Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Gregory Stafford

Committee stage
Thursday 19th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. You and the Committee will be pleased to know that my hon. Friends have made most of the points I wanted to flag.

In poll after poll and survey after survey, patients feel they do not get information in a timely and constructive way. Our amendment 46 would give patients a stronger say in their future care if they lose capacity. It clarifies that patients must be given clear, proactive support to understand, prepare and use the documents. It is about ensuring that advance choice documents are not just theoretical paperwork, but living, respected statements of a patient’s wishes.

I therefore support the clause and the amendment, and I ask the Minister three questions. How will NHS England and local integrated care boards ensure that commissioners are trained to respect and use ACDs in practice, especially in emergencies? Secondly, what oversight will ensure that ACDs are not simply ignored at the bedside, when a patient is most vulnerable? Will the Government consider a review mechanism so that we can assess how well ACDs are working in a few years’ time, after the Bill is passed?

I turn briefly to Liberal Democrat amendment 18. Like other hon. Members, I feel that the inclusion of financial information in an ACD is not appropriate, both from a practical and a personal security, safety and information point of view. I do, however, completely support the hon. Member for Winchester’s overall view that there is a significant problem with how financial stress can affect a person’s mental health. Like him, I call on the Minister to think about how we as a country, whether in this Bill or somewhere else, can address the impact of financial stress on mental health.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I will speak first to amendment 46. We agree with the principle of the amendment, but do not think it necessary. Under the Bill, if an individual who is likely to benefit from making an advance choice document approaches services to create one, they should be offered information and appropriate support to do so. The approach that we have taken in the Bill is therefore functionally equivalent to a right to request an advance choice document.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Gregory Stafford

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Gregory Stafford]

I thank the hon. Lady for her point, but I shall continue in the same vein unless I am told to do otherwise.

Clause 27 will ensure that when community treatment orders are considered, with all the restrictions they bring, the nominated person’s voice must be heard and an objection must be properly countered with evidence. Clause 28 addresses hospital transfers, recognising that being moved to another hospital can uproot fragile support networks and compound distress. By embedding a consultation duty here, too, the Bill will make it harder for patients to be moved arbitrarily or without explanation.

In summary, the clauses and the schedule empower patients, embed transparency and build trust, but they do so through a lens rightly focused on adults—capable, consenting adults who make choices freely. That brings me to my fundamental point: we must be absolutely certain that this approach will not inadvertently erode a bedrock of child protection: that a parent is the default legal protector for their child. For an adult, autonomy means freedom of choice, but for a child, especially one under 16, autonomy must never mean being left alone to navigate a labyrinth of legal forms and healthcare powers without the protection of a parent. That is why I strongly support amendments 54 and 55, which would ensure that for under-16s, parents remain the lawful decision makers and the first safeguard for their child’s welfare.

Let us imagine for a moment a vulnerable 14-year-old who, in the confusion and fear of a psychiatric admission, is persuaded by a well-meaning adult—or, worse, someone with a hidden agenda—to appoint them as the nominated person. That child may be separated from their parents—the very people who know the child best and have a legal duty to care for them—while an outsider gains rights to object to treatment or discharge decisions. Once that nomination is made and witnessed, it carries weight in law and could marginalise the very people who brought that child into the world and have a moral and legal duty to protect them.

This is not just theoretical. We know from real cases in family courts that unscrupulous individuals can exploit vulnerable young people. The risk that the new system could unintentionally open the door to manipulation must be taken seriously. Let us not be naive about how exploitation works: groomers, traffickers and abusers thrive in grey areas of the law; they will find loopholes and drive a coach and horses through them. If we do not make it crystal clear that no child under 16 can override parental responsibility without a court’s explicit order, we risk creating an invitation for abuse.

Can the Minister assure the Committee that no child under 16 will be permitted to override parental responsibility simply by nominating someone else without a full and proper process? Schedule 2 does include fall-back arrangements and eligibility checks, and those are welcome, but unless the law is explicit that only a court can displace a parent’s right to act for their child, those safeguards are not watertight.

Amendment 54 addresses a related area, the notification of incidents. It would require the Secretary of State to review whether the law should be strengthened so that all admissions of children and young people for mental health treatment trigger mandatory incident reporting, and whether the timeframes for that reporting are still appropriate. It would require the Secretary of State to review whether incident reporting requirements are robust enough for all under-18s in mental health settings. Are all incidents of restraint, seclusion, injury or absconding being reported promptly and comprehensively? If not, what must change?

We have seen far too many tragic cases in which harm or abuse in children’s mental health units came to light only after a scandal broke, because the system did not catch it in time. Proper oversight is not an optional extra; it is essential for the trust of families. In my view, a review alone is not enough, so I urge to the Minister to confirm that, if the review finds gaps, the Government will legislate swiftly to close them. In the meantime, what interim steps will be taken to ensure that no child is left unprotected?

