My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has already outraged the protocol of this House by recognising people present beyond the Bar, but I do not think that he will be taken away to the Tower for that breach because it is good that Members of the House are aware that Jane’s parents are present to see us in action. I am afraid that the other night they had the experience of seeing the Lords in action that delayed this debate, but it is such an important matter for them, their family and the wider public that we have this debate today. I sincerely hope that within a few minutes they will see Jane’s law passed by this House.
Amendment 178ZZA creates a right of appeal for the prosecution against a Crown Court decision to grant bail. It does so by extending the existing powers in the Bail (Amendment) Act 1993, which currently provides for a right of appeal against bail granted by a magistrates’ court. That appeal is to the Crown Court. Under Amendment 178ZZA, the avenue of appeal against a Crown Court decision would be to the High Court.
As we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, this is a matter that has been the subject of a campaign by Jane’s parents following the release on bail of Jonathan Vass by the Crown Court, despite representations from the Crown Prosecution Service. We considered this matter very carefully. We took account, on the one hand, of the fact that a right of appeal would necessarily impose an additional burden on the High Court. On the other hand, there was strong support for change in the other place, as we have heard, and the Director of Public Prosecutions has made it clear that he too is in favour of such a change in our law.
Our conclusion was that without calling into question the correctness of decisions made by Crown Court judges in the vast majority of cases, it is not right that such decisions should be beyond challenge. We are persuaded of the case for changing the law in order to ensure that victims and their families, and the public at large, are protected.
The effect of the provision will be that the decision to appeal must be made immediately, before the defendant has been released, and as the defendant would be held in custody pending the appeal, the appeal must be heard very quickly. Listing cases at such short notice before a High Court judge clearly has resource implications, and it is important that the right of appeal should be used sparingly. This will be recognised in the guidance that the Director of Public Prosecutions will issue to his staff, which will require a decision to appeal to be approved at a senior level.
The most notable difference between our Amendment 178ZZA and Amendment 178 moved by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham—I am grateful that he intends to withdraw it—is that ours is shorter and does not permit an appeal against a decision by the Crown Court to grant bail where it was itself made on appeal from the grant of bail by a magistrates’ court. So if a defendant was granted bail by the magistrates, the prosecution appealed and the Crown Court granted bail, the prosecution would not be able to appeal further. This is to stop a continuing series of appeals on a matter that by then would have been considered by two courts. I therefore commend Amendments 178ZZA and 178ZZB to your Lordships' House.
It is my responsibility as the Minister to put on the record the technicalities; hence, some of my remarks may seem gobbledegook to those not in the Chamber. However, I can assure the House that what the Government are doing, supported by Her Majesty's Opposition and, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, made clear, supported firmly by the other place, is approving Jane’s law.
My Lords, these are technical government amendments. I beg to move.
My Lords, we understand the intention behind the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, and are very sympathetic to his concern for children and young people. The welfare of a child or young person securely remanded is clearly very important. Extending looked-after child status to all those under 18 who are securely remanded, as we are doing in Clause 97, proves our commitment to that.
However, the Government believe that the current age threshold for secure remand of a child should remain at 12. Serious offences are sometimes committed by 12 and 13 year-olds. They present such a risk of harm that the court may come to the decision that a remand to secure accommodation is necessary to protect the public. We do not think that this decision is one that local authorities should be making, which would be the only alternative. It is not fair to impose this burden of responsibility on local authorities.
Amendment 178ZZAZA, however, raises quite different issues. It is inconsistent as between non-extradition and extradition proceedings. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has flagged up some of those inconsistencies. In the former, the age threshold for electronic monitoring of children remanded to non-secure local authority accommodation would be raised from 12 to 14 years. In extradition cases it would remain at 12 years of age. A similar inconsistency would arise depending on whether the child or young person is on bail or remanded to non-secure local authority accommodation. The age threshold is currently set at 12 years in both circumstances, but this amendment would raise the threshold to 14 years in respect of remands to non-secure local authority accommodation only. Furthermore, by removing the power of the court to use electronic monitoring in respect of 12 and 13 year-olds, the amendment could have the effect of more young children being remanded in secure accommodation. The availability of electronic monitoring can be the deciding factor in a court giving bail to a young offender.
