Countering Russian Aggression and Tackling Illicit Finance

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Amanda Milling]

May I make a little progress? I have been quite generous, to be fair.

The package will include measures to stop the Kremlin’s access to UK financial markets for sovereign debt. That means that the Russian Government will be unable to access UK services to raise capital through the issuing and trading of sovereign debt.

To pick up on the point about Nord Stream 2, we welcome Chancellor Scholz’s strong response to Russia’s egregious actions: Germany’s decision to suspend Nord Stream 2. We in Europe must now wean ourselves off dependence on Putin’s oil and gas. For example, in 2020 less than 3% of the UK’s total gas supply came from Russia.

Many hon. Members have mentioned the economic crime Bill. We are committed to bringing it forward.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

The Minister says we need to wean ourselves off Russian gas. That is eminently sensible, but I have a slightly wider question: do we need to wean ourselves off Russia more generally? Let me put it this way: does the Minister think it right in any circumstances that Tony Blair went to see then acting President Putin in 2000 or that David Cameron went to Moscow in 2011, almost to beg for Russian investment and placings and listings on the stock exchange? Surely we have made mistakes over a long period that have to do with political reputation as much as with the practicalities of gas supply.

[Amanda Milling]

The point that I want to make is about where we are today and where we have been for the past few days, weeks and months. Let us be honest: the build-up of troops on the border of Ukraine has been happening over some time.

We are committed to bringing forward the economic crime Bill. It will establish a new public register of beneficial ownership of overseas companies and other entities that own or want to buy UK property. It will ensure that individuals and entities can no longer hide in the shadows. It will also include reforms to Companies House that will bear down on the thousands of UK companies and other corporate structures used as vehicles for facilitating international money laundering, including from Russia.

We have increased checks on private flights, customs and freight travel under existing powers to prevent security threats to our people. On 17 February, the Home Secretary took decisive action to shut the tier 1 investor visa route to all new applicants of all nationalities, with immediate effect.

In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine yesterday, we announced our first package of sanctions measures. With immediate effect, we froze the assets of five Russian banks. Four of those banks are involved in bankrolling the Russian occupation: Bank Rossiya, which is particularly close to the Kremlin; Black Sea Bank for Development and Reconstruction; IS Bank; and GenBank.

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[Alison Thewliss]

I absolutely agree with the hon. Lady. The evidence is so clear but the action is non-existent. It just is not being done.

[Stewart Hosie]

On the issue of golden visas, prior to the tiered scheme there was the old UK investor visa, which was introduced in 1994. It ran from the end of the Major years through Blair, Brown, Cameron and all the Prime Ministers since, and now the tier 1 visa scheme has been done away with. Is my hon. Friend as frustrated as I am, given that the issue of dirty Russian money is not new, that the action is always too late and never quite enough?

[Alison Thewliss]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely correct. The Government are several steps behind those who wish to bend the rules and wash their money through the City of London.

This morning, in response to questioning about a photo taken with Lubov Chernukhin, the wife of Putin’s former Finance Minister, the Foreign Secretary said:

“I think we’ve got to be very careful to distinguish between those who are supporters of the regime, those who are propping up Vladimir Putin and those people who may have moved from Russia years ago and who are part of the British political system.”

I would gently suggest to the Government that when those oligarchs and good pals of President Putin are seen by the British Foreign Secretary as being “part of the British political system”, it really does illustrate the scale of difficulty that the Conservative party has got itself into.

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[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

May I make an observation before I start properly? The Minister for Asia and the Middle East, the right hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Amanda Milling), appeared to suggest earlier that, in the event of further Russian aggression, there would be tougher sanctions. That mirrors the prime ministerial statement that Madam Deputy Speaker read out earlier. However, in the debate on sanctions last night, the Minister for Europe and North America, the right hon. and gallant Member for Braintree (James Cleverly), said that there would be tougher sanctions as a result of what Russia “has already done”. Those two things are not the same. They may just have been slips of the tongue, but what we cannot have is confusion added to the delay, the dither and what many consider to be an already inadequate response. I would add—I think this rather mirrored the mood yesterday and I suspect mirrors the mood today—that Russia has already invaded and annexed a sovereign state. We do not have to wait until the tanks encircle Kyiv in order to take the necessary sanction action, which it is possible to do.

