EU and Sudan: EUC Report

Wednesday 7th December 2011 Grand Committee

Considered in Grand Committee

18:08

Moved By

[Lord Teverson]

To move that the Grand Committee do consider the report of the European Union Committee on The EU and Sudan: on the Brink of Change (18th Report, HL Paper 160).

[Lord Shutt of Greetland]

My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, speaks, I am told that an earlier person who sat in this chair said that there were 15 speakers signed up for the first debate and nine signed up for the second debate this afternoon. If all contributions, other than those of the openers and the winders, are kept to seven minutes, it should allow the Grand Committee to adjourn at 7.45 pm.

[Lord Teverson]

I thank the noble Lord for his contribution. I would say to him that of all the committees I have ever chaired, this is one that does not do what it is told the most, but it may be that on this occasion it might actually listen.

The story of South Sudan could, in many ways, be described as the best of fairy tales. We had the independence of Sudan back in 1956 and civil war started almost immediately and lasted up until 1972. Then we had a few years of peace and resolution, followed from 1983 right the way through to 2005 by a second civil war in this very sad, war-torn nation—the largest of the African nations. Yet, with 2 million people having perished and some 5 million having been displaced, and despite all that grief and pain which afflicted that nation during those 40 or so years, we had through the hard work, mostly of the United States, a comprehensive peace agreement. A very plain agenda was set out in 2005 and peace broke out. Most importantly, at the beginning of this year, there was a referendum of the people of South Sudan. Perhaps unexpectedly for those who feel pessimistic about Africa as a continent that in the past has not always been able to deliver democracy, the referendum went ahead very effectively. It was praised for the way in which it was handled and declared, with 98 per cent saying yes to independence. That result was respected by the Sudanese Government in Khartoum. Earlier this year, on 9 July, independence was declared with the blessing of Khartoum and the Sudanese Government—in fact, President al-Bashir was there and was respectfully received. We had in that moment the only instance in Africa of a constitutionally arranged division of a state and of a new state being born. That is quite something when we think about the history of that nation and those peoples.

Already at that time, there were great challenges. One of the things that I remember most about this inquiry, as I am sure will my fellow members of the sub-committee, is taking evidence from what were effectively two ambassadors, the head of mission of South Sudan, yet to be an independent state at that time, and the ambassador of Sudan. I meet them in Peers’ Entrance. They were chums. They were slapping each other’s backs, and it was excellent to see them together. They came up to the committee and there was great bonhomie as they started, but as we asked them questions, there was greater division and disagreement on key issues. I remember, as an example of an issue still to be resolved, the ambassador of Sudan saying to the head of mission of South Sudan, “Well, you’ve had $9.5 billion of oil revenues since the CPA in 2005. What has happened to that money?”. I am afraid that there was little answer. That was one of the problems and hazards mentioned in the report. It was a matter not so much of corruption, although that clearly exists, as of the use and disbursement of public and state funds in South Sudan. As is so often the case where there has been a liberation army, there is an army that still has to be paid and takes up a huge amount of the public exchequer. Security sector reform, therefore, is still a major area of concern.

Demarcation is another. There is no proper demarcation of boundaries between north and South Sudan. There are issues of citizenship. Neither South Sudan nor Sudan will allow dual citizenship of both states, so people have to decide. Once they have decided, there is great pressure for them to migrate back to the state where they have citizenship. That leads to a severe mismatch of skills and job opportunities throughout those two nations. There is a challenge of development. South Sudan has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world. It has no tarmaced roads outside Juba, its capital, and it has decided even now to move that capital from Juba to a more central location. It has hardly any schools and an illiteracy rate of some 75 per cent.

There is, of course, the continuing problem of oil. The only way that South Sudanese oil—80 per cent of the old country’s oil—can be exported, used and turned into revenue for the Government is through Port Sudan. There has to be an arrangement between the two countries. There was no agreement about the cost of transporting that oil or any such fiscal arrangements. Both countries depend absolutely on that revenue. For South Sudan, it accounts for some 98 per cent of government income.

The other challenge is the province of Abyei. I should explain that under the comprehensive peace agreement, Abyei was not allocated between the two states. How that should happen was to be agreed by the time of independence through consultation with its citizens or by referendum. That did not happen. At around the time of independence, more Sudanese forces occupied Abyei, and there was a very difficult military situation. All those challenges have reached the great situation of a new member state of the world community.

What has happened since then? We have an agreement that Ethiopian troops should come in and be peacekeepers and that the north Sudanese and South Sudanese militias should withdraw. The Ethiopian troops are there; that is the good side. However, neither of the Sudanese nations have withdrawn their own troops. In Sudan itself there are continuing problems in North Kordofan and the Blue Nile province. Unfortunately, there has been no Arab spring in Sudan, and there is little sign of it as yet.

South Sudan, too, suffers from internal violence to do with the unity of the state. There is also a situation with provincial governors, particularly Mr George Athor, one of the generals not appointed to be the governor of a state, who has taken on resistance within South Sudan. Violence in South Sudan is of great importance as well. Oil production in the south has gone down by 25 per cent, and there have been continuing disputes, many difficulties and no prices agreed. Most recently, there have been interruptions of supply. Trade between the two countries has declined in other ways and has sometimes been severed.

One of the other big problems, particularly at the Sudanese level, is a lack of trust in the world community to help deliver the solution that maybe Khartoum was looking for. One thing has not happened for good reasons, as those of us who see the violence, difficulties and human rights record of north Sudan will know. Part of the deal was that Sudan would be let back into the international community and would no longer be listed as a terrorist state by the United States. That has not happened.

However, there has been some good news. There is no war at the moment. The United Nations high-level implementation panel continues to do its good work. The transitional Government of Salva Kiir in South Sudan has some diversity in terms of gender balance and of bringing in members of other tribes. It is not completely dominated by the Dinka. Ironically, because oil reserves in South Sudan are not infinite and plans for pipelines through Uganda or Kenya to the coast are not feasible, the two nations are locked together and, in a way, have to resolve the dispute on oil for them both to survive fiscally. So there is good news out there and there is still, at the moment, world attention.

Those are the challenges within Sudan and South Sudan. I very much welcomed the government response, mainly because it almost completely agreed with our report. It is very difficult to see how we should move forward. We found the response from the European Union high representative more difficult. One of the key areas dealt with the European Union, particularly the External Action Service, having been very slow in setting up a delegation in Juba and in delivering what we would expect the European Union to be able to do. We did not receive a proper response from the high representative on that. We still look forward to it, and I am sure it will come in due course.

I was asked before this debate what I wanted to get out of it. I always saw that what we want to avoid is South Sudan, the world’s newest state, becoming one of its failed states. I want this debate to be a part of that. However, we need a stable north Sudan as well. It also has its challenges; it has lost 50 per cent of its oil revenue. We need stability in north Sudan for this part of the world to succeed. The other thing that I want to come from this debate is for South Sudan not to decline into obscurity and be forgotten as we deal with other issues in the world. If this part of Africa does not succeed and does not manage to turn around and deliver the promises of the comprehensive agreement, the world will come to regret it. What should the EU do? It is quite clear to me. The EU will not be a lead player but it is important in delivering justice, security reform, education and health structures—everything that makes a society work and gives optimism that a society can be successful.

Lastly, it is very important that other players play their full part as well. I should love to see a way for the United States to re-engage in this. We understand that it is very difficult for the US because of the situation with Sudan and the al-Bashir Government. However, the US has real leverage in this area. The other country that has leverage is the customer for that oil: China. China intervened in the disputes over oil when it stopped being delivered. I hope it will use its leverage further with the troika of the UK, the United States and Norway. Both Europe and the United Kingdom should work closely with China to make sure that South Sudan becomes the success that we always hoped it would be. I beg to move.

18:23

[Lord Selkirk of Douglas]

My Lords, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, has said. I should mention that we are naturally very anxious to publish this report as quickly as possible, before there is any possibility of it being overtaken by events. None the less, we must recognise that a great deal has happened since June, most notably the emergence of South Sudan not only as the newest state in Africa but as the 193rd country recognised by the United Nations.