Younger children are more likely to have risk factors that can be managed in the community with appropriate conditions and electronic monitoring to ensure compliance. Removing the power to monitor electronically children under the age of 14 would create a gap in the powers of the court to manage properly some children aged 12 and 13 who, regrettably, engage in serious criminal behaviour. Such monitoring is an essential tool for ensuring the compliance of children who do not meet the test for a secure remand but who nevertheless pose a risk of further offending. This risk is best met with a remand to local authority accommodation subject to curfew.
In terms of extradition, we are making provision for a hypothetical position in respect of a child subject to extradition proceedings. This will ensure fair treatment. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
I apologise for not being here at the start of the debate. Has the Minister’s department carried out any research into the influence of the peer group on young offenders aged from 12 to 14? There can be very sympathetic officials in the institutions which hold these young people but the problem is that they get influenced, if not abused, by most unwholesome characters. I draw on rather out-of-date experience as a magistrate, but that was always a concern. If the Minister does not have the information now perhaps she could write.
I am happy to write to the noble Baroness. Of course she is absolutely right. We know very well that the influence of peer groups is a very important issue.
I thank the noble Baroness for the information that was conveyed to her from the Box but it does not quite reach the point that I was making. The point was that if the country to which the child is being extradited does not apply electronic monitoring, should we be doing it? That was my question, but I am not asking for an answer now.
I am very happy to write to the noble Lord on that point.
I am grateful to the Minister for her reply and grateful too for the intervention from the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I said at the beginning that I am glad to see the reforms that are implicit already in Clauses 91 to 94 but, as I am sure the noble Baroness realises, there is disquiet over the use of electronic monitoring for extended periods, particularly for young people. I suspect that this will return on Report, if not with my amendment then in connection with Clause 75, which was discussed on Tuesday. I am grateful that obviously work has been done to produce the answers to these probing amendments. In that spirit and with gratitude to the Minister I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
It would appear that I am in some danger of becoming a repeat offender when it comes to breaching protocol. I apologise to the House.
My only concern about the technical amendments in this group is the insertion in Amendment 178ZAZB of the word “accused” before the word “charged”. I appreciate that it is intended to correct what was described as an accidental gap in replicating earlier provisions, but it concerns me that we may apply electronic monitoring to people who have not been charged but merely accused of an offence in another jurisdiction. I wonder whether it is the right approach. Perhaps the noble Lord will want to think further on that. It strikes me as a little odd, in the same way as the previous matter we discussed struck me as odd. I may be entirely wrong but it seems to jar with the notion that a simple accusation would suffice to allow somebody to undergo electronic monitoring.
My Lords, one of the uses of Committee is to allow noble Lords to scrutinise and to seek clarification. The noble Lord’s point is not covered in my notes. The amendments in this group are intended to be minor and technical. They set out a requirement for electronic monitoring in extradition cases that is consistent with its use under the Extradition Act 2003. Clause 88 is intended to create a test that is equivalent to that in Clause 87 which applies to young people who are charged with or convicted of an offence. “Accused” is the word used in the Extradition Act. If we did not change the wording of the Bill to match, we would create a lacuna whereby the courts would have only limited remand powers over an individual who was being extradited before being charged. I will clarify the noble Lord's point about the use of electronic tagging and write to him.
My Lords, this package of amendments will give effect to the second stage of the Government’s approach to the simplification and clarification of the current release and recall provisions for determinate sentenced prisoners by bringing these provisions together within a single statute—the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
The current release and recall provisions are spread across a number of different statutes, subject to commencement orders with complex transitional and savings provisions and subsequent amendments. This has created an extremely intricate and unwieldy web of legislation which is very difficult to follow, even for criminal justice experts and practitioners. This in turn has been heavily criticised by the courts and calls have been made for the Government to simplify the provisions.
