Interest Rate Swap Derivatives

Stephen Metcalfe Excerpts

Thursday 24th October 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mark Garnier]

That is absolutely right. Part of the problem, however, is that the banks have an incentive not to get in touch with people, for obvious reasons. That relates to the second point I wish to develop. It is a technical point, but it is incredibly important in terms of why it is incentivising banks to delay technical redress for as long as they can, and it has implications for the financial stability of the banks.

We should not think of these things as stand-alone products, but should recognise them for what they are. They are not stand-alone products; there is another side of this trade. They are swaps for a reason, and it is important to understand what a swap is. Any one of our victims will have been persuaded to take out a contract with the bank that has the beneficial effect of capping interest rate payments at a certain level. That is a virtuous thing and we are all familiar with the financial planning behind the thought process, through things such as fixed-rate mortgages. But these are not fixed-rate mortgages; they are stand-alone products that relate to a loan, but are not part of that loan. Importantly, many people have paid off the loan but still have the outstanding liability on the swap. The quid pro quo of having a fixed cap on interest payments is the collar that has caused so many problems for our victims, whereby they have to pay a relatively high rate of interest in today’s terms. What is not fully understood is that this is not a simple contract with the bank, as it first appears. The bank is not taking a naked bet with its customers that, in the environment of falling interest rates, it has won. It is not receiving as profit the penalty in the increased premiums being paid in interest rates by the victim, because for a swap to actually be a swap, there is a matching trade with a third party on the other side. What the banks receive in higher interest rate payments they are paying to an opposing and third-party counterpart on the other side.

I shall now go into a bit more detail. Businesses may want to make sure that they do not pay too high an interest rate; that is why they are persuaded, rightly or wrongly, to take the swaps. However, an organisation such as a pension fund needs to guarantee its income should a severe drop in interest rates, such as we have seen, occur. It would want to take a position opposite that of the businesses, which are the victims.

The pension fund will forgo a rise in rates while winning the guaranteed floor rate that it will receive. For a business to have a rate cap at, say, 7%, it will guarantee to pay no less than 5%. For a pension fund to be guaranteed to receive a minimum payment of 5%, it would agree to receive no more than 7%. In that way, the business’s and pension fund’s interests are perfectly aligned in opposition.

As both the pension fund and business are clients of the bank, the bank does two simultaneous trades—one with the business, to cap and collar the rate payments, and the other with the pension fund, to collar and cap the interest rate receipts. The bank makes a small margin, but essentially its liability, if everything stands up, is perfectly and oppositely aligned. That is the symmetry of liability and the basis of the swap market.

[Stephen Metcalfe (South Basildon and East Thurrock) (Con)]

I thank my hon. Friend for his understandable explanation of the product. I will be honest—I am new to this issue, which constituents have brought to my attention. Is it possible to explain the issue to an individual in a phone call lasting one minute and 20 seconds? That, apparently, constitutes the contract between the bank and the client.

[Mark Garnier]

I will try to explain the issue as simply as I can now.

Imagine a second-hand-car dealer. He may buy a dodgy motor on his own books and try to make as big a turn as he can, but he risks not getting his money back. Now imagine a car dealer with a valuable vintage car who aligns a seller and buyer at exactly the same time. He takes a turn with no risk at all, and that is how a swap behaves. Now imagine that, having lined up that trade, he takes the money from the buyer, so has a contractual agreement with them, and agrees a sale with the seller. However, on the way to deliver the car, he writes it off in a crash and is not insured. He still has liabilities on both sides—he still has to deliver a car to the buyer and has to pay the seller. That is the mess that the banks are in. They have caused themselves a massive car crash and have to look after the other side of the trade.

We are fully aware of the losses to the banks on the financial redress scheme—plus, obviously, the consequential loss scheme as well. We have heard about how much has been put aside, and there will be debate about whether that is the right amount or not. However, we have heard nothing yet about the value of the liability on the other side of the swap—the liability to institutions, most likely to be pension funds, that still needs to be honoured. That has implications for the stability of the banks and shows why it is important for banks to keep the redress scheme running for as long as possible.