Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

Viscount Camrose Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 27th March 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. We have had a major common theme, which is that any powers exercised by the Secretary of State in Clause 14 should be to enhance, rather than diminish, the protections for a data subject affected by automated decision-making. We have heard some stark and painful examples of the way in which this can go wrong if it is not properly regulated. As noble Lords have said, this seems to be regulation on automated decision-making by the backdoor, but with none of the protections and promises that have been made on this subject.

Our Amendment 59 goes back to our earlier debate about rights at work when automated decision-making is solely or partly in operation. It provides an essential underpinning of the Secretary of State’s powers. The Minister has argued that ADM is a new development and that it would be wrong to be too explicit about the rules that should apply as it becomes more commonplace, but our amendment cuts through those concerns by putting key principles in the Bill. They are timeless principles that should apply regardless of advances in the adoption of these new technologies. They address the many concerns raised by workers and their representatives, about how they might be disfranchised or exploited by machines, and put human contact at the heart of any new processes being developed. I hope that the Minister sees the sense of this amendment, which will provide considerable reassurance for the many people who fear the impact of ADM in their working lives.

I draw attention to my Amendments 58 and 73, which implement the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. In the Bill, the new Articles 22A to 22D enable the Secretary of State to make further provisions about safeguards when automated decision-making is in place. The current wording of new Article 22D makes it clear that regulations can be amended

“by adding or varying safeguards”.

The Delegated Powers Committee quotes the department saying that

“it does not include a power to remove safeguards provided in new Article 22C and therefore cannot be exercised to weaken the protections”

afforded to data subjects. The committee is not convinced that the department is right about this, and we agree with its analysis. Surely “vary” means that the safeguards can move in either direction—to improve or reduce protection.

The committee also flags up concerns that the Bill’s amendments to Sections 49 and 50 of the Data Protection Act make specific provision about the use of automated decision-making in the context of law enforcement processing. In this new clause, there is an equivalent wording, which is that the regulations may add or vary safeguards. Again, we agree with its concerns about the application of these powers to the Secretary of State. It is not enough to say that these powers are subject to the affirmative procedure because, as we know and have discussed, the limits on effective scrutiny of secondary legislation are manifest.

We have therefore tabled Amendments 58 and 73, which make it much clearer that the safeguards cannot be reduced by the Secretary of State. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has a number of amendments with a similar intent, which is to ensure that the Secretary of State can add new safeguards but not remove them. I hope the Minister is able to commit to taking on board the recommendations of the Delegated Powers Committee in this respect.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, once again made the powerful point that the Secretary of State’s powers to amend the Data Protection Act should not be used to reduce the hard-won standards and protections for children’s data. As she says, safeguards do not constitute a right, and having regard to the issues is a poor substitute for putting those rights back into the Bill. So I hope the Minister is able to provide some reassurance that the Bill will be amended to put these hard-won rights back into the Bill, where they belong.

I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, is not here. His amendment raises an important point about the need to build in the views of the Information Commissioner, which is a running theme throughout the Bill. He makes the point that we need to ensure, in addition, that a proper consultation of a range of stakeholders goes into the Secretary of State’s deliberations on safeguards. We agree that full consultation should be the hallmark of the powers that the Secretary of State is seeking, and I hope the Minister can commit to taking those amendments on board.

I echo the specific concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about the impact assessment and the supposed savings from changing the rules on subject access requests. This is not specifically an issue for today’s debate but, since it has been raised, I would like to know whether he is right that the savings are estimated to be 50% and not 1%, which the Minister suggested when we last debated this. I hope the Minister can clarify this discrepancy on the record, and I look forward to his response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Viscount Camrose) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Knight, my noble friend Lord Holmes and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones, Lady Kidron and Lady Bennett—

[Noble Lords]

Lady Harding.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I apologise to my noble friend. I cannot be having a senior moment already—we have only just started. I look forward to reading that part in Hansard.

I can reassure noble Lords that data subjects still have the right to object to solely automated decision-making. It is not an absolute right in all circumstances, but I note that it never has been. The approach taken in the Bill complements the UK’s AI regulation framework, and the Government are committed to addressing the risks that AI poses to data protection and wider society. Following the publication of the AI regulation White Paper last year, the Government started taking steps to establish a central AI risk function that brings together policymakers and AI experts with the objective of identifying, assessing and preparing for AI risks. To track identified risks, we have established an initial AI risk register, which is owned by the central AI risk function. The AI risk register lists individual risks associated with AI that could impact the UK, spanning national security, defence, the economy and society, and outlines their likelihood and impact. We have also committed to engaging on and publishing the AI risk register in spring this year.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I am processing what the Minister has just said. He said it complements the AI regulation framework, and then he went on to talk about the central risk function, the AI risk register and what the ICO is up to in terms of guidance, but I did not hear that the loosening of safeguards or rights under Clause 14 and Article 22 of the GDPR was heralded in the White Paper or the consultation. Where does that fit with the Government’s AI regulation strategy? There is a disjunct somewhere.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I reject the characterisation of Clause 14 or any part of the Bill as loosening the safeguards. It focuses on the outcomes and by being less prescriptive and more adaptive, its goal is to heighten the levels of safety of AI, whether through privacy or anything else. That is the purpose.

On Secretary of State powers in relation to ADM, the reforms will enable the Government to further describe what is and is not to be taken as a significant effect on a data subject and what is and is not to be taken as meaningful human—

[Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)]

I may be tired or just not very smart, but I am not really sure that I understand how being less prescriptive and more adaptive can heighten safeguards. Can my noble friend the Minister elaborate a little more and perhaps give us an example of how that can be the case?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Certainly. Being prescriptive and applying one-size-fits-all measures for all processes covered by the Bill encourages organisations to follow a process, but focusing on outcomes encourages organisations to take better ownership of the outcomes and pursue the optimal privacy and safety mechanisms for those organisations. That is guidance that came out very strongly in the Data: A New Direction consultation. Indeed, in the debate on a later group we will discuss the use of senior responsible individuals rather than data protection officers, which is a good example of removing prescriptiveness to enhance adherence to the overall framework and enhance safety.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

This seems like a very good moment to ask whether, if the variation is based on outcome and necessity, the Minister agrees that the higher bar of safety for children should be specifically required as an outcome.

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[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I absolutely agree about the outcome of higher safety for children. We will come to debate whether the mechanism for determining or specifying that outcome is writing that down specifically, as suggested.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I am sure the Minister knew I was going to stand up to say that, if it is not part of the regulatory instruction, it will not be part of the outcome. The point of regulation is to determine a floor— never a ceiling—below which people cannot go. Therefore, if we wish to safeguard children, we must have that floor as part of the regulatory instruction.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Indeed. That may well be the case, but how that regulatory instruction is expressed can be done in multiple ways. Let me continue; otherwise, I will run out of time.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I am having a senior moment as well. Where are the outcomes written? What are we measuring this against? I like the idea; it sounds great—management terminology—but I presume that it is written somewhere and that we could easily add children’s rights to the outcomes as the noble Baroness suggests. Where are they listed?