I very much welcome and support the motion we are debating today. I am glad that it refers to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Russia report. I had a hand in that report and I am very proud of it. I shall refer to only three paragraphs—all on Russian expatriates. The part entitled “Welcoming oligarchs with open arms” ties in directly to the question of what we do about dirty money. Paragraph 49 begins:

“Whilst the Russian elite have developed ties with a number of countries in recent years, it would appear that the UK has been viewed as a particularly favourable destination for Russian oligarchs and their money. It is widely recognised that the key to London’s appeal was the exploitation of the UK’s investor visa scheme, introduced in 1994,”—

almost 30 years ago—

“followed by the promotion of a light and limited touch to regulation, with London’s strong capital and housing markets offering sound investment opportunities.”

One could easily read that last half-sentence as, “excellent opportunities to launder dirty cash,” because that is precisely what happened.

Paragraph 50 goes on to explain that the UK offered

“ideal mechanisms by which illicit finance could be recycled through what has been referred to as the London ‘laundromat’. The money was also invested in extending patronage and building influence across a wide sphere of the British establishment—PR firms, charities, political interests, academia and cultural institutions were all willing beneficiaries of Russian money, contributing to a ‘reputation laundering’ process.”

It was not simply the money that the first generation of oligarchs managed to seize with Yeltsin’s privatisations, but everything that has gone on since then—a “reputation laundering” process.

That leads us to the preposterous situation my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss) referred to earlier. When the Foreign Secretary was asked about £2 million of donations to the Tory party—including, the report said, to the Deputy Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer—she said that those donors are

“part of the British political system”,

as if accepting donations of that sort of money was normal. It is not. No matter how many times it has been laundered or how many assets have been purchased and sold and purchased and sold to clean the cash, it is still dirty cash.

I understand perfectly well why a donor would wish to offer money to a political party—it buys them political influence—but I am at a bit of a loss to understand why any political party would accept such money. It does not make that party part of a normal political process; it makes it part of a racket.

The report went on to say that

“there are a lot of Russians with very close links to Putin who are well integrated into the UK business and social scene, and accepted because of their wealth. This level of integration—in ‘Londongrad’ in particular—means that any measures now being taken by the Government are not preventative but rather constitute damage limitation.”

As the hon. Member for Wallasey (Dame Angela Eagle) said earlier, this report was published in July 2020, almost two years ago. Much of the evidence is a year or two older still, and the issue of dirty money predates that. We all know what is going on.

The idea that we have to debate this as part of an Opposition day, rather than actively considering the various pieces of legislation that are necessary, is quite shameful. We have spent enough time on partygate and being ambushed by cake, but when it comes to billions of pounds of stolen cash sloshing about London, we have to talk about it on an Opposition day. That is frankly a disgrace.

That section of the report went on to say:

“It is not just the oligarchs either: the arrival of Russian money resulted in a growth industry of enablers—individuals and organisations who manage and lobby for the Russian elite in the UK. Lawyers, accountants, estate agents and PR professionals have played a role, wittingly or unwittingly, in the extension of Russian influence which is often linked to promoting the nefarious interests of the Russian state. A large private security industry has developed in the UK to service the needs of the Russian elite, in which British companies protect the oligarchs and their families, seek kompromat on competitors, and on occasion help launder money through offshore shell companies and fabricate ‘due diligence’ reports, while lawyers provide litigation support. William Browder”—

the head of the global Magnitsky justice movement—

“told the Committee that:

‘Russian state interests, working in conjunction with and through criminal private interests, set up a “buffer” of Westerners who become de facto Russian state agents, many unwittingly, but others with a reason to know exactly what they are doing and for whom. As a result, UK actors have to deal with Russian criminal interests masked as state interests, and Russian state interests masked by their Western agents.’”

I will conclude by saying that I can think of no stronger justification for the immediate introduction of an economic crime Bill, an overseas entities Bill and the register of beneficial ownership.

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[Damian Hinds]

We will work together in lockstep with our friends and allies around the world. I will not go into detail now about what future designations might be or the precise nature of them, but as I said earlier, Moscow should know that we will use these measures to their full effect.

[Stewart Hosie]

Will the Minister give way?

[Damian Hinds]

Unfortunately we are overrunning, and I will not get through responding to the points made in the debate if I take a lot of interventions. I can do either, but I think it is important that I respond to the points made in the debate.

Specifically in relation to Russian illicit finance, the National Crime Agency has increased the number of investigations into corrupt elites. Some of that response will be visible through law enforcement, policy and international engagement. Other options are less visible but that does not mean they are not impactful. We are going further. It is vital in the fight against dirty money that we increase transparency in order to know who ultimately controls and owns a company or property, and the Prime Minister is committed to bringing forward new legislation to include reforms to Companies House and to limited partnerships, and to introducing the register of overseas entities beneficial ownership Bill.