Amendment 55 is the final safeguard in this suite of amendments. It would allow the Secretary of State to make consequential amendments to other laws to implement the Bill cleanly. That is good housekeeping, but it must not become a blank cheque. When it comes to parental rights or child safeguarding, no technical tweak should be done behind closed doors by negative procedure; Parliament must approve it in full daylight, on the record. Will the Minister confirm without ambiguity that any consequential amendment that touches on parental powers or child protections will come before both Houses under the affirmative procedure?

To illustrate things in the starkest terms, let me paint one more scenario for this Committee. A 15-year-old girl, already vulnerable, is detained following a self-harm incident. Her parents, distressed but committed, wish to be involved in her care plan and discharge, but in her fragile mental state the child is persuaded by an older friend—perhaps well-meaning, perhaps not—to nominate them instead. That friend, now a legally recognised nominated person, blocks discharge, disagrees with treatment and excludes the parents from updates. The clinicians are caught in a legal tangle. The child is caught in the middle, and the parents must fight in court to reclaim their rightful role. As I said before, that is not a theory; it is the sort of real-life pitfall that sloppy drafting can enable. If we see it coming and fail to stop it, we will have failed as legislators.

I wish to be clear that I support clauses 24 to 28 and schedule 2 because they modernise mental health law for adults in a way that is respectful and empowering. I support amendment 54, because it would strengthen transparency and accountability where children’s lives and safety are at stake. I support amendment 55, because it would keep our statute book coherent, but it must never be misused to erode rights by stealth. Above all, I support the amendments because they ensure that the new nominated person system does not inadvertently weaken the oldest and strongest protection we have, which is the legal responsibility of parents to care for their own child.

I urge this Committee to adopt the clauses, the schedule and amendments 54 and 55 as essential guardrails to ensure that what we pass here is not just legally sound, but morally right. Let us modernise this law and strengthen patient voice, but let us never allow a child to lose their parents’ protection by accident or bureaucratic slip. Let us be in no doubt: when the state removes or limits parental rights, it must do so under the strictest scrutiny of a court of law, with evidence tested and the child’s welfare paramount. A signed piece of paper at a bedside should never be enough. That is the dividing line between a humane, modern health system and one that risks creating new injustices in the name of progress.

I ask the Minister again: will the Government enshrine in this Bill or elsewhere that parents are the legal representatives for under-16s unless a court directs otherwise? Will he guarantee rigorous checks to prevent the manipulation of young minds at their most vulnerable? Will he commit that any necessary changes found by the incident review under amendment 54 would be acted on without delay? I commend this package of reforms to the Committee, and I trust that the Government will listen carefully to these warnings and act to make the legislation watertight.

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris, not least because I understand you have just returned from New Zealand, where you had duties as the Government’s trade envoy. I thought perhaps we should do a haka in your honour to mark it, but you might rule against that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

Currently, under the Mental Health Act, a person detained for treatment can be kept in hospital initially for six months before the responsible clinician must make an assessment to decide whether to continue their detention or to discharge them. The independent review raised concerns that six months is too long. It heard evidence that patients were sometimes detained longer than necessary and were only considered for discharge when a tribunal hearing was due. It found that in up to 17% of cases referred to the mental health tribunal, discharge happened in the 48 hours before the hearing. That suggests that some patients are being detained longer than is necessary.

The review recommended reducing from six months to three months the initial detention period for people admitted for treatment, so that a patient’s detention is reviewed sooner to ensure that patients are not detained when they are no longer benefiting from treatment and can be safely discharged.

Clause 29 will mean that patients detained for treatment have their detention reviewed three times—up from twice—in the first year: at three, six and twelve months from the date of detention. The new renewal periods will not apply to part III patients, except in very specific circumstances when an unrestricted patient changes status. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Gregory Stafford]

I have some brief questions for the Minister about this important clause, which has serious implications for patient liberty and for public protection. We must ensure that decisions are clinically and legally sound. First, how will the proposed changes to initial and renewal detention periods help conditions and services and manage public risk more effectively, particularly in forensic or high-risk cases? Secondly, do longer detention periods after revocation of a community treatment order reflect a higher perceived risk, and if so, is there clear clinical evidence supporting that extension to six months? Thirdly, are we confident that the new timelines strike the right balance between protecting the public and ensuring patients are not detained longer than necessary? Finally, and as an adjunct to that, what other considerations are there in the clause or the Bill to keep the public safe and to make sure that decisions are correct in the context of clause 29?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. We are absolutely committed to ensuring that we create a space for young people to provide feedback. Some of that will be around past experiences when making their advance choice documents, but much broader opportunities for feedback will absolutely be built into the system. We want this to be a learning process. It is important that the code of practice is not just a document that sits on the shelf gathering dust; it should be a live document. That is why the feedback is so important.

It should be noted that although reflecting on past experiences may be therapeutic for some individuals, for others it can be traumatic, so the measure should be entirely service-user led. We also continue to be concerned about the burden that the amendment would place on independent mental health advocacy services, which are already under strain.

