Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Suella Braverman and John Hayes

Committee of the whole House
Wednesday 17th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[Suella Braverman]

I will tell the hon. Gentleman where we have a problem with a foreign court. In that scenario, when English courts had refused injunctions by the migrants to get off the flight, the foreign court overrode English judges, overrode the will of the Government and overrode the will of the British people to control our borders and stop the boats. That is the problem with a foreign court, and that is the problem that we are trying to fix.

When that flight was grounded in June 2022, it was because of rule 39 interim injunctions. Those orders are not contained in the European convention on human rights, and they are not a product or a content of the original convention. They are a creation of the Strasbourg court and the Strasbourg judges, and they have evolved over time pursuant to the living instrument doctrine that is espoused by the Strasbourg court and that has inflated and expanded its remit over decades, beyond anything conceived by the original drafters or any intention set out in the original versions of the European convention.

I believe that no one here disagrees with the aspirations and the content of the European convention on human rights. I do not disagree with anything set out in that document, which contains noble, vital and fundamental human rights that we are all proud to defend fervently and fiercely: against oppressive regimes; against authoritarianism; against genocide; against mass killings; and against some of the worst atrocities history has seen. That is the context of the European convention’s genesis.

To respond to the hon. Member for Walthamstow, the problem we are dealing with is the Court. It is the Court that has become politicised. It is the Court that has become interventionist. It is the Court that does not follow the traditional common-law rules of precedent to which the English courts subscribe. The Strasbourg Court and its judges have distorted the original European convention on human rights into something that bears no reflection to its original intention.

That has been exacerbated by Labour’s Human Rights Act. In recent decades we have seen a rights culture and litigiousness around immigration, asylum and many other areas. Public sector decision making has been stymied, thwarted and undermined by a heavily resourced, activist legal industry that is undermining Government decision making, stymying policy making and undermining law enforcement and public safety.

I have a few examples. Take the case of OO, a Nigerian national who was sentenced in 2016 to four years in prison for offences including possession of crack cocaine and heroin with intent to supply. He pleaded guilty to battery and assault in 2017. Those are serious offences. In 2020, the first-tier tribunal allowed his appeal against deportation on the grounds that he had very significant obstacles to integration in Nigeria that outweighed the public interest in his deportation. Despite the seriousness of his offending, and despite the risk he posed to the public, his article 8 rights, interpreted in a vastly elastic way—a distorted, illogical way—operated to stop him being deported.

Article 3 was invoked in the case of D v. UK. We can all agree with article 3, which prohibits torture and inhumane or degrading treatment but, in this case of a non-UK national who was convicted of dealing drugs, the Strasbourg court held that the effect of discontinuing his medical treatment, available in the UK but not in his destination country, amounted to inhumane or degrading treatment under article 3. Why should a convicted drug dealer be entitled to public services here and not be deported?

[Sir John Hayes]

Surely on that basis almost any deportation could be blocked, for few countries in the world can match the standard of our NHS, and once that precedent has been set every person will claim that they require treatment for the most minor of ailments.

[Suella Braverman]

I am afraid that my right hon. Friend is absolutely right to highlight that point. Article 3, and a stretched interpretation of it originating in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, by politicised judges pursuing a political agenda, has led to a perception that here in the UK we have an international health service, not a national health service.

Lastly, let us consider the case of AM (Zimbabwe) in 2022, thanks to which it has now become law that states that want to remove someone have to prove that medical facilities available to the deportee in their home country would remove any real risk that their lifespan would be shortened by their removal from NHS facilities. That is exactly the point that my right hon. Friend has made: the UK Government now have a duty to establish that foreign health services are sufficient before we deport people who may well pose a risk to public safety and, in some cases, national security in this country.

Those are the overall problems with the Court—not the convention, but the Court. Rule 39 is another symptom of the problem that we have with the Court and the judges, which is why the amendment is vital. It will make it clear that rule 39 orders are not binding and that it will be for the UK Government to make the decision on deportation, not a foreign court—an unidentified judge somewhere far away who does not have the same ambition or aspiration as this UK Government to stop the boats. That is why I will support the amendment enthusiastically today.

