Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Torsten Bell and Kirsty Blackman

Committee stage
Thursday 11th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Torsten Bell]

I shall take that up directly with the new Economic Secretary to the Treasury, who I am sure will talk to her colleagues in the Department for Education. I can offer the hon. Member some entirely anecdotal optimism on that issue. Whenever I now do school events in Swansea, I am seeing very high levels of financial engagement. After I have given a very worthy speech, most of the questions are not about how to reduce inequality but instead are about personal financial advice. I think the youth of today are all over it—that is my lived experience.

I have mentioned small pots and value for money. I want to flag two other areas. Dashboards have been mentioned, and they are a very large part of how we provide support. The default pensions solutions are crucial to reducing complexity, and that is probably the biggest measure in the Bill. The need to provide more advice or guidance for people to access their defined-contribution pots is reduced significantly because of the existence of default solutions. We definitely still want people to have access to advice and the ability to opt out of those defaults, but default solutions help significantly. That is why the communication of those default pension solutions, which we discussed quite extensively, is so important for people. That is why that is in the Bill.

We have touched on making more support available. We have universal access for people of any age to free impartial support through MoneyHelper—that is what the Money and Pensions Service is providing—and we have a specific focus on support for over-50s in Pension Wise. Several hon. Members have said, absolutely rightly, that access to financial advice fell in the aftermath of the reforms over a decade ago, but there is some better news on Pension Wise. The 2024 Financial Lives survey showed that of those who accessed a defined-contribution pot within the last four years, 40% had accessed Pension Wise. I think that is probably more than most hon. Members in this debate would expect, though it may not be enough. However, those people had used Pension Wise when heading towards access; they had not used it as a mid-life MOT product, which is a different thing. That 40% was up from 34% in 2020, so some things have gone in the right direction. I am gently noting that, not claiming any credit for it because it predates the election. There is a lot of overlap between what those systems of advice are providing and the measures in new clause 1.

Regarding new clause 40, I absolutely agree on how we think about under-saved groups. The groups identified in the new clause are more or less the same groups of people experiencing financial wellbeing challenges whom MaPS targets, so that is a point of consensus, but I am absolutely open to suggestions of what more we can do to make sure that we are tackling that issue. The Pensions Commission is considering the wider question of adequacy, which is why we are looking at not just average adequacy but the fairness of the system.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

Will the Minister give a commitment that the commission will specifically look at groups that are less likely to have a sufficient pension, rather than just looking at an average and increasing that average?

[Torsten Bell]

I can absolutely give that guarantee, because that is in the terms of reference of the Pensions Commission. I will come back to the wider question of the commission in one second. I will not go into detail, but targeted support is a large part of providing more guidance, and we expect the roll-out of that early next year. There is more coming in that space; we are not relying solely on MaPS.

How should we think about the interaction of dashboards and bigger DC pots? At the moment, for lots of people entering their retirement, their DC pot may be a smaller part of their overall pension income, but as we move forward, it will become the large majority of their income. That will be very visible because of dashboards. One of the reasons MaPS has been reluctant —although I do not want to say “reluctant”—to promise to deliver the kind of automatic enrolment that is being discussed by the Committee is that a lot of planning work is under way to make sure that when dashboards come online, MaPS is ready and set up to deal with the significant increase in demand for help and in engagement that may come from that. The experience of some pension schemes in Australia is that as pension pots become bigger, there is much more demand for support and guidance. We should expect that demand to grow in the years ahead with or without dashboards, but definitely with dashboards and the other measures together.

[Kirsty Blackman]

When dashboards increase engagement, as we all expect they will, will the Minister report back to the House, or encourage someone to report back to the House, on how much engagement has increased by, so that we all have an awareness of it, rather than it being in stats kept in the background that we do not know about?

[Torsten Bell]

Absolutely. I think we will want to look at the impact across a range of measures of engagement. Do dashboards help consolidation of pots? Do they encourage people to save more? We also need to be aware of riskier behaviours that dashboards could trigger. We are currently engaged in significant user testing of the system to make sure that we have done what we can to make sure that when people have visibility of their pension pots, they do not adopt behaviours that we do not want.

On the question about the Pensions Commission from the angle of the advice and guidance sector, it is an independent commission so I cannot speak for it. However, I think the commission will have heard the focus of that question, and the length of this debate in Committee.

Turning to the specific question put by the hon. Member for Horsham on what he said was the purpose of this group of new clauses, I assure him that my mind has been entirely focused by him on this issue, and that I will continue to talk to MaPS about what further lessons there are to learn.

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[Kirsty Blackman]

My understanding is that new clause 2 calls for a report. It addresses transparency. It is all well and good that stuff on competition regulations is published—I have no idea where it is published. We are asking for a report to the House, which we would all be able to access. I did not write the new clause, but it would be helpful if the Minister agreed to transparency and to review this in good time so that we can make better decisions on future legislation.

[Torsten Bell]

The first thing to say is that this is focused on scale. We appreciate that the Bill would lead to major changes to the pensions market—the hon. Member for Torbay is absolutely right—and we want to understand and monitor the consolidation and scale process over the coming years. To state the obvious, market changes such the scale measures we are talking about take time, and many of the measures in the Bill will not even be implemented within the 12 months. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not push the amendment to a vote.

I agree on the wider point about the Bill as a whole and the need for strong monitoring and evaluation. I would probably take a slightly different approach from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. The Bill contains a large number of measures, and the right way to monitor their implementation will be different for different parts of the Bill. When it comes to the questions of scale, which are the focus of this amendment, the monitoring—[Interruption.] That is not the response I was looking for. The monitoring is slightly more visible because we are talking about the number of workplace schemes, or at least workplace defaults, that exist.

Let me lay out a bit of what we have in place to monitor. We will be able to monitor scale, charges and, because of the interaction with the value for money regime, returns and asset allocation. Lots of the key success metrics that are meant to come with the scale changes, as well as the delivery of scale itself, will be visible. My honest view is that it is on all of us—obviously, it is particularly on the Government—to pay attention to that as we go.

On the wider question of whether we will consider further, I have already committed to do that and to come back and reflect on Report on how we do that. I put on the record my view that that is a reasonable thing to do, and I will do it, but we need to think about it differently for different parts of the Bill.

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[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his clarification, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

[Kirsty Blackman]

On a point of order, Ms Lewell, I am aware that I cannot make a speech at this point, but will the Minister write to me on whether he is planning to do anything about pre-1997 indexation of the PPF and FAS? If he writes to me about that, I will be happy not to push new clause 18 to a vote.

[Torsten Bell]

I suspect that I have already written to the hon. Lady, because she has raised some constituency cases with me, but she can receive another one of those letters.

New Clause 33

Report of defined benefit schemes impact on productivity

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on the impact on corporate productivity of defined benefit schemes.

(2) The report must include an assessment of—

(a) investment strategies of defined benefit funds,

(b) the returns on investment of defined benefit funds, and

(c) the impact of investment strategies and returns on productivity.

(3) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.”—(Mark Garnier.)

This new clause would require the Government to commission a report on the impact on corporate productivity of defined benefit schemes.

Brought up, and read the First time.

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[Torsten Bell]

We have now had a few discussions about the case for monitoring and evaluating the Bill and what is going on in the pension landscape more generally. I do not want to repeat everything I have said previously, so I will just address whether this is the right approach or whether it should be done through the Pensions Commission that is under way and looking at most of these issues. My view is that the Pensions Commission is focused on the headline issues that the hon. Member for Wyre Forest has just mentioned. I do not want to confuse that work by having another process consider the same issues at the same time. It is also valuable to have the independence of the commission when doing that.

My main message is that we do not have to wait long, because the Pensions Commission will report in 2027, which is earlier than the five years that we would have to wait for the Secretary of State’s inevitably excellent report as a result of this new clause. We should have faith in Baroness Drake, Ian Cheshire and Nick Pearce to deliver that.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I am not as au fait with the terms of reference of the review as the Minister. Is it possible that it will say, “We recommend that another review is undertaken in five, 10 or 15 years?” Will it look at whether the review is all we need at this point in time or whether we will need another review in future?

[Torsten Bell]

I do not want to speak for the commissioners because that would be to prejudge their work. I can tell the hon. Lady what the terms of reference require and they definitely rule out long-grassing in that they require actual recommendations for change to deliver a fair, adequate and sustainable pension system. It would certainly be open to them to say, “Do these things, and we also think that monitoring should be x and y.” That would be for them to say, and as it is an independent commission, I do not want to prejudge that. It definitely cannot be just that; it would have to include recommendations for change.

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[Kirsty Blackman]

I asked questions earlier about the consultation processes that DWP and the FCA are undertaking and about ensuring consistency in that consultation. This is a similar issue. I like the way that the new clause has been written to ensure that there are protocols so that everybody knows what side of the line they fall on. That can be a particular issue for organisations that have responsibility for both trust-based and contract-based pensions. They may be trying to scale or make efficiencies through investing or having similar default products, even though we are talking about two different types of scheme.

It would be helpful if the Government would commit to ensuring that, where those issues arise, and people are having conversations with the FCA and the Pensions Regulator about what side of the divide they fall on, the Government are keeping a watching brief. If there is regular confusion, the Government should ensure that they clarify the guidance so that people know which side they fall on. Those schemes that are either hybrid or have some sort of umbrella that encapsulates both trust-based and contract-based regulation will then know which side they fall on. They will be able to comply with both regulators, if that is the requirement, or with one of them.

As we said earlier, it is incredibly important that scheme members—current pensioners and prospective pensioners—get an excellent level of service. The vast majority of people do not know, and do not care, whether they are in a trust-based or contract-based pension scheme; all they want is to get as good a pension as possible when they hit retirement. Anything that the Minister can do to ensure that companies have a huge amount of clarity about where they fall, and that scheme members get the best outcomes when they hit retirement, would be helpful.

[Torsten Bell]

We all agree that we want providers and, most importantly, consumers to operate in this landscape as easily as possible. Particularly in the case of consumers, we do not want them to know the difference between the two. I have been very clear with both regulators that that is the objective, and I have been very clear with both Departments that oversee them that that is what we are doing.

Delivering that in practice requires thinking about how we legislate, and that is what we have done with the Bill to make sure that we are providing exactly the same outcomes through both markets. It is about Government providing clarity to regulators—we are absolutely providing that—and then about how the regulators themselves behave.

I am very alive to the issue that is being raised. There is some good news about the existing arrangements, which need to continue, because they are examples of effective co-ordination between the FCA and TPR. I have seen that through joint working groups, consultations, shared strategies and guidance, and regular joint engagement with stakeholders. The value for money measures in the Bill are probably the most high-profile recent experience of entirely joint working between the FCA, TPR and DWP.

The wider collaboration is underpinned by what is called the joint regulatory strategy and a formal memorandum of understanding that sets out how the two regulators should co-operate, share information and manage areas of overlap. I think that that basically achieves the objectives that the hon. Member for Wyre Forest set out, even if it is provided not by the Secretary of State but by a memorandum of understanding between the two organisations. I can absolutely reassure him and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North that I am very focused on this issue.

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[Torsten Bell]

I am grateful for this new clause, which was tabled by one of my neighbours in south Wales, the hon. Member for Caerfyrddin (Ann Davies). It is obviously an important issue for many ex-mineworkers and for families across Great Britain. It is basically straightforward: I want to reassure the Committee that the Government have been discussing the transfer with the scheme trustees for many months. Those discussions are actively under way. We expect to be able to make an announcement about the way forward in reasonably short order.

I am glad that the new clause will not be pushed to a vote—because if anything, it would risk slowing down the implementation of an agreed outcome—and I totally appreciate the point that the hon. Member for Aberdeen North has made. Any proposal for change will need to be consulted on with the scheme’s trustees on behalf of their members, but that will be coming forward. I hope that provides the Committee with the reassurance it is looking for.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I appreciate the reassurances that the Minister has given me. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 46

Trustees: independence

“(1) The Pensions Act 1995 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 29 (Persons disqualified for being trustees), after subsection (d) insert—

‘(da) he has a personal or financial interest in the pension scheme, except for member nominated trustees.’”—(John Milne.)

This new clause makes pension scheme trustees truly independent of the sponsoring companies so that they can protect scheme members’ interests without any conflict of interest.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[John Milne]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would have the effect of making pension scheme trustees truly independent of the sponsoring companies so that they can protect scheme members’ interests without any conflict of interest. Trustees should act solely in the best interests of their members, not those of the sponsoring employer.

Currently, conflicts of interest can arise where company-appointed trustees also have personal or financial ties to the scheme sponsor. The new clause seeks to strengthen independence, excluding conflicting trustees while still allowing member-nominated trustees. Members deserve trustees who are free to challenge employers and prioritise pensions over corporate interests. Having strong, independent trustees means stronger protection for savers’ retirement security.

Pension Schemes Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Torsten Bell and Kirsty Blackman

Committee stage
Thursday 11th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 268, in clause 58, page 67, line 34, leave out subsection (a) and insert—

“(a) that, as at the date of the application, the financial position of the ceding scheme is—

(i) not strong enough to enable the trustees to arrange an insurer buy-out, or

(ii) not affordable for the next 36 months following an assessment, certified by the scheme actuary, of all funding options to become strong enough;”.

This amendment expands the onboarding condition to give an alternative to a single day snapshot of a scheme’s funding position.

The Bill tests a scheme’s funding position on a single snapshot day. We feel that is too rigid and could unfairly exclude schemes. A scheme might just miss the mark on that day, even though funding prospects over the next three years are realistic and affordable. The amendment would allow actuaries to certify affordability over a 36-month horizon, providing a fairer and more flexible test. It would protect members by ensuring viable schemes are not shut out, while still requiring strong actuarial oversight. That is especially important in an environment where economic conditions and markets can move significantly and take scheme funding positions with them.