Last week the Home Secretary announced the closure of the tier 1 investor visa scheme—

Sanctions

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

Will the Minister give way?

[James Cleverly]

I have to get on. These measures will curtail the ability of the Russian state, Russian companies and Russian individuals to raise funds on our markets and will further isolate Russian banks. We will keep ratcheting up the pressure, targeting more banks, more individuals and more companies that are significant to the Kremlin, to touch on the point made by a number of right hon. and hon. Members. Russia—rather, Vladimir Putin—has chosen a path of international isolation. The measures that the Prime Minister announced today demonstrate that it will bear a cost for doing so and, if it does not step back, these measures will only increase.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is part of a long- term strategy. We must not give ground now or try to accommodate the illegitimate concerns that Russia has put forward. Its strategy of aggression would not end. It would not stop at Ukraine. Instead, it would be emboldened. President Putin would simply focus on a new target, so we are absolutely resolute in our response. What we do now will shape European security for many years, and it will be viewed by other parts of the world and have an impact on security issues far more widely than in Europe. We must rise to the moment. We must stand shoulder to shoulder with the people of Ukraine in their desire to protect their homeland and to protect their freedom. We must, and we will, stand shoulder to shoulder with them, and I commend the regulations to the House.

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[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I am going to do something slightly unusual and speak about the statutory instrument, although I shall make some brief introductory remarks. I welcome the measures, as far as they go. I do not think they go far enough, but I think the Minister will have already picked up that message from around the House. I welcome what he said about working together and being in lockstep with our allies. The problem is that Gennady Timchenko, Igor Rotenberg and Boris Rotenberg were sanctioned by the United States in 2018. With the measures before the House today, we are not even playing catch-up with where we need to be.

I am frustrated, and there is a general frustration, because, notwithstanding what the Minister said today—that he may go further with sanctions on the basis of what Russia has already done—there is a perception that Russia has to do more and worse before we really ratchet up what we are planning to do. Either Russia has invaded the sovereign territory of an independent nation state or it has not. We do not need to see the tanks encircling Kyiv for tough action to be taken. Russia has already invaded and annexed parts of a sovereign state.

The right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) said—I think I caught him correctly—that perhaps $250 billion had been sloshed about outside Russia. I fear that does not come close to the mark. In 2017, the US National Bureau of Economic Research suggested that $800 billion had been stashed offshore since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some people will have moved their money for good reasons. Some people will have been terrified—there will be fear. There will be crime involved and fraud and all sorts of things happening. However, a great deal of that money may well have been placed overseas, in the hands of trusted custodians and friendly overseas businesses—the modus operandi of the KGB prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

This is where I will ask the Minister a question about the instrument itself. When it comes to sanctioning individuals and to freezing cash or other assets that are at the beck and call of the Russian state, no matter whose name they appear to be held in, will this legislation actually do what is required? The explanatory notes suggests that an “involved person” now includes a person who is or has been involved in

“obtaining a benefit from or supporting the Government of Russia.”

Regulation 4 says:

“For the purposes of this regulation, being ‘involved in obtaining a benefit from or supporting the Government of Russia’ means”—

among other things—

“owning or controlling directly or indirectly…or working as a director (whether executive or non-executive), trustee, or equivalent, of…a person”.

The word “trustee” is interesting. Will this legislation allow the Government to freeze an asset if it is held in the name of an individual who appears to be completely clean, but who the Government have information to suggest is a Russian-trusted custodian of what is, for all intents and purposes, a Russian state asset?

Can we have clarity on this? I think that this goes back to the point that the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) made earlier. Will this instrument actually allow the Government the tools that they need to freeze the assets that are required to be frozen to punish Russia for the invasion of Ukraine?

Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Joint Committee

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Wednesday 15th September 2021 Commons Chamber

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I wish to speak in support of this motion to establish a Joint Committee to investigate the withdrawal from Afghanistan. It is essential that we learn as much as we can. As the hon. Member for Wigan (Lisa Nandy) said in her opening remarks, if we do not learn from our mistakes, we will repeat our mistakes. I do, however, wish to make some comments on the proposed narrow remit of the committee and on its ability to get to the truth.