The first step in our approach to achieve this simplification was to introduce the provisions contained in Clauses 100 to 112 of Chapter 4 of the Bill. These amend the current 2003 Act provisions to establish the single regime that will apply to those sentences imposed on or after commencement.
The second stage of our approach, which is what this package of amendments will do, is to consolidate within the 2003 Act those provisions of the Criminal Justice Acts 1967 and 1991 that will be required to continue to apply to those prisoners who, at the time of commencement, are subject to the release arrangements of those previous statutory regimes. We have no intention of making substantial changes to the way in which the sentences of those existing prisoners operate and so these amendments do not change the release dates or licence lengths for those current prisoners. In practice, this means saving the current release regimes for the few remaining 1967 Act prisoners; 1991 Act prisoners serving long-term sentences of four years or more for sexual or violent offences—often known as “DCR” prisoners; and for current 2003 Act extended sentence prisoners. Going forward, however, all sentences imposed on or after the date of commencement will be subject to the 2003 Act release and recall arrangements, as amended by the provisions in this Bill, regardless of the date that the offender committed his or her offences.
That is the broad effect of this package of amendments. I would be happy to explain what each of the amendments does should your Lordships find that helpful, but in the interests of keeping my explanation to a minimum I propose simply to highlight the main features. I can assure your Lordships that, while these amendments are long and technical, they do not make substantive changes to the current release arrangements. They are intended mainly to make the legislation itself clearer, easier to follow and less open to misinterpretation.
Two new schedules will be inserted into the 2003 Act—the content of these make up the bulk of the amendments. The first, Schedule 20A, makes amendments to other statutes that are consequential on the amendments made to the 2003 Act. It also contains transitional provisions to allow prisoners released under the 1991 Act to be deemed to have been released under the 2003 Act, while preserving their current licence length. The second, Schedule 20B, reproduces within the 2003 Act the elements of the 1967 and 1991 Act release regimes that need to be preserved for those prisoners already serving these types of sentence. In other words, it achieves the consolidation of all the current release provisions into a single statute.
Connected to the introduction of new Schedule 20B, our intention now is to remove Clause 112. The clause contains a power to allow the Secretary of State to make an order by secondary legislation to bring the release and recall provisions of the Criminal Justice Acts of 1967 and 1991 into the 2003 Act. But with the introduction of these amendments, and Schedule 20B in particular, that consolidation now will be achieved on the face of the Act so that the order-making power is no longer necessary and can be removed. I commend this package of amendments to your Lordships and I beg to move.
My Lords, I welcome the clarification that this range of amendments brings about. I am particularly glad to see the mea culpa stance over Clause 112 standing part and hope that this presages greater use of the procedure whereby the Government withdraw proposals which are not satisfactory. I trust that this is the first swallow of a summer of such arrivals.
That is precisely my point. The amendment rightly envisages a duty to refer to the Parole Board, but on the face of it it looks as though there is a duty of release ab initio. That is not the noble and learned Lord’s intention—and I say this with great respect, because of course he is a very eminent and learned judge—but it might have assisted his case if it had been put in that way. That point in a sense echoes the point made by my noble friend Lord Borrie.
It is sensible to restore a situation in which a release after 30 years can be contemplated and, after due process, properly agreed. If the Parole Board adjudges that it is safe to release someone, that should be the Secretary of State’s duty at that point. In fact, relatively few people are serving these sentences—I think there are 40 prisoners, and that 20 have been sentenced in that way in the last 10 or 12 years as a result of their trial and the conditional decision at the time—so I think there is a way forward on this, with a slight modification of the way in which the amendment is phrased, and I hope that the Government will look sympathetically on it while clearly bearing in mind that there will be some prisoners for whom, in the end, there will be no hope of release. One hopes that there will not be many in that category, but there will be some, and that ought to be recognised from the outset.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to the unanimity of view in the House during this debate. I sometimes think that perhaps a joint meeting of both Houses would be interesting when we discuss these issues. Nevertheless, this House has a long and proud history of providing a platform for penal reform, and it has certainly lived up to that reputation today.
