(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a privilege to spend the afternoon with you in the Chair again, Sir George.
In certain areas of legislation, for example on data protection, it is likely necessary to specify that certain effects of the existing legislative hierarchy are maintained, to ensure the continuation of the legal regime. The clause therefore establishes a new power to maintain intended policy outcomes by specifying the legislative hierarchy between specific provisions of domestic legislation and provisions of retained direct EU legislation or assimilated direct legislation to maintain the current policy effect.
I have only a couple of questions. As I said, the Opposition consider the clause to be sensible, but will the Minister outline whether any assessment has been done as to what circumstances it is likely to be used in? What steps will the Government take to preserve the intent of the measure after 23 June 2026, when regulations made under the Bill will expire?
The hon. Gentleman asked about assessment. The REUL reform programme has been under way for more than a year. Departments have been engaged as to the effect of removing EU law principles—such as that the EU is the only one that can create principles and legislation—which is what we are working on. The work will continue to take place.
On the evidence about changing interpretation rules under clause 4, in specific cases—data protection regulation and competition law—removing the principles of interpretation as set out in the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 will cause unintended policy consequences as a result of the way that the legislation has been written. The compatibility power will ensure that the relationships between individual pieces of domestic legislation going forward are maintained. We intend that to ensure that our domestic law operates as the UK Government want it to. Each Department will of course be responsible for REUL elements within their portfolio.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Incompatibility orders
I beg to move amendment 80, in clause 9, page 10, line 36, at end insert—
“(4A) Within 28 days of the making of an incompatibility order, a Minister of the Crown must, by written statement, set out the Government’s view on the incompatibility. The statement must include consideration of the impact the incompatibility order has on rights of and protections for consumers, workers, and businesses, and protections of the environment and animal welfare, and whether the Government intends to produce regulations to revoke, amend or clarify the law in light of the order.”
This amendment requires ministers to set out, through a ministerial statement, their position on an incompatibility order that includes a consideration of the impact it will have on the rights of people.
The amendment would require Ministers to report to Parliament with a written statement in the event that a court made an order to declare that EU law and domestic law are incompatible. As we explained in relation to previous amendments, the Bill could impact on many fundamental rights of citizens in multiple areas of daily life. It could also interfere with important existing environmental protections, which I have explained at length in previous amendments.
The clause might have the effect of a court setting aside laws that guarantee such rights and protections, without giving Parliament any opportunity to ensure they can continue in place. In the interests of transparency and proper scrutiny, the amendment is designed to ensure that Parliament is alerted if that happens, enabling us to scrutinise the court decision and to consider whether we should exercise our rights to legislate to ensure that there is no confusion about Parliament’s intentions. It is not my intention to press this amendment to a vote, but I would like the Minister to explain how we can ensure proper scrutiny when such clashes inevitably occur.
The clause gives the judiciary powers in connection with the ending of the supremacy of EU law. It requires a court or tribunal to issue an incompatibility order where retained direct EU legislation cannot be read consistently with other pieces of domestic legislation. It gives the judiciary broad discretion to adapt the order to the case before it. That includes granting remedies to the effect of the incompatibility.
Courts generally have wide discretion to grant remedies that they may grant in a given case, and the clause is consistent with that principle. Where the court considers it relevant, the order could set out the effect of the incompatible provision in that particular case, delay the coming into force of the order, or remove or limit the effect of the operation of the relevant provision in other ways before the incompatibility order comes into force.
The clause is a matter of judicial process. It grants powers to the courts but does not change any rights or protections in and of themselves, which is a matter for Parliament in the scrutiny of this Bill. We do not need to create a new scrutiny process for incompatibility orders. A process of “declaration of incompatibility”, similar to that set out in clause 9, exists under the Human Rights Act 1998, and no new scrutiny procedure, such as the one proposed by this amendment, has been deemed necessary. Similar court orders could also be made under the European Communities Act 1972, where conflicts arose—again, with no such scrutiny procedure.
