English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill
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Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, I am pleased to begin the third day of Committee with this group of amendments, starting with the proposition in my name that Clause 15 not stand part, as we see no justification or real purpose for it. It is not clear why the Government seek to confer yet more powers on the Mayor of London by secondary legislation. I hope other parties will join me in my concern about this clause.
The noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, pointed out at Second Reading that the Mayor of London has already been given more and more areas to oversee and a budget of approximately £21 billion. I ask the Minister: what more powers does he need? What is more, rather than giving the London Assembly more powers to represent and scrutinise on behalf of the whole community, Clause 15 will give powers specifically to the mayor. This is not community empowerment but instead gives the Government a mechanism to empower an already powerful individual, without any explanation as to why. Surely this Bill’s priority should be empowering local communities to scrutinise and ensure that services are being delivered effectively and funds used efficiently by those at the top. Can the Minister explain what consultation took place to inform this clause, and with whom?
Clause 15 is further evidence that the real purpose of this Bill has not been made clear. If it is about genuine community empowerment for all England then allowing the Secretary of State to confer further powers on the Mayor of London is hardly a priority. We do not see why London should be put on an ever-higher pedestal. The Committee deserves to know the Government’s exact reasoning behind this clause.
Amendment 70, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, seeks to insert a new clause extending the category of people whom the London Assembly can require to attend its meetings or produce documents. You cannot have effective meetings if the necessary people are not there. We on these Benches welcome Amendment 71, also tabled by the noble Baroness, which would replace the current two-thirds majority required to change the Greater London Authority’s consolidated council tax requirement with a simple majority. This is entirely sensible. It would improve decision-making and may make better budget-making in London.
Amendments 72, 73, 74, 96 and 182, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, seek to establish a London local authorities joint committee. We are hesitant about creating more committees, but I look forward to his contribution and explanation of this matter.
Amendment 75, from my noble friend Lady O’Neill of Bexley, asks us to go back to basics and initiate a review of the London governance model, covering its effectiveness, accountability and, in particular, outcomes. If the Government want to reorganise local government across the country, why not bring London in line as well? This is a perfect opportunity to cut costs and strengthen local democracy in our capital city.
The Government must come clean about their intentions for London. If reforms are made, let them strengthen local democracy and cut bureaucracy, not empower an already powerful mayor. I beg to move.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, in speaking to this group of London-related amendments, I should declare my former roles as a London borough leader, a member of the London Assembly and a founding chair of what is now London Councils—indeed, I am one of its current co-presidents.
Before I speak to the six amendments in my name in this group—together, they seek to address a long-standing anomaly in London’s governance arrangements—I want to say a brief word about the other amendments in the group, drawing on my previous experience. In particular, I wish to comment on the interesting remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, who seems affronted at the idea that the Mayor of London and the whole GLA network are somehow trying to accrue on to themselves—or the Government are trying to give them—more and more powers. I respectfully remind your Lordships’ Committee that London is the engine of the UK economy, that without London the UK’s economy would founder, and that it is therefore very important that London retains its status as one of the few great world cities. For that purpose, having strong and effective mayoral and governance arrangements in the capital city is crucial.
I was involved in the discussions with the then Government around the creation of a mayor and assembly for London, and then in the passage of the Greater London Authority Bill when it was in your Lordships’ House. The London devolution settlement was carefully devised by Nick Raynsford, the then Minister for London, and was the first of its type. That settlement has remained largely unchanged for over a quarter of a century.
I have some sympathy, therefore, with Amendment 75, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, which suggests that there should be a review of that settlement. However, I have reservations about her amendment, as I do not see why it should be a requirement of legislation. My noble friend the Minister could simply announce today that it is going to happen. Given that extensive consultations and discussions would be needed as part of a review, a year is too short a timescale. In doing such a review, one should look at the role and number of London boroughs. Does having 32 of them, plus the corporation, really make sense more than 60 years on from their creation?
I have some sympathy with Amendments 70 and 71, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon. As a member of the first London Assembly, I always felt that the role of AMs was not sufficiently defined or purposeful enough. Strengthening and widening the scrutiny role of the assembly makes a lot of sense, as does changing the two-thirds requirement for amending the mayor’s budget—a threshold that has never been passed, although I gather that the London Assembly is considering the mayor’s budget today, so perhaps something surprising will happen. However, changing that requirement might oblige the mayor to work more closely with AMs—something that has not always been evident over the first three mayoralties. Such a power might be usefully extended to assembly consideration of mayoral strategies. Such a change would, however, alter the balance of the existing governance model in London. Rather than being done in a piecemeal fashion, it should be considered as part of the putative review suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill.
I turn now to Amendments 72, 73, 74, 96, 182 and 183 in my name. They seek to address an anomaly—an omission in the original Greater London Authority Act. My understanding is that they have the support of all three parties on London councils, as well as that of the mayor’s office. At their heart, these amendments are about addressing a simple but persistent problem: that the collective body of London’s boroughs is not recognised in statute and is unable, as things stand, to receive government funding directly.
London boroughs work together extensively. Through London Councils, they co-ordinate delivery, share expertise and engage with government on issues ranging from transport and housing to retrofitting and the charging of electric vehicles. In many of these areas, boroughs are the primary delivery agency of policies that sit squarely within the devolution agenda. Despite this, London Councils lacks a clear statutory footing. As a result, it cannot receive Section 31 grants directly from national government. Instead, funding must be routed through a nominated lead authority and then passed on—an arrangement that is administratively cumbersome, slower than it needs to be, and inefficient for both local and national government.
These amendments would provide a straightforward solution. They seek to establish a statutory joint committee, made up of London’s borough leaders and the City of London, enabling London Councils to receive and distribute funding directly and ensuring that London boroughs are properly consulted where legislation envisages consultation with local government bodies. Crucially, these changes would allow resources to flow more efficiently to the boroughs that are responsible for delivery, reducing unnecessary bureaucracy and making better use of the collective capacity that already exists within the London system. They would strengthen the clarity of consultation arrangements, ensuring that London borough voices are heard in a coherent and structured way.
I should be clear that these proposals are entirely complementary to the role of the Greater London Authority. They would not impinge on or duplicate the powers or strategic status of the mayor, the GLA or the London Assembly. Rather, they would strengthen the overall London governance system by clarifying the collective role of the boroughs within it. That is why I am pleased that the GLA is supportive of London Councils becoming a statutory joint committee, recognising that this change would improve co-ordination, efficiency and the effective delivery of devolved priorities across London.
In short, these amendments are firmly aligned with the Bill’s broader aims of empowering local government and improving the effectiveness of devolution. They would correct an anomaly that has been recognised for some time and replace it with a solution that is sensible, efficient and long overdue.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, I shall speak initially to my Amendments 70 and 71 in this group. It is a pleasure being here with noble Lords; it feels like a reunion of assembly or London Councils meetings. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, who I know is not able to be here today, for adding his name to Amendment 70, and the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for adding his name to Amendment 71. Both noble Lords have direct experience of the GLA and London government as a whole. Like other noble Lords, in drafting these amendments I bring 26 years’ experience as an assembly member and a London borough councillor.
Amendment 70 is about the power of summons. The law as it stands means that the assembly has relatively limited powers of summons over individuals and documents. It can summon the Mayor of London only in his or her role as chair of one of the functional bodies. For example, you could summon the mayor to a meeting as chair of Transport for London, but you could not summon them to come to a meeting if there was a huge failure or difficulties in their housing or solar programme and you wanted a detailed discussion. That makes no sense.
