Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourth sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Paul Blomfield]

Q I wondered if I could follow up on clause 48—a clause you did not mention—and the proposals in the Bill that would, effectively, increase the threshold for initial identification for a reasonable grounds decision through the national referral mechanism. Do you think the threshold is currently set too low? Are there risks associated with setting it higher in the way the Bill does?

Dame Sara Thornton: There are two schools of thought on this. Many in the sector will argue that the current, very low bar is appropriate, but I know colleagues in law enforcement think it is too high. The Bill is suggesting that we use the wording in the European convention against trafficking, or reasonable grounds to believe that an individual is a victim of modern slavery and human trafficking. On balance, I think that is appropriate.

Reasonable grounds is a pretty low threshold that people understand. It is more than a hunch or a suspicion, but it is not as much as a balance of probabilities. There needs to be some sort of objective information to base that reasonable grounds decision on. The obvious thing to say is that the guidance given to staff in the competent authority will be key, but it is not an unreasonable proposal—not least because the current legislation in Scotland and Northern Ireland uses the word “is” and, as far as I understand, the competent authority uses the same test across the United Kingdom. I do not think it will make that much difference, and to be consistent with the European convention is a reasonable proposal.

Siobhán Mullally: A concern here would be the possible impact of changing the threshold in terms of potential victims of trafficking accessing support and assistance and in processes of identification. Is it likely to have a negative impact? Is it likely to increase difficulties in identifying victims and referring them in a timely way for assistance and protection? That would be a concern if it is a regressive measure from where we are now; in terms of human rights law, you want to ensure non-regression in the protection of human rights of victims of trafficking.

I have concerns about the impact of that and whether it will increase the difficulty of timely and early identification of victims, because early identification is critical to ensuring effective access to protection. There is a question about how it will be implemented in practice and what the fallout will be in its implementation.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

Q I thank the witnesses for their evidence so far. If I may start with Dame Sara, in answer to Holly Lynch’s questions earlier about clause 51 you expressed concern about the range of offences that might end up excluding people from access to the NRM. Are there concerns that some of the offences created by the Bill might also have that effect?

Dame Sara Thornton: That links to a comment I made in my correspondence with the Home Secretary. If the penalty for illegally entering the country is increased to four years, we could have a situation where, as a matter of course, if somebody had been prosecuted for that they would not be able to access the NRM. It is a risk that probably exists more on paper than in reality, because most of the time immigration enforcement does not use the law to prosecute; it tends to use administrative processes.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Something to be aware of, then. On disclosure, you have both expressed concern about the traffic information notices, particularly in relation to children. More generally, how awkward is it to have that sort of system and deadline in place when you are talking about victims of trafficking and their ability to disclose information about their experiences in a timely manner?

Siobhán Mullally: As I said, clauses 46 and 47 pose serious difficulties with regard to both adults and children in terms of the state’s compliance with international human rights law on the protection of victims, because of the particular difficulties a victim of trafficking may have not only in disclosing information, but even in identifying as a victim of trafficking. It is not the obligation of the victim to self-identify, but we know that where the context is new, where there may be a distrust or lack of familiarity with officials within a state, where there may be language barriers or delays in accessing legal assistance, or where there may be fears of reprisals for the victims or their families, that can lead to delays.

The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly addressed that in terms of not properly taking account of the delays that can occur, the inconsistencies that may arise and the trauma that is endured by victims. That is not appropriate in terms of ensuring the fullest protection of the rights of victims of trafficking.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Dame Sara, have you anything to add?

Dame Sara Thornton: Briefly. Siobhán has explained the issue of trauma, what we know about its impact on the brain, the way it affects memory and the way people recall with inconsistencies. We know that in practice that is very often the case with victims, and until they form trusting relationships you do not get a narrative that starts at the beginning and ends at the end; it is very piecemeal. As people trust and become more open, they might disclose more. That is a really big consideration. If we are not careful, these two clauses disregard that. Secondly, I have come across cases where victims are more able to disclose labour exploitation, for example, but it might take several years for them to disclose the most awful sexual exploitation because they may be embarrassed or ashamed about it. That is a concern. Also, of course, we know that some victims just do not identify as victims. They do not see that the awful things that they have endured mean that they are, in fact, victims.

I have been thinking about whether any amendments could acknowledge this issue about trauma. We have slavery and trafficking care standards, which are all about trauma-informed care. Is there a potential amendment that says that when you are doing this process it has to be done with those sorts of standards and principles in mind?

