14:39 - The House divided: - Ayes: 226 / Noes: 290 - Question accordingly negatived.
14:53 - The House divided: - Ayes: 0 / Noes: 0 - Question accordingly negatived.
17:52 - The House divided: - Ayes: 404 / Noes: 53 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Shailesh Vara)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr Speaker
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 13—Periods of time for certain legal challenges.
New clause 53—Application of provisions to environmental claims—
‘(1) Sections 55 to 60 of this Act shall not apply to judicial review proceedings which have as their subject an issue relating wholly or partly to—
(a) the state of elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and natural sites, biological diversity and its components, including genetically modified organisms, and the interaction among these elements;
(b) factors, such as substances, energy, noise and radiation, and activities or measures, including administrative measures, environmental agreements, policies, legislation, plans and programmes, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment within the scope of sub-paragraph (a) above, and cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used in environmental decision-making;
(c) the state of human health and safety, conditions of human life, cultural sites and built structures, inasmuch as they are or may be affected by the state of the elements of the environment or, through these elements, by the factors, activities or measures referred to in sub-paragraph (b) above.”
This amendment limits the application of the provisions of this Act on judicial review proceedings which relate to the environment, in line with the definition of environmental information in the Aarhus Convention.
Government new schedule 3—Procedure for certain planning challenges.
Government amendment 1.
Amendment 23, page 55, line 12, leave out clause 55.
Amendment 24, in clause 55, page 55, line 16, leave out “must” and insert “may”.
Amendment 25, page 55, line 18, leave out “not” and insert “decide not to”.
Amendment 26, page 55, line 20, leave out “highly likely” and insert “inevitable”.
Amendment 27, page 55, line 31, leave out “highly likely” and insert “inevitable”.
Amendment 28, page 55, line 32, leave out “must” and insert “may”.
Amendment 29, page 55, line 35, leave out
“conduct (or alleged conduct) of the defendant”
and insert “procedural defect”.
Amendment 30, page 56, line 15, leave out
“conduct (or alleged conduct) of the respondent”
and insert “procedural defect”.
Amendment 31, page 56, line 19, leave out “highly likely” and insert “inevitable”.
Amendment 32, page 56, line 21, leave out “must” and insert “may”.
Amendment 33, page 56, line 28, leave out clause 56.
Amendment 34, page 57, line 25, leave out clause 57.
Amendment 35, page 58, line 2, leave out clause 58.
Amendment 36, in clause 58, page 58, line 11, leave out subsections (4) and (5).
Amendment 51, page 58, line 11, leave out subsections (4), (5) and (6) and insert—
‘(4) On an application to the High Court or the Court of Appeal by a relevant party to the proceedings, the court may order the intervener to pay such costs as the court considers just.
(5) An order under subsection (4) will not be considered just unless exceptional circumstances apply.
(6) For the purposes of subsection (5), exceptional circumstances include where an intervener has in substance acted as if it were the principal applicant, appellant or respondent in the case.’
Amendment 37, page 58, line 18, leave out “or (5)”.
Amendment 38, page 58, line 34, leave out clause 59.
Amendment 42, in clause 59, page 58, line 41, leave out
“only if leave to apply for judicial review has been granted”
and insert
“at any stage of the proceedings.”
Amendment 39, page 59, line 32, leave out subsections (9) to (11).
Amendment 40, page 60, line 11, leave out clause 60.
Amendment 44, in clause 60, page 60, line 29, leave out “must” and insert “should normally”.
Amendment 41, page 60, line 31, leave out subsections (3) to (5).
Mr Vara
May I say at the outset that I propose to speak first to the Government amendments and then to let hon. Members speak to their amendments, to which I will reply at the end of this debate?
Clause 62 creates a permission stage for statutory challenges under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 in relation to English matters. In Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) tabled a number of technical amendments that sought to tidy up and harmonise procedures across the planning regime. I responded that we needed more time to properly consider the amendments.
Following further consideration and discussions with my hon. Friend and the Under-Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham and Stamford (Nick Boles), who has responsibility for planning, the Government now seek to advance proposals to extend the permission stage to other planning-related statutory challenges; to simplify procedures to enable challenges to costs awards connected to some planning and listed building decisions to be challenged as part of the same application; and to standardise the start time for various planning-related statutory challenges.
Amendment 1, new clause 52 and new schedule 3 omit clause 62 and replace it with a new clause and schedule that set out where leave of the court is required to bring planning-related statutory challenges. The amendments to section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act that were originally set out in clause 62 affected only challenges to decisions concerning English matters. The amendments in this new schedule are broader, ensuring that the leave requirement applies in all section 288 cases.
The new schedule also requires leave of the court before challenges can be brought to a range of planning-related decisions, orders, actions and documents. It will affect section 287 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which relates to challenges to decisions concerning simplified planning zones, highways and rights of way orders, and relief of statutory undertakers from obligations. It will also affect section 63 of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990, which concerns challenges to listed building consent procedures; section 22 of the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990, which relates to challenges to hazardous substance consent decisions; and, finally, section 113 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, which relates to challenges to development plans.
