other lawful residents will be able to make a sponsored human rights claim.

They will need to establish a genuine family life claim, which will come on to talk about in more detail in the next clauses, and show that refusal will disproportionately interfere with their article eight rights. And , as we said, the reforms don't create a new migration route or entitlement. They simply ensure that human rights claims are for those who are settled British citizens, settled persons and those with residence here are raised and considered through through the correct process. So I'll turn now to amendment 94, and I'd like to thank the honourable member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling this amendment, which requires that the Home Office would only be able to designate a place where a human or a sponsor human rights claim can be made via statutory instrument, subject to the affirmative procedure.

 The Bill does not require the definition of a designated place to be the subject of regulations, as there are currently no plans to specify the geographical place from where these claims can be made. The focus of article eight is on whether the individual in the UK is making the sponsorship claim has a strong enough claim, not where the family is based. This is because a UK based sponsor will be expected to make their claim through a paid for online application. We will use the immigration rules to specify the procedures that applicants must follow to make a sponsor human rights claim.

 This will allow us to go into the necessary level of technical detail, while retaining flexibility to make changes as we implement the new applications process. Give away indeed.
11:43
11:44
None Portrait Speaker 2
-

The honourable gentleman gets to the exact heart of what we're trying to do in this legislation. We've been guilty, I think, through the sort of build up of this legislative and legal framework of Overinterpreting Strasbourg law. And by codifying what we're doing through this bill, we're ensuring that we're not going over and above that, but we're simply complying with what our international obligations ask us to do. There's a strong rationale for adopting a different approach to sponsor human rights claims compared to protection claims, where a place is designated, protection claims will normally engage the UK's obligations under the Refugee Convention.

 Those obligations mean that states are obliged to consider claims made on their territory. We are not obliged to consider protection claims made by individuals outside of the UK, and someone must first be outside of their country of origin before they can be considered for refugee status. Designating a place ensures that we do not consider protection claims made by individuals outside of the UK, when we do not have to consider these claims under the Refugee Convention. In contrast, human rights claims are normally made via an application for leave to enter or remain in the UK, and this is the process we would expect applicants to follow when making a sponsored human rights claim.

 This allows for claims to be made in an ordered and structured way for caseworkers to consider relevant evidence, and for the Home Office to take a fee where this is required. Restoring order, predictability and consistency to article eight. Decision making is at the core of these reforms. Indeed.
11:45
11:45
11:46
None Portrait Speaker 2
-

I think it's a really important point that the hon. Lady makes, and we'll be delighted to provide more evidence as we go through the due process, making sure that they are proportionate and don't push people into poverty. But it's important that we are charging people a fee where they are bringing their family members to this country under article eight, for the reasons I've set out above, the government does not support the amendment. Amendment 112 requires the Home Office to carry out safeguarding checks on individuals who make a sponsor human rights claim, and that any information uncovered in these checks is considered when the Home Office determines that claim.

 I thank the honourable member for Rutland and Stamford for raising the importance of safeguarding vulnerable migrants, particularly children and victims of domestic abuse. This is a really important issue and one that will be fully considered in the design and implementation of the application process for sponsor human rights claims, as clause 17 simply paves the way for claiming how an entry clearance application relying on article eight family life can be made. We do not believe this level of detail is required in the primary legislation.

 The immigration rules already contain safeguards to protect children coming to the UK to join family members who could put them at risk of harm. The honourable lady makes a I forgive you, sorry. However, we would fully consider if additional safeguarding requirements are necessary as we develop the procedural requirements for sponsor human rights claims in the immigration rules. Because the honourable lady makes an important point through this amendment, and it is a safeguarding proposal that we would support in principle when the application process is designed.

 So I hope the honourable gentleman is reassured that our support for this principle is on record through this committee.
11:47
11:47
None Portrait Speaker 2
-

Of course.
11:47
11:47
11:49
11:49
11:50
11:50
11:50
11:50
None Portrait Speaker 2
-

Of course.
11:50
11:50
11:51
11:51
11:51
11:52
None Portrait Speaker 2
-

So I can absolutely undertake to provide as much information as we can to the committee on that issue. We may not know how many children somebody has in a in another country. It may not be within our knowledge of our you know, unless they've put in an article eight claim, we wouldn't necessarily know the family members that they have. So it may be a little difficult for us to predict this, but I can undertake and give my commitment to the committee that we will do our best to get as close as we can.

 Provide that to yourselves. Just to continue with a bit more of the rationale for refusing amendment 112. As I said, we do have existing safeguard measures already in place across the immigration system to identify indicators of coercion, exploitation and trafficking, and we will consider whether these measures can be further strengthened to improve the identification and mitigation of risk. Our approach ensures that vulnerable individuals are protected, whilst maintaining the integrity of the system through ensuring that the rights of UK based sponsors are the focus of entry clearance decisions which engage article eight.

 Clause 17 does not exempt human rights claims from the General Certification Power in section 94 of the Nia act 2002, which applies irrespective of whether the claimant can reside in the listed safe countries. This means that we will be able to prevent appeals by certifying human rights claims, which are bound to fail, although it may be relevant to consider whether the UK based sponsor is able to reside with their family member abroad. This will be done as part of the substantive article eight assessment.

 Yes of course.
11:53
11:53
11:53
11:53
None Portrait Speaker 2
-

As I said, it would be those who, as we set out at the beginning, those who have a settled status. So my understanding is, is those that have a refugee settled refugee status will be able to apply. But again, I can get some confirmation for the honourable lady on that point. Amendments 95 and 96, taken together would mean that sponsor human rights claims can be made inadmissible or certified as clearly unfounded, in the same way as other human rights claims.

 Clause 17 does not exempt human rights claims from the general certification power in section 94 of the nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act. Forgive me, I jumped about here. This means we will be able to prevent appeals by certifying sponsor human rights claims, which are bound to fail, although it may be relevant to consider whether the UK based sponsor is able to reside with their family member abroad. This will be done as part of the substantive article eight assessment, applying section 88 or section 943 of the 2002 act to sponsor human rights claims would procure preclude, in many cases, a substantive assessment of the claim.

 If the sponsor was a national of or able to reside in any of the safe countries listed in the Act. In most cases, it would not be reasonable to refuse to consider a sponsor human rights claim fully just because the sponsor making it was able to reside in one of those safe countries. For this reason, the government cannot accept section amendment 95. As the committee will be aware, I have tabled amendments to part three of the Bill and to to insert a new schedule which provides greater clarity on the government's approach to the core protection model.

 We'll come on to debate those amendments in the new schedule later in the committee. Indeed, yes.
11:55
11:55
None Portrait Speaker 2
-

I thank the honourable gentleman for that question. I think my understanding was that it was a recognition, really, that we just wanted to use this opportunity to ensure that we had, as firm security in this process as possible. So we obviously had a fair amount of work to to undertake to do that. And the swift passage of this bill. So it's it's about making sure that we have the opportunity for this committee to consider it, whilst ensuring it's brought in at the right stage of this bill.

 So some of these things take time, but we're keen that this bill closes as many loopholes as possible. On amendment 95 and 96 as originally put forward. Without the introduction of new schedule one by the government, they would have the effect of making the nationality of the UK based sponsor dictate how a sponsor human rights claim was considered. This would also impact British citizens who are dual nationals, even where they were born in the UK and or British from birth.

 If they also hold another nationality which is on one of the safe country lists. Amendment 95 would mean that a British citizen who was born in the UK to British citizen parents, but who also has a citizenship of an EU member state, for example, through their grandparents, would have an application to sponsor a family member to join them in the UK under article eight declared inadmissible. Ireland is an EU member state and is therefore included within the existing Sata inadmissibility provisions.

 This currently means that if an Irish citizen claims asylum in the UK, the claim is declared inadmissible and not substantively considered. But amendment 95 would mean that if an Irish citizen resident in the UK sought to sponsor a family member to join them in the UK, relying on article eight, this would be declared inadmissible. In contrast, a British citizen who holds no other nationality or a citizen of a non-EU country or a country not under section 88, a list who is settled in the UK would be able to sponsor a family member and rely on article eight.

 The opposition introduced amendment 96, which would have meant that the nationality of the sponsor would dictate whether or not any article eight claim would be presumed to be clearly unfounded. The government has instead adopted this amendment, which removes the exemption for human rights claims, but does so because within the new schedule one, it is also repealed. The reference to human rights claims in section 943. Altogether, this means that the nationality of a person will continue to dictate whether or not there is a presumption that any protected claim that they make is clearly unfounded.

 But nationality will not create any presumption in respect of non protection human rights claims. The government's position is that the designation of any country is safe, should relate to protection claims quite rightly, and that article eight claims based on family or private life will always be person specific rather than place specific. A very important difference. The test to clarify the refusal of any claim remains that it is so without substance that it is bound to fail.