[Gregory Stafford]

I apologise—this may be due to the terminology of “amendment” versus “clause”—but is the Minister saying that the Government are likely to vote against clause 35 as it currently stands? He is talking about amendments and clauses, and that is slightly confusing me. [Interruption.] His officials are nodding.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I don’t know what that nod means.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

We will figure it out as we go along. I have now lost my place. [Interruption.] My answer to the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon is that the Government are voting against clause 35 stand part.

[Gregory Stafford]

Thank you, Minister.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Right. Advocates have told us that implementing what is set out in the clause would raise logistical and resourcing problems, as it would require a significant shift from their current role. They have also raised concerns that if they acted in effect on behalf of the hospital to collect feedback, their independence and impartiality in the eyes of the patient might be undermined. We would prefer to direct resources to increasing access to advocacy services among in-patients, as proposed by the Bill. Advocates play a crucial role in promoting and protecting the rights of patients. We do not wish to detract from that or to dilute their role. I do not commend the clause to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

The clauses will amend section 132 of the Mental Health Act in relation to detained patients, and section 132A in relation to community patients, and insert a new provision in relation to conditionally discharged patients. They place a statutory duty on hospital managers to supply complaints information to detained patients, community patients and conditionally discharged respectively, as well as to their nominated person.

Patients, their family and carers have a right to complain about the treatment they receive, including care and treatment under the Mental Health Act. The patient’s rights to complain are enshrined in the NHS constitution. Although the code of practice currently sets out that information about complaints should be provided to patients when they are detained, there is no statutory duty to do so. Under the clauses, hospital managers will be required to provide information on how to make a complaint about: first, functions under the Bill; secondly, any medical treatment for mental disorder received during their detention; and thirdly, the outcome of any complaint about medical treatment. That includes providing information about how to make a complaint to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman about the mismanagement of complaints about medical treatment, where the person believes their complaint to another body—for instance the hospital or CQC—was not appropriately investigated.

Hospital managers must take practicable steps to ensure that patients have understood complaints procedures, and information about complaints must be provided both verbally and in writing. The duty requires that information must be provided as soon as practicable after the patient is first detained, when the section that they are detained under changes, when the detention is renewed, or every 12 months for restricted patients under part III of the 1983 Act. For community patients, a duty is triggered as soon as it is practical after being placed on a community treatment order and as soon as practical each time the community treatment order is renewed. For conditionally discharged patients, it is triggered as soon as practicable after being conditionally discharged. I commend clauses 42 to 44 to the Committee.

[Gregory Stafford]

I rise to speak in favour of clauses 42, 43 and 44, which together strengthen the duty to inform patients—whether detained in the community or conditionally discharged—about how to make a complaint about their treatment and the outcome of that complaint. The Mental Health Act has long included duties to tell patients their rights, but too often that information has been patchy, hard to understand or buried in paperwork. The clauses tackle that by requiring clear, repeated information about not just detention, but treatment and the complaints process.

Clause 42 relates to information about complaints for detained patients. Section 132 of the Mental Health Act 1983 originally required hospitals to inform detained patients of their rights, but that was often inconsistently applied. This clause responds to long-standing concerns about transparency and patient empowerment, aligning with the broader goals of the Bill to enhance autonomy and dignity in mental health care. Specifically, there is an expanded duty of information. Hospital managers must now ensure that detained patients understand how to make complaints, not only about their detention, but about their treatment, along with the outcomes of any complaints.

There are some timing requirements, i.e. that the information must be provided as soon as practicable after detention begins and be repeated annually for restricted patients, or after each section 20 report for others. That will improve patient’s awareness of their rights and how to seek redress. It will promote accountability and mental health services by encouraging feedback and complaints, and support better outcomes by addressing grievances early and constructively.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Gregory Stafford

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Gregory Stafford]

I rise to speak to clauses 22 and 23 and to Liberal Democrat new clause 4.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth said, the Opposition support clauses 22 and 23 generally. Clause 22 addresses the concern that community clinicians—essentially, those responsible for overseeing a patient’s care outside hospital—have historically had limited formal input into decisions about community treatment orders, even though they are central to the patient’s ongoing care. It ensures that community clinicians not only are consulted but, in some cases, must provide written agreement before key decisions are made. It aims to improve continuity of care, ensure decisions reflect the realities of community-based treatment, and reduce inappropriate and poorly co-ordinated use of CTOs.

The benefits of the clause are obvious, but they are worth restating. Clearly, it improves the continuity of care and ensures that clinicians with direct knowledge of the patient’s community care are involved in those key decisions. It enhances safeguards, adding an additional layer of professional oversight before coercive measures are imposed or suggested. It promotes collaboration by encouraging joint decision making between the hospital-based and community-based clinicians, and it reduces the risk of inappropriate CTOs by ensuring they are used only when genuinely appropriate and supported by those delivering care.

However, I ask the Minister to touch on three points. First, requiring a written agreement or consultation could delay urgent decisions if not managed efficiently, so will he explain how, under the clause, any potential delay—a disagreement or just administrative inertia—can be removed to ensure treatment is not delayed?