Similarly, the Bill does not talk at all about how long people might be given to respond to a trafficking information notice. Again, I would be really worried if that were just a matter of a few days. Colleagues have looked at arrangements in some asylum cases. It may be 20 days. I think this might be more complex, so you might think about 30 days. Is it worth thinking about putting in the Bill what sort of time period might be appropriate?

Lastly, colleagues have suggested that you might even want to define in the Bill what might be a good reason for disclosure, because at the moment it is left very much open. It could be open to guidance, but one aspect would be to list—whether it is trauma, mistrust of authority, or a threat from traffickers—all the sorts of reasons that could cause late disclosure, and perhaps, as I say, have them in legislation rather than just relying on guidance.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Thank you. In your correspondence with the Home Secretary you query the idea behind the Bill that deterrence is an effective strategy. You also express concern that differential treatment of refugees based on the nature of their arrival may serve only to exacerbate vulnerability. Can you say a little about those two points?

Dame Sara Thornton: I will start with the second first. The earlier witnesses gave evidence about the two-tier approach. The concern would be that that creates vulnerability for people who are in this country in that situation because they have fewer protections, and no recourse to public funds unless they are destitute. I know from my work that people in that situation are driven by desperation to take exploitative work. It is a real concern that it could create vulnerability, which criminals and traffickers would exploit.

On the second point, I referred to material that was in a House of Commons Library report that suggested that when you look at the reasons why people choose or choose not to come to a country, there are many other factors that they consider. There is better evidence that they consider other factors than the nature of the law and the situation when they get there—the policy and practice of the country. My concern would be that you risk making more people vulnerable, because they live lives of precarity anyway, with a hope that this will deter. I completely understand the Government’s position that this is a very dangerous way for people to come to this country and we need to stop it, but I am concerned about the extent to which there is evidence that suggests that it might be effective, given that I think it could increase vulnerability.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q A final question: what are your thoughts and views on the proposals in the Bill to reduce the recovery period?

Siobhán Mullally: Again, it is disappointing to see that reduction in the recovery period. It is a regressive measure in terms of current standards and protections, so I would have concerns that it is moving backwards the human rights protections of victims of trafficking. There have been previous examples of regressive measures, in terms of attempts to reduce assistance levels to victims of trafficking. Again, it breaches the principle of non-regression in human rights protections, so I would have concerns around that and the longer-term impact, in terms of ensuring effective protection of victims of trafficking and trying to break the cycle of re-trafficking and vulnerability to exploitation.

Dame Sara Thornton: I really welcome the fact that it is going to be in statute, because it was not in statute in the Modern Slavery Act 2015. I acknowledge that the current guidance is 45 days and that this is only 30 days, but 30 days is what is set out in the European convention. The other thing that is worth saying—I do not know whether Members are aware of this—is that the wait from reasonable grounds to conclusive grounds is very, very long. In 2020, the average was 465 days. We have a big debate about 45 days versus 30, but the reality is that when I meet victims and survivors, most of them have a sense of waiting a very, very long time. They are being provided with support, but they feel that their lives are on hold.

I have a couple of other thoughts about the time period. Of course, if people are being supported for a long time, there is some benefit to that, but there is also a disadvantage, particularly when cases are related to criminal proceedings, the courts are waiting for decisions and the system is grinding very slowly. One particular issue might seem very tactical and technical, which maybe it is, but it is important. One of the weaknesses of the current national referral mechanism is that, historically, all the decisions have been taken by the Home Office—the competent authority. I think a lot of the decisions about whether somebody has been trafficked are best taken locally by local safeguarding partners, and I am really pleased to say that the Home Office established a pilot early this year in 10 local authority areas, whereby local safeguarding boards are making those decisions. You have the right people around the table, and they have a much fuller picture of what has been going on.

Those pilots are going very well. One of the things they are able to do is that, when they meet to discuss what has happened to a child, they are able to take both the reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds decisions at the same meeting—you might imagine how that speeds things up. I would not want anything in the legislation to undermine the really good best practice that is currently being developed, which means that decisions about children’s trafficking are being made locally by the people who are best qualified to do them, and it is happening so much more speedily. I would hope that the Bill does not undermine that good practice.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Thank you. To push you a little, imagine that we lived in a country where things moved a bit more efficiently, there was not a 400-odd day wait and, generally speaking, these decisions were made timeously. Would you have concerns if the recovery period had been reduced from 45 days to 30 days, if that was the reality?