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I am sorry, but I just do not accept that intervention. This is one of the most important clauses in the whole Bill and we have to spend quite a bit of time teasing it out. The Minister has just electrified us all in what he said about the nature of this clause, what the Government are trying to achieve and how it fits within their strategy, which is even more concerning than previously. I am very sorry, but I really do not believe that this is the right point for the Whip to intervene. I have been in this House for 25 years and have never seen an intervention of that kind.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Let me make the broad point that there is no single list of outcomes for the whole Bill but, as we go through clause by clause, I hope the philosophy behind it, of being less prescriptive about process and more prescriptive about the results of the process that we desire, should emerge—not just on Clause 14 but as the overall philosophy underlying the Bill. Regulation-making powers can also be used to vary the existing safeguards, add additional safeguards and remove additional safeguards added at a later date.

On the point about having regard, it is important that the law is drafted in a way that allows it to adapt as technology advances. Including prescriptive requirements in the legislation reduces this flexibility and undermines the purpose of this clause and these powers to provide additional legal clarity when it is deemed necessary and appropriate in the light of the fast-moving advances in and adoption of technologies relevant to automated decision-making. I would like to reassure noble Lords that the powers can be used only to vary the existing safeguards, add additional ones and remove them. They cannot remove any of the safeguards written into the legislation.

Amendments 53 to 55 and 69 to 71 concern the Secretary of State powers relating to the terms “significant decisions” and “meaningful human involvement”. These powers enable the Secretary of State to provide a description of decisions that do or do not have a significant effect on data subjects, and describe cases that can be taken to have, or not to have, meaningful human involvement. As technology adoption grows and new technologies emerge, these powers will enable the Government to provide legal clarity, if and when deemed necessary, to ensure that people are protected and have access to safeguards when they matter most. In respect of Amendment 59A, Clause 50 already provides for an overarching requirement for the Secretary of State to consult the ICO and other persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate before making regulations under the UK GDPR, including for the measures within Article 22.

Also, as has been observed—I take the point about the limitations of this, but I would like to make the point anyway—any changes to the regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure and so must be approved by both Houses. As with other provisions of the Bill, the ICO will seek to provide organisations with timely guidance and support to assist them in interpreting and applying the legislation. As such, I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Clement Jones, and my noble friend Lord Holmes—were he here—not to press their amendments.

Amendment 57 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, seeks to ensure that, when exercising regulation-making powers in relation to the safeguards in Article 22 of the UK GDPR, the Secretary of State should uphold the level of protection that children are entitled to in the Data Protection Act 2018. As I have said before, Clause 50 requires the Secretary of State to consult the ICO and other persons he or she considers appropriate. The digital landscape and its technologies evolve rapidly, presenting new challenges in safeguarding children. Regular consultations with the ICO and stakeholders ensure that regulations remain relevant and responsive to emerging risks associated with solely automated decision-making. The ICO has a robust position on the protection of children, as evidenced through its guidance and, in particular, the age-appropriate design code. As such, I ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.

Amendments 58, 72 and 73 seek to prevent the Secretary of State varying any of the safeguards mentioned in the reformed clauses. As I assured noble Lords earlier, the powers in this provision can be used only to vary the existing safeguards, add additional safeguards and remove additional safeguards added by regulation in future; there is not a power to remove any of the safeguards.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I apologise for breaking the Minister’s flow, especially as he had moved on a little, but I have a number of questions. Given the time, perhaps he can write to me to answer them specifically. They are all designed to show the difference between what children now have and what they will have under the Bill.

I have to put on the record that I do not accept what the Minister just said—that, without instruction, the ICO can use its old instruction to uphold the current safety for children—if the Government are taking the instruction out of the Bill and leaving it with the old regulator. I ask the Minister to tell the Committee whether it is envisaged that the ICO will have to rewrite the age-appropriate design code to marry it with the new Bill, rather than it being the reason why it is upheld. I do not think the Government can have it both ways where, on the one hand, the ICO is the keeper of the children, and, on the other, they take out things that allow the ICO to be the keeper of the children in this Bill.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I absolutely recognise the seriousness and importance of the points made by the noble Baroness. Of course, I would be happy to write to her and meet her, as I would be for any Member in the Committee, to give—I hope—more satisfactory answers on these important points.

As an initial clarification before I write, it is perhaps worth me saying that the ICO has a responsibility to keep guidance up to date but, because it is an independent regulator, it is not for the Government to prescribe this, only to allow it to do so for flexibility. As I say, I will write and set out that important point in more detail.

Amendment 59 relates to workplace rights. I reiterate that the existing data protection legislation and our proposed reforms—

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

Has the Minister moved on from our Amendments 58 and 59? He was talking about varying safeguards. I am not quite sure where he is.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

It is entirely my fault; when I sit down and stand up again, I lose my place.

We would always take the views of the DPRRC very seriously on that. Clearly, the Bill is being designed without the idea in mind of losing or diminishing any of those safeguards; otherwise, it would have simply said in the Bill that we could do that. I understand the concern that, by varying them, there is a risk that they would be diminished. We will continue to find a way to take into account the concerns that the noble Baroness has set out, along with the DPRRC. In the interim, let me perhaps provide some reassurance that that is, of course, not the intention.

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Moved by

[Viscount Camrose]

61: Clause 14, page 28, line 17, leave out “using sensitive personal data” and insert “based on sensitive processing”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment of a heading is consequential on the amendment in my name to clause 14, page 28, line 19.

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Moved by

[Viscount Camrose]

63: Clause 14, page 28, line 19, leave out “sensitive personal data” and insert “sensitive processing (as defined in section 35(8))”
Member’s explanatory statement
This technical amendment adjusts the wording of new section 50B(1) of the Data Protection Act 2018 to refer to “sensitive processing”, rather than “sensitive personal data”, to reflect the terms of section 35(8) of that Act.

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We have an open mind on Amendment 252 because there is a balance to be struck between privacy issues and the need to ensure that service delivery and commercial activity operate on a level playing field. I listened to the passionate argument made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, also made some powerful points on this, but I would like to hear what the Minister has to say because we need to get this right as well. We cannot have a situation where one part of the public service is holding up or getting wrong public service delivery and the operation of physical delivery services to our homes and households. With that, I am content to let the Minister have his say. I hope he gets all our names right.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I feel under amazing pressure to get the names right, especially given the number of hours we spend together.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for tabling Amendments 74 to 78, 144 and 252 in this group. I also extend my thanks to noble Lords who have signed the amendments and spoken so eloquently in this debate.

