Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill (Sixth sitting)

Stephen Morgan Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this, it will be convenient to consider clause 12 stand part.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Education (Stephen Morgan)]

As I said in the last sitting, I am grateful to the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston, for his thoughtful contributions and specific questions. I will take those points away and I will try to address as many of them as I can in this debate.

As required, we have produced impact assessments for all measures in the Bill, and have followed the better regulation framework for measures that are in its scope. As outlined on gov.uk, the Regulatory Policy Committee, or RPC, is currently reviewing the Bill’s impact assessments and will produce an opinion when its scrutiny has been completed. We will publish those impact assessments shortly. We have also conducted child’s rights impact assessments, where children are directly impacted by the policies and/or there are particular groups of children and young people who are more likely to be affected than others, as I mentioned this morning. There is no requirement to publish these documents in relation to England, but the documents are currently under review, and we will also publish those shortly.

The shadow Minister made a number of points about the shortage of foster carers. Local authorities have a duty to place looked-after children in their care in registered children’s homes. We understand that sometimes authorities need to place a child quickly, including when there are no suitable registered places immediately available, but the Government are clear that all providers of accommodation for children should register with Ofsted. We are also helping local authorities to meet their sufficiency duty by investing more than £130 million in fostering hubs and kinship care and providing additional funding for children’s homes, including more than £36 million specifically on foster carer recruitment and retention.

In the light of the questions that the shadow Minister raised, I also wanted to respond on how we are working with Ofsted to embed the reforms in the Bill. As Sir Martyn set out in his evidence, Ofsted is a key partner in delivering reform of children’s social care, and we are working closely with Ofsted to ensure that each of the measures presented to the House can be implemented carefully, alongside the non-legislative asks that Ofsted also needs to respond to in parallel. The Department has provided funding for a children’s social care transformation team in previous years, which has built the capacity for Ofsted to respond effectively to all the changes we have asked of it to date and ensure that it can meet the demands placed on it by the Bill.

The shadow Minister asked about the term “reasonably suspects”. Ofsted will have the grounds to suspend registration, which could be based on minor or major non-compliance, and may consider that that is a problem in other settings owned by the same provider group. That would be a reasonable suspicion, and it will be a matter for Ofsted to apply those judgments.

On the question of whether the bar is too high for provider group-level intervention, Ofsted’s power to cancel registrations is broad and allows it to intervene when the regulatory requirements are not being met. If Ofsted reasonably suspects that two or more settings owned by a provider group are not meeting those requirements, it has the power to ensure that the provider group acts to make improvements in the settings. If an issue arises in a single setting, it is unlikely to be indicative of wider issues in the provider group, and Ofsted would use its existing powers in relation to registered providers at the individual setting level. It is right that the bar at which Ofsted should be able to require actions of a provider group is the same bar that would enable Ofsted to take action against individual settings, where that is already set out in legislation and guidance. That ensures that this further power is proportionate and that it can only be used where there are real issues of concern arising in settings.

These powers supplement the existing inspection regime. If Ofsted has serious safeguarding concerns, it has the power to close individual settings.

The shadow Minister also spoke of the need to speed up action by Ofsted. The Hesley Group case showed what can happen when a culture and environment in a provider group allows a culture of silence and allows abhorrent abuse to take place. These new powers will allow Ofsted to act quickly and go directly to the provider group to seek improvement if it reasonably suspects that requirements are not being met, which it could not do with any legal backing in the Hesley case. If the provider group does not improve its settings, Ofsted can take action. Where there are serious safeguarding risks, ultimately Ofsted has existing robust powers to cancel a registration and close the setting.

On why we are not introducing inspection of provider groups, Ofsted inspects settings at a minimum of once per year, using the social care common inspection framework. Inspection is not warranted at provider group level—the organisation that owns the providers who run the settings—given the existing robust regime for inspection of individual settings. Provider oversight will supplement inspections to ensure that Ofsted can take the quickest and most effective action for the benefit of children. In many situations, the provider oversight measures will not be necessary, as most provision is rated good or outstanding. Inspection of provider groups would, in many cases, simply duplicate what Ofsted is already doing. Ofsted is already able to cancel registrations in respect of settings if necessary. Provider oversight ensures that multiple cancellations of registrations are not necessary.