 This test applies to any claim made by a person of any nationality in conjunction with new schedule one. This test applies to any claim made by a person of any nationality. Government amendment 96 in conjunction with new schedule one, does not change the test for certification, but merely removes any presumption of certification for article eight. Private or family life claims based on nationality. Government amendments 96, 130 and 131 are consequential on these amendments and to support this model, which the Committee will examine shortly.

 Taking now amendment 97. This amendment would limit appeal rights to the Immigration Tribunal to sponsors whose article eight claim relates to a member of their core cohabiting family, as defined in clause 18. The government does not think that this amendment will be appropriate. Each case law is clear that family life is usually confined to, but can exist out of the core cohabiting family. Where a sponsor human rights claim made in relation to an extended family member is refused by the Home Office, the UK based sponsor is entitled to an EC compliant remedy.

 Therefore, in the absence of an appeal right to the tribunal, the sponsor would still be able to exercise their right to apply for judicial review of the Home Office decision. Judicial review is generally a more complex and costly route for both claimants and the Home Office than an appeal to the immigration tribunal. So we would reject this amendment on the basis that it would lead to potentially a large number of jars. So, Mr. Stewart, in conclusion, I beg to move that amendments 96 130 131 and that clause 17 stand part of the bill.
12:00
12:00
Blake Stephenson Portrait Blake Stephenson
-
-
Thank you, Mr. Chair. It's a pleasure to serve under your chair. I beg to move. Amendment 94. My name and that of my honourable friend, member for Stockton West. I shall speak to amend 95, 96, 97 to amendment 112 in the name of my hon. Friend the member for Rutland and Stamford, and to the question that clause 17 stamp part of the bill. Can I thank the Minister for her opening remarks and indeed , for answering, pre-empting and answering some of the questions I have in my speech.

 It's almost like she and I have had a spy in my tail looking at questions I might might ask. And I think we perhaps for these debates on the Echr today had a dry run yesterday in the first opposition day debate. So let me start by saying the opposition opposes clause 17, which perhaps is not a surprise to members here. As we said in our reasoned amendment at second reading, and we'll vote against it standing part of this bill.

 Our amendments are tabled to test the government's reasoning, some of which has been answered by the minister already, but I will, for the record, go through it and. And if the committee decides to keep the clause, we submit that our amendments will limit the damage that it will cause. Clause 17 is the first clause of part two of the bill. The government believes part two is the answer on article eight of the EC.

 That makes this the right place to ask the question, on which the whole debate on part two will turn. Does this bill change what a court must do when someone says that article eight prevents their removal? Or does it simply change what the court should have regard to? I'll deal first with clause 17 itself, and then with what it tells us about the bill as a whole. So in clause 17, this creates a new statutory category of sponsor human rights claim.

 This would enable someone already situated in the UK to submit an application directly to the Secretary of State at a location designated by the Secretary of State. These claims would assert that refusing a member of their family entry to the UK would breach article eight, subsection one. D then brings the sponsor claims within the scope of Human Rights Appeals Framework, set out in part five of the 2002 act, as the explanatory notes confirm. The effect is that the UK based sponsor becomes the claimant with a right to appeal subsections 3 to 7 then carve out sponsor claims which the minister did go through the sponsor carve out sponsor claims from the provisions that apply to other human rights claims.

 They cannot be declared inadmissible under section 80 A they cannot be certified as clearly unfounded under section 94. They sit outside the statutory time frame in section 86 B, and I suspect the civil servants might be looking those up now for the Minister. And there are bespoke rules on pending and abandoned appeals. The government is presenting these changes as a tightening of the rules overseas family members may not claim because the sponsor must.

 However, our reasoned amendment at second reading set out our concern that the bill will. Would allow sponsor human rights claims and so enable people outside the UK to enter on human rights grounds. There is nothing in the evidence nor what the minister said earlier in her opening remarks that convinced me that this concern was misplaced, and I have a few points, if I may, to go through. I'll give way.
12:04
12:04
Blake Stephenson Portrait Blake Stephenson
-
-
Yes. And fundamentally, I think the clause is tinkering around the edges with the application, the Echr. We've been here before and I'll come on to this later in my speech. Successive governments have tried to do this, but fundamentally my concern is that the the clause won't work. But let me first turn to the drafting, if I may. The explanatory notes say that overseas article eight applications must be made by the sponsor.

 However, the clause defines a claim made quote, at a place designated by the Secretary of State and as the House of Commons Library points out, it deals with the appeal stage. It does not say how claims are lodged in the first place. So my question to the minister is, where in the Bill is the provision that stops an overseas family member applying? Which places will be designated which I know the honourable lady did touch on, but which places will be designated and by what regulations, rules or guidance? And who holds the right of appeal today? Looking through the evidence that this committee saw from the Bar Council, this was written evidence.

 It was really clear. It states that, quote, until now, an application for entry clearance to come to the UK had to be made by a person overseas, and any appeal against refusal had to be brought by them. Clause 17 would now give the UK based sponsor an appeal of their own. Does the Minister accept that clause 17 introduces a right of appeal that currently doesn't exist today? And if so, then how is clause 17 in any way, as she says, tightening the rules.

 Second, I want to discuss the exemptions. Clause 17 leaves inadmissibility and certification in place for other human rights claims. Why should a sponsor claim be exempt from both amendments 95 and 96? And a note that the government, I believe, took over amendment 96, if that's the way to describe it, which I'm grateful for and I'm sure did it for their own good reasons, not to just copy and paste a opposition amendment, but they would remove those exemptions.

 These were probing amendments, indeed. Of course, 96, let's assume, probed sufficiently for it to be taken on board. If the minister cannot explain to this committee today for what reason, a sponsor claim would be treated more favourably than any other human rights claim and the exemptions should go. So perhaps you can address that in relation to 95 amendment 95 in some more detail when she responds. And there is a point also of drafting to consider whether the clause actually works at all.

 Clause 525 ties the commencement of subsection three to section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, and subsection five to section 50 of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 coming fully into force. Now, I recognise that the Minister won't have the answers on the tip of her tongue to sort of a complicated drafting question, but perhaps during the course of today, during these sessions, the civil servants might help provide an answer. But I note from the evidence that section 50 is not yet enforced, and that schedule one to this bill would repeal it.

 So my question is, will the minister now explain how subsection five is actually meant to commence? And if there's an error, whether that will be corrected in the drafting? I'd like to move on to the interaction with Family Reunion next. Three witnesses in the oral evidence sessions. So Vicky Tennant of UNHCR, John Fenby of the Refugee Council and Angela Afzal of the International Rescue Committee have all taken very different views to the opposition on this bill.

 However, their evidence is relevant as we scrutinise this clause today. Miss Tennant told us that the bill's presumption of cohabitation is, and I quote, a difficult threshold to make in the refugee context, particularly given the suspension of the refugee family reunion route. Mr. Fatemi estimated that probably 20,000 people have been unable to apply since that route was suspended just over a year ago, and Miss Afzal warned that families could be encouraged to resort to smugglers to reunite at the written evidence goes a little bit further.

 The Immigration Law Practitioners Association tells us the human rights claim may be the only realistic remaining path for refugee families, while the dedicated route is suspended , and the Bar Council told us that it will be the only practical gateway. The British Red cross highlights that 12,888 family reunion visas were granted in the year to June 2026, and that the core protection status of clause 21 is expected to carry no family reunion rights at all. So whilst I draw very different conclusions from theirs, the dedicated route has been suspended.

 This clause creates a statutory sponsor claim with a right to appeal. And without safe country filters, the people with expertise in this field who gave us this evidence expect that this will become the main entry route. Is this not simply the government closing one back door, opening another? And what assessment has the office, the Home Office made of of those numbers?
12:10
12:10
Blake Stephenson Portrait Blake Stephenson
-
-
Yeah. Thank you. I thank the honourable member for that question, and I recognise the government's intentions. Of course, we're here today talking about this bill and the implications of this bill, but I recognise the broader point that the honourable member makes. The Bar Council also points out that the details regarding how these sponsor claims will work will be set out in immigration rules that have not yet been made, though the minister has referred to them.

 Will the government publish those draft rules as well as the new refugee family reunion rules, before this bill progresses to report stage so that members of this House know exactly what they are voting for. The library records that roughly 500 people abroad were granted article eight visas in 2025. And how many out-of-country applications and appeals are there each year, and how many does the government expect there will be under clause 17? Amendment 97 would at least confine the new right of appeal to the family.

 The government says article eight is about an appeal on a refused sponsored claim would lie only where the family member is part of the claimants core cohabiting family. Under new section 100 and 17AA. This would be a spouse, civil partner, partner or minor child, or the parent of a child sponsor. If the government truly believes in its own definition in clause 18, why won't it accept that the sponsor's right of appeal should be limited to this very definition? If I may turn to amendment 112, which was laid in the name of my hon.

 Friend the member for Rutland and Stamford, this would require the Home Secretary to carry out safeguarding checks before deciding a sponsor claim. These checks would include whether the sponsor has convictions, protective orders or findings for domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage, or a history of immigration decisions in which those matters were material. It would also require the consideration of the weight of any risk to the family member, to the children or to others.

