Telecoms Supply Chain Review

Tom Brake Excerpts

Monday 22nd July 2019 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Wright]

I am very grateful for my right hon. Friend’s support. As he knows, my clear intent in commissioning the review was to focus first and foremost on security. No other consideration comes ahead of security. Fundamentally, we must make a decision on the basis of what is in our security interests, but he is also right that if we were to focus solely on one company or country, we would miss the broader important point that our telecoms supply chain must be resilient and secure, regardless of where equipment comes from, because risk may transfer from place to place and our population is entitled to expect that the approach we take puts security at its heart, wherever the equipment comes from.

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

It is essential that the national security implications of using Huawei equipment be fully taken into account, but what consideration, if any, is given to the use of Huawei equipment in the repression of Uyghurs? Do the UK Government take that and the use of similar equipment by other manufacturers from China into account?

[Jeremy Wright]

I know that the right hon. Gentleman regularly raises this issue with colleagues from the Foreign Office. As he knows, we are concerned about it across Government. It is important that the UK Government, in their communications with the Chinese Government, stress the importance of human rights and their protections for minorities as well as for majority populations in China, and we will continue to do that. The judgments we make in this review will not diminish the UK Government’s enthusiasm for making that case.

Leaving the EU: Mobile Roaming Charges

Tom Brake Excerpts

Thursday 7th February 2019 Commons Chamber

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

If there is no deal, it will be because the Government have made a conscious choice to go down that route.

Has the Secretary of State attempted to assess the cost implications if some of those companies that say they have no plans at present to introduce roaming charges do, indeed, do so? Has he assessed the associated costs of losing the European health insurance card, of difficulties in securing travel insurance and of the visa charges that have been mentioned? How much will that cost British consumers going on holiday?

[Jeremy Wright]

The costs of health and travel insurance are a little beyond the ambit of this urgent question, but I repeat the point that what the Government can do is to ensure that any additional costs to consumers that occur as a result of a no-deal Brexit—we fervently hope to avoid that eventuality—are limited in any way that the Government can properly limit them. The best way we can do that is to make sure that consumers know when they have reached a certain point of spending so that they can make their own judgment on whether they wish to go beyond that point. The real concern that consumers generally express is that they do not know when they are running up these very large bills while using their data abroad, which is precisely what we seek to avoid. We have chosen exactly the same point at which to make that notification as already exists in the EU regulation.

Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation

Tom Brake Excerpts

Tuesday 20th November 2018 Commons Chamber

[Margot James]

I know my hon. Friend and his Select Committee are looking into these matters and I look forward to engaging with him on them. I encourage Roger Taylor and his team to do so as well. My hon. Friend is right. A recent NESTA report looking forward at the workforce of 2030 found that 20% of our current workforce are in occupations that are likely to be subject to automation and 10% are in occupations that are likely to expand, so this is an important issue and is right at the top of our agenda.

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

The scandals of Cambridge Analytica and AggregateIQ show just how far behind Governments are in tackling data ethics and the manipulation of data. Does the Minister agree that such issues are often best tackled at EU level, and that this is precisely the wrong time for the Government to walk away from the EU if we are serious about addressing these problems?

[Margot James]

The matters to which the right hon. Gentleman refers were recently the subject, and continue to be the subject, of an Information Commissioner’s Office inquiry. I am confident that the ICO has the necessary resources and expertise to undertake these inquiries. Leaving the EU does not mean that we will be abandoning our data protection standards. We fully expect to maintain them and develop them further over time.

Artificial Intelligence Sector Deal

Tom Brake Excerpts

Thursday 26th April 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Order. Before I take questions on this statement, I should advise or rather remind the House that there is a further statement to follow, but that statement is not likely to absorb much time in the Chamber, not least on account of the 39 Back-Bench Members who wish to contribute to the principal debate of the day, on customs and borders. I would not want colleagues to be taken unaware, and therefore I am taking the unusual step of indicating that the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and the hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Angus Brendan MacNeil), together with the 39 Back Benchers who wish to speak in that important debate, should really as I speak be beetling across to the Chamber, because it would be most regrettable if they had not arrived for the start of the debate, which they so eagerly sought and of which I am myself in eager anticipation.