First, let me turn to the proposed Committee’s remit. It is obvious—from the questions asked during the debate when Parliament was recalled, the questions to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary last week, and the questions to the Minister responsible for Afghan Resettlement this week—that Members are concerned not simply about a backward-looking review, but about what is happening in the here and now, and how we move forward. However, I recognise that an open-ended inquiry would be difficult, and I am content that working on a timeline up to the completion of the evacuation makes sense at this time. I am also sure that if this Committee is established, many of the practical issues that Members are concerned about can be addressed under an examination of the policy towards civilian resettlement.

I have concerns, though, as does my hon. Friend the Member for Stirling (Alyn Smith), that if the Committee is established to explore UK Government policy on Afghanistan only from the time of the Doha agreement in February 2020, the timeline may be too restrictive. In particular, it is difficult to see how a Committee could fully analyse whether UK Government policy was consistent with the reality unfolding on the ground—based on political and military events in Afghanistan, intelligence assessment, or the actions and comments of our allies leading up to the Doha talks—or, indeed, whether Government planning, including contingency and crisis management planning, was really informed by the actuality of the situation in the country, particularly in relation to the weakness of the Afghan Government and the strength of the Taliban.

Let me explain why I think that is important. The resurgence of the Taliban did not start on the conclusion of the Doha agreement. As early as 2009, President Obama had to send 17,000 more troops to counter that resurgence. The frailty of the Afghan Government did not only become apparent on the conclusion of the Doha agreement; they were described by the US Justice Department in 2018 as

“largely lawless, weak, and dysfunctional”.

Notwithstanding the bravery of many Afghan soldiers and police, the failures of leadership were apparent and documented for years prior to the conclusion of the Doha talks. I am therefore not sure it would be possible, if the starting point is as late as February 2020, to fully judge the effectiveness of UK Government planning when many of the problems that plans must have sought to overcome had their genesis long before that.

It is also the case, as the Chair of the ISC said, that much of the information that the proposed Committee members would find most useful is intelligence assessment. Notwithstanding the proposal that he may be on the new Joint Committee, it simply would not be possible for that committee to receive secret intelligence or assessments. However, there is a great deal of good open-source material and other expert opinion regarding the situation on the ground over the period. The fact that the proposed Committee would have the power to compel Ministers to attend means, on balance, that it would be possible to have detailed consideration of UK Government policy on Afghanistan by the proposed deadline of March 2022.

Afghanistan: FCDO Update

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Monday 6th September 2021 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

We are watching the developments on the ground very carefully, but it is fair to say that the Taliban are in control of the vast majority of Afghanistan. I do not think it is the right thing at the moment to start supporting other groups, notwithstanding our previous role. I say to my right hon. Friend, with an understanding of his passion and knowledge of the issue, that we have to adjust to the new reality on the ground.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I have to say that my blood ran rather cold when the Foreign Secretary suggested that the Home Secretary would have anything to do with helping refugees. However, there are Members around the House who have been supporting Afghan nationals to try to get them out of Afghanistan—people who have now burned their documents, deleted electronic records, and have even seen their internet profile and footprint deleted by organisations for which they used to work. Can we have a categoric, cast-iron assurance from the Secretary of State today that no one entitled to support to leave when the routes are open will ever be turned away for the absence of a piece of paper or an electronic record?

[Dominic Raab]

I do not think that the Home Secretary or I—both the children of refugees—need to be lectured on this subject by him in the terms and tone that he used. We will do everything we can to get those who are eligible home, but we are not going to dispense with the basic checks—he calls them “a piece of paper”—that we need to ensure that we keep this country safe from those who are not eligible and would put our safety at risk.

Global Britain

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Monday 3rd February 2020 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend for the work that she has done in this area. For more detail, I can point her in the direction of the Prime Minister’s written ministerial statement. She will know from her own experience of negotiating with the EU that there are difficulties because it claims that access to some of the instruments will be conditional on accepting free movement. I know that she will agree that we must bring an end to free movement. However, I accept that data sharing, extradition and our relationship with Europol and Eurojust are important elements of our law enforcement co-operation, and we will be looking forward to securing appropriate relations with the EU.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I thank the Secretary of State for giving me early sight of his statement. He said that the UK would “look ahead with confidence” and “signal to future partners” that we were “outward-facing”. May I disagree? I think that all these plans risk making the UK a smaller, more insular and more isolated place. He also spoke about a “truly global Britain” and about being the “best possible allies” with the EU, but I fear that that was rather contradicted when the Prime Minister said in his written statement today that there would not be “any regulatory alignment” at all, even on the efficacy of medicines.