Furthermore, the assembly is prevented from summoning those delivering services in London. Noble Lords might well think that that does not matter because people will go and give evidence, so we do not need this power, but I will give the Committee a concrete example. Many years ago, I led an investigation into High Speed 2—then an initial programme that was going to have a huge impact in west London. High Speed 2, admittedly at that time under different management, refused to come before the assembly to give evidence to our inquiry. Despite huge amounts of correspondence, including the Department for Transport trying to put direct pressure on this body that was accountable to it, High Speed 2 refused to give any evidence at all. Yet it was delivering a project affecting London with huge amounts of public money.
Similar bodies, including the Environment Agency, the Port of London Authority and even London Councils, may attend if requested, but they, too, have at times decided not to. That cannot be right when we are trying to look at services delivering for London. This power would strengthen the assembly, allowing it to fully carry out its scrutiny role. It sits well with Amendment 72, which proposes a London local authorities joint committee, because there would need to be scrutiny of that body and this new power would allow the assembly to carry that out.
As I said, the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, is unable to be here today, but in correspondence last night he said that he was happy for me to explain his support for this. He comes at it from a different point of view. He used to work for the former Mayor of London and he said that, although we come at this from different angles—he would brief the mayor ahead of scrutiny and I would be there as a scrutineer—he feels that these scrutiny sessions are serious, healthy, important and substantive and he does not see any potential for these powers to be abused because you would use them only in exceptional circumstances. He feels that, ultimately, if the mayor turns up, they may not answer the questions put to them, but at least you would have that opportunity—so he was keen to support this amendment. This issue has had cross-party support on the assembly for years, so I hope that the Minister will seriously consider this amendment.
Of course, if more powers are given to the mayor, as was discussed at the start of this group, the assembly should be strengthened alongside this. The noble Baroness, Lady Scott, mentioned London being up on a pedestal but, actually, Manchester has more power than London in certain areas, such as health, and it feels as though London potentially needs to catch up.
Amendment 71 would remove the anomaly that, to amend the Mayor of London’s budget, a two-thirds majority is needed at the final stage. For many years, this has meant us, as assembly members, sitting there and rejecting the mayor’s budget and then it still going through at the final meeting because the threshold has not been reached. Such a threshold does not exist in any other part of local government, and I do not understand why it is needed here for London. I ask the Government to remove this requirement so that any mayor has to work with the assembly to ensure that a budget has majority support.
The other amendments in this group cover the establishment of a London local authorities joint committee and the power to pay grants to it. This would, as we have heard, put in place formally what is already taking place through other means. I am happy with these amendments. They have cross-party support and support from the London Assembly. As I said, they complement my amendment on the power of summons for the London Assembly, because I think that this joint committee should be subject to scrutiny as well.
Amendment 75, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill of Bexley, makes a reasonable point—the noble Baroness and I exchanged some correspondence at the weekend about it. As many of us have said, reviewing how the London system works and what lessons there are for other areas does not necessarily need to be in the Bill. I come at this from a different point of view. I am really keen to increase the powers of the London Assembly and to look at stronger scrutiny arrangements across the country with the rollout of mayoral and combined authorities. For me, that is the gap in the model that is being rolled out.
At the moment, there is little to no real scrutiny of billions of pounds-worth of expenditure across the country. This is a huge deficit in these new mayoral models. This scrutiny must be carried out by members who are not conflicted through other roles, such as being leaders of authorities. This is probably where I differ from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, and the noble Lord, Lord John, because I think that council leaders can be conflicted. They want to secure funding for their borough, and that can cause tension—they may not want to get into the bad books of a mayor. That is where the benefits of the GLA model, with scrutineers who are directly elected, comes in. They can look at things more independently, ask the tough questions and, sometimes, produce very tough reports.
I disagree with the suggestions we have heard in the debate on the amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Fuller and Lord Harris, about reducing the number of London boroughs. I do not think that that would be right. The amount of work, including casework, that borough councillors have to do in London is unbelievable compared to their colleagues elsewhere. That would not be a realistic option.
I look forward to the Minister’s response with interest. I hope we can start to see some movement to strengthen the powers of the assembly and to support London Councils on this matter.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (Baroness Taylor of Stevenage) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey and the noble Baronesses, Lady Scott of Bybrook, Lady Pidgeon and Lady O’Neill of Bexley, for their amendments relating to London devolution. As a mere veteran of what the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, described as provincial local government, I feel a little hesitant about sticking my head into the lion’s den of London local government—but it is my job, so I will do it anyway.
I start with the stand part notice in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, which would remove Clause 15 from the Bill. It is vital that the devolution framework works for the unique circumstances of London’s governance. Clause 15 must stand part of the Bill in order to signpost to Schedule 25 to the Bill and the GLA Act 1999. This enables the Government, among other things, to confer functions on the Mayor of London, the Greater London Authority and its functional bodies. Contrary to the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, about putting London on a pedestal, the provision enables us to confer powers on the mayor and the GLA. If the GLA was excluded from Schedule 25, it would then be the only strategic authority that would require primary legislation for the conferral of functions, and there is no rationale for creating a divergent approach just for London. Schedule 25 will ensure that the Greater London Authority benefits from the devolution framework and can deepen its powers over time.
The noble Baroness asked a question about consultation. Ahead of the Bill being introduced, the Government engaged the mayor, the GLA and London Councils on proposals in the devolution White Paper.
I thank my noble friend Lord Harris for bringing his wealth of experience and knowledge of London to our debates on this Bill. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady O’Neill, Lady Pidgeon and Lady Hayter, and the noble Lords, Lord Tope, Lord Moylan and Lord John. I have not yet been able to add up their joint years of London experience, but it is of significant breadth and depth, and it is welcome to have that informing our discussions on the Bill. For the record, my local council was formed in 1971 and has been a Labour council to this day. It does not quite meet the 60 years mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, but we are not far away, and we are a new town.
We are currently engaging positively with London Councils and the Greater London Authority on this matter. In the context of that ongoing work and the need to continue to work jointly towards a constructive resolution, I do not feel that it would be appropriate to rush in a legislative change for the unique arrangements for London governance through this amendment. I am very happy to meet my noble friend Lord Harris and other London partners, if he feels that that would be helpful before Report, because I understand the points he has made.
On Amendment 70, in the English devolution White Paper the Government committed to strengthening scrutiny in strategic authorities. As the noble Baroness knows, London is unique among strategic authorities, in that the mayor’s work is scrutinised by the directly elected London Assembly. It is my understanding that the mayor is committed to appear before 10 sessions each year for scrutiny. If he does not do so, or misses more than a number of those sessions, he can be sanctioned by the GLA.
As the Government consider the best way to strengthen scrutiny in strategic authorities, it is right that we tailor our approach to the arrangements in London. We will engage the GLA and the London Assembly on any potential changes. I have much sympathy with the frustration about key partners and providers that spend public money and then refuse to come before scrutiny bodies. I will not go into my particular pain over bus companies, but I understand the point that the noble Baroness was making there. This amendment would significantly alter the powers of the London Assembly and preclude the Government’s ongoing work on this issue, which is being taken forward in close discussion with combined authorities and the GLA.
Similarly, on Amendment 75, London’s model is unique among strategic authorities and has successfully served the people of London for the last 25 years—I think the noble Lord, Lord John, referred to the successful part of London governance. The Government are regularly in contact with the GLA to understand how its governance, scrutiny arrangements and partnership working arrangements are delivering for Londoners. As London’s devolution settlement evolves, the Government want to continue to see positive working between the GLA and its partners, including London borough councils, to deliver on shared priorities. We hope to build on these where possible. Therefore, we do not believe that a formal review is necessary.