Amendments 74 to 78 would place a legislative obligation on public authorities and all persons in the exercise of a public function to publish reports under the Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard—ATRS—or to publish algorithmic impact assessments. These would provide information on algorithmic tools and algorithm-assisted decisions that process personal data in the exercise of a public function or those that have a direct or indirect public effect or directly interact with the general public. I remind noble Lords that the UK’s data protection laws will continue to apply throughout the processing of personal data.

The Government are already taking action to establish the necessary guard-rails for AI, including to promote transparency. In the AI regulation White Paper response, we announced that the use of the ATRS will now become a requirement for all government departments and the broader public sector. The Government are phasing this in as we speak and will check compliance accordingly, as DSIT has been in contact with every department on this issue.

In making this policy, the Government are taking an approach that provides increasing degrees of mandation of the ATRS, with appropriate exemptions, allowing them to monitor compliance and effectiveness. The announcement in the White Paper response has already led to more engagement from across government, and more records are under way. The existing process focuses on the importance of continuous improvement and development. Enshrining the standard into law prematurely, amid exponential technological change, could hinder its adaptability.

More broadly, our AI White Paper outlined a proportionate and adaptable framework for regulating AI. As part of that, we expect AI development and use to be fair, transparent and secure. We set out five key principles for UK regulators to interpret and apply within their remits. This approach reflects the fact that AI systems are not unregulated and need to be compliant with existing regulatory frameworks, including employment, human rights, health and safety and data protection law.

For instance, the UK’s data protection legislation imposes obligations on data controllers, including providers and users of AI systems, to process personal data fairly, lawfully and transparently. Our reforms in this Bill will ensure that, where solely automated decision-making is undertaken—that is, ADM without any meaningful human involvement that has significant effects on data subjects—data subjects will have a right to the relevant safeguards. These safeguards include being provided with information on the ADM that has been carried out and the right to contest those decisions and seek human review, enabling controllers to take suitable measures to correct those that have produced wrongful outcomes.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I wonder whether the Minister can comment on this; he can write if he needs to. Is he saying that, in effect, the ATRS is giving the citizen greater rights than are ordinarily available under Article 22? Is that the actual outcome? If, for instance, every government department adopted ATRS, would that, in practice, give citizens a greater degree of what he might put as safeguards but, in this context, he is describing as rights?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I am very happy to write to the noble Lord, but I do not believe that the existence of an ATRS-generated report in and of itself confers more rights on anybody. Rather, it makes it easier for citizens to understand how their rights are being used, what rights they have, or what data about them is being used by the department concerned. The existence of data does not in and of itself confer new rights on anybody.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I understand that, but if he rewinds the reel he will find that he was talking about the citizen’s right of access, or something of that sort, at that point. Once you know what data is being used, the citizen has certain rights. I do not know whether that follows from the ATRS or he was just describing that at large.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

As I said, I will write. I do not believe that follows axiomatically from the ATRS’s existence.

On Amendment 144, the Government are sympathetic to the idea that the ICO should respond to new and emerging technologies, including the use of children’s data in the development of AI. I assure noble Lords that this area will continue to be a focus of the ICO’s work and that it already has extensive powers to provide additional guidance or make updates to the age-appropriate design code, to ensure that it reflects new developments, and a responsibility to keep it up to date. The ICO has a public task under Article 57(1)(b) of the UK GDPR to

“promote public awareness and understanding of the risks, rules, safeguards and rights in relation to processing”.

It is already explicit that:

“Activities addressed specifically to children shall receive specific attention”.


That code already includes a chapter on profiling and provides guidance on fairness and transparency requirements around automated decision-making.

Taking the specific point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on the contents of the ICO’s guidance, while I cannot speak to the ICO’s decisions about the drafting of its guidance, I am content to undertake to speak to it about this issue. I note that it is important to be careful to avoid a requirement for the ICO to duplicate work. The creation of an additional children’s code focused on AI could risk fragmenting approaches to children’s protections in the existing AADC—a point made by the noble Baroness and by my noble friend Lady Harding.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

I have a question on this. If the Minister is arguing that this should be by way of amendment of the age-related code, would there not be an argument for giving that code some statutory effect?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I believe that the AADC already has statutory standing.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

On that point, I think that the Minister said—forgive me if I am misquoting him —risk, rules and rights, or some list to that effect. While the intention of what he said was that we have to be careful where children are using it, and the ICO has to make them aware of the risks, the purpose of a code—whether it is part of the AADC or stand-alone—is to put those responsibilities on the designers of service products and so on by default. It is upstream where we need the action, not downstream, where the children are.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Yes, I entirely agree with that, but I add that we need it upstream and downstream.

For the reasons I have set out, the Government do not believe that it would be appropriate to add these provisions to the Bill at this time without further detailed consultation with the ICO and the other organisations involved in regulating AI in the United Kingdom. Clause 33—

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

Can we agree that there will be some discussions with the ICO between now and Report? If those take place, I will not bring this point back on Report unnecessarily.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Yes, I am happy to commit to that. As I said, we look forward to talking with the noble Baroness and others who take an interest in this important area.

Clause 33 already includes a measure that would allow the Secretary of State to request the ICO to publish a code on any matter that she sees fit, so this is an issue that we could return to in the future, if the evidence supports it, but, as I said, we consider the amendments unnecessary at this time.

Finally, Amendment 252 would place a legislative obligation on the Secretary of State regularly to publish address data maintained by local authorities under open terms—that is, accessible by anyone for any purpose and for free. High-quality, authoritative address data for the UK is currently used by more than 50,000 public and private sector organisations, which demonstrates that current licensing arrangements are not prohibitive. This data is already accessible for a reasonable fee from local authorities and Royal Mail, with prices starting at 1.68p per address or £95 for national coverage.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

Some 50,000 organisations access that information, but does the Government have any data on it? I am not asking for it now, but maybe the Minister could go away and have a look at this. We have heard that other countries have opened up this data. Are they seeing an increase? That is just a number; it does not tell us how many people are denied access to the data.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

We have some numbers that I will come to, but I am very happy to share deeper analysis of that with all noble Lords.

There is also free access to this data for developers to innovate in the market. The Government also make this data available for free at the point of use to more than 6,000 public sector organisations, as well as postcode, unique identifier and location data available under open terms. The Government explored opening address data in 2016. At that time, it became clear that the Government would have to pay to make this data available openly or to recreate it. That was previously attempted, and the resulting dataset had, I am afraid, critical quality issues. As such, it was determined at that time that the changes would result in significant additional cost to taxpayers and represent low value for money, given the current widespread accessibility of the data. For the reasons I have set out, I hope that the noble Lords will withdraw their amendments.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. There are a number of different elements to this group.