Dame Sara Thornton: If it was the case that that meant that people were getting just 30 days’ support, it would have a negative impact. If you think about providing people with counselling and helping with their medical support and legal advice—a whole range of things— 30 days is not very long. I am just saying the reality in the UK at the moment is that it is taking so much longer that the difference between 45 and 30 is less significant.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

One more question, Ms McDonagh?

[The Chair]

I have not seen anybody indicate, so yes.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Dame Sara, another thing that you mentioned is the consultation process. You had some concern that there had not been enough involvement with survivors or people with lived experience of trafficking. Can you say a bit more about that?

Dame Sara Thornton: The period between the new plan for immigration in March and the publication of the Bill in July was very short. We are aware that groups involved in asylum were much more involved in the consultation process than some of the groups that support victims of slavery and trafficking. It is too late now, but it would have been good to see more involvement of survivor groups particularly, so that people could give their views about what this would mean on a personal level, from that survivor perspective.

--- Later in debate ---

[Holly Lynch]

Q We are still waiting to probe some of the information around these trafficking information notices, perhaps in Committee, but do you have a sense that it would be appropriate to receive legal aid and legal advice at the point at which you receive a trafficking information notice, as well?

Adrian Berry: Yes, of course. As you know, there is a whole series of notices, including in relation to trafficking, which increasingly assimilate it to the asylum process where you get punished for producing evidence or material after an arbitrary cut-off date. There is no safeguard in the Bill for when that cut-off date is—it could be too soon, before you have had an opportunity to recover, to produce the information and receive support. Legal aid is one way of enabling people to properly frame their case at the earliest possible opportunity. The use of notices throughout the Bill, whether trafficking, asylum or priority removal notices, is a subject of serious concern in terms of procedural fairness and ensuring convention compliance, whether that is the trafficking convention or the refugee convention.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q I will address this question to Patricia Cabral and the European Network on Statelessness. Could you just explain what the implications of this Bill are for children who face statelessness, and how this might impact on them?

Patricia Cabral: Thank you for the question. Clause 9 proposes to amend and restrict a vital safeguard in British nationality law that was initially introduced with the aim of preventing and reducing childhood statelessness. It is important to note that the UK has international obligations in this area, so the existing safeguard implements those international obligations by enabling a child who was born in the UK and has always been stateless to acquire British citizenship after five years of residing here. We are concerned that the amendment proposed by clause 9 restricts children’s ability to access that safeguard and acquire British citizenship. It is not in line with the UK’s international obligations, and it clearly risks leaving even more children in the UK stateless and in limbo throughout their childhood.

In the last year, we developed a project to understand the issue of childhood statelessness specifically in the UK, so we have gathered some evidence about the barriers these children are facing and who the stateless children in the UK are. Perhaps it would be useful for us to share some of our findings in this area. I will just note that the stateless children in the UK are mainly children who are currently affected by statelessness because their parents belong to a recognised stateless community—for example, the Kuwaiti Bidoon, Rohingya, Palestinian or Kurdish populations—but many of them are also children in care, especially where they have a migrant background. There may be issues with acquiring parental consent if it is required for the child to access nationality, because the documentation may be missing. Children in care are at particular risk of statelessness, because there is a general lack of awareness from local authorities about nationality issues. There may also be children of Roma families or children affected by domestic abuse, trafficking or other forms of exploitation. We are generally talking about children who are already vulnerable and marginalised, and who are also stateless.

We should also bear in mind that clause 9 would amend the provision that applies only to children who were born in the UK and who have lived here for at least five years. We are talking about children who were born here, who grew up here and who really feel that they belong in the UK. They do not know any other country, they feel British and they wonder where else they belong, if not in the UK. We have received some statements from children who grew up in the UK without British nationality, and it really has an impact on them. They describe feelings of alienation, a loss of self-confidence and the challenges to their identity. We have heard from a child who told us that she could not join her class on a trip to France, and she felt that the situation was really insecure and that it was not safe for her to make close friendships. We can only imagine the emotional burdens of this.

We can see how children feel the impact of being stateless, but they really do not understand why they are stateless, and they feel disempowered to change this. That is because the power to change this is really with the UK authorities—for them to grant nationality and a sense of belonging to the UK. Therefore, that starts with simply not amending the existing safeguards that are in line with international law, so clause 9 of the Bill should simply be dropped.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Adrian Berry, you wanted to come in on that question. At the same time, can you say whether the Home Office has explained why it wants to make it more difficult for already vulnerable children not to have access to recognition of statelessness?