That moves me on to the administrative burden. Clearly, the clause adds a level of complexity and requires more documentation and co-ordination. Although I understand that that is a necessary outcome, I would again be grateful for the Minister’s thoughts on how to ensure effective and speedy implementation.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth said, the ambiguity in the roles of the two clinicians may create confusion or disputes over responsibilities if they are not clearly defined or agreed. My reading of the clause is that there is no such clear definition; will the Minister look to provide one through other agencies, or will he put something into the clause in Committee or later in the Bill’s proceedings?

Clause 23, on the conditions of community treatment orders, addresses the concerns that the threshold for imposing conditions on community treatment orders has been too low, allowing conditions that may be clinically unnecessary or overly restrictive. By removing the “appropriate” test, the clause will tighten the legal standard to ensure that only necessary conditions are imposed.

Additionally, the clause will empower tribunals to play a more active role in scrutinising CTO conditions by allowing them to recommend that clinicians review specific conditions, even if the patient is not discharged. This reflects the Bill’s broader aim of enhancing patient rights and removing unnecessary restrictions.

The clause is a welcome addition. It will ensure that CTO conditions are imposed only when strictly necessary, meaning that there are stronger safeguards, and it will enhance the role of tribunals in protecting patient rights without requiring full discharge. It will reduce clinical overreach by preventing the use of overly broad or vague conditions that may not be clinically justified.

However, as with the previous clause, I have some questions. First, the tribunal power is limited in that it can only recommend, not require, the reconsideration of conditions. Is that the intention, or will the Minister strengthen the clause at some point to ensure that the tribunal can require a reconsideration of conditions? If he will not, what issues does he see arising from there not being a reconsideration?

Secondly, as I mentioned in my intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, I have a concern about the potential ambiguity in the shift from “appropriate” to “necessary” leading to uncertainty or dispute over interpretation. As we touched on in relation to other clauses, clinicians will need additional guidance or training to apply the revised standard consistently. Where will that revised training and guidance be located, and what is the timeframe for its implementation? We need to ensure that all clinicians are fully trained and ready to use this new power.

I will briefly touch on new clause 4, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, because although I understand that the hon. Member for Winchester may not press it, somebody else might. It would place a general duty on integrated care boards to ensure that services in the community have the necessary level of resource to meet demand such that the provisions of the Bill function as intended, and to assess and report on this every two years. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth mentioned, the Opposition generally support the overall aims of the new clause, but as ever, there are some issues with the detail, so I have five questions for the hon. Member for Winchester if he responds, or for the Minister to answer in his summing up.

First, if we imposed a statutory duty on ICBs to ensure sufficient resources for the CTOs, what mechanisms would there be to monitor and enforce compliance? Secondly, what would be the consequences if an ICB failed to meet this duty? Would there be formal accountability or a sanction process? Thirdly, how would the duty interact with existing NHS budgetary constraints and competing priorities? Would it become a statutory obligation with no clear means of redress if unmet? Fourthly, could the duty set a precedent whereby Parliament mandates resource guarantees without providing additional central funding? Finally, what constitutes “sufficient” resources in the context of the CTOs? Who defines that standard, and it is defined locally or nationally?

[Stephen Kinnock]

The term “unreasonable delay” is subject to review by the courts, and further guidance will be given in the code of practice. On what happens if the responsible clinician and the community clinician disagree, the addition of a third decision maker is not about overruling the responsible clinician, who continues to have overall responsibility for the patient on the community treatment order. Including the community clinician at the point of putting someone on a community treatment order helps to ensure continuity of care for the patient. Involving the community clinician in other decisions around the community treatment order, particularly recall, revocation, renewal and discharge, means they can provide an additional insight into the patient’s status while in the community.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Gregory Stafford

Committee stage
Thursday 12th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Gregory Stafford]

I confess that I do not entirely follow the hon. Lady’s argument. My understanding is that the people she has listed—for example, hospital security staff—are not covered at the moment, so I do not think that that is the case. As I said in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, there are situations, in a number of settings, in which mental health professionals act in the capacity of restraining. With the correct and appropriate training, which is what I think all Opposition Members want, I do not think that the issue that the hon. Member for Thurrock is raising would necessarily arise. Having said that, if she really feels that the wording needs to be tweaked, I look forward to seeing and potentially supporting her amendment to the subsection, and I hope she tables it.

The second key problem is the risk of returning the burden to police officers. We have heard from Members on both sides of the House in the debate, and from police forces up and down the country for years, that the police do not have the expertise, training or capacity to be the first responders to mental health emergencies. Clause 5 finally reflects that reality, helping to move the response from law enforcement to healthcare. The Government amendments would muddy that distinction. They would result in the police once again becoming the default responders—not because it is right but because it is unclear who else is meant to act.

Thirdly, the amendments introduce legal and safe-guarding risks. Without a clear definition of who can detain, one risks inconsistency, poor practice and potentially unlawful deprivation of liberty. The amendments offer no alternative safeguards—just the deletion of the existing ones. That is not reform; it is abdication of responsibility. Finally, they undermine the spirit of the Bill. The Bill aims to modernise mental health legislation by making it more humane and effective, and more rooted in health than enforcement. The amendments point in the opposite direction. They strip away clarity, increase reliance on the police and risk compounding trauma for those already in crisis.