I submit that the principles in the report remain entirely valid and have been adopted by the High Representative of the European Commission—the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton—and by the Government. The most important principle that we set out, and on which the EU should base its actions, is:

“A priority must be to join with the United Nations, African Union and United States to press the parties to resolve the outstanding disputes”.

There are at least five subjects that can give rise to significant disputes. The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, has touched on these and I shall deal with each in turn. First, perhaps the most worrying of the potential causes of dispute is the absence as yet of a detailed agreement between north and South Sudan on the future distribution of revenues from oil. That is still the position and within the past few days the BBC reported that South Sudan had accused Khartoum of stealing its oil. It is interesting that China, a major recipient of Sudanese oil, exhorted both countries to resolve their dispute, but so far they have failed to strike a deal. This is far from satisfactory.

Paragraph 64 of the report makes the position very clear. The bulk of the oil of the Sudan lies in the south. Furthermore, while there may be a case in the longer term for the new country of South Sudan to export some of its oil through Uganda and Kenya to the sea, in the immediate future it is extremely likely that South Sudan will export its oil through the pipeline running through north Sudan.

This means that it is extremely important that Governments of both south and the north will have to agree on having transitional arrangements which take into account the possibility that South Sudan may eventually wish to build pipelines from South Sudan to the sea. We are aware that the Norwegians have put forward proposals for transitional arrangements for the sharing of the oil wealth and recommend that the EU should support the Norwegians in the search for a solution which will meet the aspirations of both countries. In recommendation 236, we assert that,

“An agreement on the sharing of future oil revenues is needed urgently”.

Secondly, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, pointed out, another possible flashpoint for disagreement is Abyei, just to the north of South Sudan's border, where the prospect of armed conflict is ever present. We suggested that unauthorised troops should be withdrawn with a view to finding a permanent solution. We floated the idea of having a referendum. We made it clear the EU should be ready to support and help implement a peacekeeping operation, if required.

Thirdly, there are problems with demarcation of the border and in this connection we recommended that the EU should play a role in assisting with border demarcation and finding solutions on border management, which we believe would be of assistance. The EU should be ready to help in providing arrangements which would remove possible sources of dispute.

Fourthly, there is the very vexed question of armed militias and the proliferation of arms. Our proposals include the recommendation that the EU and its member states,

“should take stronger measures than at present to monitor and enforce the EU arms embargo on Sudan”.

In paragraph 199, we mention the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army and recommend blocking the financing of this organisation. Also, we have expressed a concern in paragraph 268 that the possible withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from the Democratic Republic of Congo could make it difficult to eliminate the presence of the Lord's Resistance Army. This could have a destabilising effect on neighbouring South Sudan. I do, incidentally, note that US troops have just been sent to Uganda to advise that other neighbouring country on how best to deal with the threat from the Lord’s Resistance Army.

Finally, we have welcomed the EU's support for South Sudan in the field of governance. Here we said that,

“Without an effective and independent judiciary free from corruption and based on a stronger legislature, there will be no rule of law in South Sudan”.

The elimination of corruption must be a very important aim and principle if the South Sudan Government are to receive the support they wish to have. Indeed, we have the conviction that there is a potential leadership role for the EU in the justice sector, as stated in paragraph 278.

I can only touch very briefly on the issue of aid, but I will just mention that the EU, in continuing its extensive aid programmes in co-ordination with other donors, can make a considerable difference if it is prepared to invest time, finance and practical resources in South Sudan for the foreseeable future.

To sum up, we welcome very strongly the commitment of the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to upgrade the EU office in South Sudan into an EU delegation with a new head of delegation and also plan development support in the areas of justice and the rule of law, education, health, water management, urban planning and food security and rural development. We do very anxiously want to see peaceful relations between north and south.

I would echo what the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said. The average life expectancy of men in Sudan is only 58, and 1.5 million people died during the decades of warfare between north and south. I suggest that, while the EU can be of only limited assistance, if all the EU countries combine with a common policy to assist, as has happened, a real difference can and should be made. We wish South Sudan well, whatever the challenges ahead, and hope that the deliberations of the new Government will meet with success. We intend that the EU should play an effective and committed role in helping the people who have endured so very much suffering and upheaval at last to find a framework for peace, security and stability.

18:30

[Lord Sewel]

My Lords, this has all the features of a red-line debate, in which you sit and look at your notes and put a red line through the points made by earlier speakers. In that case, even by the time you get to the third speaker, you are left with a rather short speech. The alternative formulation is that if a point has been made and is a good point, it bears repeating. There is likely to be a number of points that will be repeated over the next three-quarters of an hour or so—or perhaps more.

The report was published in June and we are debating it in December. Normally, a delay of that length would be a matter of regret, if not criticism. In this instance, it has actually created an opportunity, because it has given us five months to see how the new state of South Sudan has emerged and how some of the issues are moving towards resolution or not. It gives the Government the opportunity to give us their assessment of where progress is being made and where it has either not been made or the agenda has slipped back. I very much look forward to hearing the Government’s assessment.

The challenges facing South Sudan are many, and so overwhelming that, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, has said, we had a very real fear that what we were seeing was a state almost born to fail—that it would quickly join the growing list of failed states. There must be a real, co-ordinated international effort to try to prevent that happening, but there remains a probability. Our underlying doubt was whether the state of South Sudan had, from its inception, sufficiently developed state institutions to enable the state to operate in anything approaching what one would expect of a properly functioning and effective organisation. At paragraph 263, we observed:

“Their prime need is for administrative capacity building, not least so that they can absorb the assistance which they need from the international community to enable them to fulfil fully the functions of a sovereign state. The EU should use the existing instruments at its disposal to assist in the task of strengthening weak institutions, building an effective police force and judicial and dispute resolution institutions, and addressing powerful ethnic and political grievances and intense competition over land and natural resources”.

That paragraph really sums up the scale of the problem facing the world’s newest state—newest and perhaps most vulnerable.

Another series of fundamental concerns relate to the area of external and internal security. Externally, the threat of destabilisation originating from the north centred around outstanding boundary disputes and failure to reach agreement on future oil revenues. Internally, the threat arises from local armed militias and the horrific activities of the Lord's Resistance Army. It would be useful to know from the Government if they see any glimmer of hope in that area at all.

Internal causes of concern focus around the problem of endemic corruption and especially how it impinges on the distribution and proper use of oil revenues within South Sudan and on the effects that it has on donor confidence. That is of major importance. People are not going to go into South Sudan—NGOs or states—if they think that they are at such a level of corruption that it will basically nullify their efforts.

A further set of internal concerns relate, as has been pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Selkirk of Douglas, to the areas of the rule of law, independent judiciary and human rights. I have to say that sitting on an EU Sub-Committee these concerns are not just limited to African states; there are some that are trying to knock at the door at the EU where the same sort of issue arises. So let us not compartmentalise this and say that it is purely a developing world issue; it is not.

We are an EU Sub-Committee, and throughout our report we make a number of observations on the role and contribution of the EU. In paragraph 250, we observed:

“We are very concerned that the EU has not built up its presence in Juba sufficiently or quickly enough. Given the size of the task ahead this must be acted upon immediately. The EU's performance in South Sudan will be a test for the effectiveness of its new External Action Service. We strongly urge the EU to expedite the administrative procedures for appointing a new Head of Delegation and setting up a fully functioning and expanded office with adequate accommodation”.

Could the Government give us an up-to-date account of where that has reached and what sort of capacity the EU is now able to bring to the problem?

There is another international organisation of perhaps growing importance in this part of Africa, the African Union, which historically has not been an interventionist organisation—and, quite honestly, I think that Africa has suffered from that. In the lead-up to the referendum, it asserted itself and helped to resolve problems. The critical question is whether that has been capable of being sustained and is the African Union now helping to resolve the outstanding problems to which noble Lords have referred. Again, it would be useful if the Government could give us an up-to-date assessment of the situation.

I have drawn attention to the African Union because, although the EU and individual member states of the EU and the United States—and the UN, to an extent—can help through aid and expertise, the problems that South Sudan faces are essentially African problems. That is so not least because how far developments in South Sudan go will have inevitable consequences on its neighbours, inhabiting one of the most sensitive and difficult regions of Africa.