Once again, the hon. Member for Leeds North West raised environmental regulations. To repeat myself, we will not weaken environmental protections. The UK is a world leader in environmental protection and, in reviewing our retained EU law, we want to ensure that environmental law is fit for purpose and able to drive improved environmental outcomes. We are committed to delivering our legally binding target of halting nature’s decline by 2030. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
I take on board what the Minister says, although that last comment on the environment is slightly galling considering that on 31 October the Government were meant to bring forward, under their own domestic post-Brexit legislation—the Environment Act 2021—targets on a whole range of areas, including air quality and water quality. It is now 24 November and we still have no targets. If I am a little concerned about the Government’s performance here, she should not be surprised, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Scope of powers
I beg to move amendment 50, in clause 10, page 11, line 12, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
“(b) for sub-paragraph (2), substitute—
(2) Power may only be exercised by virtue of sub-paragraph (1) if—
(a) a written statement explaining the modification has been published by the Secretary of State,
(b) the Secretary of State has made an oral statement on the modification to both Houses of Parliament, and
(c) the Secretary of State has published an assessment of the impact of the modification.”
The intention of the amendment is to do what Brexit was supposed to do: restore some parliamentary oversight to the way in which the Government make and change legislation in this place. The amendment is pretty self-explanatory. It is not ideal that Ministers are giving extensive powers to chop and change laws as they see fit. If, in exceptional circumstances, it is necessary for them to have those powers, the very least Parliament should expect is that Ministers will be held to account and will explain to Parliament—ideally beforehand, but certainly afterwards—why they have done what they have done and what the impact has been.
If the Minister genuinely believes in improving accountability in this place, she will accept the amendment. In saying that, it is clear that all Ministers—nothing against this Minister—in all Public Bill Committees are under instruction not to accept anything from the Opposition. If we moved an amendment that said, “Today’s Thursday”, the Government would keep talking until it was Friday and then vote it down.
I recognise that none of that was directed at me personally, but rather collectively at all Ministers. I beg hon. Members to reject the amendment. The Government recognise the significant role that Parliament has played in scrutinising instruments to date and we are committed to ensuring the appropriate scrutiny of any secondary legislation made under existing delegated powers. We must end the restriction that some existing powers may only be used to amend retained direct principal EU legislation or rights under section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 if they are also capable of amending domestic primary legislation.
The hon. Member for Glenrothes suggests that a written ministerial statement made by a Secretary of State is accompanied by an oral statement when an existing power is exercised. I remind him that all statutory instruments that are subject to parliamentary procedure must be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum. These memorandums provide Parliament with the information and explanations required. When powers are exercised by virtue of paragraph 3(1) to schedule 8, explanatory memorandums would be laid as appropriate. Any statutory instrument that reforms retained direct EU legislation made under existing delegated powers will be subject to the proper processes for impact assessments. However, a blanket requirement for impact assessments is not appropriate as some reforms could fall below the de minimis threshold set out in the “Better regulation framework” guidance.
Now that we have left the EU, it is only appropriate for retained direct EU legislation that was not scrutinised or approved by Parliament to be treated in the same way as domestic secondary legislation, which is amendable by existing delegated powers that this Parliament has approved. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
The difference, of course, is that any secondary legislation—even if it is done by the affirmative procedure—goes through a Delegated Legislation Committee in which, at best, three or four of the parties in this House are represented. For the last seven and a half years, the Scottish National party has been represented in those Committees because of the exceptional level of support that it enjoys in our country, but there are Members of Parliament, who collectively represent the interests of a lot of constituents, who never get on to Delegated Legislation Committees. The only chance they get to question the Minister about secondary legislation is if the Minister makes an oral statement before the House. Publishing something is all very well, but Members of Parliament who are not in one of the big three or four parties do not get the automatic right to question Ministers on a written statement—they do get the automatic right to questions Ministers on an oral statement. It is quite clear which way this is going, so I will not detain the Committee by pushing the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I ask hon. Members to reject the amendment. Clause 10 ensures that appropriate parliamentary scrutiny is applied to the use of existing delegated powers when they are used to amend retained direct EU legislation or section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 rights. It is this Government’s view that the appropriate procedure applied when amending retained direct EU legislation should be the same as the procedure applied to domestic secondary legislation. Any additional procedure, such as that proposed by the hon. Member, would be disproportionate given the type of legislation retained direct EU legislation is composed of.