Adrian Berry: There are two things to say. First, there is a real problem with the efficacy of this provision. At the moment, you can apply for registration under this route only when you reach the age of five. But at the age of 10, any child, regardless of whether they have a nationality, can apply for registration as a British citizen under a different provision—section 1 of the British Nationality Act 1981. This is a provision on the face of the Bill that is designed to capture children between the ages of five and 10, because you have another route once you reach the age of 10. The question needs to be asked: what is the point of doing that? You have to have some compelling advice about the cohort aged between five and 10 in order to do it, and there is no evidence at all that that particular cohort of people are the subject of concern. There is no data adduced to show that there is any abuse of the current provision in schedule 2 to the British Nationality Act 1981, which deals with stateless children. There is no reason why you would just leave a child stateless between the ages of five and 10, knowing that there is another provision in law once they reach the age of 10. There is no gain by using this provision. On the question of—[Inaudible.]—simply that the provisions become more available.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q On a slightly different question, perhaps one area where we can all be fairly positive is clauses 1 to 8. This is about correcting historical unfairness in the nationality system—is that right? Are we right to welcome these provisions but with the caveat that we have to see how effective the provisions become, how accessible they are, what fees are charged and so on?

Adrian Berry: Yes. Clauses 1 to 8 are good stuff, as far as they go. They correct—[Inaudible.]—on the grounds of sex discrimination, discrimination on the grounds of illegitimacy, and historical unfairness in relation to people who might have been prejudicially treated in the Windrush scandal. There is not much not to like about that. There are some omissions. They cure prejudices against people who would be British citizens and overseas territory citizens today, but they ignore the people who would be British overseas citizens today. You will know that their concern is directly because they have no ability to come to the UK, but they still have British nationality. So there is more work to do, but so far, so good, and there are some welcome developments in clauses 1 to 8.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Can I ask about the scope of the criminal offence created by the Bill for coming into the United Kingdom irregularly? The Government’s focus is on boats, but does that catch other people who arrive here and claim asylum? For example, if I arrived here on a visit visa and then sought to claim asylum, and clearly I had applied for the visit visa only for the purposes of coming to claim asylum, would that be a criminal offence? Is it clear from the Bill?

Adrian Berry: If you apply for a visit visa, you are making a representation that you intend to return to your country of origin. At some point, unless you claim on arrival when you land, you may be declared an illegal entrant under existing provisions. The problem with clauses 37 and 38 is that they criminalise arrival and assisting arrival in the UK. So it is the crime of arrival or assisting arrival, if you want to think about it like that. What that does is that applies to asylum seekers. So you say, “Of course, we are not impeding the efficacy of the refugee convention”. In the explanatory notes the Home Office says that, but in practice it is. If you criminalise arrival, that is precisely what you are doing. You cannot see those provisions separately from clause 12, which prohibits you from claiming asylum in UK territorial waters.

When you fit them all together, you have the criminal offence of arrival: you do not have to have entered the UK, you are still on a vessel. You are in UK territorial waters because you are on your way to the UK and you cannot claim asylum there. However, the maritime enforcement powers, which the Home Office gives itself under schedule 3, allow it not only to board your vessel and not take your asylum claim, but require you to go back to the port from which you came and require you to leave UK territorial waters. If you look at the package—criminal offence, not being able to claim asylum, and power to board your vessel and require you to leave—not only might that put you at risk in your insecure vessel, but it just shuts you out from the refugee convention. It is a full-scale assault on being able to claim territorial asylum in the UK.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q In essence, the only part of the asylum system that would be left would be people who happened to be in this country and there was a dramatic change of circumstances in their home country—refugee sur place. It is not so much an objection to shutting down unsafe routes; it is an objection to shutting down the UK asylum system, pretty much.

Adrian Berry: Yes. The whole point of the refugee convention is not about resettlement; it is about people making it to the territory and processing and determining their claims. That is why you have the prohibition on penalties in article 31. It is all about coming to the UK to claim asylum and being a refugee on an irregular route. If you shut that out, all that is left is sur place claims, as they are called, where you are on the territory, as you suggest.

[Paul Howell]

Q I have a question for Patricia Durr, more focused on children. One of the things we hear about is people claiming to be children when they are not, and where the boundary is in that. There are questions about what the boundary of assessment is. Do you have an opinion on that, because I do not think we have heard anything so far on that? Where do you feel that sits? Obviously, it is very important that we keep adults separate from children in any holding pattern.