18:40

[Lord Chidgey]

My Lords, I express my congratulations to the committee for the work it has done in preparing this report. I also acknowledge the comments that the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, has just made, particularly on the African Union—something that was not particularly well covered in the earlier statements, but which is very important for the future.

I speak in this debate as the vice-chair of the Associate All-Party Parliamentary Group for Sudan—and South Sudan, of course, now. In that guise, I had the opportunity to visit Juba and Khartoum with the group shortly after the referendum and before the independence of South Sudan earlier this year. We quickly discovered a stark, even macabre, contrast between the two. Khartoum is all towering office blocks and shiny five-star hotels, with modern motorways snaking between them, while Juba had some 30 kilometres of surfaced road around a collection of crumbling buildings that served as the city centre. The best hotel in town was easily recognisable as a former army barracks—nevertheless, charging room rates well into the oil state category, with payment required in US dollars in cash.

Juba had no banks. Carrying around plastic bags stuffed with dollars was not for the faint-hearted, given the frequent warnings not to stray into town day or night for fear of being robbed or shot or kidnapped—or all three.

Juba had few paved roads; little in the way of basic services; failing schools, where teachers had not been paid for months; and hospitals that hardly functioned. Added to this mix was the mass inward migration of indigenous southern Sudanese returning from the north by bus and Nile barge at the rate, we believe, of several thousand a day. By the time this exodus from the north is complete, some 2 million southern Sudanese are expected to have come home to the south.

Some six months after our visit, the Government's response to the recommendations in the sub-committee report allows us to compare and contrast the circumstances in Sudan, particularly South Sudan, then and now. In this context, I ask the Minister to respond to further questions arising from some of these key passages—if not during this debate, then perhaps later in writing.

In paragraph 230 in the recommendations, and also referred to in paragraph 257, the Government stress the importance of creating a prosperous economy to the future of Sudan and that there are no trade sanctions on Sudan from the UK or the EU and no legal obstacles to trade. Do the Government agree that the major obstacles to trade are in fact the lack of a credible banking and financial system, and to investment, the endemic corruption throughout the state and business sectors? What interventions is the UK making to address these crucial obstacles, to protect British interests and to create conditions for greater investment confidence?

In response to paragraph 233, the Government rightly acknowledge that proper accounting for oil revenue is a high priority for the Government of South Sudan. Can the Minister provide an updated assessment of progress since independence in July of this year—some while ago now—in improving financial management of public sector finances in South Sudan and reducing loss of funds through corruption?

While the report calls for South Sudan to enhance its accounting ability by building up structures for budgeting expenditure and auditing, this should be seen against the severe capacity shortfall that is a legacy of the historic inadequate education system in the south, a result of which is that some 60 per cent of civil servants have not progressed beyond primary school education and most, if not all, Ministers in the Government have been drawn from the officer corps of the SPLA, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army.

In response to paragraphs 250 and 251, the Government have noted that the UK continues to play a leading role in diplomatic presence and interests, with the EU, to maintain a high level of engagement. In February, when we visited, we noted that in Juba most of the western donor countries, together with the EU mission, shared a diplomatic compound which provided secure, effective and efficient accommodation. Could the Minister tell the House what the current and planned arrangements are now?

In response to paragraph 259, the Government recognise the need for humanitarian aid to reach the most vulnerable according to need. Do the Government agree that one of the most vulnerable groups is that of the orphaned or displaced children shipped down from the north by bus or Nile barge, often unaccompanied?

In February, we discovered during our visit dozens of small children, some no more than four years old, who were found wandering in the Juba markets by volunteers who fed and clothed them, and placed them in a one-room playschool funded mainly by ad hoc contributions from expatriates. At night, however, they had to return to the markets. We were told that by the time the girls reached nine or 10, they left to work in the market brothels. There they stayed until their premature death, usually in their early teens. No one seemed to know what happened to the boys.

With the numbers of children being shipped south thought to run into thousands, what intervention are the Government making with the Governments of the south and the north to curb this appalling abuse? While the Government agree with the recommendations in paragraph 263 on the need for capacity-building, can they confirm that in the absence of state capacity the Sudanese community has become more and more dependent on international NGOs to deliver essential services, creating a dependency culture, particularly in the urban areas? What plans do the Government have, with other donor agencies, for tackling this development?

The Government also agree with the recommendations in paragraph 264, calling for support for agricultural investment. The urgency of this can be measured by the huge reduction in land under cultivation in Sudan as a result of some 20 years of civil war. Some donor-supported agriculture projects we visited frankly proved clearly inept or inadequate. In addition, relocating urban dwellers returning from northern Sudan's towns and cities to rural areas in the south, while equipping them with farming tools and settling them on smallholdings with ill-defined land titles, hardly seemed to be a recipe for agricultural progress.

In response to paragraph 266, concerning the high levels of corruption in South Sudan, the Government state that this area is one of DfID's high priorities. What evidence is there that the Government of South Sudan are responding to this programme of support and engagement? After some six months, does the evidence show that corruption is declining or increasing? Finally, on the Government's response to paragraph 273, they note that the EU is currently drafting a joint strategy paper on the effective co-ordination of aid and the priorities of South Sudan. How does this strategy fit with the responsibilities assumed by the troika of nations that witnessed the comprehensive peace agreement: the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom?

18:47

[Lord Jay of Ewelme]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said, last year was a positive year for Sudan and, I would say, a positive year, too, for conflict resolution and peaceful change in Africa. The referendum was held, its result was clear and respected and President al-Bashir's presence in Juba was wise and right. Yet there are huge and unpredictable problems still in Darfur, which I will not say more about this evening, and in the disputed areas of Abyei, south Kordofan and Blue Nile. Abyei is now, I suppose, in a sort of semi-stable limbo but I find the prospects for south Kordofan and Blue Nile pretty worrying. There was a rather chilling remark in the recent EIU report that those conflicts have the potential to become as entrenched and protracted as the Darfur conflict, which is a very worrying thought indeed.

There is a huge responsibility on both the north and South Sudan, and on the African Union, which has been commendably involved in Sudan’s difficulties, as the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, said, to ensure that the descent into conflict is avoided. As others have said, it is hugely important, too, that the issue of oil is resolved. That can be hugely divisive but it can also be a unifying factor in the future of Sudan. If either the north or the south uses oil as a weapon against the other, then both will suffer because both need the revenues. If they work out an agreed formula for sharing it, both will benefit. Let us hope that they do.

I want to focus mostly on the south and I must declare an interest as chairman of the medical NGO Merlin, which has health programmes which I have visited in Juba, Torit and Nimule in South Sudan. The south is shockingly poor. One in eight children dies before the age of five, maternal mortality is one of the highest in the world, and when I was there two years ago—the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, says that it is the same now—there were no paved roads outside Juba and the legacy of civil war is evident, with mines in the roads and fields, people getting injured and killed by those mines and populations disturbed by the legacy of civil war. Yet, with the oil, the south is potentially wealthy. Per capita income in the south is 25 per cent higher than in the north, except that the vast majority of people in the south do not see anything of it. The need to diversify the economy away from oil dependency is huge, as it the need to develop a proper agricultural sector, to start an industrial sector and to build the human capacity necessary for both and to manage and govern a country of some 8 million people. These are huge tasks, and they will require well focused long-term aid from international and national donors, including DfID, which is commendably involved in Sudan. I also echo what others have said about how important and encouraging it is that China is involved in the development of both north and South Sudan. It clearly has a big role to play as part of the international development effort. Perhaps the Minister will confirm that there is good and constructive conflict between China and other major donors, including the UK, in Juba and the south.

[Lord Radice]

The noble Lord said “conflict”. I think he meant “co-operation”.

[Lord Jay of Ewelme]

I meant contact.

Aid needs to be well directed and focused on those who need it most. In September this year, the 38 NGOs working on peace-building, development and humanitarian assistance in South Sudan published an excellent paper called, rather cleverly, I thought, Getting it Right from the Start: Priorities for Action in the New Republic of South Sudan. It is good to see NGOs working together like that rather than working against each other. The recommendations in that report make a great deal of sense. I would like to mention three of them.