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

I thank the Minister for her statement. I did not require artificial intelligence to establish DeepMind’s view on Brexit. When I googled “DeepMind” and “Brexit”, it came up immediately with the company’s concerns about the impact of Brexit. How will the Minister ensure that the IT innovation that currently flows around the European Union can continue post Brexit? How will she ensure that top-flight companies such as DeepMind can continue to attract EU citizens to work in that important sector? Finally, she will be aware that the EU investment fund for British start-ups, which was investing £500 million in 2016, has dropped to £53 million. Much of that money would have been spent on artificial intelligence. Is she confident that Government funds will be able to replace that?

[Margot James]

The right hon. Gentleman makes some very serious points. We are committed to making the UK a destination for global talent and equity finance and venture capital in the years to come, post Brexit. As he says, we already have companies that have invested substantially in the UK; he mentioned DeepMind, and we have many others. We have doubled the number of exceptional talent visas to 2,000, and we are offering scientists who have come to this country on tier 1 visas full settlement rights at three years. I mentioned in my response to the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Liam Byrne) that, post the EU investment in this country and AI, the Chancellor has announced substantial additional moneys available through the British Business Bank to replace over the long term EU funding that will be lost once we leave the EU.

Russian Interference in UK Politics

Tom Brake Excerpts

Thursday 21st December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered Russian interference in UK politics and society.

I will indeed seek to stay within your limit, Mr Speaker, and hope to gain some credit for it at some point in the near future.

This is a very welcome opportunity to debate this subject, and I thank the Backbench Business Committee for making the time available and the colleagues who supported the bid. I am pleased that we have a very good representation of senior Members here who have a long-standing interest in Russia.

The premise of this debate is that the UK is at risk of neglecting the threat that Russia poses. I argue that Russia is a clear and present danger and presents a threat to our democracy. Some may consider that to be an alarmist statement, but I hope to explain why, in my view, it is not. I will not be able to cover, in the 15 minutes available, all areas of concern, such as the impact of dirty Russian money in the UK and the UK Government’s apparent unwillingness to hunt it down, in relation to Magnitsky in particular; the extent to which the energy industry is vulnerable to Russian takeovers or leverage; or the appropriateness of the London Stock Exchange floating the EN+ Group. I suspect that other Members will pick up on those issues.

Why do I make this alarmist statement about Russia? First, clearly, there have been attempts by the Russians to influence the outcome of a number of elections. According to the Henry Jackson Society, there is not one smoking gun, but it is a case of joining up the dots, and Russia has a history of interference. The threat is not new; it has been around for a decade, especially, for instance, in the Estonian and Georgian elections in 2008 and 2009. Of course there was the well-publicised Russian interference mainly in the period post the Scottish independence referendum, when they tried to discredit the result of the election.

In the US, we have seen the most famous example of cyber-interference through the activities of the Internet Research Agency, which has spent more than $2 million on activity in America alone over the past two years, and that funding was directly authorised from the Kremlin. This pattern of behaviour suggests that Russia will also have interfered in the EU referendum.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The right hon. Gentleman referred to this interference as having taken place over the last decade. Has this not been the pattern of behaviour ever since the Bolshevik coup 100 years ago?

[Tom Brake]

As I said earlier, I only have 15 minutes in which to contribute to the debate. Although I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that we could go back a lot further, perhaps he could do so in his speech, if he makes one. I am focusing only on recent activity.

Information emerged just last month about hundreds of fake Twitter accounts, probably run from St Petersburg. Research at the University of Edinburgh in relation to the EU referendum showed that at least 419 fake accounts tweeted about Brexit a total of just under 3,500 times, although that was mostly after the referendum had taken place, rather than before. Meanwhile, research by City, University of London from October showed that there was a

“13,500-strong Twitter bot army”

present on the social media site around the time of the referendum, and in the four weeks before the vote, those accounts posted no fewer than 65,000 tweets about the referendum, showing a “clear slant” towards the leave campaign. However, there was no mention in that report of any specific Russian involvement.

[Julian Knight (Solihull) (Con)]

I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on leading this debate. Does he agree that part of the reason that most of the hard evidence seems to come only from Twitter is that Facebook does not co-operate as it should in order to get to the root of these problems?

[Tom Brake]

As the hon. Gentleman probably expects, I will discuss Facebook shortly, including some negative and positive things about its activities.