 If the government is to create a statutory route in which the sponsor drives the claim, the least it should do is check who the sponsor is. And can I thank the Minister for supporting this amendment in principle? The Minister also went on to describe some of the existing safeguarding measures that are in place, and that will be strengthened. I would be grateful if she might unpack that somewhat more when she responds , to demonstrate the government's clear commitment to ensure that the spirit of this amendment laid by my hon.

 Friend will be implemented, and that it will be implemented a way that works in practice, if not on the face of the bill. And I. And I ask that for a particular reason. The minister will know that I've been asking the Home Office quite a lot of written parliamentary questions in past months, particularly actually about the legal immigration and the visa controls. And I have to say that from the responses that I'm getting, I question very seriously whether the systems that the Home Office has in place to monitor, track, oversee compliance with sponsors who are sponsoring visas really isn't fit for purpose.

And so I think it would be prudent for the minister to provide comfort to this committee that there will be better controls in relation to sponsors for for this particular route. Moving on to the courts. Professor. Singer who's who? It is worth noting, is opposed to this bill told us that the Court of Appeal's recent decision in I a and others was, quote, a very restrictive interpretation of article eight, and that she did not, quote, see the courts taking a particularly liberal approach to article eight.

 If that is right, what is the mischief that clause 17 addresses? Is it meant to reverse the Court of Appeal in I a to codify it or to do something else? I know the minister did refer to that particular Court of Appeal case, but if those specific questions could be answered, I would be grateful. Chair, clause 17 is our introduction to part two of the bill, as the Minister outlined. So I'd like to step back for a moment to consider part two as a whole.

 I believe the evidence is clear that this is a bill that talks tough on article eight, but does not substantively require the courts to decide cases any differently than they would would be under the Strasbourg case. Law Professor Ekins, who is supportive of the direction of travel, told the committee that the legislation, quote, leaves untouched the fundamental structures of article eight in this context, which is individuated proportionality assessment. It does not purport to be an exclusive code for article eight, does not displace article eight under the Human Rights Act.

 Claimants, Professor Eakin said, can invite the court to take this legislation as in a sense, advisory Doctor Casey explained why to stay within the strictures of the EC, the courts must have the final say. Now doctor Chris Row of Swansea University, writing for the UK Constitutional Law Association on the 10th of September, describes this bill as the government's third attempt to change directly how judges apply article eight, the previous two attempts being the 2012 rules and the Immigration Act 2014.

 Professor Ekins called the 2014 act, quote, a cautionary tale about the risks of failure. Now, my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary spoke about this in the opposition day debate yesterday in support of the ladies of Piddington and other locations around the country who are being blighted and will be blighted by asylum camps. Previous governments have been here before. Tweaks to the rules have been made before, and this, quote, a cautionary tale about the risks of failure, I think is very pertinent.

 I think this committee should consider whether, with this clause, we are going to be in the same situation again in the years to come. The 2014 act told courts to have regard to public interest considerations. The Supreme Court held in Rupia that because judges need only have regard. The act could not compel a convention incompatible result. In Doctorow's words, the device is insufficiently potent. To do so, the courts then read the apparently strict tests for foreign criminals, a requirement of very compelling circumstances over and above the statutory exceptions, as demanding no more than an especially strong claim decided by a full proportionality assessment on Strasbourg principles.

 The Doctor Rowe believes that the 2014 act did not weaken article eight protections in practice, and there is a twist that I hope the minister will reflect on when she considers clause 17, alongside failing to restrict article eight. The 2014 act simultaneously created rights that went even further than the convention in co brackets, Nigeria and later cases, the Supreme Court read some of the statutory exceptions as unqualified rights without regard to balancing this against the public interest. So the last time Parliament legislated in this space, the result was to set.

 The result was a set of unintended consequences that resulted in the creation of new rights that went beyond Strasbourg. Clause 17 creates a new statutory claim with its own appeal rights and its own carve carve outs. We are at very real risk of repeating history here, and it's the political leadership within government and within Parliament that we need to prevent that happening. What assurances can the Minister give this committee that the government's approach in this clause will not deliver the same or similar unintended consequences as the 2014 act? I'll ask the minister another way, just to make sure that's absolutely clear.

 Given rupiah, can she identify a single provision in part two of this act, this bill that would become an act that would require a court to reach a different result in an article eight case from the result it would reach applying the Strasbourg case law. Now, I want to just turn on to some of the numbers. The government's own impact assessment estimates that 11,700 additional refusals. Doctor Sumption told us that just over half of those refused would remain in the UK despite the refusal, and Professor Singer put it at 55% doctor.

 Doctor Sumption added it is one thing to restrict the legal challenges and the ability of people to get grants of status, but it's another thing actually to remove them from the UK. Mr. Dampier, in our oral evidence, told us that the majority of people claiming under article eight will not be affected at all. About half of those refused will remain. Obviously that is something of a problem, said professor Ekins said that on foreign criminals, the bill, quote, expressly preserves the capacity of foreign criminals to resist deportation on family grounds and that major obstacles will remain.

 Doctor Casey said that he could not see the logical connection between part two and deterring unlawful crossings. So what is the government's plan for the thousands of people expected to refuse, but expects to refuse but not remove? And what is the impact assessment built on? The Regulatory Policy Committee rated it as not fit for purpose, saying that little of the appraisal is quantified and most impacts are uncertain. And when my honourable friend the member for Stockton West, in oral evidence, asked how many additional removals the bill would deliver, the minister said that she did not want to put a specific figure on it.

 Miss Hewitt, of the Home Office told us that the modelling was, quote, very much a work in progress. I think the British public deserve more than that. They deserve good, thorough impact assessments. We should have figures on these issues before this is passed into law, to give the British public the confidence that this will do what is intended, doctor Sumption explained why the data is so thin. There are quotes, remarkably few statistics on human rights grants.

 So the impact assessment relies on a sample of around 3000 cases. The written evidence adds to the concern. The LPA points out that the claim in the explanatory notes that article eight is allowing people to remain outside the rules, comes with no figure or source, and that the only source for the proportion of successful claimants who entered unlawfully is an unpublished internal sample. It also says the 86% detention release statistic in the impact assessment is not by the government's own footnote specific to article eight.

 Now, I don't share IPA's conclusions to this bill, but the committee is entitled to the government's evidence, and I know that there was one impact assessment, and then there was an updated impact assessment just before we entered the first session of line by line scrutiny. But I think it would be very helpful for this committee for the Minister to run through the impact assessment, how it was created and some of the numbers sitting behind it to give us some comfort and, more importantly, the British public comfort that, again, this clause is going to do what the government intends it to do.

 So with that in mind, will the government publish the modelling and the sample and explain the 86% figure before report stage members will be pleased to know. I'm nearly at the end of what is a rather lengthy speech, perhaps my longest so far. So it's a case, he told us. Sorry. I just want to come on to the sort of structural points around article three. Doctor Casey told us that article three claims will probably increase because the bill does not touch article three claims whatsoever, and Mr.

 Webb agreed that the bill is silent on article three, despite the declaration in May, referring to reform of both. What assessment has the government made of claims migrating from article eight to article three? I recall this came up in oral evidence, and I don't believe that the officials that were with the minister recognised that that was a risk. But I think it's worth bringing it up again at this stage to get an answer from the minister on that structural point.

 When I asked Mr. Mehmet, in all the evidence what we should put in the bill, he told us we could start by declaring our intention to come out of the Echr. And of course, we conservatives believe that that's spot on and that's the right way to proceed. So we halt this merry go round of tweaking. Yeah. I'm glad.
12:24
12:24
Blake Stephenson Portrait Blake Stephenson
-
-
I, funnily enough, don't agree with the honourable member and shock horror Lord Wolfson produced an extremely extensive piece of legal advice, running to some 180 pages, which it sounds like the honourable member has read. I'm sure from from front to back there are there are absolutely no legal impediments to us leaving the EC. To do so would resolve the issues that are before us, and what we're discussing in this bill. Some of the matters that he has expressed are political matters rather than legal matters, in a sense that those can be negotiated politically.

 And so the important thing is that we are fair to the British people, and that we have an immigration system that they can have confidence in, and we can only deliver that by departing from the. And I don't want to go down, if I may, rabbit warrens on all of the reasons why . It is a fantastic policy, but no doubt the honourable member will ask further questions as we proceed. Where was I? So the.

 The one time Parliament tried to disapply the convention in this area and. And honourable members will love to hear the word. Rwanda, I'm sure, was in the Safety of Rwanda Act. The provision never took effect and was repealed by Labour. The Labour government in 2025. The Government and Parliament must be willing to take steps that require the courts to decide convention cases differently. This is the direction in which the evidence we heard points this bill.