The one bright spot in the White Paper consultation is the ATRS. That was what the initial amendments in this group were designed to give a fair wind to. As the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, said, this is designed to assist in the adoption of the ATRS, and I am grateful for his support on that.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this very wide-ranging debate. Our amendments cover a lot of common ground, and we are in broad agreement on most issues, so I hope noble Lords will bear with me if I primarily focus on the amendments that I have tabled, although I will come back to other points.

We have given notice of our intention to oppose Clause 16 standing part of the Bill which is similar to Amendment 80 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, which probes why the Government have found it necessary to remove the requirement that companies outside the UK should appoint a representative within the UK. The current GDPR rules apply to all those active in the UK market, regardless of whether their organisation is based or located in the UK. The intention is that the representative will ensure UK compliance and act as a primary source of contact for data subjects. Without this clause, data subjects will be forced to deal with overseas data handlers, with all the cultural and language barriers that might ensue. There is no doubt that this will limit their rights to apply UK data standards.

In addition, as my colleagues in the Commons identified, the removal of the provisions in Clause 16 was not included in the Government’s consultation, so stakeholders have not had the chance to register some of the many practical concerns that they feel will arise from this change. There is also little evidence that compliance with Article 27 is an unnecessary barrier to responsible data use by reputable overseas companies. Again, this was a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. In fact, the international trend is for more countries to add a representative obligation to their data protection laws, so we are becoming outriders on the global stage.

Not only is this an unnecessary change but, compared to other countries, it will send a signal that our data protection rights are being eroded in the UK. Of course, this raises the spectre of the EU revisiting whether our UK adequacy status should be retained. It also has implications for the different rules that might apply north and south of the border in Ireland so, again, if we are moving away from the standard rules applied by other countries, this has wider implications that we need to consider.

For many reasons, I challenge the Government to explain why this change was felt to be necessary. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, talked about whether the cost was really a factor. It did not seem that there were huge costs, compared to the benefits of maintaining the current system, and I would like to know in more detail why the Government are doing this.

Our Amendments 81 and 90 seek to ensure that there is a definition of “high-risk processing” in the Bill. The current changes in Clauses 17 and 20 have the effect of watering down data controllers’ responsibilities, from carrying out data protection impact assessments to assessing high-risk processing on the basis of whether it was necessary and what risks are posed. But nowhere does it say what constitutes high-risk processing—it is left to individual organisations to make that judgment—and nowhere does it explain what “necessary” means in this context. Is it also expected to be proportionate, as in the existing standards? This lack of clarity has caused some consternation among stakeholders.

The Equality and Human Rights Commission argues that the proposed wording means that

“data controllers are unlikely to go beyond minimum requirements”,

so the wording needs to be more explicit. It also recommends that

“the ICO be required to provide detailed guidance on how ‘the rights and freedoms of individuals’ are to be considered in an Assessment of High Risk Processing”.

More crucially, the ICO has written to Peers, saying that the Bill should contain a list of

“activities that government and Parliament view as high-risk processing, similar to the current list set out at Article 35(3) of the UK GDPR”.

This is what our Amendments 81 and 90 aim to achieve. I hope the Minister can agree to take these points on board and come back with amendments to achieve this.

The ICO also makes the case for future-proofing the way in which high-risk processing is regulated by making a provision in the Bill for the ICO to further designate high-risk processing activities with parliamentary approval. This would go further than the current drafting of Clause 20, which contains powers for the ICO to give examples of high-risk profiling, but only for guidance. Again, I hope that the Minister can agree to take these points on board and come back with suitable amendments.

Our Amendments 99, 100 and 102 specify the need for wider factors in the proposed risk assessment list to ensure that it underpins our equality laws. Again, this was an issue about which stakeholders have raised concerns. The TUC and the Institute for the Future of Work make the point that data protection impact assessments are a crucial basis for consultation with workers and trade unions about the use of technology at work, and this is even more important as the complexities of AI come on stream. The Public Law Project argues that, without rigorous risk and impact analysis, disproportionate and discriminatory processes could be carried out before the harm comes to light.

The Equality and Human Rights Commission argues that data protection impact assessments

“provide a key mechanism for ensuring equality impacts are assessed when public and private sector organisations embed AI systems in their operations”.

It specifically recommends that express references in Article 35(7) of GDPR to “legitimate interests” and

“the rights and freedoms of data subjects”,

as well as the consultation obligations in Article 35(2), should be retained. I hope that the Minister can agree to take these recommendations on board and come back with suitable amendments to ensure that our equalities legislation is protected.

Our Amendments 106 and 108 focus on the particular responsibilities of data controllers to handle health data with specific obligations. This is an issue that we know, from previous debates, is a major cause for concern among the general public, who would be alarmed if they thought that the protections were being weakened.

The BMA has raised concerns that Clauses 20 and 21 will water down our high standards of data governance, which are necessary when organisations are handling health data. As it says,

“Removing the requirement to conduct a thorough assessment of risks posed to health data is likely to lead to a less diligent approach to data protection for individuals”.


It also argues that removing the requirement for organisations to consult the ICO on high-risk processing is,

“a backward step from good governance … when organisations are processing large quantities of sensitive health data.

Our amendments aim to address these concerns by specifying that, with regard to specific cases, such as the handling of health data, prior consultation with the ICO should remain mandatory. I hope that the Minister will see the sense in these amendments and recognise that further action is needed in this Bill to maintain public trust in how health data is managed for individual care and systemwide scientific development.

I realise that we have covered a vast range of issues, but I want to touch briefly on those raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. She is right that, in particular, applications of risk assessments by public bodies should be maintained, and we agree with her that Article 35’s privacy-by-design requirements should be retained. She once again highlighted the downgrading of children’s rights in this Bill, whether by accident or intent, and we look forward to seeing the exchange of letters with the Minister on this. I hope that we will all be copied in and that the Minister will take on board the widespread view that we should have more engagement on this before Report, because there are so many outstanding issues to be resolved. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their amendments, and I look forward to receiving the letter from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, which I will respond to as quickly as I can. As everybody observed, this is a huge group, and it has been very difficult for everybody to do justice to all the points. I shall do my best, but these are points that go to the heart of the changes we are making. I am very happy to continue engaging on that basis, because we need plenty of time to review them—but, that said, off we go.

The changes the Government are making to the accountability obligations are intended to make the law clearer and less prescriptive. They will enable organisations to focus on areas that pose high risks to people resulting, the Government believe, in improved outcomes. The new provisions on assessments of high-risk processing are less prescriptive about the precise circumstances in which a risk assessment would be required, as we think organisations are best placed to judge whether a particular activity poses a high risk to individuals in the context of the situation.

