John McDonnell
Main Page: John McDonnell (Independent - Hayes and Harlington)Department Debates - View all John McDonnell's debates with the Cabinet Office
(11 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am very cautious about claiming agreement and support at any stage, but I thank my right hon. Friend for that. I am sure that he would acknowledge that, despite the demand for parliamentary oversight and the subsequent considerable reforms of the House of Commons—achieved mainly by the former hon. Member for Cannock Chase Tony Wright—where we now have elected Select Committees and a much greater sense of openness in our business, the Intelligence and Security Committee seems to have avoided the reform process altogether. It is the only Select Committee where its members are appointed by the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, and where the Chair is elected by the Committee rather than by a vote by party caucuses of the whole House. Its reports are published, yes, but one wonders how much is told to our colleagues on the Committee. I have no great ambitions or expectations of being appointed to it, but in an elected process all kinds of things could happen. Patronage is one of the great traditions of the British Parliament. It creates the illusion that the security services are accountable. I would have hoped that the Committee would have given the security services an extremely hard time over Sami al-Saadi, in whose case the British security services were clearly involved, over Guantanamo Bay, over Diego Garcia and over many other issues.
The second point I want to raise concerns the process that has led us to this pass of having a degree of secrecy in our courts. I opposed the establishment of the Special Immigration Appeals courts because they were anathema to everything we believe in: a special judge alone has access to the evidence; the defendant has no access to it; the defendant’s barrister has no access to evidence that he can share with his client; only the prosecutor has access to it. The whole issue is stacked against the defendant, and therein lies the potential for the most massive miscarriages of justice. Those of us who have spent much of our lives campaigning against miscarriages of justice will be well aware of past secrecy and the need for openness.
In opening, the Minister without Portfolio made much of the fact that the closed material procedure would be decided by a judge. Clause 6(2) states that
“a party to the proceedings (whether or not the Secretary of State) would be required to disclose material in the course of the proceedings to another person (whether or not another party to the proceedings)”,
where
“the degree of harm to the interests of national security if the material is disclosed would be likely to outweigh the public interest in the fair and open administration of justice, and”
where
“a fair determination of the proceedings is not possible by any other means.”
It seems to me that the Secretary of State would have considerable power in that situation.
I hope that the House understands the depth of feeling among many eminent people outside the House who have spent their lives campaigning for justice—against all the odds—and sometimes achieved it. Those who campaigned on Hillsborough eventually achieved justice, as did those who campaigned for the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four. I do not want us to create yet another situation in which future miscarriages of justice can take place.
Like me, my hon. Friend was here when the Special Immigration Appeals Commission procedures were introduced, about which we expressed some concern. He has referred to cases about which concerns have been expressed. Would he also like to comment on clause 12 with regard to SIAC? The case of (AHK and Ors) v. Secretary of State, which concerned a refusal of British citizenships on grounds of character, summed up what can go wrong in these procedures. Justice Ouseley said that
“he has been told nothing other than that naturalisation has been refused on the grounds of character and that it would be contrary to the public interest to give reasons.”
He continued:
“It is not so much that the case is untriable…it is simply that the evidence means that the Claimant cannot win.”
Having dealt with cases of constituents who have been refused naturalisation or British nationality on the basis of evidence that is unavailable, I understand exactly my hon. Friend’s point and the point made by Judge Ouseley.
In its briefing on the Bill, Reprieve told us:
“The Bill, even as amended, would still mean that…Members of the public could lose their cases against the state without ever knowing why; or knowing what evidence was used against them”,
It also states that the
“Government would be able to cover up evidence of wrongdoing”,
and that
“Ministers and officials would be able to exclude the other side from court, effectively putting themselves beyond challenge and above the law.”
The Bill would allow Ministers to use secret courts in a wide range of cases, such as those of soldiers or their families bringing negligence claims against the Ministry of Defence over faulty equipment resulting in injury or death. Many colleagues have taken up cases of soldiers who have died in the most tragic circumstances and where, on the face of it, there is a case against the Government. It could also include victims of torture or rendition seeking redress in cases in which the Government have been involved and actions brought against the Government over corruption in arms deals, which was a point I raised with the Minister earlier.
Amnesty International has also expressed deep concern about the Bill. It is concerned that the move
“could potentially mean that individuals and their lawyers who are seeking to establish the extent of the involvement of UK officials in serious wrongdoing such as torture and enforced disappearances, will be prevented from seeing crucial documents on “national security” grounds. This secrecy could be maintained potentially indefinitely, even if there is an overwhelming public interest in disclosure.”