The Prime Minister also said that there would be no

“supranational control in any area”

of UK policy. The World Trade Organisation has an appellate body—a dispute resolution body—the European Free Trade Association has a court to deal with disputes, and even the much-vaunted CPTPP has an investor-state dispute resolution mechanism. Unless the English language has changed, every single one of those bodies and mechanisms has supernatural effect—[Laughter.] It may well be supernatural as well! Every one of those bodies has supranational effect. Does the Secretary of State not understand that if our putative trading partners insist on formal dispute resolution mechanisms or institutions, our saying no might risk the UK being seen as abandoning the international rules-based system? Does he not understand that rejecting formal dispute resolution mechanisms or institutions when our partners insist on them will make it harder, not easier, to strike deals? Does he not understand that if the UK reverts to WTO rules—the UK’s favoured option outside any real agreements—the WTO has an appellate body, a dispute resolution body, that is supranational in its effect, thus rendering the red lines laid out by the Prime Minister this morning utterly useless before the ink is even dry on them?

[Dominic Raab]

The hon. Gentleman referred at the outset of his question to an approach that was smaller, insular and isolated, but I am afraid that that sounds like the Scottish National party’s recipe for the people of Scotland. The Conservatives want one United Kingdom proceeding forward and ready to grasp any opportunities, including for the Scottish people, and including ensuring that we have full control over our fisheries as an independent coastal state—one thing that he would clearly be willing to sacrifice at the drop of a hat. Although it is understandable that the SNP, given the views of its leadership, calls for more and more powers to be devolved to the Scottish Parliament, it is astonishing that it wants to give up power to unelected bureaucrats in Brussels through what he calls dynamic legislative alignment. There is a total contradiction in his position.

The hon. Gentleman referred to the dispute resolution mechanism. The UK Government will approach the negotiations in the same way we did for the withdrawal agreement—although this will be tailored to free trade and areas of security co-operation—and will ensure that there is a track for negotiated diplomacy to resolve problems through political resolution. As for arbitration, where it is necessary, the common practice is that both sides appoint arbitrators and appoint a chair. What we will never do—the EU calls for this and the SNP seems to endorse it—is allow one side’s judicial institutions to have control over the dispute resolution mechanism for both sides. That would be entirely lopsided and a fundamental abdication of responsibility by any responsible Government, and we will not go down that path.

I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman will continue to make in his own way the blinkered arguments for a second referendum in Scotland. In the meantime, we will continue to work in the full interests of the whole United Kingdom and take this country forward together and united.

Britain in the World

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Monday 13th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Stafford (Theo Clarke). I think we have already seen and heard enough to know that she will be a credit to her constituents and to her party. I am also pleased that she paid such a kind tribute to her predecessor. However, I say to her as someone who does regular surgeries in four or five of my larger villages that if she does a surgery in every one of the villages she read out, and the ones she did not, she will be extremely busy indeed.

Before I turn to the debate proper, I want to make an observation about the speech by the hon. and gallant Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat). It was a good speech, but I have two observations. The hon. and gallant Gentleman said that we would work with the European Union and the 27 countries, but have we not noticed that over the past two or three years the European Union has operated as an extremely disciplined single bloc? I think that trying to pair one or two countries off would be a fool’s errand. My second observation is that in the past week or so we have heard comments from Michel Barnier that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to complete a comprehensive trade deal in 11 months. We also heard Ursula von der Leyen saying last week that the UK would have to compromise and prioritise, so I hope that the hon. and gallant Gentleman agrees that we should suggest to the Government that putting the setting of objectives first and silly timetables second might be a really good way to proceed.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving way. I will not address his second point—he has addressed it thoroughly enough—but on his first point, there are many areas in which we co-operate bilaterally with France. The Lancaster House and Sandhurst agreements are among many examples.

[Stewart Hosie]

Indeed, but I think the hon. Gentleman understands the point I was making, which was that we do not want to find ourselves tied to ridiculous red lines and timetables when the objectives are the key thing.

It is a pleasure to take part in this debate on the Gracious Speech. As with every Queen’s Speech or programme for government, there are certain measures that one would welcome—not least, in the case of this Queen’s Speech, the announcement of increased tax credits for research and development. I say that because innovative economies are more productive economies, and when we come to combat the inevitable decline caused by Brexit, the more innovative and productive we can be, the better. A word of caution, however: research and development tax credits are a function of corporation tax, and not every innovative or innovating company, particularly the small ones, pays corporation tax. So if we can have a little imagination from the Treasury Bench about how we support innovation in smaller companies, that would be very welcome. I also welcome the announcement that measures will be developed to tackle hostile activity by foreign states, and I hope that that builds upon some of the excellent work already done in the private and public sectors, and essentially by the National Cyber Security Centre.