However, the Government are still committed to high standards of data protection, and there are many similarities between our new risk assessment measures and the previous provisions. When an organisation is carrying out processing activities that are likely to pose a high risk to individuals, it will still be expected to document that processing, assess risks and identify mitigations. As before, no such document would be required where organisations are carrying out low-risk processing activities.

One of the main aims of the Bill is to remove some of the UK GDPR’s unnecessary compliance burdens. That is why organisations will be required to designate senior responsible individuals, keep records of processing and carry out the risk assessments above only when their activities pose high risks to individuals.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

The noble Viscount is very interestingly unpacking a risk-based approach to data protection under the Bill. Why are the Government not taking a risk-based approach to their AI regulation? After all, the AI Act approaches it in exactly that way.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

That is a very interesting question, but I am not sure that there is a read-across between the AI Act and our approach here. The fundamental starting point was that, although the provisions of the original GDPR are extremely important, the burdens of compliance were not proportionate to the results. The overall foundation of the DPDI is, while at least maintaining existing levels of protection, to reduce the burdens of demonstrating or complying with that regulation. That is the thrust of it—that is what we are trying to achieve—but noble Lords will have different views about how successful we are being at either of those. It is an attempt to make it easier to be safe and to comply with the regulations of the DPDI and the other Acts that govern data protection. That is where we are coming from and the thrust of what we are trying to achieve.

I note that, as we have previously discussed, children need particular protection when organisations are collecting and processing their personal data.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I did not interrupt before because I thought that the Minister would say more about the difference between high-risk and low-risk processing, but he is going on to talk about children. One of my points was about the request from the Information Commissioner—it is very unusual for him to intervene. He said that a list of high-risk processing activities should be set out in the Bill. I do not know whether the Minister was going to address that important point.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I will briefly address it now. Based on that letter, the Government’s view is to avoid prescription and I believe that the ICO’s view— I cannot speak for it—is generally the same, except for a few examples where prescription needs to be specified in the Bill. I will continue to engage with the ICO on where exactly to draw that line.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I can see that there is a difference of opinion, but it is unusual for a regulator to go into print with it. Not only that, but he has set it all out in an annexe. What discussion is taking place directly between the Minister and his team and the ICO? There seems to be quite a gulf between them. This is number 1 among his “areas of ongoing concern”.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I do not know whether it is usual or unusual for the regulator to engage in this way, but the Bill team engages with the Information Commissioner frequently and regularly, and, needless to say, it will continue to do so on this and other matters.

Children need particular protection when organisations are collecting and processing their personal data, because they may be less aware of the risks involved. If organisations process children’s personal data, they should think about the need to protect them from the outset and design their systems and processes with this in mind.

Before I turn to the substance of what the Bill does with the provisions on high-risk processing, I will deal with the first amendment in this group: Amendment 79. It would require data processors to consider data protection-by-design requirements in the same way that data controllers do, because there is a concern that controllers may not always be able to foresee what processors do with people’s data for services such as AI and cloud computing.

However, under the current legislation, it should not be for the processor to determine the nature or purposes of the processing activity, as it will enter a binding controller-processor agreement or contract to deliver a specific task. Processors also have specific duties under the UK GDPR to keep personal data safe and secure, which should mean that this amendment is not necessary.

I turn to the Clause 16 stand part notice, which seeks to remove Clause 16 from the Bill and reinstate Article 27, and Amendment 80, which seeks to do the same but just in respect of overseas data controllers, not processors. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that, even without the Article 27 representative requirement, controllers and processors will still have to maintain contact and co-operation with UK data subjects and the ICO to comply with the UK GDPR provisions. These include Articles 12 to 14, which, taken together, require controllers to provide their contact details in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language, particularly for any information addressed specifically to a child.

By offering firms a choice on whether to appoint a representative in the UK to help them with UK GDPR compliance and no longer mandating organisations to appoint a representative, we are allowing organisations to decide for themselves the best way to comply with the existing requirements for effective communication and co-operation. Removing the representative requirement will also reduce unnecessary burdens on non-UK controllers and processors while maintaining data subjects’ safeguards and rights. Any costs associated with appointing a representative are a burden on and a barrier to trade. Although the variety of packages made available by representative provider organisations differ, our assessments show that the cost of appointing representatives increases with the size of a firm. Furthermore, there are several jurisdictions that do not have a mandatory or equivalent representative requirement in their data protection law, including other countries in receipt of EU data adequacy decisions.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Nevertheless, does the Minister accept that quite a lot of countries have now begun the process of requiring representatives to be appointed? How does he account for that? Does he accept that what the Government are doing is placing the interests of business over those of data subjects in this context?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

No, I do not accept that at all. I would suggest that we are saying to businesses, “You must provide access to the ICO and data subjects in a way that is usable by all parties, but you must do so in the manner that makes the most sense to you”. That is a good example of going after outcomes but not insisting on any particular process or methodology in a one-size-fits-all way.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

The Minister mentioned the freedom to choose the best solution. Would it be possible for someone to be told that their contact was someone who spoke a different language to them? Do they have to be able to communicate properly with the data subjects in this country?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Yes—if the person they were supposed to communicate with did not speak English or was not available during reasonable hours, that would be in violation of the requirement.

I apologise if we briefly revisit some of our earlier discussion here, but Amendment 81 would reintroduce a list of high-risk processing activities drawn from Article 35 of the UK GDPR, with a view to helping data controllers comply with the new requirements around designating a senior responsible individual.

The Government have consulted closely with the ICO throughout the development of all the provisions in the Bill, and we welcome its feedback as it upholds data subjects’ rights. We recognise and respect that the ICO’s view on this issue is different to the Government’s, but the Government feel that adding a prescriptive list to the legislation would not be appropriate for the reasons we have discussed. However, as I say, we will continue to engage with it over the course of the passage of the Bill.

Some of the language in Article 35 of the UK GDPR is unclear and confusing, which is partly why we removed it in the first place. We believe organisations should have the ability to make a judgment of risk based on the specific nature, scale and context of their own processing activities. We do not need to provide prescriptive examples of high-risk processing on the face of legislation because any list could quickly become out of date. Instead, to help data controllers, Clause 20 requires the ICO to produce a document with examples of what the commissioner considers to be high-risk processing activities.

I turn to Clause 17 and Amendment 82. The changes we are making in the Bill will reduce prescription by removing the requirement to appoint a data protection officer in certain circumstances. Instead, public bodies and other organisations carrying out high-risk processing activities will have to designate a senior responsible individual to ensure that data protection risks are managed effectively within their organisations. That person will have flexibility about how they manage data protection risks. They might decide to delegate tasks to independent data protection experts or upskill existing staff members, but they will not be forced to appoint data protection officers if suitable alternatives are available.

