Illegal Migration Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th May 2023 Lords Chamber

This is an extremely important Bill. I say to the Minister that he owes it to your Lordships to explain to us exactly the meaning of that statement. He is a good lawyer, so he should be able to do that. He should also list before this Committee—so that we can consider that list as we debate the rest of this part of the Bill—which clauses, in his view, fall within the European Convention on Human Rights, which do not and, in the spirit in which we debate things in your Lordships’ House, which ones he does not know about. It is only when we understand that statement properly that, in my view, we can have an educated debate about this part of the Bill.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I have only a very brief intervention to make, but I want to speak to Amendment 4. I have two questions for the Minister which I think require serious clarification. First, do the Government accept that the Bill, if enacted, should be implemented in such a way as to comply with the convention rights that are itemised in Amendment 4? We are entitled to know what the thinking of the Government is. Do they intend that the Bill, if enacted, complies with convention rights?

The second question is contrariwise and actually is a suspicion. What is the purpose of the purpose test set out in Clause 1(2)? My suspicion is that the purpose test is designed to displace the convention rights if they come up against the Bill, if enacted. In other words, is the purpose test designed to override convention rights? I think this House is entitled to a very direct answer on both those questions.

For myself, let me make this absolutely plain to the Government. If Amendment 4 is put to a vote at any stage, I shall vote for it, because I believe that this Government and this country should comply with convention rights. If the purpose test is designed to override convention rights, I shall vote against it if given the chance.

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords—

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It is, of course, true that the UK’s international reputation matters; but I also think that the reputation of Parliament matters at home to UK citizens. I do not think that we should forget the widespread, huge frustration when the public are told, “You cannot do that”.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Is the noble Baroness really suggesting that this country should depart from treaty obligations without much of a qualm?

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

Having no qualms is something that I would never do, but I am also suggesting that having qualms, or using those qualms, to undermine what the British public would like to do is something that other people should have qualms about. I think that people are tearing their hair out outside of here being told, “You cannot do that; you may have voted for that, but that cannot happen”. When international treaties are used in that instrumental way—which is the way I think they are being used—that is difficult.

May I ask noble Lords to put aside the specifics of this Bill just for one moment? I know that people are very emotional about this Bill, but what if, on another topic, the UK Government—perhaps another Government, not this one, whom more people in this House might be sympathetic to—brought in a different Bill? Just imagine if such a worthy Government, with a popular mandate, tried to bring in a radical, novel, innovative law; for example, enhancing workers’ rights or improving women’s reproductive rights—things that I would support. Just imagine if that Government tried to bring that Bill in and it got to the Lords, where they were told, “You cannot do that because there are all sorts of international treaty clauses that prohibit you doing it”. Imagine your frustration: would you break your promise to the electorate in that instance? I just want us to acknowledge that asking the Government to break a promise on the small boats—

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

That is correct: the ECHR memorandum is one of the documents prepared to support the Bill in its passage through Parliament. Obviously, if a matter of interpretation were required, it is the sort of material that those looking for an interpretation might be minded to refer to. Indeed, it is open to those in Parliament to refer to such documents. It is, of course, right to say that the ECHR memorandum is a standard part of the package in relation to public Bills—so, in that sense, it has regular status.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Before the Minister leaves this part of his address, will he tell the House whether it is the intention of the Government that the implementation of the Act should be compliant with all the conventions that are set out in Amendment 4? Do the Government intend to comply with those conventions? This House is entitled to know.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I have already outlined, it is clear that there is nothing in the Bill that would require the UK to breach its international obligations. The UK takes compliance with those obligations very seriously. As for the other international instruments referred to in these amendments, they have not, by and large, been incorporated into UK domestic law, and we should not seek to do so in this Bill through the back door.

Illegal Migration Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 3rd July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendment 76 which, in my view, sets out in the clearest possible terms the principles that should be applied to the power of detention presently under discussion. Indeed, if I have correctly understood the law—of which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, reminded us—Amendment 76’s principles are principles that are currently being applied by the courts, and will be applied unless this Bill is enacted in its present form.

It is perhaps worth reminding the House of the strategic purpose of the Bill: to deter would-be migrants by the prospect of deportation to their country of origin or to a safe country. In my view, that is a perfectly legitimate objective; nation states are entitled to regulate the flow of migration. However, I also think that, in the modern world, that can be done only by the collective action of countries working together. That may require—I think it probably will—the substantive amendment of existing international agreements and conventions. I think there is very little prospect of unilateral action succeeding, save on the margins of the problem. The policy that underpins this Bill will fail because it will not be possible to deport migrants in sufficient numbers to constitute an effective deterrent.