Although some of the measures to tackle climate change are very welcome, particularly coming from this Government, they are described as being “world leading” when they are nothing of the kind. The sad truth is that is a thin and poor programme for government. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford) said when opposing the programme on the opening day of this debate, our party stands against this Government’s

“cruel, punishing policies and narrow, backward-gazing politics.”—[Official Report, 19 December 2019; Vol. 669, c. 51.]

I would go further than that. Some of the measures in the programme—such as an immigration Bill that will end in law the free movement of people—will further diminish the UK’s ability to attract the best and brightest, as well as much-needed labour in other sectors, and very much risks turning the UK into an insular, reduced and backward-looking place.

Before addressing the impact that ending free movement will have on the agriculture, hospitality and care sectors, the brain drain that the UK Government’s hostile environment is already causing, and the brutish logic of the Tory party—whose plans will reduce the ability of young Scots and, indeed, youngsters from throughout these islands, to live, love, work and study freely throughout Europe—we might want to consider the practical implications of trade and how those matters are related.

When Commission President von der Leyen said last week:

“Without the freedom of movement of people, you cannot have the free movement of capital, goods and services”,

the Government should have listened. At a time when we need to boost trade, we should be paying attention to the damage that will be done to capital markets, the City of London and the ability to export services, all of which depend on people being able to travel freely. Given the damage that Brexit will cause to UK global trade, the UK Government should be doing everything possible to remove every conceivable obstacle to protecting and enhancing the opportunities to maintain and grow trade of all sorts—free, fair trade, with a level playing field. Instead, in spite of the clearest of warnings, yet more obstacles are being erected, this time by ending in law the free movement of people, which will further weaken and diminish the UK’s ability to strike good trade deals to compensate for the losses and minimise the additional costs that Brexit will cause.

We should put a couple of numbers on this. Everybody knows that there are dozens of economic assessments of Brexit. With one exception, they are universally negative. The National Institute of Economic and Social Research provides an average assessment. We could lose perhaps 20% of total global UK trade with a bad Brexit, and that is where we are heading. If we cut a deal with all the main English-speaking economies and with all the BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—we might claw back 5% or 6%. It does not take a genius to work out that we will soon run out of large countries with which to cut deals to compensate for the losses, so adding additional obstacles strikes me as making no sense.

[Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)]

Forecasts do not say that we will lose trade. They simply say that the rate of growth of our trade will be slower. They do not say that there will be a reduction in trade.

[Stewart Hosie]

Many assessments—I am not going to go through them—say that there will be a reduction in trade. Indeed, some assessments, as I have just said, suggest a 20% loss of total global trade. That is extraordinary.

At least this programme for government suggests that there will be a trade Bill—which, of course, we should already have had—with which comes the opportunity to table amendments. Those amendments will seek to ensure full parliamentary oversight over trade deals and that our devolved nations’ Parliaments are consulted, and their consent sought, on trade deals where there is a direct impact on those countries. The amendments will also seek to ensure that, as the UK rushes headlong into any deal offered, vital public services such as the NHS are off the table, important geographical indicators are protected, and vital regional industries—national industries, in some cases—such as fishing are also protected. Many of us are old enough to remember the last time the Tories treated Scottish fishing as expendable and sold it out. We have no confidence that they will not repeat that mistake.

Those things—parliamentary scrutiny, collective working to seek real agreement with the devolved nations, and protecting the NHS and regionally important sectors—should be at the forefront of UK Ministers’ minds. I fear, however, that, at best, they will be dragged kicking and screaming to make modest concessions or, worse, that the legitimate concerns of people and industries across these islands will be ignored in a headlong dash for what may be a hideous Tory-Trump deal. When I was last in the USA last year, I was repeatedly warned that the UK will be expected to put everything on the table, while the US will be expected to put nothing on the table. When the Foreign Secretary said that a US-UK deal would be win-win, I was struck by his breathtaking naivety in saying something that stands up to no scrutiny whatsoever.

[Mr Steve Baker]

Will the hon. Gentleman attribute to somebody the advice he was given? I would be very interested to know who thinks that the negotiation will be quite so asymmetric.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Order. Before the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) responds, may I remind colleagues that if we are not going to have a time limit, they need to stick to approximately 10 minutes?

