Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord McNally Excerpts

Thursday 9th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has already outraged the protocol of this House by recognising people present beyond the Bar, but I do not think that he will be taken away to the Tower for that breach because it is good that Members of the House are aware that Jane’s parents are present to see us in action. I am afraid that the other night they had the experience of seeing the Lords in action that delayed this debate, but it is such an important matter for them, their family and the wider public that we have this debate today. I sincerely hope that within a few minutes they will see Jane’s law passed by this House.

Amendment 178ZZA creates a right of appeal for the prosecution against a Crown Court decision to grant bail. It does so by extending the existing powers in the Bail (Amendment) Act 1993, which currently provides for a right of appeal against bail granted by a magistrates’ court. That appeal is to the Crown Court. Under Amendment 178ZZA, the avenue of appeal against a Crown Court decision would be to the High Court.

As we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, this is a matter that has been the subject of a campaign by Jane’s parents following the release on bail of Jonathan Vass by the Crown Court, despite representations from the Crown Prosecution Service. We considered this matter very carefully. We took account, on the one hand, of the fact that a right of appeal would necessarily impose an additional burden on the High Court. On the other hand, there was strong support for change in the other place, as we have heard, and the Director of Public Prosecutions has made it clear that he too is in favour of such a change in our law.

Our conclusion was that without calling into question the correctness of decisions made by Crown Court judges in the vast majority of cases, it is not right that such decisions should be beyond challenge. We are persuaded of the case for changing the law in order to ensure that victims and their families, and the public at large, are protected.

The effect of the provision will be that the decision to appeal must be made immediately, before the defendant has been released, and as the defendant would be held in custody pending the appeal, the appeal must be heard very quickly. Listing cases at such short notice before a High Court judge clearly has resource implications, and it is important that the right of appeal should be used sparingly. This will be recognised in the guidance that the Director of Public Prosecutions will issue to his staff, which will require a decision to appeal to be approved at a senior level.

The most notable difference between our Amendment 178ZZA and Amendment 178 moved by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham—I am grateful that he intends to withdraw it—is that ours is shorter and does not permit an appeal against a decision by the Crown Court to grant bail where it was itself made on appeal from the grant of bail by a magistrates’ court. So if a defendant was granted bail by the magistrates, the prosecution appealed and the Crown Court granted bail, the prosecution would not be able to appeal further. This is to stop a continuing series of appeals on a matter that by then would have been considered by two courts. I therefore commend Amendments 178ZZA and 178ZZB to your Lordships' House.

It is my responsibility as the Minister to put on the record the technicalities; hence, some of my remarks may seem gobbledegook to those not in the Chamber. However, I can assure the House that what the Government are doing, supported by Her Majesty's Opposition and, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, made clear, supported firmly by the other place, is approving Jane’s law.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZZZA: Schedule 11, Page 193, line 34, after “enactment,”” insert “;
““imprisonable offence” means an offence punishable in the case of an adult with imprisonment,”;
““sexual offence” means an offence specified in Part 2 of Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003,”;
““violent offence” means murder or an offence specified in Part 1 of Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003,””

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, these are technical government amendments. I beg to move.

Amendment 178ZZZA agreed.

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZZZB: Schedule 11, page 194, leave out lines 1 and 2 and insert—
“(1) Section 3 (general provisions) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (6ZAA), for “person),” substitute “person granted bail in criminal proceedings of the kind mentioned in section 1(1)(a) or (b)), section 3AAA (in the case of a child or young person granted bail in connection with extradition proceedings),”.
(3) In subsection (7)—”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZAZA: Clause 88, Page 67, line 38, leave out from beginning to “of”

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, this is a technical amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham]

It would appear that I am in some danger of becoming a repeat offender when it comes to breaching protocol. I apologise to the House.

My only concern about the technical amendments in this group is the insertion in Amendment 178ZAZB of the word “accused” before the word “charged”. I appreciate that it is intended to correct what was described as an accidental gap in replicating earlier provisions, but it concerns me that we may apply electronic monitoring to people who have not been charged but merely accused of an offence in another jurisdiction. I wonder whether it is the right approach. Perhaps the noble Lord will want to think further on that. It strikes me as a little odd, in the same way as the previous matter we discussed struck me as odd. I may be entirely wrong but it seems to jar with the notion that a simple accusation would suffice to allow somebody to undergo electronic monitoring.