Given that, I am extremely concerned about the ability of a Secretary of State to use a power of detention to reinforce, rather than to implement, the policy of deterrence. That would be an improper use of the power of detention. I am also deeply concerned that the power of detention as contemplated by the Bill will be used as an administrative convenience: detention without obvious limits of time in the hope that some possible prospect of deportation in respect of an individual will turn up. In my view, that would be highly objectionable.

I come to the four detailed provisions in Amendment 76. They should be considered individually. I will not repeat each one, because the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has read them out, but just take the first and ask a sensible question:

“the Secretary of State must intend to remove the person being detained and can only use the power to detain for that purpose”.

That seems to be a very fair statement of the law, and we are entitled to know from my noble friend the Minister what the principled objection to such a statement is. The same question applies to each of the remaining three provisions. I will not read them out because the noble Lord already has. Each one of them seems to me to be wholly right as a statement of principle, and this House is entitled to know the principled objection to them if there is one.

As it happens, I think I know the principled objections—at least I know the objections—because they are set out in paragraph 95 of the Explanatory Notes. The Government wish to give the Secretary of State, rather than the courts, the right to determine the length of time deemed to be reasonable for a period of detention. Moreover, when early deportation is not practicable, the Bill will give the Secretary of State the power to detain for such a period that the Secretary of State deems reasonable. That is a huge enlargement in the discretionary powers of a Secretary of State, and I do not want to give any Secretary of State, least of all the present Home Secretary or her immediate predecessor, such additional powers. In my view, the judgment of the legality of detention should be left to the judges and the courts, in applying the principles that are so well set out in Amendment 76.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, I have been asked by my Front Bench not to speak at all and, if I break that, to speak in the shortest possible terms. I can do that, because I completely support the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, in the speech that he just gave and most particularly in his admonishing the Government for not withdrawing this Bill. I have read the two court judgments and can say only that, until or unless the Supreme Court takes a different view, Clause 2 is a nullity, and that is the heart of the Bill.

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A person’s detention will continue to be subject to judicial oversight. We are not removing the involvement of the courts, as some in the House may have suggested. That oversight will continue by way of a writ of habeas corpus in the first 28 days, via an application for bail to the First-tier Tribunal, or a judicial review after that initial 28-day period. In any such judicial review proceedings, the Secretary of State’s assessment as to whether a period of detention is reasonable can be challenged on conventional public law grounds, including whether the decision is Wednesbury unreasonable. To be clear, the Bill explicitly does not, as has previously been suggested, provide for indefinite detention. The Government’s aim is to ensure that people are not held in detention for any longer than is absolutely necessary, as I have already said.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

If my noble friend is right, he is effectively saying that people who are detained will be released if there is no prospect of deportation. If that is right, the policy of deterrence is entirely without merit.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My noble friend is right, in that it is one of the Hardial Singh principles that, if there is no reasonable prospect of removal, that person should not be detained. But I cannot agree with him that the policy of deterrence is not right, because it is clearly the Government’s intention to remove any illegal entrants to a safe third country. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, I add that the Court of Appeal unanimously agreed with that being lawful as a matter of principle.

We recognise that circumstances can change. Where that is the case, detention must be reviewed. If it is considered that the anticipated period of detention is not reasonably necessary, the individual will be bailed. This reflects the existing legal and policy position on the use of detention.

It remains the Government’s view that the provisions in Clause 11 provide an appropriate balance between the respective roles of the Home Secretary and the courts. Accordingly, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Illegal Migration Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 5th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 156A and 161. Due to a technicality, Amendments 156 and 157 were not formally withdrawn, but they will be withdrawn, so it is Amendment 156A which is under consideration. I note my interests as a trustee of Reset and with the RAMP project, as laid out in the register.

I thank the usual channels for changing business on Monday so that this item was first today rather than last on Monday. We noted previously that, both during the Nationality and Borders Bill and during this Bill, age assessments have been talked about at 2 am and just after midnight. I am truly grateful to the usual channels for hearing my plea about not being last on the agenda again.

I am grateful also to the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister, Lady Neuberger, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for their support of these amendments. This is not the level of legislative scrutiny—which we should have in Committee—that we owe to children. There were some questions put in Committee to which we did not get full answers, and I hope the Minister might provide them today.