Schemes have not always enjoyed the present funding levels, and today’s surplus is tomorrow’s deficit. We should have regard to that fact and approach the legislation in a manner that reflects it. In the assessment over a longer time period, the trustees would also be able to consider and respond to the situation in relation to dividends, changing investment strategies and expected scheme contributions, among other key factors. In summary, the purpose of the amendment is not to block the superfund option for schemes, but rather to ensure that the legislative framework is set squarely on the basis of protecting DB scheme member benefits and the security and soundness of the pensions system.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

We have discussed other parts of the regime—for example, new entrants and their ability to scale up, and the longer-term prospects for that—which were perhaps a bit more flexible than this part. Although I am not entirely convinced that the exact wording of the amendment provides the best way to go about it, if the Minister gives some reassurance and a commitment to consider the possibility of not just taking a snapshot day, and to look at the potential ability to scale up or grow, I would be more comfortable with the legislation than I am currently.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Members for Torbay and for Horsham for the amendment. It is sensible to discuss one of the key questions in the design of superfunds policy. My main reassurance is that this exact option, or options in this space, were part of the extensive consultation on superfunds. That is important to understand. They were in the consultation, and a wide range of views were expressed in the responses, many of them pointing to the clear practical difficulties of providing the legislative test to assess whether a scheme could afford an insurance buy-out in future, as opposed to its exact position at the time of the assessment.

For reasons I will come on to, that does not mean that it is not important to look ahead to whether a scheme is likely to be able to buy out in the future, but we have taken the view, following the consultation, that that should not be the test on the face of the Bill. That is because, when it comes to projections looking ahead, both the cost of an insurance buy-out and the scheme funding levels can fluctuate significantly. Forecasts ask for more judgment to be exercised compared with an assessment of what the buy-out market is offering at the time it is carried out. It is about the current funding levels. Clause 58 already states that schemes can transfer a superfund only when they are currently unable to secure members’ benefits with an insurer.

I will offer two elements of reassurance to the hon. Member for Horsham. First, we need to be clear about the role of the legislation, which is as I just set out, and the role of the trustees, who are the ones who would approve a transfer to a superfund. Trustees will absolutely be looking ahead and thinking about the kinds of issue that the hon. Member highlighted. Do they wish to see a superfund transfer or a buy-out transfer in future? Is it plausible that they would get one? They will be relying on the guidance of the TPR and the clear intent in the legislation, which is that superfunds will provide an additional option, not replace the core approach of most defined-benefit schemes’ goal, which is an insurance buy-out. I therefore do not support putting the proposed test on the face of the Bill. Also, as the hon. Member for Aberdeen North pointed out, there are issues with the drafting of the amendment, which requires trustees in legislation to do what they will, in practice, be doing anyway.

The second point of reassurance I can offer is that the Bill sets out a power to substitute another condition to replace this condition, if needed. We will consult the industry to assess what, if any, further requirements might be added to satisfy members before the regime comes into effect. I hope that on that basis, the hon. Member will be happy to withdraw his amendment.

[John Milne]

I thank the Minister for his reassurance, but urge him to keep this in mind. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I beg to move amendment 277, in clause 58, page 67, line 34, leave out from “application” to end of line 36 and insert

“the Trustees agree, after due consideration, that it is the best option for their fund’s members;”.

This amendment would prevent a fund from having to carry out an insurance buy-out option.

The amendment asks a reasonable question about the duties of the trustees, and the possibility that they will be overwritten by the legislation and taken away from trustees. I would appreciate some reassurance from the Minister on whether the trustees will still have a duty to act in the best interests of scheme members once the legislation goes through, and whether the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Tamworth would make things better for trustees, with them better able to act in the best interests of pension scheme members.

[Torsten Bell]

I will answer the hon. Lady’s question directly, and then come to the amendment more broadly. The best way to think about this amendment is that it asks us to remove one of the core framings of the superfund regime, which is that it is not replacing buy-out, where that is available, to trustees. The amendment enables trustees to do what they like, including moving to a superfund even if they could have moved to an insurance buy-out. That is not the policy intention of this Government, nor was it the policy intention of the previous Government. It also does not align with most of the responses to the consultation.

As I said earlier, the job of the legislation is to provide clarity regarding the overall framework, which is that superfunds exist for those schemes that are not able to afford an insurance buy-out. Within that, it is for trustees to make wider judgments, as they do all the time. Directly to the hon. Lady’s question, trustees’ duties to take the decisions that deliver the best outcomes for their members, as a short hand, is totally unaffected by this. This is just a constraint on what the superfund regime is there for, and not because we do not want to see arbitrage between an insurance regulatory regime and a superfund’s regulatory regime. I hope that provides some clarity.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 215, in clause 58, page 68, line 1, at beginning insert

“that it is reasonable to expect”.

This amendment adjusts the onboarding condition in relation to the capital adequacy threshold. The Regulator now needs to be satisfied, as at the time it decides the application, that it is reasonable to expect that the threshold will be met immediately following the superfund transfer (rather than that the threshold definitely will be met at that time).

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[Torsten Bell]

This is an important clause whose role is to set out the criteria for the Pensions Regulator to approve each transfer to a superfund, having dealt with the authorisation of superfunds separately. Those include that the superfund has been authorised by the regulator and that the ceding employer scheme has no active members; we are talking about closed defined-benefit schemes.

The clause also sets out onboarding conditions, which are designed to ensure that members’ benefits are well protected. Superfunds are secure, but not as secure as an insurance buy-out. Schemes with sufficient funds to buy out benefits with an insurer may therefore not enter a superfund. Other onboarding conditions require that the trustees of the ceding scheme make the assessment in the interests of scheme members that the transfer to a superfund will make it more likely that the members’ benefits will be paid in full, and that the capital adequacy threshold is met—which is the main answer to the earlier question from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. Those and other measures, alongside a known and up-front capital buffer, will ensure that there is a very high probability that members’ benefits will be paid.

Affirmative regulation-making powers will allow greater specificity about the onboarding conditions, including the financial metrics of the capital adequacy threshold and the information that must be provided to the regulator to satisfy the onboarding conditions. I commend clause 58 to the Committee.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have a quick question, which may also be relevant to other clauses that we discussed earlier, but which I did not bring up at that point. It is about the consistency of consultations and regulations from the Department for Work and Pensions and the Financial Conduct Authority, particularly when consultations are taking place and there are scheme members and prospective pensioners who expect their pension to work in the same way as others and do not have a clue what the arrangements are—for example, whether it is regulated by the FCA or anyone else. Can we still expect parity of service and clarity?

I am aware that the different structures may require slightly different regulations. I want reassurance from the Minister on ensuring that scheme members see a consistent level of service that makes sense in the regulatory frameworks. I also want reassurance that larger organisations running different types of scheme can easily work within and respond to both types of consultation because there is enough consistency applicable across different regulatory mechanisms, within the constraints of the law and depending on the scheme type. I have been asked by insurance and pension industry professionals to raise that with the Minister, and any reassurance that he can give would be appreciated.

[Torsten Bell]

The first reassurance I can give is that this part of the Bill requires only one regulatory framework, because it all sits within the Pensions Regulator and within the defined benefit part of the landscape, as I am aware the hon. Member for Aberdeen North knows.

On the hon. Member’s wider point, which is relevant to many parts of the Bill, I absolutely agree and will offer a two-part reassurance—we will also come to a new clause later that directly gets at this issue. I entirely agree that having two regulatory regimes is no excuse for having different consumer experiences across the two halves of the regime. To address that, I have made sure that the Bill supports the same outcomes, and have stress tested that considerably, but also made it clear that, as a Government policy agenda, our goal is that that should be the case, full stop, including in some areas where it has not been historically. That is absolutely what we need to keep working towards. We should all have that in our heads.

When it comes to the regulations, it is also our clear intention that the FCA and TPR should be working very closely together, as we discussed with the value for money regulations, for example.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 58, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 59

Special provision for certain schemes coming out of assessment period

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Kirsty Blackman]

I agree with the point that the Liberal Democrat spokesperson just made. The clauses represent good decisions both for those who work in the industry and for members of the public—people paying into pension schemes and hoping to get an adequate pension when they retire.

I want to comment on a few things included in the clauses. The Work and Pensions Committee report that was published a couple of years ago asked for several of the changes that are being made here, and I appreciate that the Government are now moving towards making a significant number of them in what is the most major piece of pensions legislation we have seen in years. I do appreciate the changes being made.

I am incredibly supportive of the changes to the terminal illness criteria, which create consistency with other Government legislation on the definition of terminal illness. As the Minister said, if this allows more people to access payments earlier and can improve their quality of life when they know how very short their remaining time is, it will be incredibly helpful. It will enable those individuals to access additional payments and funding more easily and quickly, so that they can make the most of the short time they have left. I appreciate that change.

The pensions dashboard changes are sensible, because people will be able to see the widest possible range of things when they log into the dashboard. It will do what it says on the tin, which is to bring everything together in one place, rather than people having to go somewhere else.

Lastly, I do not disagree on the PPF levy changes; I think this is the right decision. However, there is a significant surplus, and there are other things that could have been done with it; we will discuss new clauses 18 and 19 later. I thought the Government’s response to the Work and Pensions Committee report that I mentioned was sensible when it came to the PPF levy changes: “Yes, we agree this needs to be changed and we will look into it.” The response on the pre-1997 lack of uplift for members in the PPF and the FAS was not so helpful. It was more like, “Well, this is an impact on the Government’s balance sheet.” That is genuinely what the Government’s response says.

I am concerned that there are two very different ways of looking at the answers to those questions. In both cases, the answer could have been: “There is a significant surplus. We agree we should do something about it.” Changes could then have been made to support people who are in some cases really struggling to make ends meet, as was mentioned in last Tuesday’s witness session. That could have made a significant difference to their lives. If the Government had committed to allowing or encouraging the PPF to apply an inflationary uplift and provide support—even if they did so in a particularly progressive way, to support folk with the lowest earnings—that would have made the biggest possible difference to people who are genuinely struggling right now.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank all hon. Members for the consensus around these amendments. We will return to the question of indexation shortly with some of the new clauses. I also want to correct the record. In the exciting debate on the Pensions Ombudsman, I mentioned 1931 but meant 1991. It is not quite as old as I suggested, so I am glad that is now noted.

Question put and agreed to. 

Clause 93 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clauses 94 to 96 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 97

Amendments of Pensions Act 2004

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Pension Schemes Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Torsten Bell and Kirsty Blackman

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

I rise to support amendment 276. It is similar to some of the points that I brought up earlier, which were also brought up in the oral evidence session, about the consistency and existence of that pipeline and the fact that it needs to be there. Reviewing in advance of a decision being made on mandation would be the sensible thing.

I mentioned earlier the issue with chickens and eggs—which comes first?—and I think the amendment brings more of a focus in primary legislation on ensuring that the pipeline exists in order that these companies and organisations can meet their commitments under the Mansion House agreement. It is all well and good for them to have the Mansion House agreement, but if the opportunities are not there and are not investment-ready, it will be difficult for them to meet those targets. This is a sensible amendment, and I am more than happy to support it.

[Torsten Bell]

Before I come to the detail of the amendment, I should re-emphasise the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth about the volume of amendments to clause 38 in particular, which is why I asked for the amended clause with track changes to be circulated to the whole Committee. I hope that Members have found that useful.

Turning to the amendment, I have a lot of sympathy for what my hon. Friend is trying to achieve. It is important that we monitor progress on the Mansion House commitments and continue to stay focused on the strength of the pipeline. There are parts of the Bill that would already facilitate that, including data collection that is consistent with monitoring the Mansion House progress, and the strength of the pipeline, which was obviously relevant to consideration of the saver’s interest test, and thus left in the Bill. I suggest that, given our sympathy with the idea of this amendment but its interactions with several other existing parts of the Bill, we commit to reviewing it with a view to deciding whether we should come back with something similar on Report, if the hon. Lady is content with that.

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[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 107, in clause 38, page 43, line 9, at end insert—

“28CA Information

(1) Regulations may make provision about information that the trustees or managers of a relevant Master Trust or the provider of a group personal pension scheme must give to the Regulatory Authority about the allocation of assets of the relevant Master Trust or group personal pension scheme.

(2) The regulations may make provision about—

(a) the types of information that must be given;

(b) when it must be given;

(c) the form and manner in which it must be given.”

This new section would allow regulations to require the provision of information about asset allocation to the Secretary of State and the Regulatory Authority.

The amendment is supplementary to a provision in the introduced Bill, proposed new section 28C(10)(d), which permits the Government to make regulations about the provision to regulators of information relating to the allocation of assets by the relevant pension providers. The amendment ensures that, in the event that the regulator does not possess crucial information that the Government require in order to design the possible asset allocation framework, or to write the report on saver and growth impacts that they will be legally required to produce, the Government can obtain that information via the regulators.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I want to ask the Minister why the amendment has been tabled. Have the regulators asked for it so that they can get the information they need, or has the provision been identified by the Government? Basically, what consultation is being done to ensure that the amendment makes sense and is doing what people need it to do?

[Torsten Bell]

The direct answer is that, yes, the amendment comes from discussions with regulators, to make sure that the flow of information is sufficient to live up to Parliament’s intent and that meaningful reports on the saver and growth impacts can be provided.

Amendment 107 agreed to.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

This is a group of minor amendments, mostly aiming at improving the clarity of proposed new section 28F, for example by removing duplication. I draw Members’ attention to the most significant amendments, which are amendments 117 and 118. They make clear that the Government must introduce the savers’ interest exemption mechanism if they are to introduce asset allocation requirements. That is a “must” rather than a “may” because the Government’s intention is that there must always be a savers’ interest exemption.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have a brief comment on Government amendment 117. Because there were so many amendments, it was quite difficult to ensure that the Minister went through all of them with a fine-toothed comb. The explanatory statement for this one does not make any sense to me—it perhaps makes sense to other people. Reading the explanatory statement was deeply unhelpful, and I ended up being more confused than I was before. I appreciate the intention—what the Minister said amendment 117 was for—and the way that he described the rest of the amendments in this group, but I am pointing out for future reference that it would be helpful if we could understand the explanatory statements.