 Committee to. If the government will not change the framework and merely ask the courts to have regard, then part two will deliver at best what the government's own impact assessment predicts. Refusals that do not become removals. Why has the government not considered giving the courts a direction. That they cannot set aside an exclusive code, for example, or disapplication of the Human Rights Act in this context? And, you know, if they have considered that but haven't moved forward with it, could the minister explain why it was rejected? The unfortunate reality for this bill is that the government is falling into the same trap that previous governments have fallen victim to well meaning and even well drafted, designed to circumvent the constraints of the.

 The courts will inevitably default to the same positions that they always have, allowing people who have no right to be in this country to stay for longer. In the meantime, if, or more likely, when, this bill fails to genuinely empower the government to deal with the extensive grounds for resisting removal that the various articles of the convention create, will the Minister and Honourable and Right Honourable members opposite finally join us in accepting that the issue here is not how carefully the legislation is drafted, but it's the E, C, h itself, and that we cannot have a meaningful conversation about restoring control over our immigration system without taking steps to leave the Echr.

 I'm going to close because I think I've spoken enough and time is pressing on. Chair clause 17 creates a new statutory claim and a new rights of appeal for sponsors, which will become the main route for refugee families. It exempts those claims from a safe country, filters it. Its detail is left to the rules we have not seen, and it commences by reference to provisions that are not yet in force, or that this bill would repeal amendments , 84 would have left out, sorry, amendment 84, which would have left out the clause entirely, has not been selected.

 So the committee's decision will come on. The question that the clause stand part, and for the reasons I've mentioned in this speech, there's been far too long. The opposition will vote against it. Thank you chair.
12:29
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

Chair Robertson.
12:29
Joe Robertson Portrait Joe Robertson
-
-
Thank you, Mr. Stewart. It's a pleasure to serve with you in the chair. I'm speaking a little earlier than I had expected. I misunderstood the shadow minister. I thought he was just getting started. It turns out that he considers his speech on the long side. Just for the record, I don't. I am going to address this wider issue of whether the bill in this particular set of amendments and the clause that stands part, really do go to address the issue that the Minister wants it to, and indeed the entire government does, by specific reference to those provisions.

Of course, the intention here, as I understand it from the government, I don't think it's controversial, at least in what the government say they want to do is to reduce the amount of claims, and for those claims to be genuine and to create some efficiencies in the system. Look, those are all aims that of course, we all want , and I think the government perhaps have made a genuine attempt here within this bill. But as far as I can see it, it's going to substantially fail on what it wants to do.

 If we look at this route of allowing a sponsor to make a right to family life, claim to bring in a family member who does not currently reside in the UK. And let us remember this is a right Being in a family member who does not. currently reside in the UK. And let us remember this is a right not to. only British citizens. This is a right to anyone who is. residing in the UK legally, which can mean they've got a lot of the great variety of legal .

Why they might be here, that they can bring in family members who are not here, who possibly never been to the UK. And it's for that reason. I ask the minister and I am grateful for her.
12:31
12:31
12:31
12:31
12:32
12:32
12:32
12:32
12:32
12:32
12:32
12:32
12:33
12:33
12:34
12:34
12:34
12:34
12:34
12:34
12:35
12:35
12:35
12:35
12:36
12:36
12:36
12:36
12:37
12:37
12:37
12:37
12:38
12:38
12:38
12:38
12:39
12:39
12:39
12:39
12:40
12:40
12:40
12:40
12:41
12:41
12:41
12:41
12:41
12:41
12:41
12:41
12:42
12:42
12:42
12:42
12:42
12:42
12:42
12:42
12:42
12:42
12:43
12:43
12:44
12:44
12:44
12:44
12:44
12:44
12:44
12:44
12:45
12:45
12:45
12:45
12:45
12:45
12:46
12:46
Joe Robertson Portrait Joe Robertson
-
-
Made about. And there is no support for me in my country of origin where I'm currently living. Again, it's going to be very. difficult to make a genuine assessment of whether that's true or not. So the decision maker, the Home Office, the courts, whatever in this country are really going to be relying on a set of assertions. So a set of assertions by a sponsor in this country, presumably with witness statement of someone overseas who says, I've got a mental illness.

 Here's a certificate from a. medical practice in my home country. And here it also says at the bottom of it, sorry, there's not much we can do. There's no support for you. I mean, the authorities here are going to have to take that as evidence, aren't they? And it's not going to be refutable. And I just see this as a big gateway of just saying, rolling over and saying yes to every application.

And if the Home Office doesn't say yes, at some point the courts will do, because we know currently that initial home Office. decisions generally across. asylum . , have a success rate of being changed, either within the Home Office's own appeal system or in the courts of 66%. So the majority of the Home Office's initial decisions are not upheld. Even if the Home Office wants to play. hardball on the.

 interpretation of mental illness, I have every. confidence that the court will. overturn lots, maybe the majority of their decisions. And in any case, we are back into the system we currently have with, ultimately the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court. interpreting each Human Rights Act will be the ultimate authority. And this provision .
12:48
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

Takes us no further .
12:48
12:48
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

Comments that he's .
12:48
12:48
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

Explore .
12:48
12:49
12:49
12:49
12:49
12:49
12:51
12:51
12:52
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

2014 .
12:52
12:52
12:52
12:52
12:53
12:53
12:54
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

Evidence or .
12:54
12:54
12:54
12:55
12:55
12:55
12:56
12:56
12:56
12:56
12:56
12:56
12:56
12:56
12:57
12:57
12:57
12:57
None Portrait Speaker 2
-

Of article eight related applications. This was to support our policy development. Further details of cohort. analysis in an unpublished internal sample, I'm afraid, will not be available due to personal data, as I mentioned, but I do appreciate the importance of further analysis, and I've noted that and will bring that to the committee. There was a question of what assessment has been made of the potential merits of Disapplying the Human Rights Act to immigration matters. I remain committed to ensuring that our broader human rights framework is fit for the challenges of today, but there are currently no plans to amend the Human Rights Act.

We do not have to withdraw from the issue, and I'll come on to discuss this more later this afternoon, or disapply the Human Rights Act to create meaningful reform. We're reviewing our approach to the. implementation within the immigration system. That's the intention of this bill on article three, article eight and article three address different harms and different legal thresholds. And just to reiterate what has previously been said, we do not expect these reforms to generate an increase in successful article three claims.

 As I've said, there will be no new rights or entitlements that will make it any easier for people to apply. And indeed, as I said, we are codifying the restrictions in the clauses we'll discuss this afternoon. Sponsors will still need to demonstrate a very high bar for their family to join them in the UK on the basis of article eight. On section 59 of the Illegal. Migration Act. The government is keeping under review whether and how to commence an.

 inadmissibility provisions of section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act, which amended section 88 of the nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act to include human rights claims. However, these provisions would not be applied to sponsor human rights claims as in most cases, it would not be reasonable to declare a claim. inadmissible just because the sponsor could reside in one of the listed safe countries. Clause 17 can be commenced without that, and we can write further on on that detail.

 Just a further follow up on safeguarding that was raised because, as I said, we do share our the honourable member Opposite's commitment to.
12:59
12:59
None Portrait Speaker 2
-

As I've already mentioned in response to honourable members, the. immigration rules already do contain safeguards to protect children coming to the UK to join family members who could put them at risk of harm, but we are considering more in the rules. I do take that very seriously and we will consider safeguards for adults to within the development of those rules, honourable members raised the Rights of Appeal. Clause 17 creates rights for a UK based sponsor to appeal again.

 We'll make clear in immigration rules that the sponsor based route is how article eight should be raised in relation to entry clearance and the right of appeal. Anyone who tries to apply from overseas, based on article eight, will be directed to apply via a UK based sponsor. And I think hopefully that's most of what I think I had here to cover. I think the key thing, I just wanted to flag again about the family reunion route and some of the points that were made about that.

 The family reunion route, as everyone knows, is currently suspended while the government is taking forward wider asylum and family reforms to place the system on a fairer, controlled and sustainable footing. Further information will be forth on forthcoming changes will be set out in due course. Sponsors with protective status can apply on other family routes if they consider they meet the relevant. immigration rules. This allows for claims to be made in an ordered and structured way for caseworkers to consider relevant evidence, and for the Home Office to take a fee where that's required.

 Specific processes exist for claims made in detention, which ensure they can be determined promptly to prevent last minute deferral of removals. So I'll pause there and say, if there's anything else that I have missed, I will endeavour to write to the committee on that. In summary, clause 17 creates a sponsor human rights claim, which aims to focus decision making on the rights of the UK.
13:01
13:01
13:01
13:01
13:02
14:00
14:01
14:01
14:01
14:01
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

No.
14:01
14:01
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

No.
14:01
14:01
14:01
14:02
14:02
14:02
14:02
14:02
14:02
14:02
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

No.
14:02
14:03
14:03
14:03
14:04
14:04
14:04
14:04
14:05
14:05
14:05
14:05
14:05
14:05
14:06
Blake Stephenson Portrait Blake Stephenson
-
-
Thank you very much, Mr. Craig. It's a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I beg to move amendment 98 in the name, in my name and that of my hon. Friend the member for Stockton West. With it, I'll speak to amendment 99 to 103, to government amendments, 44 and 45 and to clause 18 stand part clause 18 is at the heart of part two is where the government sets out for the first time in statute, as we heard earlier, what counts as family life for purposes of article eight of the ECH, other than the fact that we on the conservative benches would withdraw from the ECR to implement our borders plan.