I appeal to the House to think carefully and seriously about what we are discussing and voting on here today.
A couple of months ago, I was in the High Court to hear the case being brought by the Mau Mau people from Kenya relating to the abominable way in which they had been tortured and ill-treated by the British armed forces in the 1950s. They finally won their case and were able to present their evidence to the court. That evidence had been hidden for 40 years. They had been denied access to it, and it was only their determination that brought it to light. It had been held using secrecy arguments, and I suspect that if legislation such as this had already been in operation, they would still not have been able to bring their case to court.
Before voting on the Bill, we must think seriously about the implications of creating an even stronger secret state and an even less accountable judicial system. We must also remember that our function as Members of Parliament is to represent people against power, so that they can get justice through an independent judicial system.
Other Members have observed that there seems to be consensus on part 1 of the Bill, but I may be more of a doubting Thomas in that respect. I am not sure that part 1 will do all that it promises to do for the Intelligence and Security Committee, the House or the Bill itself.
I do not, of course, speak with experience of membership of the ISC, although I was offered membership a number of years ago, in bizarre circumstances. In fact, at one point my party was offered two seats on it, which seems bizarre even now. At that time we were negotiating the St Andrews agreement, and Tony Blair got it into his head that I might be prepared to accept annex E—which re-routed some of the Patten provisions relating to intelligence and national security—if I was offered a place on the ISC.
Hours later, I was advised that two places were on offer. I had said that it would be very difficult for a member of my party to sit on the Committee, supposedly to offer scrutiny and challenge, while being unable to tell anyone that he or she had done so or to say anything about it. The consolation was that we would have two members there, each of whom would vouch for the other in our secrecy. It was a bit like King Louie in “The Jungle Book”: “Have a banana; have two bananas.”
Members have said that the Bill is a significant advance on existing law, but I am not sure whether it is adequate or truly accountable. Part 2, obviously, has raised the more substantial issues and differences. I am at a bit of a loss, because I hear differing and confusing arguments. I hear those who commend part 2 saying that closed material procedures are not a particularly big departure because they are already used in cases of various types, and that the Bill merely codifies them in a particular area. I also hear the argument that PII is no good, that it cannot be used, that it stops cases being defended and that by its very nature it means that evidence cannot be brought. The reality is that PII can be dealt with on an evidence-by-evidence basis, and does not have to be done entirely wholesale. We have seen where it has worked in the past when the courts have granted immunity in relation to certain material, evidence and witnesses. They have protected their anonymity and secrecy and have protected material from being disclosed altogether. In other cases, they have protected material by due and measured redaction. The idea that PII is basically just a one-size-fits-all option is nonsense, as it can be used in a measured way.
I feel almost as though I am involved in some sort of closed material proceedings, because everyone else seems to be aware of why certain cases were settled as quickly as they were. I do not know why the al-Rawi case was settled in the way that it was. It had not even gone to the Supreme Court once appeal was allowed, yet settlement took place. Was it so compelling that the state had no other choice? Was there no way of having more measured terms? I do not know, but other people seem to. They seem to have been briefed and perhaps they are privy to such things, but I certainly am not and as a legislator I am not prepared to pass serious, significant legislation on spec based on somebody else’s hunch that the state would not have settled if it did not really have to.
I come from a part of the world where the state has done many things and failed to do many things. People attributed all sorts of reasons and pure motives to it, saying, “They wouldn’t have done that if they didn’t have to.” We know from last week’s revelations that that logic absolutely stinks. One of the worst things was that all down the years, when such things were happening, they were not sufficiently challenged by enough people in this Chamber and in other places.
When we receive such legislation, we must question it and ask what the compelling reason for it is. We must also look to those who know something about such things. Lord Justice Kerr has been widely quoted today on the subject of closed material proceedings, but he was not the only one to make significant statements in the al-Rawi judgment. Lord Dyson, giving the lead judgment, said that the introduction of closed proceedings in ordinary civil claims would involve
“an inroad into a fundamental common law right.”
He went on to say:
“The PII process is not perfect, but it works well enough. In some cases, it is cumbersome and costly to operate, but a closed material procedure would be no less so.”