It makes sense to have consistency across these different types of challenges and I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst for bringing the issue to my attention. I agree with him that requiring leave in some types of cases but not in others could create difficulties for the new planning court, at a time when we are trying to make things simpler and speed up planning cases. The efficiency of the court system is a matter for Government to consider across both England and Wales, and these amendments apply to the whole jurisdiction.
New clause 52 and new schedule 3 also permit challenges to awards of costs relating to planning and listed building decisions to be brought as part of the substantive challenge under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act or section 63 of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act.
At the moment, when an award of costs is made, it can be challenged only through an application for judicial review. That is separate to the application for statutory review of the substantive decision. Allowing costs to be challenged as part of the section 288 or section 63 challenge would remove the need for an aggrieved party to make two separate applications to the High Court and pay two separate filing fees.
New clause 13 standardises the date from which various challenges may be brought to the day after the relevant decision has been made. Planning challenges have to be brought within six weeks. Moving the start time to the day after the decision date is consistent with the approach taken in the civil procedure rules for judicial review claims. This is a harmonisation measure designed to assist in the smooth working of the new planning court and to reduce the scope for error by claimants.
I urge the House to accept amendment 1, new clauses 13 and 52, and new schedule 3.
Julie Hilling
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but he puts forward a false position. In this House, I can speak on behalf of my constituents and attempt to get Ministers to act on their behalf, but I cannot overthrow the rule of the court. We can of course attempt to change the law in future cases, but it is judicial review that enables our constituents to have recourse to justice, ensuring that justice works on their behalf, not just on behalf of the state.
I wanted to give a number of other examples of where judicial review has been used, but I will instead finish by saying that the Government should be ashamed that they are taking these steps to limit even further access to justice. They are further limiting the ability of the ordinary person to challenge the state and to say, “Actually, you’ve got it wrong on this occasion.” We will have better law and better justice if we do not curtail access for those who need it the most. I am most concerned about the little people at the bottom who will, thanks to these measures, not be able to access justice. I hope that the Government will see reason and accept our amendments. If they want to ensure that we continue to have a civilised society, they must support access to justice, and they must support David against Goliath.
Mr Vara
I thank all those who have contributed to the debate, and I hope that I can put on the record at least some of the points that I wish to make before the clock runs out at 2.39 pm. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) and, through him, the legal fraternity for all their help in ensuring that we have tidied up some matters relating to planning.
Mr Slaughter
I hope that the Minister will not read a prepared speech but address a subject that was raised in the debate, which the hon. Member for Halesowen and Rowley Regis (James Morris) rather gave away, namely that the clauses remove the existing balance in the system and weight it in favour of the stronger party. Rather than talking to the chief executive of the local authority, why does the Minister not talk to the care home resident, the small business that is being pulled down because of planning regulations or the homeless person who is not being taken in? Those are the people who are disadvantaged. They are not meritless cases, but people who do not have the necessary resources.
Mr Vara
I am addressing the issues concerned. I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman does not like them, but that does not mean that I will not address them. As for making proper speeches, given the personal attacks that he made when he spoke, perhaps he should have better regard for the etiquette of the House. I will not take any lectures from him.
Amendments 29 and 30 probe the scope of clause 55. In practice, the clause will bite on minor procedural defects, because more significant defects will not be highly unlikely to have made a difference to the outcome for the applicant. There is no accepted definition of “procedural defects”, and it would be virtually impossible to arrive at a definition that would stand the test of time because judicial review evolves with each new decision.
Clauses 56 to 61 will rebalance the financial aspects of judicial review. Those involved in bringing judicial reviews should not be able to hide behind a claimant of limited means or an off-the-shelf company to avoid appropriate liability at the taxpayer’s expense. I do not accept that clauses 56 and 57 will prevent meritorious judicial reviews from being brought. As now, non-party funders will be liable only where they also seek to drive or control the litigation in some way.
Clause 58 establishes two presumptions concerning persons who voluntarily intervene in a judicial review: first, that the court must order an intervener in judicial review proceedings to pay their own costs; and, secondly, that the court must order the intervener to pay the reasonable costs that their intervention has caused a party to incur. Where there are exceptional circumstances, the court need not make an order. Amendment 35 would remove the clause in its entirety, and amendments 36 and 37 would remove the second presumption. Amendment 51, which draws from the Supreme Court rules, would allow the court to award costs against an intervener only in exceptional circumstances.
The first presumption—that an intervener will pay their own costs—represents the current position. Interveners already almost invariably cover their own costs. On the second presumption—that an intervener will pay costs they cause a party to incur—it is right that all interventions should be carried out appropriately and reasonably. The Government share the view that interveners add value to proceedings, and clause 58 is not intended to prevent interventions. However, those who intervene should properly consider the cost implications of doing so.