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, one of the uses of Committee is to allow noble Lords to scrutinise and to seek clarification. The noble Lord’s point is not covered in my notes. The amendments in this group are intended to be minor and technical. They set out a requirement for electronic monitoring in extradition cases that is consistent with its use under the Extradition Act 2003. Clause 88 is intended to create a test that is equivalent to that in Clause 87 which applies to young people who are charged with or convicted of an offence. “Accused” is the word used in the Extradition Act. If we did not change the wording of the Bill to match, we would create a lacuna whereby the courts would have only limited remand powers over an individual who was being extradited before being charged. I will clarify the noble Lord's point about the use of electronic tagging and write to him.

Amendment 178ZAZA agreed.

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZAZB: Clause 88, Page 67, line 38, after second “been” insert “accused or”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZABA: Clause 92, page 71, line 16, leave out from second “sentence” to end of line 25 and insert “or order mentioned in section 76(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZBA: Clause 95, page 74, line 20, at end insert—
“(8A) A function of the Secretary of State under this section (other than the function of making regulations) is exercisable by the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales concurrently with the Secretary of State.
(8B) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide that subsection (8A) is not to apply, either generally or in relation to a particular description of case.”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZBC: Clause 96, page 74, line 37, after “homes” insert “, or accommodation within section 95(2)(d),”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZBF: Clause 97, page 75, line 28, leave out subsections (3) to (5)

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZBG: After Clause 98, insert the following new Clause—
“Regulations under this Chapter
(1) Regulations under this Chapter are to be made by statutory instrument.
(2) Regulations under this Chapter may—
(a) make different provision for different cases;(b) include supplementary, incidental, transitional, transitory or saving provision.(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this Chapter is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament, subject to subsection (4).
(4) A statutory instrument containing regulations under section 95(8B) or 96(10) (whether alone or with any other provision) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZBH: Schedule 12, page 199, line 12, at end insert—
“(5) In subsection (7), in the definition of “serious offence”, after “means” insert “(subject to subsection (8))”.
(6) After subsection (7) insert—
“(8) For the purposes of the application of this section to a person remanded on bail in connection with proceedings under the Extradition Act 2003—
(a) an offence is a “serious offence” if the conduct constituting the offence would, if committed in the United Kingdom, constitute an offence punishable in the case of an adult with imprisonment for a term of two years or more, and(b) the reference in subsection (1)(a) to a person being charged with a serious offence includes a reference to the person having been accused of such an offence.””

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZBP: Clause 99, page 76, line 35, leave out subsection (4)

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZD: Clause 100, page 78, leave out lines 17 to 20

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZH: Clause 101, page 79, line 28, leave out “, (11)”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZJ: Clause 102, page 80, line 39, at end insert—
“( ) In section 305(1A) (modification of reference to want of sufficient distress), inserted by paragraph 155 of Schedule 13 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, for “In the definition of “sentence of imprisonment” in subsection (1) the reference” substitute “In this Part any reference”.”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZL: Schedule 13, page 205, line 25, at end insert—
“Part 2Other amendmentsCriminal Appeal Act 1968 (c. 19)6 In Schedule 2 to the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (procedural and other provisions applicable on order for retrial), in paragraph 2(4), for “Sections 240” substitute “Sections 240ZA”.
Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77)7 In section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971 (exemption from deportation for certain existing residents), in subsection (4), after “section 240” insert “, 240ZA or 240A”.
Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (c. 53)8 In section 35A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (extension of disqualification where custodial sentence also imposed), in subsection (6)—
(a) omit “a direction under”;(b) in paragraph (a), for “section 240” substitute “section 240ZA”;(c) in paragraph (b), before “section 240A” insert “a direction under”.Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (c. 6)9 The Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 is amended as follows.
10 In section 82A (determination of tariffs), in subsection (3)(b), for “section 240” substitute “section 240ZA”.
11 In section 101 (term of detention and training order), in subsection (12A), for “the reference in subsection (2) of that section to section 240” substitute “the reference in subsection (2A) of that section to section 240ZA”.
12 In section 147A (extension of disqualification where custodial sentence also imposed), in subsection (6)—
(a) omit “a direction under”;(b) in paragraph (a), for “section 240” substitute “section 240ZA”;(c) in paragraph (b), before “section 240A” insert “a direction under”. International Criminal Court Act 2001 (c. 17) 13 In Schedule 7 to the International Criminal Court Act 2001 (domestic provisions not applicable to ICC prisoners), in paragraph 2(1)(d), for “sections 240” substitute “sections 240ZA”.”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZM: Clause 103, page 81, line 12, leave out from “months” to end of line 14