On the point about compliance with action and plans relating to litigation, it will be a straightforward question of whether a provider has implemented the improvement plan, which will have been agreed between the provider group and Ofsted. We do not foresee that it will lead to any lengthy litigation.

The shadow Minister spoke about local authorities who place in unregistered settings. Local authorities have a duty, of course, to place looked-after children in their care in registered children’s homes. We understand that sometimes authorities need to place a child quickly, including when there are no suitable registered places immediately available, but Government are really clear that all providers of accommodation for children should register with Ofsted. We are helping local authorities to meet their sufficiency duty by investing more than £130 million in fostering hubs and kinship care, and providing additional funding for children’s homes.

Finally, Ofsted will ask local authorities for information on their use of unregistered provision ahead of any inspections. If there are any concerns, Ofsted may focus on unregistered provision in the local authority’s next inspection. That could include the decision-making processes leading to use of this provision and the statutory duties to plan for sufficient places to meet the area’s needs.

[Neil O’Brien (Harborough, Oadby and Wigston) (Con)]

I simply want to lodge a very specific question about proposed new section 30ZC(3)(a) of the Care Standards Act 2000 and the category of people who may not be given a regulatory fine but instead must be prosecuted. I raised the issue in this morning’s session about whether those people would not be able to get a regulatory fine because of the individual case being dealt with, or whether it was the case that anybody who had a previous history of being found guilty of any of these things could not have a regulatory fine applied to them. I would be grateful if the Minister can clear that up now, or if he will undertake to write to me about it. It is just to understand what the law is proposing in that respect.

[Stephen Morgan]

I thank the shadow Minister for those comments. We will certainly take that away and get him a response.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Financial oversight

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Neil O’Brien]

It is actually quite difficult to talk to clause 13, as it looks as though pretty much all the important detail here is to be worked out in regulations. Of course, the Government should support local authorities to minimise the risk of disruption to children in homes or independent fostering placements from providers getting into financial difficulty, and financial oversight should indeed be part of their registration conditions. So far, so good.

However, proposed new section 30ZE(2) of the Care Standards Act 2000 states that a financial oversight condition

“is a condition specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this section.”

Subsection (4) lists examples such as size, the number of children looked after, geographical concentration and so on. Though this area is being left to regulations, could the Minister say more about the sort of thresholds the Government are considering for these metrics—particularly as the Secretary of State will have so much power, including to alter all the criteria in regulations? Although this is broadly a sensible measure, it is quite an open-ended and new power.

The clause is already quite long, but the Opposition wondered about an improvement, perhaps as it goes through the other place, to fundamentally change the registration approach for any new market entrants, so that it is a condition of delivery that they provide financial transparency up to the parent company level, give a quarterly going concern update to the regulator and provide financial information as reasonably requested by the regulator. Has the Department considered similar requirements, so that all providers would have to give full financial transparency as a matter of course and further investigation would follow if concerns were raised?

We are completely sympathetic to proportionality in regulation, but in this case we could reasonably put the onus on providers to share the information systematically, rather than having to wait for a tip-off from a whistleblower or for a concern to become apparent. Sometimes it is the analysis of consistently reported data that provides the tip-off that there is a problem.

To use an example from a slightly different field, in my constituency I have been involved in cases where the integrated care board is regulating GP practices, and I have always thought there is a strong case for ICBs to get more data up front. Twice, when there has been a problem in my constituency and I have talked to the ICB afterwards, it seemed to me that if it had been getting financial data, the issue would have been obvious and there would have been signs long before whistleblowers ever went to the Care Quality Commission. I wonder whether consistent reporting analysis of data would allow us to see problems coming before we get to whistleblowers and other problems down the line. One issue is therefore whether we should have reporting on a more regular basis.

The Opposition have worries of the same kind about this clause as we did about clause 11, though in this case, instead of an improvement plan, it is called a recovery and resolution plan. Again, thinking about independent schools, there is a risk that time and resource get spent preparing the request for the plan, writing the plan, challenging the plan as needed, writing a better plan and going through iterations. In the case of these providers, do we have the financial expertise, either in Ofsted or the Department, to assess the plans? It looks as though there is a recognition that we do not, because proposed new section 30ZI includes the power to arrange for an independent business review. That makes sense, but for reasons best known to the Bill drafters that does not appear to include scrutinising the recovery and resolution plan. I am not sure why not. I do not know whether that is a slip of the draftsman’s pen, as they say, or whether it is deliberate.