I know that the clause has caused some disquiet and I agreed in Committee to consider further the second presumption, having listened carefully to the points made, particularly those by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert). I wish to record my gratitude to him for his assistance, and I believe his proposed amendment reflects, in part, what we want to achieve. Although we are not in a position to accept the amendments, we are looking seriously at how to ensure that interveners consider carefully the cost implications of intervening, without deterring those who intervene in appropriate cases and add value. I am happy to commit to continuing discussions to consider further whether the clause needs to be redrafted to target the specific behaviours that we want to address.
Clauses 59 to 61 establish a codified costs capping regime in judicial review proceedings, building on the regime that has been developed by the courts through case law. The usual costs position should be circumvented only in exceptional, meritorious cases involving serious issues of the highest public interest that otherwise would not be taken forward. We are concerned that costs capping orders can currently be made at any stage of a case. If an order is made at an early stage and a judge later decides that the case has no merit and does not grant permission for it to go any further, the claimant will be protected from having to pay the defendant’s costs of defending that unmeritorious claim.
A number of points have been raised by colleagues. I simply say that with judicial review, we are trying to ensure that meritorious claims go ahead. It is unmeritorious claims that we are trying to deal with, such as those where people hide behind a shelf company, or where people front an application for other individuals who are actually behind it and driving it. We want to maintain judicial reviews for meritorious cases, but we want to ensure that unmeritorious claims are dealt with appropriately. We also want to ensure proportionality by making those who wish to intervene take account of the costs, particularly when some of those costs are to be borne by others.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 52 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 13
Periods of time for certain legal challenges
‘(1) In section 61N of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (legal challenges relating to neighbourhood development orders)—
(a) in subsections (1)(b) and (2)(b), after “beginning with” insert “the day after”;
(b) in subsection (3)(b)—
(i) for “during” substitute “before the end of”;
(ii) after “beginning with” insert “the day after”.
(2) In section 106C of that Act (legal challenges relating to development consent obligations)—
(a) in subsection (1)(b)—
(i) for “during” substitute” “before the end of”;
(ii) after “beginning with” insert “the day after”;
(b) in subsection (1A), after “begins with” insert “the day after”;
(c) in subsections (2)(b) and (3)(b)—
(i) for “during” substitute” “before the end of”;
(ii) after “beginning with” insert “the day after”.
(3) In section 13 of the Planning Act 2008 (legal challenges relating to national policy statements), in subsections (1)(b), (2)(b), (3)(b), (4)(b), (5)(b) and (6)(b)—
(a) for “during” substitute “before the end of”;
(b) after “beginning with” insert “the day after”.
(4) In section 118 of that Act (legal challenges relating to applications for orders granting development consent)—
(a) in subsections (1)(b), (2)(b) and (3)(b)—
(i) for “during” substitute “before the end of”;
(ii) after “beginning with” insert “the day after”;
(b) in subsections (4)(b), (5)(b) and (6)(b)—
(i) for “during” substitute “before the end of”;
(ii) after “day”, wherever occurring, insert “after the day”;
(c) in subsection (7)(b)—
(i) for “during” substitute “before the end of”;
(ii) after “beginning with” insert “the day after”.” —(Mr Vara.)
The provisions amended by the clause allow for legal challenges to certain planning-related decisions and other actions. They stipulate that a challenge may be made during a period of six weeks beginning with the day on which the decision or action challenged occurs. The amendments secure that the six-week period does not start to run until the following day
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
Susan Elan Jones (Clwyd South) (Lab)
I was not going to speak in this debate, but we have heard some powerful arguments. I support the new clause because we have made a distinction in law between crimes that involve guns and crimes that involve knives. I know that there are certain arguments for that—some will say that we were right to draw that distinction—but at the end of the day it makes precious little difference to families whether their teenage child is maimed by a gun or a knife. It is important that we reflect on the seriousness of crimes involving knives.
There is a specific liberal school of thought on the issue. I believe that many arguments could be made with greater force if new clause 6 related to a first offence with a knife, but that is not what it is about. A very important message is being sent.
From my personal experience as a councillor in Peckham, I know how seriously knife crime was viewed there. It concerns me that parts of the country that are many miles removed—culturally, economically and socially—from our inner cities now face crimes that 20 years ago would have been viewed as inner-city crimes. That is why it is important to send this message.
Those are some brief observations, but this is an important crime. This is not about not tokenism; it is about getting it right. If this country’s prison system is worth anything, we must also address rehabilitation so that the people who commit these crimes are put back on the right path. Let us not kid ourselves by arguing about abstract things. Knife crime is a cause of concern and I agree with the new clause.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Jeremy Wright)
This group covers several issues, but let me start with the Government new clauses and amendments. New clause 44 creates a new offence of police corruption. Police officers ensure our safety in the Palace of Westminster, and they put their lives on the line every time they go out on patrol. Many police officers regularly serve the public bravely up and down the country, but as my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said on 6 March, the findings of Mark Ellison’s review of the investigation of the murder of Stephen Lawrence are “profoundly shocking” and
“will be of grave concern to everyone in the House and beyond”.—[Official Report, 6 March 2014; Vol. 576, c. 1063.]
