Wayne David
Main Page: Wayne David (Labour - Caerphilly)Department Debates - View all Wayne David's debates with the HM Treasury
(10 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman surmises correctly. The model is clearer, more elegant and more easily understandable, and we will be able to debate it later.
Going back to the LCO process, the hon. Gentleman will recall, as he participated in those long debates on LCOs—
As the world expert on LCOs, I certainly concur with the hon. Gentleman about the cumbersome system. It is far better that legislative powers are solely with the National Assembly for Wales. Does he agree that despite the faults of the legislative competence order, the House succeeded in improving substantially the suggestions that came from the Welsh Government regarding LCOs and what happened to the legislative process afterwards?
I certainly do not want to rehearse the discussions and arguments we had on LCOs. LCOs were a curate’s egg—occasionally they went through without touching the sides. I remember chairing the LCO on mental health, which lasted for two sessions. The LCO on the Welsh language took rather longer.
From a sedentary position, the Exchequer Secretary draws a distinction between the higher rate and the top rate. I fully accept that what I mean is the higher rate, by which I mean the 40% rate, as opposed to the additional rate of 45%.
Does my hon. Friend agree that the essential point is that, although we have asymmetrical devolution in the United Kingdom—there is a great deal of variation between the devolution settlements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland—we still have one British economy? Having variation is one thing, but having huge divergence is something else altogether.
The essential point we are making is that we, unlike the Conservative party, are not in favour of tax competition. We are not in favour of one part of the UK undercutting another, but the Secretary of State and the Tory party are. It is very simple.
Absolutely; Silk said precisely that. I am saying today for the clarity of the Committee that we believe that the current Government employed the argument for party political purposes. They attempted to stop the Welsh Government doing what they wanted to do, which was to maintain the Agricultural Wages Board for Wales. That would have had significant benefits for some of the lowest paid workers in Wales. On that basis, I believe we can say firmly that Wales would be better off if we moved to a reserved powers model, with the greater clarity and additional safeguards that it would bring.
Finally, Madam Chair—[Interruption.] I beg your pardon, Sir Roger; I did not see you slip into the Chair, but it is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once more. On the background to these clauses, we did not have much chance to discuss the so-called fair funding lock. The ability of the Welsh Labour Ministers in Cardiff Bay to determine whether they think the funding settlement for Wales is fair and adequate, in advance of their moving to adopt any of the powers of income tax—or any of the other taxes—is an important test. I hope that the Government will rise to that challenge at some point in the future.
I rise to support amendment 7. I recognise that it is a probing amendment, but it is nevertheless important to discuss the volatility of stamp duty land tax revenues in Wales. I will also speak to amendment 43 and the need to move to a reserved powers model for the National Assembly for Wales. I am aware that those two issues are not really related, but both are in this group of amendments, and in my view both are extremely important.
As the Silk report states, stamp duty land tax is a “relatively volatile tax”. Indeed, as the director of CBI Wales said only last year, SDLT raised about £210 million in Wales in 2007, but only £115 million in 2008-09. That is a relatively small amount, accounting for about 2% of the Welsh block grant, but a variation from £115 million to £210 million in two years is not insignificant. As Silk himself stated, the devolution of stamp duty land tax could pose potential risks for the Welsh budget.
Let me be clear: I am in favour of the devolution of stamp duty land tax, but I would like reassurance from the Minister about precisely how that volatility will be managed. The essential point is that devolving SDLT has consequences for the block grant, which would be reduced by the amount of SDLT collected in Wales. I would like a fuller and clearer explanation from the Minister about exactly how the block grant offset will be determined. Will borrowed resources be used to meet any shortfall when the receipts from land tax are less than expected? Does the Minister agree with the Silk report that the value of the deduction should be decided between the UK and Welsh Governments, and not by the UK Government unilaterally? I suggest that the deduction should take into account the volatility of the tax and the forecast revenue in Wales. I would therefore like specific reassurances from the Minister that these admittedly esoteric but nevertheless extremely important issues will be clearly addressed, so that we know precisely what we have before us.
My second point is about whether we move from a conferred powers model of devolution for Wales to a reserved powers model. In my view, there is no perfect model of devolution. In Northern Ireland and Scotland there is a reserved powers model, but—let us be honest—those models have their problems. We will all have heard about Scotland and Antarctica. For those who are not au fait with that problem, there was an issue of whether Antarctica was included in the devolution model for Scotland. It was not on the reserved powers list, and therefore the assumption was that it was devolved to Scotland in issuing licences and permits for people to operate in Antarctica when they were based in Scotland. Of course, that was an oversight by drafters, and it was put right retrospectively. I simply cite that example to show that there is no perfect model of devolution. We can cite other difficulties that arose when Scotland adopted the reserved powers model, but the fact that no model is perfect does not mean that a reserved powers model for Wales would not be a huge step forward. It would be a huge step forward, because we have heard—very eloquently—from the shadow Secretary of State about numerous examples of issues that have been taken to the Supreme Court by the Wales Office. At root, the problem is a lack of clarity, which would not exist if we had more clearly defined the reserved powers model.
We are all concerned about the Conservative party’s determination to prevent the Welsh Government from introducing measures to protect Welsh agriculture workers, and the case for moving to a reserved powers model has been well put by the UK’s Changing Union project. Under the title “The benefits of a ‘Reserved powers’ model of devolution”, it said:
“A ‘Reserved powers’ model of devolution would benefit Wales and the UK as a whole. A ‘Reserved powers’ model would provide much greater clarity about the legislative powers of the National Assembly for Wales. This will benefit civil society organisations, politicians, civil servants and the general public—in short the democratic process as a whole. A ‘Reserved powers’ model would place the relationship between Cardiff and London on a more stable, adult footing and help reduce the number of unnecessary disputes”—
which have been alluded to already in this debate—
“between the two levels of government. A ‘Reserved powers’ model of devolution for Wales would place Welsh devolution on the same footing as devolution for Scotland and Northern Ireland making it far more likely the UK will be able to develop more effective mechanisms to manage intergovernmental relations between central government and the devolved territories.”