Other hon. Members have quoted Lord Kerr’s concluding judgment. An additional point he made was:
“This would not be a development of the common law”
as the Government
“would have it. It would be, at a stroke, the deliberate forfeiture of a fundamental right which…has been established for more than three centuries.”
In those circumstances, I do not think that we should lightly pass the Bill on the basis that the other place has made a few amendments that make it good enough.
The point has been made throughout the debate—I have not heard it all as I have been in a Westminster Hall debate—that in a piece of legislation that is actually flawed, we must ask whether the balance of interest lies in protecting the state or the individual. Clearly, the Bill protects the state rather than the individual.
That is exactly the nature of the Bill. It is a measure to ensure that the state will be protected in various litigations and that it will have an absolutely unequal power to use a procedure that will frustrate a case against it using a special secret procedure.
We are told—I have listened to other hon. Members say it—that the amendment to clause 6 in the other place that changed “must” to “may” now means that the proceedings are entirely a matter of judicial discretion and that we should therefore trust the courts. Of course, however, that is only in relation to clause 6. Once the national security case has been engaged by a judge under clause 6, clause 7 means that what happens is entirely in the hands of the state. That joker is played by the state and cannot be predicted. PII means that a judge can be selective and can scrutinise what evidence might compromise national security and what should or should not be admitted in balancing the interests of hearing the case and protecting national security, but that will no longer be the case. We are being sold a false argument about just how big a difference there is because of the change from “must” to “may”.
As well as listening to learned judges who have considered the matter, we should look to those who also have experience of closed material proceedings and such legislation—the special advocates. The Minister without Portfolio told us, in effect, that special advocates underestimate their own power—they do rather well under such provisions and have quite a good score rate. Let us listen to what the special advocates and other observers say. The late Lord Chief Justice, Lord Bingham, described the role of a special advocate as akin to
“taking blind shots at a hidden target”.
Special advocates themselves have described it as “shadow boxing” in circumstances where
“you are speaking into a black hole because you have no idea if your strategy and points are on the money or wide of the mark”.
So special advocates are frustrated by their own professional standards. They must be particularly frustrated in relation to the interests and rights of their clients.
Remember, that is what we are talking about—people who have reason, good or ill, for taking a case against the state. If, in doing so, they are speaking of actions that have fundamentally affected their human rights, that have done damage or harm to them which in other circumstances and at the hands of someone else would be deemed to be illegal, that is serious. We should not treat the issue as a matter of administrative convenience. The argument should not be that it takes Ministers too long to decide whether they want to look for public interest immunity certificates in respect of all the different pieces of information, that it could take them a whole day to do so, and that we have to come up with something quicker, so we go for closed material proceedings. That is not the way in which we should legislate for justice to be done.
Others have quoted the Government’s independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson. On one occasion he attended a session with representatives of the Government and of all three intelligence services and counsel. He was talked through seven significant cases and left with a bundle of top-secret material in each case, including evidence and internal and external advice, which he had taken the opportunity to read. Three of those seven cases were civil damages cases. His conclusion was that
“there is a small but indeterminate category of national security-related claims . . . for civil damages, in respect of which it is preferable that the option of a CMP . . . should exist”—
only preferable that the option of a CMP should exist, but the Bill goes down an almost compulsive route in relation to that and legislates too far.
There is the irony that the very procedure that the independent reviewer engaged in was a closed material procedure. He looked at files that were presented by Government. He listened to the representatives of the intelligence agencies and their legal advisers, and he formed an assessment with no other view being given from special advocates or anybody else, yet it is his advice and his conclusions that we are told we should listen to.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Mike Crockart). I seem to remember studying some of the judgments of Justice Learned Hand myself when I was doing my jurisprudence course at the London School of Economics. I knew they would come in handy one day.
I was much impressed with the speech of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips), and I agreed with him entirely. He put it more elegantly than I could—that is why he is a Queen’s counsel and I am not. I also rather agreed with my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland).
I want to concentrate on part 2 of the Bill, because it relates to the area in which I have been interested as a lawyer. It seems to me that we should not allow the best to become the enemy of the good. The best, of course, is open hearings in court with the normal, full process. However, in a limited number of cases there are particular circumstances, which my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon rehearsed well, in which it is necessary to have a different procedure.
With respect to my hon. Friend the Member for Dewsbury (Simon Reevell), who is not in his place at the moment, I do not accept the proposition that the Bill will be used to prevent people from bringing claims. Nothing that is currently available in open court will become secret as a consequence of it.