I listened to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, about issues around boroughs neighbouring London, Lee Valley park, the London grants scheme and so on. I will reflect on those. A meeting might be helpful, because I did not quite understand the balance between “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix” and there being things that need to be fixed that we should have a look at to see what changes would be necessary. It would absolutely not be right to interject a legislative knee-jerk into this space without the work that is needed between all parties to determine a way forward. I hope that we can move that forward before Report.
Amendment 71 seeks to introduce simple majority voting for the London Assembly to amend the Mayor of London’s final draft budget. This Bill includes measures to unblock mayoral decision-making. Primarily, this is by stipulating that most decisions in combined authorities and combined county authorities require a simple majority including the mayor, but also by making some functions, such as those concerning police and fire, exercisable by the mayor only.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
We talked about a review of the scrutiny arrangements of other metro mayors, if you like—mayoral and strategic authorities. Is the Minister able to give us a timescale for that? We also talked about discussions with the GLA; the GLA is made up of the Mayor of London and the London Assembly. Is the department talking to officers and members of the London Assembly, because the Civil Service often uses the term “GLA” when it means just the mayor’s office.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
My understanding is that discussions are with the GLA, but I will double-check on that and respond to the noble Baroness in writing.
We are putting in place a robust system of overview and scrutiny for the combined authorities. We are also considering, as we discussed with the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, the other day, whether a system of local public accounts committees might also be relevant.
Lord Moylan (Con)
There is a certain sleight of hand going on. The noble Baroness referred to scrutiny arrangements and, of course, the London Assembly is largely a scrutiny body; that is what it spends most of its time doing. But when it comes to budget setting, it is a co-decision-maker. That is a crucial difference. Setting and amending the budget is not a scrutiny activity by the London Assembly; it is a co-decision-making function with the mayor, which strengthens democratic oversight of the mayor’s expenditure of what are now very large amounts of money—£20 billion-plus—on the people of London.
The question is what an appropriate position and appropriate balance of power for the assembly is in that co-decision-making role—not its scrutiny role, but its co-decision-making role. We are now into 26 years of existence of the London Assembly. The fact that that threshold has never once been met illustrates that it is not allowing the assembly to function as intended, as a co-decision-making body. It needs to be adjusted. One might say that the mayor’s executive functions would be hampered if democracy were improved, but of course the mayor’s executive functions would be further unhampered if there were no democracy at all. The London Assembly is meant to be a democratic body. Why is it not allowed to function as a normal democratic body in this one area where it has a co-decision-making power?
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
I was referring to the difference between the combined authorities and the combined county authorities, which are made up of the constituent members from the local area. The GLA does not work like that, as we all know. It is not a body that represents the London boroughs; it is a different, directly elected body and it has a different scrutiny function. I was not trying to engage in sleight of hand; I was just pointing out the difference between the two bodies.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, I have listened carefully to noble Lords’ contributions, for which I am very grateful. It is so refreshing to hear about London local authorities. I have talked for a number of years in both Chambers about local government, but we very rarely have a proper debate on London governance. It is very refreshing and I thank noble Lords who have, it seems to me, hundreds of years of experience in the great city’s governance. It is seriously refreshing.
To the noble Lord, Lord Harris, I say that of course I understand the role of our great capital city and its importance in the economy of our country, but I do not think that that means that we cannot at times challenge it and scrutinise it from here, and I think that that is what we are doing. It is our genuine desire to ensure that community empowerment, efficiency and localism should apply to London as well when we are looking at the rest of the country.
Clause 15 remains wholly unclear, both in its purpose and its intention. Empowering one individual further without compelling justification or evidence is not the right direction of travel in our opinion. It may be that we need to review London before we give these further powers, as we are doing for the rest of the country. Are we giving these powers to an authority that is as efficient as it can be in governance, just as the rest of the country is being challenged to be before it gets those powers?
If there is a case for expanding the powers in London, I suggest that the Government look at that governance before they make that decision, which is why the amendment was tabled. If such a case exists, I believe that it should be laid before Parliament transparently rather than delivered through secondary legislation at a later stage in a way that limits our scrutiny and public understanding, which is important.
Equally, amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, and the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, have highlighted a real concern about the existing governance arrangements and structures, although I remain unconvinced that more layers of committees are the answer. None the less, not only are the Government taking, in our opinion, the wrong direction of travel, but they are also missing a great opportunity in this primary legislation. The proposal to reduce the two-thirds majority to a simple majority, as we have heard, for changes to the GLA council tax requirement would empower councillors, as we are trying to do in this Bill. My understanding is that, when the budget is debated, many of the issues in the budget are voted down by the GLA but, when it gets to the budget decision, that decision is lost. That does not seem right and the Government need to seriously look at this again.
The amendment tabled by my noble friend Lady O’Neill of Bexley—I thank her for all her work in the London boroughs—would give us exactly the opportunity that we want in order to assess what currently works, what does not work and where genuine reform, rooted in efficiency, transparency and local empowerment, might be needed.
I suggest that the Government are not listening to what we are saying. It seemed to me that, at different levels, there was pretty much cross-party agreement. I believe that they must explain with much more clarity why Clause 15 is necessary without some sort of review of London, who it benefits and what problems it seeks to solve. We all want a London that works for Londoners, for the people who come here to enjoy our wonderful capital city and for the economy that it feeds in this country.
I also believe that the Government’s arrangements for our city should be proportionate to those for the rest of the country. Further empowering an already powerful mayor without a real, robust rationale does not achieve that. I urge the Minister to reflect carefully between now and Report. In the meantime, I will withdraw my stand part notice but will be considering what we bring forward on Report.
Lord Jamieson (Con)
My Lords, we have had an interesting debate. In essence, we are debating a philosophical issue here. I firmly believe in democracy. Elections take place; your Lordships would be surprised to know that I do not always like some of the decisions that the electorate make, but I will defend every time the public having the opportunity to elect whom they want to represent them. That is a priority.
Just because I do not like it or just because they have a second job that I may not think appropriate, they should have that opportunity. We need some protections in place for fraud and other things, but I believe in democracy and, in essence, that is what the comments of my noble friends Lord Fuller and Lady O’Neill are about, and I associate myself with them. We should not prevent people standing for election; we should allow the electorate to make their choice. That is what democracy is. We may all have our views about whether a job is too big and therefore we cannot have somebody doing two of them but, if you believe in democracy, you believe that the electorate should have the facts presented in front of them and they should be given that choice. That is my strong philosophical view. We should not be telling the electorate, “No, you cannot have this person because they are already too busy”. Therefore, I genuinely believe my noble friend’s comments and that it is right that we should trust the electorate.
I appreciate that that may not align with certain party rules on different things, but there is no reason that the law has to mirror a certain party’s rules. I have no problem with whatever party having particular rules for the candidates they choose. That is the right thing to do. I know, from my own experience as chairman of the LGA, that the Conservative group had some very different rules from the Labour, Liberal and independent groups for how long people could stand and who was eligible. That is fine; I would not criticise the rules that Labour or the Liberals had, and I hope they did not criticise our rules. That was a choice; we were not imposing them by statute.
I very much support both the amendments of my noble friend Lord Gascoigne and the proposal that this clause not stand part of the Bill from my noble friend Lord Fuller. If Clause 16 stands part, the amendments proposed by my noble friend Lord Gascoigne would introduce a certain amount of flexibility. Given the amendments that the Government are proposing, what would happen if an election were to take place, let us say, 10 days before the end of a parliamentary term? Would the Government really want to impose a mayoral election? I am not quite sure that 10 days works, but I am sure your Lordships get my gist. If Clause 16 were to stand, a certain amount of flexibility would be beneficial, notwithstanding my previous comments.
