20:07 - The House divided: - Ayes: 279 / Noes: 164 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Andrew Western)
I beg to move,
That this House insists on its disagreement with the Lords in their Amendments 15 to 24, 27, 30 to 34, 36, 38 to 42, 83 and 88, insists on its amendments 88A, 88C and 88E to 88P to the words restored to the Bill by that disagreement, but proposes further amendments (a) to (f) to the words so restored to the Bill.
I thank the rather shrinking number of peers and hon. Members who have been engaged in the scrutiny of the Bill. It has clearly come a long way since I closed the Second Reading debate. I am glad, in particular, to see that some progress has been made in recent days with the other place’s agreement to this House’s amendments on the approach to defined contribution schemes achieving scale and on the transparency of public sector pension liabilities. That leaves one issue remaining: the Lords amendments on asset allocation. This House has already considered that question twice, and on both occasions it has rejected the Lords’ position by majorities of over 100. At each stage the Government have reiterated the need for the core policy intent to be delivered, while responding with changes to primary legislation that directly address specific issues raised.
I hope the House will bear with me while I explain what we are now proposing, and why I believe it is time for these exchanges to conclude. Let me deal first with the amendments to which we have previously agreed. The reserve power is capped at the Mansion House accord targets: no more than 10% in qualifying assets, and no more than 5% in UK-specific assets. It explicitly applies only to main default funds. Regulations cannot concentrate the requirement in any single asset class. The power can be used only once, and, if unused, lapses entirely in 2032.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
According to the Order Paper,
“The Northern Ireland Assembly, the Scottish Parliament and Senedd Cymru have approved Legislative Consent Resolutions”.
Some of my colleagues in the Assembly back home have expressed some of the concerns that the Lords have expressed. I am conscious of where we are going and where we will end up. Can the Minister please give me some indication of the content of the discussions that took place with the Northern Ireland Assembly? Members of the Legislative Assembly tell me they expressed concern. I am trying to understand how a consent motion could be conveyed and agreed.
Andrew Western
The hon. Gentleman will be aware that conversations are always ongoing to ensure that any legislation that comes from this place can be adopted by all the nations of this great country. I hope that some of the concerns that have continued to be raised by his colleagues, and by peers in the Lords as well, will be addressed by some of the detail that I am about to set out.
As I have said, that power can be used only once, and, if unused, lapses entirely in 2032. Even if it is used, however, the entire asset allocation regime falls out of effect and the statute book at the end of 2035. These provisions rule out any of the more lurid uses we have heard it claimed that the power would be used for, restricting it narrowly to underpinning the Mansion House accord.
As well as insisting on that package, the Government are today introducing further amendments to the savers’ interest test in the proposed new section 28G of the Bill. I remind the House that the reserve power exists because providers have said that they struggle to do something that is in savers’ interests, namely invest in a wider range of assets. However, the savers’ interest test exists for circumstances in which schemes can show that even investing as little as 10% in private assets—far below the levels that we see internationally, or in open defined benefit schemes here in the UK—might not be in their particular savers’ interest. In those circumstances, it allows them a route to seek an exemption from any requirements imposed by the reserve power. Arguments have been made, here and in the other place, about whether the test as drafted included sufficiently clear and strong protections. The Government have reflected on those arguments, and the further amendments before the House today respond to them. There are four changes.
First, we are lowering the threshold for an exemption. The Bill as drafted would have allowed regulations to require a scheme to show that compliance “would cause” material financial detriment. We are changing that to
“would be likely to cause”.
A scheme will need to show that detriment is the probable consequence, not a certain one.
Secondly, the Bill now makes it explicit that when a scheme meets the threshold, the regulator must grant the exemption. That has always been the Government’s intention, and the amendment ensures that there is no room for doubt.
Thirdly—here I want to respond directly to arguments raised by noble Lords about the weight that should be given to the judgment of trustees and scheme managers—we are proposing a change to put their assessment of savers’ interests centre stage. The new text makes clear that the responsible regulator must not only receive the scheme’s own assessment of why compliance would be likely to cause material financial detriment, but be required to have due regard to it. Schemes must set out their reasoning, and the regulator must engage with it properly and thoroughly. “Due regard” is established statutory language with legal weight: it means that the regulator cannot simply pay little or no attention to the scheme’s analysis.
Fourthly, the regulator must give reasons when it refuses an application. That matters because schemes have a right of appeal to the upper tribunal, a right that is strengthened if applicants know why they were turned down.