[Torsten Bell]

Noted.

Amendment 117 agreed to.

Amendments made: 118, in clause 38, page 45, line 9, at end insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State must make regulations under subsection (1) so that they have effect whenever regulations under section 28C(1) or (2) have effect.”

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 117.

Amendment 119, in clause 38, page 45, line 14, leave out “the scheme or”.

This amendment means the asset allocation requirement can only be suspended where it would cause material financial detriment to the members of a scheme.

Amendment 120, in clause 38, page 45, line 15, leave out from “the scheme” to end of line 17.

This amendment simplifies the description of what may be done by regulations under new section 28F(1).

Amendment 121, in clause 38, page 45, line 17, at end insert—

“(aa) may make provision about the basis on which the Authority may or must form such a view, including about the evidence which the Authority may or must take into account;”.

This amendment clarifies that the regulations can circumscribe the basis on which the FCA or TPR can reach a view on the material financial detriment test in subsection (2)(a).

Amendment 122, in clause 38, page 45, line 23, at end insert—

“(c) must provide for the Authority’s determination on an application to be referred to the Upper Tribunal.”

This amendment ensures that decisions on an application for the suspension of the asset allocation requirement will be referable to the Upper Tribunal.

Amendment 123, in clause 38, page 45, leave out lines 24 to 26.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 121.

Amendment 124, in clause 38, page 45, line 28, after “as” insert “material”.

This ensures that regulations under subsection (4) can also make provision about what kind of detriment is classed as “material”.

Amendment 125, in clause 38, page 45, line 30, leave out subsection (5).—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 129.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

These amendments relate to compliance and enforcement. Government amendment 127 allows the Pensions Regulator to issue risk notices to the trustees or managers of a relevant master trust or the provider of a group personal pension scheme if there were an issue in relation to the scheme relating to the quality requirement. This will require the relevant master trust to develop a resolution plan to address the regulator’s concerns. The regulator may then direct the relevant master trust to implement the measures in that plan.

Amendment 128 allows regulations to make provision for the imposition of penalties where a relevant master trust or GPP scheme accepts contributions from an employer when it should not. It will allow the regulator to issue penalties of up to £100,000 in relation to each employer from which contributions continue to be accepted. It will also give the provider the right of appeal against the penalty.

Amendment 126 enables the FCA to monitor and enforce compliance of any FCA-regulated person in scope of chapter 3 of part 2 of the Bill. It also provides that the Treasury may make regulations to enable the FCA to take action for monitoring and enforcing compliance of any FCA-regulated person with any provision under chapter 3. I commend the amendments to the Committee.

[Kirsty Blackman]

It looks like these amendments came up because of conversations with the regulator, which is looking to ensure that it can use the powers that the Bill intends to create. This is not the first time we have had amendments that have been suggested by the regulator. I would appreciate it if the Minister could go away, and, perhaps when he is making regulations or bringing forward future legislation on pensions, ensure that he has more in-depth chats with the regulator in advance, so the original legislation can be drafted in a way that will work for the regulator, rather than having to be amended after Second Reading.

[Torsten Bell]

Point noted.

Amendment 127 agreed to.

Amendments made: 128, in clause 38, page 45, line 31, at end insert—

“28H Penalties

(1) Regulations may make provision about the imposition by the Regulatory Authority of a penalty on the trustees or managers of a relevant Master Trust or the provider of a group personal pension scheme where the scheme—

(a) fails to meet the condition in section 20(1A) by virtue of not being approved under section 28A or 28C, and

(b) accepts contributions from an employer in relation to a jobholder on the basis that it is an automatic enrolment scheme in relation to that jobholder.

(2) Regulations may make provision about the imposition by the Regulatory Authority of a penalty on the provider of a group personal pension scheme where the scheme—

(a) fails to meet the condition in section 26(7A) or (7B), and

(b) accepts contributions from an employer in relation to a jobholder on the basis that it is an automatic enrolment scheme in relation to that jobholder.

(3) The regulations must provide—

(a) that a penalty must not exceed £100,000 in relation to each employer from which contributions are accepted as mentioned in subsection (1)(b) or (2)(b), and

(b) that there is a right of appeal against the imposition of the penalty.”

This amendment allows regulations to make provision for the imposition of penalties where a relevant Master Trust or a group personal pension scheme accepts contributions from an employer in relation to a jobholder on the basis that it is an automatic enrolment scheme in relation to that jobholder.

Amendment 126, in clause 38, page 45, line 31, at end insert—

“28I Enforcement by the Financial Conduct Authority

(1) The Treasury may make regulations to enable the Financial Conduct Authority to take action (in addition to any action it may otherwise take under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000) for monitoring and enforcing compliance of any FCA-regulated person with any provision of or under this Chapter.

(2) The regulations may apply, or make provision corresponding to—

(a) provision made by or under this Part in relation to the Regulator, or

(b) any provision of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000,

with or without modification.

(3) In this section, ‘FCA-regulated person’ means an authorised person (within the meaning of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000).”

This amendment allows monitoring and enforcement functions to be conferred on the FCA in relation to the compliance of FCA-regulated persons with provisions of or under Chapter 1 of the Pensions Act 2008, including the new provisions on scale and asset allocation.

Amendment 129, in clause 38, page 46, line 9, leave out subsection (14) and insert—

“(14) In section 99 (interpretation of Part)—

(a) the existing words become subsection (1);

(b) in that subsection, at the appropriate places insert—

‘“group personal pension scheme” means a personal pension scheme which is available, or intended to be available, to employees of the same employer or of employers within a group, but does not include—

(a) a stakeholder pension scheme (as defined in section 1 of the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999), or

(b) any pension scheme that requires all its members to make a choice as to how their contributions are invested;’;

‘“Regulatory Authority” has the meaning given by regulations under subsection (2);’;

‘“relevant Master Trust” has the meaning given by section 20(4);’;

(c) after that subsection insert—

‘(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations define “Regulatory Authority” for the purposes of this Part.’”

This amendment consolidates certain interpretative provisions. It also amends the definition of “group personal pension scheme” so that only schemes where all members select their investment approach are excluded.

Amendment 130, in clause 38, page 46, line 19, leave out “26(7A), 28E” and insert—

“26(7A), (7B), (7C) or (7E),”.

This amendment, together with Amendment 132, ensures that regulations relating to the new scale and asset requirements are subject to affirmative parliamentary procedure.

Amendment 131, in clause 38, page 46, line 20, at end insert—

“(15A) The following provisions of the Pensions Act 2008 (which relate to transition pathway relief) are repealed at the end of the period of 5 years beginning with the day on which they come into force—

(a) paragraph (c) of Condition 1 in section 20(1A);

(b) section 26(7C)(b);

(c) section 28D;

(d) the word ‘28D’ in section 143(5)(a).”

This amendment provides for transition pathway relief to cease to be available 5 years after the commencement of the scale requirement.

Amendment 132, in clause 38, page 46, line 20, leave out “28C,” and insert—

“28C (other than subsection (10)(d))), 28D, 28E, 28F, 28H, 28I,”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 130.

Amendment 133, in clause 38, page 46, line 21, leave out subsection (16) and insert—

“(16) If this section is repealed under section 101(5A) (repeal where asset allocation requirement uncommenced) in respect of the insertion of the provisions mentioned in that subsection, the Secretary of State may by regulations amend this section in consequence of that repeal.

(17) Regulations under subsection (16) are subject to the negative procedure.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is related to Amendment 228. It allows for regulations to be made tidying up the various references to the asset allocation requirement in clause 38 in the event that the power to commence that requirement is never exercised.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

If you will give me a bit of leeway, Mr Turner, I promise to speak only once on default pension benefit solutions. I might stray slightly outwith clause 42.

I am looking for clarity from the Minister on default pension benefit solutions. We have heard a lot of concern about how communications cannot be made to members, how there are possible issues with advertising and how members are communicated with. Can the Minister confirm that he is taking that concern seriously and has ensured that, under the General Data Protection Regulation and other data protection legislation, schemes can communicate legally with members in order to provide pension benefit solutions without being traced by the Information Commissioner’s Office or marketing regulators? Providers have raised that concern regularly.

I made it clear on Second Reading and in the oral evidence sessions that I think this proposal is a good thing. It is a massive concern that so many people are taking a lump sum without any plan for what that might look like or how the rest of the money will enable them to continue to live their life as they would like. I am really pleased that we are moving towards a better situation. However, we have not asked providers to do this before; it is something new. Providers will have to upskill themselves to make this change, both in their conversations with scheme members and in assessing whether the solutions that they provide are the correct ones.

Pension providers and insurers are used to putting people in boxes and saying, “This is a box of people for whom this solution might work.” However, some providers may not be used to clumping people together like that and providing solutions that will work for as many of them as possible. I do not think that there is a different way to do it. However, I would appreciate reassurance from the Minister that this will be kept under review; that there will be a significant amount of conversation with providers, as well as with scheme members who are receiving advice or a direction to a default scheme; and that regulators will keep an eye on whether the suggested default pension benefit solutions are appropriate for as many people as possible.

Of particular interest to me is the review timescale. What will happen to ensure that the proposal is working as intended? As I say, I think it is the right thing to do, but I want to make sure it works. I want people to have the best possible outcomes in retirement. If the position is marginally better than it is today, that will be good but not great. It would be lovely if it were way better, and if people were being suggested or guided to the solutions most appropriate for them. We do not just want to move from people dumping everything in a bank account to some people not doing so. It would be great to know that the solutions provided were working for a majority of people.

I would welcome any comfort that the Minister can give me on the review period and on what reassurance Parliament will have that people are being offered the solutions. As I say, provided that I get decent answers from him, I will be quite happy not to talk again for this entire portion of the Bill. I am sure that people will be delighted to hear that.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Lady for rightly raising the important question of communication to members. I draw the Committee’s attention to clause 44, which explicitly aims, in quite some detail, to engage with that question. It contains requirements on providers—again, with the detail to come in regulations—about how they set out their general policy, but also how they communicate to particular individuals as they head towards retirement and, potentially, enrolment in a default solution.

It is absolutely right to say that this measure is new for providers, for regulators and for the industry in the UK, and we should always have that in mind. We should take some comfort from the success of automatic enrolment in doing something new. Other countries had moved to auto-enrolment solutions ahead of us, and the same is true here to a degree. In Australia, there is a similar pattern: it has got further ahead in terms of the average size of pots, has seen some of the negative outcomes that we can potentially see in the data in the UK, and has then moved to a version of this and is working that through. We will be able to learn from its experience, as well as just working this through ourselves.

The hon. Lady asked how the measure will be taken forward. We aim to launch a public consultation in the spring and summer next year. These requirements would come in earlier than some of the wider changes that the Committee has discussed—on small pots, for example, which will come far later, and on value for money. We think it is urgent that we get on with this, because we are approaching a situation in which DC pots will be significant for some members, but I completely appreciate her point that it is a large change for the industry.

Clause 44 requires some direct communications with members. I reassure the hon. Lady that there is nothing in the GDPR or other data protection requirements that would prevent providers from communicating in that way. They will not require consent from members to do it, which is important, because otherwise it would not be effective. There are wider questions about direct marketing—communications that are not about setting out the actual situation—in this space, and I am considering those. They are tied up with questions about targeted support and the rest, but it is important for us to continue thinking about this in the pensions space, where there is a history of downsides to direct marketing. We want to make sure that this is not that, but provision of information about the working of a scheme of which someone is a member.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Once this measure beds in—once we have people being moved to default benefit solutions, or those boxes and the solutions have been created—how will it be kept under review? Will there be a process for review five years down the line, when a significant number of people have been moved to default benefit solutions, to ensure that it is working as intended and that any potential problems that Australia perhaps did not come across can be ironed out?

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Lady for that question. There is not a formal requirement on the Secretary of State to carry out a review as we are going. My honest view is that any regulator and Secretary of State will want to actively monitor what happens. I very strongly expect that this will be discussed at great length at every single pension conference around those years, because all the providers will be talking to each other about how they are taking these things forward.

The hon. Lady will remember the discussion last Tuesday with some providers, including the National Employment Savings Trust and People’s Pension, about how they are already planning to bring these solutions forward. Although they are new for the industry, most providers had already been thinking about this, because they know that it would be the right thing to do even if there were not a Government requirement to do it, and because I have been clear with them for quite some time that this is the direction of travel in both the trust market and the GPP market.

I am not sure that we need a rigid, set date for a review, but I will take away the hon. Lady’s wider question about what reassurance we can offer that people will be actively monitoring what has happened rather than just watching and seeing what happens. I can certainly write to the regulators, for example, to make it clear that that will be our expectation.

Amendment 147 agreed to.

Amendments made: 148, in clause 42, page 55, line 11, at beginning insert

“at least in such circumstances or”.

This amendment allows for regulations to provide that particular events (as well as times or intervals) trigger a requirement to review default pension benefit solutions.

Amendment 149, in clause 42, page 55, line 13, leave out “relevant” and insert “pension”.

This amendment ensures that the definition of “pension benefit solution” is capable of operating in relation to a pension scheme that is not a relevant scheme (such as a collective money purchase scheme).

Amendment 150, in clause 42, page 55, line 25, leave out

“as a default pension benefit solution,”

and insert

“of the scheme as the pension benefit solution under which—

(i) the eligible members of the scheme generally, or

(ii) a subset of those eligible members,

will receive pension payments unless they choose to receive pension payments under a different pension benefit solution,”.

This amendment clarifies the definition of “default pension benefit solution”.