The first is the need to balance longer-term development assistance with continued support for emergency humanitarian needs because in South Sudan there is no neat continuum from conflict through the need for emergency aid to the need for development aid. For some years, South Sudan will need both emergency aid and development assistance to build capacity and, at the same time, to provide direct emergency help for those who need it most, including those displaced by conflict and those now returning to South Sudan. I hope DfID can take the lead in getting aid administrations to recognise the importance of that. Perhaps the Minister can confirm that too.

Secondly, there is a real need to focus on building capacity in Juba and the different counties across key sectors. That is an absolute precondition for successful longer-term development. Thirdly, there is ensuring that that aid, whether emergency aid or development aid, is provided on time and without interruption, and that has not always been the case in South Sudan. There have been delays, gaps, overlaps and short-termism. It is impossible for the still embryonic South Sudan Administration to govern effectively unless the continuity of aid, including an assurance of long-term aid, is made absolutely clear to them now.

Two million people were killed in Sudan’s 20-year civil war. I believe that the referendum this year and the creation of South Sudan provide a real chance to build a better future. That is not, as all who have spoken tonight have made clear, by any means assured, as conflict in the regions at risk remains a real possibility. I was pessimistic before the referendum about whether it would be accepted by both sides, and I am delighted that I was wrong. The job now is to convert that achievement into longer-term and sustainable growth and development that will benefit all in the south. That will require the constant engagement of the international community, and economic, political development. I hope that the Minister can give an assurance that Her Majesty’s Government and DfID will continue to be closely involved and indeed to take a lead in that.

18:55

[Lord Trimble]

My Lords, in thinking about this debate, I am conscious of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, about the tendency to repetition. As the report and the speeches so far have, understandably, concentrated on South Sudan, I will address a few remarks to Sudan itself.

I was struck by the comment that appears in paragraph 12 of our report from Gill Lusk, giving her description of the Sudanese Government. She said that,

“the Sudanese government was a civilian one, but run by the security services”.

She described their immediate aim as survival. She said that their long-term policy was to establish their version of Islamic rule. Rather than using the term Islamic she might have been more accurate to use the term Islamist, because that gets you into the right context. We must remember that Sudan was the country that Bin Laden went to as a matter of choice until American pressure drove him out. That is partly why the Americans took such an interest in Sudan. We should bear that in mind.

I note also that the International Crisis Group report dated 26 September says:

“The loss of South Sudan has had a profound effect on the NCP, and senior generals led a soft-coup within the party. They have outflanked more pragmatic elements in the NCP who seek a negotiated strategy”.

We can see the effect of that soft coup by looking at what has been happening in the troubled peripheral regions of Sudan. Abyei has been mentioned.

On the point of the publication of our report on 20 June, Presidents al-Bashir and Salva Kiir, from Sudan and South Sudan, signed an agreement in Addis Ababa under which all northern troops would be withdrawn, as would the southern Sudanese, and be replaced by an Ethiopian-led UN interim security force. As mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, the Ethiopian force is there, but the northern troops have not withdrawn and neither have the southern troops. There is a stand-off taking place and limbo there as well. The hopes that were there on 20 June have disappeared.

Similarly, on 28 June, a framework agreement was entered into, which includes political and security agreement for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, and which was facilitated by Thabo Mbeki and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia and signed by the co-deputy NCP chairman and presidential adviser, Nafie Ali Nafie. The generals who had conducted the soft coup objected to this and a few days later President al-Bashir publicly disavowed the agreement. Since then, Kordofan and Blue Nile have descended into considerable violence. In view of the time, I will not go into dealing with the large forces that are there and the atrocities that have been committed, but they are unfortunately familiar with what has gone on.

There have been some encouraging matters. The visit by al-Bashir to South Sudan at the time of independence was encouraging, likewise, the journey in early October by Salva Kiir to Khartoum, where he was received with full ceremony and protocol appropriate to a visiting foreign head of state. Both parties committed themselves to resolving disagreements peacefully through dialogue and to avoid a return to war, but the Economist country report published in Nov 2011 concludes:

“In reality, evidence of progress is scarce and deadlines announced … look certain to be missed”.

Although with an eye to oil production and exports, the report says it is unlikely that either party will drive things to the point of open conflict.

One can see a similar pattern in Darfur. In July, the National Congress Party came to an agreement with one Darfuri faction—it is referred to as the Doha document; the faction was the Liberation and Justice Movement from Darfur. There, problems are on both sides. The larger Justice and Equality Movement was outside the Doha process, although it indicated at one stage a willingness to engage in discussions if the Doha document could be reopened. The Government have refused to do that and there has been no progress.

Latterly, we have seen a degree of coalescence between the Justice and Equality Movement and the SPLM-North, which are the forces active in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, and a link-up with other political groups within Sudan which have the general objective of regime change within Sudan. I would be very interested to know the Government’s assessment of those matters. We keep forgetting the huge size of these countries. The Khartoum Administration probably do not have the logistic capability to project their force to their borders. Consequently, these forces dealing with the borders have the potential to last for a considerable period unless there are interventions and initiatives elsewhere.

I confess to being a little disappointed by the Government’s response on these points. It refers to the Abyei interim agreement and states:

“We, the EU and the rest of the International Community will be monitoring the situation closely to ensure both sides comply with the terms of the agreements”.

Well, neither side has complied with the terms of the agreement. Many months have passed since then. I would be interested to see what the Government are considering doing.

I notice that the Government say in other responses that they will continue to support Thabo Mbeki and the African Union initiative. We may be polite about the African Union, but the reality is that it is not effective. Indeed, we saw in the Libyan situation that some of the things that the African Union does are most unhelpful. Thabo Mbeki may be a former President, but I bear in mind his ineffectiveness with regard to problems in Zimbabwe, which may be a greater indication for the future.

There is in these matters and reports of this nature a certain polite fiction that governs them. They are all notionally addressed to the EU and its involvement, but the truth is that the EU is not a major player in this. The comprehensive peace agreement was produced by the troika, Norway, the United Kingdom and the US, and the major player there was the US. I treasure the comment made in the margins of our meetings at one stage, where someone who shall remain anonymous plaintively inquired, “Why is it that Norway carries more weight in this matter than the EU?” That is just one of the pleasures of our discussions.

Unfortunately, while the comprehensive peace agreement was produced largely by American pressure, that pressure is unlikely to be renewed in the near future because the current President does not believe in exerting it. Speeches will not change the Administration in Khartoum. When people referred to the Administration, I thought, “Now, if I want to think about what they are likely to do, I just have to ask myself, ‘What would Gerry do?’”. That refers to my talks partner in Northern Ireland. I know what he would do in this situation if he was in Khartoum: he would hunker down until attention drifted elsewhere and then return to following his agenda. That agenda is set out by Gill Lusk. We have to take account of that. I cannot see the EU being effective on this; I cannot see the AU being effective on this; but we need to be effective. Concern was expressed earlier in this debate about South Sudan being a failed state. We have to bear in mind that north Sudan is not much better.

19:05

[Lord Alton of Liverpool]

My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Chidgey, I am an officer of the All-Party Associate Parliamentary Group for Sudan, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and the sub-committee for accepting written evidence from the All-Party Group and for welcoming its members during its proceedings. Inevitably, the sub-committee’s report has a considerable focus on the European Union, and I echo some of what the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, has just said. I hope that when the Minister replies she will make some reference to the very first action of Salva Kiir’s incoming Government, which was to apply for membership of the Commonwealth. It seems to me that this is an opportunity for the United Kingdom, particularly in the role that we play in the Commonwealth, to build a deep and lasting relationship with the world’s newest nation.

As the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, said, it is in some ways sad when reports are delayed, but there is real topicality and edge to this debate because of events that are going on even while we meet. There was a report in today’s newspaper, which I have shared with the noble Baroness, Lady Kinnock, that from a launch pad in the town of Kadugli, the towns of Kauda and Alburam and surrounding villages were targeted in the past 24 hours by Iranian rocket missiles fired against civilians. In my remarks, I want to talk about the situation in South Kordofan, Abyei and Blue Nile, as others have done.

