Justice and Security Bill [Lords] Debate

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Department: Cabinet Office

Justice and Security Bill [Lords]

William Bain Excerpts
Tuesday 18th December 2012

(11 years, 11 months ago)

Commons Chamber
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William Bain Portrait Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)
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It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill).

This debate has been about balance, and when the Minister responds I hope he will acknowledge the sense across the House that the Government are not yet in quite the right place regarding the balance between national security and the hard-won liberties of the individual. I hope that the Government will be open in Committee to amendments that make that balance more durable.

Justice systems across the United Kingdom have proven extremely adaptable to reforms such as the Human Rights Act 1998, which gave effect to the European convention on human rights in UK law. Such reforms provided what in some circumstances are universally applicable rights to people on UK territory, as well as recognising the growing importance of judicial review. Such proceedings can sometimes be inconvenient to Ministers and troublesome for the judiciary, but we should remember that the values of justice and fairness in our judicial system guarantee civil liberties and the rule of law.

The Bill deals with the conundrum of trying to strike a balance between the sometimes competing concerns and interests of the state and the individual, and it proposes the creation of closed material procedures in civil proceedings. As a national security measure that is reserved to Parliament under the devolution settlement, the Bill would apply to civil courts in Scotland. I know that the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) read out some comments, and no doubt there will be discussions between this Government and the Scottish Government, but the Bill is clear that the measures would apply to civil courts in Scotland.

I welcome the amendments made in the other place that strengthen protection of the individual and, in the words of the noble Lord Pannick,

“help to ensure that, if we are to have CMPs, there are proper limits, proper controls, a proper balance and judicial discretion, and that CMPs are a last resort,”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 21 November 2012; Vol. 740, c. 1816.]

The Bill as originally presented in the other place would have permitted one party—the Government—to decide whether to use CMPs. Critically, if CMPs are to be introduced, it must be for the courts and not the Government to determine whether they should be used in any given case, and only as a last resort. Questions of fairness and relevancy of evidence are for the courts, not the Government, to determine, because one of the parties to a CMP should not be able to determine such matters on its own. It is therefore welcome that the Minister without Portfolio indicated that the Government are minded to accept the relevant amendment.

Having opposed the amendments with such vigour in the other place, I hope that the Government will now accept in their entirety all amendments accepted by their lordships. Although clause 6 as presented to this House appears to contain greater balance than the measure originally presented to the other place, I am concerned that such balance does not extend sufficiently to clause 7. In particular, the Bill does not create a statutory obligation on the courts to provide the gist of the argument to the excluded party, which is vital to their being able to advise adequately their special advocate. That protection has been sought by the Law Society and is crucial to ensure a better balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the state.

Natural justice is a key principle of civil law across the United Kingdom, and we have heard comments from Judge Learned Hand. Perhaps I may remind the House of the dictum of Lord Chief Justice Hewart from the 1924 case of R v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy:

“Justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”

One key rule respected by that principle is the right to a fair hearing, which is underpinned in law by article 6(1) of the European convention on human rights.

John McDonnell Portrait John McDonnell
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May I point my hon. Friend to information given by Nicholas Blake QC—he is a special advocate—on what happens after a judgment is given in a Special Immigration Appeals Commission case? He says:

“If the special advocate thinks there is an error in law in the closed judgment, he gets permission to say, to pass a message out to the other team to say ‘I think you should be appealing, I can’t tell you why’…So there is a sort of open appeal. ‘We think there is something wrong but we don’t know what it is.’ And then the court goes into closed session”

to consider the matter. That is farce, not justice.

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William Bain Portrait Mr Bain
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My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. I will give a similar example later in my remarks that bears out the point that the Government must be careful on how their proposals tie with the common law right to natural justice.

George Howarth Portrait Mr George Howarth
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My hon. Friend referred to clause 7 and my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) referred to a special advocate. To some extent, are those points not covered by clause 7(1)(d) and (e), which relate to the need to provide a summary? It is not quite the same as gisting, but a summary would give the sort of information my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington implies does not exist.

William Bain Portrait Mr Bain
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I respect my right hon. Friend’s point, but the Law Society and many constitutional lawyers are not completely taken that the Bill provides sufficient protection in terms of common law judgments. As the debate continues in Committee, I hope we can impress upon the Government the advantages of giving greater safeguards in clause 7 to individuals and their legal advisers.

A number of decisions have created the presumption that it is not enough for an individual to be informed of a hearing affecting his or her rights or freedoms. There is also an obligation to inform them of the gist of the case—that comes from common law. That principle is vital, not least in a society governed in accordance with the rule of law. I hope the Government therefore take the advice they have received from the Law Society and others, and that they are prepared to support an amendment in Committee if the Bill receives a Second Reading.

In the Minister’s opening speech, he cited Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers in support of the principle of CMPs in exceptional cases, but perhaps he might reflect on the fact that Lord Phillips has pointed out that, if a closed material procedure is brought into law, it would “undoubtedly be challenged” in both the Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights. The Government must therefore establish that any incursion into the fair trial rights that are protected by article 6(1) of the convention is the minimum necessary and subject to suitable available safeguards and protections. The Bill allows insufficient protection of the continued balancing of interest after a CMP has been granted—that was pointed out by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and in the Bingham Centre response to the Green Paper. In allowing insufficient protection, the Bill unsettles an element of Scots law that has existed since 1956. I hope that the Minister resolves that problem in Committee.

As Tom Hickman, of University college London wrote for the UK Constitutional Law Group’s website on 27 November, in the absence of

“such a balance, CMP operates like a black box from which no information of any use or interest emerges. All information of even marginal sensitivity is immune from disclosure even if this is overwhelmingly in the interests of justice for it to be disclosed.”

The point was made more clearly in the decision in an analogous control order case—the case of CC and CF—earlier this year. British authorities admitted that they were involved in the arrest, detention and deportation of the defendants, but the defendants were given no reasons why they lost in the case, nor were they provided with any detail on the Government’s arguments, because the judge said that that part of the judgment must remain closed—the other party was excluded from it. The Government, by accepting reasonable amendments, could surely avoid such cases in the civil courts, if the CMP is introduced, and avoid the outcome warned of by the Intelligence and Security Committee. The Committee recommended restricting the use of CMPs to: UK intelligence material that would, if disclosed publicly, reveal the identity of UK intelligence officers or their sources, and their capability, including techniques and methodology; and to foreign intelligence material provided by another country on a strict obligation of confidentiality.

Even Cabinet minutes are not excluded from disclosure in a case involving serious misconduct by a member of the Cabinet, so why are the Government adopting such a restrictive interpretation in relation to the public interest balance in clauses 6 and 7? I hope the Minister will answer two further questions in his response. If the system comes into operation, will the Government pledge to review it, as the Joint Committee on Human Rights advised, and place that commitment in the Bill? Secondly, will the Minister accept the amendment made in the other place to permit both parties to apply for CMP, not just the state?

The debate has been about balance. This has been a genuinely constructive and helpful debate, both for Opposition Members and Government Members. The Government have made some progress. I hope that in Committee considerably more progress is made, so that we can ensure that the interests of the state and national security are undoubtedly protected, but that we do not cast away the hard-won liberties of the individual.