That is an effective summation of the strong case for moving to a reserved powers model. I emphasise that there is no ideal model of devolution. Inevitably, devolution is a dynamic, but if we had this model, it would be far better than what we have at the moment.
Would the hon. Gentleman add to that list the availability of maximum flexibility in the future? We had the Government of Wales Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 2006 and we now have this Bill. This piecemeal, step-by-step approach to what some of us would like to see—home rule in a federal Britain—is going on and on, but a reserved powers model would give us greater opportunities for flexibility.
Home rule, of course, was championed by Keir Hardie, who was the first Labour Member of Parliament, representing Merthyr and Aberdare. Home rule is very important and we must look at mechanisms to enhance that principle and take it forward. A reserved powers model would provide flexibility, but it would also provide greater coherence, stability and clarity. On those principles, it is superior to what we have at the moment, but—as I have said—there is no such thing as perfect devolution. Whatever the nature of the devolution settlement, we will always need to discuss, debate and even argue about some issues. On balance, however, I think a reserved powers model would be the right choice.
Do the Government recognise that a cross-party consensus is emerging in Wales that a reserved powers model would be superior to what we have at the moment? I ask the Conservative Minister not to dig his heels in on this, but to recognise that there is a constitutional consensus and that it means something. It is one of the essential underpinnings of a progressive view on devolution. For goodness’ sake, do not give the impression that his opposition to a reserved powers model is all about trying to prevent what we would see as progressive measures to protect agriculture workers in Wales. He is genuinely concerned about constitutional stability and flexibility, as has been said, and about achieving something approaching a cross-party consensus on the way forward for devolution. That is why the amendment is very important indeed. In some ways, it takes us beyond the parameters of the Bill, but nevertheless, if the House were to support it, it would give an important indication of how we all see devolution moving forward. It is therefore very important that we support the second amendment, amendment 43 to clause 28.
I shall deal with stamp duty land tax and landfill tax later in my speech. As for income tax, I am tempted to explain to the hon. Gentleman yet again about the lockstep attributes of our reforms. He has expressed concern about tax competition, but it seems to me from his earlier remarks that he does not believe in it, and that, if he had a chance to seek greater tax competitiveness for any part of the United Kingdom, including Wales, he would not do so. Indeed, he seems to be advocating a policy of “tax uncompetitiveness” for Wales. However, I must not detain the Committee too long on that subject.
I realise that the Minister wants to make progress, and I know that he has rejected the suggestion that there should be an analysis of what might happen as a consequence of the Bill, but it would be helpful to have a clear articulation of the Government’s position on tax competition. Does he want tax competition, yes or no?
What we want is greater devolution in terms of income tax. When we debated the subject last week, I explained in some detail why we thought that it was a good thing, primarily because it would increase the accountability of the Welsh Government to the Welsh people, which I would expect Members in all parts of the Committee to want.
Amendments 32 and 33 were tabled by members of Plaid Cymru. Clause 6 introduces an important new power to devolve further tax powers to the Assembly via an Order in Council. The power has a broad scope, and can apply to brand-new taxes and to existing UK-wide taxes. The clause sets out the process for making such an order, which would need to be approved by both the House of Commons and the other place, as well as by the Assembly. Amendment 33 would remove Parliament from the process, so that the order would need to be passed only by the Assembly.
We recognise that it is important to give the Assembly and the Welsh Government the economic levers that are needed to generate growth in the Welsh economy, including the ability to introduce new taxes. We also recognise that—although this would depend on the proposal under consideration—if we are to proceed in a timely manner, it would be advantageous to be able to devolve further taxes without requiring primary legislation. However, a balance needs to be struck. Tax devolution should not be at the expense of reducing the overall tax receipts or competitiveness of the United Kingdom as a whole.
That last point is particularly important. As we stated in the Command Paper that accompanied the Bill, we would assess any proposals for further tax devolution against a number of criteria. For example, we would consider whether any new tax would affect the UK’s wider economic policy, impose disproportionate burdens on businesses or individuals, or create new tax avoidance opportunities. In short, the criteria would ensure that any new tax would not be to the detriment of the UK as a whole.
It is important for the devolution of further tax powers to take place in the constructive and collaborative manner that led to the Bill. It is therefore right for the resulting legislative process similarly to involve both the Assembly and Parliament, so that the proposal can be considered from the perspectives of both Wales and the wider UK. It would not be right for either to be able to legislate to devolve further taxes without the agreement of the other.
Not at all. I welcome those announcements. I wish there had been an announcement about improvement to the infrastructure in my constituency, and I wish there was to be improvement to the main infrastructure coming into Wales along the M4 corridor, but today’s announcements are obviously positive. However, we need to underline the delays that take place on that artery, that investment is essential and that borrowing powers need to be granted. Improvement should have taken place well before now. The original commitment was made pre-1997 but the Labour Administration cancelled it and the Welsh-led Labour Administration have not built it since. We should consider the delays, the accident records, the damage to the south Wales economy, and the hauliers based in my constituency who have had to set up on the Avonmouth side of the border because of the lack of investment and ambition over the past 15 years on the part of the Welsh Labour Administration.
Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that borrowing powers are vital because the Welsh Government’s capital budget has been cut by one third because of central Government cuts?