William Cash
Main Page: William Cash (Conservative - Stone)Department Debates - View all William Cash's debates with the HM Treasury
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberWith this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 7, page 1, line 7, at end insert—
‘(3A) Any loans made under this Act, and any repayment of principal or payment of interest received thereunder, shall be denominated in sterling.’.
Amendment 4, page 1, leave out lines 8 to 18.
Amendment 6, page 1, line 18, at end insert—
‘(7A) Before determining the interest to be charged on any payments under this Act, the Treasury must specify the rate of interest by order; and the Treasury may not make such an order unless—
(a) the House of Commons has determined by resolution the rate of interest to be charged; and
(b) the order provides for that specified rate to be charged.’.
Amendment 8, page 1, line 20, at end insert—
‘(8A) All loans made under this Act shall be repaid by 8 December 2040.’.
Amendment 10, page 1, line 20, at end insert—
‘(8A) Before any loan or binding offer of a loan is made, or guarantee given, under this section, the relevant agreement must be laid before, and approved by a resolution of, the House of Commons.’.
Clause stand part.
I have just abstained on Second Reading for one simple reason. I had intended to vote for it, but I remain gravely dissatisfied by the answer that I received from the Chancellor regarding the increase in the amount specified in clause 1. I do not want in any way to misrepresent what he said, but as I understood it, it was that that was all right because it was about exchange rates. However, anybody who examines clause 1 carefully will notice that subsection (4) states:
“The Treasury may by order made by statutory instrument substitute a greater amount for the amount for the time being specified in subsection (3)”,
which is £3.25 billion.
The next two provisions simply determine whether any increase will be subject to affirmative or negative resolution. An order would be made under the negative resolution only if the increase is to do with exchange rates, but I can see nothing to say that an increase under subsection (4) would be affected by subsequent provisions. I was bound to take great exception to that. It is a serious matter, because we simply do not know what the greater amount would be. We are totally exposed, subject only to affirmative resolution, which cannot be amended. Such a measure would simply go through on a whipped vote, just as the rest of the Bill doubtless will. That is why I abstained on Second Reading.
Amendment 3 addresses the definition of “Irish loan”. I was staggered when I looked carefully at the Bill, because clause 1(2) states that “Irish loan” means simply
“a loan to Ireland by the United Kingdom.”
The background is the recent debates on economic governance, and the origins of the European financial stability mechanism and the alternative eurozone facility, which as someone pointed out is as much as €440 billion, which is easily enough to cope with the Irish situation. There is a very close interconnect at all points between the so-called bilateral loan proposed in the Bill and the mechanism that I described.
The difficulty is that there is an overall determination to do as much as possible by way of integrating with Europe when it is quite obvious to anybody that this is the time for us not only to step back, but to desegregate from the European venture. I believe very strongly that the technique that is consistently employed in all spheres of activity is to say, “We don’t like what goes on in the EU, but we can just go along with it. Alternatively, to satisfy the Eurosceptics or Eurorealists, as they prefer to be called, we can make parallel arrangements along the lines of what we would have done if we were in the eurozone.”
The research paper helpfully supplied by the Library states:
“It is worth noting that the bilateral element”—
assuming that that is what the Bill is—
“of the UK’s support is broadly equivalent to what the UK would have provided if it were part of the eurozone-only EFSF.”
In other words, we would have provided the loan anyway. The Minister may well say that that is not his intention, but that is what Library researchers believe, and they are often right.
A portion of the total loan package is contingent money for Irish banks—they may or may not need it. Is my hon. Friend worried that they could come back for even more, and that clause 1(4) could allow an extension of our loan for Irish banks?
Yes I am. Treasury civil servants are exceedingly clever and may know of pitfalls, but they might not fully explain them to Ministers. Of course, the Minister takes ultimate responsibility, but the question is: what is the effect on the daily lives of the people whom we represent? That is the issue on which we have to concentrate.