I make one or two preliminary comments. The noble Baroness, Lady Stern, referred to the campaign to abolish the death penalty. Like many in this House I am old enough to remember that campaign, and I remember that part of it, which swung many MPs, was the proposal that life would mean life. It has always been a problem area, particularly for those who have committed the most horrific crimes.
The story that the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, told was very encouraging in that it told of someone’s capability do good, even after the most horrific crimes. However, that capacity to do some good would not convince me to release a dangerous person into the community—and it is that test that has to be passed. I would hope that even those who spent the rest of their lives in jail would find within their confinement a capability to do good.
I think that we will return to this theme on a number of occasions in the next hour or two, as various amendments come up. The noble Baroness, Lady Stern, asked what sort of penal system and what sort of values we should have, and the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, called for courage. Courage is certainly needed, but so is a practical use of the art of the possible. Penal reform is always a balance between humane treatment of those who are in prison, concern for the victims of crime and the retention of public confidence in our system of justice. Unless we can convince the public of the elements of punishment and public protection within the system, we will not get their buy-in to rehabilitation, which as I have often said from these Benches is very much part of what I and the Lord Chancellor see as built into the system. However, unless we can carry colleagues and the public with us and retain public confidence, we will not get the kind of reform that we want. I freely acknowledge that carrying through some of these reforms is an exercise in the art of the possible in what will win the confidence of the other place and the public.
As the noble and learned Lord said in introducing his amendment, things were different some time ago. One good thing to my mind about recent reforms was that all tariffs are now judicially determined. I am one of those—and I share it in other cases as well—who thinks that we should rely on judicial judgment in these matters. The imposition of minimum terms and whole life orders is now a matter that is exclusively for the judicially. I was very interested in his views on the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. I tend to agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, that when the Court gets it right it does not get much coverage. I am sure that if it reverses its decision, it will be page 1 again. Nevertheless I was a little worried that both the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord seem to think that a majority verdict was somehow of less value. A verdict is a verdict, and a win is a win. I am sure that he has been on the winning side a few times in those circumstances—I knew I was tempting fate.
Yes, the Minister was tempting fate, but I am very grateful to him. We said that it was by the very slenderest of majorities because three judges decided one way, three judges decided the other way and the seventh judge decided with the majority on a reason that, at any rate, I simply cannot understand. It seemed to have nothing to do with the case. Anyway, we will know when it goes to the Grand Chamber.
When I read the football results on a Saturday night and Blackpool have won four-three, I am not interested in whether the final goal was thought to be offside as long as it counted, but I am sure that is not a legal opinion.
As has been explained, the amendment provides for the possibility of a conditional release of a prisoner serving a life sentence with a whole life tariff once he or she has served 30 years. It would produce the odd effect that an offender who had committed the most exceptionally serious crimes could be considered for release earlier than a life sentence prisoner with a determinate minimum term of more than 30 years. The minimum term or tariff under a life sentence is the period which the court determines the offender has to spend in custody for the purpose of punishment and deterrence. In other words, it reflects the seriousness of the offence. Schedule 21 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides guidance to the courts on the determination of a minimum term for a life sentence imposed for murder. It provides for a whole life tariff to be the starting point for the most exceptionally serious cases, where the offender was aged 21 or over at the time the murder was committed.
The types of case that might attract the whole life tariff are: the murder of two or more persons where each murder involves a substantial degree of premeditated planning; the abduction of the victim or sexual or sadistic conduct; the murder of a child involving the abduction of the child or sexual or sadistic motivation; a murder done for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause; or a murder by an offender previously convicted of murder. Few would argue against these types of case representing crimes so heinous that the court may well consider the appropriate punishment to be that the offenders must be incarcerated for the rest of their lives. Those punishments are, as we would expect, rarely used. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to a figure; the actual figure is that 47 prisoners are now serving a whole life tariff.