I should say that I am not attacking the Russians here; I am attacking the Russian Government. Of course, some things that the Russian Government or people associated with them might have been involved with may, indeed, be also activities that other state actors are conducting, so this is not just about Russia, although that is clearly the subject of the debate.

The United States has a gaping vulnerability to disinformation operations carried out by Russia and other malicious actors across the social media environment. In the USA, just one account from the troll factory in St Petersburg managed to amass more than 120,000 followers, interacted with the Trump campaign leaders, and was quoted in newspapers such as the Washington Post as a voice of the American right. Is the Minister happy that the UK has adequate defences against such interference here?

The simple truth is that although Arron Banks and Nigel Farage may be Putin fans, President Putin is certainly not a friend of this country. Russia would only have interfered in the EU referendum or any other elections here in order to damage the security of the UK and, indeed, the EU.

[Liam Byrne (Birmingham, Hodge Hill) (Lab)]

The right hon. Gentleman is making a brilliant point, but has he noticed that the American national security strategy—published this week—explicitly recognises this threat, whereas our national security strategy does not?

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Brake]

That is a very good point, which I will come back to. The Minister now has advance notice that he needs to be prepared to answer that question, because it is clearly a source of concern.

There is no soft power in Putin’s eyes and, as far as he is concerned, the use of social media to interfere in foreign states is a vital, weaponised tool. The covert interference I referred to is supplemented by more overt attempts to create a media counter-narrative. I am now talking about RT. The RT chief editor, Margarita Simonyan, is on the record comparing RT to the Ministry of Defence, saying in 2008:

“We were fighting the information war against the whole of the Western world”.

She referred to “the information weapon”, which is used in “critical moments”, and said that RT’s task in peacetime is to build an audience, so they can fight the information war better next time. Not surprisingly, therefore, Chatham House and the Henry Jackson Society see RT as a tool of destabilisation from the Kremlin.

Members will know that RT was found in breach by Ofcom in September 2015 for stories about Assad and chemical weapons. However, as I understand it, Ofcom has not always enforced sanctions as and when appropriate. According to the Library, Sputnik has never been found in breach by Ofcom. Ofcom imposed 84 sanctions against 57 broadcasters in the 10 years up to March 2017—RT was not the subject of a sanction during that time—and found broadcasters in breach of the broadcasting code more than 2,500 times

I am certainly not advocating shutting down RT, and I do not think anyone else is. I just want to ensure that it abides by the broadcasting rules and that appropriate action is taken by Ofcom every time it does not. Is the Minister happy with Ofcom’s actions? Does it consistently pursue RT for breaches in the way he would like? As an aside, I would like Ofcom to be much more active in pursuing a number of other TV channels that are broadcast here, in particular when threats are made to the Ahmadi Muslim community on some of those channels.

No British parliamentarian should be taking money from RT. In fact, I would go one step further and say that, frankly, no British parliamentarian should appear on RT. The only exception to that rule might be if they have complete control and are completely unedited—if they can go on the channel and say what they want, knowing that it will not be chopped, edited and cut by RT. Apart from that, no one here or in the House of Lords should ever appear on that channel. The only time that RT ever contacts me is when I have said something critical about the Government. Well, I am happy to say critical things about the Government on the BBC, but RT is trying to create an agenda that is about attacking the Government at every turn, and I will not facilitate that process.

The next issue is the question of whether the Russians are infiltrating or leaking content from political party systems. Well, we know what they did regarding the Democrats. Incidentally, they also hacked the Republicans, but they only released the information on the Democrats. We also know that they attempted to infiltrate Macron’s team by setting up a number of websites with pseudo-official titles that would email Macron’s members of staff, trying to get them to click on links and provide back-door access to their systems. As I understand it, Macron managed to defeat that, mainly by inserting some fake news into the content that the Russians were trying to access so that the story was demolished because of the inconsistencies within it.

As Members will know, Monsieur Macron had a more aggressive and muscular stance towards Russia than any other parties in that French presidential election, and I believe that that is why he was targeted in a way in which the others were not. As I understand it, the other French political parties were targeted, but the Russians were clearly interested in releasing information that related to Macron in particular. Mr Putin has said that these hackers may not be associated with the Government and that they may be “patriotic” hackers. Well, they may be patriotic hackers as far as he is concerned, but one has to suspect that they have the Government’s endorsement, because I am sure that the Russian Government could clamp down on these so-called patriotic hackers if they wanted to do so.