Let me draw this together. The savers’ interest test now provides a lower threshold, an explicit guarantee that exemptions will be granted when the test is met, a requirement for the regulator to give proper weight to the scheme’s own analysis, and transparency and accountability if an application should fail. Taken alongside the constraints on the power itself—the percentage caps, the single-use restriction, the 2032 sunset and the 2035 full repeal—this is a framework of strong and explicit protections.
There are those, here and in the other place, who would prefer the reserve power not to exist at all. As Members of this House know, we respect that position, but it is not a position that we share and it is not the position of the Government. There is a well-evidenced collective action problem in the defined contribution market, and the consequences of leaving it unresolved would fall on pension savers. That is not a risk that the Government are prepared to take.
This House has made its view clear on two occasions, and the Government have responded by baking in a raft of additional safeguards to primary legislation. This is now a third round of material changes, which I suspect this House may again endorse with a decisive majority. At some point, the question before the House is no longer the detail of the amendments, but whether the other place should continue to reject the clearly expressed view of the elected House and delay the passage of a Bill that delivers for savers in a whole host of ways. I urge the House to send these amendments back to the other place, and to bring these exchanges to a close.
Andrew Western
I recognise, as the shadow Secretary of State set out, that there has been a great deal of consensus on many aspects of the Bill, and that we are wrangling merely over this one remaining issue. The Opposition argue that this power is wrong in principle, but we fundamentally disagree. We have had this debate on a number of occasions, including on Second Reading. I set out in my opening speech why this continues to be the Government’s position, and we have heard the arguments against.
I gently point out that the shadow Secretary of State’s letter to industry last week conceded that in the absence of this sort of power, funds are understandably cautious about being first movers, and that is a legitimate concern. That is the collective action problem that we have. The Mansion House compact has been running since 2023, but progress has been modest. The industry has identified competitive pressure to keep costs low as the single biggest barrier to delivering on its own commitments. In other words, providers want to diversify in their members’ interests, but they risk being undercut on cost by competitors that do not. The reserve power gives the market confidence to move together.
We have also heard that the power undermines fiduciary duty—it does not. Trustees’ duties of loyalty and prudence, and to act in members’ best interests, remain.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
With the greatest respect, the Minister is talking nonsense. At the end of the day, every trustee has a fiduciary duty to get the best return for their members. By putting in these mandation powers, the Government are fundamentally going against the most basic principle of the City of London, which is dictum meum pactum—my word is my bond. The Government entered into a pact with the industry, and they are now reneging on that pact by introducing mandation and not allowing the industry to move things forward. The Government are so wrong on this whole point. The Minister should withdraw the mandation powers and get rid of clause 40.
Andrew Western
I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Gentleman, but that is not going to happen. We have to deal with the collective action problem that we are facing, to ensure that providers can move forward with the commitments that they have made. The power gives them assurance, but we hope that we will never need to use the power. The fact of the matter is that the industry requires that certainty; without it, it will not be able to move forward, given the collective action problem that exists. That point has been accepted by the shadow Secretary of State.
Helen Whately
The hon. Gentleman is quoting selectively from a letter that I have written to the industry. We had this exact debate with the Pensions Minister last week. There is an acknowledged and debated collective action problem; on that, there is a level of consensus, but there is no consensus that mandation is the right answer. In fact, there is a consensus in the sector that mandation is the wrong answer. This Bill contains measures that will make a difference, and will go towards fixing this collective action problem, such as the value for money framework. The Mansion House accord was only signed last year, and the Government should give it time to work. We do not need mandation in this Bill.
Andrew Western
On the consensus in the industry, I say to the hon. Lady that it wants this Bill done and taken through this House. Tonight’s amendments make the savers’ interest test easier to pass, create a lower threshold for an exemption, and give certainty that the exemption will be granted where the threshold is met, with due regard being paid to the scheme’s assessment. Reasons for any refusal will be set out.
The House has now considered this Bill three times. On each occasion, it has endorsed the Government’s position. We have listened to the concerns raised in the other place, and we have responded with numerous material changes to the primary legislation across three rounds. The power is capped, neutral across asset classes, restricted to a single use, completely sunsetted in 2035 and subject to a savers’ interest test that tonight’s amendments have materially strengthened.
The TUC has said that it is “vital” that this Bill passes. Age UK has said that the measures in this Bill
“will help both today’s and tomorrow’s pensioners”.
The industry wants to get on with implementing these reforms. The Association of British Insurers and its members have said the same. They have welcomed the safeguards that the Government have put in place on the reserve power. It is time to get this Bill passed, and I commend the Government’s position to the House.
Question put.