Under the circumstances, I am extremely dubious about the way in which the whole thing has been put together. In particular, I would mention what I will call the mechanism, as compared with the facility. I had an exchange earlier about the mechanism with the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling), who said, “This is all going to be done by qualified majority voting.” However, that is not the case. Within the mechanism as it is set out, the request comes from the member state; it is only the final arrangement that requires qualified majority voting. Indeed, the EU sent in the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund in flagrant contradiction of the provisions of article 3 of the regulation in question.
In fact, the EU was operating the provision as if it were already law, when it was not. That it is typical of the European Union. It keeps on telling us about the rule of law, but when it suits, it completely ignores the law. What happened was unlawful. I also believe that it was unlawful in respect of article 122, which was the legal basis used to create the mechanism. I do not need to go into detail, but article 122 concerns natural disasters, energy supply and things of that kind. Anyone who looks at article 3, article 122 and the other provisions that they mention would reasonably conclude that they should not be used for the purposes of sorting out an unmitigated mess that was created by banks, as well as by the Government of Ireland and other parts of the European Union. Therefore, I am afraid that the answer that I received from the former Chancellor—that there really was no alternative to what was done, because such decisions are reached by qualified majority voting—does not stack up. If what happened was unlawful, it should have been resisted and, because of the consequences, it should, if necessary, have been taken to the European Court.
My hon. Friend has great legal expertise. I understand that the European Union is trying to negotiate an amendment to article 122 of the treaty in order to put the matter beyond doubt. Would that be retrospective, or could that undermine the current position?
That is a very good question. I doubt very much whether an attempt to make the provision retrospective would remedy the mischief.
I am afraid that the question of illegality taints the Government’s position as well, and I shall explain why—the Minister will know all the detail, because I think that he was the Minister responsible. There is provision for the European Scrutiny Committee under Standing Order No. 143 regarding scrutiny and scrutiny reserves. It so happens that the European Scrutiny Committee was not set up until November—a few weeks ago. However, I have here a table setting out the dates that shows that the date of deposit was 25 May 2010. The decision was taken on 9 May at ECOFIN, which happened to be 48 hours before the coalition was pushed through. In the case of ECOFIN’s decision on the financial stability mechanism, the table states unequivocally that there was an override of both the European Scrutiny Committee and the Lords. On both counts, the then Government and the current Government breached the scrutiny arrangements. Indeed, it is quite extraordinary that the explanatory memorandum that accompanies the documents in question, and which should have been presented much earlier, was presented on 15 July. I know that the Minister will not dispute that, because it comes from Government documents. There is a serious worry about the manner in which this matter has been manipulated.
Just before the proceedings began, we were presented with another document, which reinforces my concern. If my amendment 3 were accepted, the Bill would read: “In this Act, ‘Irish loan’ means a loan to Ireland by the United Kingdom other than a loan by virtue of any provision by or under the European Communities Act 1972.” I am very familiar with the way in which interweaving goes on, not only as Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee but because, for the past 26 years, I have watched this process of integration and the manner in which, by extremely clever and adroit manoeuvring, we get further and further integrated into these arrangements. The mechanism is an open-ended invitation until 2013, as I ascertained during an exchange with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Until 2013, we are stuck with the present arrangements.
I am sometimes a bit of a Cassandra, in that I make prophecies—more like predictions—about certain events, find out that I was right and then find out that nobody took any notice until they had happened. On this occasion, I am going to say that it is extremely likely that, if Portugal gets into really deep trouble—and perhaps Spain, too—that will happen before 2013. If this greater amount is interwoven into the stabilisation mechanism, or even if it is not, the mechanism itself will entrap us in the arrangements which, although not yet permanent, will go on until 2013.
I also think that the Government are struggling a bit in relation to article 122, under which this measure was introduced—unlawfully, in my opinion—because the Commissioner responsible, a Mr Sefcovic, has stated that the Commission is still considering whether to use article 136 or article 122. Against that background, the Van Rompuy Committee is sitting and might already have concluded that it would be appropriate to have a permanent mechanism in place only under article 136, and therefore only by reference to the eurozone. That would be a plus, but it would not alter the fact that, between now and 2013, we are at risk.