 Allow me to say at the outset that the opposition does support the broad direction of travel of this clause. The public are entitled to expect that the right to respect for family life protects genuine, close family relationships, and is not stretched to cover extended relationships and loosely evidenced dependency, which is a very problem with which is the very problem the government's own explanatory notes identified. So the question for the committee is not whether clause 18 points the right way, in my opinion.

It's whether it will make any difference at all in the courtroom on the evidence this committee has heard and read so far. I fear the answer is, unfortunately, very little. Clause 18 does three things. First, subsection three inserts a two stage sequence into sections 117 a the 2002 act. A court or tribunal must first decide whether article eight is engaged at all, having regard in particular to new section 117 A, A, and only then turn to the public interest question.

 Secondly, subsection four inserts section 100 and 17AAA person's family life is normally limited to their core cohabiting family, a spouse, civil partner or partner, and minor children or parents to the extent that they live together. A parent who does not live with a child does not normally have a family life with that child, unless there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship, and an adult does not normally have family life with another adult unless they live together as partners, or there is an additional element of dependency beyond normal emotional ties.

 Thirdly, subsection five of the new section lists four things which on their own do not amount to that additional dependency financial dependence illness unless it meets a three part test of constant care and emotional resilience and concern for a relative living. Living in a country affected by war or instability. Subsection six, then provides that nothing in subsection five stops a court considering those same factors. When it comes to the public interest question why the direction is right, there is a real problem here, Mr.

 Smith, the former director general of Border Force, told the committee that article eight is, and I quote, often used as a lever quite late in the process, which we all know about from all of the cases we hear about on the news. And the minister gave the committee an example from Home Office casework of a man who falsely claimed paternity of eight children, was sentenced to six years imprisonment. Families, of course, take many forms, and nobody on this side of the committee wishes to deny that at all.

 But the law should be clear that the core of family life is the family that lives together, and that anything beyond it must be proved. So we support the principle. But we have been here before, and I refer back to the debate on the grouping of clauses in Group 14 and the many good speeches made. Then the. We have been here before with the immigration rules in 2012 and the Immigration Act in 2014, and I want to test whether this clause will succeed where those attempts did not.

 So first, looking at the language, new section 117 a. A does not say that family life is limited to the core cohabiting family. It says that it is, quote, normally limited to it. The same words appear in subsection three and four. Professor Eakins told us that this word is where the litigation will end up turning justice, which opposes this part of the bill, makes the same point. Of course, from the other side, its written evidence accepts that the use of.

 Normally, together with the need only to have regard to those considerations, quote, preserves the possibility of finding family life beyond those prescribed circumstances. So I asked the minister, in what circumstances does the government expect a court to find family life outside the core cohabiting family, and will there be will that be set out anywhere? If the government cannot say, why is the word. Why is the word there at all? Amendments 99, 101 and 102 would remove it.

 Second, let's look at the duty itself. That new section 117 A brackets one B says that the court must in particular have regard to section 117 AA. It does not say that the court must apply it. That matters in rupiah, a case that was mentioned in the previous session, the Supreme Court held that the Have regard formula in the 2014 act could not put decision makers in a straitjacket. And as mentioned again earlier, Doctor Chris Rowe at Swansea University, writing for the UK Constitutional Law Association, described the device as insufficiently potent to force a result incompatible with the convention clause.

 Clause 18 uses exactly the same device. What in the new section 117, a one A to one C differs in kind from the formula the Supreme Court has already held cannot bind. Amendment 98 would replace quotes have regard to. With a requirement that the court determine the question in accordance with section 117 A, a and then there is subsection six of the new section. Subsection five tells the court that financial dependence, illness, emotional reliance, and concern for a relative in a war zone do not, on their own, create family life.

 Subsection six tells the court that it may consider every one of every one of those factors when it weighs the public interest. The Immigration Law Practitioners Association that adds that the bill is silent on whether those factors may be combined. When the court decides whether there is an additional element of dependency, and that the Strasbourg court in Kumari and Martinez Alvarado allows exactly that. If the court read a combination test into subsection four B to keep the clause compatible, the list compatible, the list in subsection five will do very little work.

 So what is subsection six for if not to give back at the second stage, what subsection five takes away at the First Amendment, 103 would leave it out to test exactly that. So the central question is whether clause 18 changes the law or whether it does not. The government's Human rights memorandum says that section 117 A codifies the Strasbourg Principles on the Existence of family life. The House of Commons Library notes that the Strasbourg court has itself said family life is normally limited to the core family, and in Kumari and the Netherlands, the records and records.

 Professor singer's view that it is unclear how the clause would differ significantly from current practice, but the Law Society tells this committee that the new emphasis on cohabitation is, quote, a significant move away from the current position in UK law and a substantial narrowing of article eight. Protections and justice, say the clause, quote, falls short of codifying the Strasbourg principles on the existence of family life, despite the government's assertion to the contrary in its Echr memorandum. In particular, for young adults who still live with their parents with respect, the minister can't have it both ways.

 So if clause 18 merely codifies Strasbourg, what will it change and why? Present it to the public as a tightening? If it goes further than Strasbourg, then with the Human Rights Act unchanged and only a duty to have regard, the courts will read it down just as they did read down the 2014 act. So, Minister, perhaps you can. Perhaps the Minister can explain to the Committee which it is. There are also some questions of detail, each of which goes to whether the clause will hold at first partner quote partner is not defined.

 There is no test of duration or durability. Will a relationship of a few months formed with an eye to an application count as part of the core cohabiting family? What test does the government intend and where will it be set out? Amendment 100 offers one. A partner who is not a spouse or civil partner would count only after two years of living together in a relationship akin to marriage, which we think is a sensible approach.

 Secondly, subsection three requires, quote, evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship where a parent does not live with a child. The test is the existing one. What is new is the evidential burden. What evidence will be required? Contact maintenance, involvement in the school, in the child's schooling, for example? And will that all be set out in guidance and given the paternity fraud case the Minister described to us in, I think, our first session, how many claims does the Home Office see each year that involve falsely asserted parenthood? Government amendments 44 and 45 go some way here, and we welcome them.

 Amendment 44 applies the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test whether or not the parent lives with the child. Amendment 45 tells decision makers to look at the nature, length and frequency of contact and whether it has only recently been established or re-established. So will the minister confirm that a relationship rekindled for the purpose of an application will not meet this test? Thirdly, subsection five B says that illness counts only if the person needs constant care, the family member can provide it, and the person would not receive adequate care in their own country.

 The Law Society has written evidence, says that lim that third limb is, quote, likely to be incompatible with article eight because the Strasbourg court does not require dependency to be exclusive. What is the government's legal advice, to the extent it can share it in committee? On that point, if the court read down, read that limb down what is left of the test? And Doctor Casey warned us that article three claims will probably increase because the bill does not touch article three claims.

 Whatever. Again, another matter that was brought up in previous speeches, the medical dependency cases that subsection five B is designed to exclude can simply be run under article three. What assessment has the Home Office made of that displacement? Then there is the question of who will apply this new test under part one? Most appeals will be decided by adjudicators of the New Appeals Authority and need not be legally qualified. Justice observes that the new framework places significant responsibility on the shoulders of legally unqualified adjudicators.

 As we discussed in previous groups, as we debated in previous groups, and the Law Society describes judgments about family life and proportionality as inherent, inherently legal judgments. A multi limb test qualified throughout by the word quote, normally applied by non-lawyers, invites errors of law. Every error of law is a further appeal to the upper tribunal, where the Strasbourg based approach will reassert itself. What training and legal support will adjudicators have to apply? 100 and 17AA and what increase in appeals to the upper tribunal does the government expect? Now, turning to the pressure to the wider definition, the Committee should also be clear about the pressure.

This clause will come under. Much of the written evidence proposes widening it. The Law Society wants a route for couples who do not live together, reunite families UK wants routes for grandparents, adult children who provide care and siblings, and wants the war zone exclusion and subsection five D removed. LPA wants young adults brought within the core family and the illness test relaxed. Some of these cases are genuinely hard. Miss Tennant of the UNHCR told us that a presumption of cohabitation is, quote, a difficult threshold to make for refugee families separated by conflict.

 Our answer to those cases is safe and legal routes, and that was mentioned by the honourable member earlier. Properly controlled, of course, not a looser definition of family life under article eight, but each of these amendments, if accepted, would add back a category the government says it is excluding. So will the Minister confirm that the government will resist them, and if it concedes any, what will be left of the core cohabiting family? The government's own impact assessment estimates around 11,700 additional refusals across part D and, as was debated earlier, Doctor Sumption told us that just over half of those refused would remain in UK despite the refusal, and Mr.

