Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Ramsbotham Excerpts

Thursday 9th February 2012 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Ramsbotham]

178ZZAZA: Clause 87, Page 66, line 12, leave out “twelve” and insert “fourteen”

[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, in speaking to the amendment and Amendments 178ZAA, 178ZAB, 178ZAC and178ZAD, I must state my strong support for the reforms implicit in Clauses 91 to 94, which place two clear sets of conditions on a court before a child can be remanded in custody. I say that because, at present, one-third of all children remanded to youth detention accommodation do not go on to receive a custodial sentence. I also support the simplified single remand order, which addresses the anomaly of 17 year- olds being remanded in adult accommodation.

I turn to Amendment 178ZZAZA. Our debate on Tuesday on Clause 75 concerning the proposed increase in curfew hours is linked to Clauses 87 to 89, to which the amendment refers, because electronic monitoring of children is part of their curfew regime. Clause 87(2) states:

“The first requirement is that the child has reached the age of twelve”,

before he or she may be electronically monitored. I and the Prison Reform Trust—for whose admirable briefing on this and many other issues I and, I am sure, many other noble Lords are extremely grateful—contend that 12 is too young.

Research suggests that, particularly if the longer periods that were so deplored around the Committee on Tuesday are adopted, many children aged 12 are likely to find compliance with electronic monitoring too onerous due to developmental immaturity, learning difficulties, learning disabilities or other mental health and communication problems, contributing to a lack of understanding of the consequences of their actions. This is borne out by the breach figures, which show that one in six children aged 10 to 14 in custody had been imprisoned for breach of a curfew order.

As was mentioned on Tuesday, Home Office research published in 2005 raised concerns that electronic monitoring can also prevent children participating in legitimate activities, thus increasing the likelihood of breach. I am aware that in Committee in another place the Minister, Crispin Blunt, said in rejecting a similar amendment:

“By removing the power of the court to use electronic monitoring with 12 and 13-year-olds, the amendments would push courts to remand more young children in secure accommodation … contrary to the policy underlying the provisions, which are aimed at reducing the use of secure remands of children and promoting greater community provision”.—[Official Report, Commons, Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill Committee, 11/10/11; col. 709.]

With respect, I think he missed the point that was being made, which was that removing the power to electronically monitor would encourage positive engagement. From personal experience, I know that better outcomes result from positive engagement than from the imposition of onerous conditions, particularly with younger offenders. The amendment seeks to raise the minimum age for electronic monitoring from 12 to 14, with the same age condition for remand to youth detention, to which my Amendments 178ZAA to 178ZAD refer. I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, it is certainly desirable that electronic monitoring should be used very sparingly but there may well be cases in which even a 12 or 13 year- old has exhibited behaviour which requires—I say with some reluctance—monitoring of this kind. Therefore, I am afraid that the Opposition cannot support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham.

However, I have a question in relation to Amendment 178ZAD, which concerns extradition cases. I should like an assurance that, if the country requesting extradition does not itself apply electronic monitoring to the age group in question, such cases will not attract that procedure in this country. It would seem anomalous if we were to go further than the country seeking extradition in applying electronic monitoring to those cases. Perhaps the noble Baroness could deal with that. If she cannot do so today, perhaps she could write to me accordingly.

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[Baroness Northover]

I am very happy to write to the noble Lord on that point.

[Lord Ramsbotham]

I am grateful to the Minister for her reply and grateful too for the intervention from the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I said at the beginning that I am glad to see the reforms that are implicit already in Clauses 91 to 94 but, as I am sure the noble Baroness realises, there is disquiet over the use of electronic monitoring for extended periods, particularly for young people. I suspect that this will return on Report, if not with my amendment then in connection with Clause 75, which was discussed on Tuesday. I am grateful that obviously work has been done to produce the answers to these probing amendments. In that spirit and with gratitude to the Minister I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 178ZZAZA withdrawn.

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[Lord Borrie]

My Lords, I have a natural sympathy with the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord. I was once, admittedly a long time ago, a member of the Parole Board, when it was fairly new. That was under the chairmanship of Lord Hunt of Llanfair Waterdine, who was in this House. He was sometimes known as Lord Hunt of Everest, for obvious reasons. I served on the Parole Board then and thought that it was a rather good body. The noble Baroness, Lady Howe of Idlicote, was a fellow member. I have fond memories of it and thought it a good body with a good mix of experience of criminal law, criminals and criminology—in my case, apparently. It is bound to be even better today in terms of experience. I am glad that it has a central position under the amendment.

I have one query, rather on the same lines as that of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It is a question to the noble and learned Lord about the difference between duty and discretion, and who has what. I would also like to know the answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—as would he. My question is a slightly different twist on that. In the amendment there is a duty on the Secretary of State, and then if the matter goes to the Parole Board, the board has discretion. Surely, even among those who have spoken this afternoon who are most sympathetic to the long-term prisoner, we can all think of those who should never come out of prison under any circumstances. That is clearly known and pretty definite. I wonder why the amendment does not impose a discretion on the Secretary of State rather than a duty, on the basis that it will be a complete waste of time for the Parole Board to examine or review certain cases on which every report, indication and study from within the Prison Service shows that it would be quite unsafe at any time to allow the release of certain people given life sentences. I query the duty and discretion bit from a very different angle from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but pursuing the same point. I certainly believe that most cases should have a review and that should be by the Parole Board. That would be excellent and I hope that the amendment will be carried.

[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, I support my noble and learned friend Lord Lloyd on this excellently moved amendment and pick up on a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. He mentioned the impact on prison order. I will, as it were, personalise this. As Chief Inspector of Prisons I was always interested in how prisoners serving natural life sentences were managed. Without the word “hope”, which has appeared in the contributions of many noble Lords, those prisoners had nothing to look forward to. More importantly, the staff had—in theory—nothing to offer the prisoner.

Noble Lords may remember the name of Dennis Nilsen, who was awarded a natural life sentence for a series of perfectly dreadful crimes. Noble Lords may not know that one aspect of education denied to blind children is access to science textbooks because graphs cannot be read in Braille. One of the education officers in the prison, looking at Dennis Nilsen and his characteristics, reckoned that something there could be harnessed. Nilsen was taught to write in Braille. Then, over four years, he described graphs in a science textbook in a way that would be understood, and translated his descriptions into Braille. After four years, blind children had access to a science textbook, thanks to the activities of someone who, in theory, had been rejected by society. I talked with Nilsen and will not describe that. But I will never forget talking to the education officer who had had the wit to realise that there was something in Nilsen that could be harnessed to the public good. She used the word “hope”, which was present at the time, and said how essential it was that she had hope that something could be achieved. I was enormously disturbed when that hope was removed by the 2003 Act. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to respond to this amendment.

[Baroness Prashar]

My Lords, I support the amendment. As the former chairman of the Parole Board, I agree with most of the comments that have been made so far in the debate. The discretion should be with the Parole Board and there should be an automatic review after 30 years. The concepts of hope and incentive are very important. In my experience, the fact that cases would go before the Parole Board was an incentive for prisoners. That is an important aspect. The Parole Board is also very good at risk assessment. It should be given that discretion with all the reports. I agree that it should then be the duty of the Home Secretary to accept the recommendation made by the Parole Board. I would very much like the Government to support the amendment.