Amendment 151, in clause 42, page 55, line 40, at end insert

“;

(d) such other factors as may be prescribed.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment allows other factors to be added by regulations to the factors that trustees or managers of a relevant scheme have to take account of in determining what default pension benefit solutions the scheme should make available.

Pension Schemes Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Torsten Bell and Kirsty Blackman

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mark Garnier]

Again, I have no real comments, apart from to ask the Minister, perhaps when winding up, if he could explain how the Government came to the penalty levels of £10,000 for individuals and £100,000 for others. It would be useful to understand what the thinking was behind that.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

My question was not dissimilar to the shadow Minister’s question on the amounts of the penalties—£10,000 for an individual and £100,000 in any other case. There is no delegated authority to raise it beyond those levels. There is an ability to set the amounts, provided they do not go above those. Would the process have to be in primary legislation should the Government wish to raise it above those levels? I am not generally in favour of a level of delegated authority, but if we end up in a situation where inflation is out of control, £10,000 may not seem a significant amount for an individual and £100,000 may not seem significant for a larger organisation. They may not be enough to prevent people or create the level of disincentive we wish to see. Have the Government looked at whether £10,000 and £100,000 are the right amounts?

On the clarification about FCA regulation, and the fact that if somebody is FCA regulated in another capacity, it may stop them from being subject to this, it is absolutely sensible that the Government have tabled the amendments. I am happy to support the changes and the clauses.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Members for Wyre Forest and for Aberdeen North. The main question raised is about the level of the fines. To provide some context, the answer is yes—that would need to be amended by further primary legislation; there is not a power in the Bill to change that. It is an increase on previous levels of fines for individuals and organisations—from £5,000 to £10,000 for individuals, reflecting the high inflation we have seen in recent years. On that basis, it gives us certainty that we have seen a substantial increase, and we would not need to change it in the near future, but I take the point that in the longer term, we always need to keep the levels of fines under review, and we will need to do that in this case. I hope that provides the answers to hon. Members’ questions.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 31

Enforcement by the FCA

Amendment made: 41, in clause 31, page 29, line 38, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

“(4) For the purposes of this Chapter a person is ‘FCA-regulated’ if they are an authorised person (within the meaning of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000) in relation to the operation of a pension scheme.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment clarifies that the definition of “FCA-regulated”, in relation to a person, refers to the person being FCA-regulated in respect of the operation of a pension scheme (as opposed to in a capacity unrelated to small pots regulations).

Clause 31, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32

Power to alter definition of “small”

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member for Torbay for tabling the amendment. The Government share his commitment to ensuring that the pot limit remains appropriate. As we have just heard, it is a matter of consensus, and it is good to debate how we best do that. The Government’s view is that the amendment is not necessary at this stage. Clause 32 already enables the Government to undertake a review at any time. That is a deliberately flexible approach that allows us to respond to developments in the market—not least reflecting on the question from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North about inflation—but also to any other material changes, and it empowers the Government to act when needed.

The amendment risks creating unintended consequences with a rigid cycle of Government reviews, which might mean that reviews do not happen when there is a good reason for looking at the matter, and that the Secretary of State is forced to carry them out when there is no rationale for doing so. We favour a more flexible approach. I take seriously the request for clarity that there will be regular reviews, and I can give that clarity. That is the intention.

A wider question has been raised about the success of the policy and its monitoring, which is separate from the level of the threshold. Changes to the threshold might be one response to success metrics, but others might be about the operation of the consolidation process more generally. I commit to actively monitoring those—not least what is happening to people’s pots as they are moved, how people are responding to that and levels of awareness. That is exactly what we need to be doing, irrespective of what happens on the scale of the threshold over time. There is cross-party consensus on the objective here. We have taken a slightly different view on the flexibility of that review and how often it happens, but I give all hon. Members a commitment that that will happen.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have just one more brief comment. It drives me completely mad that whoever is standing at that Dispatch Box seems to believe that they will be in government in perpetuity. Given that this is the second colour of Government I have faced across the Committee floor, it may be that the Minister and his Secretary of State—who has changed, by the way—are very keen on doing a regular review, and I appreciate the Minister committing to it. However, it is not that easy for him to commit a Secretary of State of a different political stripe. Therefore, to give us all certainty, it would be great if the Minister went away and considered the possibility of including a more regular review on Report, so that a Secretary of State of any party is required to conduct one more regularly.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member for that comment. The nature of every piece of legislation means that a future Government can take a different decision. Thanks for the reminder of the nature of British politics—that is how it operates. I am slightly more relaxed than she is, because there will be significant pressure from the industry, and from everybody, to keep this under review. That is not a matter of controversy. It is conceivable that there may be a Government who are steadfastly against ever again looking at the small pots threshold, but having lived through the last 15 years, I would put that low down the list of uncertainties in British politics. However, I take the intention behind the hon. Lady’s point, and I promise never to assume that Labour will win every election from now until eternity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

Never! No. We should clarify what we mean by “industry”: in a lifetime provider model, employers take on a significantly greater administrative burden, because they have to engage with potentially every pension scheme in the country. Admittedly, we are limiting the number of those in future, but still, that is what employers find burdensome about a lifetime provider model. That was the preferred model of the right hon. Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt) when he was Chancellor, but it was never actioned as Government policy.

As I said before, the 2014 Act was about “pot follows member”—for good reason, to try to address the small pots worry. I hope that that at least reassures the hon. Gentleman that my notes were the right way up.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I am now entirely confused. Can the Minister please clarify for all of us what the Bill actually does in terms of the consolidation?

[Torsten Bell]

I am glad we are all thoroughly confused. Three broad approaches have been set out to this small pots problem. The first is the one that the Bill takes forward, which is the multiple default consolidation solution—the automatic sweeping up of small pots into consolidated schemes to make everyone’s lives easier. Members would have one large scheme, or several larger schemes, but no really small schemes that they had to consolidate themselves. They could then choose to consolidate those larger schemes as they wished; there is a debate to be had about the size of the threshold in future. That is an automated approach.

One thing that is really important, about the point on average returns made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest earlier, is that this is not about average. A scheme can only be a consolidator if it offers good value, so a pot cannot be swept into one that does not.

There has been much debate about other approaches over the years, and I have tried to distinguish between two of them. They aim to provide more of what has been debated here, which is slightly more ownership of one pot by the individual. However, “pot follows member” is, in practice, still maintaining the relationship between an employer and a single provider. It is not the individual but the employer who chooses the scheme. That is the approach we are rejecting today.

There is then a longer-term discussion about whether there are attractions to a lifetime provider. That is the case in some of the countries that have been mentioned—the “stapled to your lapel” model—where it is the individual who chooses their provider; obviously to some degree individuals can opt out now if their employer is happy. That is not on the table here. It needs to be considered, but it is a much more fundamental change to the relationship between the employers and the pension schemes.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I thank the Minister for that clarification. These are almost two different stages in the same process: we need to do the consolidation of the small pots right now, and then look at what we are going to do so that small pots will not ever exist and nobody will end up with a small pot, because we do one of the two options or some other option presented for the next step.

My understanding is that if we were to move to what the Conservatives have proposed in new clause 36, that would solve future problems but probably not deal with the situation where somebody has five small pots already. It does not schoomp them all together—I do not know how you are going to write that, Hansard; I am really sorry.

I appreciate what the Minister says about ensuring that the next step is kept under review and not automatically ruling out some of the options presented for the future. I tend to agree that we need to get this bit done—get rid of all those tiny pots that are dormant right now—and then move on to having that discussion, perhaps as part of the sufficiency and adequacy discussions, so that we have a pensions system that ensures that people are as well off as they possibly can be in late life.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34

Interpretation of Chapter

Amendment made: 42, in clause 34, page 31, line 1, leave out

“No. 42, ‘FCA-regulated person’”

and insert

“‘FCA-regulated’, in relation to a person,”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 41.

Clause 34, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 35 and 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37

Repeal of existing powers

Amendment made: 43, in clause 37, page 34, line 20, at end insert—

“(3) In consequence of subsection (1)(b), in section 256 of the Pensions Act 2004 (no indemnification for fines or civil penalties), in subsection (1)(b), for ‘that Act’ substitute ‘the Pensions Act 2014’.”—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment amends section 256(1)(b) of the Pensions Act 2004 in consequence of the repeal of Schedule 17 to the Pensions Act 2014 by clause 37(1)(b) of the Bill, including uncommenced amendments of section 256(1)(b) on which the reference to “that Act” in section 256(1)(b) relies.

Clause 37, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38

Certain schemes providing money purchase benefits: scale and asset allocation

[Torsten Bell]

I beg to move amendment 44, in clause 38, page 34, line 27, leave out

“‘other than an authorised Master Trust scheme’”

and insert

“‘that is not a relevant Master Trust and’”.

This amendment clarifies a verbal ambiguity in the amendment of section 20(1) of the Pensions Act 2008.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

Thank you, Ms McVey—I was about to start by saying that I will not talk about clause 38; I will just talk about the technical amendments.

I have made the point before about the significant number of amendments. I do not know why the Government chose to table this number of amendments rather than submit a new clause that would replace the entirety of clause 38 and make all the changes that they wanted to make. I appreciate that the Government got in touch with us with some briefing information in relation to the changes to this clause, but we had that information very recently rather than significantly in advance. Given the huge number of technical amendments, it is very difficult to picture what the clause will look like with them all. Would the Minister agree that there could have been a better way to approach amending clause 38?

[Torsten Bell]

Let me first respond to the thrust of the comments from the Opposition; I will then come directly to that question. I am conscious that, having sat through Second Reading, most hon. Members have heard my views, and the Government’s views, on this, but let us set out the facts. It is the industry itself that set out the case for change. That is what the Mansion House accord does: it says that a different set of asset allocations is the right way to go in the longer term.

I support the industry’s judgment. The previous Conservative Pensions Minister has welcomed its judgment. I think it is the view of every senior Conservative ex-Minister sitting on the Opposition Back Benches that that change needs to come. [Interruption.] I am not speaking for the Opposition Front Bench; the hon. Member for Wyre Forest has just spoken eloquently for himself. I am speaking for former Conservative Ministers, including former Chancellors. If anything, they accuse me of being too timid—I am not sure what the characterisation of their current Front Bench would be in that regard. That is the status of the debate on this.

Why is there consensus? Leaving aside some of the points that have been raised, it is because this is in savers’ best interests. That is the motivation and the goal. It is also wrong to set out the conflict in terms as broad as the hon. Member for Wyre Forest has just used, because there is a clear savers’ interest test within the Bill that enables trustees or scheme managers to say that proceeding in a certain way would not be in the interests of their savers, and the asset allocation requirements would not bite.

Turning directly to the question about unreasonable Ministers—I have heard rumours of such things. They can exist, and there are protections against them: there are the usual judicial review protections, but in the Bill there are specific requirements to provide a report justifying any use of the reserve power and how it would play out. There are significant limits on the assets—it is broad asset classes—that can be set out in an asset allocation and there are limits to which assets can be covered.

There is the savers’ interest test, and importantly, there is a sunset clause for exactly the reason that we cannot predict what 2040 looks like today. I recognise that hon. Members will not support that part of the clause, but I hope they recognise that the goal is the same, which is that a change in investment behaviour is in savers’ interests. That is what the industry is telling us. As I said last Tuesday, the danger of a collective action problem—the problem that saw commitments made by the industry and the previous Conservative Government not delivered—is partly what this reserve power helps to overcome.

I have absolutely heard the points made about the volume of amendments. They are on the record, as will be all the points made during this process. To answer the question directly, the reason there are so many is that we had lots of useful feedback from industry over the summer, and I wanted to provide more clarity through the clause and make sure that we had the best version of it. We did not want to leave it until Report, so people have had a chance to see it as we go through Committee. I absolutely recognise the points made, and the specific point about the drafting choice of a large number of amendments versus an additional clause. I am sure the drafters will have heard that comment.

Amendment 44 agreed to.

Amendments made: 45, in clause 38, page 34, line 32, leave out “Conditions 1 and” and insert “Condition 1 and Condition”.

This amendment makes a minor verbal change to facilitate differential commencement of the scale and asset allocation conditions.

Amendment 46, in clause 38, page 34, line 37, leave out “of that scheme”.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment reflects the fact that a main scale default arrangement may be used by multiple schemes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

Amendments 250 to 253, as well as Government amendment 113, which we will discuss later, clarify the word “innovation” and look at how best to define it. There are two different approaches from the Government and the Opposition to what innovation means. I raised the issue of defining innovation on Second Reading, so I am glad that both parties are trying to clarify it here, but I am not entirely happy with the way in which the Government have chosen to do so.

When we come to Government amendment 113, I do not feel that the chosen definition of “innovative products” is necessarily right. There could be a way of working that is innovative not in the product but in the way people access the product. For example, some of the challenger banks that we have had coming up are not necessarily providing innovative products, but they provide innovative ways to access those products, and in some cases, their pitch is that they provide a better interface for people to use. I think there is potentially a niche in the market for innovative services rather than innovative products. Government amendment 113 perhaps ties too much to products, although it depends on what the definition of “products” is.

Obviously regulations will come in behind this that define “innovative”, but I think the pitch made by the Opposition for the addition of “or specialist” is helpful. “Innovative” suggests that it may be something new, whereas there could be specialist services that are not of that size but are specific to certain groups of people who value the service they are receiving, one that is very specific to their circumstances, and who would prefer that operation to keep running and to keep having access to it because of the specialist service that is provided.

I am concerned about Government amendment 113. My views are perhaps closer to the Conservatives’ amendment, but thinking particularly about services rather than the products, and the way in which the services are provided to people and the fact that there could be innovation in that respect. Also, as the hon. Member for Wyre Forest said, there could be particular niche areas that do not need to be that size in order to provide a truly excellent service to perhaps a small group of people. It depends on how the Government define “innovative” and what the regulations may look like this, but I am inclined to support the Conservatives’ amendment.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for tabling these amendments. We all recognise the importance of innovation in the pension landscape, but I respectfully oppose the inclusion of the amendments in the Bill.

