Financial Services Bill

Tom Greatrex Excerpts

Monday 6th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Tom Greatrex (Rutherglen and Hamilton West) (Lab/Co-op)]

I wish to make a relatively brief contribution. I do so without the degree of expertise that has been exhibited by a number of right hon. and hon. Members who have spoken, particularly those who have served on the Joint Committee and on the Treasury Committee. I know that they have examined the detail of this Bill and have taken evidence on it over a period of time. My expertise on and knowledge of financial services has largely come about as a result of issues raised by constituents since my election to this House. That is why I wish to spend a little time discussing part 2 of the Bill, which creates the Financial Conduct Authority, which we have heard referred to as one of the successor bodies to the Financial Services Authority, and part 5, which deals with independent inquiries into investment schemes, among other things.

I come to those parts of the Bill as a result of what I suspect will become known soon enough as the latest in a long line of mis-selling episodes, to which the Chancellor and shadow Chancellor referred. My right hon. Friend reminded the House that there have been a number of these episodes over the course of 30 years and under various different regulatory regimes and set-ups. The issue that I refer to is the collapse of the Arch Cru investment vehicle in 2009 and the interests of the 20,000 individuals who have, almost certainly, been adversely affected by it. As many hon. Members will be aware, Arch Cru was established in 2006 and was sold as a vehicle to provide low-risk, cautiously managed funds that were sold through independent financial advisers and, like all investment funds in the UK, were regulated by the FSA. The authorised corporate director was Capita Financial Managers, part of the Capita group, and the two depositories of the fund were the Bank of New York Mellon and HSBC, whose activities were, again, regulated by the FSA. Many of those who invested in Arch Cru did so on the basis that it was managed cautiously, and the use of those household names gave people comfort that the regulator was overseeing those bodies and that people’s money was indeed being invested cautiously and wisely.

As many hon. Members will know, the fund was suspended in March 2009. At the time, it was worth £363 million but by March 2011 its value was estimated at £148.8 million, which means that many people have suffered losses as a result. Far from being cautiously managed, funds were invested in cells registered in Guernsey in a cavalier manner. Investments were made in off-plan property, in real estate in Dubai, and in Greek shipping and ferries. It remains highly dubious as to what level of recompense investors are likely to receive.

The collapse of a supposedly low-risk collective investment scheme such as Arch Cru has caused a high degree of anxiety. Although we accept that no regulatory system can provide absolute protection, the failures of the FSA, in many respects, in this case mean that it is important that the measures being put in place give consumers the right amount of protection. That is why I particularly welcome clauses 64 to 68, which deal with independent inquiries into regulatory failures in respect of collective investment schemes. However, clause 64(5) has the effect of meaning that events occurring before 1 December 2011 will not be subject to the power of inquiry, and Arch Cru’s collapse occurred well before that cut-off date. The Government have the power under section 14 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to institute an inquiry, and I hope that they will still make use of that power.

Clause 67 deals with the conclusion of an inquiry, noting that the person holding that inquiry must

“make a written report to the Treasury”.

The existing legislation contains a provision stating that the Treasury may publish the whole or any part of a report and, should it decide to do so, the report should be laid before Parliament. However, a similar provision appears to be missing from the Bill, so perhaps the Financial Secretary will enlighten the House on whether I have missed it or whether we will need to make an amendment in Committee to ensure that that degree of transparency is in place for such inquiries.

If we are to minimise the chances of another episode such as the Arch Cru collapse happening again, the people who invest their retirement nest eggs on the basis of being told that a fund is cautiously invested need to be adequately protected by the regulatory regime. There should be some governance over the terms used to describe investment vehicles, especially where, as in this case, the reality turns out to be very different from the description.

[Alun Cairns]

I pay tribute to the work that the hon. Gentleman has done on Arch Cru. Does he share my concern that the risk category of any financial product is assessed by the Investment Managers Association and that there is no regulatory framework or matrix by which such an organisation conducts its work on assessing the risk of a product?

[Tom Greatrex]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I do not wish it to appear as if we are just congratulating each other, but I want to place on the record my appreciation of all the work that he has done on Arch Cru as co-chair of the all-party group on Arch Cru. It is my pleasure to co-chair that group with him and he makes an important and significant point.

As the Bill goes through Committee, we need to consider that issue in detail as it relates to the set-up of the FCA, to ensure that we are never again in a position in which descriptors with no value are attached to investment opportunities, almost as a marketing exercise, with nothing behind them. I hope that the Financial Secretary hears the hon. Gentleman’s important point, and that we can return to it in more detail.

One way in which to prevent a repeat of the experience is fully to learn the lessons of the Arch Cru collapse, and to ensure that, as a result, the consumer is protected by a more robust regime. The Financial Secretary will no doubt recall that in a Westminster Hall debate on Arch Cru last October, many Members on both sides of the House asked the Government to instigate a section 14 inquiry. The Financial Secretary replied that he did not think such an inquiry appropriate at that point and he continued:

“The powers are available where it appears that significant damage has been done to the interests of consumers that might not have occurred but for a serious failure of regulation. It is worth pointing out that the power has never been used.”—[Official Report, 19 October 2011; Vol. 533, c. 285WH.]

First, I am not quite as convinced as the Financial Secretary is that the fact that the power has never been used means that it should not be used. Secondly, to my mind, Arch Cru is an example of regulatory failure. The FSA failed properly to regulate the fund, and let down my constituents and thousands of others across the country by not stepping in earlier. The FSA was statutorily responsible for regulating Capita Financial Managers, which was the authorised corporate director for Arch Cru, yet Capita failed to see what was going on until it was far too late.

As the intervention by the hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) illustrated, there is cross-party consensus on the issue, and the all-party group extends across the whole House, with members from every party other than the Scottish National party—that might be pertinent. When answering questions in December, the Prime Minister was receptive to the idea of considering what more the Government could do to address this important issue. One course of action could, and I would argue should, be to establish a section 14 inquiry, the findings of which could be used to inform a detailed discussion of the proposed FCA, and to ensure that the body is established with the resources, expertise and powers necessary to minimise the opportunity of anything like the Arch Cru failure happening again.

Even at this late stage, I ask Ministers—the Economic Secretary is now on the Front Bench and might be less familiar with the issue than the Financial Secretary, who was there when I started speaking—to reconsider the position on a section 14 inquiry, so that this part of the Bill can be as robust as possible. When the current regulator admits that it did not know what was happening, because of the structure of an investment vehicle and the nature of some of the investments in Guernsey and elsewhere, in my mind it becomes the responsibility of the Government to minimise the risks of the same thing happening again. The Government have an opportunity, as do we, through the Bill, to ensure that the successor body is better placed to ensure such a result.

It is sometimes easy, when getting into the weeds of an issue such as Arch Cru—as I and others have done over recent months—to forget that ultimately this is about people. It is about my constituents and others who deserve the right consumer protection, and we must be confident that in dealing with the consumer aspects of regulation, the successor body does not fail in the way its predecessor did. To ensure that, we need to know what did not work under that predecessor regime, so that there is confidence in the successor body and people are protected in the right way. That is why it is still relevant and important that the Government consider a section 14 inquiry into Arch Cru under the current legislation, and I hope that Treasury Ministers understand that this point is being made in the best interests of scrutiny, of effective regulation and of the consumers who expect, and deserve, to be protected when purchasing financial services products.