It would be wholly inappropriate if, for example, updating individual provisions adding cheese and honey to the simplified active substance list required the approval of both Houses of Parliament, the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Parliament. Making it easier to use pre-existing powers to amend assimilated retained direct EU legislation, while ensuring it receives the most suitable level of parliamentary scrutiny, will ensure our regulations can be kept up to date, supporting growth across the whole UK.
The Minister referred to domestic secondary legislation. Does she not understand that if a piece of secondary legislation relates exclusively to, for example, a devolved power of Senedd Cymru, as far as this place is concerned that is not domestic law—it is somebody else’s domestic law—and this Parliament should keep out of it?
I think we have covered the point of domestic law, law in Westminster and the role of Attorneys General. At the moment, we are forced to treat some retained direct EU legislation as equivalent to an Act of Parliament when amending it. It is no longer appropriate for retained direct EU legislation to keep the status of primary legislation when most of it has not had anywhere close to the same level of UK parliamentary scrutiny. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute to withdraw the amendment.
I will withdraw the amendment, but it is something that we will return to on Report. This is an Executive power grab; it is a weakening of the role and influence of Members of Parliament in favour of the Executive. It is intolerable, and I hope that, when we do get to discuss it on Report, we will have the combined support of the Opposition. This is a dangerous road that we do not want to go down, and something we should avoid at all costs. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to debate that schedule 1 be the First schedule to the Bill.
Hon. Members are already aware that clause 10 modifies powers contained in other statutes that can be exercised to make secondary legislation amending former directly effective EU law. Schedule 1 makes related amendments with similar effect to alter the procedural requirements in relation to other powers to amend retained direct principal EU legislation in line with the changes made in clause 10 to schedule 8 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. Schedule 1 also contains amendments that are consequential on the changes to the EU withdrawal Act in clause 10. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clause 11
Procedural requirements
I beg to move amendment 81, in clause 11, page 13, line 26, leave out subsections (1) and (2).
This amendment removes the subsections that omit and replace paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 from the European Withdrawal Act 2018, and thereby leaves intact the existing scrutiny procedure for instruments which amend or revoke subordinate legislation made under s2(2) of the ECA 1972.
Good afternoon, Sir George. In essence, the amendment would remove the subsections that omit and replace paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of schedule 8 to the EU withdrawal Act and leave intact the scrutiny procedure inserted for instruments that amend or revoke subordinate legislation made under the European Communities Act 1972.
If Ministers wish to revoke retained EU law, they are currently subject to what I would consider to be an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny, with mandatory explanatory statements, mandatory periods of prior parliamentary scrutiny and the mandatory use of draft affirmative procedures. Those enhanced provisions were inserted during the passage of the EU withdrawal Act in 2018 because Parliament considered such enhanced scrutiny necessary and proportionate, given the vast and varied nature of retained EU law and the potential impact of changes that we have debated at length over the past few days. We are talking about important environmental rights, workers’ rights and consumer rights. As we can see from the submissions made to the Committee, it appears that social media platforms are also at risk of being inadvertently switched off as a result of the Bill. We therefore think that this enhanced scrutiny is required.
I gather that the Government’s response as to why the requirements from the EU withdrawal Act can be watered down is that they believe those procedures have brought no tangible benefit. However, it is difficult to see what the rationale is for reducing the level of scrutiny when Parliament as a whole obviously thought that they were important enough to place in the Act just a few years ago. Could the Minister set out why she considers that a lower level is now appropriate?
I hear what the Hansard Society said about these procedures not having been used extensively thus far, but we are, of course, talking about something of an entirely different order to what we have seen to date. The procedures have mainly been used to maintain the status quo, but we are on a different and possibly uncertain trajectory now. It is clear from the Government’s refusal to accept any of our amendments to protect any pieces of regulation that there are going to be dramatic changes as a result of the Bill. Removing the requirement for the affirmative procedure will, once again, see a significant erosion of Parliament’s ability to scrutinise and hold Ministers to account when they amend the law. Why should parliamentarians not have greater involvement in the process set out in the Bill?
I have said this a number of times, but we really should aim to do better in the Bill. We should ensure that we are confident that, when changes are made, both Houses are able to scrutinise Ministers’ decisions. We will probably be presented, yet again, with arguments as to why we do not need such levels of scrutiny because these laws were foisted on us against our will in the first place, but that is essentially a way of saying that two wrongs make a right. I do not accept that. As I explained extensively on Tuesday, there has been a great deal of involvement on the part of UK politicians and representatives in the development of EU laws. I just do not accept the characterisation of these laws as having been foisted on us as correct.