It is not just about legislative precision; it is about protecting people. When someone is in acute mental health crisis, they are at their most vulnerable. Turning up with police officers, sirens and handcuffs does not calm the situation; it escalates it. It creates trauma, damages trust and can lead to long-term disengagement from mental health services. Clause 5 offers us a path out of that pattern. It allows approved professionals—such as paramedics, mental health nurses and crisis practitioners —to intervene early, with care and dignity. It does not exclude the police, where there is a genuine risk to safety, but it rightly repositions them as the last resort, not the first response. The Government amendments may be well intentioned, but they threaten to unravel that balance. We cannot allow vague flexibility to become a smokescreen for inadequate planning or under-resourced services.

If the Minister pushes his amendments to a vote, and, as the parliamentary maths suggests they will, those amendments pass, what will he do to sort out the problem that we, on both sides of the House, have talked about today? He is currently planning to keep the status quo, which we all seem to agree is not appropriate. At least we and our noble Friends in the other place have attempted to improve the situation. What will he and his Department do?

The clause is part of a broader rethinking of how we response to mental health need. It supports community-based care. It pushes for better training. It honours patient autonomy and it places the right people—clinicians, not constables—at the centre of care delivery. We all want a system where people in distress are met with compassion, not criminalisation. Clause 5 helps us to get there. The Government’s amendments drag us backwards. Clause 5 is one of the most thoughtful and necessary parts of the Bill. It raises standards, reduces harm and finally begins to close the gap between what the Mental Health Act allows and what good mental health care demands.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I will touch on the questions that have been asked on cumulative and escalating behaviour, on having a review of public safety and on the training plan. The details will be provided for in a mixture of the code of practice and the annual written ministerial statement.

The code of practice will be based on consulting both those who use the new criteria, such as clinicians, approved mental health professionals and members of the tribunal and, then, of course, on the other side, those with lived experience, service users, families and carers. It will be shaped and drafted on that basis. It will then go out to public consultation and will be laid before Parliament so that Parliament will have an opportunity to debate it. It will be a comprehensive and detailed development of the code of practice, and will address the issues around cumulative and escalating behaviour, the public safety issues and training.

On cumulative and escalating, it is worth noting that under the reforms in both the Bill and the current Act, clinicians have the power to detain on the basis of a risk of harm that may occur, not that already has or is happening at the time. That power already exists.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Gregory Stafford

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Kinnock]

There were a number of technical and drafting issues. The Public Bill Office ruled that the amendment, as drafted, was out of scope. One of the key concerns was about the unintended consequences of the relationship between physical disability and mental disorder. The drafting of the amendment could have caused confusion, because it could have started to bring physical disability into the scope of the Bill, which is clearly not what it is about. There were a number of technical and drafting issues, but I do not think that they are insurmountable. We can get to where we need to be, just not through a legislative vehicle.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

I support the comments of the Minister and the hon. Member for Winchester on the issue. On a cross-party basis, I know that my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt) has taken a close interest. Could he also be included in those discussions?

[Stephen Kinnock]

Yes, absolutely. We had a very constructive meeting with the right hon. Member for Godalming and Ash, along with the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley, and we are certainly open to working with that team of people, who are clearly focused on getting the results that we all want to see.

Clause 1 will make it a statutory requirement for the Secretary of State to include, in the statement of principles in the Mental Health Act code of practice, the wording of the four principles identified by the independent review. Those principles are choice and autonomy, least restriction, therapeutic benefit and the person as an individual. This will ensure that the review’s principles underpin the implementation of the Mental Health Act 1983 and are considered when making decisions related to care, support or the treatment provided to patients under the Act.

Embedding the principles in day-to-day practice will help to drive the culture change envisaged by the independent review. We are including the principles in the Act so that they govern the content of the code of practice and can changed only by Parliament. The Government are firmly supportive of the four principles, which were co-designed with service users during the independent review. They have informed every decision made in developing the Bill. We have embedded the principles in measures throughout the Bill, such as via the inclusion of therapeutic benefit in the detention criteria and several measures to improve patient choice and autonomy, including new treatment safeguards, introducing advance choice documents and the right to choose a nominated person.

I turn to clause 2. The code of practice for Wales already includes a statement of principles, although it is not a statutory requirement under section 118 of the Mental Health Act 1983 for Welsh Ministers to do so. Clause 2 will amend section 118 to extend subsection (2A) to Wales, along with the new subsection (2B) inserted by clause 1. To do so, clause 2 will also make amendments elsewhere in section 118 to clarify the application of each subsection, which will be to the Secretary of State in relation to England, to Welsh Ministers in relation to Wales, by virtue of the transfer of devolved functions, or to both.