The public expect the police to act with honesty and integrity at all times, which is why the Government are introducing a range of measures to improve both the integrity and the transparency of the police. In the small number of cases where police officers fall short of the high standards we expect, it is right that the full force of the criminal law is available to punish and deter acts of corruption or other improper exercise of power.
Police corruption is currently dealt with in the criminal law as part of the common law offence of misconduct in public office. Although the number of prosecutions for misconduct in public office has increased in recent years, they have spanned a range of occupations, not just police officers. This Government believe that the British public expect on-duty police officers, as the guardians of the law and the Queen’s peace, to conduct themselves to a higher standard than other public servants. If police officers fail to conduct themselves to those high standards, it is right that we should seek to uphold that higher standard by means of the criminal law.
We believe that the best way to do that is to create a new offence of police corruption that applies solely to police officers, alongside the existing broader common law offence. The new offence will be triable only in the Crown court, and it will carry a maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment. It will send a clear message that police corruption is serious, and that Parliament has expressly set a high maximum sentence for those convicted.
We have deliberately cast the behaviour covered by the new offence more broadly than the existing common law offence to ensure that it catches all acts of corrupt or other improper exercise of police powers and privileges. For example, were an officer deliberately to focus lines of inquiry away from a suspect with whom he had a corrupt relationship, such as by arresting a person they knew to be innocent, they would commit the offence. The offence applies whether or not the benefit or detriment came about, and regardless of whether the officer was on duty at the time of the corrupt behaviour. It covers cases where an officer fails to act for a purpose that is improper, such as if the officer knows that a suspect did not commit a crime, but conceals that knowledge because of an improper relationship with the person who committed it. It also applies where an officer threatens to act or not to act, and that threat is made for an improper purpose.
Amendments 45 and 46 are minor consequential amendments to the Bill’s extent and long title that arise from new clause 44.
New clauses 45 to 50 and new schedule 2 introduce new criminal offences of ill-treatment or wilful neglect by an individual care worker, and ill-treatment or wilful neglect of someone following a gross breach of a relevant duty of care by a care provider. The House will well remember the appalling events that occurred at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust. Much work has been put in train since February last year, when Sir Robert Francis published the final report of the public inquiry into those events, including the establishment of several reviews into specific issues.
The inquiry on patient safety, led by Professor Don Berwick, identified a small but significant gap in the existing legislation. It recommended the creation of a new offence of ill-treatment or wilful neglect to fill that gap. Of course, no sort of ill-treatment or wilful neglect of patients or those receiving social care is ever acceptable. Yet at the moment, no matter how egregious the conduct, prosecutions are difficult to pursue unless the victim either lacks capacity, is subject to the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983, or is a child to whom section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 applies. That means that a significant group of patients and service users are denied the protection of an offence directed explicitly at ill-treatment or wilful neglect by those entrusted with their care, both individuals and organisations. There is a range of existing legislative and regulatory safeguards that may apply in some cases, but we share the view that they are not sufficient to cover all the situations that might arise from ill-treatment or wilful neglect.
Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)
Will the Minister take account of the one new element in the situation, the development of social media, which makes it possible for a large crowd to be assembled for an illegal rave in a property that has been taken over for that purpose? That causes great problems for the neighbours.
Jeremy Wright
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. He makes a very good point. That is one of the things that we need to look at carefully in considering whether to pursue the ideas that my hon. Friends the Members for Shipley and for Bury North are putting forward in new clause 34. We will continue to do that work and to keep the legal framework under careful review. However, I hope that my hon. Friends will understand that, for the reasons I have given, I cannot accept the new clause today.
New clause 35 seeks to extend the offence in section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004—causing or allowing a child or vulnerable adult to die or suffer serious physical harm—so that it applies to causing or allowing any person to die or suffer serious physical harm. I understand that the intention of my hon. Friends is to create a new form of joint enterprise offence. As they will readily recognise, the law on joint enterprise is complex. It forms part of the common law on secondary liability and requires a common purpose between two or more people, resulting in each of them being liable for any offences which might be committed in pursuit of, or as a consequence of, that common purpose.
The offence under section 5 of the 2004 Act, by contrast, is not an offence of joint enterprise. Under the section 5 offence, the person who allows the death or serious physical harm is liable on the basis that he or she failed to take such steps as he or she could reasonably be expected to take to protect the victim from a foreseeable risk of serious physical harm, and not necessarily because he or she shared some common purpose with the person who caused the death or serious physical harm.
The important point about the section 5 offence is that it applies only to members of a victim’s household who had frequent contact with the victim, and could therefore reasonably be expected to have been aware of a risk of serious physical harm to the victim, and to have protected the victim from such harm. The offence therefore covers domestic situations in which members of the household may feel under pressure to remain silent to protect themselves and other members of the household.