I am not going to rehash all the arguments at the length I did the other day. I merely reaffirm that scrutiny is important, and when we, as parliamentarians, are faced with such a ministerial power grab, we should be concerned about trying to restrain it in some way. That is what this amendment seeks to do.
I stand to speak in favour of the amendment, although, at best, all it seeks to do is take an entirely unacceptable clause and make it slightly less unacceptable. Clause 11 is about a Henry VIII power; it is about removing protections for this House that were, ironically, forced on the Government by Members of the other House. I am not a great fan of unelected legislatures anywhere—I certainly do not want my country even partly ruled by one—but I have to say to Conservative Members that when the House of Lords is keener on protecting the rights of this House than Government Back-Bench and Front-Bench Members are, the Government really do need to look at themselves in the mirror and ask themselves: are we a democratic Government or are we not?
I support the limited improvements to the clause, but if the amendment falls, I will seek to divide the Committee to exclude clause 11 in its entirety.
I ask hon. Members to reject the amendment. Unless I was in a different Committee Room, or on a different planet, I think Opposition Members have had every opportunity to raise their voices, because we have heard much from them today and on Tuesday, and we have had much scrutiny as well. Our constituents know exactly what we are doing because it is all noted in Hansard.
The amendment would render clause 11 without purpose. Subsections (1) and (2) ensure the removal of additional parliamentary scrutiny requirements, established in the EU withdrawal Act, in relation to the amendment or revocation of secondary legislation made under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. Subsections (1) and (2) will ensure that when secondary legislation made under section 2(2) ECA is being amended or revoked using other delegated powers, the only parliamentary scrutiny requirements that will apply are those attached to the power being used. These delegated powers have their own parliamentary scrutiny procedure attached, which has been approved by Parliament, ensuring suitable scrutiny will continue to occur.
It is imperative that additional scrutiny requirements are removed, because it is clearly inappropriate that legislation created solely to implement our obligations as a member of the EU enjoys this privileged status. What is more, no tangible benefit has been identified as a result of these scrutiny requirements; as was mentioned, that was referenced in the evidence session by Dr Ruth Fox of the Hansard Society. In practice, they add a layer of complexity that makes it difficult to make amendments to legislation containing section 2(2) ECA provisions.
Removing these requirements reflects the main purpose of this Bill, which is to take a new approach to retained EU law, removing the precedence given in UK law to law derived from the EU that is no longer considered fit for purpose.
The Minister said that we get our voices heard, including in this Committee, and that may well be true for the Government, the official Opposition and SNP members. However, we have heard a lot today about Northern Ireland. When is the voice of the Democratic Unionist party and the Social Democratic and Labour party going to be heard? We have heard a lot about the environment, but where is the voice of the Greens? Where is the voice of Plaid Cymru? Where is the voice of the Liberal Democrats? They will not be heard in a Delegated Legislation Committee. We are not talking about the voice of Parliament, but the voice of a DL Committee, which is very restricted.
The hon. Member is not being wholly honest. The level of scrutiny of any piece of legislation, not only in Committee but on the Floor of this House and the Floor of the other place, takes place for all items of legislation.
The hon. Member will be well aware of the evidence session we had just a few weeks ago, when we had a number of people from environmental agencies who previously had Green credentials or who were previously Green or Lib Dem candidates. So it is not as if those voices are not heard.
I cannot speak about what decisions the Scottish Parliament will take after we are independent, but I look forward to seeing that day before any of us are very much older. I am confident that it is a modern, democratic Parliament with much improved scrutiny procedures. For example, in the Scottish Parliament it would have been impossible for us to have two changes of Prime Minister without the explicit approval of the Parliament. Nobody can become a Minister of the Scottish Government without being approved by the Scottish Parliament. There is much greater parliamentary accountability for the Executive than there is ever going to be here.