The primary rationale for moving to a senior responsible individual model is to embed data protection at the heart of an organisation by ensuring that someone in senior management takes responsibility and accountability for it if the organisation is a public body or is carrying out high-risk processing. If organisations have already appointed data protection officers and want to keep an independent expert to advise them, they will be free to do so, providing that they also designate a senior manager to take overall accountability and provide sufficient support, including resources.

Amendment 83, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would require the senior responsible individual to specifically consider the risks to children when advising the controller on its responsibilities. As drafted, Clause 17 of the Bill requires the senior responsible individual to perform a number of tasks or, if they cannot do so themselves, to make sure that they are performed by another person. They include monitoring the controller’s compliance with the legislation, advising the controller of its obligations and organising relevant training for employees who carry out the processing of personal data. Where the organisation is processing children’s data, all these requirements will be relevant. The senior responsible individual will need to make sure that any guidance and training reflects the type of data being processed and any specific obligations the controller has in respect of that data. I hope that this goes some way to convincing the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

The Minister has not really explained the reason for the switch from the DPO to the new system. Is it another one of his “We don’t want a one-size-fits-all approach” arguments? What is the underlying rationale for it? Looking at compliance costs, which the Government seem to be very keen on, we will potentially have a whole new cadre of people who will need to be trained in compliance requirements.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

The data protection officer—I speak as a recovering data protection officer—is tasked with certain specific outcomes but does not necessarily have to be a senior person within the organisation. Indeed, in many cases, they can be an external adviser to the organisation. On the other hand, the senior responsible individual is a senior or board-level representative within the organisation and can take overall accountability for data privacy and data protection for that organisation. Once that accountable person is appointed, he or she can of course appoint a DPO or equivalent role or separate the role among other people as they see fit. That gives everybody the flexibility to meet the needs of privacy as they see fit, but not necessarily in a one-size-fits-all way. That is the philosophical approach.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Does the Minister accept that the SRI will have to cope with having at least a glimmering of an understanding of what will be a rather large Act?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Yes, the SRI will absolutely have to understand all the organisation’s obligations under this Act and indeed other Acts. As with any senior person in any organisation responsible for compliance, they will need to understand the laws that they are complying with.

Amendment 84, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is about the advice given to senior responsible individuals by the ICO. We believe that the commissioner should have full discretion to enforce data protection in an independent, flexible, risk-based and proportionate manner. The amendment would tie the hands of the regulator and force them to give binding advice and proactive assurance without full knowledge of the facts, undermining their regulatory enforcement role.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

The Minister has reached his 20 minutes. We nudged him at 15 minutes.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

Do I have to shut up?

[Lord Harlech (Con)]

My Lords, just for clarification, because a number of questions were raised, if the Committee feels that it would like to hear more from the Minister, it can. It is for the mood of the Committee to decide.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

As long as that applies to us on occasion as well.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I apologise for going over. I will try to be as quick as possible.

I turn now to the amendments on the new provisions on assessments of high-risk processing in Clause 20. Amendments 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98 and 101 seek to reinstate requirements in new Article 35 of the UK GDPR on data protection impact assessments, and, in some areas, make them even more onerous for public authorities. Amendment 90 seeks to reintroduce a list of high-risk processing activities drawn from new Article 35, with a view to help data controllers comply with the new requirements on carrying out assessments of high-risk processing.

Amendment 96, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, seeks to amend Clause 20, so that, where an internet service is likely to be accessed by children, the processing is automatically classed as high risk and the controller must do a children’s data protection impact assessment. Of course, I fully understand why the noble Baroness would like those measures to apply automatically to organisations processing children’s data, and particularly to internet services likely to be accessed by children. It is highly likely that many of the internet services that she is most concerned about will be undertaking high-risk activities, and they would therefore need to undertake a risk assessment.

Under the current provisions in Clause 20, organisations will still have to undertake risk assessments where their processing activities are likely to pose high risks to individuals, but they should have the ability to assess the level of risk based on the specific nature, scale and context of their own processing activities. Data controllers do not need to be directed by government or Parliament about every processing activity that will likely require a risk assessment, but the amendments would reintroduce a level of prescriptiveness that we were seeking to remove.

Clause 20 requires the ICO to publish a list of examples of the types of processing activities that it considers would pose high risks for the purposes of these provisions, which will help controllers to determine whether a risk assessment is needed. This will provide organisations with more contemporary and practical help than a fixed list of examples in primary legislation could. The ICO will be required to publish a document with a list of examples that it considers to be high-risk processing activities, and we fully expect the vulnerability age of data subjects to be a feature of that. The commissioner’s current guidance on data protection impact assessments already describes the use of the personal data of children or other vulnerable individuals for marketing purposes, profiling or offering internet services directly to children as examples of high-risk processing, although the Government cannot of course tell the ICO what to include in its new guidance.

Similarly, in relation to Amendments 99, 100 and 102 from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, it should not be necessary for this clause to specifically require organisations to consider risks associated with automated decision-making or obligations under equalities legislation. That is because the existing clause already requires controllers to consider any risks to individuals and to describe

“how the controller proposes to mitigate those risks”.

I am being asked to wrap up and so, in the interests of time, I shall write with my remaining comments. I have no doubt that noble Lords are sick of the sound of my voice by now.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I hope that no noble Lord expects me to pull all that together. However, I will mention a couple of things.

With this group, the Minister finally has said all the reasons why everything will be different and less. Those responsible for writing the Minister’s speeches should be more transparent about the Government’s intention, because “organisations are best placed to determine what is high-risk”—not the ICO, not Parliament, not existing data law. Organisations are also for themselves. They are “best placed to decide on their representation”, whether it is here or there and whether it speaks English or not, and they “get to decide whether they have a DPO or a senior responsible individual”. Those are three quotes from the Minister’s speech. If organisations are in charge of the bar of data protection and the definition of data protection, I do believe that this is a weakening of the data protection regime. He also said that organisations are responsible for the quality of their risk assessment. Those are four places in this group alone.

At the beginning, the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, talked about the trust of consumers and citizens. I do not think that this engenders trust. The architecture is so keen to get rid of ways of accessing rights that some organisations may have to have a DPO and a DPIA—a doubling rather than a reducing of burden. Very early on—it feels a long time ago—a number of noble Lords talked about the granular detail. I tried in my own contribution to show how very different it is in detail. So I ask the Minister to reflect on the assertion that you can take out the detail and have the same outcome. All the burden being removed is on one side of the equation, just as we enter into a world in which AI, which is built on people’s data, is coming in the other direction.

I will of course withdraw my amendment, but I believe that Clauses 20, 18 and the other clauses we just discussed are deregulation measures. That should be made clear from the Dispatch Box, and that is a choice that the House will have to make.