I am trying to make my questions very clear because I know that the officials in the Box can then provide a written answer for the Minister to read out and get on the record straightaway, so I have another easy question for him. Will he consider making UK political parties part of the critical national infrastructure, and what are the implications of taking such a step?

To be able to ascertain the level of threat, we have to assess it accurately, otherwise I risk coming across as a conspiracy theorist. I know that I do already in relation to Brexit, but I do not want to become the person known for conspiracy theories in this place. The difficulty we have is that we do not really know the extent of the activity because, frankly, no one has investigated it properly yet. It is only when that has been done that we will know. I regret that it took so long for the Intelligence and Security Committee to be reconstituted, but I welcome the fact that it has stated that Russia will be a topic that it will focus on. Does the Minister think that the Committee should give priority to the subject? Would he also want the ISC to work effectively with the Electoral Commission so that it can go to places that the Electoral Commission cannot? An ISC inquiry would help us to establish accurately the level of threat.

To pick up on an earlier intervention, we know that Facebook was asked by the Electoral Commission to look at examples of paid ads from Russia, but it was not asked to look at the use of bots or trolls, so the picture we are going to get will, at best, be very incomplete. The response the commission has had—that the Russians apparently spent £7.50 on advertising—does not quite sound right to me.

[Jo Swinson (East Dunbartonshire) (LD)]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend on securing the debate. We are not talking just about a few Twitter or Facebook accounts with no picture avatar and 10 followers. The David Jones account had more than 100,000 followers and was listed as one of the most influential Twitter accounts during the last general election. It purports to be from Southampton, yet it tweets exclusively in office hours in a Russian time zone. Surely the social media companies have a greater role to play in identifying fake accounts—which are pretending to be something they are not—for the integrity of the debate we should all enjoy online.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Brake]

I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. I do not know whether she has, but I have engaged in exchanges with David Jones—clearly, I will not continue to do so—because whoever he or she is was a very prolific tweeter during that campaign. So, yes, we need to be aware of those issues.

According to Facebook, neither the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, nor No. 10, nor the intelligence services have given it any advice about what it should be looking for. If that is correct, it concerns me, and I hope the Minister will respond to that point.

[Liam Byrne]

I think the Americans looked at 47 accounts, which were all provided to the Mueller inquiry by intelligence agencies, but—the right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right—our agencies have offered, I think, only one. The other risk we have to be careful of, though, is that money was transferred onshore—the Electoral Commission is now investigating that—so some of the illicit money may have come from UK onshore accounts.

[Tom Brake]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that intervention. That is another aspect of this issue that I am not going to be able to dwell on at great length in the few minutes that remain.

Facebook is doing work on ad transparency, and I welcome that. Personally, I would be comfortable with having the equivalent of a “printed and published” on the political ads that I place on Facebook. Such measures would help people to understand who was actually promoting themselves. I wonder whether the Minister would support that suggestion.

There is also the issue of authentication. I and, I suspect, every Member here have a blue tick on Twitter, so we have been confirmed as being real people. Maybe Facebook should do something similar to authenticate people with Facebook accounts so that we know that everyone is a genuine person, rather than someone sitting in an office block on the outskirts of Moscow preparing fake accounts. I hope the Minister will agree with that point as well.

We need to resource our response appropriately, and I have concerns—I certainly had concerns when I was a Minister and had dealings with it—that the Electoral Commission does not, in fact, have the resources to deal with this issue. Dealing with activity abroad is clearly not within its remit, and it would not have any expertise to do that, so we need to hear how it can access that expertise. The Minister is nodding, so hopefully he will be able to clarify that issue. I hope he is confident that the Electoral Commission has the necessary resources and expertise, or can at least access them.

[Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)]

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman, and I ask him to emphasise the point about the resources that are needed to investigate. There is a danger that we are sidetracked into the social media side of this, when, ultimately, the more important thing is the money. Does he believe that the Electoral Commission is sufficiently equipped, resourced and empowered to properly follow the money and to ascertain where donations come from, whether the original donors really own that money and whether the agencies and the Electoral Commission need more powers to properly track the finance and the politics?

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Brake]

My short answer is, no, I do not think it is. Clearly, that needs to be acted on. It is not just about political parties; it is also about tracking the money associated with political movements, such as the leave campaign or—this may not be controversial for the right hon. Gentleman—Momentum, so that we actually have some clarity about where the money is coming from and so on. We would all benefit if there was more transparency.