My confident expectation is that when an independent Scotland goes back into the European Union, the Scottish Parliament will have a much greater role in scrutinising the actions of our Ministers, acting on our behalf, at the European Council than this Parliament has ever had. As I have said to the Committee before, the problem with lack of accountability and scrutiny of European legislation is not because the European Union’s processes are flawed, but because parliamentary accountability in this place is fundamentally flawed.
If I intended to be part of this establishment for much longer, I would be attempting to improve its processes in order to bring it into line with proper democratic Parliaments, such as the one in Scotland. Given that neither I nor any of my colleagues from Scotland are likely to be here for very much longer, I will have to leave it to those who remain to sort out the mess of a Parliament that they have created.
Our objective is not to remove power from Parliament. Our objective is to ensure that amendments or revocations made to subordinate legislation made under other existing powers receive the most appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny. Fundamentally, people need to accept the Brexit vote and appreciate that we have to have sovereignty here. I do not think we are going to win that argument—we are too far apart.
When the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 was agreed, additional parliamentary scrutiny requirements were agreed in relation to the amendment or revocation of secondary legislation made under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. It is clearly inappropriate that legislation created solely to implement our obligations as a member of the EU enjoys that privileged status. We therefore seek to remove those requirements. This reflects the main purpose of the Bill—removing the precedence given in UK law to EU-derived law—which is no longer fit for purpose now that the UK has left the EU. I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The overarching aim of the Bill is to define retained EU law as a legal category, and the power to restate such law must be viewed with that in mind. The hon. Member for Argyll and Bute said that he wants to help the process, even though he is fundamentally trying to block it. The power to restate has been designed to allow the Government to restate domestic law where it is considered appropriate for the UK in a post-Brexit setting. However, the resulting legislation will no longer be retained EU law, as subsection (3) makes clear. The restated legislation will be ordinary domestic UK legislation that is subject to traditional domestic rules of interpretation. In particular, the supremacy of EU law will no longer apply, and section 4 rights and the general principles of EU law will cease to be read into the legislation.
If I can make a bit of progress, I will give way later.
The power will enable the Government to clarify, consolidate, codify and restate REUL to preserve the effect of the current law, while removing it from the category of REUL. It will be used selectively and is not a way to simply continue the broad concepts of EU law. Retained EU law was never intended to sit on the statute book indefinitely, although I believe that hon. Members wish it did. It is both constitutionally anomalous and politically challenging. Subsection (3) is therefore a crucial part of clause 12, and is necessary to ensure that the Government can deliver on the overarching aims of the Bill.
Can the Minister explain the difference between restating and amending? At what point does a restatement of a piece of legislation become either an amendment or a completely new piece of legislation? Who will be the arbiter of that? Will the courts decide?
I did not hear the end of that question, but each Department will be in charge of the Bills in its portfolio. We have the Brexit opportunities department helping as well. I have already mentioned the processes in place to ensure that scrutiny happens, and how Ministers will work to ensure that we assimilate, amend or update.
I am sorry if the Minister did not understand my question. I am talking not about the political, democratic scrutiny, but about the legal interpretation of restated legislation, which will fall to the courts. My question is: who decides whether what has been done under clause 12 is simply a restatement of EU retained law or an amendment to law, which requires a different process?
I hope I am not failing to understand the question. As I mentioned, each of the REUL Bills is assigned to a Department, and it will be for the Ministers responsible for the REUL Bill to make a decision on whether they need to assimilate, repeal or update.
I ask the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute to withdraw his amendment. I ask the Committee to accept the Government amendments. They are simple clarificatory amendments that ensure that the restatement powers in clauses 12 to 14 cannot be used to bring back EU law concepts, such as the principle of supremacy, or general principles that the Bill aims to sunset.
The Minister is right. As we have said from day one, we oppose the Bill, but if it has to pass—history and the numbers in the room tell us that it will pass—it will do so without our support. As we have said, we have a duty not to ignore the most egregious parts of this legislation. Where we think that it will hurt people, affect businesses or leave holes in the statute book, or is ideologically driven folly, we will oppose it, and point out the problems to the Government, so that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Glenrothes said, there cannot come a time when the Government say, “We didn’t know. Nobody told us this was happening.” Our role here is to oppose every step of the way, but also point out in as much detail and with as much clarity as we can where this dreadful piece of legislation is almost inevitably headed. We will pick the matter up, I am sure, on Report, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: 8, in clause 12, page 15, line 2, leave out “legislation” and insert “the thing”.