One point that is at risk of being lost from the discussion so far is the central insight that is the motivation for this clause, which is that scale really is important. Scale really does matter. It has the potential to unlock a wide range of benefits, from better governance to lower costs, to access to a wider range of assets. All of those are integral to improving member outcomes, and if we provide many carve-outs, every scheme will say it is a specialist provider that should not be covered because its members value its inherent difference from every other, and we risk undermining the premise that I think has cross-party agreement, which is that we need to move to a regime of bigger schemes.

One of our aims in this Bill, which is relevant to the asset allocation discussion we just had, is to provide clarity that the change will happen, people will not duck and dive around for years attempting to litigate what is and is not a specialist provider and so on. Innovation is really important, as is competition in the market, but we need to do this in a way that does not undermine the purpose of the scale requirements, which I think is a matter of cross-party consensus.

Having said that, while innovation in the market is important, the Government’s view is that it is not an alternative to achieving scale. That is why we have provided for a new market entrants pathway. There, the innovation grants a temporary exemption from scale requirements, not a permanent exemption as the amendments would enable. That is because scale is very important indeed. Applicants to the pathway will be able to enter the market if they can demonstrate they have strong potential to grow to scale, and if they have some kind of innovative design. That is not a permanent exemption from scale requirements, and there should be cross-party consensus on avoiding that.

To provide reassurance on some of the points that have been raised, I emphasise that the scale requirements apply only to providers’ default offers. Providers of specialist offers and the rest, and self-invested personal pensions, are all able to continue to offer those specialist services, but the main offer in the workplace market does need to meet scale requirements. I hope with that explanation, hon. Members will not press the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I want to make a brief comment about the definition of “specialist”. I appreciate the Minister’s clarification about the default products provided, but there could be a sensible definition of “specialist” that included, for example, that if providers can demonstrate that over 75% of their members engage in the management of their pension fund every year, that would be a very specialist and well-liked service. I understand that the scale is incredibly important. However, if a provider can demonstrate that level of engagement in its pension scheme, because of its innovative product or service, I think it would be sensible to look at the scale requirements, even if that provider does not yet meet them.

The Opposition have kindly left it up to the Minister and the Government to define what “specialist” would be, so I will support the Opposition amendments on that matter. However, when we come to Government amendment 113, I will require some clarification from the Minister about the definition of “products”.

[Torsten Bell]

I am reassured that our agreement that scale is the desirable outcome is clear. It is great to have that on the record. I also put on the record that there is agreement about the value of innovation and about new entrants. I think that the only distinction is between a new entrant that then grows and a new entrant that does not. Our approach is to allow new entrants, but they need to be ones with a plausible sense that they can get to scale. Inherent to most of the innovation in the market—for example, in collective defined-contribution schemes—is that they would have to operate at scale to be effective. I think that the banking analogy is actually quite apt.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I am delighted that the hon. Member agrees with me.

[Torsten Bell]

I shall speak briefly because I am conscious that we need to adjourn shortly for Treasury orals, which I know everybody will be joining us for. I will not rehearse the arguments I have already set out against the purpose of amendments 248 and 249, other than to note that I do not agree with the characterisation by the hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire.

Amendment 275 seeks to prevent the Government from designating securities in UK water companies as qualifying assets for the purpose of the asset allocation requirement. I recognise the points that the hon. Member for Wyre Forest made, and I am not surprised to hear that Reform has not thought through its policies in this regard. The Government have set out the safeguards we have put in place around the use of this power. We do not think we should single out a particular sector in primary legislation, so I ask Members not to press their amendments.

I thank the hon. Member for Horsham for introducing new clause 4. The investment he references is exactly the kind that we think would raise financial returns and improve quality of life at retirement. That is the purpose of these changes. He rightly raises the bringing together of the demand side—that is, the Mansion House accord and the change in investment behaviours—with the supply side. That is exactly what the Government are doing via planning permissions and everything else, to ensure that the pipeline of projects is there, including via the British Growth Partnership work, which is intermediating all of that. On that basis, we think that the new clause is unnecessary, but I completely agree with much that it contains.

Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Torsten Bell and Kirsty Blackman

Committee stage
Thursday 4th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Kirsty Blackman]

The Liberal Democrat and Conservative amendments are very different methods to achieve a similar outcome. Conservative amendment 258 is a bit wider, in the sense that it would require the affirmative procedure for a wider range of things, but both parties are concerned about the possibility of regulations allowing a surplus below the buy-out threshold level.

I think the amendments are reasonable asks. I am generally in the habit of supporting more scrutiny of regulations; upgrading the requirements for regulations from the negative to the affirmative procedure is very much in my wheelhouse, given that it is so difficult for Parliament to oppose regulations made under the negative procedure unless the Leader of the Opposition puts their name to a motion praying against them. In practice, that very, very rarely happens. Given that both amendments are asking for relatively small changes to ensure increased parliamentary scrutiny, particularly where the threshold drops below the buy-out level, I think that they are not unreasonable. I am happy to support them both.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Members for Torbay and for Wyre Forest for their amendments. On amendment 264, I hope that I have already reassured hon. Members that there are many safeguards built into the policy for surplus release, both at an individual scheme level and at a wider policy level, including the ultimate control of trustees, the need for prudent funding to be maintained and the actuarial certification.

The Government’s view is that it is not for the Secretary of State to assess every single scheme in the way that the amendment intends. To offer some more reassurance, however, TPR and the PPF have carried out scenario testing in this area; we heard the PPF chief executive’s reassurance in oral evidence on Tuesday. In that regard, I do not think the amendment is necessary. It would also involve the Secretary of State holding a lot of evidence about every single DB scheme in the country, which I do not think is a good use of resources.

[Kirsty Blackman]

The point is about the regulations on the surplus and the times at which schemes can pay it. It is not about looking at each individual scheme; it is about looking at the level that is set in the regulations. Much as I am sure that the Minister is having a lovely birthday, he would probably admit that he is not going to be the Pensions Minister in perpetuity. It is unlikely that he will still be the Pensions Minister in 50 years’ time. He may therefore not have control of these regulations. This is about putting guardrails in place so that, no matter who is in government, the level cannot be reduced below the full buy-out funding level.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

On we go! I was going to thank the hon. Member for Torbay for his words on his amendments, but I shall move on to them anyway, and to clause stand part. Ultimately, value for money is a much-needed member protection measure for savers enrolled in a defined contribution scheme. I should remind the Committee why we have it and why it is so important: because the risk of poor value for money now lies in the defined contribution market to such a large extent with individual savers. That is what the Bill is ultimately, most importantly, about.

It is important to remember that members of defined benefit pension schemes already have protections and benefit from the sponsor employer shouldering all that risk, as was mentioned earlier by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. Those employers also have greater agency to deal with the value-related issues, such as the effective administration of their pension schemes.

Clause 10 sets out that certain pension schemes and arrangements will be in scope for the value for money framework. The clause provides regulation-making powers to specify the types of schemes and arrangements that will be in scope of the value for money requirements. We envisage that those initially in scope will be default occupational pension schemes offering defined contribution benefits. That is fundamental, given that the vast majority of defined contribution savers are saving into exactly those kind of pension schemes. To spell out what that means, we are not talking about non-workplace defined contribution pensions—that is, personal pensions. There is a regulatory power to extend in future if required, but initially we are talking about workplace defined contribution pension schemes.

With that explanation, I hope that the hon. Member for Torbay will not press his amendment, and I commend clause 10 to the Committee.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I rise to speak to clause 10 and the consultations that the Secretary of State will undertake in advance of making the value for money regulations. Subsection (7) says:

“The Secretary of State must consult with such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate before— (a) making value for money regulations; (b) issuing guidance under subsection (6).”

I appreciate that that is in there—it should be in there, as it is important. However, I do not know the road map off the top of my head, although the Minister might. Will the value for money regulations be published in draft in advance of the final decisions being made? I understand that they will go through the affirmative procedure when they do come before Parliament, but, in order to consult, will the Secretary of State publish the drafted regulations so that all of us can see them?

Also, on the right people to consult, I would always recommend that the Secretary of State runs those regulations before the Select Committee in advance of publishing them, so that it can suggest any changes. It is far easier for the changes to be made in advance of the statutory instrument being laid, when it is in draft form, than for there to be an argument in a Delegated Legislation Committee—I am sure that nobody on either side of the House wants there to be arguments in a Delegated Legislation Committee. We would all, I am sure, hope that there would be widespread agreement in advance.

The value for money regulations are really important, and it is important that they are got right. I am pleased that there is to be a consultation, but I push the Minister to agree that it will be significant—not just a couple of people in advance—so that potential problems with the value for money regulations are ironed out, and we do not see 273 amendments to them down the line.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Garnier]

This seems like a very technical clause, and we certainly have no objections to it. I also have no doubt that we will not be voting against the Government amendment. I think we are very happy with it.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have a similar question to the one I had earlier. We need to ensure that those responsible for generating the data are kept in the loop and that they have enough of a timeline to create the correct data. The Government must listen if they say, “We’re very sorry, but we can’t this bit of data in the way that the Government want.” I seek reassurance from the Government that this would be a conversation, so that the Government get the data they want, but that an unreasonable burden will not be placed on the trustees or managers who have to provide that data. That conversation needs to continue as time goes on.

[Torsten Bell]

The answer to the hon. Lady’s question is that that conversation is going on to a huge degree. Because there are so many lessons to be learned from abroad and so many technical questions to be worked through, including about the provision of data—these are important technical questions for the scheme to work and be operationalised—there is a high level of consultation on the value for money framework. It is absolutely an ongoing conversation. It was happening for some time under the previous Government, and it is continuing now. Another phase of that discussion will be launched in the near future and will continue as we move to the operational phase.

Amendment 29 agreed to.

Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12

VFM assessments

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

Clause 15 details the actions that may be required when an arrangement falls into an intermediate rating. That could be an arrangement that is at risk of not delivering value, or one that provides a certain level of value, but needs more work to improve the value it offers. It allows for regulations to detail the actions required of trustees and managers for schemes or arrangements rated intermediate. That could include producing an improvement or action plan, outlining their planned steps towards improved value for members or informing the employers currently paying into the arrangement of its value for money rating and ensuring that the arrangement does not take on new employers until it improves the value rating. That last point was raised at the evidence session on Tuesday.

As clause 14 provides the ability to set a number of sub-categories of rating within the intermediate category, clause 15 enables different consequences to be attached to those sub-categories depending on the value being provided. We are proposing to give schemes in the intermediate rating a period of up to two value for money assessment cycles to make the improvement needed to provide value to their savers.

It is important to differentiate between the intermediate and the “not delivering” rating. Schemes rated as not delivering are essentially not providing value to savers, with no identifiable improvements within a reasonable amount of time. Those schemes will be required to make an assessment of their next steps, which will most likely be to transfer the savers to a scheme that is providing value. That is the ultimate sanction within this framework.

Schemes that are rated intermediate will have identified where improvements can be made and will be required to complete an improvement plan. This would outline the proposed changes to improve their VFM rating within two years. As well as providing definitions of employer and participating employer in the context of the clause, it also allows for the content of an improvement plan to be included in secondary legislation.

[Kirsty Blackman]

When questioned on Tuesday, the Minister talked about the issues that had been raised about intermediate ratings, and the possibility of intermediate points within intermediate ratings. It would be helpful if he could confirm from the Front Bench that he will take action to ensure that the negative consequences that were raised, with people being so keen to avoid falling out of that, do not happen. The Minister will be aware that confirmation from the Front Bench is helpful in clarifying the intent of the legislation and would put some of our minds at rest.

[Torsten Bell]

Let me directly address that point, and then I will turn to the Government amendments. The answer is yes. I did not respond, but I should have, to the related point raised by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest in the previous grouping. The experience in Australia was that there was a binary cut-off, but with a very high-stakes outcome if people fell on the wrong side of it. That did lead to herding behaviour. That is one of the most well-established lessons from the Australian experience, and it is certainly central to the evidence that we have heard in the consultations. I can absolutely provide the confirmation that we will be avoiding that outcome, not least via these multiple levels of intermediate ratings.

Government amendments 30 to 34 introduce other changes. These amendments are of a minor and technical nature and clarify the policy intent. Amendments 30, 31 and 33 make drafting corrections. Amendment 32 clarifies that the Pensions Regulator’s assessment of a transfer solution is to be based on the trustees or managers’ assessment carried out for the purposes of the action plan. Finally, amendment 34 removes a power that we no longer need.

Clause 16 details the actions that must be undertaken when schemes or arrangements are rated as not delivering value for money. This is necessary to help protect pension savers from lingering in arrangements that are “not value” and allow them to be moved into arrangements that do provide value. These actions may include submitting an action plan to regulators, informing employers currently contributing to the arrangement of its “not value” rating and closing the arrangement entirely to new employers.

Clause 16 also enables regulations to set out further actions that will be required of trustees or managers, including the conditions under which a “not value” arrangement may not have to be closed to new members. The clause also allows the Pensions Regulator to require trustees or managers to initiate the transfer of members from the “not value” arrangement into another that does offer value. It outlines the conditions when this would apply.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Consequences of a “not delivering” rating

Amendments made: 30, in clause 16, page 16, line 20, leave out

“the responsible trustees or managers to transfer”.

This amendment corrects an error.

Amendment 31: in clause 16, page 16, line 21, leave out “(all or” and insert “all (or”.

This amendment corrects an error.