[John Spellar]

Until we get a change in mindset among these bodies, additional resources will not have the necessary impact. These bodies have to have the will and the necessary policy framework, and action on the resources may follow that if they are not sufficient. That applies not just to the Electoral Commission, but right the way across the agencies of Government.

[Tom Brake]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that. Yes, this debate is partly about giving them the will and telling them that they have the backing of Members of Parliament on both sides of the House to take the action that is needed.

I will conclude by reading out the few questions I have left for the Minister—I have been generous in taking interventions. First, as I understand it, the Government have not tasked the intelligence and security services with investigating Russian subversion as a high priority. Russia is a tier 1 threat, but the six-point national security strategy does not mention defence against Russian interference in our political system, so will the Minister press for that to be changed?

On the funding of political movements, does the Minister agree, following the intervention from the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), that financial accountability for political movements must be improved as well? On the Mueller inquiry, will the Minister confirm that the UK Government will proactively seek and supply any relevant information to the inquiry, rather than just sit there and wait to be approached? Finally, social media companies are, on the positive side, keen to work with the Government to try to close some of the loopholes we have referred to today.

We need to make sure that Russia is held publicly to account, whether that is through Ofcom or through Ministers, when they know that this has happened, making it clear that the Russians have been actively hacking some of our systems—as they did in relation to the NHS hacking by North Korea. The ISC also needs to come forward with its report.

I am pleased to have had the opportunity to raise this issue, and I hope the House will give the Minister the oomph he needs to go away and ensure that the respective Departments—one of the problems is that this is an FCO, Cabinet Office and Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport issue—will grab this bull by the horns and make sure that Russia, because of the threat it presents to the UK, is dealt with with the degree of seriousness that is required.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Brake]

I thank the Minister for his tough words about the social media companies, but we also need to ensure that the security services provide them with information they may have so that they can follow the leads already obtained by the intelligence services. I hope that the Minister will take it from this debate that the House demands that the UK Government prioritise defending our democracy from Russian interference.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered Russian interference in UK politics and society.

Leaving the EU: Data Protection

Tom Brake Excerpts

Thursday 12th October 2017 Commons Chamber

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

I thank the Minister for so generously giving way. I just wanted to press him on the point that he made about the engagement that will happen at a technical level. In practice, does that mean that our standards will be maintained in tandem with those in the EU, and that therefore there will be no difference between the two?

[Matt Hancock]

What it means is that the arrangements are harmonised right now. Should the Data Protection Bill become an Act, as I sincerely hope it will—it does have cross-party support—our existing arrangements at the point of exit will be harmonised. What happens after that will depend on the negotiation of our future relationship, with the UK being sovereign. The point is to ensure that the technical details are informed by high-quality UK technical considerations and the capability of the Information Commissioner’s Office. This is, of course, subject to negotiation. We set that out as something we wanted to consider when we published the paper in the summer, but, as the right hon. Gentleman may have heard, we are not yet on to negotiating our future relationship, although we are looking forward to that happening.

During the summer, we published the future partnership paper, which sets out how we ensure the continued protection and uninterrupted exchange of personal data between the EU and the UK. The purpose of setting that out was to offer stability and confidence to businesses, public authorities, charities and individuals. My message to business in particular is very clear. We understand how important this matter is. We know that it is in the strong self-interest of the UK and the EU to get a good deal that involves the unhindered free flow of data. The new partnership should protect the privacy of individuals and respect the UK’s sovereignty, including the UK’s ability to protect the security of its citizens and to maintain and develop its position as a leader in data protection. Ensuring that we protect privacy while also allowing for the innovative use of big data so that the UK can be a world leader in artificial intelligence are the joint goals of the Data Protection Bill.

[Matt Hancock]

I am sure that the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester (Mr Walker), will have heard that point—this is a bit like a return to business questions from earlier. Parliamentary procedure is a matter for that Bill, but the hon. Gentleman has made his case. It is very important that the element of the GDPR that is directly applicable and therefore not in the Data Protection Bill is brought into UK law. However, we have designed the Bill so that that can slot directly in, meaning that once we leave, the UK should have a fully consistent, full-spectrum data protection regime under our legislation.