This amendment provides that effects produced by virtue of the retained EU law referred to in subsection (5) do not apply in relation to anything that is codified.
Amendment 9, in clause 12, page 15, line 10, leave out “of legislation”.—(Ms Ghani.)
This amendment enables regulations to produce, in relation to anything that is codified, an effect equivalent to an effect mentioned in subsection (4).
Clause 12, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Power to restate assimilated law or reproduce sunsetted retained EU rights, powers, liabilities etc
Amendments made: 10, in clause 13, page 15, line 29, leave out “legislation” and insert “thing”.
This amendment provides that effects produced by virtue of the retained EU law referred to in subsection (4) do not apply in relation to anything that is codified.
Amendment 11, in clause 13, page 15, line 33, leave out “of legislation”.
This amendment enables regulations to produce, in relation to anything that is codified, an effect equivalent to an effect mentioned in subsection (4).
Amendment 12, in clause 13, page 15, line 36, leave out “of legislation”.
This amendment enables regulations to produce, in relation to anything that is codified, an effect equivalent to an effect mentioned in subsection (7).
Amendment 13, in clause 13, page 15, line 40, leave out “legislation” and insert “thing”.—(Ms Ghani.)
This amendment enables regulations to produce, in relation to anything that is codified, an effect equivalent to an effect mentioned in subsection (7).
Clause 13, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill
Clause 14
Powers to restate or reproduce: general
The Government recognise the importance of ensuring legislation undergoes appropriate scrutiny and consultation, and I will set that out shortly. However, I ask that hon. Members reject amendments 82, 83, 55 and 56.
It is right that we ensure that any amendments to retained EU law or assimilated law receive appropriate scrutiny and are subject to the proper processes for consultation. That is why we have sought to ensure that the Bill contains robust scrutiny mechanisms, including for the powers to restate under clauses 12 and 13. First, the draft affirmative procedure will be applied where the powers to restate are being used to amend primary legislation. Secondly, the sifting procedure will apply to clauses 12 and 13 for the regulations that are proposed to be made under the negative procedure. The sifting procedure largely corresponds with the sifting procedure under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, and will provide for additional scrutiny of the legislation being made. Parliament can then scrutinise instruments, subject to sifting, and make active decisions regarding the legislation. It is our expectation that Departments will follow the standard procedures regarding consultation during policy development.
On amendment 56, let me be clear that the powers are not capable of restating any REUL or assimilated law that is primary legislation. Work is already ongoing across Whitehall on a REUL statutory instrument programme, which will continue after the Bill’s Royal Assent. The inclusion in the Bill of a consultation requirement for the powers, which is what the amendments seek to achieve, would build further time into the SI programme. That would disempower Departments, hindering their ability to pursue the REUL reform that they judged to be necessary. For the powers to restate in particular, that would delay the opportunity for Departments to use the powers to maintain the existing policy effect of their REUL in cases where that was judged to be necessary, by reproducing certain EU principles of interpretation that will cease to apply after the sunset.
Given that the powers to restate have been designed to enable Departments only to provide for substantially the same policy effect, when that is considered desirable and appropriate for the UK in a post-Brexit setting, the inclusion of a requirement to consult—both on the regulations proposed to be made and the purposes for their use—seems particularly unnecessary. As such, I ask the hon. Member for Leeds North West to withdraw the amendment.
The Government’s simple clarificatory amendments will ensure that the restatement powers in clauses 12 to 14 cannot be used to bring back the EU law concepts—such as the principle of supremacy or general principles—that the Bill aims to sunset, in general terms.