 Dampier said the same. Obviously there is something of a problem. Clause 18 is aimed at one group claims based on extended family or adult dependency. How many of the article eight grants in the government sample of around 3000 cases turned on relationships outside the core cohabiting family? Will the government publish that breakdown and the sample itself? I know we've had partial questions to that in response to earlier groupings. Finally, chair, as structural point in these amendments, Professor Eakins told us that the bill does not purport to be an exclusive code for article eight, does not displace article eight under the Human Rights Act, and that claimants can invite a court to treat it as an uncensored advisory.

 And we've discussed this earlier. Professor singer from the other side of the argument told us that setting out an interpretation of article eight in domestic legislation does not change the meaning of article eight as a matter of international law. And we've heard evidence that this should go further. Our amendments 98 and 99, test the government's resolve, leave out the word quotes normally and require courts to apply section 117 AA , rather than merely have regard to it.

 Will the government accept them? If not, will the Minister confirm plainly that she has chosen to leave the final decision on family life with the courts? And when does the government intend clause 18 to come into force, given the power in clause 529 to commence part two retrospectively? Will section 117 AA apply to claims and appeals already in the system? Yesterday in the House, the honourable member for South Norfolk spoke of this bill in glowing terms.

 I recall it sitting on the other benches. He described its contents as not merely cosmetic changes or empty promises, but as a detailed set of legislative provisions which strengthen the framework, allowing us to remain in the Echr and regain control over the immigration system. The honourable member also encouraged my party to engage seriously and put forward amendments. I hope that the honourable member has engaged seriously on our amendments to clause 18, which are made most definitely.

 In that spirit, whilst we do not share the government's confidence that the whole package is sufficient, we particularly we particularly believe that strengthening is required here. In an opposition day debate speech in the House yesterday, the Minister spoke very briefly about this bill and described conversations about leaving the HR as, quote, unnecessary and counterproductive, stating that the idea that leaving the EC was the solution was the solution was not born out of reality. I think the minister's words minister also spoke about the importance of an effective deterrence must play in dealing with the problems in our immigration system.

 Does the Minister not agree that leaving a convention that too often and too easily allows foreign criminals and those with no right to be here to stay, regardless of any deterrent the government introduces, is a much more effective form of deterrence. Tweaking legislation to try and circumvent the ways the Echr renders the UK powerless to solve these problems, and hoping that they stick is not an effective deterrent plan. I look forward to the Minister's comments.
14:24
14:24
14:24
14:24
14:24
14:26
None Portrait Speaker 3
-

Madam Chair, and Mr.. It's a pleasure to have you in the chair today. I . In complete opposite to the honourable member for Mid Bedfordshire. In almost every respect, I am going to speak against clause 18 and its inclusion in the Bill. I'm going to oppose the government amendments that would put further tests on the level of parental child relationship and involvement for refugees, and I will also be opposing the conservative amendments, which set to put even tighter constraints on family life.

 I'm here to defend article eight protections because I say our as well, because I believe it's really important that we set laws for refugees and asylum seekers to which we ourselves would be happy to be subjects. That is absolutely at the core of the universal nature of human rights, the international agreements that we have made to respect human rights around the world in the way that we would want them to be respected, should we be in that horrible position of being someone who needs to claim asylum.

 And within all of this article, eight protects the right to family life specifically for us under the European Convention on Human Rights. I know that although it's not absolute, it does require any state interference in these rights to be lawful, necessary and proportionate. And I do not agree with the government when they say in their human rights memorandum, that that they are taking a proportionate means of achieving legitimate aims. To me, that paragraph 26 in the memorandum very clearly admits that there is interference in our rights with this legislation because they are using that argument that it's proportionate of achieving the legitimate aims, and their legitimate aims that they lay out are maintaining efficient immigration control, economic well-being and the prevention of disorder or crime.

 But I honestly do not see how this section on family life, on people making claims for reuniting their families, for maintaining this essential human right, protected under article eight comes into those proportionate means. This is about reducing the ability of families to reunite the. The impact assessment clearly says that many thousands of people who would be able to come here under current laws will be denied their claims. This is a reduction in human rights and seriously needs looking at.

 I'm not equipped and not planning to add further arguments relating to Northern Ireland and the Windsor framework today, but I do believe there are further conversations that need to go on around what is currently in this bill. Never mind what would happen if we were to withdraw from the EC. I think everybody on this committee wants a fair, robust and effective immigration system, one that works, that upholds the rule of law and in which people have confidence. And article eight within all of this is not an abstract concept.

 It is the law that decides whether a parent can stay in the country where their children live, or whether a British child grows up with both parents. We do not want to see families separated or children separated from the parents who care for them. Yet that is precisely the risk posed by clause 18, and the impacts of it are assessed by the government itself. Clause 18 would replace the. I would.
14:30
14:31
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

Yes.
14:31
None Portrait Speaker 3
-

I thank the honourable member for his intervention and his perspective. And as a constituency MP as I am, he must appreciate, through his own casework, the general principle that article eight claims need to be assessed on an individual basis, and I think that this bill tries to codify things in way and generalise things in ways that reduce the ability for anyone making decisions, to really look at the genuine family lives of those who are making the claims.

And this can result, and you can get bad decisions resulting from people misunderstanding different cultures, from unconscious biases, from all kinds of things like that that go on. And I think it's really important that we we don't try to prescribe family life under state definitions. And I will come on to that more. I will also come on to the toxic rhetoric and the awful examples and anecdotes which add to that the examples I think we've heard from do from from ministers do increase the toxicity of the debate.

And I think we can do much better than this bill in reducing that. Coming back to where I was , clause 18, as I've just intimated, would replace the reality of family relationships with statutory presumptions. Families today come in many, many forms. We have single parent household blended families, grandparents raising children, parents who, through circumstance rather than choice, do not live under the same roof. A family does not stop being a family because it fails a cohabitation test.

 The government's stated objective is to confine family life normally, and I will always stand up against people trying to define what a normal family is. But the government tries to confine family life normally to the core cohabiting family unit. A parent who does not live with their child must prove the relationship is genuine, judged on how often and how recently they have had contact, even where work, shared care or the immigration system itself has kept them apart.
14:33
None Portrait Speaker 4
-

The honourable lady.
14:33
14:33
14:34
14:35
14:35
None Portrait Speaker 3
-

Just once more?
14:35
14:35
14:35
14:36
14:36
14:37
None Portrait Speaker 5
-

Go back?
14:37
None Portrait Speaker 3
-

I fundamentally disagree with the honourable member on that. I do think we need to be looking at individual cases individually, that no two families are the same, that there are many, many circumstances we can imagine that we would want to be exceptions to this, and therefore putting in rigid criteria on top of what the government's already trying to do. And the government has rightly left in caveats throughout the bill, which I believe the opposition are arguing against.

 It's the wrong way to go with this. It's absolutely wrong, and that the best way to deal with any problems that we see is in the initial decision making. I'm going to go back on to where I am now. Clause 18 also says that financial or emotional dependence, illness or living in a conflict zone are not alone enough to establish family life. Yet families routinely support one another financially, emotionally and practically.

 Ministers say these can still be weighed at the public interest stage, but that stage is never reached once family life is ruled out. So what will this mean in practice? As I have hinted at, the government's own impact assessment tells us it's article eight reforms it says, will mean 14,000 more refusals every year, even after appeals, around 11,700 more people will be refused each year. These are people who would succeed under the law as it stands today, which shows that clause 18 is not simply clarifying existing principles.

It is intended to change outcomes on a substantial scale. It is diminishing human rights for refugees in this country, as admitted in the government's memorandum on human Rights . And the way it is doing this, I, I buy the bill, I think is is very troubling for for two main reasons. First of all, it suggests that family relationships deserve protection only when they fit a model chosen by the state. But article eight has never worked that way. The European Court has always looked at the substance of an individual relationship, not its form.

 Indeed, the very cases the government cites require an individualized assessment of all the circumstances. As the honourable member for Mid Bedfordshire, Bedfordshire said earlier, we have been here before. The examples we are hearing from the Home Secretary and the Minister come in what is now a mini tradition of home secretaries using exaggerated anecdotes to add to toxic rhetoric about migrants.
14:40
14:40
None Portrait Speaker 3
-

I will.
14:40
14:40
None Portrait Speaker 3
-

I thank the honourable member for trying, but you are the member is talking to a person who cannot read the Universal Declaration of Human Rights without welling up. And I will never, ever give up making arguments of this sort. So earlier legislation on this to which the honourable member, I think, was referring, followed directly on from the then Home Secretary, now Baroness May of Maidenhead in the other place, her 2011. Her infamous 2011 party conference speech, in which she repeated false claims in newspapers that judges had permitted a man to escape deportation because he had a pet cat, something she says she did not make up.