I am concerned about the deficient wording in clause 1(2), because not excluding what might be done under the European Union effectively leaves it open to the European Union’s continuing to weave its way into the arrangements, despite the fact that they are described as a bilateral loan. Some people might say, “Ah, but you have to understand that when the explanatory notes talk about a bilateral loan, they mean that.” It does not say that in the Bill, however. Furthermore, we have had some unpleasant experiences with explanatory notes in the European Scrutiny Committee recently, as anyone who wants to read the report that we have just issued will see. The explanatory notes in question were positively misleading, and distorted the legal position. That is a matter that we will be pursuing in Committee, when we ask whether parliamentary sovereignty or judicial supremacy should prevail. I do not need to go into the detail of that now, but the fact that a bilateral loan is mentioned in the explanatory notes has been severely vitiated by our experience of the explanatory notes to the European Union Bill.
I happen to agree with that, which is why I did not vote against the Bill, but I must say that this is not a matter of merely academic interest, because the consequence that I mentioned at the beginning of my speech, which led me to abstain, is that there is no restriction on the greater amount. I wait with enormous interest to hear whether the Minister will differ from the Chancellor of the Exchequer on that, but when it is an open-ended provision for a greater amount, I would like to know what that greater amount’s limit would be.
In the context of the interlocking aspect to which I have just referred, I remain deeply concerned that the amount could be greater, and that this matter could get caught up in the complicated ongoing negotiations—I recognise that the Chancellor and his Ministers have had some very complicated negotiations. I remain worried about the direction in which we seem to be going, therefore. It would be so simple for the Government to give me either a direct assurance, which I would regard as a second-tier response, or a specific agreement to accept my amendment just to get me off their back. I would regard such an agreement as a useful way of dealing with the situation, but I bet I do not get that.
We will listen with interest to what the Minister has to say, but, just to be clear, is the hon. Gentleman’s argument that the greater amount under clause 1(4) could be used to increase not only the amount of the loan to the Irish Republic, but interweaved with the financial stability mechanism to provide money for other countries? Is that his argument, or is it specifically about the loan to the Irish Republic?
The provision appears to apply to the Irish component, but because of the implications of what I am saying and the interlocking aspects in the kaleidoscope, it is extremely difficult to work out exactly what is intended by such opaque words. What I am asking for is very modest: simply the removal of all doubt by making it clear that any such loan would be
“other than a loan by virtue of any provision by or under the European Communities Act 1972.”
If all doubt were to be removed in that way, it would be the end of the story and there would be no problem, so why not do it? I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Another issue arises under paragraph 6 of the summary of key terms document. The paragraph covers events of default, and sub-paragraph (h) states that one event of default will be
“the Borrower”—
Ireland—
“not being or ceasing to be a member of the European Union”.
Why would such a provision be wanted if it were not integral to the fact that Ireland is a member of the European Union? I do not think I need to advance the case any further as it is very simple: if we would exclude Ireland from the arrangements by virtue of its ceasing to be, or not being, a member of the EU, that must have special significance, otherwise it would not be stated. That is another exceedingly worrying feature.
Paragraph 8 refers to the governing law, and it states:
“The credit agreement and any non-contractual obligations arising out of or in connection with it will be governed by English law.”
Paragraph 9 is on enforcement, and the document’s authors have clearly thought a lot about this matter, and the more they think about it the more worried I get, because they are transposing their thinking into the provisions of the Bill and this document:
“The English courts will have exclusive jurisdiction in relation to any dispute including a dispute relating to non-contractual obligations arising out of or in connection with the credit agreement.”
That gets to the heart of the problem, because anything that within law is under the jurisdiction of the European Union and within the framework of the European Court under the European Communities Act 1972 cannot be excluded from that jurisdiction by such words in a document of this kind that is “for information purposes”—hence our European Scrutiny Committee report on the relationship between parliamentary sovereignty and the judiciary. Therefore, merely writing in such a document that something will be governed by English law and that the English courts will have exclusive jurisdiction in relation to any dispute is not worth the paper it is written on.