I am not persuaded that it would be right to extend section 5 in the way that is suggested, not least because it is not an offence of joint enterprise. Moreover, the Government in 2004 deliberately limited the section 5 offence to the special circumstances that pertain when a person, whether a child or a vulnerable adult, who particularly needs the protection of the law is within the sanctuary of their own home. It has been used successfully in a number of cases, most notably that of baby Peter Connelly. We believe that such circumstances deserve special and extraordinary measures that are separate from the norm.
In addition, the section 5 offence does not require the person who allowed the death or serious physical harm to have been present at the time of the unlawful act, but simply to have been a member of the same household who had frequent contact with the victim, and could therefore reasonably be expected to have been aware of a risk of serious physical harm to the victim. If the allower had to be present at the time of the unlawful act, as the new clause requires, it would raise more difficult evidential requirements for the prosecution in a baby P-type case. My hon. Friends’ new clause would therefore detract from the usefulness of the offence in the specific circumstance at which it is aimed, and it would not necessarily be workable in a wider context. For that reason, I am afraid I cannot accept it.
New clause 36 would change the scope of the offence under section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 of intentionally causing harassment, alarm or distress to others by using
“threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour,”
meaning that “insulting” words or behaviour are no longer captured. My hon. Friends’ intention may be to bring that section of the 1986 Act in line with a similar amendment to section 5 of that Act, which came into effect earlier this year. There are, however, significant differences between the section 5 offence and the more serious and deliberate offence made out under section 4A. The latter requires proof of intent to cause harm to another person, and proof that such harassment, alarm and distress were actually caused to another person. Those differentiating features make it much more serious and significantly raise the threshold of what must be proved. In the light of that higher threshold, the Government do not agree that excluding “insulting” words or behaviour is justified.
Furthermore, during the long-running campaign that culminated in the change to section 5, one key argument put forward by those seeking to remove “insulting” was that removal would not have a negative impact on minority groups because the police had more appropriate powers available to deal with such unacceptable behaviour under section 4A of the 1986 Act. Having accepted that argument as part of the reasoning behind the removal of “insulting” from section 5, it does not seem sensible to remove the protections provided by retaining “insulting” in relation to words and behaviour in section 4A.
For new clauses 6 and 7 I pay tribute not just to my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes)—to whom generous tribute was paid by my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield North (Nick de Bois)—but, preventing his modesty from excluding the facts, to my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield North. He has done a huge amount to raise awareness of knife crime concerns, and few people in this place have done more to enhance the safety of the communities they represent, and indeed other communities, by a single-minded focus on this issue.
As my hon. Friend knows, the Government have done their bit on this subject. We have a comprehensive plan in place under the ending gang and youth violence programme, and—in no small measure down to his efforts—we extended new offences of threatening with a knife or offensive weapon in a public place or a school to young people as well as adults, and introduced a minimum sentence for those offences. We have stopped simple cautions being used for possession of a knife in the absence of exceptional circumstances, and as he knows, we are legislating further on cautioning in the Bill. We have taken this issue seriously throughout, and will continue to do so.
Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)
When some of those measures were passed, full consideration was given to their consequences. What would be the consequences for the prison population of accepting new clauses 6 and 7?
Jeremy Wright
As my hon. Friend and distinguished predecessor will understand better than most, these are not Government new clauses and therefore they do not come with the same assessments. He will appreciate that the two different new clauses would have different effects, but if the House of Commons decides that those changes should play a part in the Bill, we will make all the necessary assessments. He will also understand that the Government’s clear policy is to ensure that the right people are in prison and that the courts have the opportunity to send the right people to prison whenever they deem that appropriate. The way to deal with and reduce the prison population is, very straightforwardly, to ensure that reoffending is reduced and that people do not continue to return to custody. My hon. Friend began the good work in that regard.
Sir Bob Russell
The Minister, quite rightly, is using his words carefully. Following the intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Crispin Blunt), would the sentence be mandatory, or would judges still have an element of discretion?
Jeremy Wright
My hon. Friend the Member for Enfield North made the position very clear. It is a mandatory sentence in the absence of exceptional circumstances. The courts would have the opportunity to say that in those exceptional circumstances the penalty should not apply, but that is standard practice for mandatory sentencing across the criminal law, and entirely appropriate.
Crispin Blunt
I do not understand how my hon. Friend can vigorously oppose new clause 34, despite its evident merits—and on which I unusually agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies)—because it has not been fully considered, and not come out with a similar line about the cost of the measures before us, which ought to be part of our full consideration before we make our decision.
Jeremy Wright
My hon. Friend is right that if he is in agreement with my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies), he does have me worried. He will appreciate that the arguments on new clause 34 are rather broader than its cost implications. As I have set out already, we cannot accept it at this stage for several reasons, and that is different from a specifically cost-related calculation.