 However, in real life, neither of the judges decisions in this case was based on the man having a pet, and the second and final of these decisions was not even based on any human rights consideration at all. It was straightforwardly based on a failure by the Home Office to apply its own policy, amnesty, in its written evidence to us, gives us more information. It says this together with the readiness of many political commentators, to cherry pick often minor or irrelevant facts that are mentioned in tribunal or court judgments, and present these as if the main or sole reason for a decision that may have little or nothing to do with them continues to underpin criticism of article eight in immigration related decision making.

 That criticism is plainly misinformed, often careless and, in some cases on its face, clearly ill intended, including out of dogma, dogmatic hostility to the Echr and other political motivations. So that's what amnesty had to say. And indeed, at second reading of this bill, the Home Secretary, the current Home Secretary, also summarized an unnamed case. Thus, she said in 2025, an Albanian man jailed for growing cannabis escaped deportation not because he had any right to be here, but because it was deemed unduly harsh on his partner to deport him.

 She was not his wife or life partner. Instead, this relationship began only after a deportation order had been served. Why was the deportation deemed to be unduly harsh? The partner spoke no Albanian and had never visited the country before. So that's our current Home Secretary. Okay, I will give way.
14:43
14:43
None Portrait Speaker 3
-

Thank you, chair, and yes, I will be responding to that shortly based on some some data. But to go back to the anecdote we were given by the current Home Secretary, amnesty again, and it's written evidence corrects the record. It says a key error in this summary is the statement that the relevant relationship had only begun after a deportation order had been served. That is not correct. The judge's decision makes clear that it began significantly before the order of.

A special relevance was that the notice that such an order might be made was served in December 2019, but no order was then made for more than four years. By the time it was made in January 2024, the relationship had developed over a relatively lengthy period, and despite. This and the criminal conviction that was mentioned by the Home Secretary, amnesty also correct this this information as well. They say he was jailed for four months for this relatively minor offence and that now he was working lawfully and supporting himself.

 They also say there was no suggestion of any risk of reoffending. His partner, who had no connection, had never been to Albania, was working and providing daily support to her sister and mother. Whatever may have been, the position in 2019 was clearly not the position in 2024, and the relevant facts were clearly not adequately presented in what had been reported or at second reading. Now, I wanted to go through that because that kind of anecdote is what always appears in the newspapers, and that does appear to be the best the government could do at second reading in terms of giving us examples.

 So in my view, the government has not shown that there is a significant problem with these family life claims being abusive. Parliament can of course change the law, but when it removes protection from thousands of people with genuine claims, it must show why. Its own impact assessment does not estimate how many refusals involve abusive claims. And indeed, when pressed for evidence, the minister has given us in her letter of the 6th of October and pointed us to the impact assessment that article eight applicants for the first time.

 Of those, 83% were granted. Initially, only 17% refused, and of those refused, 30% appealed and 54% of those appeals were allowed. There is not a sound evidence base for reforming our migration system in this way that the government has established the government.
14:46
14:47
14:47
14:48
14:49
14:49
14:50
14:51
None Portrait Speaker 3
-

I.
14:51
14:51
14:52
14:52
14:52
14:52
14:54
14:54
None Portrait Speaker 3
-

Off the top of my head, I cannot think of any. I really think that the current law needs to be administered better, that we need to see better decision making, more humanity in all of this, and more support for people to get good decisions made the first time, I really do. Now, where was I? I, I think, and I would be very happy to receive from the, the government any clear evidence of abusive claims that do not rely on anecdote under the current law.

 But I am absolutely sure that the government is seeking to deny people who would currently succeed from achieving asylum in this country, from being reunited with their families by clause 18. And I will move on to two more things that the government have said. The government tells us that clause 18 is consistent with Strasbourg case law, and it even cites the cases. But I think , as other members have mentioned, it cannot have it both ways.

If the clause simply restates the law, then it's unnecessary. And its own impact assessment does say that it expects grants to be cut by a third by these reforms. If it goes further, it risks putting the country in breach of the convention and inviting years of litigation. But either way, this clause does not deliver the clarity ministers promise and I think possibly the opposition benches the United on that today. I believe a fair immigration system should tackle abuse while protecting genuine family life, and it should put the best interests of children first and reflect the reality of modern families.

 Clause 18 does neither. It risks real hardship for genuine families with little evidence that it will achieve anything else. So I do urge the government to think again. We can maintain effective immigration control without using this clause to break up thousands of families. We can protect our borders without sacrificing the compassion and fairness that are fundamental British values. And for these reasons, I ask the committee to agree that clause 18 should not stand part of the bill.
14:56
Joe Robertson Portrait Joe Robertson
-
-
Thank you. Mr.. It's a pleasure to serve with you. In the chair. I will address clause 18. And I must confess, chair, I do have a slight tendency to stray, but I'm comforted by the fact that the honourable member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes will be on it and ensure that I stick to the particular grouping that's in front of us. I have already made some comments in relation to this clause, but what I will say in the earlier session this morning.

But what I will say is additional and it focuses on the situations where a right to family life can still be argued under this new bill, even though it seeks to make restrictions on family life, human rights applications. And that is not where there is a a family, a core cohabiting family, but where there is a case that a sponsor in the UK who does not necessarily have a UK passport, but nevertheless has a right to reside here, applies for somebody, not necessarily a family member living elsewhere with no right to come here who has a mental illness.

 They need the support of the person applying or the sponsor in the UK, and they can't find that support at home. This to me seems to be the widest part of the bill that allows for a great range of claims to be made and to increase or maintain the backlog at the Home Office and through the courts. And it seems this provision around mental illness could create a dodgy market in mental health clinics elsewhere in the world, specifically to get some sort of paperwork to make an application under the government's provision here.

 And it's not fanciful. We know the huge pressure there is in a black market that involves people smugglers and all sorts of not just immoral, but illegal and abhorrent behaviour abroad to get people in this country, because of course, it is a great place to live and to want to build a life. So we know the pressure is already there. That's why we have such high numbers coming. So by providing this mental illness route set out in law that seems to have such a low bar of evidence, I think could lead to an entirely new dodgy avenue opening up.

 So let's us envisage a very real type of application. Someone in this country says they have could be a family member. It could be a close friend, as they say, living in another part of the world who now has a mental illness and has a certificate to prove it. But that certificate could very well come from a clinic that doesn't adhere to the standards of the NHS, the CQC or anything that we recognise in this country.

 And they could say that bit of paperwork which, by the way, at the bottom says sorry, there's no support at home, could give rise to that application now, without any evidence to the contrary, I don't see how the Home Office can deny that application, or indeed for a court to deny that application. Now, I'm sure the minister will address this point when she speaks a little later. But let's suppose that the Home Office envisaged that they would not rely on She speaks a little later.

 But let's suppose that the Home Office envisaged that they would not rely on that evidence alone. They would want to make their own. assessment of whether this mental illness was , and whether it was of such a. magnitude that that person, the only person in the world they could rely on, happened to be a sponsor living in the UK. I would question the Home Office's own. ability to make that assessment.

 If it is a Home Office case worker with no clinical.
15:00
15:00
15:01
15:01
15:01
15:01
15:01
15:01
15:01
15:01
15:01
15:01
15:03
15:03
15:03
15:03
15:04
15:04
15:04
David Smith Portrait David Smith
-
-
Relationships that seem to spring up the week. A removal notice lands on the doormat. The government say clause 18 will bring that to an end, and that family life will mean what most people think it means your husband or wife, your partner, your children. That's what the public think family life means, and it's what Parliament should say it means. The trouble is, the drafting clause 18 sets out a clear definition. And then in three separate places, it adds a single word that undoes it.

 As my hon. Friend rightly set out, that word is. normally new. Section one. One seven AA says family life is. normally limited to the cohabiting family. A parent who does not live with their children does not. normally have family life with them. One adult does not normally have family life with another with other adult relatives such as brothers and sisters, unless there is real dependency.

 Every immigration lawyer in the country will read the word normally the same way. If family life is only. normally limited, then their job is to show that their client is not normal. Every case becomes the exception. We've seen this before. A clear rule, a soft word, and ten years of litigation about what the soft word means. And it's not as if the clause lacks a safety valve.

 Subsection four B. already provides for adults with a. genuine additional element of. dependency beyond normal emotional ties. That is the test the Court of Appeal set out in more than 20 years ago, and it's where.
15:05
15:05
15:06
15:06
15:06
15:06
15:06
15:06
15:07
15:07
15:07
15:07
15:08
15:08
15:08
15:08
15:08
15:08
15:08
15:08
15:09
15:09
15:09
15:10
15:10
15:10
15:10
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

And our commitment to values like universal human rights, because they can see that these are people that are not being genuine. They're exploiting our generosity. And while we want to fulfill those commitments, it's really important to me that the system has integrity. And that's what this bill is about. I don't mean to be rude, but the honourable ladies have plenty of time so we can pick this up outside the chamber. But I wanted to get that on the record.