The new relationship should also not impose unnecessary additional costs on businesses and must be based on the objective consideration of evidence. Furthermore, because many of these issues are technical, we will continue to seek ongoing regulatory co-operation between the EU and the UK on current and future data protection issues. By doing that, we will build on the opportunity of a partnership between global leaders on data protection and continue to protect the privacy of individuals. As the paper that we published in the summer reiterates, it is important that we provide clarity and certainty for businesses and individuals as soon as possible, so that data flows are not disrupted when the UK leaves the EU. In addition, this is part of a wider global debate about the flow of data, because it is also incredibly important that we get right our data relationship with the United States, Japan and others.

[Tom Brake]

The Minister is being very generous with his time. I am sure that he is aware that the people of Gibraltar are concerned about the impact of the disruption of data flows. Gibraltar holds many data servers, and people there are very concerned that there might be longer-term impacts on their businesses. Can the Minister say anything about that?

[Matt Hancock]

Gibraltar is, and will continue to be, part of the United Kingdom. The Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union leads on issues relating to Gibraltar. He will have heard those concerns and will be able to respond to them in detail. In a sense, all this shows why it is so important to get this agreement right.

[Tom Brake]

I thank the Minister for giving a detailed response. I just wanted to put on record my interest in relation to Gibraltar so that it is not missed.

[Matt Hancock]

I am glad that I gave the right hon. Gentleman the opportunity to do so.

A strong relationship on data is beneficial to citizens as it will reassure them that their personal data is subject to robust protection. Maintaining the flow is also important. Once we have left the EU, we will continue to play a leading global role in the development and promotion of appropriate data protection standards with trading partners right around the world.

--- Later in debate ---

[Robert Neill]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The two key messages that one gets on this topic from Gibraltarians across the political spectrum and from all parts of Gibraltarian society are, first, that they do not want to be left behind in any arrangements that the UK makes with the EU27—they do not want to be collateral damage in any sense—and they want to maintain the arrangements and access that we have. Secondly, they want above all to maintain the closest possible friction-free trading arrangements with the UK, where a great deal of their service business is already conducted. Getting that right is terribly important for Gibraltar. It is a small economy with little other resilience, and it really needs our support in getting the data issues right to protect what is a very successful story for the British family.

My third point relates to legal matters. I take the liberty of referring to the Justice Committee’s ninth report from the 2016-17 Session of the last Parliament. As hon. Members will know, I have the honour to chair that Committee, and we issued a report on the implications of Brexit for the justice system. I hope we will soon have a response from the Government to that report; it is one of those that is in Ministers’ in-tray—or, I hope, out-tray—at the Ministry of Justice. Perhaps a gentle nudge might be delivered by those on the Treasury Bench to their right hon. Friends there.

The report is constructive and stresses the importance of information-sharing arrangements for the legal system and the justice system. Part of that relates to the UK’s legal services, and that links in to what I said earlier about the financial services sector in London. The legal service sector underpins a great deal of that financial services work, so getting this issue right is critical for UK firms contracting with parties in the EU or with third parties. At the moment, a great deal of work is written in English law, and that is a great advantage to us, so getting the data sharing right around all those matters is terribly important to the firms involved.

However, the other issue in our report, which is perhaps even more strikingly important, relates to information sharing on policing and critical justice co-operation. In many respects, we have led the field in this regard, and it will certainly not be the intention of the Government or of the Prime Minister, who both as Prime Minister and as Home Secretary has stressed the importance of this issue, to lose any of that information sharing. However, again, the devil is always in the detail in these matters, and perhaps I can highlight what the Committee found.

We took a considerable amount of evidence, and it is clear that the EU offers a number of information-sharing tools. I particularly want to highlight the importance of the European criminal records information system. We are in that at the moment, and it was clear from the professionals in the field who gave evidence to us that we must do all we can to maintain access to that system. It provides access to accurate records of EU citizens’ offending histories.

It is perhaps worth putting on the record a quote from the National Crime Agency. Its evidence was:

“Through ECRIS, the UK is able to exchange tens of thousands of pieces of information about criminal convictions each year that help police and other law enforcement agencies to investigate crime, protect the public and manage violent and sexual offenders.”

[Tom Brake]

Is the hon. Gentleman able to clarify for me whether that is one of the data exchanges that are subject to the European Court of Justice rulings to ensure safeguards for those exchanges of data? If I am correct, how does he see that relationship continuing with the UK post Brexit?