Amendment 32: in clause 16, page 16, line 31, leave out sub-paragraph (i) and insert—

“(i) based on the assessment carried out by the responsible trustees or managers under section 14(6)(a) in the action plan of the scheme or arrangement, transferring the benefits of all (or a subset of) the members of the scheme or arrangement to another pension scheme (or arrangement under a pension scheme) could reasonably be expected to result in the generality of the members of the scheme or arrangement receiving improved long-term value for money, and”

This amendment clarifies that the Pensions Regulator’s assessment of a transfer solution is to be based on the trustees or managers’ assessment carried out for the purposes of the action plan.

Amendment 33: in clause 16, page 16, line 34, leave out “the measures” and insert “any other measures”.

This amendment makes a minor clarification.

Amendment 34: in clause 16, page 17, line 8, leave out subsection (5).—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment removes a power which is no longer needed.

Clause 16, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Compliance and oversight

Question proposed, that the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Torsten Bell]

The hon. Lady is not only telling me I am going to be fired, but then clearly angling for the job by again giving the speech I was going to give. I agree that there is broad consensus across the room that there is no perfect answer, but there is a balance of risks. We are attempting to introduce a large change to the pension system that will affect millions of people, and we need to do that in a steady and gradual way—yes, with the intention of considering going further in the future, but not in a rushed way.

Let me talk through a few of the issues and points that were raised. As I am sure those proposing the amendment know, our view is that we should stick with the £1,000 limit at this point and then come back to consider future increases once the system has been put in place. We want all hon. Members to have it in their heads that the implementation of this aspect of the Bill is on a slightly slower timeline than some of the other bits we have discussed—for example, because we need the value for money regime to be in place before we move to the small pots part of the picture.

Directly on the question of where the £1,000 limit came from, it came from extensive engagement and formal consultation with industry stakeholders over quite a large number of years. There is no academic answer to why it is £1,000 and not £900 or £1,100, but it does strike a balance between the pressures on a competitive industry and the level of administrative hassle, and the number of people who will be affected. We need to build a system that can manage the flows.

To give Members some idea of quantity, the evidence gathered from pension schemes last year showed that the £1,000 threshold would bring approximately 13 million pots into scope. I appreciate the logic behind calling for a higher threshold, but this one would mean a significant 13 million pots. The hon. Member for Wyre Forest is looking aghast at that number. I am just providing it as a bit of context. For further context, it already represents more than half of all deferred small pots, so it is not that we are trying to affect hardly any to start with; it is a significant number. That is in 2024 terms; the picture will look different in 2030 or so when the measure comes in, but that helps Members to have a sense of it.

On how to change the threshold, I can absolutely provide the reassurance that was asked for: that will be done in a public-facing way. An affirmative resolution is always required to change it. Unlike some other aspects of the Bill, where the first regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure but later changes can be made through the negative procedure, any change to the pot size requirement will always require the affirmative procedure, for exactly the reasons that have been discussed, which are that this would be a material change that affected the industry and individuals as they go through. Certainly, we would consult on that in the future.

For those reasons, I am glad that this is a probing amendment. I hope I have been probed, and we would like the clause to stand part.

[Kirsty Blackman]

On that point, perhaps I am reading the clause completely wrongly, but it says:

“Small pots regulations…are subject to the affirmative procedure if they…are the first such regulations…otherwise, are subject to the negative procedure.”

I am confused.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have a question on the definition of “dormant”. The clause states that a pension pot is “dormant” if no contributions have been made for 12 months and if

“the individual has, subject to any prescribed exceptions, taken no step to confirm or alter the way in which the pension pot is invested.”

I am concerned that that definition is too wide.

If somebody has just said, “How much is in my pot?” and is confirming what is invested in it, are they considered to be somebody who is actively involved in their pot and who may not want consolidation? There is obviously a requirement to tell people anyway that it is going to be consolidated. What if they were actively involved, but only to the level that they checked the numbers?

For example, I have a small pension pot. I have tried to amalgamate it with another one, but it did not work because I have changed my name. I would love for it to be amalgamated; I cannot work out how to do it, but I have engaged with that pension pot in recent times and therefore it may not be considered a dormant pot.

Can the Minister give us some clarity or promise future clarity about what “dormant” means? If there has been a rough engagement with it, is that dormant? If people are very keen on their pension pot and have spent a lot of time saying, “Actually, it should be invested like this,” that is definitely not dormant, no matter how small it is. A lot of people will have had only a passing interest and would be delighted for it to be consolidated.

[Torsten Bell]

The hon. Lady’s last point is basically the right one. The policy objective is that where someone is not actively engaging in their pot, that is available for consolidation. The kind of minor administrative engagement—trying to access the website—is not what is envisaged by the clause. It is to make sure that somebody who has taken active choices about how their pot is invested is not treated as being disengaged when they have done something that is, it turns out, very unusual.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21

Small pots data platform

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

Does the Minister have any hypothetical examples? I am not asking him to commit to anything being a prescribed condition, but just to give us some examples so that we have an idea.

[Torsten Bell]

That is a fair question. The most prevalent example will be people whose existing pot, although small, has unusual and valuable guarantees attached to it, or benefits that they would lose if they transferred into the default fund of another provider. That is likely to be the most common use of the clause. The clause will provide for transparency by allowing regulations to be made to set out in more detail how those decisions and others will take place.

Given the admin costs and unprofitability of small dormant pots, we do not expect schemes to abuse this exemption. For the benefit of people who do not spend lots of time looking at these matters, I should say that lots of schemes are happy to see small pots go, because they are expensive for them to operate; they are neither in the provider’s interest nor in the saver’s. This clause strikes a careful balance.

Clause 24 will ensure that pension savings are not left idle, requiring all eligible pots to be held by a default consolidator. As Members will know, millions of workers accumulate small pension pots as they move between jobs. Specifically, the clause will allow for the transfer of those dormant pots without requiring active consent—again, that is something that Governments do not do lightly, but it is required by the best interests of savers in these cases—where a transfer notice has been issued and no objection received from the member, as I set out in relation to clause 22.

If a member does not opt out, the trustees and managers of the scheme are required to act on the transfer notice and transfer the pot to the designated consolidator. Clause 24 also provides legal certainty, because it will empower schemes to consolidate pots even if doing so breaches existing scheme rules. That removes administrative barriers and places the member’s interest at the heart of the system.

Clause 25 plays a role in providing legal clarity and continuity for individuals whose small dormant pots are transferred. The clause sets out what happens when a pension pot is moved to a different pension scheme or a different arrangement within the current scheme. This ensures that an individual’s membership status, rights and obligations are automatically and seamlessly updated at the point of transfer—so it is not just that a member’s pot has been transferred, but that they have become a member of the scheme that they are entering, even though they have not signed up to a contract explicitly in so doing. This means that they automatically acquire all the rights and responsibilities that come with that membership. In schemes where membership results in a new contractual relationship, the clause will deem that a new contract is formed at the point of transfer.

Clause 26 will play a critical role in ensuring that the transfer of small pots to consolidating schemes is undertaken in a legally robust and administratively efficient manner. By establishing clear timeframes for transfers, it will allow for the safe and effective consolidation of small dormant pension pots.

This clause introduces two key timing rules. First, it mandates the minimum 30-day notice period before any transfer or change of arrangement can take place. That gives individuals the opportunity to review the proposal and respond. That time period is aligned to the approach taken for members who wish to opt out of automatic enrolment.

Secondly, the clause sets out a maximum one-year deadline for completion of the transfer or change of arrangement. It provides clarity and operational certainty for pension schemes and savers. That also enables schemes to maximise the use of bulk transfers, supporting a lower-cost and more efficient transfer process, rather than having shorter deadlines that force them to move individuals in small batches. It also ensures that the small pots consolidation framework remains responsive and co-ordinated. If trustees and scheme managers are waiting for proposals from the small pots data platform, the transfer period can be extended. This clause strikes the right balance by protecting savers and making sure they have time to act, while also providing an impetus for timely action in the consolidation process.

I am grateful to members of the Committee for listening to all those points, and I commend clauses 21 to 26.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have a couple of questions on the small pots data platform. On Second Reading, I raised issues about the pensions dashboard and the fact that after a significant length of time, it has not yet appeared. I appreciate that lots of people have been doing lots of work on it, but we do not have it yet.

It is vital that the small pots data platform exists and works in order for small pots consolidation to happen. Can the Minister give us some comfort that it will materialise and work? If there is a possibility of any errors in the system or the data is not correct—if the platform is not absolutely spot on—there is the risk of significant problems being created. Is he convinced that enough investment will be made in the data platform for it to work, and that it will be incredibly safe, given that it will potentially have—like the pensions dashboard—significant amounts of data relating to individuals and money? It therefore needs to be as safe from cyber-attack as possible, if it is presumably in the cloud or another such system. I would appreciate any reassurance about that, and lastly, that it will have the required resources to work and that the Government will push to create the resources if they are not there and the timeline is beginning to lag.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member for those questions. She is right to mention the dashboard, and I will say two things about that. First, although these are different systems, there are lots of learnings from the process—as we heard from Chris Curry on Tuesday—not least the impetus that it has provided to schemes to make sure they have put all their record keeping in order. For them to be able to engage with the dashboard, they now have a legal requirement to have that data in a standard format. It is also about how the central system works, but it will be a different system, so the hon. Member is right to raise those questions.

I do not want to offer her total certainty because that is not available to me for a scheme that is looking to be operational in the next decade. We have intentionally left that longer timeline for exactly the reasons that the hon. Member has outlined. I can reassure her that very extensive engagement has been going on with industry about this. I mentioned the feasibility study, but there has also been heavy engagement, including on the security element that she mentioned. That is absolutely key, and lessons definitely have gone through from the dashboard approach to make sure that we are happy with how that will take place. I hope that provides her with some—if not perfect—reassurance.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 22 to 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned—(Gerald Jones.)

Pension Schemes Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Torsten Bell and Kirsty Blackman

Committee stage
Thursday 4th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

I declare an interest as a holder of deferred membership of a local government pension scheme in Scotland, which will come into scope should the Government amendments go through, as I imagine they will. First, I thank the Government for working with the Scottish Government to make these changes and for taking the decision to agree with the Scottish Government’s request for these changes to be made. It is appreciated.

While I am on thank yous, the people who manage local government pension schemes are managing an incredibly significant amount of money and are ensuring that benefits are provided to many millions of people in those schemes. The hard work they do to steward those funds appropriately cannot be overestimated, so I say thank you to all the trustees who take that action on behalf of so many of us. Those working in the public sector tend to get a lower salary than they would in the private sector, but they often get access to a defined-benefit pension scheme or a career-average pension scheme, which is better than many people in the private sector get. There is a bit of give and take there.

On Tuesday, we heard from the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board and also from one of the pension schemes. There was a commitment that came forward in the evidence to ensuring trustees are appropriately trained—I am not for a second saying that they are not appropriately trained right now, but we must ensure that level of training is provided when they have many other competing demands on their time. It is important that the Government ensure the correct monitoring, evaluation and also support of those organisations, so that if new training is required—for example, if environmental, social and governance provisions change, or decisions about where it is best to invest funds change—the Government commit to ensuring that trustees are given all the training they need. I believe that all pension trustees have a difficult job, but particularly those managing local government pension schemes, who are often local councillors—a task that, I know, is not a part-time job and is incredibly busy.

The other concern raised on Tuesday, and which was just mentioned by my Liberal Democrat colleague, the hon. Member for Torbay, is about the locality of the decisions made. It is important that the pooling of resources means more investment in important and key projects than would result from a smaller organisation. Hopefully, the reduction in administrative costs will ensure that those schemes are significantly more efficient, but I am keen that we do not lose the local voice within the pension schemes that we have now.

The case was made very eloquently on Tuesday that, while pension schemes take into account value for money—what we would have called best value in local government in Scotland—in decision making, they should ensure that they are not supporting projects that the community are absolutely up in arms about, because so many of their members will live in that community. Scheme members need that guaranteed return, but they also need their communities to be nice places for them to live.

I am slightly concerned that, with pooling, the ability for local projects to be put forward could potentially be lost. Although I am not asking for any specific changes, I would ask that the Government keep an eye on that. Should there be significant numbers of smaller projects that are not being supported because of the changes that previously might have been supported, the Government should consider whether they need to take action to ensure that those voices are better heard and that those smaller projects still have the opportunity for investment.

Thank you very much for allowing me to speak on this, Chair. I am assuming that we have also spoken on the clause stand part and are unlikely to debate that again at the end; I have therefore made most of my general comments here rather than particularly specific ones on the amendments.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank everyone who has spoken. I am grateful for the welcome for the Bill as a whole, for this chapter and for the amendments that particularly relate to Scotland. As the hon. Member for Wyre Forest pointed out, this Bill builds on progress that was put in train over the last decade, and I am glad to see that. It is only because of that progress that we are now able to accelerate quite significantly.

Questions were raised about mandation. I want to be absolutely clear that questions about asset strategy will sit directly with the administering authorities, as they do today. It is for them to set out those asset allocation decisions, which are, in the end, the biggest driver of returns for members. The investment decisions sit with pools, never with Governments. We will provide clarification, if we come on to one of the amendments later, to make clear that the Government will not be directing individual investment decisions of pools; that was never the intention.

Questions were raised about the administrative costs of transition. Those do exist, as they have in previous moves towards pooling, and will obviously need to be managed sensibly, but I think we all agree that those costs are small relative to the very large savings that will come from a much less fragmented system.

Points about the importance of trustees were powerfully made, and I absolutely agree. Stronger governance reforms have already been put in place for the LGPS trustees in England and Wales, and these reforms build on that through stronger governance more generally.

I also hear the argument about local voice. As I said, the administering authorities are responsible for setting the strategy in relation to local investments. Strategic authorities, because of a Bill that was passed earlier this week, will have a requirement to collaborate with the LGPS on those local investments. I take the points that were made, and I think there is consensus on these amendments.