 I want to start first with the purpose of clause 18. Clause at 18 introduces a definition of article eight family life into UK primary. legislation for the first time, giving courts and decision makers a more consistent framework to apply to immigration cases. Until now, courts have had to determine the existence and scope of family life on a case by case basis, which has resulted in significant. variability in outcomes. Article eight is a two stage test.

 First, a decision maker or court must decide if family or private life exists. Secondly, where family or private life is established, they must decide whether interference with it pursues a legitimate aim, such as in the interests of public safety or the economic well-being of the country, and is proportionate when the nature of the breach is balanced against the public interest of removing an individual or refusing them entry. It is right that article eight acts as a safeguard to protect genuine family relationships.

 However, these protections can create opportunities for individuals to rely on weak or peripheral family. connections as a basis to remain in or come to the UK. Clause 18 addresses this. It acts in tandem with clause 19 by setting coherent. parameters for when family life can be. established in line with Strasbourg Strasbourg case law before the strengthened public interest test is applied. It provides a clearer statutory framework .
15:12
15:12
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

Determining whether .
15:12
15:12
15:12
15:14
15:14
15:14
None Portrait Speaker 2
-

Would .
15:14
15:14
15:14
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

Out in this bill? Minister your audience. Oh, sorry. It's absolutely right. And that's exactly what we're seeking to do. We have had evidence of people moving back in with families and with dependants, purely on the basis of trying to put forward this claim. I'd like to thank the honourable member for Mid Bedfordshire for amendment 98, which would require courts and. tribunals to determine whether article eight is engaged in accordance with section.

 117 AA, rather than having regard to the. considerations set out in that section. I do not consider that that this change is necessary. The Bill already requires courts and tribunals to have regard to relevant factors which determine whether article eight family life exists. That ensures the statutory framework established by Parliament must be properly considered and applied. The government's approach is deliberate. We are providing a clear statutory framework to guide decision makers and promoting greater.

 consistency in the assessment of family life claims. At the same time, it is right that courts retain their proper. constitutional role in applying that framework to the particular facts of individual cases. And so, for these reasons, I ask the honourable member to withdraw the amendment. Turning to amendments 99 , 101. 102 from the Honourable member for Mid Bedfordshire. The intention behind clause 18 is to provide a clearer statutory framework for determining whether family life exists for article eight purposes.

 It makes clear that family life will normally concern the core cohabiting family unit, while retaining provision for cases involving genuine parental. relationships or additional elements of dependency. These amendments would remove the word normally to narrow that definition. While I initially had some sympathy with this amendment and asked similar probing questions myself, I do not think that this is the right approach. While the clause is specifically designed to limit the circumstances in which tenuous.

 relationships with a child or an extended family relationship involving no more than nominal emotional ties can be used as the basis of an article eight claim. It is important to retain the flexibility needed to consider the facts of individual cases. The clause already provides a much clearer framework without creating an.
15:16
15:16
15:16
15:16
15:17
15:17
15:17
None Portrait Speaker 2
-

Rightly factored .
15:17
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

Into the assessment .
15:17
15:17
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

The word .
15:17
None Portrait Speaker 2
-

Normally .
15:17
15:17
15:17
15:18
15:18
15:19
15:19
15:19
15:19
15:19
15:19
15:19
15:19
15:20
15:20
15:20
15:20
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

Illness, and concern for living for someone living amid war or. instability do not, when taken independently, establish the necessary dependency. But those circumstances do not cease to be relevant for every purpose. If family life is established, the court must then undertake the separate public interest and. proportionality test. William. Subsection six therefore, provides an important. safeguard to ensure that at that stage, the full factual circumstances can be considered when balancing any interference with family life against the public interest.

 It also protects the Home Office's freedom to consider these factors when arguing that the public interest requires a refusal of leave. And turning now to the government amendments. It is right that children are given additional safeguards in article eight decision making. But because of these well-meaning protections, a tenuous relationship with the child can be used by an adult to remain in the UK. The first step to prevent people from relying on weak parental links to children in article eight claims, is to ensure that the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test in clause 18 operates as intended.

 Therefore, Government amendment 44 makes it clear that a parent does not normally have family life with a child under the age of 18 for the purposes of article eight, unless there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship. It broadens the application of the test so that it applies. consistently to all parent child relationships involving a child under 18, regardless of whether the parent and child live together. This clarifies that what is relevant is the is the substance of the parental relationship, not simply the living arrangements.

 The amendment aims to reduce the scope for weak or limited parental relationships to be relied upon in article eight claims, including where cohabitation has been resumed. opportunistically for immigration purposes. It does not remove protection for genuine parent child.
15:21
15:21
15:22
15:22
15:22
15:22
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

All relevant.
15:22
15:23
15:23
15:23
15:23
None Portrait Speaker 1
-

No core cohabiting family arrangement. Well, I think in a circumstance like that, that's exactly why we've provided the flexibility within this bill. The individual case will be assessed under article eight. So in a situation like that, there is there is the space for for that individual case to be assessed together with clause 19. These amendments provide a clearer and more consistent framework for determining whether removing an individual with a tenuous relationship to a child is compliant with article eight, and I'd just like to.

 If it's okay. Just add some of the key. principles behind this clause, if I may. Clause 18 establishes clear boundaries around which family life exists, consistent with Strasbourg case law providing the foundation upon which clause 19 is strengthened. Public interest test is applied. Together, these clauses will ensure that article eight is not used to routinely circumvent immigration rules, supporting a more ordered and controlled system where those who do not meet the rules are not routinely able to stay in the UK.

 Secondly, members have suggested the clauses are too expansive and that they may widen where family life can can be found to exist. That's not correct. A recent Court of Appeal judgment reaffirmed the existing legal framework for assessing family life under article eight. Through this clause clause, Parliament is providing greater clarity. These reforms will make it clearer how family life and. dependency should be assessed, promoting greater. consistency in decision making and curtailing expansive.

 interpretation of where family life is found to exist. I was going to talk a bit more about the Echr, but I won't test members patients and I'll instead just try and reply to some of the points that have been made. In the earlier debate, there was a sort of sense that is this relevant? Will the courts just ignore, you know, what we're trying to sort of codify here? I mean, successive governments have recognised concerns about how article eight operates in the immigration system, but we're really undertaking the hard work here to.

 understand that. comprehensive reform is required to restore order and control to the system. We're working within our international obligations to reset this balance, provide a more comprehensive and consistent. framework to article eight decision making, and clause 18 works alongside clause 19 by establishing the clear basis on which the Home Office can argue that family life does not exist. Before considering whether the public interest warrants a refusal of leave together, this clearer framework should be assessed for how article eight should be assessed, will promote greater.

 consistency in decision making and ensure the courts place appropriate weight on what Parliament considers to be in the public interest. When considering article eight immigration decisions. And just moving on to a couple of points that were made, the framing of the new clause 117 AA is necessary to preserve the small degree of flexibility. necessary so that decision makers in the courts are not. constrained to determine claims under article eight that are inconsistent with the article itself.

 Reference was made to the definition of eligible partner. This definition will be set out in rules and guidance. It's not appropriate to have this level of detail in primary legislation. We need the. flexibility to be able to change and respond to behavioral patterns and abuse. One of the honourable members talked about young adults. Clause 18 preserves flexibility to grant young adults if they have family life with parents, and the word.

 normally is a caveat. To preserve that, I was asked for a little more evidential requirements. I had some case study here and some case studies I think would be helpful. The family immigration rules are intended to create a fair system which balances the. importance of. protecting family and private life. When 71% of the first time grants are made to applicants who have arrived illegally or. overstayed their permission to be here, it's really clear that article eight is not.
15:27
15:27
15:27
15:27
15:28
15:28
15:29
15:29
15:29
15:29
15:30
15:30
None Portrait Speaker 3
-

Paper, the .
15:30
15:30
15:30
15:30
None Portrait Speaker 4
-

No, no.
15:30
15:30
15:30
15:30
15:30
None Portrait Speaker 3
-

Jay .
15:30
15:30
15:30
15:30
15:30
15:31
15:31
15:31
None Portrait Speaker 5
-

Amendment .
15:31
15:31
15:31
15:31
15:31
15:31
None Portrait Speaker 4
-

Contrary no, no, no.
15:31
15:31
15:32
15:32
15:32
None Portrait Speaker 4
-

The division.
15:32
15:32
15:32
None Portrait Speaker 5
-

Already been debated.
15:32
15:33
15:33
15:33
15:33
15:33
15:33
15:33
None Portrait Speaker 5
-

Which again, has .
15:33
15:33
15:33
15:33
15:33
15:33
15:33
15:33
15:33
15:33
None Portrait Speaker 5
-

Of the contrary, no.
15:34
None Portrait Speaker 4
-

No.
15:34
15:34
15:34
15:34
15:34
15:34
15:34
15:34
This debate has concluded
Return to start of debate - Return to top of page