[Robert Neill]

My understanding is that it is likely to be subject to the ECJ, and we concluded that while we might seek to remove the direct jurisdiction of the ECJ in some matters, the idea that we will not have an ongoing relationship with the ECJ on such matters is unrealistic. That will be important.

We want to stay in ECRIS, but we noted that there are no previous examples of a non-EU member having access to it. We will have to seek a bespoke arrangement to achieve that, and I hope that Ministers regard that as a high priority.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Brake]

I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman’s excellent Committee had an opportunity to look at the contingency plans that would be necessary for all the valuable databases he has set out, should the UK crash out of the EU in March 2019.

[Robert Neill]

The clear evidence given to us was that the only viable contingency plan would be a significant transitional period. It would not be possible to replicate those systems in the event of a supposed clean-break arrangement, and it would be necessary to have transitional measures. The evidence did suggest that those could vary from sector to sector, in terms of the length of time required and the amount of detailed work to be done, but it would be a serious setback for us to leave the European Union and the current data-sharing arrangements without something being put in place to bridge us over the leaving period for implementation or a clear end state for our ongoing relationship in the areas of data sharing and criminal justice co-operation. It is in everybody’s interests that we achieve that and it is an important issue to bear in mind.

We concluded that data sharing is not an area in which we can take a risk. Indeed, we concluded that these matters are so important that one would ideally wish to see them decoupled from the rest of the Brexit negotiations. Divorce bills or otherwise, public safety and security work for our interests and for every one of the citizens of the EU27, too. The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point and I agree with him.

I have talked about two key systems and I want to highlight their interrelated and technical nature because it is important to put that on the record. As well as those two systems, we also have access to Prüm, a regime for exchanging biometric information and vehicle registration data. It reduces the time taken to find matches from tens of days to 15 minutes when fully in place. We have recently gone into Prüm, and the chairman of the Criminal Bar Association, Francis FitzGibbon QC made the point to us that—and I shall quote his stark words in full to highlight their significance—

“if someone lets off a bomb in Berlin and makes his way to London, the police will be able to get hold of the fingerprints of the chap they arrest for double parking, or whatever it is, instantaneously.”

That gives us the swift ability to track down serious threats to our safety across the continent. We have not yet implemented Prüm, but we have signed up to do so and I hope that we will make it clear that we will implement it while we remain in the EU and we will seek to continue in it once we leave.

Our concern was that both Norway and Iceland—which are not members of the EU, although they are Council of Europe countries and have association arrangements with Interpol and others—have waited some years to have access to Prüm. We have started from a closer position and it would be a tragedy if we went back to the same place in the queue as them, giving away something that we are already moving into. I hope that the Minister will reassure us that the Government will attend closely to those specific points during the negotiations.

Our conclusion was that all these matters, extradition arrangements, the EAW, the data sharing that underpins prisoner exchange arrangements, together with our arrangements on judicial co-operation—on which British judges work closely with their counterparts—and of course our membership of Europol are all part of a system that comes together to protect us in criminal justice and security matters. They were described by our witness Professor Wilson as part of a system that

“you cannot disaggregate because, in my view, if you take out elements of the system, you have a less effective system for protecting British citizens on the streets.”

That was also the clear evidence from the Northumbria Centre for Evidence and Criminal Justice Studies. The evidence was overwhelming. Sometimes, as lawyers, we get cases in which the evidence all points one way, and that was very much our conclusion from the evidence to the Committee’s inquiry. These are all important matters. Of course, they are but one part of the data protection and sharing regime, but they are critical.

We received the clear message from practitioners that whatever we do and however we get to these arrangements —I hope that the Bill, when it is brought to the House, will help us to achieve this—the end state has to include a means of making sure that our data sharing and data protection regime are sufficiently close to those of the EU27. We shall, therefore, have to have a means of tracking changes and replicating them when it is likely to be to our mutual advantage to do so. Otherwise, with the very best will in the world, a law enforcement agency or police officer in the EU27 might not be able to share potentially critical information with his or her UK counterparts because he or she might find themselves in breach of the data regulations in his or her own EU27 country. That cannot be in anyone’s interest. I hope that the Minister will reassure us that creating such a system will be the centrepiece of our objectives on data sharing in relation to criminal justice and co-operation matters.