My understanding is that Ofsted already has the power to inspect the financial position of schools, but there is a limit on what it does because of the need for a high level of expertise to pick through these cases. Looking at the accounts of a school or group of schools is simpler than analysing the complex debt and ownership structures that we see in some of the private equity-owned children’s homes.

In practice we know that the market is so tight for placements that the loss of even a smaller provider would be disruptive, and the timing of the issuing of the advanced warning notices set out in proposed new section 30ZJ will be terminal for the affected businesses. Page 47 of the policy summary states that the regulations may be extended in scope,

“so that they may provide that a person is not fit to carry on an establishment or agency if a parent undertaking has failed to comply with the financial oversight scheme.”

I am unclear where that provision is in the Bill. Perhaps the Minister could clarify that, because it is quite a complicated clause. Are there any other potential extensions of the Secretary of State’s power by regulations here? Could the Minister clarify the thinking behind allowing Ofsted to determine that someone applying for registration is not a fit and proper person to manage an organisation in this area?

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[Amanda Martin (Portsmouth North) (Lab)]

We heard from the right hon. Member for East Hampshire about the involvement of larger and smaller-scale providers in children’s social care, and the Bill covers the other places that children and young people can make their home in. I think we all agree that there is a need for a wide range of options, so that we can determine what is best for individual children and young people when they are finding their home.

Clause 13, however, is particularly relevant to larger-scale providers because of the sheer number of children who would be affected should one of those providers experience unexpected or unreported financial difficulties. No young person should be faced with losing their house overnight, and this measure would help to secure provision for those children in a planned way, as opposed to a reactive situation where a number of places have to be found overnight.

The clause also follows the Competition and Markets Authority’s recommendation to emulate the equivalent schemes we find in adult social care. That is long overdue in child social care. It adds safeguards that allow for transparency and security, which we welcome when we are dealing with children’s social care and the homes that they will hopefully have for a long time.

[Stephen Morgan]

We are aware that a provider of children’s social care places suddenly closing their provision as a result of financial failure could have a significant detrimental impact on the care and stability of children and young people where they live. Currently, local authorities have no way of knowing whether a private provider or its corporate owners are at risk of failing financially. If a large provider were to fail and suddenly exit the market without warning, it could be difficult for local authorities to find alternative placements for those children or places that appropriately meet their needs. That is why we are developing a new financial oversight scheme in children’s social care, as recommended by the Competition and Markets Authority, which will for the first time increase the financial and corporate transparency of difficult-to-replace children’s social care providers and allow accurate real-time assessment of financial risk.

The scheme will give local authorities advance warning of failure, so that they can take swift action and minimise disruption to the most vulnerable children. Those in the scheme will be required to submit a recovery and resolution plan containing information on risks to providers’ financial sustainability and plans to reduce those risks. The Secretary of State may also require providers or a corporate group member in the scheme of heightened financial risk to undergo an independent business review. We will provide details of the RRP and the IBR through guidance.

I thank the shadow Minister for his comments and questions and my good and hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North for her insightful contribution. The shadow Minister asked a number of questions about how the scheme will work in practice ahead of the regulations, and made a number of points about which providers will be in scope of the financial oversight scheme.

It is worth saying that the scheme will be proportionate and target only difficult-to-replace providers and their owners according to their size, market share and geographical concentration. The scheme will apply to private, voluntary and charity providers of children’s homes, including dual registered special schools and independent fostering agencies operating in England. We will also extend the measure to supported accommodation, and we in the future may look to extend it by regulation to residential family centres. Local authorities routinely manage placements of individual children in the event of closures of smaller services, so we do not think those need to be covered by the scheme.

To answer other questions raised by the shadow Minister, the Bill sets out the foundations of the financial oversight scheme, exercisable through the Secretary of State’s powers. We know that the children’s social care placement market is dynamic and we will use these measures and powers to set out the detail in regulations, which will enable my Department to review and update the details in line with future changes to the market. We will publish guidance alongside the regulations, setting out how the scheme will operate in practice and enabling providers to understand what the scheme requires of them.