We have already referred to the fact that the Government's position on this was upheld in the European Court of Human Rights. We will await the outcome of the appeal, but our position stands. Nevertheless, if a stage is reached where the continuing incarceration of a whole life tariff prisoner is found to be inhuman and degrading, for example where the person is terminally ill or severely incapacitated and poses no further risk, the Secretary of State has the power to release the prisoner on compassionate grounds.
The Government do not therefore consider that it is necessary or desirable to accept this amendment. The court will have taken full account of the circumstances of the offence and the offender in determining that the whole life term is appropriate. Such appalling cases are mercifully rare, but judges can legitimately find that lifelong incarceration is necessary as a punishment. If the detention of a whole life tariff prisoner could no longer be justified and became inhuman and degrading, there is already the mechanism allowing for his or her release. On those terms, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Some future Government may well bring forward a proposal along those lines. The judgment of the Government at the moment is that on a law that is safely in judges’ hands for determination, and that applies to a specific number of the most serious crimes, the position as it is now is best in retaining public confidence. It is a matter of political judgment, and the political judgment is that to move on this point, at this point, would not retain public confidence in a package in which we are trying to make moves in certain directions and carry colleagues who are not as enthusiastic as this House on some of these matters.
In the last few minutes the Minister has encouraged me, because he has said that at some point it may be appropriate to introduce legislation that meets the arguments that are being put. It is not the first time that I have heard the noble Lord refer to the importance of holding public confidence, and we all understand that point, but it is not a matter of accepting as inevitable the existing state of public opinion. We have to be very careful that we are not, in effect, running scared of the sensationalist media. We really should be not only respecting public opinion and public confidence but helping to shape public confidence by putting forward the positive argument for change. That is essential to successful democracy. If we have become convinced that this is the right thing to do, we have to speak up for it.
I entirely agree. That is why I said in my opening remarks that I am proud that this House has been the platform for penal reformers to argue their case over centuries, but I also say to this House that we have to carry another place and public opinion with us in these matters. One of the things I am most proud of is that this Government, and the Ministry of Justice under this Lord Chancellor, have been willing to try to educate public opinion. Some of the measures in this Bill will, I hope, move that forward, but no matter how much courage is used in expounding these views, if the result is for the public to lose confidence in the criminal justice system, those are Pyrrhic victories indeed.
Does the right honourable and learned gentleman—sorry, whatever you are.
From William Wilberforce to Sydney Silverman campaigns have been fought, and fought successfully. I am sure that this debate will be repeated in debates on other amendments, but I can only make the point so many times that politics is the art of the possible. We believe that the package of reforms here carry forward some of the interests of some of the Members of this House. However, they must also recognise that wider public opinion—and wider political opinion—does not share all their ambitions at this moment. We are all involved in debate and political education, and I welcome this debate as a contribution to that, but I have to deal with political reality as well.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his reply. The views of the House today could not really be more unanimous. It is clear that every single person who has spoken is in favour of this idea. I would like to mention them all but I shall mention particularly the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chichester, as he happens to be—
I hate to intervene, especially in the middle of a tribute being paid to a Bishop, but I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord would ponder my suggestion that a joint meeting of both Houses would produce such unanimity. The Members at the other end actually have to face the public in a way that this House does not.
Indeed. In a sense, that is the only point that the Minister has made, to which the answer surely is that it is occasionally possible for the House of Lords to lead the way, to influence the other place and even to influence the public. If that were possible, this would be an opportunity to do it. I would like to mention particularly the observations of the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, with all her experience and knowledge of this subject, and the right reverend Prelate because he is my diocesan bishop and I feel therefore that I owe him that duty. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.