The Bill significantly restricts any legal avenues for challenging an incorrect age determination. The appeal mechanisms instituted by the Nationality and Borders Act, though they have not yet been implemented, will now be disapplied. Following government amendments at this late stage, judicial review will also be limited to such a narrow scope as to make it impossible for a potential child to challenge the assessment of their age based on evidential fact.

All the while, if the Home Office were to inaccurately assess a child to be an adult, the implications would be disastrous and irreversible. A child would face entering an adult system alone, where they would be detained with adults before potentially being removed to a third country with no safeguards in place, perhaps without ever encountering a child protection officer. This is simply absurd, but to remove all legal safeguards and weaken a putative child’s access to justice, when the implications are so grave, is as horrifying as it is immoral.

We must not forget that the Home Office does indeed get age assessments wrong. Based on the Home Office’s own data, we can see that last year nearly two-thirds of all age dispute cases were found to be children. Currently, no method exists that can determine accurately and consistently whether a person is a child; that fact is well acknowledged by the Home Office and is clearly there in the children’s impact assessment that we got yesterday. Therefore, it is understandable that subjective and visual age assessments by immigration officers can lead to inaccurate judgments.

Because of this fact, a potential child must not be disqualified from a judicial review on whether their age decision was wrong on the basis of fact and judicial review must serve as a barrier to a child’s removal. Not to permit the courts to grant relief when the verifiable age of a child is available would allow the Government to proceed with the removal of a child when they know their decision was flawed. Last year, this would have meant over 1,000 unaccompanied children could have been eligible for removal to a third country. A child should not be removed from the UK on such a fallible basis. For the sake of children, this cannot be allowed to stand, and that is reason enough why access to judicial review should be there.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I have been saying—and I hope to reinforce this point—that I have one anxiety. As I understand the amendment, it confines the right of appeal to the grounds set out in Clause 56(5), which exclude an appeal on the basis that there has been a mistake of fact.

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

I was about to sit down, but I will note that. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for bringing back these amendments. I am also grateful to the Home Office for finally publishing its child rights impact assessment yesterday afternoon although, I must say, getting it has been like pulling teeth.

However, on age assessment and other children’s rights issues, it reads more like an attempt at post hoc justification than a serious analysis of the implications for children’s rights. The initial reaction from the children’s sector is damning. That it continues to use misleading statistics on age assessment that were challenged in Committee is disappointing, to put it mildly.

In Committee, I asked for an explanation of

“why the Government have ignored the very clear advice of their own advisory committee on the question of consent”,

raised by Amendment 161. The Minister’s response was:

“Of course we consider the advice”,—[Official Report, 12/6/23; cols. 1806-16.]


but the fact is that Clause 57 represents a rejection of that advice. Will the Minister explain why, having considered the expert advice, the Government then rejected it? In effect, their approach is that of guilty until proven innocent but, as we have heard, Clause 56 will make proving innocence—or, more accurately, that one is a child—much more difficult than now in what is increasingly a culture of disbelief.

The limitations on appeal and JR rights are, as the JCHR points out and despite what the CRIA says, clearly not in any child’s best interests. Likewise, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has expressed concern and recommended that age-disputed children should not be removed to a third country. I asked in Committee what the Government’s response is, but received no reply; nor was it explained what steps would be taken to ensure the following, in the words of the supplementary ECHR memorandum, echoed in the CRIA:

“The appropriate support and facilities will need to be in place in the country of removal to ensure that the individual can effectively participate in their judicial review from abroad”.


It is difficult to believe that effective participation would be possible, even with support. We need, at the very least, to know what that support would be. Even if the child managed to challenge the decision successfully from abroad, they could then order only a reassessment. How would that be meaningfully carried out if the child is no longer in the UK? If the child were then reassessed as a child, would they be moved back to the UK?

I have a final question. The Nationality and Borders Act provided for a new statutory right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to replace judicial review as the means to challenge age assessment under that Act, so that it

“can be resolved as swiftly as possible”

and

“to ensure that genuine children don’t slip through the net and are classed as adults”.

Over a year on, this section has not been commenced. Can the Minister say why and set out the Government’s timetable for doing so, or has it been jettisoned before it has even come into force?

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 156A, although I regret the limited nature of the appeal contemplated by that amendment. I very much welcome Amendment 158A, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.

As a matter of principle, I am very much in favour of giving individuals the right of appeal although, as I said when I intervened on the right reverend Prelate, I fear that his amendment provides for a more limited right of appeal than I would wish.

