(6 years, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThank you, Mr Hanson. The two items on the register are, first, that I was a legal counsel at BT before my election as a Member of Parliament, where I was responsible for data protection law. Secondly, I had a relationship with a law firm called Kemp Little to maintain my practising certificate while I was a Member of Parliament.
My argument in support of amendment 160 is one that I have rehearsed in previous debates. In line with recommendations from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, today we benefit from an exemption under European treaties that say that national security is a member state competence and therefore not one with which the European Union can interfere. However, if the UK leaves the European Union, the European Commission reserves the right to review the entire data processing legislation, including that for intelligence services of a third country when seeking to make a decision on adequacy—as it has done with Canada. Where the amendment talks about adequacy, it would be helpful—
It does, but it has been reviewed by the European Commission. One of the concerns the Commission has had with Canada is its intelligence-sharing arrangements with the United States of America, which is why this amendment is so pertinent and why it is right to support the Government in seeking this adequacy decision. I make the point again that we will no longer benefit from the exemption if we leave the European Union and I hope that the Government keep that in mind.
Before I start, I want to clarify what the hon. Gentleman has just said about adequacy decisions. Canada does have an adequacy decision from the EU for transfers to commercial organisations that are subject to the Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. I am not sure that security services are covered in that adequacy decision, but it may be that we will get assistance elsewhere.
As the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill is aware, amendments 159, 160 and new clause 14 were proposed by a campaigning organisation called Reprieve in its recent briefing on the Bill. They relate to concerns about the sharing of personal data with the US and seek to apply the data sharing protections designed specifically for law enforcement data processing, provided for in part 3 of the Bill, to processing by the intelligence services, provided for in part 4. That is, they are seeking to transpose all the law enforcement measures into the security services. However, such safeguards are clearly not designed for, and do not provide, an appropriate or proportionate basis for the unique nature of intelligence services processing, which we are clear is outside the scope of EU law.
Before I get into the detail of these amendments, it is important to put on record that the international transfer of personal data is vital to the intelligence services’ ability to counter threats to national security. Provision of data to international partners bolsters their ability to counter threats to their security and that of the UK. In a globalised world, threats are not necessarily contained within one country, and the UK cannot work in isolation. As terrorists do not view national borders as a limit to their activities, the intelligence services must be in a position to operate across borders and share information quickly—for example, about the nature of the threat that an individual poses—to protect the UK.
In the vast majority of cases, intelligence sharing takes place with countries with which the intelligence services have long-standing and well-established relationships. In all cases, however, the intelligence services apply robust necessity and proportionality tests before sharing any information. The inherent risk of sharing information must be balanced against the risk to national security of not sharing such information.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIf I understand the hon. Lady’s argument correctly, she has presented the judicial commissioners as permitting, for example, warrant to be granted. Having sat through the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill and then the Public Bill Committee, I can tell her that I am afraid that is not how that Act works. What happens is that the Secretary of State grants the warrant and then that decision is overseen by the judicial commissioner. I will come on to the difference between the Investigatory Powers Act and this Bill in due course, because the terminology used draws on that in the Investigatory Powers Act, but that Act is very different from this Bill, which is about the processing of data, in its engagement with people and their rights.
Will the Minister give way on that point?
If I may, I will make some progress. Along with existing provisions in section 28 of the 1998 Act, clause 27 provides for a certificate signed by a Minister of the Crown certifying that exemption from specified data protection requirements is required for the purposes of safeguarding national security. There are equivalent provisions in parts 3 and 4 of the Bill. Such a certificate is conclusive evidence of that fact, for example in any legal proceedings. That is the point about the certificates—they only come into play if the exemption or restriction is actually applied.
The certificate provides evidence that the exemption or restriction is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security. It therefore has relevance only in the event that, first, the exemption or restriction is applied to the data in question and, secondly, there is a need to rely on the certificate as conclusive evidence in proceedings to establish that the exemption or restriction is required for the statutory purpose.
I will come on, if I may, to the judicial review test. I have quite a lot about that.
I am grateful to have more time for my officials to scribble a response.
I am happy to help the Minister. She keeps referring to the framework that has been in place for the last 30 years. That has been a time when we have been a member of the European Union. In reviewing this situation, the House of Lords European Union Committee made the point that under the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, there is absolute jurisdiction for national member states to take decisions on national security. That is not an EU area of jurisdiction. The treaty says that we are protected as a member of the EU, but if we leave the European Union we are not protected by that exemption under the treaty. That is why, for third countries, the European Commission looks at the whole legislative framework. Do we not risk the adequacy decision by taking this approach? In the future, we will not have the answer of saying that it is an issue of exemption from the European Commission.
National security must always be a matter for any member state in the EU, but also once we leave the EU. Sorry, I may have misunderstood the hon. Gentleman, but how we deal with national security is, of course, a matter for the state.
I am happy to clarify for the Minister. The status quo is that the European Union will not look at areas of national security because they are the jurisdiction of member states. When we leave the European Union, the Commission will look at the entirety of legislation around data protection and privacy rights, because there are no exemptions that it needs to take into account. The noble Lords made the point that our
“data protection standards would be assessed without the benefit of the protection afforded by the national security exemption”
under the treaty. Do we not risk our adequacy by taking these exemptions?
No, because those who have drafted the Bill have sought, at all times, to comply with the law enforcement directive and with the modernised, draft Council of Europe convention 108. The Bill very much meets those standards, not just on law enforcement but across parts 3 and 4.