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZP: Schedule 14, page 205, line 27, at end insert—
“Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (c. 53)1 In section 35A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (extension of disqualification where custodial sentence also imposed)—
(a) in subsection (8), after “section” insert “243A(3)(a),”;(b) in subsection (9)(a), after “in respect of section” insert “243A(3)(a) or”.Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (c. 43)2 In Schedule 1 to the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (transfer of prisoners within the British Islands), in paragraphs 8(2)(a) and 9(2)(a), after “sections 241,” insert “243A,”.
Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (c. 6)3 In section 147A of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (extension of disqualification where custodial sentence also imposed)—
(a) in subsection (8), after “section” insert “243A(3)(a),”;(b) in subsection (9)(a), after “in respect of section” insert “243A(3)(a) or”.International Criminal Court Act 2001 (c. 17)4 In Schedule 7 to the International Criminal Court Act 2001 (domestic provisions not applicable to ICC prisoners), in paragraph 3(1), for “sections 244” substitute “sections 243A”.”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZQ: Clause 104, page 82, line 12, after “91” insert “or 96”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZT: After Clause 108, insert the following new Clause—
“Replacement of transitory provisions
(1) Chapter 6 of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (release on licence) is amended as follows.
(2) In section 237(1)(b) (“fixed-term prisoner” includes those serving sentence of detention)—
(a) after “91” insert “or 96”;(b) before “228” insert “227 or”.(3) At the end of that section insert—
“(3) In this Chapter, references to a sentence of detention under section 96 of the Sentencing Act or section 227 of this Act are references to a sentence of detention in a young offender institution.”
(4) In section 244(3)(a) (duty to release prisoners: requisite custodial period), after “91” insert “or 96”.
(5) In section 250(4) (licence conditions)—
(a) after “91” insert “or 96”;(b) before “228” insert “227 or”.(6) In section 258 (early release of fine defaulters and contemnors), after subsection (3) insert—
“(3A) The reference in subsection (3) to sentences of imprisonment includes sentences of detention under section 91 or 96 of the Sentencing Act or under section 227 or 228 of this Act.”
(7) In section 263(4) (concurrent terms)—
(a) after “91” insert “or 96”;(b) before “228” insert “227 or”.(8) In section 264(7) (consecutive terms)—
(a) after “91” insert “or 96”;(b) before “228” insert “227 or”.(9) In section 265(2) (restriction on consecutive sentences)—
(a) after “91” insert “or 96”;(b) before “228” insert “227 or”.(10) In Part 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (life sentences: release on licence)—
(a) in section 31A(5) (termination of licences), in the definition of “preventive sentence”, after “a sentence of imprisonment” insert “or detention in a young offender institution”;(b) in section 34(2)(d) (interpretation), after “a sentence of imprisonment” insert “or detention in a young offender institution”.(11) In the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Sentencing) (Transitory Provisions) Order 2005 (S.I. 2005/643), article 3(7), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15) and (17)(a) and (b) (transitory provision replaced by this section) are revoked.”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZU: Schedule 15, page 208, line 4, at end insert—
“( ) Section (Replacement of transitory provisions) applies in relation to any person who falls to be released under Chapter 6, or (as the case may be) under Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, on or after the commencement date.”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord McNally]

178ZV: Before Clause 113, insert the following new Clause—
“Simplification of existing transitional provisions
(1) Chapter 6 of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”) is to apply to any person serving a sentence for an offence committed before 4 April 2005 (whenever that sentence was or is imposed).
(2) Section 258 of the 2003 Act (release of fine defaulters and contemnors) is to apply to any person who was, before 4 April 2005, committed to prison or to be detained under section 108 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000—
(a) in default of payment of a sum adjudged to be paid by a conviction, or(b) for contempt of court or any kindred offence.(3) In accordance with subsections (1) and (2)—
(a) the repeal of Part 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 which is made by section 303(a) of the 2003 Act has effect in relation to any person mentioned in those subsections;(b) paragraphs 15 to 18, 19(a), (c) and (d), 20, 22 to 28 and 30 to 34 of Schedule 2 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Commencement No. 8 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Order 2008 (S.I. 2005/950) (which relate to the coming into force of provisions of Chapter 6 of Part 12 of the 2003 Act) are revoked.(4) Section 86 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (extension of periods in custody and on licence in the case of certain sexual offences) is repealed.
(5) Schedule (Amendments of the Criminal Justice Act 2003: transitional and consequential provisions) (transitional and other provisions consequential on this section) has effect.
(6) Schedule (Criminal Justice Act 2003: restatement of transitional provisions) (amendments to the 2003 Act restating the effect of certain transitional and other provisions relating to the release and recall of prisoners) has effect.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

That is precisely my point. The amendment rightly envisages a duty to refer to the Parole Board, but on the face of it it looks as though there is a duty of release ab initio. That is not the noble and learned Lord’s intention—and I say this with great respect, because of course he is a very eminent and learned judge—but it might have assisted his case if it had been put in that way. That point in a sense echoes the point made by my noble friend Lord Borrie.