I note that new clauses 6 and 7 contain some minor, technical flaws that would need to be addressed if either were to receive the approval of the House today. As my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield North knows, his objectives have considerable support among Conservative Members. However, as he also knows, although both coalition parties are fully committed to protecting the public, policy agreement has not been reached on these new clauses, so it will be for the whole House to decide on the conclusion to this debate. So that that debate may continue, I shall finally say that I hope that the House will support—
Dr Huppert
The Minister coyly described flaws in the new clauses. Would he care to list them so that the House may know exactly what they are?
Jeremy Wright
I am not sure that this is the appropriate time. There are some minor and technical flaws, but my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield North has made his case and the House will have to consider what he has said and decide what it wishes to do. Regardless of the fate of my hon. Friend’s new clauses, I hope that the Government’s new clauses, new schedule and amendments will find favour with the House.
Mr Slaughter
I will take a different approach from the Minister’s and address the majority of my remarks to new clauses 6 and 7; I shall discuss the Government’s clauses at the end of my speech. I welcome this debate and the chance to discuss a subject important to all hon. Members—perhaps particularly to those with constituencies in London, where almost half of knife-related offences take place. Knife crime is one of the most serious and intractable criminal justice issues, and one that often leaves irrevocable damage in its wake.
In my own borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, we have seen more than 800 knife crime incidents since 2010, with tragic consequences for the victims and their families. In London as a whole, that figure is closer to 40,000. In 2013-14, more than 50% of all murders in London were committed with a knife. Knife crime is not just an issue for London and other major cities: it is a national menace. Nearly a third of adult offenders currently receive an immediate custodial sentence. New clauses 6 and 7 would impose what has been referred to as a mandatory minimum custodial sentence on those convicted of a second knife possession offence. For those aged 18 and over, it would be six months; for those aged 16 to 18, it would be a four-month detention and training order.
Contrary to press reports, and statements made by the Deputy Prime Minister, the new clauses would permit judicial discretion, and that is key to our support. Subsection (2B) of new clause 6 states that
“the court must impose an appropriate custodial sentence…unless…there are particular circumstances”—
those are the words, rather than “exceptional circumstances”—
“which…relate to the offence or to the offender and…would make it unjust…in all the circumstances.”
It would also be a defence to the new offences if possession were with lawful authority or reasonable excuse. This measure should not be seen as a catch-all solution.
In light of the current overcrowding crisis in the prison system, The Guardian reported today that the Lord Chancellor will be unable to implement his legislation, if passed, for at least a year; his reverse King Midas touch extends, it seems, to all areas of the criminal justice system.
Jeremy Wright
As the hon. Lady will understand, I will not have a chance to sum up this debate, so I will respond now, if she will forgive me. I hope that she will look carefully at our “Transforming Rehabilitation” proposals. Part and parcel of those proposals is that young and older people should have support that starts before they leave custody and sees them through the prison gate and out into the community. Many people who receive sentences for the knife crime offences that she is describing have custodial sentences of less than 12 months. As she will appreciate, no licence or rehabilitation automatically applies to such sentences at the moment. We have already changed that and the “Transforming Rehabilitation” proposals will support that.
Heidi Alexander
I am grateful to the Minister for those remarks. However, most people would still agree that the level of reoffending in our society is too high. I am pleased that the Government are taking those positive steps, but I know that he will agree that there is still much more to do.
To conclude, this is a difficult issue but, on balance, I believe that the new clauses tabled by the hon. Member for Enfield North should be supported in the Division Lobby this evening. I will certainly support them.
Jeremy Wright
I do not doubt for a moment the sincerity of the hon. Gentleman’s objectives. He may well have a very good point on the deficiencies in joint enterprise law. But the point I was trying to make to him earlier—perhaps in too Sir Humphrey-ish a way—was that what he would actually achieve with new clause 35 is almost the direct opposite of what he wants. The problem he will face, if this were to become the law, is that people who can be prosecuted now under the Act will not be able to be prosecuted because he is replacing a requirement that someone knew what was going on but did not need to be there with a requirement that they were there at the time. That is the problem.
Philip Davies
If the Minister had listened when I explained the case of Donald Banfield, he would know that it was pretty obvious that the mother and daughter were there. Everybody accepts that, yet those women are still walking free, and it seems that the Minister is not prepared to do anything about it.
Finally, new clause 36 would decriminalise insulting words and behaviour. Courtesy of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 was amended to remove the word “insulting”. As of 1 February this year, it has not been an offence to use insulting words or behaviour contained within a section 5 charge. The law change did not, however, affect sections 4 and 4A of the same Act. I was delighted that the word “insulting” was removed from section 5 of the 1986 Act, but I think it must follow that it should be removed from all sections of it. If we are to be consistent, why not? Section 4A is very similar to section 5, and I would like to see all references to “insulting” removed from the legislation. I have focused on this particular issue for the purpose of today’s debate on the amendments. The word “offensive” would remain; only the word “insulting” would be removed. As the Minister said, section 4 needs to be coupled with the threat of violence, whereas someone can be found guilty of an offence by intentionally insulting someone under section 4A and could be sent to prison for six months.