I rise to support the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Heeley. I had the pleasure of cross-examining Baroness Williams of Trafford, who is the Minister responsible for some of these issues, on the Select Committee on Science and Technology in our inquiry on the biometric strategy and why there has been such a delay in the Government publishing that document. We had grave concerns about the delay in the strategy, but also about the way in which IT systems and servers in different forces act in different ways, which make things potentially very difficult.
The amendments would add safeguards to legitimate purposes—to prevent them from going too far. They should be welcomed by the Government and included in the Bill. There are a number of situations where, in this developing area of technology, which could be very useful to us as a country, as my hon. Friends have said, we need to ensure that the appropriate safeguards are in place. On facial recognition, we know from information received by the Science and Technology Committee that there is too high a number of facial records on the police national database and other law enforcement databases, when there is no legitimate reason for them to be there. We understand that it is difficult to delete them, but that is, with respect, not a good enough answer.
The Select Committee also heard—I think I mentioned this in an earlier sitting—that we have to be careful about the data that the Government hold. The majority of the adult population already has their facial data on Government databases, in the form of passport and driving licence imagery. When we start talking about the exemptions to being able to share data between different Government functions and law enforcement functions, and the exemptions on top of that for the ability to use those things, we just need to be careful that it does not get ahead of us. I know it is difficult to legislate perfectly for the future, but these safeguards would help to make it a safer place.
I will mention briefly the IMSI-catchers, because that covers my constituency of Bristol North West. It was the Bristol Cable, a local media co-operative of which I am a proud member—I pay £1 a month, so I declare an interest—that uncovered some of the issues around IMSI-catchers with bulk collection of information. It is really important that when we are having debates, as we have had with algorithms and artificial intelligence, we recognise that human intervention and the understanding of some of these systems is sometimes difficult. There are very few people who understand how algorithms actually work or how the systems actually work. As they become more advanced and learn and make decisions by themselves, the idea of human intervention or a human understanding of that is increasingly difficult.
In a situation where human resource is extremely stretched, such as in the police service, the tendency will understandably be to rely on the decisions of the systems within the frameworks that are provided, because there is not time to do full human intervention properly. That is why the safeguards are so important—to prevent things getting ahead of us. I hope the Government support the amendments, which I think are perfectly sensible.
I have just a small correction. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley said in error that the Home Office were holding on to the photographs. It is not the Home Office. It is individual police forces that hold that.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesAbsolutely. The exemption will not be enacted on the basis of nationality. It is enacted on a case-by-case basis to uphold the integrity of the immigration system. There will be no question of EU nationals being in any way targeted by it. Indeed, we know the great effect that EU nationals and other people from other countries have had in this country, and we certainly would not be looking to target them on the basis of nationality.
Is it not right to say that EU citizens will be part of the immigration system? They will be immigrants with immigration rights as part of the Brexit process. These rules could therefore apply to them, could they not? Secondly—
I will answer the first one—yes. The hon. Gentleman asked whether EU citizens would be targeted. Once we leave the European Union, we will have our own immigration policy. There will clearly be no distinction between EU and non-EU, because everyone will be outside of the UK, if I may put it that way, very inelegantly.
But they would still be subject to the right to exempt them from their data protection rights. I welcome the Minister’s comments on the time-limited nature of the intention of using the rules, but can she point me to the section of the Bill that defines that time limit, because I am struggling to find it?
If I may, I will come back to that point in a moment. In the case of subject access requests, each request would need to be considered on its own merits. For example, we could not limit the information given to visa applicants on how their personal data would be processed as part of that application. Rather, the restrictions would be applied only where there was a real likelihood of prejudice to immigration controls as a result of disclosing the information concerned.
I would not make that assumption. The vast majority of immigration cases are dealt with in a civil context.
No, forgive me. I have been very generous with interventions. I am going to make some progress, and then no doubt others will intervene on me in due course.
I turn to the charge that the exemption has no basis in EU law. Article 23 of the GDPR allows member states to restrict the application of certain provisions of the regulation to safeguard important objectives of general public interest. Immigration control constitutes one such objective. We see immigration as an important matter of public interest, and the GDPR allows member states to exempt rights where that is the case. We are not alone in our belief that immigration is an important matter of general public interest. The Irish Government clearly stated that in their own Data Protection Bill. Clause 54 of the Irish Bill gives powers to make regulations restricting certain rights and obligations under the GDPR to safeguard important objectives of general public interest. The list of such objectives in the Bill includes matter relating to immigration.
Opposition Members have talked about their concerns about the fact that these provisions may be covered by paragraph 2 of the schedule. I want to reflect on the outcome of the debate on this provision in the House of Lords, which contains many noble Lords who are extremely learned in the law, have much experience of campaigning on immigration rights and so on. We listened very carefully to the concerns raised at Lords Committee stage, and as a result the Government tabled amendments at Lords Report stage to narrow the scope of the exemption so that it no longer covers the right to rectification and data portability. In response to those amendments, Lord Kennedy of Southwark said:
“The amendments tabled by the Government provide important clarification on what is exempt, limit the power in Bill and seek to address the concerns highlighted during the previous debate and today…I am happy to support their amendments.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 13 December 2017; Vol. 787, c. 1590.]
Furthermore, in a Division on a Liberal Democrat amendment to strike out the immigration exemption, the official Opposition abstained. I wonder what has changed between their abstaining on that amendment and accepting that the Government’s amendments were sufficient, and today. Nothing has changed since the Bill left the Lords, so perhaps the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill can help us with why their position has changed.
I hope I have been able to satisfy the Committee that this provision is necessary and important.