Amendment 7 agreed to.

Amendment made: 8, in clause 1, page 1, line 12, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “responsible authority”. —(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment and Amendments 10 and 11 are consequential on Amendment 7. References in Clause 1 to the Secretary of State are changed to “the responsible authority”. That term is defined by Amendment 24 to refer either to the Secretary of State (as regards England and Wales) or to the Scottish Ministers (as regards Scotland).

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[Kirsty Blackman]

I was thinking about how the amendment would work in practice in my local area. I live in the Aberdeen city council area. We are landlocked. We are surrounded by the Aberdeenshire council area. If those local authorities were in separate local government pension schemes, the effect of the amendment would be that Aberdeenshire council could not class an investment in Aberdeen as a local investment despite the fact that its local authority headquarters are in Aberdeen. That is the only sensible place for them because Aberdeenshire goes all around Aberdeen, and it is the only place to which someone can reasonably get transport from all the areas in Aberdeenshire.

Although I understand what the hon. Members for Wyre Forest and for Mid Leicestershire are saying about the classification of local investments, I am not uncomfortable with the fact that the clause includes

“for the benefit of persons living or working in”

the area. If, for example, people in Aberdeenshire invested in a new swimming pool in Aberdeen city, I imagine that it would be used by a significant number of people in Aberdeenshire, and would absolutely be for their benefit.

We should remember that the local government pension schemes will have to prove that the thing they are investing in is for the benefit of local people living or working within the scheme area, although it may be slightly outside it. For example, if they invested in a small renewable energy project providing renewable energy to local people across a border, they would fall foul of this. It would not be classed as a local investment despite the fact that it would be very much for the benefit of people living or working within the scheme area.

The level of flexibility in the clause, and the fact that the schemes will have to justify their investments anyway, is more sensible than what the amendment suggests. I understand the drive to ensure that provision is made for local investment in local areas, but because of the nature of some of those boundaries, it makes more sense to keep the clause the way that the Government have written it.

[Torsten Bell]

I will give a very short speech because the hon. Member for Aberdeen North has just made every single point that I was going to make. I understand the motivation behind the amendment, but we do not support it because it would prevent investments that straddle boundaries—for example, investments in transport and infrastructure that would benefit people living in both Wales and neighbouring English counties. We have heard other examples as well. It would be wrong to limit authorities in where they could invest in this way. I ask the hon. Member for Wyre Forest to withdraw the amendment as it unnecessarily limits the remit of local investment.

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[Torsten Bell]

Clause 2 sets out how assets will be managed in the LGPS under the reformed system of asset pooling. It requires that asset-pooling regulations introduced under clause 1 include requirements for all LGPS assets to be managed by pool companies. The clause would therefore introduce a statutory requirement to consolidate all LGPS assets into those pools, delivering the significant benefits that I know all hon. Members present agree on.

The clause also sets out that the regulations must require administering authorities to formulate, publish and keep under review an investment strategy for their authority’s assets. It also stipulates that regulations may set out from whom administering authorities can take advice on their investment strategy, a point raised by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest. The Government intend to use regulations to require that the pool be the primary source of advice. That will ensure that advice is provided on a consistent basis and free from competing interests, given that pools exist solely to serve their administering authorities. That is an important wider point to remember: the administering authorities are the shareholders of pools and are working together to deliver for members; they are not competing interests.

Regulations must also require administering authorities to co-operate with strategic authorities to identify and develop appropriate investment opportunities. This requirement will soon see the LGPS involved at an earlier stage on local investment opportunities. For the purposes of this provision, for England the definition of strategic authorities matches that in the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill, while for Wales it includes corporate joint committees. Members may wish to note that there is a reciprocal duty on strategic authorities in the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill.

In summary, the Government are introducing the provisions to finalise the consolidation of assets into pools, and to codify the role of the administering authorities in setting investment strategies and how that engagement with strategic authorities will happen.

I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for tabling new clause 31, which would require the Government to publish guidance on how LGPS surpluses—of which there are now more, which is welcome—can be deployed to address financial needs in local authorities. I recognise that the hon. Member seeks to support local authorities in considering their financial positions against potential funding surpluses.

Decisions on employer contribution rates in the LGPS are rightly taken locally, not by central Government. Contribution rates for employers are set every three years as part of a valuation process—which hon. Members will know is approaching shortly—in which administering authorities will work with their actuaries and employers, including local authorities, to determine a contribution rate that is sustainable for employers and will allow the fund to pay out pensions in the future. As part of that process, a local authority is able to utilise a surplus in its funding position by reducing employer contribution rates. The LGPS is currently in a healthy funding position, as I said, and it is expected that some employers will follow that path. But crucially, again, that is a decision to be made locally on the basis of each employer’s needs.

The existing statutory guidance says that funds should set out in their funding strategy their approach to employer contributions, including a reduction of contributions where appropriate, and should carefully identify and manage conflicts of interest, including conflicts between the role of the particular administering authority and other local authorities that are participants.

[Kirsty Blackman]

This is a genuine question that I do not know the answer to. Is reducing the contribution made by employers the only way that the funds can currently utilise a surplus, or are there other methods by which they can spend it?

[Torsten Bell]

That is the only way that I have seen taken up by local authorities, and it is the main one that local authorities are discussing, although, as I have said, that is a decision for them. I hope that at least partially answers the hon. Lady’s question. I commend clause 2 to the Committee, and ask the hon. Member for Wyre Forest to withdraw his new clause.

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[Torsten Bell]

Clause 3 concerns how procurement law relates to the LGPS. New clause 21 is intended to replace clause 3, and I will endeavour to explain why it is a technical but valuable amendment. The existing clause and the replacing new clause are identical in their purpose and desired outcome. The reason for the change is technical: rather than stating in the Bill how procurement law affects the LGPS, new clause 21 will instead move the LGPS exemption directly into schedule 2 to the Procurement Act 2023, thereby future-proofing it against changes to the Procurement Act itself.

The amended clause has two aims. First, to broaden the scope of cross-pool collaboration, and secondly, to put client authorities, of the kind mentioned by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, on the same footing as share- holders. That is necessary because the Procurement Act effectively caps the potential for collaboration through joint ventures between pools, as the vertical exemption in schedule 2 to that Act requires demonstration that no more than 20% of a pool’s turnover can be generated on behalf of anyone other than that pool’s shareholders. That may limit the collaboration between pools that we expect to see more of.

Legislation should not act as a barrier to collaboration. The clause addresses that by exempting LGPS pools from the 20% limit, such that the relevant procurement rules are satisfied so long as a pool is acting in the interests of any LGPS authority. Furthermore, given that LGPS authorities can choose to participate in their pool as a contracting client or as a shareholder, the clause also enables all LGPS authorities to benefit from the exemption, regardless of whether they are a client only or a shareholder. This means that LGPS pools will be able to specialise as centres of excellence for particular asset classes and for other pools to access those services, thereby reducing duplication and enabling the investments at scale that we heard so much about in the evidence session.

I ask that clause 3 does not stand part of the Bill, but commend to the Committee new clause 21, which replaces clause 3.

[Kirsty Blackman]

The Government have requested to withdraw clause 3 and replace it with new clause 21. I am slightly confused as to how we got to the point where the Government did not make this decision in the first place, and how the Bill we discussed on Second Reading did not include the change being made to the Procurement Act, instead of the change being made directly in the Bill. Have the Government done significant consultation over the summer, or received input from various organisations that has made it clear that the new way they are now proposing is better than the original?

I can understand that there are two different ways and that there may be a toss-up about which one is best, but why have the Government come down on the side of changing the Procurement Act rather than making the change in primary legislation in the Bill? The Minister has made a little bit of that case, but if he could expand on why the Government have chosen to change their approach, it would be incredibly helpful.

[Torsten Bell]

I will be very straight with the hon. Lady, in answer to her fair question. It would obviously be preferable if the clause were not changing between Second Reading and Report, so it is a completely reasonable question to ask. The straight answer is that it is both because of consultation responses, or people’s feedback, and because the legal advice is that this is a more foolproof way to make sure that the intent of the Bill on Second Reading is put into effect.

As I set out earlier, the key change is that other changes to the Procurement Act will not have unintended consequences for the LGPS in future. I hope the hon. Lady understands that that is the motivation. There is nothing else going on here. The change has happened over that period because that is when comments came in and when legal advice was received.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

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[Torsten Bell]

Thank you for the learning, Sir Christopher.

Clause 4 enables the Government to make regulations that require LGPS administering authorities to undertake and publish an independent review of their governance arrangements at least once every three years. I am sure that Committee members will agree that good governance is critical to the healthy functioning of a pensions scheme. The clause will ensure that authorities face external scrutiny of their governance processes. Many authorities already carry out governance reviews of this form and this measure will merely ensure consistent high standards.

The clause also enables the Secretary of State to direct an authority to undertake an ad hoc governance review if they are concerned by significant weaknesses in an authority’s governance or suspect that an authority is not complying with regulations. As a result of the amendments we have already discussed, the power can also be exercised by Scottish Ministers in relation to the LGPS in Scotland.

New clause 22 enables the Secretary of State to give specified LGPS administering authorities certain additional powers, which most administering authorities will already have by virtue of being local authorities. The new clause allows the powers to be extended to administering authorities that are not local authorities, such as the Environment Agency. The new clause will simply create a level playing field for all administering authorities in England and Wales.

[Kirsty Blackman]

What is the Government’s rationale for not including Scotland in new clause 22? Is it because the Scottish Government looked at the original Bill and had not seen the amendments? Or is it because the differential structures between Scotland and the rest of the UK mean that it would not help in the Scottish situation? If the Minister is not clear on the answer, will he please commit to ask the Scottish Government whether they want to be included in the new clause and the relevant changes to be made so that it applies in Scotland? If the regulatory systems are the same, it seems sensible that a level playing field apply. It would be incredibly helpful if the Minister could make the commitment to check whether the Scottish Government want to be included.

[Torsten Bell]

I am happy to give that commitment. I am not aware of any administering authorities in Scotland that would be affected, but I am happy to take that point away.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Mergers of funds

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[Kirsty Blackman]

If the hon. Member for Wyre Forest can confirm that he does not intend the change to apply in Scotland, because we do not have strategic authorities, I am quite happy not to vote for or against it and to leave it to those who do have strategic authorities.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for the amendment and for the points he raised. Amendment 244 would amend clause 5 to allow fund mergers only if the two funds are in the same strategic authority, so it would be a highly constraining power. I recognise the logic, but our view is that it is far too constraining.

I emphasise to Members that the Government do not have any plans to require the mergers of LGPS funds, and that our strong preference is that when mergers take place, that happens by agreement between the administering authorities. The Government would use the power to require a merger of pension funds only as a last resort, if local decision making failed to deliver satisfactory arrangements.

I reassure Members that during the reform process Ministers and officials have looked carefully at how local government reorganisation, which is ongoing and very important, as the hon. Member for Wyre Forest rightly pointed out, maps on to the existing LGPS geography, and we will continue to do so. There should not be any friction between the emerging unitary structures and the LGPS. I reassure the Opposition that the administering authorities that were in the Brunel and Access pools are already carefully considering their choice of a new pool in the light of local government reorganisation.

In summary, it is important that local government pension funds and Ministers retain flexibility in their decision making so that decisions can be taken in the best interests of the relevant scheme. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw amendment 244.

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[Torsten Bell]

I welcome the broad consensus about the direction of travel from everyone who has spoken. I will come first to the remarks from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, who made some key points. She understandably makes the direct comparison with the LGPS. To a large respect, that reflects the fact that the LGPS is an open scheme where the ongoing contributions are much more of a live question, but I take her point.

I will make a few remarks on her more controversial points about the role of trustees and what funds are used for. The powers of trustees are very strong. Trustees have an absolute veto on any surplus release under the clause, as they do currently, and they have fiduciary duties about how they should use their powers. That is stronger than was implied in some of the remarks that we have heard.

As for the wider point about pressure on trustees from employers, that can affect lots of issues and is not specific to the one we are discussing today. That is what the fiduciary duties of the trust system exist to protect against and what the regulatory work of the Pensions Regulator ensures does not happen. If there was inappropriate pressure on trustees, it would be a very serious issue. That is not specific to the surplus question—that applies to trustees just doing their job. My strong impression with every trustee I talk to is that they take that duty very seriously indeed. I agree that we should always keep that under review.

[Kirsty Blackman]

There is an absolute veto power—a yes or no—but it is also about the power for trustees to be able to say to employers, “This is how we would like you to use the money.” There is less flexibility for trustees there. Once the money is handed over to the employers, there is no comeback for trustees if employers do not use it as suggested.

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[Kirsty Blackman]

I will not say much just now. I would like to hear what the Minister says, and I might bob again after that, Sir Christopher.

[Torsten Bell]

I thank the hon. Members for Torbay and for Horsham for their amendments and for giving us the opportunity to discuss the matter of defined-benefit members and pre-1997 accruals. I should be clear that clause 9 and the related amendments refer to defined-benefit schemes, not to the questions of the Pension Protection Fund and financial assistance scheme compensation, which were discussed at such length—and, as several hon. Members have said, powerfully—at the evidence session on Tuesday.

The Government understand the intent behind the amendments. It is crucial that the new surplus flexibilities work for both sponsoring employers and members, for example through discretionary benefit increases where appropriate. That point was raised several times on Second Reading before the summer recess.

On pre-1997 indexation, it is important to be clear that most schemes—as I said, these schemes are not in the PPF or receiving FAS compensation—pay some pre-1997 indexation. Analysis published last year by the Pensions Regulator shows that only 17% of members of private sector defined-benefit pension schemes do not receive any pre-1997 indexation on their benefits, because different scheme rules specify whether someone receives that indexation.