A decision on the age of an individual is critical in determining a person’s status under the legislation. I am concerned that, in many instances, the original decision about age will be made in a somewhat perfunctory manner. I imagine that immigration officers may get rather impatient and make rather perfunctory decisions. At the end of the day, age is a matter of evidence and I cannot find any persuasive reason why the original position on age should not be challenged. In my view, the right of appeal should extend to appeals based on the ground that the relevant authority had made a mistake of fact. That is what the noble and learned Lord seeks to achieve in Amendment 158A. However, if I have correctly understood the amendment and its relation to the Bill, the grounds of appeal are limited to those set out in Clause 56(5) of the Bill as it stands. The grounds specified there are essentially judicial review grounds—for example, that there was some procedural unfairness, or the ground of irrationality—and appeals based on fact are expressly excluded. I regard that exclusion as highly regrettable.

To meet some of the anxieties that I fear will be expressed by the Minister regarding my comments and the amendments, I make this point as well: the rights of appeal could be abused, and I would therefore like the burden of establishing the appeal to be on the appellant. It must be for them to satisfy the relevant appellate body that the grounds of appeal are made out. That may in fact be the existing law and practice—it has been such a long time since I practised in that field of law that I simply do not know. If it is not, it should be, and it would meet many of the anxieties likely to be expressed on the government Benches.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I understand very well the child rights impact assessment on this issue. Naturally, the Government are concerned about people’s ability to pretend that they are under age when they are not, but that does not in fact deal with the underlying problem: there are a large number of children from countries outside Europe who mature much more quickly, certainly quicker than children in western Europe.

I remember going on a visit to Safe Passage, which was offering a drop-in centre for young men under 18. A number of those I met, and whom Safe Passage was absolutely satisfied were under 18, had beards or moustaches. If such person is interviewed by the Home Office, will it not immediately assume that a moustache or beard absolutely means that they are over 18? In the case of some of these young people, that will be incorrect.

I also remain very concerned about the issue raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in relation to Clause 5. If the issue is, as I suspect it will be, that they got it wrong, it is not necessarily—or probably not ever—an issue of law but a question of fairness. It is a question of dealing fairly and in the best interests of those who are genuinely under 18.

Reading through the child impact assessment, what depresses me is the suggestion regarding the extent to which the Government are following the principles of the Children Act—which every Government in my lifetime have followed—and looking out for the best interests of children. They are saying it again and again and, quite simply, doing the exact reverse. This is extraordinarily depressing.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, as we have heard, these amendments take us on to the provisions regarding age assessments. Given that, under Clause 3, unaccompanied children will be treated differently from adults, and given the obvious safeguarding risks of adults purporting to be children being placed within the care system, it is important that we take steps to deter adults from claiming to be children and to avoid lengthy legal challenges to age-assessment decisions preventing the removal of those who have been assessed to be adults. Receiving care and services reserved for children also incurs costs and reduces the accessibility of these services for genuine children who need them.

Assessing age is inherently difficult, but it is crucial that we disincentivise adults from knowingly misrepresenting themselves as children. Our published data shows that, between 2016 and March 2023, there were 8,611 asylum cases in which an age assessment was required and subsequently resolved. Of those cases, nearly half— 47%, or 4,088 individuals—were found to be adults. This percentage aggregates initial decisions on age taken upon arrival, comprehensive assessments and the outcomes of legal challenges. I make clear that only those assessed to be adults will fall within the duty.

Accordingly, Clause 56 disapplies the right of appeal for age assessments, which is yet to be commenced and was established in Section 54 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, for those who meet the four conditions in the Bill. Instead, those wishing to challenge a decision on age will be able to do so through judicial review, which will not suspend removal, and can continue from outside the UK after they have been removed. In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I say that we are keeping the commencement of Section 54 under review, but I am unable to provide a further update at this stage.

Clause 56(5) provides the basis on which a court can consider a decision relating to a person’s age in judicial review proceedings. It provides that a court can grant relief

“only on the basis that it was wrong in law”,

and must not do so on the basis that it

“was wrong as a matter of fact”.

This distinguishes the position that the Supreme Court adopted in its judgment in the 2009 case of the Crown on the application of A v London Borough of Croydon, page eight. The intention is to ensure that the court cannot make its own determination on age—which should properly be reserved for those qualified and trained to assess age—but instead can consider a decision on age only on conventional judicial review principles.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

The court will receive evidence from people who have made these assessments, and courts are well versed in determining which evidence is to be preferred.