Let me conclude by saying that this is our last chance to fix this problem. We have stretched the patience of the British people. This comes down to a simple but profound question: who governs Britain? Is it us, the democratically elected representatives who have been directly sent here on behalf of the British people, on a clear mandate and with a clear instruction of what to do, and whose laws are passed by a clear and transparent majority, to which we can all be held to account at the ballot box? Or is it an opaque forum many miles away, in a different country, that is distant, outsourced, foreign and does not share our values—

Manchester Arena Inquiry: Volume 3 Report

Debate between Suella Braverman and John Hayes

Monday 6th March 2023 Commons Chamber

[Suella Braverman]

May I associate myself with the comments that the hon. Gentleman has so powerfully made about his constituents? The report does not pull its punches. Sir John is unequivocal in his assessment of what happened, what should have happened, what could have happened, and what may have resulted as a consequence. That is why the director-General of MI5 and the lead at Counter Terrorism Policing did not shy away from the words that they expressed last week. It is absolutely right that we support the families going forward. I want them to know that I have full confidence in the process that Sir John has just run. It has been extensive and it has taken a long time. Some of the hearings had to be carried out during covid, with additional burden. The process was exhaustive and robust at all times. We have here an authoritative conclusion and assessment of what happened and, importantly, lessons that we can all learn and take forward, so that such an incident does not happen again.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

The Home Secretary is to be commended for her statement today and for her refocusing of Prevent on Islamist fundamentalism. That tyranny is the greatest threat to us. Will she take account of the recommendations of this inquiry in two particular respects? The first is the relationship between counter-terrorism police and the intelligence services—she spoke about collaboration a moment ago. Secondly, as the shadow Home Secretary said, the continuing observation of those who were formerly subjects of interest but then moved to less stringent surveillance seems to be a critical element in this inquiry.

[Suella Braverman]

As Sir John said in his report, no one should underestimate the very difficult job that the Security Service and Counter Terrorism Policing do, and that job has become more difficult with the emergence of lone-actor terrorists whose activities are more difficult to track. That is why the Government, including MI5, are committed to doing everything in their power to strengthen our defences against terrorism. That is also why Prevent remains a vital tool for early intervention. Without a Prevent referral being made, it is impossible for authorities to intervene to support those susceptible to radicalisation. It is an essential tool in minimising and eliminating the threat posed by terrorism, and it is vital that we now carry out the reforms of William Shawcross to improve it so that we stamp out this insidious behaviour.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Suella Braverman and John Hayes

Thursday 3rd May 2018 Commons Chamber

[Suella Braverman]

The hon. Gentleman raises a crucial point relating to the development of our domestic space strategy, and Scotland has a strong heritage in the sector. For example, Glasgow has built more satellites in the past two years compared with other European cities, and we also have the Prestwick aerospace park, Strathclyde University and many companies breaking new frontiers. We want the UK to reach space from our own shores, and we recently passed the Space Industry Act 2018, which is the first key step towards licensing the first missions from the UK into space. Brexit will not pose a barrier to our journey into space.

[Mr John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

The ancients named the planets after their gods. In affirming that the United Kingdom will continue to lead geo-galactic enterprise and innovation across the continent, will the Minister explain how, goddess-like, she changed her name and tell us what role she intends to play in promoting the United Kingdom in this place, in the Government, on earth and across the cosmos?

[Suella Braverman]

My right hon. Friend sets the bar very high. I thank him for his question, for his stellar contributions and his work with the space sector, and particularly for his work on the Space Industry Act, which, as I said, has paved the way for our domestic policy. His reference to my goddess-like status is slightly exaggerated, but I would expect nothing less of him. Even in this space age, it takes a brave woman to follow tradition and change her name following marriage. He is right to suggest that the UK’s historic strength in the space sector will be secured as we leave the European Union and develop our own new partnership with our allies across the channel. It is in that spirit, boldly going where no woman has gone before, that I can tell the House from the Dispatch Box that, as of today, I am pleased to be known as Suella Braverman.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Suella Braverman and John Hayes

Committee Debate: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 19th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Hayes]

That is a fair argument and that is why it is necessary to supplement what the hon. and learned Gentleman describes with the code of practice in the way that I have described. My invitation to him was that if he accepts that, he might want to focus attention on the code of practice to see whether it is as good as it might be. I drew attention to the provision on the necessity and proportionality. It might be that the draft could be further improved. After all, nothing, at least on earth, is perfect, and certainly no Government would want to claim perfection—

[Suella Fernandes]

rose—

[Mr Hayes]

I was about to say that perfection was an intellectual construct, but I am happy to give way on that note.

[Suella Fernandes]

Is it not impossible that privacy will not be considered as part of any application? Proportionality runs through the authorisation regime, and if a single point of contact has to apply a proportionality test, by definition and necessity, he will incorporate a wide-ranging consideration of the impact on privacy.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Suella Braverman and John Hayes

Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

Welcome to the Chair, Mr Owen, for my first contribution to this Committee.