I also agree with the Government’s amendments, assuming that eight days is the correct period and would give time for an MP to stand down and so forth, but I have a particular question on this. It may be very unlikely, but what happens if an election for a mayor happens when Parliament is not sitting? My understanding is that an MP cannot resign when Parliament is not sitting. Could the Minister at least consider that? I am not necessarily expecting an answer here, but a written answer would be helpful for everyone.
The fundamental point is why this Government believe that the electorate are not the right group of people to decide who represents them, even if they decide that it is Andy Burnham.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Gascoigne and Lord Fuller, for their amendments, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, for moving the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, on members of legislatures disqualified for being a mayor of a strategic authority, and for probing whether Clause 16 is needed.
It is not the job of this Committee to debate the Labour Party rulebook or decisions of its national executive committee. Your Lordships must trust me that they do not want that job. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for their interventions on that issue.
Clause 16 will prevent individuals being a Member of Parliament, or of the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and a mayor at the same time. This is an important clause for two reasons. First and most critically, the post of mayor is a vital role at the forefront of delivering change—whether that is economic growth, public services, planning for the strategic area, transport or many other issues—and its responsibilities will only increase with this Bill. The role must demand a person’s full attention as a full-time post, rather than being a part-time position done alongside another vital public service role.
Secondly, elected members and mayors have a duty to represent the constituents who elected them. The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, raised the potential issue of having different constituencies. Fulfilling two different roles on behalf of different geographical areas could lead to conflicts of interest or undesirable trade-offs. This is absolutely not party political; it is common sense. Indeed, it is now the case that those mayors who are also police and crime commissioners—Andy Burnham and Tracy Brabin—cannot be Members of a UK legislature at the same time.
I know that this House operates on a slightly different basis, but when I joined it, I was still leader of my council. As a Minister you cannot do both jobs at the same time, but even before I was a Minister, I would not have dreamed of trying to do so. They are different jobs; both carry a heavy level of responsibility, and it was important to me to focus on one.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
Can the Minister clarify that what she just said about PCCs and Members of the legislature concerns the elected Members? We have to be very careful here; we are part of the legislature.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
I apologise; I could have been clearer on that. The noble Baroness is quite right: it is the elected legislature. In view of my comments, I ask that noble Lords do not press their amendments.
Government Amendments 77, 80, 82, 85 and 90 will modify Clause 16 to introduce a grace period in which a mayor can hold office and simultaneously be a Member of a UK elected legislature without being disqualified. The period will be eight days. To answer the question from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, the eight days enables the Chiltern Hundreds process to happen—that is the period required for going from being an MP to being a mayor. To go from being a mayor to being an MP, it enables the mayor to put their affairs in order before they take up their post as an MP. In the event that a mayor is running to be a Member of a UK legislature, it will be eight days beginning on the day when they are elected to that legislature.
I will write to the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, as I do not know the answer to his question. It is important that Members are given reasonable time to get their affairs in order and to ensure their resignation from the respective legislature. These amendments address concerns raised in the other place about ensuring that an orderly transition can occur in the event that an MP is appointed as a mayor. Similarly, mayors running to be a Member of a UK legislature would otherwise be disqualified immediately on election. Introducing the grace period provides a period of transition for the outgoing mayor to get their affairs in order. I commend these government amendments to the Committee.
Lord Jamieson (Con)
I raised another point in relation to the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Gascoigne. With a very strict timetable of eight days, one could envisage situations where any sensible person would stand back and ask, “Do we really want to have a mayoral election for the sake of two, three or four weeks?” Will the Government consider a bit more flexibility?
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
I apologise; I meant to say to the noble Lord that I will write to him about the situation in which Parliament may not be sitting when that election takes place.
Lord Jamieson (Con)
I appreciate that the Minister will do that, but I was also making the point that the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, would at least provide some flexibility. The common-sense approach would be to ask, “Why would I have a mayoral election this month when there’s one happening next month anyway?” Can there be a bit more flexibility? As the Labour Party has rightly said, it costs a lot of money to run an election in Manchester.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
I will reflect on that question and come back to the noble Lord.
“(1A) If a person—(a) is elected as the mayor for the area of a combined authority, and(b) is, on the first day of the mayoral term, an elected member of a legislature in the United Kingdom,the person is not disqualified under this paragraph for holding office as the mayor at any time in the period of eight days beginning with the first day of the mayoral term.(1B) If a person—(a) becomes an elected member of a legislature in the United Kingdom, and(b) is, when the person becomes the elected member, the mayor for the area of a combined authority,the person is not disqualified under this paragraph for holding office as the mayor at any time in the period of eight days beginning with the day on which the person becomes the elected member of the legislature.”Member’s explanatory statement
This would stop the new disqualification from applying during an 8 day “grace period” beginning with the day when it would otherwise apply (in the absence of this amendment). This would give time for an orderly resignation as legislator (where the person becomes mayor) or as mayor (where the person becomes a legislator).
““first day of the mayoral term” , in relation to a person who is elected as the mayor for the area of a combined authority, means the day that would be the first day of the person’s term as the mayor if it is assumed that the person is not disqualified under this paragraph.””Member’s explanatory statement
This makes clear that the effect of the new disqualification provision must be ignored when working out what is the first day of the mayoral term.
“(1A) If a person—(a) is elected as the mayor for the area of a CCA, and(b) is, on the first day of the mayoral term, an elected member of a legislature in the United Kingdom,the person is not disqualified under this paragraph for holding office as the mayor at any time in the period of eight days beginning with the first day of the mayoral term.(1B) If a person—(a) becomes an elected member of a legislature in the United Kingdom, and(b) is, when the person becomes the elected member, the mayor for the area of a CCA,the person is not disqualified under this paragraph for holding office as the mayor at any time in the period of eight days beginning with the day on which the person becomes the elected member of the legislature.”Member’s explanatory statement
This would stop the new disqualification from applying during an 8 day “grace period” beginning with the day when it would otherwise apply (in the absence of this amendment). This would give time for an orderly resignation as legislator (where the person becomes mayor) or as mayor (where the person becomes a legislator).
““first day of the mayoral term” , in relation to a person who is elected as the mayor for the area of a CCA, means the day that would be the first day of the person’s term as the mayor if it is assumed that the person is not disqualified under this paragraph.”Member’s explanatory statement
This makes clear that the effect of the new disqualification provision must be ignored when working out what is the first day of the mayoral term.
“(1A) If a person—(a) is elected as the Mayor, and(b) is, on the first day of the Mayoral term, an elected member of a legislature in the United Kingdom,the person is not disqualified under this section from being the Mayor at any time in the period of eight days beginning with the first day of the Mayoral term.(1B) If a person—(a) becomes an elected member of a legislature in the United Kingdom, and(b) is, when the person becomes the elected member, the Mayor,the person is not disqualified under this section from being the Mayor at any time in the period of eight days beginning with the day on which the person becomes the elected member of the legislature.”Member’s explanatory statement
This would stop the new disqualification from applying during an 8 day “grace period” beginning with the day when it would otherwise apply (in the absence of this amendment). This would give time for an orderly resignation as legislator (where the person becomes Mayor) or as Mayor (where the person becomes a legislator).
““first day of the Mayoral term” , in relation to a person who is elected as the Mayor, means the day that would be the first day of the person’s term as the Mayor if it is assumed that the person is not disqualified under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This makes clear that the effect of the new disqualification provision must be ignored when working out what is the first day of the Mayoral term.