If it is within the European Union legal framework, that means the European Court will get its hands on it. It may be that if there was a dispute or default or any of the other difficulties that could arise from the agreement in the Bill as enacted—as I rather suppose it will be—that will in no way alter the fact that ultimately, as long as parliamentary sovereignty prevails in the light of the European Communities Act, the Supreme Court will not prevent it from falling within the framework of the European Court of Justice.
Of course, it would be open to any future parliamentary Bill to try to unravel the arrangement, but what a pity it would be if we found that the fast-track arrangements we are experiencing today led us to the situation that I have described, simply because we were not prepared to listen to the argument that could resolve the problem by excluding the European jurisdiction. The legal advisers, the Treasury officials and the Minister may well be wrong. If they are wrong, we are in deep trouble. If they are doubtful, perhaps they could listen to those of us who have been proved right on a number of past occasions.
These are my final words—not from Cassandra, but from me. When things go wrong, it is much better to have taken advice beforehand and keep ahead of the curve, rather than allowing the curve to catch up with us.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash); I very much agree with what he has been saying. He is clearly much more erudite on these matters than me, but I understand what he is saying—that today, we are making to our closest friendly neighbour country a bilateral loan which has nothing to do with the European Union and which is not part of the panoply of EU arrangements. I am happy to go along with such an arrangement.
The right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) has said many times that, if there are problems in the eurozone with the eurozone, they should be sorted out by the eurozone, not by countries outside the eurozone. I agree with him very strongly. This is a country that is our closest neighbour, with which we have deep, long historical relations—very friendly relations now, we are pleased to say. Indeed, I have many Irish constituents who are concerned about their country. We are making a friendly gesture to a neighbouring country—our nearest friendly neighbour—that happens to be in the eurozone, which we happen not to be.
We do not want to be in a situation where, if another country gets into difficulty, it says, “You made a loan to Ireland—you can make a loan to another country in the eurozone.” That would not be acceptable.
On amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash), the amendment of itself does not preclude the fear that he and my hon. Friend the Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins) have that at some point in the future there might be a loans to Spain Bill, a loans to Portugal Bill or something similar. The amendment would not preclude the possibility of any other such bilateral loans being arranged in future. I do not believe that the amendment, which is commended to us in those terms, will serve the purpose for which it was tabled.
I know that the hon. Gentleman made that point, too, and I want to turn to it. He carefully quoted and referred to a number of points in the loan agreement, which was made available at the start of the debate. The summary of key terms refers to a number of matters, and the hon. Member for Stone seemed to say that those references alone mean that the bilateral loan is being interweaved with the wider EU and IMF support packages to Ireland. However, hon. Members should bear in mind a point that the Chancellor made on Second Reading—that one advantage of the bilateral loan arrangement is the place that it gives the UK at the table when it comes to arranging and overseeing the restructuring plan that is to take place in relation to the Irish banking sector.
The key terms include, under the heading “Other Terms”, at paragraph 1(d):
“no amendments to the facilities provided by the IMF, European Financial Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Fund or Sovereign bilateral lenders or to the Memoranda of Understanding that would have a material adverse effect on the Borrower’s ability to restore its capacity to access the capital markets.”
Given that the purpose of the loan arrangement is to make sure that Ireland can go to the bond markets on its own as soon as possible and get money at competitive rates, it is clearly in the House’s interests, as the UK will be providing this loan, to make sure that the loan terms are protected against any undue terms coming from the other loans being made available in this context.
Several hon. Members have mentioned the role of the European Central Bank. We can look at the history of this situation and question the role of the ECB on a number of occasions. First, it kept interest rates very low—at times against the express wish and request of the Irish Finance Minister—which helped to contribute to the problem. Secondly, as many hon. Members have mentioned, there is the open-ended nature of the Irish Government’s guarantee to the banks. Again, the ECB seems to have been the primary body urging a guarantee of that extent. Thirdly, there is the whole issue of the need for the bail-out and the creation of circumstances in which the Irish Government have had to seek it. Again, many people have questions about the precise role and performance of the European Central Bank in all that. Hon. Members have asked serious questions about the ECB, and we know that a much bigger loan facility is being granted through the EU and the IMF, so surely the House will want to know that the terms of the bilateral loan and its operation will not jeopardise the interests or purposes for which it is being made available. It therefore makes sense for the key terms that are summarised in the document to refer to the restructuring plan that is to be undertaken in relation to the banks.