Under the Bill, decisions to enable the scheme to release a surplus will always rest with trustees, who have a duty to act in the interests of scheme beneficiaries. Trustees, working with the sponsoring employer, will be responsible for determining how members should benefit from any surplus release, which may include discretionary indexation. My personal view is that, in lots of cases, it should, but that is where the discussion takes place. The Government are clear that trustees’ discretion is key to this policy. Trustees are best placed to determine the correct use of the surplus for their members, not least because that will involve making some trade-offs between different groups, particularly of members, and it is trustees who are in the position to do so.

It would not be appropriate for the Government to mandate that schemes provide uncapped indexation, in line with the consumer prices index, to all members prior to the making of a surplus payment. Where trustees plan to award discretionary increases, they are best placed to identify what increase is affordable and proportionate for the scheme and its members.

Although scheme rules may require an employer to agree to a discretionary increase—this point was made by several Members who were anxious about it on Second Reading—the trustees will have the final say when deciding to release surplus, and they are perfectly within their rights to request such an increase as part of any agreement that leads to a surplus release. That is a powerful power for trustees to hold on to.

The Pensions Regulator will publish guidance for trustees, as I previously mentioned, and for their advisers, noting factors to consider when releasing surplus and ways in which trustees can ensure that members and employees can benefit. That will happen following the passage of the Bill. These measures already give trustees the opportunity to secure the best outcomes for their members, which could include discretionary increases. I am grateful for the contribution from the hon. Member for Horsham, but on those grounds, I ask him to withdraw the amendment.

[Kirsty Blackman]

As I said, I wanted to hear from the Minister. I agree that trustees should be the ones making the decision on how to spend any surplus and whether to make an uprating. However, as some schemes are barred by their scheme rules from making such an uprating, my concern is about allowing them the flexibility to make it in any circumstances if they decide that that is the best thing to do. It is not about tying their hands and saying that they have to make an uprating; it is about allowing every single scheme the flexibility to make it if they decide that that is the best thing to do.

Where there are employer blockers or other issues in the scheme rules, can anything be done, in the Bill or anywhere else, to remove those blockers so that we can ensure that trustees have an element of choice and remove some of the unfairness that we heard about on Tuesday?

[Torsten Bell]

I think I can offer the hon. Lady some reassurance. It is true that within some scheme rules it will be clear that discretionary increases of the kind that we are debating would require employer agreement. I know that that has worried some hon. Members who think that that could be a veto against such releases in a surplus release situation.

My view—and the guidance to be released by the TPR will make this very clear—is as follows. It may formally be for the employer to agree to those discretionary increases. The scheme rules may apply to that, although in some schemes the trustees may be able to make that decision on their own—that will be a distinction that will depend on the scheme rules. However, even when the scheme rules say that the employers must agree, they will have a strong incentive to agree with the trustees if they are asking the trustees to release. That is why I say that the process of surplus release will change the dynamic of those discussions, which I recognise are currently not proceeding in some cases because employers are saying a blanket no to discretionary increases. We do not need legislative change to make that happen.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Would the Minister encourage those schemes that find that they want to release the surplus in relation to the uplift, but are struggling to get that process across the line, to go to the TPR, look at the guidance that is coming out and ask for assistance with making those discretionary uplifts?

[Torsten Bell]

I absolutely would. I have been making exactly those points to anyone who will listen.

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[Torsten Bell]

The hon. Member rightly returns to an important question. As I set out at the evidence session on Tuesday, our pension policy road map, published at the same time as the Bill, details exactly when we are planning to bring forward regulations. My understanding is that these particular regulations should be consulted on in the spring of next year—if that is not right, I will make sure we come back to him with further details. As I say, the road map provides the details of that timeline. It is a very important question for people to be clear on. In that consultation, I am sure the evidence we have heard will be taken into account.

Amendments 260 and 265 correctly aim to ensure that members are well informed and represented when it comes to their pension schemes and retirement. The new paragraphs would be inserted into clause 9 of the Bill, which amends section 37 of the Pensions Act 1995. Section 37 already provides that regulations must require members to be notified in relation to a surplus payment before it is made.

This is therefore not about the flexibility of trustees; it is redundant, given the requirements already in the Bill. It is similar to the existing requirement under section 37 of the Pensions Act 1995, and we will again consult on these draft regulations following Royal Assent. Furthermore, trustees already have a clear duty to act in all matters in the best interests of the beneficiaries of their scheme, and they are best placed to decide, in consultation with the sponsoring employer, what actions are best for members—I will not keep repeating that point as we go through the rest of this Bill.

Finally, I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for proposing amendment 261, with its requirement for actuarial confirmation that proposed payments from a DB surplus to employers will not adversely affect members’ benefits, and that members have been notified ahead of that release. Those are valuable objectives, but they are already achieved by the robust safeguards in place, including trustee discretion, the prudent funding threshold —on which we will consult—and the actuarial certification that a scheme is well funded.

In addition, the defined-benefit funding code and the underpinning legislation already require trustees to aim to maintain a strong funding position, and that is actively overseen by the Pensions Regulator. I believe the safeguards we have put in place put members at the heart of the policy, which is a point of cross-party agreement, and will allow trustees to continue to be the people who strike the correct balance between the benefits for employers and members. I hope this offers some reassurance to the Committee that, for the reasons I have outlined, these amendments are unnecessary; I urge hon. Members not to press them.

[Kirsty Blackman]

The Minister has said that trustees are required to act in the interests of and to the benefit of scheme members. However, they are required to act so that members will get the benefits that they are promised under the pension. They are not required to act to the benefit of scheme members. As I said earlier, there is a distinct possibility—particularly with surplus, which is not going into the pension scheme and which can only be paid if those benefits are already guaranteed—that the surplus is only a surplus in the case where members are definitely going to get those benefits anyway.

It is the case that trustees might not know what is to the benefit of members. Requiring them, or asking them, to consult members on what they would like, or to provide members with information about how money is going to be spent, could get better results for those members. It is not going to change the amount of pension they will get, which is the trustees’ requirement; however, it may change their lives in a more positive way. Whether or not they are people currently paying into the scheme and actively employed, there are ways that the surplus could be spent that would benefit or disbenefit their lives.

In making that case, I think there should be a consultation with members. The hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire made the point very well that we should encourage people to take more interest in and have more input into their pensions, so that they have a better idea of what is going on, of the possibility of surpluses and of how they are spent. I would appreciate it if the Minister, when he is considering the regulations and the changes being made, could think about how best to consult scheme members. Given that trustees have a duty to act not in the best interests of members, but in the best interests of members’ pensions, I would love to see, around the surplus, arrangements that benefit scheme members—whether they are currently paying, future or deferred members, or those already getting their pensions—rather than solely the employer and the employer’s intentions.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Gerald Jones.)

Pension Schemes Bill

Debate between Torsten Bell and Kirsty Blackman

2nd reading
Monday 7th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

Obviously that can happen only where there are surplus funds, and there may not be surplus funds in all circumstances. I just want to give the Minister a heads-up in relation to the questions about employee benefits. It would be useful in Committee to have more information about the Government’s analysis of how many of these surplus releases will directly benefit the employees rather than the employers. I understand that the Government, with their mission for growth, want investment in growing the company as well, but what kind of split does he expect to see? I do not expect an answer to that today.

[Torsten Bell]

It is nice to sometimes be able to surprise on the upside. I would expect employees to benefit in most cases, because trustees are in the driving seat and I am sure they will want to consider how employers and employees will benefit from any surplus release. Obviously, the exact split between the two will be a matter for the individual cases, but I am sure we will discuss that further in Committee.

I want to reassure the House that this is not about a return to the 1990s free-for-all. DB regulation has been transformed since then, and schemes will have to remain well funded and trustees will remain in the driving seat. They will agree to a release only where it is in members’ interests and, as I said, not all schemes are able to afford to buy out members’ pensions with insurers.

The Bill also introduces the long-awaited permanent legislative regime for DB superfunds, which is an alternative means to consolidate legacy DB liabilities. This supports employers who want to focus on their core business, and, as the superfunds grow, they will have the potential to use their scale to invest in more productive ways. Crucially, trustees will be able to agree to a transfer into a superfund only where buy-out is not available and where it increases savers’ security.

The Pension Protection Fund is, of course, the security backstop for DB members. It celebrates its 20th anniversary this year, and it now secures the pensions of over 290,000 people. The Bill updates its work in three important ways: first, by lifting restrictions on the PPF board so that it can reduce its levy where appropriate, freeing schemes and employers to invest; secondly, by ensuring that PPF and financial assistance scheme information will be displayed on the pensions dashboard as it comes onstream, which my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent and Rhymney (Nick Smith), who is now not in his place, is keen to see; and thirdly and most importantly, by making a change to support people going through the toughest of times. As several hon. Members have called for, we are extending the definition of terminal illness from a 6-month to a 12-month prognosis, providing earlier access to compensation for those who need it most.

Pensions are complex beasts, and so are the laws that surround them. That complexity is inevitable, but not to the extent that some recent court cases risk creating. The Bill also legislates to provide clarity that decisions of the Pensions Ombudsman in overpayment cases may be enforced without going to a further court. I have been clear that the Government will also look to introduce legislation to give affected pension schemes the ability to retrospectively obtain written actuarial confirmation that historical benefit changes met the necessary standards at the time.

Governments are like people in one important respect: they can easily put off thinking about pensions until it is too late. I am determined not to do that. We are ramping up the pace of pension reform. The past two decades have delivered a big win, with more people saving for their retirement, but that was only ever half the job. Today, too many are on course for an income in retirement that is less than they deserve and less than they expect. The Bill focuses on securing higher returns for savers and supporting higher income in retirement without asking any more than is necessary of workers’ living standards in the here and now.

The Bill sits within wider pension reforms as we seek to build not just savings pots but a pensions system that delivers comfortable retirements and underpins the country’s future prosperity. Legislation for multi-employer collective defined-contribution schemes will be introduced as soon as possible after the summer recess, and we will shortly launch the next phase of our pensions review to complete the job of building a pensions system that is strong, fair and sustainable. It is time to make sure that pension savings work as hard for all our constituents as our constituents worked to earn them. I commend the Bill to the House.

Pensions: Expatriates

Debate between Torsten Bell and Kirsty Blackman

Tuesday 20th May 2025 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Torsten Bell)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Dowd. I thank the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon (Gregory Stafford) for opening today’s debate, which was granted by Backbench Business Committee, and for setting the scene so well, in a way that others then followed.

I thank all hon. Members who made the time to speak and set out their cases. They covered issues that are important to many state pension recipients living abroad. I recognise that those who are affected, who obviously cannot speak today, feel strongly about this issue; many of us, in their shoes, would feel the same. On that basis alone, it is right to debate this subject and to hear from hon. Members about their constituents, including my hon. Friend the Member for West Dunbartonshire (Douglas McAllister), the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) and others who are not in Scotland.

Late last year, my predecessor, now the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, met Anne Puckridge and others from the End Frozen Pensions campaign to discuss the policy’s impact. We have listened, and I read case studies every week, either from hon. Members who have written in about them or in letters directly from pensioners themselves. We are all aware that there are many countries where high inflation has posed particular challenges in recent years, so I recognise the salience of today’s subject matter.

We all recognise the importance of the state pension, as the UK’s foundation of support for older people. In 2025-26, the Government will spend over £174 billion on benefits for pensioners. That represents 5.8% of the UK’s GDP and includes £145 billion spent on the UK state pension, including for those living abroad. I raise those facts because they are important; they sit behind the debates that we often have here or in the main Chamber about the size of the state and the level of taxation.

As hon. Members are very aware, the state pension is uprated abroad only when there is a legal basis for doing so, which is why we are here today.

[Kirsty Blackman]

On that, the state pension is uprated abroad only when there is a legal requirement to do so. There is no legal bar to the UK uprating those pensions in countries where there is not a reciprocal agreement in place.

[Torsten Bell]

There must be a legal basis for making payments. However, the hon. Member is right to say that under the specific policy I am setting out, payments are made only when there is a legal requirement to do so. As the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon set out right at the beginning, that is a long-standing policy that has lasted for 70 years. For many years, the priority for successive Governments of all parties has been to prioritise those living in the UK when making difficult spending decisions on pensioner benefits. That was true of the coalition Government, when a Lib Dem Pensions Minister chose for five years not to make any progress on this issue. He did that under a Conservative Government and a Conservative Prime Minister all the way through.

The hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe (David Chadwick)—my constituency neighbour—mentioned Lloyd George, who introduced a state pension with no uprating whatever. The first uprating of the contributory state pension in 1946, under the Attlee Government—again, I am making a point about the cross-party basis of some of these decisions—was not paid to pensioners living abroad. So since the beginning, policy on pension uprating has been consistent.

As we have discussed, people move abroad for many reasons—to be with their family, as the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) set out, enjoy a particular climate or return to their country of birth. It is for individuals, not the Government, to make those decisions, but when they make them, they will of course consider the impact on their finances, alongside a wide range of other factors. As the hon. Member for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith) set out, our duty is to ensure that information regarding the effect of living abroad on the state pension entitlement is available. These days, that is on gov.uk, and includes information on where the uprating does and does not occur.

Pensioners who have retired to other countries will obviously take into account the UK state pension position, but they will also look at the wider provision for pensioners in those countries. Many countries will have a means-tested provision that is similar to the UK pension credit. It is true that the real-terms value of some people’s state pension will fall over time, but in most cases, particularly in the countries that have been mentioned today, that will be compensated for by higher means-tested payments when they are living abroad.

It is also important that further advice can be obtained from the International Pension Centre or the Pension Service. The hon. Member for South West Devon asked whether there is more we can do, and I want to be clear that I am always open to new ideas about what more we can do to communicate what happens to the state pension if people choose to retire abroad. More generally, I am happy to meet with any hon. Members who have suggestions in that area.