The Minister talked about both an appropriate level of scrutiny and robust scrutiny, but then went on to talk about sifting. We know that there are upwards of 4,000 regulations. That is exactly the concern we have about how much scrutiny there will be across those regulations. The Minister’s main objection seemed to be that the provision would create too lengthy a procedure for the SI programme. Our point is that it would otherwise be rushed through within a matter of months, until the 2023 sunset date, without the proper scrutiny. That is why amendments 82 and 83, and the SNP amendments 55 and 56, are necessary. I will press amendment 82 to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
A long time ago now, it seems, I was a member of my local planning authority for a number of years. We used to get dozens and dozens of planning applications for consideration, and there was often a lot of discussion about whether councillors who were uncomfortable with an application should attempt to draft conditions that had to be honoured before the application could be approved. A lot of those conditions were perfectly reasonable; we would put in conditions to ensure that housing development was road-safe, for example. An important piece of national guidance that certainly applied in Scotland—I do not know if there was an equivalent in England—was that if someone had to burden a planning application with a huge, complex set of conditions in order to make it acceptable, the application should be refused and the applicant invited to come back later with a better one. That is where we are with clause 15. The official Opposition clearly feel that the only way to make clause 15 even vaguely acceptable is to restrict it in so many ways, and with so many amendments, that it would effectively tear the heart out of the clause.
Although I certainly will not oppose any of the amendments that the hon. Member for Leeds North West wants to press to a vote, we will oppose clause 15 when the question on it is put, whether it is amended or not. It is an utterly dreadful piece of legislation. Can Members imagine any circumstance in which it could be considered good governance to give an individual or a national authority the right to repeal 4,000 pieces of legislation, knowing perfectly well that they have no intention of bringing anything forward to replace them? That is what clause 15 effectively aims to do.
As the hon. Member for Walthamstow pointed out earlier, subsection 5 of clause 15 gives the lie to the entire argument about why the Tories wanted to be allowed to regulate for themselves. It was never about being allowed to have better standards of employment law than the rest of Europe, and it was never about being allowed to apply better standards of environmental protection, consumer protection, animal welfare or anything else. It was always about pandering to what my hon. Friend the Member for Argyll and Bute has described as the wide-eyed enthusiasts of the European Research Group, and those who are so far to the right of the ERG they cannot even get elected to this place. In clause 15, and particularly in subsection (5), theirs is the agenda we are being asked to follow.
I am really interested to hear the Minister explain why she feels it is necessary to have an Act of Parliament that potentially allows a national authority to tear down 40 years of protective legislation, with the intention of replacing it with nothing, and with the extreme risk that we will run out of time to replace it with anything. We should remember that we have barely a year from now, never mind from when they start to tear apart the legislation.
When we look at the restriction in subsection (5) and then look over the page at what some of the terms in the subsection mean, we find that they are hair-raising. Legislation that imposes a burden that could include a financial cost is not allowed. There is no threshold and no limit on how many people would need to be affected by that financial cost. For example, the personal protective equipment non-provider PPE Medpro—it was slated in The Guardian this morning and in the Chamber earlier—made a profit of £76 million by supplying to the Government PPE that was not fit for use. If the Minister had been minded to bring in replacement legislation, it would have reduced PPE Medpro’s overnight profit from £76 million and tuppence to a mere £76 million. The Bill would say that was a financial burden. It would therefore be an increased regulatory burden, and it would not be allowed.
Subsection 10(b) refers to “an administrative inconvenience”. Well, good luck to the lawyers who want to decide what is an inconvenience and what is not. Again, there is no threshold and nothing about proportionality. There is nothing to say whether it imposes a disproportionate administrative inconvenience on a substantial section of the economy. That would be a reasonable protection to want to build in, but anybody who claims that that is inconvenient administratively could then challenge it in court. In fact, there is nothing written into the clause that says that the burden has to affect the private sector in order to make it unlawful.
If the burden applies to the civil servants that are trying to administer the new legislation, that is an administrative inconvenience to the civil service, especially if there will be 90,000 fewer of them than we had last year. I am talking about improving legislation that allows one person out of 60 million in these islands to say, “That’s a bit inconvenient for me”, and an entire piece of secondary legislation can be struck down. Despite some of the things I have seen from the Conservative party in my time, I genuinely do not believe that that is what it wants, but I know that that is what some people want.
My fear is that people who cannot get elected to this place are pulling the strings of those who did. Those people are looking to use the clause, and particularly subsection (5), to achieve their dream of a tiny bit of the world where all regulations can be struck down at the stroke of a pen, and once they are struck down it is impossible to replace them with anything. There are people who, at times, have been very close to the seat of power in this place—their donations have helped to change the course of political history in the last 10 years—who do not want there to be any workers’ rights whatever.