The document makes it clear that “conditions precedent” will include “finalisation by the Borrower”—namely Ireland—
“after consultation with the Lender, of a restructuring plan in relation to its banking sector with the IMF, European Commission and European Central Bank”.
That is not the interweaving that the hon. Member for Stone has discussed, but a sensible, diligent precaution on the part of the House in providing for money to be borrowed. The “Other Terms” also include at paragraph 1(c):
“no amendments to the Restructuring Plan that would have a material adverse financial impact on the UK operations of Anglo Irish Bank, Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland”.
Again, it makes absolute sense for the House and the Government, who are responsible to it, to make clear cross-reference to what else is happening under the restructuring plan and to what other lenders might urge in relation to other parts of the plan in terms of key interests that the House needs to protect, including those of the banking sector in Northern Ireland and the contribution of the Irish banks to the wider UK economy.
Amendment 3, which my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) moved by, would ensure that the Bill did not apply to any loan made by the United Kingdom to Ireland under the European Communities Act 1972. Let me give him a second-tier assurance that the Bill applies only to the UK’s bilateral loan to Ireland. Any EU loan made to Ireland through the financial stability mechanism would not be a loan from the UK to Ireland and would not be subject to the Bill.
There is no interweaving or interlocking, and therefore the amendment is unnecessary. My hon. Friend referred to paragraph 6(h) of the loan agreement. I am sure he will understand that the funding Ireland gets is dependent on it being a member of both the International Monetary Fund and the European Union. If it were no longer a member, it would no longer receive the funding and therefore there would be a problem. Amendment 4 would remove the power to increase the cap on the loan and adjust the cap for exchange rate fluctuations. I hope that the comments made by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor remove the need for anyone to push that amendment further.
Amendment 6 would require the interest rate on the loan to be approved by Parliament. That is not appropriate. The interest rate for each tranche of the lending to Ireland will be a fixed rate that is set by adding a margin of 2.29% to the sterling seven-and-a-half-year swap rate at the time that the disbursement is made. That is set out in the loan agreement and gives certainty to us and to the Irish Government, who would want to have certainty when accepting and voting on this package.
My hon. Friend the Member for Clacton (Mr Carswell) said that the amendment would enable the loan interest rate to be reduced. It could also lead to the loan interest rate being increased to the detriment of the Irish Government and their economic recovery. It is important that there is a clear, definitive statement about what the rate is. We have published the summary of key terms of the loan agreement to help colleagues understand what the rate is and how it will be set. The rate is set with the Republic and within the range of interest rates agreed with other multilateral bodies. It would be a big mistake and irresponsible of the Labour party to vote for amendment 6, because it would create uncertainty and instability where we want certainty and stability for the Irish Government. I question whether what the amendment proposes is the right thing to do. The loan rate is agreed and clear, and it is in the summary of key credit terms. The Irish Government have signed off on those key terms. That is the rate they are expecting to get. Amendment 6 would create unnecessary uncertainty and I therefore ask my hon. Friend to withdraw it.
For the time being, I have decided against pressing amendment 3 to a Division.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 6, page 1, line 18, at end insert—
‘(7A) Before determining the interest to be charged on any payments under this Act, the Treasury must specify the rate of interest by order; and the Treasury may not make such an order unless—
(a) the House of Commons has determined by resolution the rate of interest to be charged; and
(b) the order provides for that specified rate to be charged.’.—(Mr Carswell.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I thank the hon. Gentleman. Just at what I thought was my moment of great glee, he took it away from me. Nevertheless, I will take some satisfaction from what the Government have decided.