[Stewart Hosie]

I will not attribute that advice—that would be completely unfair—but I assure the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker) that that warning was given to me on more than one occasion.

I will take your advice, Madam Deputy Speaker, and miss out from my speech a chunk on the trade Bill, which I will be able to use when it is finally published. I will say one thing, however. The UK Government have said the main elements of the trade Bill will be to

“create powers so that the UK can transition trade agreements we are party to through our membership of the EU, ensuring continuity for businesses.”

So far, so good. The problem is that this Government could not even roll over, in full, the agreements we had with Norway and Switzerland. The Tory Government were unable or incapable of replicating the agreements we had with two close, relatively small, western-friendly neighbours, yet they expect that a simple piece of domestic legislation will pave the way, quickly and easily, to replicating some of the UK’s larger, more complicated deals. If that is what they truly believe, we are no longer dealing with reality; we are dealing with the politics of delusion.

I will end with what the Foreign Secretary said at the beginning of the debate. I think he was wrong to say that, post Brexit, the UK would have expanded global horizons. The truth is that this programme for government—including a trade Bill that may give too much power to the Executive, and an immigration Bill that will end freedom of movement—will lead to a weakened, diminished, reduced UK, with shrinking, not expanded, global horizons. We will oppose this programme for government, and the sooner we are out of this United Kingdom and this backward-looking politics, the better for us all.

Exiting the European Union (Sanctions)

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Tuesday 9th April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I am pleased that the Minister has said that the EU sanctions list will, in effect, be rolled over. At this early point in his contribution, notwithstanding that we are talking about sanctions on three specific countries—plus the EU one at the end—will he give the House an assurance that there is no immediate intention to change the sanctions list from the one we will adopt from the EU?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I can confirm that there is no such intention. Indeed, the intention and the expectation is that the existing regimes in the EU sanctions regime will be lifted and shifted, and put into ours. However, having scrutinised the individual elements of these, we will have to make sure that they all meet the threshold of evidence and justification that our own autonomous Act of Parliament requires. It is possible that something may not be carried over, but the expectation is that everything will be.

--- Later in debate ---

[Helen Goodman]

That was going to be my concluding point.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

The hon. Lady made the point about extraterritoriality, but the UK Government, at the same time as introducing the statutory instruments, are rolling over the EC blocking regulation into UK legislation to stop UK citizens being subject to US extraterritoriality. I think that that is sensible, notwithstanding my worries about where they might go in future. May I check, given what the hon. Lady said, what Labour’s position is? Does the Labour party believe that tying the statutory instruments with rolling over the blocking regulation makes sense, or would it do something different?

[Helen Goodman]

There was a lot of conversation about having some euro vehicles to facilitate trade and investment from Britain and the other European countries and I do not quite know why that has run into the sand. Perhaps the Minister will enlighten us.

Let me come back to the general question that the right hon. Member for Wokingham raised, because it is important. One the one hand, everybody can have their idea of the perfect sanctions regime to get the particular policy objective they want. The problem with that lone ranger approach is that shared regimes are needed for sanctions to be effective. The statutory instruments cover sanctions that were introduced at European level. The European Union is a large, significant group of countries that can have a significant impact when it imposes sanctions. Separately from that, we have legal obligations to impose any sanctions that are agreed at UN level. Because of the difficulty of doing anything that works, I want to know from the Minister how he intends to co-ordinate and co-operate in a post-Brexit world.

From the perspective of British business, there is already an awkwardness if the European regimes are not absolutely in line with the American regime, and a proliferation of different legal regimes would cause significant problems for British banks and businesses. I therefore personally do not believe that that is the right route to follow, so I come back to a question that I asked the Minister during the passage of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. If he would like to intervene again, will he explain to the House how the Government intend to co-ordinate and co-operate with other European countries on sanctions policy post Brexit?

Council of Europe

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Wednesday 18th April 2018 Westminster Hall

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Stewart Hosie (in the Chair)]

Ten Back Benchers wish to speak and we have 35 minutes. If they take three and a half minutes each, they will all get in; if they do not, some will not.

--- Later in debate ---

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Stewart Hosie (in the Chair)]

Order. We now come to the Front-Bench speakers, who have about nine minutes each. I apologise to those who were not called.

Palestine and Israel

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Monday 13th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart).