The shadow Minister asked why Ofsted is not leading the financial oversight scheme. The forensic financial analysis required to fulfil the scheme’s aims extends beyond Ofsted’s remit as a largely quality-focused regulator. Given that Ofsted is not a financial regulator, we will build on my Department’s existing capabilities and market oversight functions to undertake the specialist work required to develop the scheme. A Department-led scheme means that we can play a stronger co-ordination role should a difficult-to-replace provider exit the market, enabling a quick multi-agency response.

Finally, how many providers will be covered and how many placements they represent, we want the financial oversight scheme to deliver an effective oversight function that is proportionate and not overly burdensome. We therefore want to introduce a scheme that covers difficult-to-replace providers only, as recommended by the Competition and Markets Authority. We will determine how many providers will be subject to the scheme as we develop the regulations. Providers who meet the conditions will include private, voluntary and charity providers; we may look to scale the number of providers in the scheme up or down in future ,according to market developments, to ensure that we continue to meet the aims of the scheme.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14

Power to limit profits of relevant providers

[Munira Wilson (Twickenham) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 42, in clause 14, page 28, line 37, at end insert—

“(c) independent schools with caring responsibilities and offering SEND provision.”

This amendment would include independent special schools within the profit cap provision.

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My final question is: does this also apply to the voluntary sector? We are talking about profit, but a charity or voluntary organisation does not have distributed profit. They may, however, have a surplus, so does this also apply to surpluses made by entities in that sector?

[Stephen Morgan]

Amendment 42, in the name of the hon. Member for Twickenham, seeks to extend the powers to cap profits of Ofsted-registered non-local authority providers of children’s homes and independent fostering services to also cover private schools with caring responsibilities and offering SEND provision.

As hon. Members will be aware, the Competition and Markets Authority found the children’s social care placements market to be dysfunctional, estimating that the largest private providers were making profit margins well above what would be expected in a well-functioning market. It is important to be clear that the study was restricted to looking at the state of the market for specific types of placements. It provides clear evidence of excess profit making by some providers of these placements, but its scope did not extend to looking at private schools.

We set out a wider package of measures in “Keeping children safe, helping families thrive”, which we expect will rein in profiteering among children’s social care providers, and the profit cap is intended as a last resort if they fail to do so. Children and young people with special educational needs are found throughout the private school sector, and it is not our intention to introduce a blanket cap on profits in private schools that offer special educational provision.

With regards to private special schools, they can play an important role in the special educational needs and disability system, particularly in meeting low-incidence needs. Many have important expertise, but we recognise that independent special schools have higher costs than maintained special schools and academies. The Government are very aware of the challenges in the SEND system, and we understand how urgently we need to address them. But these complex issues need a considered approach to deliver sustainable change. As part of that work, we are considering the role and place of independent special schools. It would not be appropriate to introduce a profit cap on a completely different sector without proper engagement with stakeholders and an assessment of its impact.

The hon. Member for Twickenham made a number of insightful and helpful comments when moving her amendment, and I hope that I addressed earlier her remarks about private special schools. As I mentioned, private special schools often have higher costs compared with their maintained equivalents. In some cases, that will be particularly because of higher specialist provision to support children and young people, particularly those with complex needs.

Some private schools, of course, operate for profit. We need to ensure that placements in private special schools are used appropriately. It is the Government’s intention that special schools should be reserved for those with the most complex needs. As I have mentioned, we will consider the role and place of private special schools and the potential for a cap on profits as part of our wider reforms to special educational needs.

Amendment 25, in the name of the hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston, the shadow Minister, seeks to require the Secretary of State, before making regulations to implement a profit cap, to lay a report on the number of placements for looked-after children in relevant establishments or agencies and the expected impact of a profit cap on the number of places available. As I outlined earlier, we intend to use the powers in clause 14 only if profiteering is not brought under control through the wider package of measures set out in “Keeping children safe, helping families thrive”. Those measures include improving data transparency and boosting the supply and diversity of provision, helping to foster greater competition and to drive down prices and profits to more sustainable levels.