Before I sit down, I do want to recognise one thing, which is that the Minister said that he would work alongside us between now and Report; I thank him for that, and I accept that. I also noted that he said that it was a responsibility to take care of children by default. I agree with him; I would like to see that in the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, explained, his intention to oppose the question that Clause 19 stands part seeks to retain the status quo. As I read Section 62 of the Data Protection Act 2016, it obliges competent authorities to keep logs of their processing activities, whether they be for collection, alteration, consultation, disclosure, combination or the erasing of personal data. The primary purpose is for self-monitoring purposes, largely linked to disciplinary proceedings, as the noble Lord said, where an officer has become a suspect by virtue of inappropriately accessing PNC-held data.

Clause 19 removes the requirement for a competent authority to record a justification in the logs only when consulting or disclosing personal data. The Explanatory Note to the Bill explains this change as follows:

“It is … technologically challenging for systems to automatically record the justification without manual input”.


That is not a sufficiently strong reason for removing the requirement, not least because the remaining requirements of Section 62 of the Data Protection Act 2018 relating to the logs of consultation and disclosure activity will be retained and include the need to record the date and time and the identity of the person accessing the log. Presumably they will be able to be manually input, so why remove the one piece of data that might, in an investigation of abuse or misuse of the system, be useful in terms of evidence and self-incrimination? I do not understand the logic behind that at all.

I rather think the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has an important point. He has linked it to those who have been unfortunate enough to be AIDS sufferers, and I am sure that there are other people who have become victims where cases would be brought forward. I am not convinced that the clause should stand part, and we support the noble Lord in seeking its deletion.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

This is a mercifully short group on this occasion. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for the amendment, which seeks to remove Clause 19 from the Bill. Section 62 of the Data Protection Act requires law enforcement agencies to record when personal data has been accessed and why. Clause 19 does not remove the need for police to justify their processing; it simply removes the ineffective administrative requirement to record that justification in a log.

The justification entry was intended to help to monitor and detect unlawful access. However, the reality is that anyone accessing data unlawfully is very unlikely to record an honest justification, making this in practice an unreliable means of monitoring misconduct or unlawful processing. Records of when data was accessed and by whom can be automatically captured and will remain, thereby continuing to ensure accountability.

In addition, the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s view is that this change will not hamper any investigations to identify the unlawful processing of data. That is because it is unlikely that an individual accessing data unlawfully would enter an honest justification, so capturing this information is unlikely to be useful in any investigation into misconduct. The requirements to record the time, date and, as far as possible, the identity of the person accessing the data will remain, as will the obligation that there is lawful reason for the access, ensuring that accountability and protection for data subjects is maintained.

Police officers inform us that the current requirement places an unnecessary burden on them as they have to update the log manually. The Government estimate that the clause could save approximately 1.5 million policing hours, representing a saving in the region of £46.5 million per year.

I understand that the amendment relates to representations made by the National AIDS Trust concerning the level of protection for people’s HIV status. As I believe I said on Monday, the Government agree that the protection of people’s HIV status is vital. We have met the National AIDS Trust to discuss the best solutions to the problems it has raised. For these reasons, I hope the noble Lord will not oppose Clause 19 standing part.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his response, but he has left us tantalised about the outcome of his meeting. What is the solution that he has suggested? We are none the wiser as a result of his response.

This pudding has been well over-egged by the National Police Chiefs’ Council. Already, only certain senior officers and the data protection leads in police forces have access to this functionality. There will continue to be a legal requirement to record the time and date of access. They are required to follow a College of Policing code of practice. Is the Minister really saying that recording a justification for accessing personal data is such an onerous requirement that £46.5 million in police time will be saved as a result of this? Over what period? That sounds completely disproportionate.

The fact is that the recording of the justification, whether or not it is false and cannot be relied upon as evidence, is rather useful because it is evidence of police misconduct in relation to inappropriately accessing personal data. They are actually saying: “We did it for this purpose”, when it clearly was not. I am not at all surprised that the National AIDS Trust is worried about this. The College of Policing code of practice does not mention logging requirements in detail. It references them just once in relation to automated systems that process data.

I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, for what he had to say. It seems to me that we do not have any confidence on this side of the House that removing this requirement provides enough security that officers will be held to account if they share an individual’s special category data inappropriately. I do not think the Minister has really answered the concerns, but I beg leave to withdraw my objection to the clause standing part.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, will be relatively brief. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her amendments, to which I was very pleased to add my name. She raised an important point about the practice of web scrapers, who take data from a variety of sources to construct large language models without the knowledge or permission of web owners and data subjects. This is a huge issue that should have been a much more central focus of the Bill. Like the noble Baroness, I am sorry that the Government did not see fit to use the Bill to bring in some controls on this increasingly prevalent practice, because that would have been a more constructive use of our time than debating the many unnecessary changes that we have been debating so far.

As the noble Baroness said, large language models are built on capturing text, data and images from infinite sources without the permission of the original creator of the material. As she also said, it is making a mockery of our existing data rights. It raises issues around copyright and intellectual property, and around personal information that is provided for one purpose and commandeered by web scrapers for another. That process often happens in the shadows, whereby the owner of the information finds out only much later that their content has been repurposed.

What is worse is that the application of AI means that material provided in good faith can be distorted or corrupted by the bots scraping the internet. The current generation of LLMs are notorious for hallucinations in which good quality research or journalistic copy is misrepresented or misquoted in its new incarnation. There are also numerous examples of bias creeping into the LLM output, which includes personal data. As the noble Baroness rightly said, the casual scraping of children’s images and data is undermining the very essence of our existing data protection legislation.

It is welcome that the Information Commissioner has intervened on this. He argued that LLMs should be compliant with the Data Protection Act and should evidence how they are complying with their legal obligations. This includes individuals being able to exercise their information rights. Currently, we are a long way from that being a reality and a practice. This is about enforcement as much as giving guidance.

I am pleased that the noble Baroness tabled these amendments. They raise important issues about individuals giving prior permission for their data to be used unless there is an easily accessible opt-out mechanism. I would like to know what the Minister thinks about all this. Does he think that the current legislation is sufficient to regulate the rise of LLMs? If it is not, what are the Government doing to address the increasingly widespread concerns about the legitimacy of web scraping? Have the Government considered using the Bill to introduce additional powers to protect against the misuse of personal and creative output?

In the meantime, does the Minister accept the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron? As we have said, they are only a small part of a much bigger problem, but they are a helpful initiative to build in some basic protections in the use of personal data. This is a real challenge to the Government to step up to the mark and be seen to address these important issues. I hope the Minister will say that he is happy to work with the noble Baroness and others to take these issues forward. We would be doing a good service to data citizens around the country if we did so.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for tabling these amendments. I absolutely recognise their intent. I understand that they are motivated by a concern about invisible types of processing or repurposing of data when it may not be clear to people how their data is being used or how they can exercise their rights in respect of the data.