Many of us will remember the great hope and expectation felt when the Oslo accords were finally signed in 1993 in Washington, but I wonder if many can recall what the accords were supposed to deliver: the withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of Gaza and the west bank; the affirmation of a Palestinian right to self-government within those areas through, in the first instance, the Palestinian Authority; and an interim period during which permanent status negotiations would commence, supposedly no later than 1996. Thereafter, Israel was to hand over power in stages. Major issues such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security and borders were to be decided during the permanent status negotiations.

We must remember that the two groups also signed letters of mutual recognition. The Israeli Government recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; the PLO recognised the right of the state of Israel to exist, and renounced terrorism, other violence, and the desire for the destruction of the Israeli state. There were many other associated agreements. There was a joint Palestinian-Israeli Co-ordination and Co-operation Committee for security, and a similar continuing committee for economic progress. The parties even signed an environmental protection plan. There was a follow-up in 1995, Oslo II, to highlight the progress made since the Oslo accords were signed.

What of the last 20 years? There has been a separation wall or barrier, which encroaches deeply on the west bank; that is where 85% of the wall is located. The wall de facto annexes 46% of the west bank, effectively creating ghettos or military zones. The air, sea and land blockade of Gaza, which has effectively imprisoned more than 1.5 million Gazans, has been criticised by the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon. We have seen Operation Cast Lead and, more recently, Operation Protective Edge from the Israelis; no doubt the justification is the rocket attacks by Hamas, which should not have taken place. There were 4,000 deaths, mainly Palestinian, in those two actions alone, as well as spectacular loss of and damage to property, industry and agriculture. Of course, Israel continues to build settlements on the west bank. This is the history that our constituents will be familiar with, but perhaps we should briefly look back further.

In 1947, the UN Special Committee on Palestine said that there should be partition into a Jewish and an Arab state. In the same year, the UN agreed resolution 181, which took effect in May 1948. On 11 May 1949, Israel was recognised by the UN, and it was effectively recognised by the UK two days later, formal recognition coming the following year. If we are serious about a two-state solution, 65 years is too long to wait for recognition of Palestine. Even if only to provide parity of dignity—the basic dignity of having one’s nation state recognised—we should recognise it. The time for excuses is over; we should recognise Palestine today.

Balance of Competences

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Thursday 12th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for some parts of his question. I well remember that general election, in which, I have to say, I got a lot more votes than he did—but not so many that I did not want to resign the following day. I am grateful for his endorsement of the statement, following the ringing endorsement—“no objection”—from the Opposition. We now have the enthusiastic support even of the Euro-federalist members of the Liberal Democrats. This exercise will therefore begin with strong cross-party support.

I cannot confirm that the review will be led by civil servants, because it is the job of Ministers to lead in Government, but there will of course be many assiduous officials engaged in the process and answering to Ministers, through whom the Government are accountable to Parliament. I can confirm that it will be an analytical exercise. I would not join the right hon. Gentleman in describing those in political parties who will draw policy conclusions from it as the “wilder elements”, as those parties are an important part of the functioning of our democracy. I am sure that the exercise will inform the functioning of our democracy, for which the right hon. Gentleman is a great enthusiast.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

The Joint Ministerial Committee’s memorandum of understanding on EU policy states:

“Ministers and officials of the devolved administrations should be fully involved in discussions within the UK Government about the formulation of the UK’s policy position on all issues which touch on matters which fall within the responsibility of the devolved administrations.”

I want to ask the Foreign Secretary two questions. First, was there any discussion at all with the devolved Administrations on the formulation of this review policy? Secondly, does he really think it adequate that Cardiff, Belfast and Edinburgh should be invited to submit evidence to the review? Does that meet the terms of the MOU, which states that the devolved Administrations should be “fully involved” in discussions on policies in which we have competence? He mentioned agriculture, fisheries and the environment: many of those matters are devolved.

[Mr Hague]

They will of course be involved in determining policy. I stress again that this is a review to establish a proper understanding of the use of EU competences and the balance of those competences with the powers of the United Kingdom. It will then be a matter for the political parties or the devolved Administrations to draw their policy conclusions from it. They will be involved in the way that has been set out in the memorandum. The commitment to undertake this exercise is in the coalition agreement; it is part of what the coalition Government said they would do at the beginning. That agreement is not qualified by, and cannot be diluted by, consultations with the devolved Administrations; we are empowered to do this as a coalition. Of course the devolved Administrations will be involved in determining policy, and I look forward to the representations that they make as part of the review.