It is crucial that we allow time for those other measures to work before considering regulatory action. If it becomes necessary to use the powers—I hope that it does not—the clause already includes important safeguards through restrictions that ensure that the powers are used appropriately. Regulations may be made only if the Secretary of State is satisfied that that is necessary on value for money grounds. The Secretary of State must also have regard to the welfare of looked-after children and the interests of local authorities and providers, including the opportunity to make a profit.

Crucially, the clause also requires the Secretary of State to consult before making regulations. That will be particularly important to ensure that all interests are considered in determining issues such as how the cap will be calculated and the level at which it will be set. The consultation is particularly important: not only would it inform the details of the proposed cap itself, but it would require the Government to respond and publish that response. That would set out our rationale if a cap were introduced, including the matters in the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston.

In addition, the explanatory memorandum to the regulations would set out the policy rationale; in effect, that would already fulfil the amendment’s aim of having a report laid before Parliament. Of course, the regulations would be subject to affirmative resolution, so these matters would no doubt be covered in debate. I hope that the hon. Member is reassured that important safeguards are already in place to ensure that the power to cap profits is appropriately restricted. Existing mechanisms also ensure that Parliament has sight of the information that the amendment covers. For those reasons, I ask hon. Members not to press their amendments.

I turn to clause 14, which inserts new sections into the Care Standards Act 2000. It is a crucial element of our strategy to drive down profiteering in the children’s social care placements market. It will provide new powers for Government to take regulatory action to restrict provider profits if they are not brought under control through our wider package of measures set out in “Keeping children safe, helping families thrive”. While some private providers are doing brilliant work, we want to ensure that all providers are delivering high-quality placements at a sustainable cost. We know that that is not always happening. The Competition and Markets Authority found the placements market to be dysfunctional, establishing that the largest private children’s social care placement providers were making profit margins of 19% to 36%—well above what would be expected in a well-functioning market.

Let me be clear: making this level of profit from providing placements for some of our most vulnerable children is unacceptable and must end. The clause provides important backstop powers to ensure that the Government can take action if needed to end profiteering. The clause also sends a clear signal to providers that Government will not hesitate to take regulatory action to restrict this unacceptable behaviour if profit making is not reined in. If it becomes necessary to use these powers—I hope it does not—then the clause includes important safeguards and restrictions on the powers to ensure that they may only be exercised proportionately.

Regulations may be made only if a Secretary of State is satisfied that it is necessary on value-for-money grounds. The Secretary of State must also have regard to the welfare of looked-after children and the interests of local authorities and providers, including the opportunity to make a profit. Crucially, the clause also requires the Secretary of State to consult before regulations are made. That will be particularly important to ensure that all interests are considered in determining issues such as how the cap would be calculated and the level at which it would be set.

In addition, clause 14 provides for regulations to be made that set out important detail about the administration of any future cap by providing for annual returns from registered providers and the ability to request supplementary information. The detail of these returns, including their contents and format, will be determined after full consultation. We will want to ensure that we do what is possible to prevent profits from being disguised while ensuring that returns are not overtly onerous and burdensome.

I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston, for his specific points. I also thank the right hon. Member for East Hampshire for his points on the importance of places and on the profit cap. On the question of why we cannot do an annual report on placement sufficiency, local authorities already have a duty to undertake an assessment of the availability of placements and sufficiency. As discussed earlier, the regional care co-operative will be able to take this forward at a regional level.

The shadow Minister also asked about the annual report on places. We are improving data transparency and boosting the supply and diversity of provision among other interventions, which will have swift, positive impacts. They will help to foster greater competition, which will naturally help to drive down prices and profits to more sustainable levels. The shadow Minister is right to raise the hiding of profits. We are aware that there are numerous ways in which registered providers may seek to avoid the cap or artificially reduce their profits for the purpose of the profit cap return, and legislation will seek to limit that. Should our analysis indicate that providers have attempted to hide profits, we will take that into our account in our determination as to whether the cap has been breached. That can also be considered to be an aggravating factor that could lead to more a severe monetary penalty for breach of the cap.

We are not introducing a profit cap immediately and we are not setting out the level of cap at this stage. The level of the profit cap will depend on a number of factors, including market conditions at the point it was introduced. Full consultation with local authorities and provider representatives, including on the appropriateness of the level of the cap, would need to take place before this power is used. We are clear that we are not seeking to eliminate profit making entirely; it will continue to play a role in the market.