Lord Jamieson (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak briefly to these amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, who asked a number of important and timely questions.
Let me use her first amendment in this group as an example. It would require the Secretary of State, when making regulations, to consider and
“minimise any conflict, overlap, or duplication between the functions of the Mayor and the functions of other authorities or public bodies”.
This is absolutely sensible and common-sense, and it should happen. However, I suggest that, for clarity, this should extend also to Whitehall, from where powers are devolved; then, with the exception of oversight, those powers and the bureaucracy involved should no longer exist within Whitehall.
The Bill amends the 2023 Act through numerous schedules and amendments. It is right, therefore, that we ensure this clarity and avoid unnecessary overlap. I am sure that many Members in this Grand Committee will remember the passage of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill through the House. It was a long and complex piece of legislation—I pay tribute to the excellent work done by my noble friend Lady Scott—and the changes in this policy and space must be approached with care. I am keen, therefore, to hear from the Minister about the Government’s overall approach to avoiding unnecessary and costly duplication and legal uncertainty, in relation not just to this amendment but across the Bill as a whole.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, for her amendments on the role of mayors. Before I respond to these amendments, I want to clarify the rationale for Clause 18. The clause will extend an existing power of the Secretary of State to provide that certain general functions may be exercised solely by a mayor. The power currently exists in the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 and, as the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, said, in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023. This clause will ensure that it can also apply to general functions conferred under any other regulation or Act of Parliament. The extension of this existing power reflects the broader range of routes through which functions may be conferred on strategic authorities and their mayors, once the current Bill becomes law.
Amendments 91 and 92 seek to amend this clause and prevent the potential for conflict, overlap or duplication between a mayor’s functions and those of other authorities or public bodies. As your Lordships will know, mayors of combined authorities or combined county authorities are not corporate entities in themselves. For that reason, all functions must be conferred on the underlying authority rather than directly on to the mayor. However, some functions may be designated as mayoral functions, as they are to be exercised only by the mayor. Where functions have been made mayoral, they typically relate to the management of day-to-day activities.
Key strategic decisions still require approval by the strategic authority constituent members. To give an example, all members will vote on which roads form part of a key route network, after which the mayor will be responsible for managing it. This will allow for swifter decision-making and more effective governance on day-to-day matters.
It will be important that all tiers of local government work together to benefit their communities. This is why principal local authorities will be embedded within the decision-making structures of strategic authorities as full constituent members. This will ensure that they play a central role in drawing up specific strategies and plans, such as local growth plans. Furthermore, before any new function is conferred on a strategic authority by regulations, the Secretary of State will be required to consult the constituent councils of any affected strategic authorities and any other person who exercises the function concerned. This will ensure that the views of those affected are properly considered.
I hope that, with these explanations, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Thornhill (LD)
I absolutely accept that the new structures are complex and complicated. It is very easy to be seduced by the noble Baroness’s fluent explanation. My amendment was coming more from the perspective of practicalities, which was also borne out by the comments earlier that, in reality, there is overlap, with weakened scrutiny, unclear accountability and eroded public trust. I would like to feel that a lot of work was being done into what those are. We know it is probably happening, but it is all going to come later through SIs and secondary legislation. I wanted to make it absolutely clear, up front, that those overlaps and duplications will be considered, because they will be a source of conflict and friction going forward. It was interesting that the leaders of boroughs are saying that that is happening even 20 or however many years later. But, for the moment, I will withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook
“(f) the progress of housebuilding as a consequence of devolution, including whether housing targets are being met and whether the right types of housing are being delivered to meet local needs,(g) the rate and distribution of economic growth in devolved areas, with particular reference to the impact of newly devolved powers,(h) any tax changes made within devolved areas under the powers conferred by this Act, including analysis of their fiscal impact and effect on local services, and(i) changes to the organisation, delivery, and funding of social care in devolved areas, including an assessment of outcomes for service users.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment expands the reporting requirements placed on the Secretary of State. It seeks to probe how the Government will assess the wider consequences of devolution, including the impact on housebuilding and whether local housing targets are being met; the effect of devolved powers on economic growth; the fiscal implications of tax changes introduced by devolved authorities; and the consequences of devolution for the delivery, funding, and outcomes of social care services.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, let me make it clear from the outset that, with Amendment 93, we are not asking for a new bureaucratic hurdle in yet another review, but a few additional report considerations. Amendment 93 in my name would expand the reporting requirements placed on the Secretary of State. It seeks to understand how the Government intend to assess the wider consequences of devolution, including: its impact on housebuilding and the delivery of housing targets; its effect on economic growth; the fiscal implications of tax changes introduced by devolved authorities; and the consequences for the organisation, funding and outcomes of social care services.
I will take each proposed new paragraph of this amendment in turn, beginning with paragraph (f). This asks the Secretary of State to consider the progress of housebuilding as a consequence of devolution, including whether housing targets are being met and whether the right types of housing are being delivered to meet local needs. We have consistently made it clear that we support new homes. The Conservative Party is pro development. However, we are equally clear that local voices must be taken along this journey and that local consent must remain front and centre. Only then can we ensure that the right homes are built in the right places, meeting the genuine needs of local communities. Devolution, if done well, has the potential to unlock more housing delivery. This amendment simply asks how we will measure progress against that ambition.
Proposed new paragraph (g) concerns the rate and distribution of economic growth in devolved areas, with particular reference to the impact of newly devolved powers. Devolution has long been argued as a means of restoring local growth. George Osborne, as Chancellor of the Exchequer between 2010 and 2016, was the principal architect of the metro mayor model, advancing it as the cornerstone of the northern powerhouse agenda. The argument was clear that empowering city regions with elected local leadership could help rebalance an economy overly concentrated in London, drawing on the well-established economic case for productivity growth in cities. This amendment simply asks how the Government intend to judge whether these devolved powers are, in practice, delivering that promise and whether growth is being spread more evenly across regions. I hope the Minister will agree that this is a sensible extension to the Minister’s report requirements.
Proposed new paragraph (h) relates to
“tax changes made within devolved areas under the powers conferred by this Act, including analysis of their fiscal impact and effect on local services”.
Tax policy shapes behaviour, incentives and market signals. Changes to local taxation will inevitably affect residents, businesses and the funding of public services. Local people have a right to understand how such decisions affect them and how the revenues raised are being translated into outcomes. How do the Government propose to analyse the behavioural and fiscal consequences of devolved tax decisions? What mechanisms will ensure transparency and accountability to Parliament, but mainly to local residents, for the impact of those choices on services?
Finally, proposed new paragraph (i) concerns changes to the organisation, delivery and funding of social care in devolved areas, including assessment of outcomes for service users. Social care is among the most vital and sensitive of the public services we provide. It also represents a substantial and growing call on public finances. Devolution may bring opportunities for innovation and better integration with local health services. However, it also carries the risk of variation in provision and outcomes. With this in mind, how will the Government ensure that devolved arrangements protect service users and maintain consistent standards of care? What measures will be used to assess whether outcomes are improving for those who rely on social care, rather than simply shifting responsibilities between tiers of government? This amendment reflects a desire to ensure that devolution works as intended, delivering growth, homes and better services while remaining transparent, accountable and focused on outcomes. I hope the Minister can provide reassurance on how the Government intend to monitor and report these important issues.
An extension of the reporting requirements in Clause 19 seems a sensible and proportionate addition. It does not seek to constrain Ministers or to prescribe outcomes, but rather to ensure that Parliament and the public can properly understand how these significant powers are being used in practice.