I am not alone in wanting this change. The Joint Committee on Human Rights said in its report of October 2011:
“We also support the amendment of the Public Order Act to remove all reference to offences based on insulting words and behaviour. This would enhance human rights and remove the possible incompatibility with the right to freedom of expression.”
Peter Tatchell—an unlikely ally of mine, Madam Deputy Speaker—said:
“Section 4A of the Public Order Act is sufficient to convey all the exceptional circumstances requiring prosecution (although its criminalisation of mere insults should also be repealed for the afore-mentioned reasons).”
I believe that it is totally unacceptable in a supposedly free country with alleged free speech that we should have any reference to the term “insulting” in the laws of our land. I think most people are fed up with political correctness, so abolishing any further criminalisation of insults would be a great step to restoring faith in this place, showing that Britain is a country where free speech is cherished. A ComRes poll showed that 62% of people did not believe that the state should ever criminalise insults—a viewpoint supported by Liberty and the National Secular Society.
I think these are important matters, but I do not intend to press the new clauses to a vote. I am appalled and depressed, however, that the shadow Minister thinks all of these issues that affect people’s lives are not even worthy of consideration. He should be ashamed of himself; I look forward to his apology at some future point.
The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Grayling)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
Let me start by thanking all the right hon. and hon. Members who served in Committee, spoke on Report and took part in the debates on the Bill. It has benefited from the interesting and lively debate that we have had—[Interruption.]
Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)
Order. I am sorry to interrupt the Lord Chancellor but will Members who are leaving the Chamber please do so quietly and swiftly and show due deference to him?
Chris Grayling
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.
I am grateful to the Under-Secretaries of State for Justice, my hon. Friends the Members for North West Cambridgeshire (Mr Vara) and for Kenilworth and Southam (Jeremy Wright). Their excellent work in Committee and on Report has guided the Bill to this stage. I also thank members of the Bill team and the Clerks for their advice and support.
This is an important Bill that toughens up sentences for serious and repeat offenders and strengthens the justice system. I have always been clear that those who break the rules should face the consequences and that protecting the public is our top priority. As a result of the action that the Government are taking, we are reducing crime, toughening up the justice system and giving victims the support they both need and deserve. We are making sure that hard-working families feel safe and secure in their local communities. This Bill is yet another step in delivering our promises and guaranteeing that security.
We are not a Government who legislate without taking into account the views of Parliament. We have listened carefully to the valuable discussion and debate in this House and the Bill has been improved as a result. Many colleagues in this House have rightly expressed concern that sentencing for those who cause death or serious injury by driving while disqualified has been inadequate. In particular, I pay tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Gloucester (Richard Graham), for Gillingham and Rainham (Rehman Chishti) and for Kingswood (Chris Skidmore), who have campaigned tirelessly on the issue. That is why we have added measures to the Bill to ensure that the courts have the power properly to penalise those who step back behind the wheel after being disqualified from driving and cause death or serious injury. It is right that they should face a longer sentence for doing so. It is clear from the discussion on Report and in previous debates that concerns remain about the penalties available for other serious driving offences. That is why we have committed to carrying out a wider review over the next few months, which we hope will address many of the points that have been raised.
We also had a very interesting debate in Committee and on Report on child grooming. In an age of constantly changing modes of communication, it is vital that our laws provide the utmost protection for children. My hon. Friend the Member for Ealing Central and Acton (Angie Bray) suggested changes to the law on malicious communications. We agreed that that offence should be triable either way and subject to a higher penalty. In doing so we have also provided the police with more time to investigate those offences. That is a step forward in keeping children safe in the modern world and I commend my hon. Friend for her contribution to this Bill.
To be bipartisan, the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) also suggested changes to the law on child grooming following her excellent work with Barnardo’s on child sexual exploitation. The Government have committed to considering whether changes to the law on meeting a child following child grooming are required and we are open to the arguments she has been making.
Let me turn to the provisions on secure colleges. I can only say that I am disappointed by the position taken by Opposition Members on the proposals. Youth reoffending rates are far too high and the system as it stands is not working well enough. Secure colleges represent an opportunity to change the way we detain and rehabilitate young offenders and prevent them from embarking on a life of crime. My vision is for young people to have access to high-quality education and training that will allow them to fulfil their potential. My vision is of detaining young people in an environment that is less like a prison and more like an educational institution with a fence around it, where we can ensure not only that they lose their liberty as per the orders of the court but that we maximise the time we have them with us to ensure that we equip them in the best possible way so that they do not reoffend afterwards. That is all the more important if a young person has set out on the wrong path in life. It is beyond me how the Opposition can criticise these once-in-a-generation reforms, which put education at the heart of youth custody, which seek to equip young people with the skills they need to turn their backs on crime and which give those who have broken the law the opportunity to make a fresh start in life.