Let me give the hon. Gentleman an example of how the argument about security is used—the Shrewsbury 24, the pickets who were imprisoned 40 years ago. When they sought the information upon which they were arrested and prosecuted by the Government, the letter sent back from the Secretary of State for Justice told them that a “security blanket” had been wrapped around that information, so the records would not be published on the grounds of national security. Is that the sort of issue that the Bill should cover?
With respect, it seems to me that at the moment public interest immunity would be invoked in such a case, possibly by an ex parte application, without any notice to the claimant. I fail to see how that would assist people in such a situation. It is better at least to have the opportunity for any relevant and admissible material to be considered, albeit through the less than perfect closed material process.
In my 25 years at the Bar, I predominantly practised in the criminal jurisdiction, and it is right that the Government are not seeking to apply the closed material procedure to that jurisdiction. When I started, public interest immunity criminal cases were a little-developed area, and the jurisprudence grew as time went on to reflect, as other Members have said, the changing demands placed upon the courts system and the nature of how intelligence operations were conducted. The jurisprudence moved flexibly to reflect that, and the same is occurring in the Bill.
I know two things from my experience of the use of PII in criminal cases. First, the judges took extremely seriously their responsibilities in relation to PII applications, including their duty to review the material and their initial rulings. I have no reason whatever to doubt that the same judicial meticulousness will be applied to the closed material procedure in civil cases. It is right that there should be safeguards, which I think are broadly accepted and will be taken forward. I, too, am pleased that the discretion allowed for in clause 6 is widened by the use of the word “may”. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon that that is adequate, and I urge my hon. Friend the Minister to resist the temptation to refine the definition further by including certain factors in the Bill. The risk of that would be that jurisprudence would grow up around the definition of those factors, and case law would eventually erode the jurisdiction and make it worse than simply using the word “may”.
The second point that strikes me from my experience at the Bar is that, as has been observed, it is not always the individual who is the loser as the result of a PII application. I believe the same will apply to the closed material procedure. I remember, in a criminal case, invoking not PII but the court’s inherent jurisdiction to sit in camera. Part of the mitigation that I needed to advance on my client’s behalf related to his activities in relation to reputable freedom movements in the Soviet bloc. I could not advance that mitigation in open court, because the consul of the Communist-controlled country was represented in court and was sitting in the gallery, and there would have been serious consequences for my client and his family. Mr Justice Steyn—later Lord Steyn; a very eminent judge—acceded to the application, and important material in my client’s favour was put before the court. Again, the point is that the material could be ventilated, and it is better in a civil case that that is done through the closed material procedure than were it not ventilated at all. That is why we should not allow the best—an open procedure—to become the enemy of the good, or CMP, which is an improvement in civil cases on existing PII arrangements.
There is general consensus about the importance of removing the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction from such cases. We have to be realistic and concede that although many meritorious claims are brought against Government and Government agencies, many unmeritorious claims are brought in the courts. There is, as the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) suggested, a growing tendency for jurisdiction shopping in relation to the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction, which has moved away from its original purpose in intellectual property cases to cases of this kind. It is not right that we should allow that to be abused in these cases.
Similarly, it is not right that the British taxpayer should pay millions of pounds when it is not possible to resist a claim in cases where, if the material were considered by the judge under the closed material procedure, it might be discredited. In the criminal jurisdiction, the choice facing the prosecutor is either to disclose material if ordered to do so or not to continue with the case. We have a tradition in this country of respecting assurances that have to be given in the interests of furthering justice. We have discussed that in relation to the assurances that we give the security services of our allies abroad.
We already do so in a different way in criminal cases in relation to informers, and have done so on more than one occasion. It is distasteful but necessary that we sometimes employ informers so that wrongdoers can be brought to book, and it is important that they are given assurances by the police that their anonymity will be protected. In certain circumstances, rather than disclose someone’s identity, I and other prosecuting barristers would offer no evidence so as not to put the informer’s identity at risk. Otherwise not only are they at risk, and not only is an undertaking breached, but there is a risk that other people will be less willing to come forward and provide information that might be helpful. The same applies even more strongly to assurances given in relation to our national security. I do not think that we should worry about that, subject to the proper safeguards.