A former member of the Government, on whose watch this Bill was drafted, is on the record as saying that he does not think workers have an automatic right to paid holidays. That is the kind of ideology we are dealing with here.
Clause 15 is not about achieving a reasonable objective; it is about completely tearing down 40 years of legislation, some of which we might not welcome but much of which has helped to make the four nations of the United Kingdom more modern and democratic. For that reason, I can understand why some people would happily see all that legislation torn up and replaced with nothing. I genuinely do not believe that is what the Minister wants, I genuinely do not believe it is what the majority of Conservative party members want and I can say with absolute certainty that it is not what the people of Scotland want, and it is not something that the people of Scotland will accept.
I will support any amendments that the Opposition are minded to press to a vote but, amended or unamended, I will seek to divide the Committee on removing clause 15 from the Bill.
I beg that the Committee rejects amendment 84 and does not press new clause 9 or amendment 87.
It may surprise the Committee that English is not my first language—I was not born in this country—but it has never occurred to me that the words “regulation” and “standards” are the same. Members can look them up in a dictionary, but they are definitely not the same.
Clause 15 is about ensuring we have the right regulations in place, by removing those regulations that are unduly burdensome, outdated or not fit for purpose in the UK. How about swapping them for proportionate, high-quality and agile regulations that help the UK economy, and all of us who work in it, to be nimble and competitive?
I remind the Committee that Departments will be able to maintain the current level of regulation where it is considered appropriate. Only where existing regulations are considered to be unnecessarily burdensome and not fit for purpose may a lower level of regulation be introduced. I will validate that in a moment.
The concerns of hon. Members regarding the scope of the Bill’s powers are unfounded, as the powers to revoke or replace are important cost-cutting enablers of retained EU law reform. The dashboard has identified more than 2,500 pieces of retained EU law, and it is therefore right to have a power of this scope that is capable of acting on a wide range of REUL covering a variety of policy areas. The powers have several safeguards that mitigate their use, namely any legislation made under clause 15(2) that recreates a delegated power or a criminal offence present in REUL is subject to the affirmative procedure. Legislation made under clause 15(3) is specifically subject to the affirmative procedure, which will ensure that changes to policy objectives can be actively approved by Parliament. In addition, a sifting procedure will apply to legislation where Ministers choose to use the negative procedure.
The clause 16 power is intended to facilitate technical updates to retained EU law, to take account of changes in technology or developments in scientific understanding. This ongoing power is not intended to bring about significant policy change. It is instead designed to ensure the UK keeps pace with advances in science and technology over time.
The amendments would add a significant amount of time to the process and, ultimately, could risk Departments being unable to maximise the use of their powers to revoke or replace retained EU law across all policy areas, until such powers sunset. The Bill has been drafted to ensure that legislation made under these powers is subject to robust scrutiny procedures that are proportionate to the scope of the powers, as highlighted above.
I ask the Committee not to press amendments 85, 86 or 94. As I mentioned, the Bill is an enabling Act. Amendment 94 would place a number of environmental requirements on UK Ministers or devolved authorities when they intend to use the powers to revoke or replace, irrespective of the policy area. This amendment would therefore preclude Departments making reforms in policy areas unrelated to the environment, which would significantly impact the opportunity to use these powers.
On amendments 85 and 86, we have sought to ensure that the powers to revoke or replace cannot be used to add to the overall regulatory burden on this subject area. In her evidence to the Committee, Professor Alison Young noted that combining
“a number of earlier burdens, turn them into one burden with a higher standard, that is also not increasing the burden.”––[Official Report, Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill Public Bill Committee, 8 November 2022; c. 19, Q33.]
The requirement not to add to the overall regulatory burden has been drafted to allow the relevant national authority to determine how best to achieve the desired policy outcome. For example, removing regulations or administrative requirements that are deemed unnecessary or unsuitable will make it possible to add new regulations with a higher standard—shock, horror—where it is deemed necessary or desirable, provided that the overall regulatory burden is not increased. The reforms that these powers will enable are vital to allow the UK to drive genuine reform and seize the opportunities of Brexit.
We had a repeat of the debate about animal welfare. As I mentioned the other day, the Government remain focused on how best to deliver the “Action Plan for Animal Welfare” published in 2021, which builds on our existing high animal welfare standards. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Leeds North West to withdraw the amendment.