The extent of the Mental Health Act is England and Wales, and there are separate codes of practice for England and Wales. Both codes of practice currently include a statement of principles, although the principles themselves vary slightly. Clause 2 will place a statutory requirement on Welsh Ministers to include the wording of the four principles identified by the independent review in the statement of principles when preparing the Mental Health Act code of practice for Wales.

As in clause 1, we are putting these principles explicitly in the Act so that they govern the content of the code of practice and so that they cannot be changed except by Parliament, or by the Senedd in respect of Wales. The Welsh code is already required to undergo scrutiny by Senedd Cymru, but clause 2 will also update the position in relation to the Senedd Cymru scrutiny procedure for the Welsh code. I commend clauses 1 and 2 to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

It is absolutely a team effort. Sadly, when people have severe and acute mental health disorders, a multi-agency effort is often required to support them and to help them to get the treatment they need. The process should not be about trying to isolate people. We are keen to ensure that people stay in mainstream society and remain as integrated as possible, because that is often an important part of supporting their mental health condition.

All of that means that local authorities, mental health professionals, social workers, and often children’s social care professionals or adult social care professionals are important in the process—it requires a team effort. That integrated approach will be really important as we build the community services that we want to see.

[Gregory Stafford]

On the point made by the hon. Member for Ashford about local authorities, given that the Government are devolving and reorganising local government structures across parts of the country, how will the Minister ensure that the standards around this issue—and other health and social care issues—are maintained? That restructuring means that we will have a whole load of new local authorities that do not necessarily have experience of dealing with this area.

[Stephen Kinnock]

The devolution Bill and the process of reorganising and restructuring are based on two really strong principles: that it is up to us through legislation to create the outcomes that we need to see delivered across the country and that there are clear standards and targets that we need to see met. But the implementation work needs to be done to deliver those desired outcomes and targets. Local authorities are empowered to do that, which is why we are seeing, for example, a lot of breaking down of ringfencing. The Government are keen to massively reduce the amount of ringfencing, because that has become a straitjacket for local authorities, integrated care boards and others in how they can best manage their portfolio of activities and deliver that devolved power and responsibility.

The answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question is that we want to devolve. We are absolutely committed to decentralising and we believe that is an important part of modern governance. Of course, that has to be done within a framework of set targets and the development of community services that the Bill commits to. All of that will come together to enable those at the coalface, who are best placed to understand them, how to deliver those services to their communities.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Gregory Stafford

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend is right; although a number of the Liberal Democrats are entirely worthy, there are some concerns about the drafting, which could give rise to ambiguity, legal loopholes and definitional issues. In that example, I do not think that “seek to ensure” is helpful. When the hon. Member for Winchester is summing up, perhaps he might explain how “seek to ensure” can be robustly defined within the law, or if it cannot be, suggest a different form of wording that he may wish to use in a future amendment if this amendment fails to be agreed.

Part II of the Mental Health Act 1983 covers the powers to detain individuals for assessment and treatment. Detention can clearly be traumatic, especially for children and young people. Amendment 9 reflects a growing consensus that detention should be the last resort— I think hon. Members on both sides of the House agree with that—and that community-based preventive and therapeutic alternatives should be prioritised. Again, I think it would be very hard to disagree with that ambition.

On the positive side, community-based care is clearly better than detention in most cases, and, if we can get to a point where people are assessed earlier, as is the intention of some of the other amendments, clearly—hopefully—that would lead to community-based care and not detention. The amendment would also protect children’s rights and support the trauma-informed approaches to mental health that were raised previously regarding amendment 47.

The amendment could also reduce the long-term harm associated with institutionalisation and potentially coercive treatment. As we have heard from Members on both sides, that would align with best practice in child and adolescent mental health services and it would promote and encourage a system of accountability by making ICBs and local authorities responsible for proactive care planning. All of that is extraordinarily laudable.

On the potential downsides, there is an ambiguity about the enforcement of the amendment, as my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said, because of the lack of legal force or clarity in some of the phraseology. There would be also resource implications and, if there are resource limitations at the ICB or local authority level, that might hinder their ability to provide adequate, community-based alternatives.

I do not say that as an excuse for not supporting the amendment, but the hon. Member for Winchester has to understand the reality of the world we live in. Although I want local authorities and ICBs in every area to be entirely fully funded and resourced—and frankly, I do not think the Government’s cut of 50%, or indeed more in some ICBs, will do anything to help community-based care—there would be resource challenges. There would also be implementation challenges in areas where mental health services are already underfunded or overstretched that could lead to delays in care.

This is the key question that I ask the hon. Member to respond to in his summing up. Members on both sides of the House want to ensure that all people of all ages get the best, most appropriate mental health care as early as possible. But in an imperfect world, if there are potential delays in care because community services are struggling to find alternatives to detention, the unintended consequence could be that someone may not be treated at all because of the onus on defined community-based care rather than detention. Will the hon. Member explain how that would work?

I draw my remarks to a close by saying I, certainly, and the Opposition, entirely agree with the ambitions of the amendments. However, some practical and legal issues would need to be ironed out before I could wholeheartedly support them.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Again, I thank the hon. Member for Winchester for his amendments. I understand the intent behind amendments 8 and 9, but the clauses on registers and the associated duties on integrated care boards and local authorities are specifically aimed at people with a learning disability and autistic people, because of the detrimental outcomes that these groups of people may suffer when detained.