The right hon. Member for East Hampshire asked a range of questions about how this will work in practice. I hope I have covered a number of them already, but the Secretary of State will assess returns, including ascertaining whether revenue not recorded as profit should have been. The process will look retrospectively at profits made in previous periods. Any breaches of the cap will be punishable by fine. The former Education Secretary also asked about how we will enforce the cap. Yes, the Secretary of State will be able to issue a civil monetary penalty if the cap has been breached, and the maximum level of the penalty for a breach may be prescribed in affirmative regulations and changed as needed in future with the approval of Parliament.

Finally, and more broadly, we are committed to taking a measured approach to implementing our reforms and are acutely aware of the importance of not destabilising the market and risking significant disruption to the care of our most vulnerable children and young people. We are confident that the package of reforms set out in the paper published on 18 November last year will address profiteering and ensure that the supportive and caring placements that children need are delivered at a sustainable cost to the taxpayer. However, we will keep the market under close review, and we will not hesitate to take action to cap providers’ profits if needed.

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[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 16 stand part.

[Stephen Morgan]

My Department will introduce civil monetary penalties to compel children’s care providers to comply with the financial oversight scheme and—if implemented in the future—the profit cap. It is imperative that providers comply with the scheme in order to protect vulnerable children from the disruption to their homes and care that could result from a sudden market exit by the providers of their placements. If providers do not comply, we will tackle that effectively by introducing penalties. Penalties could apply up to the highest level of the organisational structure of a provider that has failed to comply with the scheme.

If a profit cap is introduced in future, clauses 15 and 16 provide for civil monetary penalties for breaches of any profit cap, to be issued at provider level. The Secretary of State will be able to issue monetary penalties for breaches of the cap, and for failure to comply with annual return requirements. Both are essential to allow for the proper administration of the cap—if we need to bring it in in the future.

Furthermore, if providers fail to comply, action may be taken against their registration. The Care Standards Act 2000 is amended to give Ofsted the power to suspend or cancel the registration of a person, in respect of a children’s home or fostering agency, if they have failed to comply with either measure.

Clause 16 sets out the process that both the Secretary of State and Ofsted must follow when issuing civil monetary penalties under provisions in the Bill. It will ensure that any penalties are issued fairly and consistently. It places a duty on the Secretary of State and Ofsted, when issuing a monetary penalty, to serve a notice of intention on the recipient. They must also take into account any representations from the recipient of the notice before a final decision to issue a penalty is made.

The clause sets out that the Secretary of State or Ofsted may issue a monetary penalty of any amount. The only exceptions to that are when the Secretary of State has prescribed in regulations a maximum penalty that may be imposed. Proposed new schedule 1A specifies the maximum amount and sets out the factors that must be considered when determining the amount of the monetary penalty to be issued, ensuring transparency.

To ensure that monetary penalties are paid on time, we will have the ability to charge interest on any unpaid penalty and to recover the unpaid amount, including any interest, as a civil debt. The interest will be charged at the standard rate, as specified in the Judgments Act 1838, but the total amount must not be more than the amount of the penalty. All penalty moneys are to go into the Consolidated Fund to help pay for vital public services. Finally, persons may appeal either the imposition of a penalty or the amount to the first-tier tribunal. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Neil O’Brien]

I will be much briefer, because this is essentially a consequential clause relating to clause 14, but I want to touch on a couple of things.

A further difficulty in enforcing this profit clawback, and understanding what excess profit is, is that even within a single market not all these institutions are doing the same thing. In a funny way, the remarks that the hon. Member for Twickenham made about clause 14 go to that point. We look at the very large unit costs—that is a horrible expression—or the costs per child of care in independent special schools, and we think, “Gosh, these unit costs are so high. Surely we have to do something about this.” The Government and the Opposition are seized of that point—we do not want to spend money that we do not need to spend—but we should sometimes look at the individual cases.

For example, a child in my constituency who has just been put into one of these brilliant institutions—Red Kite, over in Northamptonshire—literally needs constant help just to keep breathing, so we have to be clear about whether these things are really like for like. It is true that that independent special school is a lot more expensive than a mainstream school, but is it really like for like?