Patricia Durr: We are waiting for more information about the age assessment, given the placeholder clauses in the Bill. I guess our biggest concern is about children being treated as adults. I know that the Committee has expressed some concern about adults being treated as children, but we need to consider that the greater risk is that children are being pushed into adult systems through inappropriate age assessments. Obviously, it is a concern all round, but that is the greatest concern, I think, because the consequences of the adultification of children who are then also criminalised are huge. In any provision for children and young people in this country, we should have in place very strong, robust safeguarding measures that provide better protection for children and young people there than would be provided for a child in adult provision. That is the way I would consider that.

We are concerned that age assessment should remain within a safeguarding framework and remain with professionals who are skilled in children’s development and care. I think the British Medical Association has given written evidence to the Committee to disavow the idea that there is a scientific method or approach to age assessment. It is obviously about professional judgment by skilled professionals—in this case, social workers—who have a better understanding of child development.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Are there any other questions? Mr McDonald, I stopped you on a question. Would you like to carry on?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Thank you, Ms McDonagh. I have just a couple more questions. Mr Charalambous was very comprehensive in his own questioning. Can I go back to the change to the standard of proof? How problematic is it having this balance of probabilities test in there alongside the refugee convention definition of a refugee, which talks of real risk?

Adrian Berry: It is extremely problematic, and not just because it is deprecated in other jurisdictions, but because it makes the judge’s task so much harder—they have to have a split personality. They have to weigh some of the evidence—including the question of whether the person has a refugee convention reason, such as a political opinion or membership of a particular social group—on the balance of probability standard, and then they have to assess the question of what happened in the past on that standard. Then they have to evaluate future risk, which is intimately bound up with how you have been treated in the past, on the lower civil standard of reasonable degree of likelihood.

It is a charter for errors of law creeping into decision making and for onward appeals. It will almost certainly lead to more onward appeals, which will lengthen the process. It will add to costs and uncertainty, and ultimately it will leave people without protection, when there is a commonly understood threshold test, with the reasonable degree of likelihood across the piece, whether it is past facts or future risk, that has applied in this country and other common law jurisdictions and is endorsed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Thank you. Finally, can I ask Patricia Cabral about statelessness? You have indicated what is wrong with the Bill and how it makes access to recognition of statelessness for children more difficult. What would you like to see in the Bill? Is it fair to say that the system for applying to be recognised as stateless in the United Kingdom is fairly good by international standards, but there are still hurdles and problems that need to be improved? What could be put in the Bill to improve the system for recognising statelessness in the UK?

Patricia Cabral: Yes, there are a number of issues with statelessness in the UK anyway, but with this Bill we want to focus on clause 9, in particular. Our research shows that children who are brought up stateless in the UK already face a number of significant issues in acquiring British citizenship. There is a lack of legal advice and quality legal support. Legal aid is not always available. There are a number of challenges in evidencing and proving statelessness. There are already all these barriers for children trying to acquire British nationality, which might be the only nationality available to them.

What we are really aiming for today is just to make sure we do not create even more barriers for these children, and that we remove clause 9 to ensure that we do not amend any of the existing safeguards. Paragraph 3 of schedule 2 to the British Nationality Act 1981 is in compliance with international law—the 1961 convention on the rejection of statelessness and the convention on the rights of the child. We simply do not need to touch those safeguards or make this amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Thank you very much.

[Holly Lynch]

Q I have a question for Every Child Protected Against Trafficking. Patricia, in your written submission you were very critical of the lack of due process. Could you take me through just how dissatisfied you were with the consultation process and why?

Patricia Durr: We have talked about how children’s rights are exercised by the provisions in the Bill. A children’s rights impact statement would really have assisted consideration of some of the measures, by setting out which children’s rights are invoked and how they are impacted. It is something the Committee on the Rights of the Child has asked the UK Government to do systematically. It is safe to say that the length of the consultation period was not sufficient.

We were quite surprised that the part 4 provisions are being included in this asylum and immigration Bill, particularly given that there is currently a review of the modern slavery strategy. On the lack of consultation, certainly from our perspective, what implications might there be for child victims of trafficking? Their experience of waiting in limbo, and the lack of provision for leave to remain as recognised child victims of trafficking, rather than through asylum provisions within the immigration rules are certainly a huge concern for the young people we work with, and that would come through very strongly from them. It was that combination: why these provisions in this Bill, and the lack of engagement with children and young people—from our perspective—but also, survivors of trafficking and exploitation more broadly.