Regarding amendments 59 and 60, is it not the position that bulk interception is provided for under section 8(4) of RIPA and is therefore subject to tests of necessity and proportionality? If it relates to a British citizen within the British Isles and an analyst wishes to select for examination the content of the communication of an individual known to be located in the British islands, the analyst has to apply to the Secretary of State for additional authorisation under section 16(3) of RIPA—similar to section 8(1). There are robust and extensive safeguards in place for this purpose.

[Mr Hayes]

I am delighted to be able to say in response to that extremely well informed intervention that my hon. Friend is right. The Bill does not actually add to bulk powers, contrary to what some have assumed and even claimed. In the sense that it reinforces safeguards and maintains the ability of our agencies to collect bulk data, it builds on what we already do. The Bill pulls together much of the powers in existing legislation; part of its purpose is to put all of those powers in one place, making them easier to understand and more straightforward to navigate. She is absolutely right; we took those powers in RIPA because they were needed to deal with the changing threats and the character of what we knew we had to do to counter them. That was done in no way other than out of a proper, responsible desire to provide the intelligence agencies with what they needed to do their jobs.

To return to amendments 59 and 60, when people are discovered to be outside the country and are subject to an investigation by the security services they do not usually present their credentials for examination, and it is important that the powers we have fill what would otherwise be a gaping hole in our capacity to do what is right and necessary. The aim of the Bill is to place vital powers on a statutory footing that will stand the test of time.

Amendment 83 relates to clause 14 and the definition of secondary data. It is important to point out that it has always been the case that an interception warrant allows communications to be obtained in full. Historically, that has been characterised in law as obtaining the content of communication and of any accompanying “related communications data”. However, as communications have become more sophisticated it has become necessary to revise the definitions to remove any ambiguities around the distinction between content and non-content data and to provide clear, simple and future-proof definitions that correctly classify all the data the intercepting agents require to carry out their functions.

Secondary data describes data that can be obtained through an interception warrant other than the content of communications themselves. Those data are less intrusive than content, but are a broader category of data than communications data. For example, it could include technical information, such as details of hardware configuration, or data relating to a specific communication or piece of content, such as the metadata associated with a photographic image—the date on which it was taken or the location—but not the photograph itself, which would, of course, be the content.

I want to make it clear that the data will always, by necessity, be acquired through interception. The definition does not expand the scope of the data that can be acquired under a warrant, but it makes clearer how the data should be categorised. Interception provides for the collection of a communication in full and the amendment would not serve to narrow the scope of interception. It would, however, reduce the level of clarity about what data other than content could be obtained under a warrant. It would also have the effect of undermining an important provision in the Bill. In some cases secondary data alone are all that are required to achieve the intended aim of an operation or investigation. That is an important point. Another misconception is that it is always necessary to acquire content to find out what we need to know. In fact, sometimes it is sufficient to acquire simpler facts and information. For that reason, clause 13 makes it clear that obtaining secondary data can be the primary purpose of an interception, and the kind of data that can be obtained under a warrant is also set out.

Narrowing the scope of secondary data would reduce the number of occasions on which the operational requirement could be achieved through the collection of those data alone, resulting in greater interference with privacy where a full interception warrant is sought. Where we do not need to go further we should not go further. Where secondary data are sufficient to achieve our purposes, let that be so.

Secondary data are defined as systems data and identifying data included as part of or otherwise linked to communications being intercepted. Systems data is any information that enables or facilitates the functioning of any system or service: for example, when using an application on a phone data will be exchanged between the phone and the application server, which makes the application work in a certain way. Systems data can also include information that is not related to an individual communication, such as messages sent between different network infrastructure providers, to enable the system to manage the flow of communications.

Most communications will contain information that identifies individuals, apparatus, systems and services or events, and sometimes the location of those individuals or events. The data are operationally critical to the intercepting agencies. In most cases, the information will form part of the systems data, but there will be cases when it does not. When the data are not systems data and can be logically separated from the communication, and would not reveal anything of what might reasonably be considered to be the meaning of the communication, they are identifying data. For example, if there are email addresses embedded in a webpage, those could be extracted as identifying data. The definitions of systems data and identifying data make clearer the scope of the non-content data that can be obtained under the interception warrant.

The fact that the definition of secondary data is linked to clear, central definitions of systems and identifying data ensures that there can be consistent application of powers across the Bill to protect privacy and that data can be handled appropriately regardless of the power under which it has been obtained.