On the specific points raised by noble Lords about intellectual property rather than personal data, I note that, in their response to the AI White Paper consultation, the Government committed soon to provide a public update on their approach to AI and intellectual property, noting the importance of greater transparency in the use of copyrighted material to train models, as well as labelling and attribution of outputs.

Amendment 103 would amend the risk-assessment provisions in Clause 20 so that any assessment of high-risk processing would always include an assessment of how the data controller would comply with the purpose limitation principle and how any new processing activity would be designed so that people could exercise their rights in respect of the data at the time it was collected and at any subsequent occasion.

I respectfully submit that this amendment is not necessary. The existing provisions in Clause 20, on risk assessments, already require controllers to assess the potential risks their processing activities pose to individuals and to describe how those risks would be mitigated. This would clearly include any risk that the proposed processing activities would not comply with the data protection principles—for example, because they lacked transparency—and would make it impossible for people to exercise their rights.

Similarly, any assessment of risk would need to take account of any risks related to difficulties in complying with the purpose limitation principle—for example, if the organisation had no way of limiting who the data would be shared with as a result of the proposed processing activity.

According to draft ICO guidance on generative AI, the legitimate interests lawful ground under Article 6(1)(f) of the UK GDPR can be a valid lawful ground for training generative AI models on web-scrape data, but only when the model’s developer can ensure that they pass the three-part test—that is, they identify a legitimate interest, demonstrate that the processing is necessary for that purpose and demonstrate that the individual’s interests do not override the interest being pursued by the controller.

Controllers must consider the balancing test particularly carefully when they do not or cannot exercise meaningful control over the use of the model. The draft guidance further notes that it would be very difficult for data controllers to carry out their processing activities in reliance on the legitimate interests lawful ground if those considerations were not taken into account.

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Moved by

[Viscount Camrose]

110: Clause 25, page 44, line 18, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
“(3) In Schedule 7—(a) Part 1 contains minor and consequential amendments, and(b) Part 2 contains transitional provision.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in my name inserting amendments of section 119A of the Data Protection Act 2018 into Schedule 7 to the Bill.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, UK law enforcement authorities processing personal data for law enforcement purposes currently use internationally based companies for data processing services, including cloud storage. The use of international processors is critical for modern organisations and law enforcement is no exception. The use of these international processors enhances law enforcement capabilities and underpins day-to-day functions.

Transfers from a UK law enforcement authority to an international processor are currently permissible under the Data Protection Act 2018. However, there is currently no bespoke mechanism for these transfers in Part 3, which has led to confusion and ambiguity as to how law enforcement authorities should approach the use of such processors. The aim of this amendment is to provide legal certainty to law enforcement authorities in the UK, as well as transparency to the public, so that they can use internationally based processors with confidence.

I have therefore tabled Amendments 110, 117 to 120, 122 to 129 and 131 to provide a clear, bespoke mechanism in Part 3 of the Data Protection Act 2018 for UK law enforcement authorities to use when transferring data to their contracted processors based outside the UK. This will bring Part 3 into line with the UK GDPR while clarifying the current law, and give UK law enforcement authorities greater confidence when making such transfers to their contracted processors for law enforcement purposes.

We have amended Section 73—the general principles for transfer—to include a specific reference to processors, ensuring that international processors can be a recipient of data transfers. In doing so, we have ensured that the safeguards within Chapter 5 that UK law enforcement authorities routinely apply to transfers of data to their international operational equivalents are equally applicable to transfers to processors. We are keeping open all the transfer mechanisms so that data can be transferred on the basis of an applicable adequacy regulation, the appropriate safeguards or potentially the special circumstances.

We have further amended Section 75—the appropriate safeguards provision—to include a power for the ICO to create, specifically for Part 3, an international data transfer agreement, or IDTA, to complement the IDTA which it has already produced to facilitate transfers using Article 46(2)(d) of the UK GDPR.

In respect of transfers to processors, we have disapplied the duty to inform the Information Commissioner about international transfers made subject to appropriate safeguards. As such, a requirement would be out of line with equivalent provisions in the UK GDPR. There is no strong rationale for complying with the provision, given that processors are limited in what they can do with data because of the nature of their contracts and that it would be unlikely to contribute to the effective functioning of the ICO.

Likewise, we have also disapplied the duty to document such transfers and to provide the documentation to the commissioner on request. This is because extending these provisions would duplicate requirements that already exist elsewhere in legislation, including in Section 61, which has extensive recording requirements that enable full accountability to the ICO.

We have also disapplied the majority of Section 78. While it provides a useful function in the context of UK law enforcement authorities transferring to their international operational equivalents, in the law enforcement to international processor context it is not appropriate because processors cannot decide to transfer data onwards on their own volition. They can only do so under instruction from the UK law enforcement authority controller.

Instead, we have retained the general prohibition on any further transfers to processors based in a separate third country by requiring UK law enforcement authority controllers to make it a condition of a transfer to its processor that data is only to be further transferred in line with the terms of the contract with or authorisation given by the controller, and where the further transfer is permitted under Section 73. We have also taken the opportunity to tidy up Section 77 which governs transfers to non-relevant authorities, relevant international organisations or international processors.

In respect of Amendment 121, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on consultation with the Information Commissioner, I reassure the noble Lord that there is a memorandum of understanding between the Home Office and the Information Commissioner regarding international transfers approved by regulations, which sets out the role and responsibilities of the ICO. As part of this, the Home Office consults the Information Commissioner at various stages in the process. The commissioner, in turn, provides independent assurance and advice on the process followed and on the factors taken into consideration.

I understand that this amendment also relates to representations made by the National AIDS Trust. Perhaps the simplest thing is merely to reference my earlier remarks and commitment to engage with the National AIDS Trust ongoing. I beg to move that the government amendments which lead this group stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, very briefly, I thank the Minister for unpacking his amendments with some care, and for giving me the answer to my amendment before I spoke to it—that saves time.

Obviously, we all understand the importance of transfers of personal data between law enforcement authorities, but perhaps the crux of this, and the one question in our mind is, what is—perhaps the Minister could remind us—the process for making sure that the country that we are sending it to is data adequate? Amendment 121 was tabled as a way of probing that. It would be extremely useful if the Minister can answer that. This should apply to transfers between law enforcement authorities just as much as it does for other, more general transfers under Schedule 5. If the Minister can give me the answer, that would be useful, but if he does not have the answer to hand, I am very happy to suspend my curiosity until after Easter.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his amendment and his response, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bassam. The mechanism for monitoring international transfers was intended to be the subject for the next group in any case, and I would have hoped to give a full answer. I know we are all deeply disappointed that it looks as if we may not get to that group but, if the noble Lord is not willing to wait until we have that debate, I am very happy to write.