As we think about capping profits in this industry, a further complexity is that, depending on the caseload and the child, the profit and risk levels will be different. Within an individual institution, there could be some unbelievably hard-to-place, hard-to-look-after, very difficult and expensive children, alongside other children, so it will not be easy to work out an acceptable level of profit.

Proposed new schedule 1A(6), on the right of appeal against imposition of monetary penalty, further extends the opportunities for people to game the system. First, it is retrospective—it is about clawing money back from people after the fact, which gives them an opportunity to manage their profits so they look like they are compliant—and then there is a right of appeal. I understand why that is in the Bill, but to return to the metaphor about the lack of proper enforcement with regard to illegal working and the lack of information about the fines that are collected, by the time we have tried to claw money back retrospectively and given people the right of appeal, it would be easy for them to say, “This is in the name of my brother. We have collapsed the company. Sorry, we don’t have any money to pay this fine,” so we may not end up with anything at the end of it. Meanwhile, the people who are really behind the scheme have moved on and are doing the same thing down the road.

I want to highlight those points. This clause is consequential on clause 14. If we have clause 14, it makes sense to have clause 15, so we will not oppose it. I want to emphasise again, however, that there are even more dimensions to why it will be difficult to use this measure, so the focus should be on supply.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

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Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stephen Morgan]

Clause 17 enables information sharing between Ofsted and my Department to ensure the effective functioning of the financial oversight scheme and profit cap regime. Sharing relevant information also supports Ofsted’s functions under part 2 of the Care Standards Act 2000.

For the purposes of a financial oversight scheme, effective information and the sharing agreements that are in place between my Department and Ofsted are crucial, and they will enable us to bring together financial corporate performance and quality indicators about individual providers to inform decision making. This clause does not authorise the processing of data, which would contravene data protection legislation.

[Neil O’Brien]

I have a brief question. I understand what the Minister is trying to do here; the Secretary of State is taking powers to require the Ofsted chief inspector to share information with them in connection with the functions under this part. Can the Minister explain how that differs from the current ability of His Majesty’s chief inspector to share information with the Secretary of State? As the Minister just said, proposed new section 30ZO(8) is clear that it cannot contravene the GDPR legislation anyway, so I am trying to understand what gap this clause is trying to fix.

[Stephen Morgan]

I thank the shadow Minister for that. Data will be shared to other parties as part of the financial oversight scheme. It is worth saying that the Department will share with local authorities which providers meet the financial oversight conditions and are subject to the financial oversight scheme. That is to support their local sufficiency and contingency planning.

To ensure that commercially sensitive information is kept confidential, we will not share any provider information submitted as part of this scheme with local authorities or the sector. The Department will use this information to make an assessment of financial risk and issue an advance warning notice to local authorities where there is a real possibility that financial risk could lead a provider to cease operating.

Finally, where providers or their corporate owners, as I mentioned earlier, breach the requirements of this scheme, the Department will publish information on civil monetary penalties imposed. That is to be transparent about providers who fail to comply with the scheme.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18

Use of agency workers for children’s social care work

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Minister for School Standards (Catherine McKinnell)]

Clause 18, through the introduction of a regulation-making power, will allow the Government to take stronger action to alleviate the significant affordability and stability challenges that have arisen from the increase in the use and cost of agency workers in local authority children’s social care in England. This clause ensures that, while agency workers remain an important part of local authority children’s social care, they do not become a long-term replacement for a permanent, stable workforce.

The clause will allow the Secretary of State to introduce regulations on the use of agency workers in English local authority children’s social care services. It will strengthen the existing regulatory framework for the use of agency social workers in local authority children’s social care services, which is currently set out in statutory guidance. It will also extend the framework beyond the social workers to the wider local authority children’s social care workforce, such as agency workers delivering targeted early intervention or family help.

We remain committed to working in partnership with stakeholders across the children’s social care system, including agencies, to ensure that the proposals implemented are proportionate and effective. The clause provides a duty to consult ahead of introducing regulations.

Regulations will make it clear to local authorities, the recruitment sector and agency workers what they should expect from each other. The consistency that that brings to the market will benefit all parties. Reducing local authority spend on agency workers will allow local authorities to invest more in services supporting children and families and enhance the offer to permanent employees. I hope that the Committee agrees that the clause should stand part of the Bill.