It is very unusual for there to be a debate on Sudan in which we will not hear the voice of my noble friend Lady Cox. At present, she is in Westminster Abbey giving one of the readings at a carol service during which a collection is being taken up for her small charity, HART, which does such admirable work in Sudan and in many other parts of the world, so I would like to place on record the reason why she is not here to speak today. I also want to pay tribute to her work in that part of the world, where she has been so many times over the years, and to the work of HART’s Lydia Turner, who has prepared such an excellent briefing in advance of today’s debate.

Previous speakers have referred to the comment in the summary of the sub-committee’s report:

“We assess the risk that the new country of South Sudan will fail as a state as high, even if the international community maintains the current levels of assistance and support”.

There is a danger in making statements of this kind, not least because they can become self-fulfilling prophecies. I also rather disliked the statement because it is what Khartoum has always insisted will happen. I am surprised that at this point in the report’s summary no mention is made of the hostile role of the Republic of Sudan—northern Sudan—whose behaviour is the principal reason why the south is battling against such daunting odds.

We know what constitutes a state that fails, but what name do you give to a state such as north Sudan, whose bombing campaign against the south led, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Jay, a few moments ago, to the deaths of 2 million people during the civil war and whose decision in 1983 to impose Sharia law in that religiously diverse nation led to the civil war which ensued? What do you call a state which declared war on its own people in Darfur, seeking the forced Arabisation of African peoples and lands, their enslavement and the imposition of its extremist form of Islam, leading to the deaths of around 400,000 mainly Muslim people and the displacement of 2 million others?

[Lord Radice]

Does the noble Lord consider that in fact South Sudan will not succeed unless there is regime change in Sudan proper? Is that part of his argument? It seems to be leading to that.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool]

My Lords, others have commented on the possibility of the Arab spring having some effect in the Republic of Sudan in due course. We will see, but in the past 24 hours 1,000 people in Khartoum were chanting their support for the Syrian opposition and then started to demand a change in the Khartoum regime led by Field-Marshal Omar al-Bashir. I think it is too early to say but, rather like the noble Lord, I hope that there will be change in Sudan as there will, we hope, be positive change in many other places in that part of the world.

During the civil war that I referred to, I travelled with the SPLA into southern Sudan and saw the situation first hand. Four years later, I went to Darfur where I took first-hand accounts from some of the Darfuri victims of what clearly constituted the first genocide of the 21st century. Those accounts of rape and murder and the depredations of the Janjaweed militia will always be with me. What do you call a state whose leaders permit such atrocities to occur? The International Criminal Court has given it a name; it is an indicted state. In July 2008, Luis Moreno Ocampo, the prosecutor of the ICC, indicted Omar al-Bashir and in 2009, the ICC judges in The Hague issued a warrant for his arrest for crimes against humanity, the first against a sitting head of state. Only last week, the Defence Minister, Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, was similarly indicted. Egregious crimes have been committed by the highest levels of government, and the killing continues while we meet.

Northern Sudan has become a pariah state and fails every test of how a civilised or humane Government should behave. Even as those independence celebrations were taking place last July, a chain of political and military developments, initiated by Khartoum, have once again placed the region on the brink of outright civil war. It is worth mentioning in this context that some 70 per cent of Sudan’s income, the oil income that has been referred to, is being used for military expenditure to fuel this killing.

Although the post-independence violence came as no surprise, the sheer ferocity of the attacks in southern Kordofan, Abyei and Blue Nile, areas located along the new international border, has been truly shocking. In southern Kordofan heavy fighting continues between SPLA-North and Sudan’s armed forces. On 1 December, the SAF claimed to have taken the town of Taruje, a claim refuted by the SPLM-North who said that fighting is ongoing. Earlier today, I met with representatives of the SPLM-North and they particularly raised with me the failure to investigate the apparent collaboration of peacekeepers in the massacre of escaping refugees in Kadugli, an issue that I raised on the Floor of the House earlier this year. They described the humanitarian situation as disastrous, with 2 million people across the border region now threatened with starvation.

Aid agencies suggest that at least 305,000 people are displaced in southern Kordofan. Aerial bombardment continues and the humanitarian conditions for the displaced are deteriorating with many hiding in caves in the mountains at great risk.

In Blue Nile, reports from numerous sources consistently describe offences and atrocities perpetrated there by the Government of Sudan similar to those that I have just referred to. They, too, involve aerial bombardment resulting in civilian deaths and injuries, denial of access for humanitarian aid, extra-judicial killings, detention and torture of civilians and looting of civilian properties. It is estimated that up to 400,000 people have now been displaced from southern Kordofan and Blue Nile and 30,000 to 40,000 of them have fled into Ethiopia.

In Abyei, more than 120,000 of the indigenous Ngok Dinka population have fled to South Sudan. Many aid organisations, including Oxfam, have pulled out of the region. As the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, rightly reminded us earlier on, Abyei is mistakenly being identified as part of the Republic of Sudan, when no settlement of that matter, as the noble Lord, Lord Selkirk, said earlier, has been made.

There are reliable reports that Khartoum has issued death sentences to 19 SPLM civilians. As a result, some of those are now being held at Kober prison, among them the renowned writer and poet, Mr Abdel-Monim Rahma. Meanwhile, while those tragic events have been unfolding, the flow of oil from the south, as we have heard, has been halted. Here is an opportunity with China which has been referred to in this debate. The economics of Sudan will influence China. Her Majesty’s Government need to have serious bilateral discussions with China about how together we might be able to make some sense of this appalling situation.

The United Nations Security Council and the international community must urgently respond to the following questions and issues, such as the Government of Sudan’s continuing military offences, including these aerial bombardments. We must revisit the issue of the no-fly zone. On 11 August, the noble Lord, Lord Howell, told me that:

“A no-fly zone in Darfur and Southern Kordofan would be a major logistical challenge”.—[Official Report, 11/8/11; col. WA 444.]

Are we seriously saying that if the political will were there the logistical challenges could not be overcome? As the dry season approaches, there is acute fear of an intensification of military activities, with grave consequences for the civilian population. We must demand access by humanitarian agencies that are denied access at this present time.

On 9 November, the noble Lord, Lord Howell, told me that,

“we continue to work closely with United Nations agencies and international partners to seek urgent access to those most affected by the conflict”.—[Official Report, 9/11/11; col. WA 66.]

What have those urgent endeavours achieved? We need an international independent committee of inquiry to be sent to southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei to investigate and report on these recent developments.

On 21 June, the noble Lord said:

“Reports of such atrocities will have to be investigated and, if they prove to be true, those responsible will need to be brought to account”.—[Official Report, 21/6/11; col. WA 294.]

More than five months have now elapsed. What results have the investigations yielded, and who has been held to account?

On 11 August, the Minister said:

“We are deeply concerned by reports of this attack on the hospital north of Kauda Valley and other attacks. We continue to urge for a ceasefire, and for access so that these claims can be fully investigated. We will, if necessary, consider action to refer the situation in Southern Kordofan to the International Criminal Court”.—[Official Report, 11/8/11; col. WA 444.]

Have we now done that?

On 11 August, the Minister also told me that he found the UNMIS report, The Human Rights Situation During the Recent Violence in Southern Kordofan Sudan, “deeply concerning”. He went on to say:

“We will, if necessary, consider action to refer the situation in Southern Kordofan to the International Criminal Court”.—[Official Report, 11/8/11; col. WA 446.]

Have we done that?

There are two things that the UK should do immediately. First, the British Government should seriously consider implementing targeted sanctions to try to halt Khartoum’s continuing policies, which are inflicting widespread death and destruction. These could include a UK trade embargo and diplomatic sanctions imposed on senior politicians in Khartoum’s ruling party responsible for the humanitarian crisis and human rights offences. On 10 November, the Minister told me:

“We judge that further targeted travel sanctions would not help at this stage in achieving our objectives, but will keep this under review in consultation with European Union and United Nations partners”.—[Official Report, 10/11/11; col. WA 95.]

What has to happen for us to do that?

The Sudanese bishop, Macram Max Gassis, one of the most courageous and wise men in Africa, once said:

“Peace without justice is like building a house without foundations; it is a pseudo-peace doomed to collapse at the very first storm”.