There has been much debate about the detail of the secure college regime and the pathfinder college. Let me be clear that no final decisions have been made on who will be accommodated in the pathfinder. Those decisions will be taken as plans for the pathfinder are developed and in light of careful analysis of the needs of the youth custodial population and the impacts on different groups. Our plans for the rules that underpin the secure college provisions will be subject to public consultation. They will be published during the passage of the Bill to benefit from the wealth of expertise within the youth justice sector.
I hope that hon. Members from all sides recognise the genuine opportunity that such a new regime offers us to tackle youth reoffending and to help make a positive impact on the future for young offenders. Of course we are still developing some of the details, but the Bill lays down the foundations for a transformative approach to youth custody. I urge the Opposition to think again before they play politics with the future of young people who will genuinely benefit from both the education and the regime that the Bill is designed to provide, and to turn away from the siren voices that say that this is a new brutal regime. It is about a positive experience for young people in the hope that we can turn their lives around. Who can disagree with that?
Finally, I turn to judicial review. I fully recognise that judicial review is an important issue, which has been reflected by the debate and the interest that the House has shown. I remain firmly of the view that the Government are right to take action. Too often unmeritorious cases clog up the system, wasting time and taxpayers’ money. Judicial review is important. It should always remain available for well-founded challenges that raise issues of genuine significance. It also enables individuals to sort out a situation where they have faced, for example, maladministration from a public body, but I do not accept that the system should allow pressure groups to use judicial review as a PR stunt, or as a means of delaying properly made decisions—often decisions made in this House—while the taxpayer foots the bill.
The recent case concerning the remains of King Richard III illustrates exactly why we need reform. My decision to grant a licence to exhume Richard III’s human remains was challenged by the Plantagenet Alliance. It was a spurious and nonsensical claim brought as a stunt, and those bringing the claim hid behind a shell company to avoid facing the costs of doing so. They all claimed that they were members of the family of the Plantagenets. Well, I suspect that most of us in the Chamber are to some extent descendants of the family of the Plantagenets. It was not an issue in which there was any obvious family involvement. It was, as I say, a stunt. Because the company did not have any assets, an absolute protective costs order was sought and granted.
In the end the High Court upheld my decision as lawful, rational and fair, but we and our constituents were still left to pick up the tab for defending the challenge. At a time when difficult decisions are being taken across the public sector and when people are losing their jobs because of the need to rationalise to tackle our deficit, can Members honestly say that that was a good use of the judicial review process and of hard-working taxpayers’ money?
Applications for judicial review for cases that stand little prospect of success put undue pressure on the courts and on other essential public services and can unduly frustrate decisions that were properly made. The reforms in the Bill were developed following a full public consultation. They are aimed at improving, not scrapping, the judicial review process so that it is not open to abuse, and so that genuinely arguable cases can proceed quickly to final resolution.
In summary, the Bill is an important piece of legislation that has benefited from the scrutiny of this House and the additions that have been made as a result. In this legislation, the Government are ending automatic early release for dangerous criminals, child rapists and terrorists, we are restricting the use of cautions for serious offences, and we are toughening up sentences for prisoners who go on the run. We are taking the action that the public expect to help keep them safe and secure.
The Bill will also help us to modernise court processes and to work to break the cycle of youth reoffending. It is about rehabilitation as much as it is about tough action in our justice system. That is the mix we need in our justice system. People need to be properly punished when they offend, on behalf of the victims as well as on behalf of justice, but we also need to do everything we can to turn their lives around once they have offended so that they do not come back and commit crimes all over again. That is the philosophy of this Government. That is what underlies the Bill, and I commend it to the House.
Sarah Champion
I want to put on record my abhorrence at the idea of the giant children’s prison. Not one of the witnesses we heard from spoke favourably about it. I know that it is being packaged as an educational establishment, but there is nothing in the Bill to tell us that there will be qualified teachers and social workers or anything about the level of education that the children will be offered.
Particularly worrisome for me is that, given that only 4% of the young people and children in the prison population are between the ages of 12 and 15, the vast majority of the young people will be much older than that, and only 4% will be girls—out of 320 young people, about 12 will be girls. Those girls might have committed crimes, but there is an awful lot of evidence that when girls commit crimes, it is normally because they are coerced into it, or they are acting up because of some gross abuse that has already happened to them and it tends to be a cry for help. I find it deeply abhorrent to put them in a very testosterone-led environment, and worry for their psychological futures.
I also find the fact that there was no commitment for there to be qualified teachers extremely worrying, and it confirms to me that the college is just a holding borstal, rather than an educational establishment as it is described. I also found it troublesome that there is a lot of mention of restraint in the Bill, and some of the techniques being used are not legal according to the UN—that should not be happening, particularly to children. Again, I make a plea to the Secretary of State to please consider that matter.
Chris Grayling
Can the hon. Lady draw my attention to where in the Bill the word “restraint” appears?
Sarah Champion
Standing here now, no I cannot, but I will be happy to provide that evidence. If the Secretary of States gives me a couple of minutes I could probably dig it out of the Bill.