It is sensible to restore a situation in which a release after 30 years can be contemplated and, after due process, properly agreed. If the Parole Board adjudges that it is safe to release someone, that should be the Secretary of State’s duty at that point. In fact, relatively few people are serving these sentences—I think there are 40 prisoners, and that 20 have been sentenced in that way in the last 10 or 12 years as a result of their trial and the conditional decision at the time—so I think there is a way forward on this, with a slight modification of the way in which the amendment is phrased, and I hope that the Government will look sympathetically on it while clearly bearing in mind that there will be some prisoners for whom, in the end, there will be no hope of release. One hopes that there will not be many in that category, but there will be some, and that ought to be recognised from the outset.

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to the unanimity of view in the House during this debate. I sometimes think that perhaps a joint meeting of both Houses would be interesting when we discuss these issues. Nevertheless, this House has a long and proud history of providing a platform for penal reform, and it has certainly lived up to that reputation today.

I make one or two preliminary comments. The noble Baroness, Lady Stern, referred to the campaign to abolish the death penalty. Like many in this House I am old enough to remember that campaign, and I remember that part of it, which swung many MPs, was the proposal that life would mean life. It has always been a problem area, particularly for those who have committed the most horrific crimes.

The story that the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, told was very encouraging in that it told of someone’s capability do good, even after the most horrific crimes. However, that capacity to do some good would not convince me to release a dangerous person into the community—and it is that test that has to be passed. I would hope that even those who spent the rest of their lives in jail would find within their confinement a capability to do good.

I think that we will return to this theme on a number of occasions in the next hour or two, as various amendments come up. The noble Baroness, Lady Stern, asked what sort of penal system and what sort of values we should have, and the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, called for courage. Courage is certainly needed, but so is a practical use of the art of the possible. Penal reform is always a balance between humane treatment of those who are in prison, concern for the victims of crime and the retention of public confidence in our system of justice. Unless we can convince the public of the elements of punishment and public protection within the system, we will not get their buy-in to rehabilitation, which as I have often said from these Benches is very much part of what I and the Lord Chancellor see as built into the system. However, unless we can carry colleagues and the public with us and retain public confidence, we will not get the kind of reform that we want. I freely acknowledge that carrying through some of these reforms is an exercise in the art of the possible in what will win the confidence of the other place and the public.

As the noble and learned Lord said in introducing his amendment, things were different some time ago. One good thing to my mind about recent reforms was that all tariffs are now judicially determined. I am one of those—and I share it in other cases as well—who thinks that we should rely on judicial judgment in these matters. The imposition of minimum terms and whole life orders is now a matter that is exclusively for the judicially. I was very interested in his views on the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. I tend to agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, that when the Court gets it right it does not get much coverage. I am sure that if it reverses its decision, it will be page 1 again. Nevertheless I was a little worried that both the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord seem to think that a majority verdict was somehow of less value. A verdict is a verdict, and a win is a win. I am sure that he has been on the winning side a few times in those circumstances—I knew I was tempting fate.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

Yes, the Minister was tempting fate, but I am very grateful to him. We said that it was by the very slenderest of majorities because three judges decided one way, three judges decided the other way and the seventh judge decided with the majority on a reason that, at any rate, I simply cannot understand. It seemed to have nothing to do with the case. Anyway, we will know when it goes to the Grand Chamber.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McNally]

When I read the football results on a Saturday night and Blackpool have won four-three, I am not interested in whether the final goal was thought to be offside as long as it counted, but I am sure that is not a legal opinion.

As has been explained, the amendment provides for the possibility of a conditional release of a prisoner serving a life sentence with a whole life tariff once he or she has served 30 years. It would produce the odd effect that an offender who had committed the most exceptionally serious crimes could be considered for release earlier than a life sentence prisoner with a determinate minimum term of more than 30 years. The minimum term or tariff under a life sentence is the period which the court determines the offender has to spend in custody for the purpose of punishment and deterrence. In other words, it reflects the seriousness of the offence. Schedule 21 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides guidance to the courts on the determination of a minimum term for a life sentence imposed for murder. It provides for a whole life tariff to be the starting point for the most exceptionally serious cases, where the offender was aged 21 or over at the time the murder was committed.