I was trying to listen carefully to the Minister’s statement on amendment 2. As a lone traveller trying to amend the legislation, I might have misread the wording of clause 2, but I still do not quite understand the sequences of subsection (4), which states:
“No report is required to be prepared or laid in relation to a period if—
(a) no payments…are made…
(b) no sums…are received in the period, and
(c) no amount of principal or interest in respect of an Irish loan is outstanding at the end”.
I could not see any circumstances where paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) would simultaneously apply. For example, if no amount of principal or interest were outstanding, how could there be any circumstances where, under paragraph (a), payments had been made or, under paragraph (b), sums had been received? Surely if no report is required when no amounts are outstanding, the conditions under subsections (4)(a) and (b) are redundant. Looking at the drafting of subsection (4), it would be easy to imagine the parliamentary counsel becoming entangled in an arcane discourse on ontological logic. There are several twists to the double negatives set out in the drafting.
As a layman reading subsection (4), I could not see why paragraphs (a) and (b) were necessary, when they must be concurrent with subsection (4)(c), given that (4)(c) states that there is nothing left owing, according to my reading of it. If each of the three paragraphs were alternatives, or contrasting, perhaps using the words “either” or “or”, that might make sense. They are conjoined, however, by the non-contrasting linkage “and”, suggesting that each of the three conditions must be fulfilled simultaneously, and I am not quite sure that I follow that. Perhaps the Minister needs to walk me through it one more time. I do not wish to press this matter to a vote, because I am sure that there is a higher drafting power at work here, but as I read it, I could not see any circumstances in which paragraph (c) would be true simultaneously with paragraphs (a) and (b).
In general terms the reports will be important, not least because we need to see the terms of the loan that the people of Ireland will have to repay, as well as the amounts of money that the British people will have in return for adding to our national debt. There is a whole series of other questions to which I would eventually like answers. For example, what is the aggregate amount of interest that we expect to be paid by the Irish Government, and what is the impact for us in this country?
As I have said, it is a shame that the summary of the terms of the credit facility was deposited only at the eleventh hour, and I hope that we will have another opportunity to scrutinise it at another time. For the time being, however, that was the purpose of amendment 1, and I am grateful to the Minister for his acceptance of the first amendment that we tabled.
I have much the same curiosity as the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie). I was a bit puzzled by the drafting of this provision, and I wanted to find out what the Minister had in mind. I am not sure that he has left me any more satisfied than I was when I started out, however, because my experience over the past 26 years of the dogged fashion in which Ministers operate is that they just say, “We’re not going to make the amendment.” They do not usually explain the position satisfactorily either.
Having said that, it seems to me that if there is nothing to report, we should just not bother with the reports. Subsections (1), (2) and (3) will be necessary. It is possible that, in due course, the concerns that I raised on an earlier amendment might need to be included in the report. That was the case, for example, in relation to the reports on the Maastricht convergence criteria, despite all the footling remarks that were made during the debate on Maastricht, when we were assured that this, that and the other would not happen. When we came to the convergence reports, and got into the whole business of the golden rule, the stability and growth pact and all the other shenanigans and wriggling, we were proved right over and over again.
I just want to pick up the hon. Gentleman’s point that if there is nothing to report, there is no need to have any reports. I believe that it would be of interest to the House if, even when no payments were made, a report were still produced to set out that fact. That might seem a small point but, for example, in the unlikely event that default became an eventuality, the lack of a payment being received might be of interest. That was also part of the rationale behind deleting subsection 4(a) and (b).
I think I might agree with that too, but I think that is catered for by subsection (3)(a), which says that each report must include details of
“any payments made by the Treasury”.
One could have said, “payments, if any,” but for practical purposes I think subsections (1), (2) and (3) would be sufficient. I am not particularly fussed about it; I just wanted to table a probing amendment. I got the usual stonewalling operation from the Minister. I have got used to it over the years; it makes no difference to me and it makes no difference to him.
I think the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) has a second career beckoning as a parliamentary draftsman. He has summed up the situation exceptionally well.