I anticipate that the Minister may say that such a requirement is unnecessary and that existing reporting mechanisms are sufficient. However, devolution should ultimately be judged against its ambitions. If we are serious about empowering local areas to deliver more homes, stronger growth and better public services, it follows that we must also be serious about measuring whether those ambitions are being met. Local people must be able to see the effects of devolution in their communities and Parliament must be able to hold both central and local government to account for the outcomes it produces. For those reasons, I hope the Government will reflect carefully on whether modest additional reporting could strengthen rather than hinder the success of this agenda. I beg to move.
Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)
There is a duty to provide that kind of governance in the Bill. All I am trying to say is that there are various kinds of capacity in the 10,000 parish councils and they are not all the same. We cannot approach them in the same way. We know some of them have problems. I come from a shire county in the north-east of England so I know the capacity of parish councils and town councils to do certain jobs. We are well aware of that, and it is something that we obviously want to try and improve, and work with these parish and town councils into the future.
Amendment 252 concerns the powers available to local and combined authorities to promote local economic growth through banking and credit provision. Banking regulation is of systemic national interest. Its implementation must be consistent in applying technical standards, ensuring financial stability and protecting taxpayers. As such, it remains important that banking regulation continues to be considered at the national level as a reserved matter. Local and community banking is already possible within the existing framework, and the UK has a strong record of enabling new entrants to support access to finance. Mutuals, including building societies and credit unions, play a key role in supporting local economic growth. The Government are committed to doubling the size of the mutuals sector, with reforms already under way to help mutuals grow and raise capital. Further, through our financial inclusion strategy, the Government are improving access to affordable credit and strengthening community finance partnerships to support people and local economies. As such, the objectives of the proposed review are already addressed by existing initiatives, and I ask noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 93 in my name is about understanding whether devolution is delivering what it promises, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, for his support. The Bill places significant powers in the hands of devolved authorities, which is welcome, but with these powers must come clear and transparent assessment of their impact, not only on governance structures but on outcomes that matter to people’s daily lives.
The amendment seeks to expand the Secretary of State’s reporting requirements to cover four key areas, as I have said: housebuilding, economic growth, fiscal change and social care. These are central tests of success. Are housing targets being met? Are the right homes being delivered in the right places? Is devolution driving growth, et cetera? These are not unreasonable questions; they are essential if Parliament is to judge whether devolution is improving outcomes or delivering value for money and reducing inequalities between different places across our country.
This amendment would not prescribe policy but simply ask the Government to measure, report and be transparent about the consequences of their choice. I have listened to the Minister’s response, but he will not be surprised that I am disappointed. I do not think that using the existing reporting system will necessarily cover things and give us answers on whether these very major changes to local government are a success or whether they need some change. We need to look at this further before Report.
I have not done as much work as I should on parish and town councils, because I know that they will come up in future groupings. However, the one thing that came out of this debate for me, and from one or two of the Government’s responses on different groupings, is that town and parish councils are enshrined in legislation; they have rules. I cannot see anything further in this Bill that would put another type of very local responsible organisation in primary legislation. I would be very worried if there were. These neighbourhood arrangements are not going to be legislative arrangements; they will just be local groupings.
I have seen a lot of how this works in Wiltshire. When we went unitary, we were totally parished; we set up the city of Salisbury as a parish council. However, we also had area boards, which were within our council’s gift. They were where local councillors, police and fire representatives and local council officers got together to discuss local issues. Those boards had small budgets as well. They are very different things, however. I would also suggest that parish councils would work in cities and towns—they do work in some. They work very well in neighbourhoods and, in new developments where there are a large number of houses, they can work, but they want the support of government to work, and some small changes in government policy to make them work. I am not sure that having a parallel neighbourhood arrangement is the correct way to go.
The detail of that is for another debate before this Bill finishes Committee. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment and, as I said, we will consider this further and possibly bring something back on Report.
Lord Mawson (CB)
My Lords, I support this amendment because it opens up some interesting thoughts. Some years ago, I worked in east London on what had been for many years a dysfunctional housing estate in Tower Hamlets. As some noble Lords will know, Tower Hamlets has, over many years, experienced the dysfunction of local government and services. My work began in a place where nothing was working properly and a small group of us in a local church decided we wanted to be practical and do something about it. We have gained competence in delivering projects, having delivered 1,000 projects over the years. With local residents, we have built our own housing company, which now has 10,000 properties, owns 34% of the land in Poplar and has about a £2 billion regeneration programme in play. But it did not start like that; it started very small, in a housing estate, where, behind our buildings, there was a local authority park where children were injecting on a night.
At that point, we must have worked through 14 Governments but then the Liberals—not the Liberal Democrats—were running the local authority, and they began to realise that, as a local community group and charity, we had competence in delivering things when so much did not seem to work. All the policies and everything were in place, but things did not work. They started to have a conversation with us—our first small project—about whether we would like to run the local park behind our buildings where children were injecting at night. What happened to us at the other end of the telescope was that we spent six months with the chief executive of the local authority putting together a proper plan, in great detail, for the management of that park, getting to know each other and building relationships, and we got it to a place where we were ready to start.
There was then a council election. At that point, the Liberals had created seven neighbourhoods. They lost the election; the Labour Party won, and it then created seven committees. All the work we had been doing for quite some time was completely lost. It was not the Labour Party’s or anyone else’s fault but, for those of us trying to do something about that park, it was another example of local structures and processes creating massive dysfunction for local people. The terms “community reality” and “place-based knowledge” really matter, and we should not just assume that councillors and others have all the knowledge of such realities.
I have one thought for the Government. There is a real opportunity in this legislation, and I am pleased that they are thinking about this; I am encouraging the process. I gave the officials a document we wrote for Demos during the previous Labour Administration about our work in east London, called Communities in Business. I have had no reply from any of the civil servants about it, but it sets out in some detail some of the work we have done and the thinking behind it. We are not the only people doing this. I now operate across the country and there are other really interesting examples that are led not by councillors or parish councils but by groups of people who come together, put a business logic behind something and deliver a very different kind of culture.
This amendment, and the discussion we had earlier, opens up the opportunity to start to think differently about this stuff and what community empowerment might really mean. Of course it needs to involve government and councillors, but I suggest that it is not just about them; it is about the people in these real places who are often grappling with the machinery of the state, certainly in places such as Tower Hamlets, which has not worked for many years.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Janke, for her Amendment 95A, which is modest but important. It does not seek to block devolution or slow it down unnecessarily. Instead, it asks for two simple safeguards when new strategic authorities are created or altered: transparency and consent. The amendment seeks to strengthen rather than weaken the devolution framework in the Bill and attempt to ensure that strategic authorities are rooted in local identity, coherent service delivery and democratic agreement. For those reasons, I hope the Government will give it serious consideration.
Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Janke, for her amendment and noble Lords for their contributions to the debate. This amendment concerns the powers in this Bill for the Secretary of State to direct the establishment or expansion of a combined authority and to designate single foundational strategic authorities and established mayoral strategic authorities.
The amendment would require the publication of a statement assessing the impact on community identity and public service boundaries when these powers are used, as well as requiring consent from the affected area. I am pleased to say that the Bill already contains safeguards to address these issues. For example, before conferring functions on a single foundational strategic authority or unitary authority, the Secretary of State must consider the effective exercise of functions for a local area. In addition, local consent is required prior to designation as a single foundational strategic authority.