The types of case that might attract the whole life tariff are: the murder of two or more persons where each murder involves a substantial degree of premeditated planning; the abduction of the victim or sexual or sadistic conduct; the murder of a child involving the abduction of the child or sexual or sadistic motivation; a murder done for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause; or a murder by an offender previously convicted of murder. Few would argue against these types of case representing crimes so heinous that the court may well consider the appropriate punishment to be that the offenders must be incarcerated for the rest of their lives. Those punishments are, as we would expect, rarely used. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to a figure; the actual figure is that 47 prisoners are now serving a whole life tariff.

We have already referred to the fact that the Government's position on this was upheld in the European Court of Human Rights. We will await the outcome of the appeal, but our position stands. Nevertheless, if a stage is reached where the continuing incarceration of a whole life tariff prisoner is found to be inhuman and degrading, for example where the person is terminally ill or severely incapacitated and poses no further risk, the Secretary of State has the power to release the prisoner on compassionate grounds.

The Government do not therefore consider that it is necessary or desirable to accept this amendment. The court will have taken full account of the circumstances of the offence and the offender in determining that the whole life term is appropriate. Such appalling cases are mercifully rare, but judges can legitimately find that lifelong incarceration is necessary as a punishment. If the detention of a whole life tariff prisoner could no longer be justified and became inhuman and degrading, there is already the mechanism allowing for his or her release. On those terms, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McNally]

Some future Government may well bring forward a proposal along those lines. The judgment of the Government at the moment is that on a law that is safely in judges’ hands for determination, and that applies to a specific number of the most serious crimes, the position as it is now is best in retaining public confidence. It is a matter of political judgment, and the political judgment is that to move on this point, at this point, would not retain public confidence in a package in which we are trying to make moves in certain directions and carry colleagues who are not as enthusiastic as this House on some of these matters.

[Lord Judd]

In the last few minutes the Minister has encouraged me, because he has said that at some point it may be appropriate to introduce legislation that meets the arguments that are being put. It is not the first time that I have heard the noble Lord refer to the importance of holding public confidence, and we all understand that point, but it is not a matter of accepting as inevitable the existing state of public opinion. We have to be very careful that we are not, in effect, running scared of the sensationalist media. We really should be not only respecting public opinion and public confidence but helping to shape public confidence by putting forward the positive argument for change. That is essential to successful democracy. If we have become convinced that this is the right thing to do, we have to speak up for it.

[Lord McNally]

I entirely agree. That is why I said in my opening remarks that I am proud that this House has been the platform for penal reformers to argue their case over centuries, but I also say to this House that we have to carry another place and public opinion with us in these matters. One of the things I am most proud of is that this Government, and the Ministry of Justice under this Lord Chancellor, have been willing to try to educate public opinion. Some of the measures in this Bill will, I hope, move that forward, but no matter how much courage is used in expounding these views, if the result is for the public to lose confidence in the criminal justice system, those are Pyrrhic victories indeed.

[Lord Clinton-Davis]

Does the right honourable and learned gentleman—sorry, whatever you are.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McNally]

From William Wilberforce to Sydney Silverman campaigns have been fought, and fought successfully. I am sure that this debate will be repeated in debates on other amendments, but I can only make the point so many times that politics is the art of the possible. We believe that the package of reforms here carry forward some of the interests of some of the Members of this House. However, they must also recognise that wider public opinion—and wider political opinion—does not share all their ambitions at this moment. We are all involved in debate and political education, and I welcome this debate as a contribution to that, but I have to deal with political reality as well.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his reply. The views of the House today could not really be more unanimous. It is clear that every single person who has spoken is in favour of this idea. I would like to mention them all but I shall mention particularly the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chichester, as he happens to be—

[Lord McNally]

I hate to intervene, especially in the middle of a tribute being paid to a Bishop, but I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord would ponder my suggestion that a joint meeting of both Houses would produce such unanimity. The Members at the other end actually have to face the public in a way that this House does not.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

Indeed. In a sense, that is the only point that the Minister has made, to which the answer surely is that it is occasionally possible for the House of Lords to lead the way, to influence the other place and even to influence the public. If that were possible, this would be an opportunity to do it. I would like to mention particularly the observations of the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, with all her experience and knowledge of this subject, and the right reverend Prelate because he is my diocesan bishop and I feel therefore that I owe him that duty. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.