If north and South Sudan are to have any kind of future, the north will have to learn to coexist with the south, and there will have to be justice as well as peace. Britain and China, I re-emphasise, should work with one another to try to facilitate this. Following Rwanda, we said that we would never countenance another genocide—“Never again”, we said. But it is “Never again” all over again in south Kordofan and this part of Sudan, unless we act.

19:17

[Lord Elton]

I did not come here with the intention of speaking. I came here with the intention of learning, and I have learnt some very uncomfortable facts and am left with some uncomfortable questions. I suspect that the very illuminating speeches, the last two in this debate, will cause some untidiness in the language in which we describe what is going on in that part of Africa.

The question that we all ask is what we can do to bring this tragic story to a happy conclusion. The question that I am left with is a much smaller one which I would like the Minister to answer after she has answered all the questions that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, asked so eloquently a moment ago. I look forward to those answers with great interest. How many of the members of the Government of Khartoum are welcomed into our capital city and elsewhere? Do they have property here? Do they enjoy the rights of civilians here? If a British citizen kills one person the least he gets is a mandatory life sentence. What do generals who have arranged the murder of thousands get in return if they come to this city of ours?

19:18

[Baroness Kinnock of Holyhead]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and the committee for taking the initiative in writing and preparing this excellent report. Indeed, we welcome the opportunity to take stock this evening of where we are now in the wake of the excellent assessment made by the committee on the challenges faced by Sudan and the role of the European Union in efforts to build peace, security, governance and developments. These objectives, as many noble Lords have said, apply to both Sudan and South Sudan, which both face uncertainty and potentially increasing tension and conflict created by a raft of unresolved contentious issues.

While the focus this evening has been mostly on South Sudan, we should urge the European Union and all donors to be vigilant and be careful not to neglect the need to respond to the destabilising effect of South Sudan’s independence on the north, where the economy is in serious trouble after two decades of mismanagement in Khartoum by the NIF—with huge military expenditure, corruption and cronyism. Add to this a potential 37 per cent decline in oil revenues and inflation at 15 per cent and rising. Foreign exchange reserves are at an extremely low level and very painful cuts are hurting the people of Sudan. Behind all this is a gigantic $38 billion of external debt.

There are clear reasons for remaining engaged with the Republic of Sudan and for the EU to persevere with what is described as a “comprehensive approach” approved by Foreign Ministers at the Council in Brussels in June.

The EU has had and does have a central and important role to play. EU funding has for many years been crucial in Sudan, especially in South Sudan, in terms of the support given to grassroots human rights organisations—the programme in Khartoum has been and is excellent—and work on food security issues in the south and east. ECHO, the humanitarian office of the EU, continues to provide a critical lifeline to Darfur and to the south. The EU provides a balanced set of incentives to both Sudan and South Sudan to settle their differences peacefully and focus on development. So far, as noble Lords have intimated, those incentives have not persuaded either country to settle their differences. However, it is important that they know and understand that these incentives are there, and there should be intensified efforts to support the urgent need to encourage dialogue and co-operation.

The place to do this is clearly through African Union’s Thabo Mbeki panel. I know that a number of noble Lords have referred to this and made disparaging comments about it. It is a difficult situation, but it is the only show in town. There is no prospect of dialogue and discussion other than through the African Union. It is the only place where the two sides are likely to go for that dialogue. Thabo Mbeki, in my judgment, has been doing a very good job of ensuring that discussions take place. He has done that in very difficult circumstances. It is not ideal, but it is the best hope that we have of brokering agreements between the north and the south on, for instance, oil revenue, citizenship, borders and Abyei. Another option is the joint Africa-EU strategy, which has the potential to provide the space for some political dialogue.

In just a few weeks, the people of South Sudan will mark the anniversary of their vote last year to secede from the north. As two members of the APG who are here today have said, when we went to South Sudan, we met with enormous hope and expectation. We have memories of people who could not even say “referendum” without breaking out into a huge grin of happiness and satisfaction. They believed; the expectations were high. They told us that there would be new roads, clinics, jobs, food and schools for their kids. Most of all, they looked forward to peace and security at last.

It is therefore unthinkable that donors, including the EU, cannot now effectively respond to support a Government who need to tackle chronic poverty and make some progress to reaching the millennium development goals, which are currently way out of reach. The scale of the challenge is daunting and the statistics truly shocking. Save the Children has highlighted that South Sudan, as other noble Lords have said, has the highest maternal mortality rate in the world.

Access to services is rare. The women die of haemorrhage, infection, obstructed labour and, indeed, of unsafe abortion. There is widespread malnutrition among children, which leads to stunting and lifelong underdevelopment. South Sudan has one of the lowest routine immunisation coverage rates on earth; only about 10 per cent of children are fully vaccinated. The women of South Sudan are among the poorest and most marginalised of the world; 92 per cent of them are illiterate. This is deplorable. In human development terms, it is as bad as you can get and it demands a focus on human, social and economic capacity to develop infrastructure, social services and public services.

Last month, the EU held a workshop in Juba where the discussion was about how to streamline effective measures designed to ensure that EU assistance can be effective. The workshop was organised by the EU special representative, Dame Rosalind Marsden, who, as I understand it, was somewhat criticised by the committee for not actually living in Sudan.

[Noble Lords]

No!

[Baroness Kinnock of Holyhead]

No? Good. This was not in the report but I was told that in an exchange she was made to feel that there was some criticism of her on that score. Clearly, if that was not the case—

[Lord Teverson]

Perhaps I can make it clear that that was absolutely not the case.

[Baroness Kinnock of Holyhead]

Thank you very much for clarifying that, because it would be extremely unusual for any country representative or envoy to live in the country which they follow. I would say that Dame Rosalind Marsden is doing a very good job as a special representative and has enormous respect among the Sudanese and, indeed, others in the European Union.

All the EU member states’ missions in Juba attended that workshop, as did representatives from the Government of South Sudan, the UN and the World Bank. This is part of a concerted effort by the EU and by other players to encourage joint programming by member states of the European Union and by other donors who need to co-ordinate, certainly better than has been the case. One thing we know, for instance, is that the education ministry is currently dealing with 17 different bilateral donors, as well as countless NGOs. This takes time and is extremely difficult when you do not have the computers, the staff or the capacity to manage being inundated in this way by requests and pressure from so many donors. That workshop was the first time that partners had come together in this way—in this Room, we would say “And about time too”.

The strategic plan is now to join EU donor teams together, which will assist with efforts to tackle humanitarian needs. Several areas will of course need to be prioritised; as noble Lords have said, there is justice, the rule of law, education and urban development. One area which I think was not mentioned is the rural economy, which has become a major priority for the European Union. The EU will participate in the pledging conference due to be held in Washington DC later this month and play a lead role on the agricultural sector in that meeting.

The noble Lord, Lord Jay, mentioned the NGO report; I, too, certainly recommend Getting it Right from the Start as very interesting reading. It recommends substantial support for small-scale agriculture and pastoral production, which is extremely important in Sudan, and called for targeted support for access to areas of the country where large numbers of returnees are settling, making huge demands on the population living there. The report also calls on the EU and others to provide long-term, predictable funding, as noble Lords have said, for the Government and for NGOs as well, which are of course heavily involved in the current provision of basic services in South Sudan. Another key issue is the need for all systems to promote equitable social and economic development.

Currently, Jonglei gets roughly a third as much per capita as Western Bahr El Gazal, while grappling with a food-insecure population nearly six times as large. These discrepancies need to be tackled. Adjustments to redress inequalities should be encouraged in order to respond to references in the comprehensive peace agreement and the transitional constitution to,

“historical injustices and inequality between different regions of Sudan”.

They called for wealth to be shared without discrimination on any grounds.

A very important EU contribution will be to develop trade opportunities with South Sudan and to continue free access to EU markets under the “Everything But Arms” arrangement with the least developed countries. That is already under way. South Sudan is a litmus test of how donors manage to get development right. However, it is important that we understand the right of the Government to own the whole process. We tend to talk as though donors own the process of managing a Government who may face difficult issues of capacity. Nevertheless, there is a particular tendency to feel this pressure from donors. I have certainly seen this in many years of following international development in fragile states. President Salva Kiir said recently:

“How we spend money as a government, and how our development partners spend money in our countries, is critically important to our success, given the scale of need across our nation”.