The Secretary of State may designate an established mayoral strategic authority only if the authority submits a written proposal asking to be so designated. The authority’s consent is an inherent part of the process, as no authority can be designated unless it actively applies. Also, the criteria outlined in the English devolution White Paper are clear about the eligibility requirements for a mayoral strategic authority seeking to be designated as established. These criteria are designed to ensure the effective exercise of functions across a local area.
Finally, on the establishment or expansion of combined authorities, the Government have been clear that it is our strong preference and practice to work in partnership with local areas to develop proposals for devolution that carry the broad support of local leaders and the local area. The power to direct the establishment or expansion of a combined authority would only ever be used as a last resort where a local area has not brought forward its own viable proposal. This will ensure that all areas across England are able to benefit from devolution and that no area is left behind.
On the establishment or expansion of combined authorities more generally, the Bill already includes the necessary safeguards, including a statutory test to ensure effective and convenient local government across the areas of competence. Furthermore, where the geographical expansion of a combined authority area could affect the exercise of its functions, the Secretary of State must consider this before making an order to expand the authority.
I hope that, with this response, the noble Baroness is able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I would like to give an alternative view from that of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, on Amendment 241C. First, though, I say this to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam: I spent 10 and a half years representing Great Bentley in the European Parliament—not all of its residents, but the greater group in the area—and it was a great privilege to represent that part of Essex.
I pay tribute to the work of the North York Moors National Park Authority. Let me say a word about how dramatic its work has been, with the wildfires last summer and the potential prosect of further wildfires ahead. It has done a sterling job. Obviously, at one stage, it looked as though livelihoods and livestock might be imperilled and lost with the wildfire at Fylingdales, which was in my constituency for the last five years of my time in the other place; it came perilously close to many farms. I pay tribute to the work that the authority did.
I apologise that I did not realise that I should have spoken before the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, in order to understand more about the background to what he is seeking to do. I would like just to place on the record that, to my certain knowledge, the powers that the North York Moors National Park Authority already has—as well as the powers under the Bill—are received very warmly. It is already working quite hard, I think, and devoting a large amount of time to consulting as widely as it possibly can. I am slightly concerned that Amendment 241C could introduce an extra burden that it would be very hard pressed to meet.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, we on these Benches welcome Amendment 97 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, to whom I am grateful.
Parish councils are the most local level of government. They were based on one of the most ancient forms of local administration in England, namely the parish system, which is still rightly maintained by the established Church of this country. Any Bill that wants to reflect the movement towards localism and protect local geographical identity must, in our opinion, have provisions to empower parishes. Parish councils are often the best places to truly understand local views on issues that face local people, providing insights on planning and enhancing both community well-being and quality of life, with the protection of things such as green spaces, playing fields and allotments. They can pay attention to the little things that matter but from which larger bodies are too distant—or in which they are disinterested.
The National Association of Local Councils, of which I am a vice-president, has highlighted that town and parish councils raise more than £900 million in precepts each year and invest more than £2 billion in communities. I thank all of the approximately 10,000 of these councils in England for the volunteering that they do, their time and their energy; indeed, they put some 14 million hours a year into serving their communities. They deserve more of a place in this Bill. Can the Minister explain, therefore, why the Government are not protecting and strengthening such councils’ roles in this Bill?
On Amendment 241C, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for raising this issue. Clearly, there is a problem, in that some communities that border or surround the national parks have less of a say because they are currently not consulted on matters that affect them. However, I remain somewhat hesitant about how this amendment might work in practice. I will talk to the noble Lord because I would like some further clarification on, for example, how a consultation taking place for the communities in the Peak District might have to involve, say, the city of Sheffield. How large or close would a community have to be in order to be consulted, in other words?
In addition, we would also like to understand, as my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering mentioned, the implications on any authority’s resources and capacity. I am interested in the views of the Minister on that amendment as well. We strongly support giving local people more of a voice, which is what this Bill says it should be doing. But we strongly believe in the role of town and parish councils as a way to get really local voices into local services delivery. I urge the Government to look further at the role of town and parish councils in the new local government model for this country.
Lord Shipley (LD)
My Lords, the issues raised in this group are fundamental, and I support everything that has been said so far, broadly speaking. Our efforts to identify how the new structure will relate to all the other organisations delivering public services, and how they will all work together, demonstrates the importance of Committee. I hope that when the Minister replies there will be some positive movement on that.
I hope the Minister will not think me flippant when I have said what I am about to say. Amendments 98 and 99 are important in probing the necessity of forcing local partners to respond to meeting requests. Many of the Bill’s pages—pages 23 to 34—are about mayoral powers to require local partners to attend meetings and other mayors to collaborate, and so on. I have a simple question for the Minister about local partners; as I say, I hope she will not think I am being flippant. The Bill says:
“The mayor for the area … may convene meetings with local partners to consider relevant local matters”.
I understand that, but can local partners convene a meeting with the mayor to consider relevant local matters?
I ask that question because, on previous days in Committee, the answers that we have had about devolution away from mayors to, say, constituent councils, have been that there is to be no power of scrutiny for a constituent council within a strategic authority. That is a very serious matter—I do not think it will work. My question is simple: can local partners convene a meeting with the mayor, or is this a one-way power whereby only the mayor can convene meetings with local partners? If it is, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, and the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, will be willing to pursue the matter when we get to Report.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Scott and Lady Royall, and the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, for their amendments on local partners’ co-operation with mayors. This is an important group of amendments. Without this type of local co-operation, devolution will not work, so I take it very seriously.
Amendment 98 would provide for the Mayor of London, instead of the Secretary of State, to define “local partners” for the purposes of Clause 21. Elsewhere in England, it would remain for the Secretary of State to define the meaning of “local partners” in regulations. Were this amendment to be made, it would create an immediate inconsistency between the powers of the Mayor of London and the approach taken elsewhere in England. Allowing the Mayor of London to specify local partners where other mayors could not would lead to a piecemeal and unclear definition of local partners, risking confusion at all levels. Defining “local partners” in regulations will allow for appropriate parliamentary scrutiny—I think that is important—will provide a single, coherent definition across England and will ensure that mayors’ power to convene can be clearly understood by both mayors and local partners.
Examples of the types of organisations the regulations may include are those that deliver public services on behalf of, or receive funding from, a mayoral strategic authority; are identifiable as key enablers in statutory strategies; or play a material role in helping a mayoral strategic authority perform its functions within its local area. We are not seeking to define “local partners” in isolation. We are interested in understanding from strategic authorities and their mayors the type of organisations and institutions that should fall under a definition of a “local partner”. We are doing some more work on that with our strategic authorities.
I turn to Amendment 99, which seeks to understand the requirement for local partners to respond to a notification from a mayor of a strategic authority to convene a meeting. Clause 21 provides mayors with a new power to notify local partners of their intention to convene a meeting on a local matter that relates to their areas of competence. It also places a corresponding requirement on any local partner to respond to such a notification. This power is designed to enable mayors to bring the right people around the table, so that partners can work together to tackle shared challenges, seize opportunities for their communities and deliver the best outcomes for local people. The point from the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, about data sharing was very relevant to this. It is often the lack of ability to share data across organisations that slows down these kinds of collaborative projects.
The requirement on local partners is proportionate and not unduly burdensome. It does not oblige partners to engage beyond acknowledging the notification, nor does it prescribe what steps a local partner must take following any meeting or how they must act. Rather, the requirement is simply to respond to a mayor’s notification. The intention is to promote constructive dialogue even where there may be a difference of view on the relevant local matter. Taken together with the other mayoral powers of competence in this Bill, Clause 21 will strengthen the role of strategic authority mayors, giving them the means to drive growth, foster collaboration and deliver improvements for their communities.