In subsection (4) all three paragraphs—(a), (b) and (c)—have to apply if no report is to be published. If amendment 2 were made, removing paragraphs (a) and (b), payments could have been made in the period but they would not be reported if there was no balance outstanding at the end. Therefore we must ensure that all three are true before we allow no report to be published. I hope that provides clarification.
I hope I am not seen by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) as someone who seeks to stonewall his inquiries, but having imposed a duty on the Treasury to report, it is right that that duty be extinguished when the loans are repaid; otherwise someone will say, “Yes, the loans have been repaid, but your Act requires you to make those reports.” It is right that the duty to report is extinguished when the loan has been repaid, and that is simply the purpose of—
Perhaps a little bit of irritation, which is not usual in my case, is beginning to burgeon, because a number of questions that I tabled weeks ago about the legal advice regarding the stabilisation mechanism still have not been answered, and when I use the word “stonewall” I mean just that. When I do not get an answer, and I am told that I will get the answer as soon as possible but I still do not get it, and I have to put in a reminder but I still do not get it, there is something going on; I know that. They do not want to disclose the legal advice; they do not want even to disclose whether in fact it was given, or when it was given. I would like to know the answer to those questions because as Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee—
Order. This is an intervention. It is a very long intervention. The hon. Gentleman has clarified what he meant by stonewalling, but perhaps we might leave the considerations about the European Scrutiny Committee for another day, because it is not particularly relevant to the amendment that we are discussing now.
I, too, hope that this Bill succeeds, because it is important to help Ireland. I would like to see Ireland as part of a new configuration of the European Union, rejoining this country on a different footing from the arrangements that currently prevail in the European Union. The European Union is increasingly in its death throes and I hope that this does not lead to an implosion. We have seen riots in the streets here in the United Kingdom, in Greece, in Portugal and in Italy—there were riots in Rome only yesterday. The situation is extremely grave and a lot of it results from the very point made by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) about growth. The plain fact is that under the current arrangements there is no growth. Until powers are repatriated we will not get the sort of oxygen into the small business community that will be able to fill the gap between the requirements of the Irish economy and those of the UK economy.
In the meantime, we are considerably exposed to the indebtedness of the Irish banks. The amount that we have made available, small as it is comparatively but great as it is from the point of view of the British taxpayer, has been justified, but that is without prejudice to my concerns. They are that the former Chancellor of the Exchequer’s explanation of how the financial stability mechanism came to be put through remains unsatisfactory. He could have referred the whole question to the European Court, because this was unlawful and remains so. I sent a note to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on this very question as he was going off to an ECOFIN meeting. I regret to say that the explanatory memorandum produced by the Government on 27 July—perhaps it was 25 July —endorsed the decision taken by the former Government, and that speaks for itself.
I am also deeply worried about this business of the “greater amount” under the provisions that we have already discussed because, irrespective of what the Chancellor said about the exchange rate, the reality is that the amount of the increase is simply a matter of whether or not it is carried by the affirmative resolution. It is only when the exchange rate issue comes into play and we are therefore just dealing with a fluctuation in the amounts to be made available that we revert to using the negative resolution. Therefore, the Bill still provides that this “greater amount” is an open-ended commitment, and I hope that the Government will keep this closely under surveillance. I have heard nothing from the Front Benchers to dissuade me from that view.
Finally, we need to deal with the question of the Euro-ectoplasm and the way in which the kaleidoscope of European legislation in conjunction with all the other arrangements that have been made parallel to this so-called “bilateral loan” weave together, because there is a serious risk that the European jurisdiction applies here. I did not press my amendment to a Division for reasons relating to another vote that did not, in fact, transpire along the lines anticipated.
Be that as it may, the Bill is understandable from the point of view of the Irish economy. However, the Irish Government and the Irish banking system have to take the blame for allowing their economy to get so far out of kilter, and that point needs to be made on the Floor of this House. We are helping them, but we are doing so without prejudice to the fact that they got themselves into the same kind of mess as the Labour Government did on our economy. This is not a day for excuses or congratulation; it is a day for a bit of sober reflection. If people spend what they have not got, they end up with it catching up with them. There is a great deal to be said for prudence, but not of the former Prime Minister’s kind.