We recognise the concern around the treatment of children and young people, which is why we have several provisions in the Bill aimed at improving their care. However, dynamic support registers are particularly tailored to the needs of people with a learning disability and autistic people, and have been established in NHS England’s policy for some time. We do not have evidence that they would be an appropriate mechanism for wider cohorts.

We do recognise that bereavement, miscarriage, the experience of trauma and difficult life transitions can all have a bearing on mental health. However, access to mental health support is based on clinical need, not on the circumstances that might give rise to that need.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

Given that we have discussed the proposed new sections in depth, I do not intend to dilate upon this clause for long. Suffice it to say that the Opposition, notwithstanding the questions asked by the shadow Minister, support the clause, which is essential to ensure the safeguards and progress that we are trying to achieve through the Bill.

Clearly, the clause is prevention-focused and helps avoid unnecessary and traumatic hospital admissions. It leads to better planning because it supports tracked admission of services tailored to individual needs. It also has an element of legal accountability, given that it makes it a legal duty for ICBs to monitor and support at-risk individuals. It is also data driven because it encourages the use of real-time data to inform care decisions.

That being said, a number of the concerns that we raised during debate on the amendments apply to the clause itself. In the Minister’s summing up, can he touch once again on the privacy concerns, as well as the resource demands and the risk of stigma? By that, I mean that being placed on a register could be seen as labelling or pathologising. How do we ensure that the register does what it is supposed to without that risk? Can he also touch on some of the vague criteria and definitional phrases, such as “at risk”, and how they might potentially lead to inconsistent application?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I am conscious that we will be voting imminently, so I will try to rattle through. Going back to my phrase “the red thread”, the thread running through all the shadow Minister’s questions is delivery. The proof of the pudding in all legislation is whether we convert it into action in a way that best delivers for the interests of the British people, and in a way that absorbs the risks, builds resilience in the system and ensures that we are constantly monitoring, evaluating, reviewing and learning from what is happening on the ground and, through a constant process, improving delivery.

The shadow Minister asks some very good questions, but the problem is that so many will relate to the work that we need to do at pace as soon as the Bill receives Royal Assent. This is a sequential process; we first need the legislation and the comprehensive spending review, so that we know our funding package. We then need to start work consulting on the code of practice, getting that feedback and shaping a plan that defines what good community services look like, because we all know that we are a million miles from having good community services at the current time. We are in a state of crisis and the system is on its knees; we are very conscious of all those facts. There is an immense urgency with all this.

The shadow Minister asked about evaluating and updating pathways and CETRs, duty to respond, the information collected, managing the risks, preventing paternalism and ensuring that people do not get labelled. All those things will have to be set out and explained in the project plan. That is something we will all be working very hard on as soon as the Bill gets Royal Assent.

One of the shadow Minister’s factual questions was on how many CETRs have been issued. I cannot give him that number, but I can tell him that, as set out in the impact assessment, 86% of in-patients received a CETR in the last year. If my answer that this is about delivery does not satisfy him and he thinks there are issues that relate directly to the Bill rather than to the implementation plan, I am happy to write to him on that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

I thank my hon. Friend for his extraordinarily helpful intervention. I was not aware of the changes, and I certainly had not heard of fusion before, or about what is going on in Scotland. Of course, if the new clause had already been enacted in another part of the United Kingdom in some form, I would be much more comfortable with it. But, as I said in relation amendments 52 and 53, if the new clause is to pass in its current form in this Bill or in some future form in another Bill, there has to be a focus on proper training and guidance. Because there is potentially such a legal quagmire, we must ensure that people understand the legal framework within which they can do this.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Once again, I am grateful to the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley for moving the amendments and the new clause on behalf of the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge.

I will first speak to amendments 52 and 53. The new detention criteria explicitly require decision makers to consider the risk of serious harm and the likelihood of harms occurring in order to justify detention. It is right that clinicians have the power to intervene when a patient is at risk of seriously harming themselves, both when they do and when do not have mental capacity.

If we were to accept the amendments and the new clause, we think that patients would be left without the protections that the Mental Health Act provides. For example, let us consider a patient with a serious eating disorder who is assessed as having capacity but is refusing treatment. If there were no longer an option to detain that patient under the Mental Health Act, that could leave clinicians and families without a route for treatment, potentially leading to tragic results.

The pre-legislative scrutiny Committee highlighted concerns about cases where the concept of capacity had been used to justify denying individuals care that they had sought voluntarily, particularly in relation to very ill and potentially suicidal patients. That goes against the spirit of the Mental Health Act and could fall short of professional standards.

Patient choice is, of course, critical, and the changes that we are making recognise that when patients have a say in their treatment, they are more likely to engage. We also think that it is right that when those decisions put people at risk of serious harm, including risk to their own life, there is a duty to intervene.