On the point that the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, made about whether public bodies can require the mayor to attend, the mayor’s role in convening will probably answer that point, but I will reflect on it. If the mayor had a duty to convene people to collaborate on issues, and another body requested a meeting to discuss something like that, it would not seem in the spirit of what is in this Bill for the mayor to decline that invitation. I will take that back and think about it a little more.
Finally, I turn to Amendments 196 and 237 from my noble friend Lady Royall and the noble Lord, Lord Bichard. I assure noble Lords that the Government —and I—strongly support the spirit of the amendments: local public service partners and strategic authorities should collaborate to ensure quality, joined-up services for local people. Placing a new, wide-ranging statutory duty on local public service partners to attend meetings; provide information and assistance; and engage with strategic and local authorities in their local area may place an additional and unwarranted burden on these bodies. I, too, remember the Total Place initiative. One thing that got in the way of that was the dialogue between bodies, when they said, “We just do not have the capacity to provide that at the moment”. It caused some friction between some bodies.
As set out in the English devolution White Paper, it is the intention that mayors act as conveners on public service reform. The Bill provides them with the power to do this by granting them a power to convene local partners on their areas of competence, which include health, well-being and public service reform. The Bill places a corresponding duty on local partners to respond to a request by a mayor to meet. It is important to note that this does not place a duty on local partners to agree to particular policies of the mayor or to meet if they do not think that it is appropriate. We believe that this strikes the right balance between giving mayors the tools to drive collaboration, protecting the independence of local partners to act as they think fit and avoiding burdensome duties to which they must adhere.
Lord Jamieson (Con)
I will take back what the noble Baroness says. In this case, my point is that a random unelected body is not the same as an elected body. I genuinely think that democracy is important. If you wish to engage, you probably need to be a bit more nuanced in whom you engage with, because it should not be random; it should be those people who can really give you the feedback and information you need, depending on the subject and the place. Take central Bedfordshire, for example: a random 100 people from across central Bedfordshire will not be particularly helpful when we are discussing what is happening in my own little village of Maulden; I would rather discuss it with the residents of Maulden.
With that, I shall move on. This debate has made it clear that collaboration is important—in many cases, essential. I hope that it will be taken seriously by the Minister and that she will come back with some flexibility later on in the Bill’s passage.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
My Lords, I am sorry that we have been pressing on time; the Hansard team and other officers were here until very late last night and we do not want to put them under any further pressure.
I thank the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, the noble Lords, Lord Ravensdale and Lord Wallace, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett and Lady Janke, for their amendments on the duty to collaborate. I shall start with Amendment 100, for which I thank the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty. I completely understand the intention behind this amendment—we have now had many discussions on this issue—but we ultimately think that it is unnecessary, as cultural well-being is captured in the current wording of Clause 22.
Culture underpins our creative and visitor economies; in this way, cultural activity is inherently captured in the meaning of
“economic, social or environmental well-being”.
The formulation is intentionally wide so that mayors can request collaboration on a broad range of matters; it is also intended to avoid an exhaustive or prospective list. Adding “cultural” risks undermining that approach and creating pressure to enumerate further dimensions of well-being without delivering any substantive new effect. Indeed, explicitly singling culture out could invite arguments that other aspects of well-being that are not listed are of lesser importance, or that cultural interests should be interpreted narrowly or separately from economic, social or environmental considerations.
Mayors of strategic authorities can, and already do, collaborate on cultural matters. The Mayors of South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, York and North Yorkshire have come together to sign the White Rose Agreement, committing to work together on high-profile culture and sporting events and to celebrate Yorkshire’s heritage. I hope that the noble Earl and the other noble Lords who raised the issue of culture have been reassured by my agreement to reflect on how culture is treated in the competency framework.
I turn to Amendment 101, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, which seeks to promote greater regional collaboration between mayors and other public and private partners. The Government agree with the value and benefits of regional collaboration. However, while the amendment is well intentioned, we do not think it is necessary. Strategic authorities and their mayors already have a wide range of mechanisms to collaborate across administrative boundaries, and several mayors are already doing so successfully. We heard some examples from the noble Lord.
The powers in Clause 22 are not intended to replace the wide range of positive and informal collaboration that already takes place. They are intended to supplement these existing mechanisms and strengthen mayoral leadership by providing a more formal route for cross-boundary pan-regional collaboration where this can improve outcomes for communities. However, it should be for mayors to decide for themselves how to use these powers rather than for the Government to prescribe or constrain the purposes and form that mayoral collaboration must take. More broadly, under existing legislation, combined authorities and combined county authorities can already enter into joint committees, allowing them to discharge certain powers together and jointly produce legislative documents such as spatial development strategies.
I turn to Amendment 102 from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace; this is not from Sir Humphrey, but from me—I am passionate about devolution and am not letting anyone get in the way of that; it is good programme, though, and I like it. This amendment would require strategic authorities to prepare joint strategic development plans, covering two or more strategic authority areas in certain circumstances. I appreciate the intent behind the amendment to join up strategic authorities, but I do not agree that the amendment is necessary. We already have broadly equivalent powers as a result of the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025. New Section 12B of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, as inserted by the 2025 Act, enables the Secretary of State to require authorities to work together on spatial development strategies through the establishment of a strategic planning board. The Government intend to use these powers, in particular in areas without a combined authority or a combined county authority. The same Act gives the Secretary of State a wide range of intervention powers in relation to the preparation and adoption of spatial development strategies.
It is worth highlighting that, where strategic planning authorities are working on separate spatial development strategies, they are required by the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, as amended by the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025, to have regard to the need to be consistent with current national policies. The National Planning Policy Framework sets out strong expectations on authorities to work effectively across local government boundaries.
I turn to Amendment 103. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for raising the importance of citizen engagement in local decision-making. The Government fully agree that residents should have meaningful opportunities to shape the decisions that affect their areas. However, as the locally elected leaders in their regions, mayors should have the ability to decide on how best to engage with their local communities. Mayors can convene citizens’ assemblies if they wish to, and, in places such as South Yorkshire, mayors have decided to use these powers. Once the Bill becomes law, all mayors will have general powers of competence conferred automatically on them, which will enable them to convene citizens assemblies should they wish to do so.
Finally, the Bill already includes a provision in this area. Clause 60 introduces a neighbourhood governance duty, requiring all local authorities to put in place arrangements to secure effective neighbourhood governance. That will ensure that communities have meaningful opportunities to inform and influence local decisions.
I turn to Amendment 104, from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and Amendment 196, from the noble Baroness, Lady Janke. Both seek to ensure that mayors and strategic authorities work closely with their local authorities, public service providers and bodies representing local communities in town and parish councils. I recognise the spirit in which these amendments have been made. It is important for all mayors to engage with the wider public sector and the local authority family in delivering their own functions. However, strategic authorities are already expected, through existing legislation and provisions in this Bill, to work collaboratively with local partners and communities when exercising their functions.
Amendment 104 in particular would impose a disproportionate administrative burden on mayors of strategic authorities by placing a new duty requiring them to meet local authorities, public service providers and town and parish councils. As an illustration, North Yorkshire alone compromises 729 individual parishes, organised into 412 town and parish councils. Expecting a mayor to discharge this proposed duty in respect of each body would be impractical and may crowd out some of the time needed for the officer’s other strategic responsibilities. Parish and town councils continue to be supported in their work, and local authorities are strongly encouraged to work with them to understand the contribution they are able to make to the delivery of local services and the management of local assets.