Another critical issue that deserves more than lip service is the need to support South Sudan civil society in its efforts to participate in the decisions. I also strongly emphasise the need for much more investment in the South Sudan Parliament. Last week, MPs were here as guests of the CPA. I met two MPs from South Sudan, who told me that they do not have offices, a library or any computers. They have no access at all to information, yet they are supposed to manage these complex and challenging issues. It is critical that this newly elected Parliament is given the means to work efficiently so that it can hold the Government to account, particularly when the Parliament scrutinises budgets, for example.

Currently, the increased flow of funds into the economy in South Sudan, as a result of taking all the oil revenue from the southern oil fields, is not being properly accounted for, as others have remarked on. This could be put down to corruption; we are very quick to do that. However, surely the sheer lack of functioning institutions is a major factor. Anyone who has been to a developing country without such institutions understands that there is corruption but there is also an inability to manage very complex fiscal and budgetary issues.

I believe very strongly that the collective importance of the EU will be critical at this time. As it says in the report, the issue of the ICC arrest warrant resulted in Sudan refusing to ratify the Cotonou partnership agreement in 2010. The legal framework for co-operation with the EU was therefore denied to South Sudan. The agreement is the only legally binding instrument that includes an ICC clause. The EU Council and the ACP council should be commended for their efforts to ensure that South Sudan can access that funding. In July the EU Council agreed to give €190 million of uncommitted funds from the ninth and previous European development funds to meet the needs of the most vulnerable populations in both the north and the south. Additional funds amounting to €200 million have already been allocated in the context of the 2011-13 development plan drawn up by the Government in Juba. A decision has been taken with the ACP. It is very good to see the combined efforts of the council—of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific—and the EU to adopt what they are calling a flexible approach, which will allow South Sudan to become a party to the Cotonou agreement and the 10th EDF funds. I know that this was an issue that particularly exercised the committee during the discussions that took place.

South Sudan has lost a lot of time because of the donor-pooled funds by the World Bank. They have lost a lot of time when strategic planning was difficult for them. Of the £800 million allocated at the time of the CPA agreement, only one-third had been spent by July this year. It is terrible that the money has been there and has not been spent. It was mainly because of the over-rigorous and ridiculously stringent conditions imposed on the disbursements of the funding.

I visited Sudan a number of times over many years, and I cannot but help feel and share the joy and anticipation felt by the people who have known decades of such terrible war and suffering. What we know now is that countless thousands have been displaced and the conflicts for decades have caused such misery. The two countries now face seemingly intractable problems, but the opportunities for supporting positive progress towards peace, development and accountable governance are also significant and we should not be so pessimistic as to rule that out. The call now has to be for the two Governments to change their approach and for civil society and Parliaments to hold their Governments to account. I know that the EU is seen as central to those efforts, and to support it, UNMIS and the AU High-Level Implementation Panel. We should support the EU premise that the provision of basic services can help reduce the risk of conflicts driven by competition over resources. Similarly, the EU believes that providing services in areas under pressure from large numbers of returnees will reduce further potential for conflict.

Finally, the new and excellent UN representative, Hilde Johnson, based in Juba, has said:

“If there is one important lesson to learn from the negotiations that ended Africa's longest civil war, it is the need for international engagement—continuous, coordinated and forceful”.

19:37

[Baroness Verma]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Teverson for tabling today’s debate, and all noble Lords for their valuable contribution to this very important topic. I hope that I will reassure noble Lords through my remarks and responses to questions raised that the Government very much take on board noble Lords’ concerns that progress in Sudan and South Sudan is slow. If I cannot answer questions today, I will write to noble Lords, but I would like to start by paying tribute to the Associate Parliamentary Group for Sudan, some of whose members have participated today. Its continued interest and commitment to the people of both Sudans is crucial and vital, and is rightly welcomed by all those who care about the welfare of the peoples of these two countries. As with the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, if it is repetition on a good point, repetition it will be.

We very much welcomed the report produced in June this year by EU Sub-Committee C, which accurately predicted many of the challenges that would be faced by the two countries after South Sudan’s secession. It made some very sensible recommendations, and made clear what can be achieved by working with our EU partners in Sudan and South Sudan. We very much value the role of the EU in Sudan, and particularly, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kinnock, just said, of EU special representative, Rosalind Marsden. We look forward to continuing to work with them and her.

At this stage, it would be most useful if perhaps I set out the current UK policy towards Sudan and South Sudan. Since the committee’s report was issued in June, we have seen the birth of the world’s newest nation, South Sudan. The independence of South Sudan on 9 July was a great success, passing peacefully and with the consent of both nations. Our own Foreign Secretary was there to represent the UK and made clear our ongoing commitment to both countries.

We continue to make clear that we would like to see two prosperous states peacefully coexisting with each other. We want to see a swift resolution to the many conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan, which are affecting stability in both countries, and we want to see full humanitarian access granted to all conflict areas. We can work closely with our international partners, particularly the EU, in pursuit of these goals.

The UK continues with its extensive development programme, co-ordinated through DfID, in both countries. Humanitarian needs play a big part of our programming, but we also provide significant development assistance to both countries. We should also be clear that no money goes directly to the Governments in Sudan or South Sudan.

In South Sudan, the UK is providing over £90 million a year for the next four years to help the people of South Sudan. This funding will support international efforts to promote peace and stability in South Sudan. Specifically, our assistance will help to build more accountable, inclusive and transparent government; deliver basic services, such as education, clean water and healthcare; support economic growth; provide humanitarian relief; and improve security and access to justice.

In Sudan, we are providing £50 million per year for the next four years. Sudan has undergone massive upheaval this year. As such, we are looking at our programme to make sure it meets the needs of the Sudanese people in these changing times. Whatever happens, our programmes will contribute to the provision of humanitarian aid to those most in need. They will help deliver clean water, sanitation and better education. Our programmes will also aim to deliver better access to justice, particularly for women, and improved governance in Sudan.

On a recent visit in November, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Stephen O’Brien announced additional support for the World Food Programme that will enable it to meet the humanitarian food needs of approximately 315,000 people who have been particularly affected by conflict in Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei. This will cost around £4.8 million.

The British Council is increasingly engaged in Sudan. While there in July, Henry Bellingham, Foreign Office Minister for Africa, witnessed the signing of a statement of intent between the British Council and the Sudanese Ministry of Education confirming the commitment of both parties to an English-teacher training programme. It will lead to the development of a cadre of 40 ministry teacher trainers and result in 900 more teachers at basic and secondary school level in Khartoum state receiving professional development training.

However, it is unfortunate that, despite the efforts of the UK and the international community, progress remains slow in many areas and we have seen deterioration in others. The violence in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile state continues. It is estimated that, in total, 200,000 people have been displaced from Southern Kordofan and 130,000 from Blue Nile state. There is little humanitarian access to either area. We are working closely with our international partners to push for an immediate cessation of hostilities and to encourage the establishment of an agreed process to address the root causes of violence in both states. We urge the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in the north to allow immediate humanitarian access to the area.

More recently, there have been worrying developments, with the Sudanese Air Force bombing Yida in South Sudan and Quffa in the border area on 10 November, and further violent altercations on 3 December. The Minister for Africa, Henry Bellingham, made a statement in November condemning any action that puts civilian lives at risk and called on both parties to exercise restraint. These latest events make it all the more important that both sides allow a border monitoring mission to deploy quickly.

We also continue to urge both Sudan and South Sudan to find a way to resolve their remaining areas of difference. It is particularly concerning that the parties could not come to an agreement on oil revenue sharing during the talks in Addis Ababa last week. We encourage both parties to make every effort to come to an agreement in the next rounds of talks that will take place throughout December.

We also urge both parties to come to an agreement on citizenship, border demarcation and the status of the disputed region of Abyei. As the Foreign Secretary said in a joint statement yesterday with his Norwegian and US colleagues, it is vital that the two parties return to the table as soon as possible to find equitable solutions. The situation on both security and humanitarian difficulties in Darfur remains an area of grave concern. The UK is actively supporting the development of the UN-AU road map for the peace process in Darfur, which is due to be presented to the UN Security Council in January 2012.

