EU and Sudan: EUC Report

Lord Trimble Excerpts

Wednesday 7th December 2011 Grand Committee

[Lord Trimble]

My Lords, in thinking about this debate, I am conscious of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, about the tendency to repetition. As the report and the speeches so far have, understandably, concentrated on South Sudan, I will address a few remarks to Sudan itself.

I was struck by the comment that appears in paragraph 12 of our report from Gill Lusk, giving her description of the Sudanese Government. She said that,

“the Sudanese government was a civilian one, but run by the security services”.

She described their immediate aim as survival. She said that their long-term policy was to establish their version of Islamic rule. Rather than using the term Islamic she might have been more accurate to use the term Islamist, because that gets you into the right context. We must remember that Sudan was the country that Bin Laden went to as a matter of choice until American pressure drove him out. That is partly why the Americans took such an interest in Sudan. We should bear that in mind.

I note also that the International Crisis Group report dated 26 September says:

“The loss of South Sudan has had a profound effect on the NCP, and senior generals led a soft-coup within the party. They have outflanked more pragmatic elements in the NCP who seek a negotiated strategy”.

We can see the effect of that soft coup by looking at what has been happening in the troubled peripheral regions of Sudan. Abyei has been mentioned.

On the point of the publication of our report on 20 June, Presidents al-Bashir and Salva Kiir, from Sudan and South Sudan, signed an agreement in Addis Ababa under which all northern troops would be withdrawn, as would the southern Sudanese, and be replaced by an Ethiopian-led UN interim security force. As mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, the Ethiopian force is there, but the northern troops have not withdrawn and neither have the southern troops. There is a stand-off taking place and limbo there as well. The hopes that were there on 20 June have disappeared.

Similarly, on 28 June, a framework agreement was entered into, which includes political and security agreement for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, and which was facilitated by Thabo Mbeki and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia and signed by the co-deputy NCP chairman and presidential adviser, Nafie Ali Nafie. The generals who had conducted the soft coup objected to this and a few days later President al-Bashir publicly disavowed the agreement. Since then, Kordofan and Blue Nile have descended into considerable violence. In view of the time, I will not go into dealing with the large forces that are there and the atrocities that have been committed, but they are unfortunately familiar with what has gone on.

There have been some encouraging matters. The visit by al-Bashir to South Sudan at the time of independence was encouraging, likewise, the journey in early October by Salva Kiir to Khartoum, where he was received with full ceremony and protocol appropriate to a visiting foreign head of state. Both parties committed themselves to resolving disagreements peacefully through dialogue and to avoid a return to war, but the Economist country report published in Nov 2011 concludes:

“In reality, evidence of progress is scarce and deadlines announced … look certain to be missed”.

Although with an eye to oil production and exports, the report says it is unlikely that either party will drive things to the point of open conflict.

One can see a similar pattern in Darfur. In July, the National Congress Party came to an agreement with one Darfuri faction—it is referred to as the Doha document; the faction was the Liberation and Justice Movement from Darfur. There, problems are on both sides. The larger Justice and Equality Movement was outside the Doha process, although it indicated at one stage a willingness to engage in discussions if the Doha document could be reopened. The Government have refused to do that and there has been no progress.

Latterly, we have seen a degree of coalescence between the Justice and Equality Movement and the SPLM-North, which are the forces active in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, and a link-up with other political groups within Sudan which have the general objective of regime change within Sudan. I would be very interested to know the Government’s assessment of those matters. We keep forgetting the huge size of these countries. The Khartoum Administration probably do not have the logistic capability to project their force to their borders. Consequently, these forces dealing with the borders have the potential to last for a considerable period unless there are interventions and initiatives elsewhere.

I confess to being a little disappointed by the Government’s response on these points. It refers to the Abyei interim agreement and states:

“We, the EU and the rest of the International Community will be monitoring the situation closely to ensure both sides comply with the terms of the agreements”.

Well, neither side has complied with the terms of the agreement. Many months have passed since then. I would be interested to see what the Government are considering doing.

I notice that the Government say in other responses that they will continue to support Thabo Mbeki and the African Union initiative. We may be polite about the African Union, but the reality is that it is not effective. Indeed, we saw in the Libyan situation that some of the things that the African Union does are most unhelpful. Thabo Mbeki may be a former President, but I bear in mind his ineffectiveness with regard to problems in Zimbabwe, which may be a greater indication for the future.

There is in these matters and reports of this nature a certain polite fiction that governs them. They are all notionally addressed to the EU and its involvement, but the truth is that the EU is not a major player in this. The comprehensive peace agreement was produced by the troika, Norway, the United Kingdom and the US, and the major player there was the US. I treasure the comment made in the margins of our meetings at one stage, where someone who shall remain anonymous plaintively inquired, “Why is it that Norway carries more weight in this matter than the EU?” That is just one of the pleasures of our discussions.

Unfortunately, while the comprehensive peace agreement was produced largely by American pressure, that pressure is unlikely to be renewed in the near future because the current President does not believe in exerting it. Speeches will not change the Administration in Khartoum. When people referred to the Administration, I thought, “Now, if I want to think about what they are likely to do, I just have to ask myself, ‘What would Gerry do?’”. That refers to my talks partner in Northern Ireland. I know what he would do in this situation if he was in Khartoum: he would hunker down until attention drifted elsewhere and then return to following his agenda. That agenda is set out by Gill Lusk. We have to take account of that. I cannot see the EU being effective on this; I cannot see the AU being effective on this; but we need to be effective. Concern was expressed earlier in this debate about South Sudan being a failed state. We have to bear in mind that north Sudan is not much better.