In conclusion, it is important to stress again that we are not discussing secret courts. Yes, it is a less than satisfactory process, but ultimately it is one part of the process: the rest is an open process, and the hearing of the claim, as my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon set out, remains in the public domain. A number of hon. Members have cited Lord Kerr and the al-Rawi case, but to balance Lord Kerr’s judgment it is worth quoting the judgment of Lord Clarke, who took a different view:
“A closed procedure might also be necessary in a case in which…the non-state party…wishes to rely upon the material which would otherwise be subject to PII in order to defend itself in some way against the state. In such a case either party might seek an order for such a procedure based on necessity, namely that such a procedure would be necessary in order to permit a fair trial.”
That is a balanced statement on what is proposed in the Bill. I agree with Lord Clarke, and it seems to me that Mr Justice Ouseley, in the AHK case, made a similar proposition.
When he responds to the debate, I hope the Minister will take on board some of the legitimate concerns that have been raised. I shall support the Bill on Second Reading and we can examine the detail in Committee. We should not, however, allow ourselves to retreat from a necessary—albeit not always desirable—step in this class of case, and allow the best to become the enemy of the good. I therefore hope that the Bill will commend itself to the House.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill).
This debate has been about balance, and when the Minister responds I hope he will acknowledge the sense across the House that the Government are not yet in quite the right place regarding the balance between national security and the hard-won liberties of the individual. I hope that the Government will be open in Committee to amendments that make that balance more durable.
Justice systems across the United Kingdom have proven extremely adaptable to reforms such as the Human Rights Act 1998, which gave effect to the European convention on human rights in UK law. Such reforms provided what in some circumstances are universally applicable rights to people on UK territory, as well as recognising the growing importance of judicial review. Such proceedings can sometimes be inconvenient to Ministers and troublesome for the judiciary, but we should remember that the values of justice and fairness in our judicial system guarantee civil liberties and the rule of law.
The Bill deals with the conundrum of trying to strike a balance between the sometimes competing concerns and interests of the state and the individual, and it proposes the creation of closed material procedures in civil proceedings. As a national security measure that is reserved to Parliament under the devolution settlement, the Bill would apply to civil courts in Scotland. I know that the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) read out some comments, and no doubt there will be discussions between this Government and the Scottish Government, but the Bill is clear that the measures would apply to civil courts in Scotland.
I welcome the amendments made in the other place that strengthen protection of the individual and, in the words of the noble Lord Pannick,
“help to ensure that, if we are to have CMPs, there are proper limits, proper controls, a proper balance and judicial discretion, and that CMPs are a last resort,”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 21 November 2012; Vol. 740, c. 1816.]
The Bill as originally presented in the other place would have permitted one party—the Government—to decide whether to use CMPs. Critically, if CMPs are to be introduced, it must be for the courts and not the Government to determine whether they should be used in any given case, and only as a last resort. Questions of fairness and relevancy of evidence are for the courts, not the Government, to determine, because one of the parties to a CMP should not be able to determine such matters on its own. It is therefore welcome that the Minister without Portfolio indicated that the Government are minded to accept the relevant amendment.
Having opposed the amendments with such vigour in the other place, I hope that the Government will now accept in their entirety all amendments accepted by their lordships. Although clause 6 as presented to this House appears to contain greater balance than the measure originally presented to the other place, I am concerned that such balance does not extend sufficiently to clause 7. In particular, the Bill does not create a statutory obligation on the courts to provide the gist of the argument to the excluded party, which is vital to their being able to advise adequately their special advocate. That protection has been sought by the Law Society and is crucial to ensure a better balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the state.
Natural justice is a key principle of civil law across the United Kingdom, and we have heard comments from Judge Learned Hand. Perhaps I may remind the House of the dictum of Lord Chief Justice Hewart from the 1924 case of R v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy:
“Justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”
One key rule respected by that principle is the right to a fair hearing, which is underpinned in law by article 6(1) of the European convention on human rights.
May I point my hon. Friend to information given by Nicholas Blake QC—he is a special advocate—on what happens after a judgment is given in a Special Immigration Appeals Commission case? He says:
“If the special advocate thinks there is an error in law in the closed judgment, he gets permission to say, to pass a message out to the other team to say ‘I think you should be appealing, I can’t tell you why’…So there is a sort of open appeal. ‘We think there is something wrong but we don’t know what it is.’ And then the court goes into closed session”
to consider the matter. That is farce, not justice.