We hope that this will push for the early implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur; continue with negotiations with those movements not yet signed up to the agreement; include consultations with the people of Darfur; and set out a clear process by which the international community can support the process.

I will now respond to some of the points raised by noble Lords. I know that a number of noble Lords have raised the failure of the two countries to reach an agreement on equitable sharing of oil revenues between the two countries. We welcome the constructive role being played by the AU high-level implementation panel which is mediating between the parties on this question. The troika of the UK, US and Norway is playing an important role by supporting mediation politically and with technical advice. And, of course, we welcome the recent actions by China, raised by noble Lords to support a negotiated solution between the two countries on the question of oil. The EU also has a valuable part to play alongside the troika in supporting the AU’s mediation.

Talks facilitated by the AU, the African Union, in Addis Ababa on 25 to 30 November unfortunately came to no agreement, but constructive proposals were placed on the table. The noble Lord, Lord Chidgey, has noted that this included an offer by South Sudan on the level of compensation it could pay to Sudan for its loss of oil revenue with a headline figure of $4.5 billion. That proposal needs to be looked at in a broader context, including the outstanding debts that are to be offset, but it is a proposal that we hope the Sudanese Government will consider seriously and to which it will respond constructively.

Noble Lords have raised the unwelcome statements by the Sudanese Government that they are intending to withhold payments for South Sudanese oil. Such threats are clearly not helpful in reaching an agreement which is needed for the economic welfare of both countries. My noble friend Lord Selkirk has mentioned the proposal that a new pipeline should be built to take South Sudan’s oil to the sea without crossing Sudan as a longer-term solution. We believe that if such a proposal were viable or affordable for Sudan, it would not take away the need to urgently seek a solution for the near term.

As my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary said in a joint statement yesterday with his Norwegian and US colleagues it is vital that the two parties should return to the table as soon as possible to find equitable solutions for the economic benefit of both countries.

It is also vital that South Sudan, whose oil reserves are finite, should seek to diversity its economy rapidly, as noble Lords have mentioned today, to ensure longer term growth.

Noble Lords have rightly mentioned the importance of tackling corruption in South Sudan and of ensuring that the new Government have the right measures in place to deal with this. We welcome the renewed emphasis that President Kiir has placed on stamping out corruption in recent public statements. It will be important that this is followed up by implementing the various actions that have been agreed with expert international assistance. Dealing with corruption and improving the management of public finances will be considered at the international engagement conference for South Sudan that is to be held in Washington on 14 and 15 December. My honourable friend the Parliamentary Secretary at DfID, Stephen O’Brien, will be chairing the session on improving transparency and accountability in government. We hope that this will be an opportunity for the Government of South Sudan to announce further specific measures in this area.

Noble Lords have asked about the progress in establishing EU representation in Juba. An EU delegation is in place sharing a compound with a number of other EU member states, as has been mentioned in the course of this debate. The UK too has been increasing its presence with more than 30 staff from the Foreign Office and DfID now in place. We are currently sharing the same compound although we are exploring the option of more permanent accommodation. We recognise that the EU delegation has been understaffed in Sudan so far. I know that the External Action Service has action in hand to remedy that and we look forward to the arrival soon of a senior head of delegation.

My noble friend Lord Chidgey and other noble Lords asked whether South Sudan could benefit from Sudan's original allocation under the European Development Fund, which has not been used due to Sudan's failure to ratify the Cotonou agreement. I can assure him that the EU is drawing on a number of sources, including unspent EDF money, to fund significant development and humanitarian programmes in the medium term. South Sudan will itself need to join the agreement in order to benefit from the EDF in future rounds.

My noble friend was also right to stress the importance of ensuring that aid money is not misappropriated given the difficult environment for delivering aid in South Sudan and the wider problems of corruption that I have already mentioned. The EU has long experience of providing assistance in difficult circumstances and has the procedures and safeguards available to ensure that best practice is followed. But that is not a reason to be complacent. This will be an area in which we will pay close attention in considering how effectively the EU is spending its resources in South Sudan.

I am being handed a paper to say that I must wind up, so I will go through some quick points. The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and other noble Lords are concerned that the Sudanese armed forces and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army have not yet withdrawn from Abyei despite the presence of the UN interim security force. We are urging of both sides immediate redeployment and the granting of full humanitarian access to the area.

The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, also commented on support to South Sudan. I will undertake to write to the noble Lord about that support. There is a comprehensive plan and that would be helpful rather than skipping over some points now. However, I will say that one of the first actions South Sudan on becoming an independent state was to apply for membership of the Commonwealth, which is a positive sign. To join the Commonwealth you have to undertake all the criteria and it is welcome to all of us to see that it is willing to undertake the core values of democracy, human rights and law. It is a welcome move.

The noble Lord, Lord Jay, asked about DfID. It is piloting a new approach to aid partnerships with fragile countries such as South Sudan which was the focus of discussion at the summit last week it will continue to play a leading role in ensuring that the aid community in South Sudan follows best practice.

It is clear that there is still a long way to go before the people of South Sudan and Sudan can live their lives in a peaceful and prosperous environment. For our part, we will not be afraid to deliver tough messages to both Governments when we need to. We will have to continue to make it clear that both countries must refrain from military action in each other's territories either directly or through support to other armed groups. We will keep urging both countries to negotiate seriously to settle issues outstanding from the comprehensive peace agreement and from the secession of South Sudan.

The UK remains fully committed to helping the people of both countries through humanitarian and development projects. We will continue to provide assistance to respond to the humanitarian needs of conflict-affected populations, to support security and access to justice, to build basic services and encourage more transparent and accountable government in both countries. Through all of this, we will work as closely as closely as possible with our key international partners including the EU. Through a united international effort, perhaps we can begin to make strong progress in Sudan and South Sudan and it is important that we note that since the secession, we have seen some positive developments in both countries. Sudan has also shown some welcome signs of becoming a more constructive voice in regional issues. For example, it is playing a leading role in the Arab League’s recent action against the Syrian regime and its support for the new Government in Libya.

I know that noble Lords will not be satisfied with the responses today because all noble Lords who have taken part today know that we have a very long journey of challenges ahead. I hope that noble Lords will take on board that the Government take this issue incredibly seriously. Where I have failed to respond directly to noble Lords’ questions, I will undertake to write to noble Lords.

However, I hope that when we next have a debate on Sudan we will be able to talk about more progress and better governance in both countries. I thank all noble Lords, particularly my noble friend, for raising this very important topic today.

19:55

[Lord Teverson]

My Lords, my noble friend the Minister should not be quite so downbeat about her contribution. There can be very few debates where she is asked so many questions about so many issues, some of which I had not come across previously. I am sure that, for the areas that have not been completely covered, there will be an opportunity to write to noble Lords.

I conclude by thanking all noble Lords for their contributions. A broad range of issues have been brought up that were not necessarily covered by the report. I thank particularly the noble Lords, Lord Chidgey and Lord Alton, for their insights and their practical experience. I thank also the noble Baroness, Lady Kinnock, for her giving us much of her experience and an in-depth view of the European Union side of this issue—we are a European Union Committee at the end of the day. I am slightly less pessimistic about Europe’s role than some of my noble friends.

We were very pleased indeed to have Dame Rosalind Marsden as a witness. We welcomed her appointment and we hope that she will be part of making sure that the EU’s role is delivered.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Elton, for sitting through the debate. His brief contribution did not get an answer, but I was pleased to read that the Kenyan Government have made it quite clear recently that if President al-Bashir landed on Kenyan soil, he would be whisked away to the International Criminal Court. The Kenyan ambassador was banished from Khartoum as a result, but that is the right way forward.

I thank lastly the clerk of the Committee, Kathryn Colvin, and our secretary, Bina Sudra. If the Grand Committee would indulge me, I would like to thank also our policy analyst, Oliver Fox, who has provided excellent service to this sub-committee during the number of years that he has worked in that role for us. He has now left to join the External Action Service. Although he is dealing only with Switzerland at the moment, he will hopefully have an opportunity to fix South Sudan in the future as well.

Motion agreed.

Committee adjourned at 7.58 pm.