We recognise that detaining and treating patients with capacity without their consent is a very serious step to take. However, we think that it is right that we intervene when someone is a risk to themselves, not just to other people. That is in line with the Government’s commitment to delivering a cross-sector suicide prevention strategy for England. We should deprive somebody of their liberty and detain them only as a last resort. The threshold of serious harm in the new criteria reflects the gravity of that decision.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Gregory Stafford

Friday 16th May 2025 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that intervention. As I say, the Government do not take a position on the policy intent that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has set out. I would simply observe that if somebody has been in a home for a considerable period of time, that home is then considered to be their home. As such, any action to take them out of that home could engage article 8 of the ECHR, on the right to family life.

I now turn to the procedure for receiving assistance under the Bill, including safeguards and protections. First, I will speak to the amendments that have been tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley with technical workability and drafting advice from the Government.

Amendment 58 clarifies the duty on the Secretary of State to make through regulations provisions for training about reasonable adjustments and safeguards for autistic people and those with a learning disability. That remedies previously unclear wording in the Bill. Amendment 60 is required to make provision for circumstances where the independent doctor dies or, through illness, is unable or unwilling to act as the independent doctor. Amendments 67 and 68, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, clarify that an approved substance can be self-administered using a device should the individual be unable to self-administer without one. Amendment 91 gives effect to amendment 273, which was accepted in Committee, by ensuring that data will be recorded in the final statement to ensure coherence within the Bill.

I turn now to the amendments tabled by other Members on the subject of procedure, safeguards and protections that the Government have assessed may create workability issues if voted into the Bill. New clause 7 would limit the number of times two doctors can be jointly involved in the assessment of a person seeking assisted dying to three times within a 12-month period. In situations where there is a limited pool of doctors in any geographical location or area of medicine, that could limit access to assisted dying and create inequalities in access. New clause 9 would require the co-ordinating doctor, independent doctor and assisted dying review panels to apply the criminal standard of proof that requires them to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. Cases considered by the panel are civil matters, and as such it would not be usual practice for the criminal standard of proof to be applied to their decision making—and it is a very high bar. The provision would also impose additional standards on the assessing doctor that fall outside the usual framework for medical decision making.

[Gregory Stafford]

Is the Minister saying that, in his view, it is better that someone who should not die does die, than that someone who should die does not?

[Stephen Kinnock]

As a Minister at the Dispatch Box, with the Government being neutral, I am not commenting on the policy intent of the Bill. What I am saying is that the new clause could create significant uncertainty. For example, it is not clear how the standard it introduces would interact with the definition of “terminal illness” set out in clause 2, which requires that a person’s death

“can reasonably be expected within six months”,

as it is not clear whether “reasonably be expected” fits within the balance of probabilities threshold or is beyond reasonable doubt.

Amendment 101 would exclude any person with a learning disability, including people with Down syndrome, from a preliminary discussion about assisted dying unless they raise the subject themselves, irrespective of whether they would otherwise be eligible. That may be subject to challenge under various international agreements, including the United Nations convention on the rights of persons with disabilities and article 14 of the European convention on human rights, which prohibits disability discrimination.

Amendment 102 would introduce a requirement that

“the registered medical practitioner must ensure that the person has no remediable suicide risk factors which pose a significant risk to their life”

before holding a preliminary discussion under clause 5. The terms “remediable suicide risk factors” and

“a significant risk to their life”

have not been defined, so the amendment may be difficult to operationalise.

Hospice and Palliative Care

Debate between Stephen Kinnock and Gregory Stafford

Monday 13th January 2025 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Kinnock]

The hon. Gentleman will not be surprised to know that I have a section in my speech on employer national insurance contributions. I will get to it.

A number of colleagues raised concerns about regional variations. Facts and evidence are very important in that context. To address that issue, NHS England has developed a palliative and end of life care dashboard, which brings together all the relevant local data in one place. The dashboard helps commissioners to understand the palliative and end of life care needs of their local population, enabling ICBs to put plans in place to address, and track the improvement of, health inequalities, and to ensure that funding is distributed fairly, based on prevalence.

[Gregory Stafford]

Will the Minister give way?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I will, but I have to finish at 9.58 pm, so there is only about five minutes left of my contribution.

[Gregory Stafford]

It is generous of the Minister to give way, so I shall be brief. Would funding continue to be produced through ICBs, or will the system be funded centrally?

[Stephen Kinnock]

That is precisely the topic of conversation for officials in my Department and NHS England, who are looking at this issue in the round and deciding how we will work. We need a system that empowers ICBs to deliver at the coalface, but we also need accountability from the centre to ensure that things are delivered. Getting the balance right is never easy, as I am sure the hon. Gentleman will understand; that is what we are trying to navigate.

Alongside NHS England, my officials and I will continue to proactively engage with our stakeholders, including the voluntary sector and independent hospices, to understand the issues that they face. In fact, I will meet the major hospices and palliative care stakeholders, including Hospice UK, early next month to discuss potential solutions for longer-term sector sustainability. That will inform our 10-year health plan.